EFiled:Aug31201212:35PMEDT TransactionID46205653 CaseNo.

7717VCG INTHECOURTOFCHANCERYOFTHESTATEOFDELAWARE ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

LAURENGLASSMAN, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, v. CROSSFIT,INC.and GREGGLASSMAN, Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

C.A.No.7717VCG

MOTIONFORATEMPORARYRESTRAININGORDER Defendants/CounterclaimPlaintiffs CrossFit, Inc. ("CrossFit" or the "Company") and GregGlassman("Mr.Glassman"and,withCrossFit,"CounterclaimPlaintiffs"),byandthrough their undersigned counsel, hereby move the Court for an Order temporarily restraining and enjoining Plaintiff/CounterclaimDefendant Lauren Glassman ("Ms. Glassman" or

"CounterclaimDefendant") and her affiliates, employees, agents and any person acting on her behalf from consummating any sale of equity in CrossFit to thirdparty Anthos Capital ("Anthos").Thegroundsforthismotionareasfollows: INTRODUCTION 1. In June of this year, Ms. Glassman, a director and coowner of CrossFit,

announced her intention to sell her equity interest in the Company an equity interest that is currentlyheldintrustaspartofongoingArizonadivorceproceedingsbetweentheGlassmans, and subject to an injunction issued by the Arizona court that prohibits either party from transferringtheirshare.Sheseparatelycommencedthislitigation,allegingthatMr.Glassman andCrossFithadbreachedtheirfiduciarydutiesinundertakingtheacquisitionofasmallaircraft forcorporateuse.
RLF16871876v.1

2.

Since this suit commenced, CounterclaimPlaintiffs have learned from both

Plaintiff'sowncounselandcounselforAnthosthatMs.Glassman'spurportedsalewasmade possible by Ms. Glassman's secret disclosure of confidential Company documents: providing them to Anthos as "due diligence" materials without the knowledge or permission of the Company,andwithnosafeguardstoprotecttheCompanyfromAnthos'furthermisuseofthose materials. 3. It is wellsettled that a fiduciary may not share confidential company materials

withthirdpartiesforherownenrichment.YetthatisexactlywhatMs.Glassmanhasdone. 4. Thesale,ifconsummated,wouldcauseseriousharmbothtoCrossFitandtoMr.

Glassman. Asaninitialmatter,Anthoswouldhaveacquired50%ownershipoftheCompany withthebenefitofunauthorizedaccesstoconfidentialcompanyinformationasignificantharm in itself. Beyond that, Anthos has stated that it intends to make significant changes to the Company's(highlysuccessful)businessmodelchangesthatbothCrossFitandMr.Glassman believewouldbehighlydetrimental.ThesalecouldalsoresultinCrossFitlosingitsstatusasa subchapterScorporation,whichwouldhavesignificanttaxramificationsaswellasimposenew administrativeburdensuponthecompany. 5. Nonetheless,Ms.GlassmanhasproceededtopetitionthedivorcecourtinArizona

toliftitsinjunctiontopermithertoconsummatehersaletoAnthosandprematurelydividethe estate.AhearingonMs.Glassman'smotionisscheduledforSeptember5,2012.Counterclaim PlaintiffshaveeveryexpectationthattheArizonacourtwillnotpermitthesaletogoforward.In theeventthatitdoes,however,Ms.Glassmanhasindicatedthatsheintendstoconsummatethe transaction immediately. CounterclaimPlaintiffs requested that Ms. Glassman agree to delay any closing until this Court had the opportunity to adjudicate the counterclaims. She refused.

RLF16871876v.1

Accordingly, CounterclaimPlaintiffs are forced to bring this motion, requesting a temporary restrainingordertohaltthesale,protectCrossFit'sconfidentialmaterialsandenforceitsrightsto loyaltyandcarefromitsdirectorsintheeventthattheArizonacourtpermitsthesaletoproceed. FACTUALBACKGROUND1 6. CrossFit is a Delaware corporation that develops fitness programs for use at

affiliated gyms. CrossFit offers a unique fitness and strength program, publishes a fitness journal, and provides seminars, training, and consultation services regarding its product throughouttheworld.(Counterclaims15.) 7. CrossFit also partners with other companies in the athletics and fitness market,

includingapartnershipwithReebokInternational,topromoteitsbrandthroughvariousfitness relatedeventsandcompetitions,suchastheannualCrossFitGames,whichappearsonESPN's networkpursuanttoacontractbetweenthetwocompanies.(Counterclaims16.) 8. CrossFit has grown exponentially over the past decade and now has over 4400

affiliatesworldwide.ThatgrowthisaresultofboththebenefitsoftheCrossFitsystemandalso CrossFit's unique culture, which offers an alternative to conventional gym membership or individualworkoutregimens.(Counterclaims17.) 9. Mr. and Ms. Glassman jointly own 100 percent of the shares of CrossFit as

communityproperty.(Counterclaims18.) 10. Mr. and Ms. Glassman commenced divorce proceedings on March 25, 2010.

(Counterclaims22.) 11. APreliminaryInjunctionenteredaspartofthedivorceproceedingshasenjoined

the "transferring, encumbering, concealing, selling, or otherwise disposing of" the Glassmans'
1

ThebackgroundtothismotionissetforthmorefullyintheVerifiedCounterclaimsfiledon August8,2012.

RLF16871876v.1

community property including their sole ownership of CrossFit without written consent of the parties or the permission of the court. See Ex. 1 (Preliminary Injunction), at 2. That PreliminaryInjunctionisstillinforce.Asaresult,neitheroftheGlassmanscansellanyportion oftheCrossFitshareswithouttheother'sconsentoracourtorder.(Counterclaims28.) 12. However,Ms.Glassmannowseekstoliftthisinjunctionanddisposeofherentire

stake to Anthos, a Californiabased private investment firm interested in making an equity investmentinCrossFit.(Counterclaims30.) AnthosSeekstoAcquireEquityinCrossFit 13. CrossFit'sdealingswithAnthosgobacktoAugust2010,whenAnthossoughtan

introductiontoCrossFitmanagement.Anthosspokewithlowerandmidlevelmanagement,but discussionsdidnotproceedbeyondthatlevelatthattime.(Counterclaims30.) 14. Anthos renewed its interest with vigor in April 2011, making contact with Mr.

Glassman and other senior CrossFit management. Over the next several months, Anthos employees particularly Bryan Kelly ("Kelly"), a managing partner, and Chris Jacobson ("Jacobson") an associate met with Mr. Glassman and other members of CrossFit's managementtodiscussboththeCompany'soperationsandAnthos'viewofhowtheCompany shouldbemanagedanditsrevenuemaximized.(Counterclaims31.) 15. Anthos' aim in acquiring equity in CrossFit was not merely to act as a passive

investor.Rather,AnthosexpressedadesiretochangeCrossFit'scoreapproachtoitsbusiness. Rather than encouraging affiliates to focus on a simple, backtobasics approach to fitness, Anthosexpressedaninterestinturningthe4000plusCrossFitaffiliatedgymsintopointsofsale fortshirts,nutritionsupplements,exercisevideos,andthelike.Likewise,Anthoscontinuously voiced its intention to "help" CrossFit "get out" of its agreements with certain commercial

RLF16871876v.1

partners,andrepeatedlyrequestedconfidentialinformationfromtheCompanyinordertodoso. Not coincidentally, Anthos has relationships with competitors of one or more of CrossFit's currentcommercialpartners.(Counterclaims34.) 16. CrossFit management viewed Anthos' proposed changes to the Company's

businessmodelasentirelyantitheticaltotheCompany'sphilosophyandbrandidentity.CrossFit management believes that, if implemented, the Anthos approach would alienate CrossFit's clienteleandaffiliates,andseverelydevaluetheCompany.Accordingly,CrossFitmanagement rejectedAnthos'offers.(Counterclaims35.) 17. BrianMulvaney,aCrossFitrepresentative,furtherexplainedinanemailtoKelly

that"CrossFit,Inc.isselffundingforalloftheinitiativeswecareabout.Addingotherpeople's moneytotheequationrepresentsmorethreatthanopportunity."(Counterclaims35.) Ms.Glassman'sTransactionWithAnthos 18. During the Spring of 2012, Mr. Glassman had extensive discussions with Ms.

Glassmanaboutasaleofher50%interestintheCompany.Mr.Glassmanmadeaninitialoffer tobepaidoutoverfiveyears,inorderfortheCompanytoreacquirehershares.Ms.Glassman counteredwithanoffersheetthathaddifferentoptionsandbuyouts,theshortestonebeingover fifteen years,whichactuallyresultedinalower netpresent valuethanwhattheCompany had proposed.TheCompanynonethelessproposedatiereddealatahigherpriceoverthesamefive year period. Itappearedthatthepartieshadreached anagreement inprincipleonprice terms andthediscussionshadreducedtotermsregardinglifeinsurancebeneficiariesandothersmaller issues thus ensuring that the Company could maintain its existing, and highly successful, businessmodelandculturefreefromoutsideinterference.(Counterclaims67.)

RLF16871876v.1

19.

The parties went forward with this plan and were down to the minutiae of the

divorce settlement when Ms. Glassman's attorneys announced that the offers were withdrawn and the deal was rejected. In fact, unbeknowst to CounterclaimPlaintiffs, Ms. Glassman was negotiatingwithAnthosaboutsellingherinterestintheCompanytoAnthos.(Counterclaims 68.) At no point did she give either Mr. Glassman her husband or the Company an opportunitytomatchorcountertheAnthosproposal. 20. Additionalfactsrelatedtothisagreementhavenowcometolight.Itappearsthat,

on June 13,2012,Ms.Glassmanenteredintoasocalled NonDisclosureAgreement("NDA") with Anthos sothat shecould share"proprietary and confidential information" with Anthos to furtherapotentialsaletoAnthosofherinterestintheCompany.SeeEx.2(NDA) 21. Anthos has admitted that it received "due diligence" materials from Ms.

Glassman.Ex.3(LetterfromA.DunningdatedAugust6,2012). 22. Following this admission, Ms. Glassman provided CounterclaimPlaintiffs with

copiesofthematerialsthatshegavetoAnthos.Ex.4(CoverletterfromG.Park).These"due diligence" materials included extensive confidential information, including: CrossFit payroll information (including salary information for individual employees), confidential CrossFit contracts(including those related to sponsorship arrangements and key marketing efforts), internalboarddocuments,andnonpublicfinancialstatements. 23. Ms.GlassmanenteredintotheNDAandprovidedthe"duediligence"materialsto

Anthoswithoutanypriornoticeto,orpermissionfrom,theCompanyortheBoardofDirectors. CrossFit was neither a party to the NDA nor was it identified as a thirdparty beneficiary. (Counterclaims71.)Accordingly,CrossFitwasgrantednoabilityundertheNDAtoenforcea remedy for a breach of its terms should Anthos misuse the confidential Company information

RLF16871876v.1

providedtoitbyMs.Glassman. SeeEx.2.Ms.GlassmanandAnthosclearlyunderstoodthe consequences of a breach of the NDA noting that it would "cause irreparable harm" and granting her the right to enjoin a breach or threatened breach but no such safeguards were providedtotheCompany.Id. 24. The NDA is less than two pages long and contains woefully inadequate

protections. If the Company had been advised of the NDA or of Ms. Glassman's desire to disclose "proprietary and confidential information" to Anthos, it would have objected. (Counterclaims72.) 25. Ms. Glassman knew that the Company would object to her disclosure of

"proprietary and confidential information" to a third party. She intentionally concealed these activitiesfromtheCompanyandtheBoardofDirectors.Indoingso,shebreachedherdutiesto theCompanyandputherpersonalfinancialinterestsbeforetheinterestsoftheCompanyandits shareholders.(Counterclaims73.) 26. OnJune20,2012,shortlyafterMs.GlassmanenteredintotheNDAwithAnthos

andwithoutpriorwarningtotheCompany(astheCompanyhadnoknowledgeoftheNDAor Ms. Glassman's negotiations with Anthos), Kelly informed Mr. Glassman that Anthos had "enteredintoadefinitiveagreementtopurchase[CounterclaimDefendant's]50%interestshare." Ms.Glassmanhassubsequentlyproduceda"PurchaseandSaleAgreement"whichpurportstobe afinalsalecontract.(Counterclaims74.) 27. This Agreement is contingent on, among other things, the "separation" of Ms.

Glassman'sinterestinCrossFitfromthatofherhusband,eitherbyhisconsentorbycourtorder. Ex.5(PurchaseandSaleAgreement)5.1,6.1.Thesaleisalsopredicatedonthecondition that there be no "action, suit, claim [etc.] pending or threatened against Seller or Purchaser

RLF16871876v.1

which, if adversely determined, would be reasonably likely to question the validity of the transactioncontemplatedbythisAgreement."Id.5.5.Anthos,however,maywaivethislatter condition.Id.5. 28. On July 26,2012, Plaintiff filed a motion in the divorce proceedings in Arizona

SuperiorCourttoliftthepreliminaryinjunctioninordertopermitherproposedsaletoAnthosto goforward.AhearingonthatmotionispresentlyscheduledforSeptember5,2012. 29. The announcement of this sale has caused considerable dissatisfaction among

CrossFit'saffiliatebasethethousandsofgymsacrosstheworldthatlicensetheCrossFitbrand andapproach.AffiliateshavecontactedCrossFittovoicetheirconcernthatAnthos'acquisition would diminish their autonomy and harm the brand. Affidavit of Dale Saran, 11. CrossFit management anticipates a significant risk of affiliates leaving CrossFit if the transaction is completed.Seeid. 30. A further concern raised by the potential acquisition is the risk that the sale to

AnthoswouldrequiretheCompanytoconvertfromanSCorporation(permittingsingletaxation of proceeds) to a CCorporation, imposing doubletaxation (once as corporate earnings and a secondtimetoshareholders)andothernegativetaxconsequencestoitsshareholders,including Mr.Glassman.AffidavitofKenSmith7(1). 31. CounterclaimPlaintiffs further contend that Ms. Glassman's subsequent conduct

in opposing the acquisition of the aircraft a purchase that she discussed with CrossFit managementasearlyasMarch,2012hasbeenpurelytacticalandinfurtheranceofherbreach ofduty.Thatis,heroppositiontotheaircraftpurchase,andthisentirelitigation,ismotivated not by any reasonable concern about the Company's fiscal health, but by a desire to create

RLF16871876v.1

gridlock intheCompany'soperationsto forcemanagementto agreetothesaleofherinterest. (Counterclaims7583.) 32. PlaintiffwasfullyawareoftheCompany'spendingacquisitionoftheairplanefor

months and raised no objection. Plaintiff had access to the Company's financial statements disclosing that purchase in her capacity as a director. Plaintiff also received those documents pursuant to her requests as a shareholder. Ms. Glassman emailed Ken Smith of CrossFit, inquiringaboutthepurchaseandaskingfollowupquestionsinMarch,2012. 33. However,itwasnotuntiloverthreemonthslaterafterreachingheragreement

with Anthos, by which she would sell her entire equity position in the Company, that she commencedthisactionandsoughttohaltthepurchaseoftheaircraft. 34. At no point during this threemonth period did Ms. Glassman seek to halt the

purchaseorconveneaboardmeetingtoaddressthetransaction. 35. This delay, followed by Ms. Glassman's immediateresort to litigation, is strong

evidence that CounterclaimDefendant was motivated not by her fiduciary duties to, or the financialwellbeingof,theCompany,butratherbyadesiretopressureCounterclaimPlaintiffs to acquiesce in her sale to Anthos rather than face constant inquiries about routine business functions. ARGUMENT CounterclaimPlaintiffsMeettheStandardforIssuanceofaTemporaryRestrainingOrder. 36. CounterclaimPlaintiffs meet thestraightforward test fora temporary restraining

order. "To obtain such an order, a party must demonstrate three things: '(i) the existence ofa colorableclaim,(ii)theirreparableharmthatwillbesufferedifreliefisnotgranted,and(iii)a balancingofhardshipsfavoringthemovingparty.'" ArkemaInc.v.DowChem.Co.,2010WL 2334386,at*3(Del.Ch.May25,2010)(citationsomitted) seealsoTrueN.Commc'nsInc.v.
RLF16871876v.1

Publicis S.A., 1997 WL 33173290, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1997). Because a temporary restraining order is designed to prevent irreparable injury on an emergency basis, the risk of irreparableinjuryistheparamountconsiderationintheanalysis. See,e.g.,Cottlev.Carr,1988 WL 10415, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 1988). Thus, if a movant shows that he will suffer or is suffering immediate irreparable harm, a temporary restraining order should issue unless the Courtispersuadedthattheclaimis"frivolousornottrulylitigable"or"thattheriskofharmin grantingtheremedyisgreaterthantherisktoplaintiffofdenyingit."Id. CounterclaimPlaintiffsHaveAllegedaColorableClaimthatCounterclaimDefendant BreachedherFiduciaryDutiesinDisclosingConfidentialMaterialstoAnthos 37. CounterclaimPlaintiffs easily establish the first requirement for a temporary

restraining order because their claims on the merits are more than colorable. To establish a colorableclaim,aplaintiffneedonlyshowthatitsclaimsare"nonfrivolousandlitigable."Id.at *4.Thatis,"theanalysisofwhethertheclaimsassertedaremeritoriousrequiresnothingmore thanashowing'thatacolorableclaimhasbeenmadeoutifthefactsallegedaretrue.'" Topspin P'rs, L.P. v. RockSolid Sys., Inc., 2009 WL 154387, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 2009) (citation omitted). 38. Here, Ms. Glassman breached her fiduciary duties in sending confidential

companymaterialsoutsideofthecompanyforherownbenefit,withoutevenadvising,letalone obtainingpermissionfrom,theCompanyoritsboardofdirectors. 39. Delawarelawprovidesthat"itisinequitabletopermit[a]fiduciarytoprofitfrom

usingconfidentialcorporateinformation."Kahnv.KolbergKravisRoberts&Co.,L.P.,23A.3d 831,838(Del.2011)seealsoBrophyv.CitiesServiceCo.,70A.2d5,78(Del.Ch.1949)("A fiduciary is subject to a duty to the beneficiary not to use on his own account information

RLF16871876v.1

10

confidentially given him by the beneficiary or acquired by him during the course of or on accountofthefiduciaryrelation."(internalcitationsomitted)). 40. Thecorporationitselfneednotshowanylossforaclaimforbreachoffiduciary

duty to lie. Id. see also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 ("If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of his duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself, the law charges the interest so acquired with a trust for the benefit of the corporation, at its election, whileitdeniestothebetrayerallbenefitandprofit.") 41. The facts of this case fit squarely within this Court's decision in Hollinger

International. Inc. v. Black. 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004). In that case, Conrad Black, a controllingshareholderofplaintiffHollinger,enteredintosecretnegotiationswithathirdparty (theBarclaysbrothers)tosellhisequityinterestinadealthatwouldbenefitBlackatHollinger's expense. See id. at 1046. To make this transaction possible, Black shared Hollinger's confidential, proprietary information with the Barclays, including internal valuations and other proprietary data. See id. ("Stated simply, Black used confidential advice given to him in his officialcapacityatInternationaltonegotiatebehindInternational'sbackwiththeBarclays"). 42. Hollinger, through its independent directors, brought suit to enjoin the

Black/Barclaystransactionandpreservethecompany'seconomicviability. TheCourtfound thatBlackhadviolatedhisfiduciarydutiesofcareandloyaltyinusingthecompany'sinternal informationforhisbenefit,tothedetrimentofthecompanyitself: Blackviolatedhisfiduciarydutyofloyaltyby,amongotheracts,misleading hisfellowdirectorsabouthisconductandfailingtodisclosehisdealingswiththe Barclays, under circumstances in which full disclosure was obviously expected [and] improperly using confidential information belonging to International to advance his own personal interests and not those of International, without authorizationfromhisfellowdirectors."

RLF16871876v.1

11

Id.at106162.TheCourtgrantedtheinjunctionsoughtbyHollingerhaltingtheselfinterested transactionbetweenBlackandtheBarclays,andsubsequentlygrantedsummaryjudgmenttothe companyastoliabilityanddamages.SeeBlackv.HollingerInt'l,872A.2d559,561n.1(Del. 2005). 43. ThefactsherelargelymirrorthoseinHollinger,andreflectthebroaderprinciple

thatafiduciarymaynotdisseminateconfidentialinformationorusethatinformationforhisor herownprofit.Ms.Glassman'sdealwithAnthoswasplainlyundertakenforherownbenefit. In the process, she provided confidential internal information, including contracts, payroll and budget information and board documents to Anthos. She did not inform CrossFit of this disclosure, and gave CrossFit no recourse under her NDA in the event that Anthos misused CrossFit'sdocuments.ThisdisclosureofinternalCrossFitdocumentstomakeherowndealwith Anthos possible is a violation of her obligations. Accordingly, CounterclaimPlaintiffs have statedacolorableclaim. ThereIsaSubstantialRiskofImmediate,IrreparableHarm ifaTemporaryRestrainingOrderisNotGranted 44. CounterclaimPlaintiffs face irreparable harm if CounterclaimDefendant is

allowedtoconsummatehertransactionwithAnthos. 45. First, as noted above, Delaware law provides that the misuse of confidential

corporate information by a fiduciary is, in and of itself, an injury even without a showing of economicloss.See,e.g.,Brophy,70A.2dat8.Here,theviolationofMs.Glassman'sdutyin providingconfidentialmaterialstoAnthosisitselfactionableinequity.CounterclaimPlaintiffs seekonlytohaltfurtherinjurybyenjoiningthecompletionofthesale. 46. Again,theHollinger caseisinstructivehere.TheCourtinthatmatterheldthat

the plaintiff had established a likelihood of irreparable harm arising from the disruption of its 12

RLF16871876v.1

strategicplancausedbyBlack'sunlawfulsaleofequitytoathirdpartyandhismisuseofinsider information. See Hollinger, 844 A.2d at 1090. The Court further noted that the sale, once completed, could not be undone. See id. ("Without an injunction, it will be practically impossible to rescind the Barclays Transaction and [plaintiff] will lose the unique opportunitiesthe[strategicplan]maydevelop.") 47. Similarly,theproposedsaletoAnthosplacesCrossFit'sbusinessstrategyatrisk.

AnthoshasaffirmativelystatedthatitdoesnotshareCrossFit'sstrategyforgrowth,andseeksto recreate CrossFit as, essentially, a merchandising platform for other products. As a result, CounterclaimDefendant'spurportedsaletoAnthos,madepossiblebyonhermisuseofinternal information,constitutesnotjustactionableinjuryinitself,butalsoarisktothelongtermvalue ofCrossFit. 48. Asdescribedabove,CrossFitandMr.Glassmanalsofaceadditionalrisk,suchas

loss of affiliates and adverse tax consequences upon conversion of CrossFit from an S Corporation to a CCorporation if the transaction is allowed to proceed. These harms further weighinfavorofaninjunctioninthiscase. TheBalanceofHardshipsTipsDecidedlyinFavorofCounterclaimPlaintiffs 49. A final consideration in the TRO analysis is whether the balance of hardships

weighsinfavorofgrantingrelief.SeeArkemaInc.v.DowChem.Co.,2010WL2334386,at*5 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010) (granting TRO because the "balance of the hardships is either in equipoiseortipssomewhatinfavorof[plaintiff]."). 50. Onthecurrentfacts,thethreatofimminent,irreparableharmtotheCounterclaim

Plaintiffsdramaticallyoutweighsanypotentialinconveniencethatmightresultfrombarringthe immediatesaleofMs.Glassman'sinterestinCrossFit.

RLF16871876v.1

13

51.

Simplyput,CounterclaimDefendantdoesnotfaceanyrealriskofinjury.There

is no urgency in her proposed sale to Anthos. CounterclaimPlaintiffs believe that the sale to AnthosshouldneveroccurgivenMs.Glassman'smisuseofconfidentialinformation,butifthe Court disagrees, the sale could be consummated at a later date. At this time, Counterclaim Plaintiffs are merely seeking to preserve the status quo to give them and the Court the opportunitytoadjudicatetheirclaims.Moreover,iftheArizonacourtallowsit,Counterclaim Defendant can enter into a different transaction with another buyer (without the misuse of confidentialdata)shouldshewishtosellincludingtheprospectofsellingherequitybackto CrossFit or retain her equity and continue to receive shareholder distributions and the other benefitsofownership. 52. CounterclaimPlaintiffs,bycontrast,facetheriskofirreparableharmassetforth

above. The misuse of CrossFit's corporate information and the negative consequences that proceedfromanAnthosacquisition,weighinfavorofhaltingthesale.Otherwise,theAnthos acquisitionwillerodeshareholdervaluefortheremainingshareholderGregGlassmanwhile allowingMs.Glassmantolockinherillgottenproceeds. CONCLUSION Fortheforegoingreasons,aswellasthosepresentedintheVerifiedComplaint,

53.

CounterclaimPlaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their motion for a temporary restrainingorder,enteranorderintheformattachedhereto,andgrantanysuchotherreliefas justandappropriateunderthecircumstances.

RLF16871876v.1

14

/s/RaymondJ.DiCamillo RaymondJ.DiCamillo(#3188) KevinM.Gallagher(#5337) Richards,Layton&Finger,P.A. 920NorthKingStreet Wilmington,Delaware19801 (302)6517700 AttorneysforDefendantsCrossFit,Inc.andGreg Glassman Dated:August31,2012

RLF16871876v.1

15

EFiled:Aug31201212:35PMEDT TransactionID46205653 CaseNo.7717VCG

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 4

EXHIBIT 5

EFiled:Aug31201212:35PMEDT TransactionID46205653 CaseNo.7717VCG

EFiled:Aug31201212:35PMEDT TransactionID46205653 CaseNo.7717VCG