FedericoFaleschini(ID10902214) ModuleConvenor:PaoloDardanelli Module:PO885(DecisionmakingintheEuropeanUnion) 17January2011 Essay2(wordlimit:4000;actualwords:4087)

AssesstheRelativePowerofNationalityandIdeology inShapingEUDecisionMaking

Introduction Uptothelate'90stheroleofpartiesandpartypoliticsintheEUdecisionmaking(D M)wasaneglectedresearchfieldamongEUscholars.OntheonehandtheCouncilwasseen as the intergovernmental battlefield par excellence in the EU, where party politics are completelybannedandnationalinterestprevails,whileontheotherhandtheCommissionand the European Parliament (EP) were conceptualized as preference outliers, i.e. whose preferences arealwaysmoreintegrationistthanmemberstates' ones.Tsebelis definesthis Supranational scenario (Tsebelis et al., 2000: 1517) and says it represents how most observersbelievetheEUhasoperatedsincemid1980stotoday(ibidem:10). Sincethelate90'showeveranewapproachhasappeared.Itfocusesonpartypoliticsin theEUDMandhasbeendefinedbyoneofhisearlyrepresentativesthepartisantheoryof EUpolitics(Hix,2008).Thisapproachischallengingsometraditionalassumptionsaboutthe preferencesofEUinstitutionsandthusaboutthedominantforcesshapingEUDM.Drawing fromtheliteratureofthepartisantheory,thepaperwilltrytoassesstherelativepowerof nationality(i.e.nationalinterest)andideology(i.e.partypolitics)inshapingintrainstitutional EUDM. Theessayisorganisedasfollows.Thefirstsectiondealswiththetopicoftheinfluence ofnationalactorsintheCommissionontheCommission'sDM.Next,thesecondsection coverstheinfluenceofpartisanandnationalforcesintheCouncil(boththeCouncilofEurope andtheEuropeanCouncil)andprovidesacasestudyrelatedtotheservicesdirective.The thirdsectionpresentstheevidenceofpartypoliticsintheEP(payingparticularattentionto thedifferencesbetweennationalpartiesandEuropeanparties'federations);thecasestudyfor theEPtootreatstheservicesdirective.Thefourthsectionconcludes.

TheCommissionandtheinfluenceofnationalactors Asstatedabove,duringthe'90sthesupranationalscenariosimplyassumedtheCommission asabodyprimarilyconcernedwiththeexpansionoftheEU(i.e.ofitsown)competences, 1

withouttestingthisclaimempirically(Crombez,1996;Pollack,1998,Tsebelis,1994,Tsebelis etal.,2000).Howeverinthelast10yearsmuchworkhasbeendoneontheinfluenceof national actors in the Commission, often taking recourse to the principalagent model to describe the relationship between Commissioners and member states' governments 1. Two branchesofresearchcanbedistinguished: Analysis of the appointment process of Commission members and on the demographicalandpartisancompositionoftheCommissionunits; AnalysisoftheCommission'sinternalDMdynamics. Withrespecttothefirstbranch,thefocusismainlyontheCollegeofCommissioners2. Wonka(WonkaA.,2007)sustainsthatgovernmentschoosecandidateCommissioners whosharesimilarpolicypreference.Thislogicofselection(ibidem:174)aimstowield agendasettingpowerswithrespecttotheCollegeofCommissionersandrequirestocheckthe reliability of candidates in terms of policy preferences both exante (i.e. before the appointment)andexpost(i.e.aftertheappointment): the exante control entails that candidates should satisfy two requirements: party inclusiveness (i.e. they should be member of the parties represented in the governments)andpoliticalvisibility(i.e.theyshouldbeexperienced/highlevelparty members: members of national and/or European parliaments, ministers, party executives)(ibidem:175176,181); theexpostcontrolconsistsmainlyingovernment'srighttorefuseaCommissioner's renominationorreemploymentinthenationalpoliticalarena(ibidem:177). Thefindingsstronglysupportthehypothesesofpartyinclusivenessandpoliticalvisibilityof candidateCommissioners:themoststrikingevidenceofthisprocessisthestronglydownward trend over time of nonvisible Commissioners (which are absent in the Barroso I Commission)3.HeconcludesthatspeakingofatechnocraticandindependentCommissionis neithertheoreticallynorempiricallyjustified:Commissionersshouldbeconsideredpolitical
1 PollackusestheprincipalagentrelationshiptodescribethesenseofEuropeanintegrationprocessinhisbook TheenginesofEuropeanIntegration(PollackM.A.,2003) 2 OtherunitsoftheCommissionhavebeenanalysedtoo:seee.g.EgebergM.,HeskestadA.(2010)foran analysisoftheprocessofdenationalizationoftheCabinets. 3 Dring(2007)reachesalmostidenticalconclusions.

ratherthantechnicalactors.However,sincetheCommissionisacollectivebodynosingle nationalinterestcandominate. Withrespecttothesecondbranchofresearch,theliteratureontheanalysisofDM dynamics too focuses on the College of Commissioners4. Four main scenarios have been identified.Egeberg(2006)definesthemasfollows: Commissionrole:actingintheinterestoftheCommissiontakenaswhole(astheEU lawstates); Portfoliorole:actingintheinterestofCommissioner'sownDirectoratesGenerals; Countryrole:championingtheinterestsofCommissioner'sownmemberstate; Partypoliticalrole:takingsideswithCommissioner'sownpoliticalparty. Egebergworkisonlybasedonqualitativeevidence(interviewswith SecretariatGeneral's officers from the Delors and Prodi Commission) and it aims to develop a theoretical framework (organizational theory) to understand how Commissioners (and executive politiciansingeneral)handlethedifferentpressuresandinputstheyreceive.Heidentifiesfour organizationalfactors(ibidem:35)whichinfluenceCommissioner'sbehaviour. Egeberg finds that the DM style in the College of Commissioners is most of the time consensualandthatgenerallyspeakingthePortfolioroleisthemostfrequent:thisisaneffect ofthehighdegreeofspecializationoftheCommission.TheCommissionrole andthe Countryroleseemtobeevokedwiththesamefrequency,althoughthelatterisheavily hindered by the College's organizational structure and organizational demography (howevergeographicalpoliciesi.e.[entailing]distributionalconsequencesalongnational lines(ibidem:7)canrendermorelegitimatetheCountryrole).Partyroleseemstheleast commonrole. Wonka(2008)buildsonEgeberg'sworkbutfollowsanoppositeapproach.Headoptsa rationalistversionofneofunctionalism[thusanalyticallyseparating]institutionsfromactor's politicalmotives(ibidem:1147).Heidentifiesfourscenarios: Nationalagentscenario:equalsEgeberg'sCountryroleandissaidtobebasedon broaddomesticcoalitionsbetweengovernmentandoppositionnationalparties;
4 AnexampleofadifferentresearchareacanbefoundinTrondal(2007),ontheDMdynamicsof Commission'sSecondedNationalExperts.

 Portfolioscenario; Nationalpartyscenario:thereisastronglinkwiththeappointmentprocessdescribed inWonka(2007); Transnational party scenario: depends on the cohesiveness of transnational party familiesandshouldcutacrossissues,particularlytheonesprominentontheleftright dimension. ThelastscenarioisthemaindifferencebetweenWonka'smodelandEgeberg'sone.Wonka choosestwocasestudiessalientontheleftrightdimensiontocheckforthepartisanscenarios. He finds that in both case studies the partisan scenarios are not effective for explaining Commissioner's behaviour, while on the other hand both the Portfolio scenario and the National agent scenario account for Commission's behaviour in the vast majority of circumstances. WhileWonka's(2008)andEgeberg's(2006)worksdoreachthesameconclusions, theylackthestrongempiricalsupportprovidedbylargenanalysis.Thomson(2008)instead analysesmorethan2000observationsrelatedto70controversialproposals[]introduced bytheCommissionfrom1996to2000(ibidem:169).Hisaimistounderstandunderwhat conditionsthepolicypositionsofaninternationalorganizationcorrespond[totheones]of relevant national actors (ibidem) since the empirical evidence presented in the literature showsthatthereisconsiderablevariationinthelevelofagreementbetweentheCommission andmemberstates,indeedenoughtoquestionthetraditionalimageoftheCommissionasa constantpreferenceoutlier. Thomsondefinesthreehypothesis: 1. Commission'spolicypositionshouldbeclosertothepositionofthehomemember stateoftheCommissionerprimarilyresponsiblefordraftingtheCommissionproposal thantotheotheractors'policypositions; 2. TheeffectofHypothesis1shouldbestrongerifCommission'sproposalissubjectto QMV[ratherthanunanimity]votingintheCouncil(ibidem:174); 3. TheeffectofHypothesis1shouldbestrongeriftheCommissionerresponsiblefor draftingtheproposalisamemberofagoverningpartyinhis/herhomememberstate. Theanalysisofempiricaldatastronglysupportsthesecondhypothesis,thusindicatingthat 4

votingrules(apartofEUorganizationalstructureinEgeberg'sterms)domatter.Neitherthe first hypothesis nor the third one are supported by the results. Thomson concludes that PortfolioroleandCountryrolearethemostinfluentialscenarioswhileCommissioner's party linkage is rather weak, therefore strengthening even more Egeberg's and Wonka's conclusions.However,asWonka(2008)does,hesustainsthattheCommission'scollective natureandtheissuespecificmemberstate'scoalitionsintheCouncilpreventsinglenational intereststodominateCommission'slegislation.

TheCouncilofEuropeandtheEuropeanCouncil TraditionallytheCouncilhasbeenseenasdominatedbynationalinterest,eitherindefenceof theinterestofnationalproducers(Moravcsik,1998)orindefenceofthenationalinstitutional setup(themisfitschool)(Brzel,2002;Heritier,1994):eitherwaypoliticsintheCouncil (and in the EU in general) were defined by only one dimension, integration versus independence(againfollowingthesupranationalscenarioTsebelisetal.,2000:1517).The recent literature however argues that the political space in the EU is defined by two dimensions: []leftright dimension andthe independenceversus integration dimension (Mattila,2004:29). ThefirstdistinctiontobemadeinthisfieldofstudyistheonebetweentheCouncilofEurope andtheEuropeanCouncil.GivenitsfundamentalroleintheEUlegislativeprocess,scholars have aimed their attention to the higher level of the Council of Europe (CoE), i.e. the ministerialmeetings5.TheliteratureontheCoEwillthusbeaddressedinfirstplace. ThestudyofvotingpatternsintheCoEhaslongbeenimpossibleduetothesecrecyof Council'snegotiations.Onlyafter1994theprocesshasbeengraduallyopenedup(ibidem)and votingrecordshavebeenmadeavailabletothepublic. Mattila(ibidem)analysedrollcallvotesintheCoEbetween1995and2000.Heidentifiesa recognisabletrend,bothinbivariateandinregressionanalyses:leftwinggovernmentsare lesslikelyonaveragetovoteagainstthemajorityintheCoE(althougheuroenthusiastic
5 An example of another area of research (the working groups of the CoE) is given by Fouilleux E. et al. (2005)

rightwingpartiesdosolessthaneveryotherparty)i.e.they'remorelikelytoformcoalitions betweenthemselves,whiletheintegrationindependencedimensionisnotassignificantasthe leftrightone.Otherinfluentialfactorsarethesizeofthecountry(largememberstatesvote againstthemajoritymoreoftenthansmallones)andthelevelofbudgetarytransfers(net beneficiariesvoteagainstthemajoritylessoftenthannetcontributors)6. Hagemannetal.(2008)furtherdevelopthislineofresearchbyusingalargerdatabase (which covers all the decisions taken in the CoE by member states' governments' representativesfromJanuary1999toOctober2007)andbyrefiningthecodingofthedatain ordertobetterestimatethelevelofdissent(ibidem:1210).Theauthorsaimtofindwhether coalitionsintheCoEformalongpartylinesandwhetherachangeofpartiesinamember state'sgovernmentcauseittochangecoalitionpartnersintheCoE. The results support both hypothesis. A clear coalition pattern along party lines can be recognised,althoughthedeviationsfromthisrulecanbequiteconsistent:forexamplesome centreleftgovernmentswerelocatedmuchclosertothemedianpositionofEPP(European People's Party, rightwing) governments than to the median position of PES (Party of EuropeanSocialists,leftwing)governments.Inregardtothesecondhypothesis,thechangeof partyingovernmentcausedmostofthetimesthenewgovernmenttochooseadifferentally thantheprecedentgovern,onthebasisofideologicalaffiliation:thisfindingconfirmsthe importanceoftheideologicaldimensionintheCoEDM. ThecasestudyoftheServicesdirective(Miklin,2009)looksatthequestionofparty politicsintheCouncilfromyetanotherpointofview,byfocusingtheattentiononthelevelof theindividualministers.UsingthePrincipalAgentscheme,Miklinarguesthat preference heterogeneities and information asymmetry between the individual minister and his/her government'spartyopenupthepossibilityfortheformertomakehis/herownideological preferencesprevailattheCoEnegotiations.Governmentpartiescaneitherwielddirectcontrol overministersthroughcoordinationeitherputtouseinterestgroupsorpartyMEPs(Members oftheEP),bothinvolvedinEUDM,asmeansofindirectcontrol.Howeverthereisevidence thatmonitoringtheCoEDMprocessisnoeasytaskformemberstates'governments,above allbecauseoftheCoE'shighlysectoralisedorganization.
6 Aspinwall's(2006)findingssupporttherelevanceoftheleftrightdimensionandofbudgetarytransfersfor thesupportofEUintegration.

Thechoiceoftheservicesdirectiveascasestudyisjustifiedonthegroundofitshighsalience ontheintegrationversusindependenceandleftrightdimensions;thecountrieschosenfor the comparative analysis are Germany, Austria and Sweden, each 864771one exercising different degrees of control over ministers. The results show that despite similar [] background conditions, representatives with different ideological preferences took very differentpositions[]bothbetweenandwithincountriesandgovernments(ibidem:959)but theywereforcedtosidewiththeirgoverningparties'leadershipafterthedirectivecaused publicdebateandasaconsequencedivisionsinsidegovernments.Althoughlimitedinits scope, this case study show that both nationality (i.e. governing parties' leadership) and ideology(oftheindividualminister)doplayaroleinCoE'sDM;howeverthedominantforce isstillnationality. Finally,thequestionofpartypoliticsintheEuropeanCouncil(EC)willbeaddressed. TheECisthesupremepoliticalbodyoftheEU[]associatedwiththesafeguardingand clashingofnationalinterest(Tallberg etal.,2008:122223).Tallberg etal. (ibidem)tryto determinetheconditionsthatincreasetheimportanceofpartydividesintheECnegotiations; thesearetheissue'ssalienceontheleftrightdimension,thepartisancompositionofthe ECandthecohesionandmobilizationoftransnationalparties(especiallyinrespecttothe coordinationbetweenthevariousEUbodies)(ibidem:1223).SincetheEC'snegotiationsare evenmoreopaqueandinformalthantheCoE'sones,norollcallanalysisispossible:the authorsusequalitativeevidence(interviewsanddirectobservation)andillustratetwocase studies. Theconditionsoutlinedabovearenotsupportedbytheresults.Theinterviewees(bothfrom leftandrightwingparties)donotthinkthattheissuestheECaddressescanbeeasilyplaced on the leftright dimension (ibidem: 1229) and sustain that the transnational parties are neither cohesive nor active enough to influence EC negotiations along party lines. The evidencedrawnfromthecasestudies(bothsalientontheleftrightdimension)ismixed.On theonehand,thecasestudyoftheEmploymentchaptersupportsthepartisanhypothesisby showing the effective coordination by an internally coherent PES and the importance of partisancompositionoftheEC(strongmajorityofPESgovernments).Ontheotherhand,the casestudyoftheLisbonAgendashowsafailedtentativeofcoordinationbythetransnational 7

parties,whichweredeeplydividedinternally.Overall,nostrongevidenceofpartypoliticsin theEChasbeenfound.

TheEuropeanParliament ItshouldnotcomeasasurprisethatresearchonpartypoliticsintheEUstartedwiththestudy ofvotingpatternsintheEP.ThehistoryoftransparencyoftheEP'sDMenabledscholarsto makeanalysesofMEPs'votingbehaviourbasedondatasetscoveringthewholelifeoftheEP. Moreover,thedebateonthedemocraticdeficitoftheEU,particularlylivelyinthelate '90s/early2000s(seeHixetal.,2006:534541),drovescholarstoconcentrateontheEP. ThemostprominentareaofresearchisthecohesivenessofEuropeanpartygroups(EPGs)as aproxyforthepresenceofpartypoliticsintheEP(Noury,2002; Faas,2003;Hix etal., 2007;Coman,2009). ThemoststrikingfindingaboutvotingbehaviourofMEPsistheveryhighlevelof cohesionofEPGs(Hixetal.,2007:4).Thisissurprisingforthreereasons: Thedegree ofagenda control bythe EPGs' leaders is morelimitedthan inmost Parliaments(ibidem)andconsequentlytheycannotkeepdivisiveissuesoffthefloor; [EPGs']leadersdonothavemanyinstrumentstodisciplinetheirmembers(ibidem: 5)apartfromtheallocationofpositionsofpowerintheEP:thisinstrumentfallsshort ofthestrongeronesavailabletopartiesinparliamentaryregimes(ibidem). The EU's separatedpowers institutional characteristics, which do not promote cohesivevotingbehaviour(ibidem:1318,89). Hixetal.(2007)presentoneofthemostcomprehensiveanalysisofvotingpatternsintheEP, basedonadatasetcoveringthefirstfiveEPs(19792004).Theyfindthatoverthisperiodthe averagerelativecohesionofEPGshasrisenandmoreoverithasalwaysbeenhigherthan theaveragerelativecohesionofeachnationalgroupofMEPs.Last,PES(PartyofEuropean Socialists)andEPP(EuropeanPeople'sParty),thetwolargestEPGs,haveonaveragebeen morecohesivethantheotherEPGs(ibidem:945). Hixetal.identifymanydeterminantsofpartycohesion(ibidem:95104);themostrelevant 8

are: EPGsize:thelargertheEPG,themorecohesiveitis,sinceitismorelikelyto influencepolicyoutcomes; NationalfractionalisationoftheEPG:themorefractionalisedalongnationallines theEPG,thelesscohesiveitis; Percentage of MEPs from parties in government in the EPG: the higher this percentage,thehighertheEPG'scohesion,sincepartiesingovernmentdonotwantto seetheproposaladoptedbytheCouncilbeingvetoedbytheEP; PoweroftheEP:themorepowerfultheEP,themorecohesivetheEPGs(again becausetheyaremorelikelytoinfluencepolicyoutcomes). TherelevanceofEPGs'nationalfractionalisationsuggeststhatEPGs'cohesiveness cannotbesimplyusedasaproxyforfullyEuropeanlevelpartypoliticsintheEP.MEPsare indeedconsideredasagentswithtwoprincipals:thenationalpartygroup(NPG)andtheEPG. Therefore,acloserexaminationisneededtounderstandwhatprincipalMEPsareactually obeyingto. Hixetal.sustainthattherelationbetweentheNPGEPGdistance,theMEPNPGdistance andtheMEPEPGdistanceonagivendimensionisthebestpredictorforMEPs'behaviour incontestedvotes.Theychoosetwoideologicaldimensions, leftright and independence integration,andfindthatincontestedvotesMEPsonaveragearemorelikelytosidewith theirNPGsratherthanwiththeirEPGsonbothdimensions(ibidem:132146). Coman(2009)buildsuponHix etal.'s(2007)analysistobetteraddressthisquestion.He argues that focusing on the overall defection rate from the EPG and the NPG produces observationallyequivalentpredictionswhenEPGandNPGsharethesamepolicyposition.To avoidthis,heanalysesonlycontestedvotesbetweentheNPGandtheEPG(Coman,2009: 110011)chosenfromadatabasecoveringthefirstsixteenmonthsofthesixthEP(20045). HechoosessimilarindependentvariablestoHixetal.'s(2007)onesbutwithrespecttothe MEPNPGEPG distance (Marksetal.,2006:157). Coman'sresultsdonotconfirmHixetal.'s(2007)findings.Indeed,theresultsshowthaton he considers also another dimension, (GALTAN) Green/Alternative/LibertarianismTraditionalists/Authoritarians/Nationalists

theleftrightandintegrationindependencedimensions,thegreaterthedistancebetweena certainMEP'sNPGandtheEPG,themorelikelythatMEPistosidewiththeEPG.Onlyon theGALTANdimensionaMEPwhoseNPGisdistantfromtheEPGismorelikelytoside withtheNPG. The importance of Coman's results should not be overstated: as he himself recognizes, contestedvotesareonlyasmallpartoftotalvotesandhisfindingsdonotchallengethenotion thatMEPsarestillcontrolledtoalargerdegreebytheirNPGsratherthanbytheirEPGs (Coman,2009:111213).However,hisresearchcastslightontheconditionsunderwhicheach sideisgoingtoprevailandconfirmsoncemoretherelevanceoftheideologicaldimensionin theEP. HavingassessedthehighlevelofcohesivenessofEPGs,scholarshaveaimedtheir attentionatthemeansEPGsactuallyusetoenforcepartydiscipline(seeinteraliaKreppel, 2002;Hix,2004;Corbettetal.,2005). ThequestionisaddressedbyLindberg(2008)inhercasestudyontheServicesdirective. Drawing from the literature, she argues that the EPGs' leaders' most usual disciplinary measure is to deny to disloyal MEPs important internal EP positions such as relevant committees' seats and rapporteurships. She thus sets up six hypotheses concerning the characteristicsaMEPshouldpossesstobeappointedasrapporteurofadirective;candidate rapporteursshould: Holdpolicypreferencesontheleftrightdimensionclosetothemedianpositionboth ofhis/herEPGandoftheEPasawhole(tomakesurethatthepositionisacceptable tothelargestmajoritypossible); Demonstrateloyalvotingbehaviourbothtohis/herEPGandtohis/herNPG(sincethe distributionofrapporteurshipsisassumedtobeusedinteraliatorewardloyalMEPs); inaddition,rapporteursshouldholdamedianvotingpositionintheEP(ibidem: 1187); Bepolicyexpertsinthepolicyfieldofthedirective. Theservicesdirectivehasbeenchosenascasestudybecauseithasbeenthemostsalientand contested piece of legislation passed in the EU in the last decade (ibidem: 1185): it is reasonablethereforetoassumethatnationalandsectoralpressuresonMEPstodefectfrom 10

theirEPGsmusthavebeenverystrong,providingagoodbenchmarkforEPGs'cohesiveness. The results confirm the presence of party politics in the appointment process: policy preferences close totheEPG's medianandvoting loyaltytoboththe NPG andtheEPG mattered,althoughitisnotclearwhatistherelativepowerofNPGsandEPGs.Ontheother handnorpolicyexpertisenorthevotingpositionoftheEPasawholeseemedtomatterinthis particularcase.

Conclusions ThispaperhastriedtoassesstherelativepowerofideologyandnationalityinEUDMand, morespecifically,inintrainstitutionaldecisionmaking.TheevidenceofpartypoliticsinEU institutionsisstillrathermixedanduncertain,butoverallitcanbesaidthatnationalityisstill thepredominantforceinEUDM. TheCommission,althoughnotastechnicalandindependentasstatedbyEUlaw,is stillnotinfluencedbyideologyinitsinternalDMprocess.Themostprominentrolesonthe contrary are the Portfolio role (expertise), followed by the Country role (nationality). Moreover,thestatisticalanalysisofvotingbehaviourconfirmstheinsignificanceofPartisan rolesintheCommissionDM. IntheCoEevidenceofstablepartisancoalitionshasbeenfound,althoughitisrather weakbecauseofsomenotableexceptions.ThecasestudyontheServicesdirectiveopensyet another research field by focusing on the policy preferences of the individual minister: howeveritshowsthatgoverningpartiesstillhavetheupperhandonthefinaldecision.Not surprisingly,noevidenceofpartypoliticsintheEChasbeenfound. Finally,thereisstrongevidenceofpartypoliticsintheEP,inpartthankstotheEP's transparency policy which allowed scholars to build large databases. All the EPGs have becomeincreasinglycohesivesincethefirstEPlegislatureandhavenowreachedhighlevels ofcohesion.ThecasestudyontheServicesdirectiveconfirmsthepredominanceofideology overnationalityalsointherapporteur'sappointmentprocess. Of course, this paper suffers from a serious limitation: by focusing on intra 11

institutionalDMitdoesnotpaintthewholepictureofEUDM.Theresearchareaofinter institutionalDMprocessisstillunderdevelopedbutisverypromising.WorkslikeHagemann etal.(2010)givenewinsightsontheroleofideologyandnationalityininterinstitutionalD MandwillsurelydeepenourknowledgeofEUDM.

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