COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991] Facts: The petitioners in G.R.

Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process. In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail. The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs. Section 1. Bail Defined CASES: Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals 247 SCRA 741 Facts: Petitioner Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged as co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder for the killing of members of the Bucag family in Gingoog City of which, petitioner was the mayor at the time. The trial of the case was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for petitioners apprehension, but before it could be served on him, petitioner, through his counsel filed a motion for admission to bail with the trial court. Petitioner furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Gingoyon , to the Regional State prosecutor and the private prosecutor. The trial proceeded to hear the application for bail, but only assistant prosecutor appeared for the prosecution and four of petitioners counsel. Petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to acute costochondritis, his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter of the IBP and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he is considered being in custody of the law. The prosecution neither supported nor opposed the said application for bail. The trial court admitted petitioner to bail. The following day, petitioner managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also appeared personally and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. 20 days after the resolution of the trial court, Prosecutor Gingoyon filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that he received a copy of the petition for admission to bail only a day after the hearing. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, and so Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter the respondent Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals annulled the decision of the trial court in granting bail to petitioner on the ground that they were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Responednt court observed that at the time of petitioners application for bail, he was not yet in the custody of the law, apparently because he filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. Respondent court also noted that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that no bail was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons held that the grant of bail was doubly improvident. Issue: A.Whether or not petitioner was in the custody of the law when it applied for bail before the arrest warrant was served on him. B. Whether or not bail was granted with grave abuse of discretion considering that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt was strong. Ruling: A. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required under the conditions

Issues: (1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process. (2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to preemptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM) It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for

specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 10As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. 11As this Court has put it in a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is available to "all persons" where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law. On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area B. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of

proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum. The Court ruled that Prosecutor Abejo was authorized and could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing for bail. He was also explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional State Prosecutors Office, to manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case, was waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence. The prosecution was dispensing with the introduction of evidence en contra and this it did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that is during the mandatory hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that such was the position of the prosecution. G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991 RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying reconsideration, be set aside. On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings. Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988. Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990. ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health." RULING: Yes, The bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into

effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines . It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes. The judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Silverio vs Ca FACTS: Silverio was charged criminally for violation of Revised Securities Act. For more than two years, there were series of postponements of the arraignment scheduled therein. He could not be arraigned because he had gone abroad several times without the necessary court approval. The prosecution got fed up already. So upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court ordered the DFA to cancel Silverios passport or to deny the application to re-new the passport. The Commission on Immigration is also ordered to prevent Silverio from leaving the country. Now, according to Silverio, the courts orders are unconstitutional because under the Constitution, courts can impair the right of a citizen to travel only on the ground of national security, public safety or public health. Silverio: Is there an issue of national security? Wala man! Public safety? Wala man! Public health? Wala rin! Therefore, you cannot prevent me from travelling. The SC here traced the history of that constitutional provision. How did that provision came out? HELD: The phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party. (because during the Marcos era, he created a travel processing agency headed by General Ver, where every Filipino who wants to travel abroad must be cleared by that office.) Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts MARCOS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN 247 SCRA (August 9, 1995) FACTS: Criminal charges were filed against Imelda Marcos. In one of the cases, she was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. After conviction, she filed a motion for reconsideration and while her motion was p ending, she filed a motion for leave to travel abroad for treatment of hypertensive heart disease, uncontrolled angina pectoris, and anterior myocardial infarction. The motion was supported by medical reports prepared by her physician and cardiologist and other doctors in Makati Medical Center. Presiding Justice Garchitorena referred the issue to a committee of cardiologists from Health Center of the Philippines for extra opinion on some questions among which was: Is Marcos

condition fatal? Or, Is she in danger of dying? The committee submitted a report which was heard in the presence of the two lawyers of Marcos. Report ng committee: she was sick but the evidence not confirm the allegation that Mrs. Marcos is in the high risk group of sudden cardiac death. In other words, she is sick but she is not in danger of dyiing. With that, the Sandiganbayan, Ah hindi pala malala eh! So, wala! Motion denied! Marcos went to the SC attacking the Sandiganbayan order alleging that the court adopted an unusual and unorthodox conduct by motu propio conducting a third party asking the latter to give an opinion. Marcos: Nobody is questioning. Bakit ba itong Sandiganbayan will not take the words of my doctors? Parang walang kumpiyansa! HELD: The Sandiganbayan acted properly. Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. The subject lay beyond its competence and since the grant of the request depended on the verification of the claim that petitioner was suffering from a medical condition that was alleged to be serious and life threatening, the respondent court, we think, followed the only prudent course available of seeking the opinion of other specialists in the field. Indeed, when even in their own field of expertise (law) courts are allowed to invite amici curiae to shed light on recondite points of law, there is no reason for denying them assistance on other subjects. Perhaps the best proof that she is not in the group is the fact that she ran in the last election for a seat in the House of Representatives and won. It may be assumed that she waged an arduous political campaign but apparently is none the worse for it. Meaning, even in law which is already your field of expertise, the court are even allowed to seek the help of other lawyers, lalo na when it comes to the field of medicine. And finally after one year, she ran for congresswoman in Leyte and she won. Of course when you campaign, you have to undergo a terrible schedule of campaigns. Eh bakit buhay ka pa? So in other words, you are not really in danger of dying. And she is very much alive now. MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [247 SCRA 127; G.R. NO. 115132-34; 9 AUG 1995] Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's First Division denying petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for medical treatment. The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. This was supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio. Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here. The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all of the motions.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or orders or any judicial action of respondent court.

Issue: Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings (3) said that there was no necessity to get medical treatment abroad.

HELD A single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is a variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment; and act deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. BP 22 applies even where the dishonored checks were issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guaranty and not as actual payment, as the law does not make any distinction. On the other hand, the checks were not payment for a pre-existing obligation nut as consideration for each shipment of rice. The checks were issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of her property. Reyes made good 3 of the checks, giving assurance to Garcia that the remaining checks were fully funded. Her failure to make good the checks raised the prima facie inference of deceit.

Held: No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous. Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. What would be objectionable would be if respondent court obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in deciding a case against them. In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries. On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which summarily states that the required medical treatment was available here in the Philippines and that the expertise and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment. The heart ailments of the petitioner were not as severe as that was reported by Dr. Anastacio. Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution People vs. Reyes 9 May GR 101127-31, 18 November 1993 FACTS Lorie Garcia delivered rice to Cresencia Reyes, as accommodation to her friend Manny Cabrera who had no more stock to sell. Reyes issued 6 checks for 6 orders delivered in different dates. Only 3 of the 6 checks were made good, the other 3 were returned by the bank due to insufficient funds. Garcia notified Reyes of the dishonor and the latter promised to pay her their total value. Despite demands, Reyes failed to make good the checks or replace them with cash. 3 criminal cases for violation of BP 22 and 2 criminal cases for estafa were filed against Reyes. ISSUE Whether a single act of issuing a check may entail criminal liability of both violation of BP 22 and Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (Estafa).