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Background Notes,' on the Emergence' of Associated Statehood in the Eastern Caribbean

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It is perhaps a little ironic that whereas the British Constitution is a mass of respected norms and conventions resting on a bedrock of Anglo-Saxon "common law" which is appealed to as and when necessary, the British government has, at times, gone to extraordinary lengths in the various parts of her former farflung colonial empire to devise carefully constructed and intricate mechanisms of unitary or federal government. Always included would be carefully defined constitutional guarantees and a passive bureaucracy steeped in the British colonial tradition and heavily imbued with the notions of financial responsibility and utmost prudence. It could be argued that this is a reminder of the "promotion of good government" thesis, predominant in the pre-Second World War period when Britain saw her-imperial role to be that of a trustee' working for, and on behalf of, civilization, albeit on a financial shoestring. Although superseded by the post-1945 emphasis on "self-government," this tradition continued to be respected. A judicious mixture of both these impulses -goodand self-government- was in the eyes of the Colonial Office in 1965-67, to be expressed in the concept of Associated Statehood. and, its subsequent operationalization in the context of the individualistic small islands of the Eastern Caribbean. Basically, it must be seen as an essentially British response to the situation in which many of these islands found themselves after the collapse of federation with their larger, now independent, neighbors. Although a very high degree of permanence .was ascribed. to the arrangement by the British government at the time of its inauguration, most of the islands are seriously considering taking. up the option of independence allowed them under the agreed formulas, following the lead of Grenada in 1974. ' . Overall, the Caribbean has occupied a special place in British imperial history. Not only were all the vicissitudes of

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imperial policy to be found there as elsewhere, but the relatively long time scale to which' these various territories were subject and exposed to British rule" meant that it was inevitable that essentially "British" attitudes and models of government would take strong root. Of equal importance was (and continues to be) the heritage of slavery in the islands, made manifest by the almost complete lack of any indigenous culture, the near total denudation of the old British colonial population (as well as thatof the unfortunate Caribs) and the gradual evolution of a divisive class system based primarily on race. This latter phenomenon is an unfortunate inheritance of the least attractive attribute of British imperialism, that of racialism and social snobbery; The road to Associated Statehood as a means of decolonization has been by no means a smooth one. Characterized by a long history of poverty and uncertain British colonial and commercial policies, the small Eastern Caribbean islands have suffered from the environmental impact of insularity and small size. They began, as is well known, as immensely profitable producers in the European sugar boom of the eighteenth century, and useful pawns in the Anglo-French rivalry of that time. The subsequent reality, however, was one of poverty, neglect and exploitation as they slid into a state of deepening depression after the Napoleonic Wars, and the later withdrawal by Britain of their privileged trading preferences consequent upon the new metropolitan free trade (and cheap food) policy. By the ear-ly twentieth century, Lloyd George could refer to them as "slums of Empire"? without fear of contradiction, and as late as 1938, when the celebrated Royal Commission toured the British West Indies following widespread labor disturbances, Sir Walter Citrine (lktel' Lord Citrine) of the British Trade Union Congress recorded his sense of profound shock and disgust at the prevailing economic and social conditions. I Despite increased aid and a considerable flow of U. S. resources following the construction and operation of numerous bases in the Eastern Caribbean resulting from the Treaty with Britain of 1941, an observer in Antigua in 1955 could record that
the atmosphere is consistently depresing : physically somber and silent, socially morose and lethargic."

also been recognized by the U. S. government following the conclusion of the bases deal. President Roosevelt pronounced against the possible acquisition of the islands remarking:
If we can get our ... bases why, for example, should we buy with them two million headaches, consisting of a number of' human beings who would be a definite economic drag on our country ... 77

The recurrent poverty of the islands was also reported by an anonymous British civil servant who dutifully recorded the "regrettably" high infant mortality rate caused by widespread malnutrition and very poor housing conditions." He was not alone in his concern, for the bad situation had

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Faced with this widespread impoverishment and the historical heritage of a string of little islands stretching from just east of Puerto Rico to the shores of Venezuela, all with their particular administrations, the British government was naturally attracted to the federal idea. The first systematic start was made in 1871 with the Leeward Islands Federation: Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat and Dominica (until 1940), centralized on Antigua. A far more decentralized confederal structure was followed for the Windward Islands in 1885: St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, Tobago (to 1889) and Dominica (after 1940), replacing an earlier grouping that included Barbados but excluded St. Lucia. Following riots, Barbados had withdrawn into isolation from her neighbors, a policy to be repeated in 1965, and asserted its independent spirit based upon a jealously guarded, seventeenth century planter-dominated constitution. Both groupings, however, were to end in 1956 and 1957 respectively to allow for the entry of each island as an individual constituent unit into the newly proclaimed Federation of the West Indies in January 1958, the culmination of all the federal efforts over the years. It was not only the British who expressed occasional enthusiasm for closer union; the small local middle class, then comprising the political elite, had inaugurated meetings in the interwar years, culminating in the Dominica meeting of 1932. But the issue was not so much one of a path to independence but rather expressing an insistence that in the Crown Colony system with its limited franchise and reliance upon executive rule, with a largely nominated Legislative Council, more respect be paid to local interests and that there be more sharing of decision-making by the British colonial administrations. This initiative proved abortive once the British government discovered that, far from reducing expenditure, closer union in the Leeward and Windward Islands would cost more." On the other hand, the British government was gradually accepting the principle that good government is no sub-

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stitute for self-government; indeed, as early as. 1919, L. S. Amery gave a commitment to eventual self-government in the' Empire" although, of course, the contemporary meaning of the term in the context of dominion status before 1931 was essentially internal self-rule. This laudable aim was to be oftimes repeated (but with no time-scale mentioned) as in 1938 when Colonial Secretary Malcolm Maefronald stressed that the main purpose of the British colonial empire was
the gradual spread of freedom among all His Majesty's subjects in whatever part of the Empire they live ... and we can say confidently that the trend is towards the ultimate establishment of the various members of a great Commonwealth' of free peoples and nations.'?

The immediate future for, and the main problem of, the Eastern Caribbean islands was to be made manifest in that sentiment, for they were far from being "self-supporting." Wishing to combine self-government with. a desire to dispose of the majority of its Caribbean dependencies in one administrative--'stroke, the Colonial Office initiated discussions in 1945 for a federation,culminating in the historic Montego Bay Conference in September 1947. Opening the conference, Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones remarked:
I do not want for a moment by the slightest suspicion to convey the idea that His Majesty's Government is urging closer union in order to unload its own responsibility on to the West Indian territories ...

peoples or economic assistance granted by the larger and richer islands. Faced with its collapse in 1962 and the subsequent independence of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago that year, it is not surprising that the smaller islands continued to search for a federalsolution as no other alternative presented itself. The next attempt at federation, now restricted to the Eastern Caribbean, was to founder on much the same grounds as before.vwith Barbados not wishing to assume responsibility' for economic support of five poor island groups. Trinidad had, it is true, offered unitary statehood (i.e., complete amalgamation) to any of the islands which wished it but the offer was ,less than half-hearted and soon abaridoned. The smaller islands, in addition, demanded from Britain full guarantees of economic aid for five years, even at a level far below what had been independently recommended, a commitment which the British government, playing for time, would not give until it was too late." 'Recrimination was, therefore, the order of the day and with the impending independence of Barbados, a leading West Indian economist sadly wrote that "other schemes besides federation are mirages.":" As far as the larger islands were concerned, they had always taunted the "small islander" while everybody recognized that although the smaller ones had most to gain from a federation, they had the least to contribute. The comment by Sir Ellis Clarke, Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the UN Committee of 24 (the so-called Committee against Colonialism), on the matter of the smaller islands that
surely, it. is not ex-colonies such as Trinidad and Tobago which today must be called upon to pay the overdraft due . from colonialism'" . , .

but, en passant, suggested that "full responsible government would be conceded once federation is reolieeti"?' (emphasis added). This was seized upon by the nationalists and two crucial resolutions were passed, one welcoming the principle of federation and the other recognizing that this would allow for more political autonomy, with full independence being gradually achieved after federation. , The unstable' and erratic progress of the West Indies Federation and its eventual inevitable failure has been extensively documented elsewhere." Suffice it to say that it could' not succeed against such disabilities as the desire by Jamaica for weak federal power (and her fundamental differences with Trinidad over this point) ; the deep seated quarrels over the crucial question of the division of financial resources between the unit and federal governments; the varying levels of political advancement in the various territories; the fears, of the smaller islands of domination by 'thelarger ones; and . the lack of any free trade, movement of
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is perhaps indicative of the general feeling. With the-collapse of federation attempts in 1965, at last the inherent differences between the islands, despite their common history, had asserted themselves; the term "British West Indies" had proved to be what it always was ~only a geographical expression. Each West Indian island fulfilled the image of "personal politics" with a dominant leader who, with the full panoply of government, was individually jealous of local autonomy and power base. Between the remaining dependent islands trade was negligible, the bulk of their commercial relations being with Britain. The British connection was also forcefully expressed in education and culture with the result that there was little West Indian. let alone Eastern Caribbean, consciousness. To

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this was added not only barriers represented by stretches of salt water but also a popular fear of the sea itself so that far from being "a glistening road to friendly cultural interchange,"!" it was perceived as a source of death and something to be avoided. This tradition of insularity was compounded by the small size of the islands, both in geographical and economic terms, which expressed itself by a high degree of external penetration of the miniscule economies, and a heavy burden of administration. On the face of it, therefore, the remnants of the old British Caribbean empire were left without a meaningful political future, and their first reaction was to request individually full internal selfgovernment. However, at precisely this time, the British government had begun to consider actively the whole problem of the smaller colonial territories scattered over the globe, now that the larger ones had gained independence. Faced with United Nations pressure and a desire to further liquidate colonial responsibilities, Anthony Greenwood, the Colonial Secretary of the then new Labour government, decided to initiate action. Beginning with a speech at a meeting of the Commonwealth writers of Britain, he referred to the UN General Assembly Resolution on coIonialism'? which states, inter alia, that
inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.

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He went on to comment that while the British government agreed with this, there were a number of smaller and more remote territories which, by their very own circumstances and expression of free choice, would remain linked to Britain and that, therefore, "we ought to be thinking very seriously how we should discharge our continuing responsibility in the years to come." In addition, he noted that
independence is not something conferred like an honorary degree ... Those who really desire independence, get it. The real point is that the pace of political progress is, in the last analysis, a matter for the people themselves.!"

Insofar as the Eastern Caribbean islands were concerned, the thought of independence by both local leaders and the Colonial Office was not, at that time, deemed realistic. Put simply, "the map of social reality"!" carried in the minds of both political elites meant that, for Britain, a new approach was essential. This was rapidly forthcoming from

Colonial Secretary Greenwood, who not only sent a series of all-party groups of MP's to visit various small territories, but also called a private meeting at Oxford University in July 1965 for informal discussions by officials, academics, businessmen and journalists on various aspects of the future relationship. referred to, "and the international aspects of these questions .... "20 It was from this meeting that, for Britain, the concept of Associated Statehood was born. The recently concluded Cook Islands arrangements with New Zealand (whereby foreign affairs and defense matters were left with the excolonial power) were closely scrutinized and considered attractive; the endorsement by the United Nations of this status as being within the terms of Resolution 1541 (XV)21 was further noted. The Western Samoa constitution also attracted attention: here, full independence had been 'granted by New Zealand in 1962 and a Treaty of Friendship signed immediately after independence whereby New Zealand not only undertook to defend the territory but also to represent it overseas where and when necessary. However, the former scheme was preferred by some at the Oxford Conference; it was felt that any residual areas of British responsibility, however construed, must be met by adequate legal provisions to exercise power when necessary," a problem which was, ironically, to lead to British, official. disenchantment with Associated Statehood later on. On the other hand, what was certainly denied were full citizenship rights on the lines of the present Northern Ireland or Isle of Man relationship, for internal British political reasons. F'inally, it was sincerely felt that this scheme presented at least a long-term solution. This is borne out by the intricate procedural hurdles that any future Associated State would have to go through to achieve independence (although as will be seen subsequently, a considerable loophole later presented itself), despite the "voluntary" nature of the proposed agreements. Also, as the Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference makes clear, the alternative of full internal self-government within a colonial status "was a situation which had been found acceptable in the case of territories on the road to independence within a reasonably short period and within a foreseeable future (emphasis added), but was likely to create difficulties for both sides if unduly prolonged.'?" It was explained that in this situation international law dictated that the British government would be held ultimately responsible for all aspects of that territory's affairs, whether internal, constitutional
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or external, "matters which they had no effective means of controlling. " That decided, preliminary discussions with the island governments began in November 1965 and constitutional .proposals were formulated in a White Paper'" in December to serve as a basis for discussion at the ensuing Constitu.tional Conferences held early in 1966. Seven island units were offered, the. new status: Antigua, St. Kitts-NevisAnguilla, St, Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica, Grenada and 'Montserrat. However, Montserrat turned it down in favor of an "advanced" colonial constitution, both as an expression of a reluctance to emulate neighboring islands and a concern .over economic matters whereby, within the context of a colonial status, British aid would not only be morally but also . legally binding." Given the nature of the prevailing economic conditions of the islands, this point was to be reiterated .constantly at all three Constitutional Conferences. 'I'he f'irst conference, that for Antigua (February 28 to March 15, 1966) was marked by some confusion on both sides. as to what exactly was being offered. Chief Minister (later Premier) Vere Bird, who had played a leading role in the breakdown of the Eastern Caribbean federation negotiations, had to be persuaded of the merits of Associated Statehood, and he sought the maximum power possible. What was unexpected by the Antiguans were the considerable legislative and executive powers reserved by the British government to discharge their responsibilities for defense and .f'oreign affairs," whereas in the Cook Islands constitution New Zealand had relied heavily upon the island's self-gov, erning powers to give effect to its international obligations. The Windward Islands Conference (April 18 to May 6, 1966) also discussed this question but was marked by disagreements over the question of aid, a crucial problem for the impoverished economies of St. Vincent and Dominica. The question came to a head at the final conference, that for SL Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla (May 12 to May 26). Worried that "there had been, other conferences beforehand, the then Chief Minister; Paul Southwell, was concerned that the British government "had been forced to entrench itself on certain matters on which [I J would have preferred. ; . disentrenched.,,27He unsuccessfully pressed for the status of association to be reviewed every foul' years "to take advantage of new ideas'?" but, in contrast to the experience of the Windward Islands, successfully insisted that economic matters be discussed concurrently with the constitutional talks. Also the delegation managed to obtain Britain's agreement that,
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whereas to terminate the statehood arrangement in favor of independence required a two-thirds majority in both the legislature and a referendum, the latter would not be necessary .should it wish to federate or unite with anindependent Commonwealth Caribbean nation or another AssociatedState," Further pressure. resulted ina lessening of the powers of the new office of British Government Representative (who .would, in effect, bethe "overseas arm" of the Foreign Office in the discharge of its legal responsibilities, as well as fulfilling .. British consular function when necessary), and ~ the inclusion of a provision that if any British troops were to , be stationed in the state, they were to be subject to territorial and not military laws. Also, Britain agreed to consider the inclusion of a representative of the state "in any British delegation whenever a matter materially affecting the interests of St .. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla is being discussed in an international body of which Britain is a member.Y'" Finally, for every Associated State, certain delegated powers were granted concerning external relations whereby each island could "conduct on behalf of Her Majesty's Government"affairs of local interest "subject to the understanding that the Government ... will inform Her Majesty's Government in . advance of any proposal for the .exercise of the delegated executive authority and will keep Her Majesty's Government fully informed of theprogress and conduct of any negotiations related to those external affairs.":" Allowance was also made for further delegation to be considered on request by , the state concerned. Following the Constitutional Conferences, each Legisla'.tive Council ratified the agreements despite some misgivings expressed by some of the local press. The West Indies Act .was passed in the British Parliament in February 1967 and all except St. Vincent acceded to the new status of "Statehood in Association with Great Britain" in early 1967. St. Vincent followed in 1969 when a confused internal political situation was finally resolved. On a popular level, the new status was seen as, to all intents and purposes, independence, but misgivings were often voiced within and without the governments. To the poorer islands it meant continued effective control by the British government by .virtue of the provision of grant-in-aid to cover recurrent expenditure. This has involved very close scrutiny of .the governments' accounts by the Ministry for Overseas Development, acting for the British Treasury; only now is this particular aid being transferred to the Caribbean Development Bank for admin; istration on a multilateral basis." Dissatisfaction was also

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expressed at the negative attitude of the British government towards increased trade and immigration between themselves. and Britain, particularly in the context of British membership of the European Economic Community, which Britain finally joined in 1973. Subsequently, the islands were considerably disturbed to discover that Community aid and trade access were to be considered not under the 1975 Lome Agreement but rather under Part IV of the 1957 Rome Treaty, which was designed for dependencies. Besides the psychological factor, they were inadequately represented at the negotiations in Brussels. Elsewhere there was, and continues to be, direct opposition to British policy in the United Nations. Prompted by its Fourth Committee, the General Assembly refused to recognize the status of Associated Statehood as constituting effective decolonization." Since 1967 opinions as to the political and economic viabili ty "threshold" for independence have changed as independence, for Grenada in 1974 has shown. Indeed, negotia'tions for the independence of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla (although, in reality only the first two islands are involved) are continuing even though the 1976 budget shows that over 60 per cent of expenditure is recurrent and that a planned deficit of approximately US $6million is left largely uncovered." But, in 1966, British reluctance to concede independence was very noticeable, as has been mentioned earlier. Although the status was billed as "voluntary" in the sense that a procedural route for independence was carefully mapped out, the hurdles were considerable and tortuous. But not wishing to tie Britain forever, the legal draftsmen of the Colonial Office provided'" that Britain (and the other parties to the agreements) could unilaterally terminate the association, giving six months notice. It is this that has provided a largely unforessen loophole for independence, the exploitation of which Britain has acquiesced. In essence, it is a confirmation of the "Round Table" consensus method so favored by the British in the past; in these circumstances, a pre-independence election to set the new political scene, plus evidence of a wide spectrum of support for the idea of independence, is normally required. ' How has the British government reacted to the operationalization of the status of association? Basically, the concern is about the delicate balance between the responsihilities of the respective parties to the agreement. Any boundary between internal and external affairs is, by nature, obscure ami full of pitfalls. Allied to this legitimate. concern is the underlying problem of responsibility without power.

Originally commented upon in the debate on the West Indies Bill," this was shown up in sharp relief during the Anguillan crisis of March 1969. Invited to intervene by the St. Kitts government to restore law and order and arrest the movement toward secession, Britain agreed to military iaction because of apparent evidence of outside interests being involved, prejudicial to her responsibilities for external affairs, Once on Anguilla, the strength of the secessionist movement and its considerable lobby of support in the British Parlia.ment persuaded the British government not to restore Anguilla to the three-island state. Since Britain had divested itself of all legal authority to sever the union without the agreement of the Associated State, in the words of one authority, "all the dilemmas concealed by the concept of associated statehood lay bare.":" On the basis of that experience alone, the British government will not extend the status to other islands in the Caribbean or elsewhere." In retrospect, the concept of Associated Statehood was a genuine attempt at decolonization in an area of the old colonial empire that had known many false starts. The question of how long it will continue is an open one. But whatever its faults, it is just one more political step in the evolution of the English-speaking Caribbean ..
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Notes
"Trusteeship: Theory and Practice," Year 5 (London: Stevens, 1951), p. 223. 2. St. Kitts, dubbed the "Cradle of the Caribbean," was settled in 1623, followed by Barbados in 1625. 3. Quoted in Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro: The Histo. ry of the Caribbean, 1492~1969 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1~70), p. 44.3. . .. .
Book of World Affairs

1. :D. H. N.Johnson,

4. Lord Citrine, Men at Work: The Autobiography of Lord Curine .. (London: Hutchinson, 1964), pp. 80 ff. . . 5. David Lowenthal, "Economic Tribulations in the Caribbean: A Case Study in the British West Indies," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 9 (1955), p. 71. 6. Colonial Reports: Leeward Islands, 1949 and 1950 (London: HMSO, 1951), pp. 35-37. 7. F.D. Roosevelt to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Memorandum of January 11, 1941, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941II1 (Washington: GPO, 1959), p. 3. 8. J. Proctor, "The Development of the Idea of Federation in the British Caribbean Territories," Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 5 (June 1957), pp. 20-22. 9. House of Comrnons Debates, 20 July 1919, Col. 188. 10. Speech at the Oxford University Summer School on Colonial Administration, August 1938, quoted in W. R. Crocker, Self-Government for the Colonies (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949), p. 135. 11. Colonial Office, Conference on the Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies, Part Two, Proceedinqe (London: HMSO, 1948, Colonial No. 218), pp. 8-9. It should be noted that this link between federation and independence, especially for the smaller islands, was certainly not a new one, the first reference made to it being by C. S. Salmon in the Preface to his The Caribbean Confederation (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1888). 12. See, e. g., Amitai Etzioni, "A Union that Failed: The Federation of the West Indies (1958-62)," in Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965); and John Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968). 13. K. Bahadoorsingh, "The East Caribbean Federation Attempts," in Roy Preiswerk (Ed.), Regionalism and the Commomoeolth. Caribbean (St. Augustine, Trinidad: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, 1969), p. 162.
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14. W. Arthur Lewis, The Agony of the Eight (1965), reprinted in David Lowenthal and Lambros Comitas (Eds.), The Aftermath of Sovereignty (New York: Doubleday, 1973), p. 233. 15. UN, GAOR (19th Session, 1964), Summary Record, Docum. A/ AC.109/SC4/SR.9, p. 5. 16. J. Gillin, "Is there a Modern Caribbean Culture? ," in A. Curtis Wilgus (Ed.), The Caribbean at Mid-Century (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1962), p. 133. 17. UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). The full title is "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." 18. Quoted in W. P. Kirkman, Unscrambling an Empire (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), p. 173. 19. Wendell Bell (Ed.), The Democratic Revolution in the West Indies (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publ. Co., 1967), p. 5. 20. House of Commons Debates, 15 July 1965, Cols. 762-63. 21. Principle VI of this Resolution allows for ex-colonial territories to reach a full measure of self-government either by becoming independent or by free association, or by integration with another independent state. However, Principle VII insists that "Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned, expressed through informed and democratic processes." 22. Information from personal interviews. 23. Cmnd. 3021/1966 (London: HMSO, 1966), pp. 6-7. 24. Cmnd. 2685/1965 (London: HMSO, 1965). 25. Information from personal interviews in Montserrat, It should be also noted that the remaining very small territories -Cay man Islands, Turks and Caicos and the British Virgin Islandswere not offered this status, and remain British Crown Colenies. 26. M. Broderick, "Associated Statehood -A New Form of Decolonisation," Int'l. and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 17 (April 1968), p. 371. 27. The Labour Spokesman (St. Kitts), 11 May 1966. 28. Ibid., 13 May 1966. 29. Advocate-News (Barbados), 25 May 1966.
30. Report on the St.' Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Constitutional Confer'ence, Comnd. 303111966 (London: HMSO, 1966), pp. 8-9.

31. These items were contained in a Memorandum sent to each island government; this wording is taken from that of St. Lucia, Memorandum No. 68, Commonwealth Office, 16 February 1967: .

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32. P. Emmanuel, "New Budgetary Assistance Proposals for the Less Developed Countries: Some Implications," Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs, Vol. 2 (May 1976),pp. 36. 33. Ultimately the oppositionarose from the denial by the British government that a referendum -or similar test of opinionwas necessary before the status was granted. For a summary of the debate, see UN Monthly Chronicle: March 19M, pp. 2530; April 1967, pp. 25-36; January 1966, pp. 70-76. 34. St. Christopher-N evis-Anguilla, 'Budget" Address, April 1976. 35. West Indies Act, 1967, Section 10(2). 36. House of Commons Debates, 31 January 1967, Col. 351. 37. S.A. de Smith, Microstates and Micronesia (New York: N. Y. U. 'Press, 1970), p. 69. 38. Information from personal interviews, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.
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