Eric Spalding BSO Complaint

Case 0:12-cv-61651-RSR Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/23/2012 Page 1 of 31
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION Case No.: ERIC J. SPALDING, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW TAYLOR, individually, JUAN L. HERNANDEZ, individually, MARC SOTO, individually, and ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) COMPLAINT 1. This is a civil action seeking money damages in excess of $15,000 dollars,
exclusive of costs, interest, and attorneys fees, against Defendant ANDREW TAYLOR, individually, Defendant JUAN L. HERNANDEZ, individually, Defendant MARC SOTO, individually, and Defendant ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida. 2. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988, and the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has jurisdiction of this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 28 U.S.C. 1331, and 28 U.S.C. 1343. Plaintiff further invokes the supplemental jurisdiction of the United States District Court to hear pendant State tort claims arising under State law, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(a).
3.
Plaintiff ERIC J. SPALDING has served notice upon Defendant ALFRED T.
LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, and Jeff Atwater, as Chief Financial Officer, Florida Department of Financial Services, pursuant to 768.28 of the Florida Statutes. PARTIES 4. Florida. 5. At all times referred to herein, Defendant ANDREW TAYLOR [hereinafter Plaintiff ERIC J. SPALDING is a resident of Broward County, State of
Defendant RODRIGUEZ] was acting under color of law as a deputy sheriff for ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, and in such capacity as an agent, servant, and employee of ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida. 6. At all times referred to herein, Defendant JUAN L. HERNANDEZ
[hereinafter Defendant HERNANDEZ] was acting under color of law as a deputy sheriff for ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, and in such capacity as an agent, servant, and employee of ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida. 7. At all times referred to herein, Defendant MARC SOTO [hereinafter
Defendant SOTO] was acting under color of law as a deputy sheriff for ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, and in such capacity as an agent, servant, and employee of ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida. 8. Defendant ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY,
Florida, is the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida [hereinafter Defendant ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF OF BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, or Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE],
as organized and existing under the Constitution and laws of the State of Florida. In this cause, Defendant ALFRED T. LAMBERTI, as SHERIFF of BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, acted through its agents, employees, and servants, including Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant HERNANDEZ, Defendant SOTO, and others. 9. Plaintiff sues Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant HERNANDEZ, and Defendant
SOTO in their individual capacities. FACTS 10. On Saturday, February 20, 2010, Plaintiff, age 39, and his wife, Alejandra
Spalding, invited several guests to their residence located at 11302 Roundelay Road, Cooper City, Broward County, Florida, to celebrate the engagement of Johnny Regis to Diana Regis. The guests included Jon Onaindia and his girlfriend, Sandra Carolina Alarcon, an attorney (in her native Colombia). Plaintiff, Onaindia, and Johnny Regis were all co-workers at BellSouth (now AT&T). 11. Several other couples were also invited, including Eduardo and Jenny Ibarra,
and Carlos and Lina Marquez. Plaintiffs brother Todd, and Rodrigo Castro, a police officer for the City of Sunrise and the recipient of their Officer of the Month Award for July 2009, also attended. 12. Guests began arriving around 9:00 p.m., and socialized both inside Plaintiffs
residence and a screened enclosure in the back-yard. 13. Shortly after the arrival of guests at Plaintiffs residence, the Broward
Sheriffs Office received an anonymous noise complaint. 14. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs residence was located in a zero-lot line
townhouse community. There was a history of acrimony between Plaintiffs family and one of their neighbors. Based on information and belief, the anonymous noise complaint was made by Plaintiffs neighbor.
15.
Defendant TAYLOR responded to the noise complaint after 10:00 p.m.
Defendant TAYLOR testified: It was like a party-type environment. You hear some screams, a short scream and maybe a laugh, you know. Thats pretty much it. You could just hear constant chatter. The chatter was pretty reasonable, other than the scream or two here and there. Defendant TAYLOR left the area without making any arrests or issuing any citations. 16. Within two hours, Defendant TAYLOR responded to Plaintiffs residence for
a second noise complaint. Again, Defendant TAYLOR left the area without making any arrests or issuing any citations. 17. After no action was taken by Defendant TAYLOR, Plaintiffs neighbor called
Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE on February 21, 2011, and alleged that an unknown assailant threw an egg and/or orange at her residence. 18. Several deputies, including Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant HERNANDEZ,
Defendant SOTO, and deputy sheriff Andrew Rodriguez responded to Plaintiffs residence and the residence of Plaintiffs neighbor. 19. The wooden fence between Plaintiffs residence and his neighbors property
prevents line-of-sight between the two properties. However, Plaintiff was able to observe flashlights in the back of his neighbors residence, and heard a voices yelling: [T]he partys over. Everybody f - - - ing go home. 20. At that time, Plaintiffs remaining guests began exchanging end-of-evening
salutations, in preparation for their departure from Plaintiffs residence. 21. While Plaintiff was in a guest bathroom, Alejandra Spalding and others heard
banging on the front door. 22. Alejandra Spalding opened the front door, whereupon she observed several
deputies from Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE, including Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant HERNANDEZ, Defendant SOTO, and deputy sheriff Andrew Rodriguez (hereinafter Rodriguez). 23. Rodriguez reached into Plaintiffs residence with his left hand and grabbed
Onaindia shirt, and pulled Onaindia outside the residence, in the absence of voluntary consent or exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into Plaintiffs residence. 24. As Onaindia stood with his hands in the air, Rodriguez pointed his index
finger very close to Onaindias face, and screamed: Who fucking threw the orange?, whereupon Rodriguez ordered Onaindia to get on the ground. 25. Upon complying with Rodriguezs request to get on the ground, Rodriguez
arrested Onaindia for the misdemeanor offense of resisting arrest without violence/obstruction of justice, in the absence of probable cause that Onaindia committed any criminal offense. 26. 27. Rodriguez then handcuffed Onaindia behind his back. Upon handcuffing Onaindia behind his back, Rodriguez rolled Onaindia onto
his back and proceeded to punch Onaindia in the area of his chest, whereupon Rodriguez stated: Youre not so tough now, mother f- - ker. 28. In the interim, Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant HERNANDEZ, and
Defendant SOTO entered Plaintiffs residence without warrant, notwithstanding Alejandra Spaldings immediate and unequivocal verbal protests directing the deputies to leave the residence. 29. Defendant TAYLOR confronted Plaintiff immediately upon Plaintiff exiting
the guest bathroom, at which time Defendant TAYLOR physically took hold of Plaintiff and placed him over the back of a nearby couch, and handcuffed Plaintiff behind his back. 30. Defendant TAYLOR then physically threw Plaintiff, while handcuffed, out
the front door of his residence and into nearby ficus hedge. 31. Plaintiff came to rest partly on the front of his torso, with his feet caught up
on a raised light fixture located within ficus hedge. 32. As Plaintiff remained hung up in the hicus hedge, in handcuffs, Defendant
HERNANDEZ struck Plaintiff with his knee in the area of Plaintiffs back. 33. Defendant TAYLOR subsequently charged Plaintiff with the misdemeanor
offense of resisting arrest without violence/obstruction of justice. 34. Following their arrests, Plaintiff and Onaindia were transported to Defendant
BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE substation in Cooper City, followed by a substation in Davie, Florida. Plaintiff and Onaindia were subsequently transported to the main Broward County Jail in Fort Lauderdale, for incarceration. 35. Following Plaintiffs arrest, Defendant TAYLOR prepared a sworn probable
cause affidavit and supplemental report for submission to prosecuting authorities, containing false statements and material omissions. 36. At all times material hereto, Defendant TAYLOR knew that his probable
cause affidavit and supplemental report would be relied upon by prosecuting authorities for the commencement and continuation of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. 37. The probable cause affidavit and supplemental report prepared by Defendant
TAYLOR for submission to prosecuting authorities contained false statements, insofar as the probable cause affidavit falsely alleged that for officer safety, Plaintiff was ordered to place his hands behind his back for handcuffing but refused to do so, when in fact, as Defendant TAYLOR knew, there was no issue of officer safety justifying the handcuffing of Plaintiff in his own residence. 38. The probable cause affidavit and supplemental report prepared by Defendant
TAYLOR for submission to prosecuting authorities contained material omissions, insofar as the probable cause affidavit and supplemental report omitted the material fact that Defendant TAYLOR was not engaged in the lawful execution of any legal duty at the time of his arrest of Plaintiff, insofar as Defendant TAYLOR was in the process of violating Plaintiffs constitutional rights during the warrantless search of Plaintiffs residence, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1248 (11th Cir. 2007) ([A] warrantless entry into the home to effect an arrest is prohibited absent consent or exigent circumstances). 39. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR caused the commencement or institution
of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff, concluding in the trial court conducting a suppression hearing on October 19, 2011, wherein the trial court determined that Defendant TAYLOR violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment by the warrantless search of Plaintiffs residence. 40. The criminal proceedings commenced as a result of the conduct of Defendant
TAYLOR reached a bona fide resolution in Plaintiffs favor, and Plaintiff has never been convicted by any prosecuting authority of any criminal offense as a result of his arrest by Defendant TAYLOR on February 21, 2010. 41. At all times material hereto, the conduct of Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant
HERNANDEZ, and Defendant SOTO occurred under color of state law. CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT I UNLAWFUL SEARCH CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT TAYLOR, INDIVIDUALLY, COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. 1983 For his cause of action against Defendant TAYLOR, individually, in Count I, Plaintiff states: 42. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count I, the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 43. In sworn deposition testimony on September 21, 2010 in State of Florida v.
Eric Spalding, Defendant TAYLOR testified: A: The third time, well we knocked at the door. Somebody then We looked for Mr. Spalding. We were looking for Mr.
answered the door. Spalding at the time.
The door was open and we pretty much figured, hey, they didnt say anything to us about not being able to come inside and we walked inside the house towards the front of the house. Q: A: Did you ever ask permission to walk inside of the house? I think somebody said, where is Mr. Spalding or where is Eric or
something to that sort and they were looking for the homeowner. And the person who answered the door, they were standing at the door. We walked inside. I didnt hear an objection at that time at that point. 44. In fact, Defendant TAYLOR entered Plaintiffs residence without warrant or
other lawful authority, including the absence of exigent circumstances or voluntary consent. In addition, Defendant TAYLOR remained in Plaintiffs residence notwithstanding Alejandra Spaldings immediate and unequivocal verbal protests directing Defendant TAYLOR, Defendant HERNANDEZ, and Defendant SOTO to leave the residence, and thus, the sworn testimony of Defendant TAYLOR on September 21, 2010 is materially false. 45. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR towards Plaintiff was objectively
unreasonable and violated Plaintiffs clearly established rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983 to be secure in his house,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure. 46. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, in violation of
42 U.S.C. 1983, Plaintiff has suffered grievously, has been brought into public scandal, and with great humiliation, mental suffering, and damaged reputation. 47. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant
TAYLOR, Plaintiff suffered mental anguish and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs civil rights. Plaintiff has also agreed to pay the undersigned a reasonable fee for his services, herein. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. e. f. appropriate. COUNT II UNLAWFUL SEARCH CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT HERNANDEZ, INDIVIDUALLY, COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. 1983 For his cause of action against Defendant HERNANDEZ, individually, in Count II, Plaintiff states: 48. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count II, the allegations Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Judgment for exemplary damages; Cost of suit; Reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 49. In sworn testimony at the suppression hearing conducted on October 19, 2011
in State of Florida v. Eric Spalding, Defendant HERNANDEZ testified that he could not recall the details of the incident and whether he received consent to enter Plaintiffs residence. 50. In fact, Defendant HERNANDEZ entered Plaintiffs residence without
warrant or other lawful authority, including the absence of exigent circumstances or voluntary consent. In addition, Defendant HERNANDEZ remained in Plaintiffs residence notwithstanding Alejandra Spaldings immediate and unequivocal verbal protests directing Defendant HERNANDEZ, Defendant TAYLOR, and Defendant SOTO to leave the residence. 51. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ towards Plaintiff was objectively
unreasonable and violated Plaintiffs clearly established rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983 to be secure in his house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure. 52. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, in violation of
HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff suffered mental anguish and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs civil rights. Plaintiff has also agreed to pay the undersigned a reasonable fee for his services, herein. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Judgment for exemplary damages; Cost of suit;
d. e. f. appropriate.
Reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
COUNT III UNLAWFUL SEARCH CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT SOTO, INDIVIDUALLY, COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. 1983 For his cause of action against Defendant SOTO, individually, in Count III, Plaintiff states: 54. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count III, the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 55. In sworn deposition testimony on September 24, 2010 in State of Florida v.
Eric Spalding, Defendant SOTO testified: Q: And you stated before you cant recall whether or not you heard Mrs.
Spalding allowing Deputy Taylor into the residence, correct? You didnt hear her say anything? A: I didnt hear anything, but we were allowed in. She opened the store
[sic] and we were allowed in. Q: allowed in? A: Well, we were conducting an investigation as to what happened When you say you were allowed in, why do you think you were
between the neighbor and them and thats probably why she allowed us in so we could continue our investigation. Q: But Im just trying to get to the point of how you know youre allowed
in. If somebody opens the door, you ultimately assume youre allowed in or are they
just opening the door because youre knocking and? A: No. I ask them if were allowed in when Im a [sic] entering the
residence after the door being opened. So, Im assuming that we were allowed in. Q: The only way you know you were allowed in is because Deputy
Taylor had taken that initial action to go in? A: 56. Yes. In fact, Defendant SOTO entered Plaintiffs residence without warrant or other
lawful authority, including the absence of exigent circumstances or voluntary consent. In addition, Defendant SOTO remained in Plaintiffs residence notwithstanding Alejandra Spaldings immediate and unequivocal verbal protests directing Defendant SOTO, Defendant TAYLOR, and Defendant HERNANDEZ to leave the residence, and thus, the sworn testimony of Defendant SOTO on September 24, 2010 is materially false. 57. Regardless of Defendant TAYLORs decision to enter Plaintiffs residence,
the unconstitutional behavior of Defendant TAYLOR did not relieve Defendant SOTO of his responsibility to decide for himself whether to violate clearly established constitutional rights by intruding into Plaintiffs residence without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or voluntarily consent. ORourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1210 (11th Cir. 2004) (Hayess only remaining defense is that he did not make the initial decision to enter the office, but instead merely followed the other officers inside, defer[ing] to their judgment. His defense ultimately boils down to But everyone else was doing it! Without inquiring as to what Hayes would do if everyone else were jumping off a bridge, we recognize that precedent squarely precludes his claim). 58. The conduct of Defendant SOTO towards Plaintiff was objectively
unreasonable and violated Plaintiffs clearly established rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983 to be secure in his house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure. 59. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, in violation of
42 U.S.C. 1983, Plaintiff has suffered grievously, has been brought into public scandal, and with great humiliation, mental suffering, and damaged reputation. 60. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant SOTO,
Plaintiff suffered mental anguish and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs civil rights. Plaintiff has also agreed to pay the undersigned a reasonable fee for his services, herein. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. e. f. appropriate. COUNT IV FALSE ARREST/FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT TAYLOR, INDIVIDUALLY, COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. 1983 For his cause of action against Defendant TAYLOR, individually, in Count IV, Plaintiff states: 61. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count IV, the allegations Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Judgment for exemplary damages; Cost of suit; Reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
of paragraphs 1 through 41.
62.
Defendant TAYLOR proximately caused Plaintiffs arrest in the absence of
lawful authority or probable cause that Plaintiff committed any criminal offense. 63. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR towards Plaintiff was objectively
unreasonable and violated Plaintiffs clearly established rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. 1983 to be free from arrest and detention in the absence of probable cause. 64. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, in violation of
TAYLOR, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs civil rights. Plaintiff has also agreed to pay the undersigned a reasonable fee for his services, herein. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. e. f. appropriate. COUNT V Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Judgment for exemplary damages; Cost of suit; Reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE BY DEFENDANT RODRIGUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY, COGNIZABLE UNDER 42 U.S.C. 1983 For his cause of action against Defendant RODRIGUEZ, individually, in Count V, Plaintiff states: 66. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count V, the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 67. The use of force by Defendant RODRIGUEZ towards Plaintiff was objectively
unreasonable and unnecessary for Defendant RODRIGUEZ to defend himself or any other person from bodily harm during the arrest of Plaintiff, and constitutes the excessive use of force in violation of Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. 1983. 68. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, in violation of
RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff suffered bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs civil rights. Plaintiff has also agreed to pay the undersigned a reasonable fee for his services, herein. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Judgment for exemplary damages; Cost of suit; Reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988;
e. f. appropriate.
Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
COUNT VI INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE, in Count VI, Plaintiff states: 70. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count VI, the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 71. The warrantless entry into Plaintiffs residence by Defendant TAYLOR and
other members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE was in the absence of lawful authority, including exigent circumstances or voluntary consent. 72. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR was objectively unreasonable and
occurred in the presence of Plaintiffs family and guests, and caused Plaintiff outrage, mental suffering, shame, and humiliation, and was undertaken in such a manner as to cause outrage, or mental suffering, shame, or humiliation, to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 73. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR was an invasion upon Plaintiffs physical
solitude or seclusion, and constitutes invasion of privacy. 74. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR towards Plaintiff occurred during the
course and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff for Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE. 75. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has
suffered grievously, has been brought into public scandal, and with great humiliation, mental
suffering, and damaged reputation. 76. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant
BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. appropriate. COUNT VII INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT TAYLOR, INDIVIDUALLY For his cause of action against Defendant TAYLOR, individually, in Count VII, Plaintiff states: 77. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count VII, the allegations Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Cost of suit; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 78. The warrantless entry into Plaintiffs residence by Defendant TAYLOR and
other members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE was in the absence of lawful authority, including exigent circumstances or voluntary consent. 79. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR was objectively unreasonable and
occurred in the presence of Plaintiffs family and guests, and caused Plaintiff outrage, mental suffering, shame, and humiliation, and was undertaken in such a manner as to cause outrage, or
mental suffering, shame, or humiliation, to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 80. The conduct of Defendant TAYLOR was an invasion upon Plaintiffs physical
solitude or seclusion, and constitutes invasion of privacy. 81. Alternatively to the allegations set forth in Count VI, if the invasion of
Plaintiffs privacy by Defendant TAYLOR was committed outside the course and scope of Defendant TAYLORs employment or in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, the conduct of Defendant TAYLOR occurred in his individual capacity. 82. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has
suffered grievously, has been brought into public scandal, and with great humiliation, mental suffering, and damaged reputation. 83. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant
TAYLOR, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. e. appropriate. Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Judgment for exemplary damages; Cost of suit; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
COUNT VIII INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE, in Count VIII, Plaintiff states: 84. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count VIII, the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 85. The warrantless entry into Plaintiffs residence by Defendant HERNANDEZ
and other members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE was in the absence of lawful authority, including exigent circumstances or voluntary consent. 86. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ was objectively unreasonable and
occurred in the presence of Plaintiffs family and guests, and caused Plaintiff outrage, mental suffering, shame, and humiliation, and was undertaken in such a manner as to cause outrage, or mental suffering, shame, or humiliation, to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 87. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ was an invasion upon Plaintiffs
physical solitude or seclusion, and constitutes invasion of privacy. 88. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ towards Plaintiff occurred during
the course and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff for Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE. 89. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has
BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and
resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. appropriate. COUNT IX INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT HERNANDEZ, INDIVIDUALLY For his cause of action against Defendant HERNANDEZ, individually, in Count IX, Plaintiff states: 91. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count IX, the allegations Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Cost of suit; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 92. The warrantless entry into Plaintiffs residence by Defendant HERNANDEZ,
and other members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE, was in the absence of lawful authority, including exigent circumstances or voluntary consent. 93. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ was objectively unreasonable and
occurred in the presence of Plaintiffs family and guests, and caused Plaintiff outrage, mental suffering, shame, and humiliation, and was undertaken in such a manner as to cause outrage, or mental suffering, shame, or humiliation, to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 94. The conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ was an invasion upon Plaintiffs
physical solitude or seclusion, and constitutes invasion of privacy.
95.
Alternatively to the allegations set forth in Count VIII, if the invasion of
Plaintiffs privacy by Defendant HERNANDEZ was committed outside the course and scope of Defendant HERNANDEZs employment or in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, the conduct of Defendant HERNANDEZ occurred in his individual capacity. 96. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has
HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. e. appropriate. COUNT X INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE, in Count X, Plaintiff Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Judgment for exemplary damages; Cost of suit; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
states: 98. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count X, the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 99. The warrantless entry into Plaintiffs residence by Defendant SOTO and other
members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE was in the absence of lawful authority, including exigent circumstances or voluntary consent. 100. The conduct of Defendant SOTO was objectively unreasonable and occurred
in the presence of Plaintiffs family and guests, and caused Plaintiff outrage, mental suffering, shame, and humiliation, and was undertaken in such a manner as to cause outrage, or mental suffering, shame, or humiliation, to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 101. The conduct of Defendant SOTO was an invasion upon Plaintiffs physical
solitude or seclusion, and constitutes invasion of privacy. 102. The conduct of Defendant SOTO towards Plaintiff occurred during the course
and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff for Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE. 103. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has
BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays:
a. b. c. d. appropriate.
Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Cost of suit; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
COUNT XI INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT SOTO, INDIVIDUALLY For his cause of action against Defendant SOTO, individually, in Count XI, Plaintiff states: 105. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XI, the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 106. The warrantless entry into Plaintiffs residence by Defendant SOTO and other
members of Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE was in the absence of lawful authority, including exigent circumstances or voluntary consent. 107. The conduct of Defendant SOTO was objectively unreasonable and occurred
in the presence of Plaintiffs family and guests, and caused Plaintiff outrage, mental suffering, shame, and humiliation, and was undertaken in such a manner as to cause outrage, or mental suffering, shame, or humiliation, to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 108. The conduct of Defendant SOTO was an invasion upon Plaintiffs physical
solitude or seclusion, and constitutes invasion of privacy. 109. Alternatively to the allegations set forth in Count X, if the invasion of
Plaintiffs privacy by Defendant SOTO was committed outside the course and scope of Defendant SOTOs employment or in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, the conduct of Defendant SOTO occurred in
his individual capacity. 110. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has
suffered grievously, has been brought into public scandal, and with great humiliation, mental suffering, and damaged reputation. 111. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant SOTO,
Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. e. appropriate. COUNT XII FALSE ARREST/FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE in Count XII, Plaintiff states: 112. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XII the allegations Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Judgment for exemplary damages; Cost of suit; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 113. Defendant RODRIGUEZ proximately caused Plaintiffs arrest and detention
in the absence of probable cause that Plaintiff committed any criminal offense.
114.
The actions of Defendant RODRIGUEZ, in causing the arrest of Plaintiff in
the absence of probable cause, were taken in the absence of lawful authority. The actions of Defendant RODRIGUEZ constitute false arrest/false imprisonment of Plaintiff under Florida law. 115. The false arrest/false imprisonment of Plaintiff was committed by Defendant
RODRIGUEZ in the course and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff for Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE. 116. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has
BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. appropriate. COUNT XIII FALSE ARREST/FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT RODRIGUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY For his cause of action against Defendant RODRIGUEZ, individually, in Count XIII Plaintiff states: Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Cost of suit; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
118.
Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XIII the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 119. Defendant RODRIGUEZ proximately caused Plaintiffs arrest and detention
in the absence of probable cause that Plaintiff committed any criminal offense. 120. The actions of Defendant RODRIGUEZ, in causing the arrest of Plaintiff in
the absence of probable cause, were taken in absence of lawful authority. The actions of Defendant RODRIGUEZ constitute false arrest/false imprisonment of Plaintiff under Florida law. 121. Alternatively to the allegations set forth in Count XII, if Plaintiffs arrest by
Defendant RODRIGUEZ was committed outside the course and scope of Defendant RODRIGUEZs employment, or in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, the conduct of Defendant RODRIGUEZ occurred in his individual capacity. 122. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has
RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff suffered loss of liberty and freedom, bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Judgment for exemplary damages;
c. d. e. appropriate.
Cost of suit; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
COUNT XIV BATTERY/UNNECESSARY FORCE CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE in Count XIV, Plaintiff states: 124. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XIV, the allegations
unreasonable and unnecessary for Defendant RODRIGUEZ to defend himself or any other person from bodily harm during the arrest of Plaintiff, and resulted, as Defendant RODRIGUEZ reasonably should have foreseen, in a harmful and offensive contact of Plaintiff, against his will. 126. The battery/unnecessary use of force by Defendant RODRIGUEZ towards
Plaintiff occurred during the course and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff for Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE. 127. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has
BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE, Plaintiff suffered bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent
or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. appropriate. COUNT XV BATTERY/UNNECESSARY FORCE CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT RODRIGUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY For his cause of action against Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE in Count XV, Plaintiff states: 129. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XV, the allegations Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Cost of suit; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
unreasonable and unnecessary for Defendant RODRIGUEZ to defend himself or any other person from bodily harm during the arrest of Plaintiff, and resulted, as Defendant RODRIGUEZ reasonably should have foreseen, in a harmful and offensive contact of Plaintiff, against his will. 131. Alternatively to the allegations set forth in Count XIV, if the conduct of
Defendant RODRIGUEZ occurred outside the course and scope of his employment for Defendant BROWARD SHERIFFS OFFICE, or was committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, then the battery/unnecessary force was committed by Defendant RODRIGUEZ in his individual capacity. 132. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has
RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff suffered bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs rights WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. c. d. e. appropriate. COUNT XVI MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AGAINST DEFENDANT RODRIGUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY For his cause of action against Defendant RODRIGUEZ, individually, in Count XVI, Plaintiff states: 134. Plaintiff realleges and adopts, as if fully set forth in Count XVI, the allegations Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Judgment for exemplary damages; Cost of suit; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
of paragraphs 1 through 41. 135. No reasonably cautious police officer in the position of Defendant
RODRIGUEZ would have believed Plaintiff was guilty-in-fact of any criminal offense. 136. The conduct of Defendant RODRIGUEZ caused the commencement or
institution of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff, resulting in the trial court granting Plaintiffs motion to suppress on October 19, 2011.
137.
The conduct of Defendant RODRIGUEZ, in commending or instituting
criminal proceedings against Plaintiff, was with malice, and in the absence of probable cause that Plaintiff committed any criminal offense. 138. At all times material hereto, Defendant RODRIGUEZ knew that his arrest
affidavit and supplemental report would be submitted to prosecuting authorities for the determination of whether criminal charges should be filed against Plaintiff, and included materially false statements and material omissions necessary to a finding of probable cause. 139. The conduct of Defendant RODRIGUEZ was reckless and without regard to
whether the institution of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff were justified. 140. The criminal proceedings proximately caused by the conduct of Defendant
RODRIGUEZ reached a bona fide resolution in Plaintiffs favor. 141. As a direct and proximate result of the acts described above, Plaintiff has
suffered grievously and has been brought into public scandal, with great humiliation, mental suffering and damaged reputation. 142. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of Defendant
RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff suffered loss of his liberty and freedom, mental anguish, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Plaintiff also retained a criminal defense attorney to represent him in the criminal prosecution instituted as a result of the conduct of Defendant RODRIGUEZ, and agreed to pay him a reasonable fee for her services. Plaintiffs losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future, in violation of Plaintiffs rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: a. b. Judgment for compensatory damages in excess of $ 15,000 dollars; Judgment for exemplary damages;
c. d. e. appropriate.
Cost of suit; Trial by jury as to all issues so triable; and Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 143. DATED this Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues so triable as of right. 23rd day of August, 2012. By: s/. Hugh L. Koerner Hugh L. Koerner Florida Bar No.: 716952 Email: hlklaw@hughkoerner.com Hugh L. Koerner, P.A. Sheridan Executive Centre 3475 Sheridan Street, Suite 208 Hollywood, FL 33021 Telephone: (954) 522-1235 Facsimile: (954) 522-1176 Attorneys for Plaintiff Eric J. Spalding

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Case 0:12-cv-61651-RSR Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/23/2012 Page 1 of 31

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Plaintiff ERIC J. SPALDING has served notice upon Defendant ALFRED T.

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Defendant TAYLOR responded to the noise complaint after 10:00 p.m.

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answered the door. Spalding at the time.

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of paragraphs 1 through 41.

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Defendant TAYLOR proximately caused Plaintiffs arrest in the absence of

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physical solitude or seclusion, and constitutes invasion of privacy.

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Alternatively to the allegations set forth in Count VIII, if the invasion of

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The actions of Defendant RODRIGUEZ, in causing the arrest of Plaintiff in

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The conduct of Defendant RODRIGUEZ, in commending or instituting

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