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6314

Operational Research Section

~~JII

31 Dc ;tober 19)43

A VIII BV3BER CU I AND OPERATIONS FROMyi THE POINT OF VIEW OF BOIIING ACCU.CY.
1 January

1943 - L October 19)43

INTRODUCTION

The combat conditions under

which

daylight heavy bombardment

operations have been conducted int this Theater over the past 15 months have compelled not only the development and putting into effect of new bombing techniques and tactical procedures, but likewise of new methods of evaluating the results of such operations. The assessment of the bombing results of heavy bombardment units operating under VIII Bomber Command, from the viewpoint of bombing accur-

acy, has been one of the functions of the Operational Research Section attached to this Command. In performing this work, a very large amount It is believed that the time has come when

of dat. has been accumulated.

it will be useful to give an account of (a) the methods which have been
formulated in making quantitative evaluations of our bombing, and (b) the

results of, and the lessons learned from, the application of these criteria to our operations since 1 January 1943. memorandum. To these ends, this memorandum has been divided into two parts: Such are the purposes of this

Part

THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS "OF PATTERN BOIIIG

1. The necessity for segrega.ting the bbmbfalls of the separate group formations. Analysis resulting from segregation of Group bombfalls.

2.

V
A. B. C. Pattern aiming errors Pattern characteristics Assessment of accuracy of Group atacks b around aiming points. counts

"

lx.)vG tA D:'DAT 3 YEARINTERVALS; DElLISSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DIR 5200.10

DOD

PART II
RESULTS OF APPLICATION OF THESE CRITERIA TO OPERATIONS

SINCE 1 JANUARY
Review of operations as a whole.

1943

1. 2.

Certain specific relationships which have been shown to affect bombing results in this Theater. A. Effect of different techniques of releasing bombs when attacking in formation. Effect of pattern sizes on the percent of bombs placed within 1000 feet of the aiming point. Problems connected with the size of the overall attacking forces.

B.

C.

At the end of this memorandum will be found two supplementary appendices: Appendix I: Basic Data and uieasurements. Classification of Patterns by Area and Aiming Error.

Appendix II:

Part

THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF PATTERN BOLBING Je take it that there are two basic objectives in any study of bombing accuracy as such: (1) to point the direction in which steps for

the improvement of bombing should proceed, through the isolation of the nature and causes of bomb dispersion; and (2) to provide a guide as to

the most effective use of a bombing force, through a knowledge of its capabilities. Hence, any methods for the quantitative analysis of bombing First, they must be

results must be selected with two things in mind:

discriminating, in that they must measure not only overall results, but the important components as well, so that the relation between particular causes and their associated effects will not be concealed by broad observations drawn from a heterogeneous mixture of causes. Second, such

methods must be penetrating, in that they should result in furnishing a reasonable basis upon which to base predictions for future operations or disposition of forces, by the theory of probability or otherwise.

-2-

e Necessity for. Segregating the Bobfalls of the Separate Group Formations. Essential to the attainment of the two basic objectives of bombing accuracy analysis, mentioned above, is the development of a technique for segregating the separate bombfalls of the respective Group formations composing an attacking force. The necessity for this arises

from the fact that combat conditions in this Theater are such as to make it defensively impossible for individual aircraft to bomb, one at a time, a given target. Our bombers are forced to attack from tight defensive

formations, the basic unit of which has been the Group, comprising up to 21 aircraft. In consequence, in formation bombing we are concerned prim-

arily with the pattern or the Group bombfall as a whole rather than with the individual bombs dropped by the several aircraft. Various methods of sighting and releasing bombs from such Group formations have been tried, ranging from a technique where one man's sighting operation controls all the bombs of the Group, to one in which independent sighting operations are carried out in each aircraft, at least for range. Hence, any method of analysis which fails to take

into account the bombing results achieved by individual Group formations will scarcely be revealing. Suppose, for example, that an attack on a

certain target was carried out by four Group formations, and suppose that photographs reveal that one-half of all the bombs dropped by the entire attacking force fell within the effective target area. Although this is

highly useful information, it leaves one in the dark as to whether (a) two Group formations dropped in and two dropped out, or (b) each of the four Groups put about half of its bombs in. Clearly, information as to

what was done by each Group is crucial when it comes to the question of what is causing bombing errors and what to do about it, as well as in any comparison between different bombing techniques. The segregation of the individual Group bombfalls is accomplished by study of the photographs taken frqm the aircraft during the bombing attack. Suffice it to say here that it has been found possible to
:i.i

y.-f

ta

high degree of reliability, the bombfalls of

the individual Groups in all but a comparatively few cases where, because other special circumof the lack of adequate photographic coverageor or stances, the application of the technique becomes impossible. This segre-

gation constitutes the cornerstone on which all of the analysis work described in this memorandum rests. 2. Analysis Resulting from Segregation of Group Bombfalls.

Having in hand a large number of individual Group bomb plots, we have undertaken to analyze the results quantitatively, in the following three different respects: A. How well are these patterns being aimed?

'B. What are the pattern characteristics? C. What percentage of bombs are being placed within specified distances of pre-assigned aiming points?

We proceed to discuss these in more detail. A. Pattern Aiming Errors The error in aiming each individual Group bombfall has been determined as follows: Since all of our daylight operations over the European Continent involve formation bombing, it was decided that it would be appropriate to regard the entire Group fall as the result of a single aiming operation, and to record for.each such fall a single range error, deflection error, and radial error: these three measurements being designed, then, to give

in a nut-shell the story of how well the pattern in question was aimed, quite aside from what kind of pattern the bombs formed. In a large number and

of cases the pattern was, in fact, placed as a result of one sighting; even when.this was not the case, the concept still seemed to be sound.

The reference point in the pattern, to which errors with respect to the aiming point should be measured, was at first chosen as the M.P.I. (Mean Point of Impact) of the pattern. After some trial this proved un-

satisfactory, since two or three stray sticks of bombs may fall well outside the main body of the pattern, the periphery of the main fall and hence pull the M.P.I. out to

or even outside of it.

Measuring the

error

.cd

.misleadn ynt

Frther trials

led to the adoption of the center of that circle with 1000 foot radius which encloses the maximum number of bombs in ferred to as "Pattern Center") The errors of each pattern, Pattern Center. the fall (hereinafter re-

as the most revealing point of reference.

then, have been measured with respect to this

The particular radius of 1.000 feet was chosen empirically:

a circle of this size appeared to bear a sensible relation to actual and optimum pattern size, and also, which is just as important, to the size

of most of our target areas.

In other words, many of our targets are such

that, all other things being equal, a count of the number of bombs falling within 1000 feet of the aiming point is in fair relation to the objective sought to be accomplished. Center, as above defined, Thus an aiming operation which places the Pattern exactly on the aiming point may fairly be regarded

as a perfect aiming of the pattern involved. The following analysis of the aiming errors of group bomb patterns covers the period 1 January 1913 through

15

October 1943.

In this

period there were 615 separate visual daylight group attacks on Continental Europe by VIII Bomber Command. The bombfalls of 398 of these attacks have Of these 398, 113 have

been separately plotted from strike photographs,

been rejected from this analysis because .no -ohdreht compact pattern was formed, or because they represent attacks on targets of opportunity or some other reason made error measurement inappropriate. The pattern

centers of the remaining 285 have then been plotted about one common aiming point (A.P.), the result: with a common direction of run. Figure l shows

the A.P. for all falls is the center of the small circle,

and all runs have been adjusted so as to be towards the top of the page. (Actually only 26 pattern centers appear on the diagram, the remaining

20 being errors so large that they were off the page with the scale as used.) These 285 aiming operations have now been analyzed as follows: A histogram of the radial errors was made using 200-foot class intervals. (Figure 2.) The distribution shows a conspicuous peak cor-

responding to a radial distance from the A. P. of roughly 800 feet. * This and all other "Figures" ref~ found at the end of Part I.
t

in

this Part"will be

r,

he shape of the distribution is very closely similar to that

which would be displayed by a circular normal distribution, with the following striking difference: a true circular normal distribution of

errors, whose histogram showed a peak at about'800 feet (indicating standard errors of the same magnitude for each of the component error distributions), would fall more than 99% within 3000 feet of the aiming point. The actual distribution, however, shows a much larger residue outabout 33%.

side of the 3000-foot circle --

In our'opinion this fact furnishes a first rough classification of errors into two kinds, namely, "normal" and "gross" errors. tribution of errors found is exactly the kind of thing The dis-

vhich

would arise

from (i) a set of aiming operations all performed under substantially the same conditions, and (ii) an additional set of aiming operations, subject to disturbing influences not present in the former set. The former would

account for the inner normal distribution, representing "normal" errors, the latter for the outer set, representing "gross" errors. Pursuing this hypothesis, the gross errors (80 aimings with radial errors at least 3000 feet) were next rejected, separate histograms drawn for range and deflection for the 205 aimings retained, and normal distribution curves fitted to them (Figures 3 and 4). The fit is satis-

factory; the resulting theoretical distributions correspond to average range errors of 760 feet, average deflection errors of 730 feet. distribution obtained is thus essentially circular. The

The circular normal

distribution corresponding to two perpendicular linear normal distributions with average errors = 715 feet gives rise to the theoretical radial histogram curve which is shown drawn on Figure 2 for comparison with the actual radial distribution found in practice. The average value of the radial

errors in normal aimings is approximately 1210 feet. Combat crew reports provide ample evidence that there is a substantial number of misses in bombing which have nothing whatever to do with the inherent capacity of the bombsight as an instrument or with the

ability of the bombardiers.

A formation may have to sheer out of line

:"t

just before bombs are "away"

because of the dangpr..of'; dropping bombs

through a second formation; bad visibility may make bombing a mere guess; the formation may be under attack; and the target may be incorrectly identified. This list is by no means exhaustive. It seems clear that there

are in fact present disturbing influences which we should expect to give rise to errors vhich are in general larger and more capriciously distributed than those errors obtained during runs when these influences are absent. No such separation of gross from.normalaiming errors can pos-

sibly be exact, and an inspection of Figure 2 suggests that the rise of the histogram over the curve in the range 2000--3000 may be due to the inclusion of errors which are more nearlyof the second kind among the normal aimings. Despite this reservation, the approximate separation

seems so clear that in the following text we. adopt a conventional definition: normal aimings are taken to be those in which the pattern center all other

is less than or equal to 3000 feet from the aiming point: aimings constitute gross errors.

There is an aspect of group leader pattern bombing which tends to make the normal aiming errors of patterns so aimed slightly larger than would otherwise be the case. This aspect is the non-constant position

of the bombs from the lead ship in relation to the bomb pattern as a whole. What the lead bombardier actually aims is the first bomb to leave his bombbay. If this first bomb always bursts at the effective pattern center,

then of course the lead bombardier would only need to set his cross hairs on the point in the target area which has been pre-selected as optimum for this purpose. In practice, however, the first of the leader's bombs Tests have been carried out, both in

is rarely at the pattern center.

practice missions and in combat, in an effort to collect all possible evidence on this point. Preliminary conclusions are (a) that the position

of the leader's bombs with relation to the pattern as a whole varies considerably, thus constituting a source of error in aiming the pattern; and (b) that the average of examples examined so far indicate that the lead bombardier's sighting should proba1ye:short by an amount not

iv;

.ii

excee information on this poi. B.

r testp are expected to yield more precise

Pattern Characteristics. As we have already indicated, daylight attacks by heavy bombers

in this Theater involve pattern bombing.

The present section of this

memorandum is devoted to a discussion of the characteristics of the bombing patterns obtained. A discussion of the different methods used by a formation of aircraft to lay down a pattern of bombs over a.target will be found in a later section of this memorandum. For the present it is sufficient to A Group formation, known as a

give the following brief descriptions:

"combat box", which typically consists of between 16 and 21 aircraft, passes over the target. formation in its track. The lead aircraft in the box guides the whole The instant at which each aircraft releases its A

bombs may be determined by one sighting operation or by several.

typical procedure is for the lead bombardier to sight for range as well as deflection and to drop his bombs on his own sighting, and for the other bombardiers in the box to release their bombs the instant they see the leader's bombs leave the bay. Usually, then, all the bombs carried by

the entire formation leave their shackles within a few seconds of each other, although early or late drops, hung bombs, etc., quently, The usual practice is for all ships in the formation to carry the same bomb load. The most common loadings have been 10 or 12 x 500A ship's load will be occur not infre-

pound G.P. or 5 or 6 x 1000-pound G.P. bombs.

dropped in train, by intervalometer or manually, producing a "stick" of bursts along track. From typical altitudes (20,000 to 25,000 feet) the

sticks from ea~ch plane depart widely from the theoretical rectilinear equispaced configuration, and sticks from different ships are usually intermingled in quite haphazard fashion. The resulting aggregate of

bomb bursts on the ground takes the form of a very irregular cluster or

Part II, Section 2A, "Effect of Different Techniques of Releasing Bombs whe trmation" (p. 18).
' , j " ,'.

<:,. ...

"?blobV c ust :r

in Th ich prectlcal1y no. or

or' sustuo i,_ *Jsc -rnrbi Ptteror,"

woo r?

u: the

roup s
t i'

titshould

of color;,
thoe

P rnv t

oxiol ci tiy c are=ful

no1 nt(c d

out

i'.

is -a

pa torn by courtesy only;

orlthbilitv

tKP

which hove:

boon

Inaodt

on the assumption tin qually suoc ;droes and

a ircr' P:t can cdrop bombs in colur :r:s

_a.true patterri,,_ th

b1w

no

relation

to the t r w of bo mbinp at

pr ;sont uno-r 6i

cus-

sion. Phi folio';L~nT

showc

arce
the

x mples of' those: Grouep-patterns.

Th erroirv

the, Iret

ion

Df

attack.
d,rd Groin)

Pattonwr-o redb-,
-

atProst,

?7..)r3.

1t~n

~ronJby 3O~th Group

: t

il t,

x.',.4.

ito

Pattern Dropped by

9L Group at Flensburg, 19.5.h3. th

Pattern Droppei by 379th Group at Le Bourget,

16.8.43.

Between two and three hundred of such Group patterns have been isolated and plotted on a scale of 1 to 25,000. measurements and counts e now describe the

hich we have applied to these in an attempt to

charactcrize them as accurately as possible. The first is how large is it? question which should be answered about a bomb pattern As one way of measuring the density or compactness of

such patterns, we have recorded their length along track and width across track (excluding a small number of patterns which fail to form any coherent cluster at all). The profpE of measuring presents a difficulty

-10-

s obvious. If a bomb foot;r etaflge, but incl ude05 s

'cel.,

f r

x m pl,

I''flabwhi
e:1_ ll~s i

3 0 0 x J JO O

iag-l cburst

a mile further along ti a

cause, bar a rrnni

its lengt;h as

tarily hung bomb,

it is clearly more sensible to record

4000 feet rather

than stretch the measurement to include the

mavorick burst; face? cehave

yet once the door is opened in this direction, one is

vihery

iJth -a series of nice decisions as to just

to driaw the line.

'imply measured the. patterns as "se nsibly" 4possible;, probably

(but not certainly)

excluding

no more. than 10'

of the

total

identified

bombs from the. enclosing ractangles.

A typoical "meeasurcment rectangle"1

is as folious:

The,

results

of

these measurements wi11

be found in full in Appendix II.

The average for the whole Command for the period 1 January 19L43 to 15 October 1l1_0 is 3700 feet long and 2500 fect wide. bombs, Per 500 or 1000 pound

fall 2000 x 2000 is about the lower limit of our experience. 100 lbs., or fragment^.tion bombs) tend to give

Smaller bombs (300 lbs. ,

patterns which are longer along track--in mentation bombs, by perhaps 5' ,. s: co.ra atrn
er:ceig'cio

the

case of the 20-pound frag-

y of masurie

th

density or compactness of the

is asfolows ;

The "p~tt rn centecr" h, s be n ?efined in th1e ha ce(1000 ft.radius) which In general,

st+cetro

enclos s

to

grreatest number of burst-s.

small

cmatpt

terns wLl have a relateively high pc rta.ge of their bombs 1within this
circa _, t, rr. wail.

the

pcerccntage '11tend

to fall off for larg. loose patr h' centag~c of

a. r:crdon-forr"

each plo$ted3 paftten

r~nbified

bombs which fall within this circle of greatest density VIII Bomber Command's experience has been

that about a circle.

% of

a Group's pattern can be enclosed in such

For the sake of completeness, this same percentage will also be found recorded in Appendix II for a.circle drawn around the same center with a 2000-foot radius. For this radius the average of our experience

has been that such a circle will contain 81% of the identified bombs. C. Assessment of Accuracy of Group Attacks by Counts Around Aiming Points After a period of trial and error, consultation with staff and Group commanding officers, and accumulation of experience with the character of our bombing patterns and targets, the decision was made that a simple, reliable, and revealing index to accuracy of bombing would be provided by recording, for each Group attack on a target, the percent of all the identified bombs which were found within 1000 feet of the preassigned aiming point. As supplementary data, like counts have been re-

corded for a 2000-foot radius. It should be emphasized that the essential characteristics of formation bombing are such as to make inapplicable any appraisal of accuracy which is based upon a count of hits on particular structures in a target area. Bombing with combat-box patterns means that individual bombs If a d.ircle be drawn

are not being aimed at individual structures at all.

circumscribing the target complex, our efforts are really directed bo placing a compact pattern of bombs in such a position that as many as possible come within this circle, depending upon chance and a high density to provide the hits on key structures. Thus, a method of attack which

yields a high percentage of bombs in this circle must be adjudged a good one, even though we may have been "unlucky" enough to miss the vital pinpoints on this particular attack. Again, the size of the circle to be taken is difficult to decide on merely theoretical grounds. Different size targets suggest different

radii, but it is clearly essential to have a standard for comparison purposes. The choice of 1000 feet O feet as radii was made simply

4
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'1

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i

.1

-1.

Q*
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because

abservation of target sizes and bomt

these would give rise to an intelligible set of figures, .sensitive to changes in accuracy, and because a good man :of our industrial targets ' are. comparable in size to the smaller circle. One other point should be mentioned in this connection, concerning the reliability of this measurement: A count of bursts on strike It

photographs rarely comes up to the number of bombs actually dropped.

is our belief that for the vast majority of falls the bombs that are not found are distributed in essentially the same manner as the ones that are; so that if, of all bomb bursts identified, 10% are within the 1000-

foot circle, we may assume the same distribution for all of the bombs dropped. Correctness of this assumption has been tested in the following manner: In a number of missions, clear areas were located which were uncratered by previous operations and free of structures (e.g., airfields). Let A designate such an area. Suppose that the strike photox, y, and

graphs show that the identified bomb patterns from formations z A. overlap If A, with proportional parts of p, q and r z

respectively within are designated

the total numbers of bombs dropped by x, y and

by f, g, and

h, then the assumption set forth above means that our best

estimate of the total number of bombs dropped within Ais given by pf + qg + rh. The character of the terrain being selected for the purpose,

we have available a means of checking this estimate (and hence our basic assumption) simply by counting the number of bomb craters within area on post-raid reconnaissance photographs. A

The largest error disclosed by

application of this test was 15%, -with most -cases considerably -lower. In the period 1 January 19h3 to 15 October 19L.3, the percent of the total identified group fall hich was plotted within 1000 feet of the Appendix
-TH,

aiming point has been recorded for each group attack in column
under column

S4iSimilar percentages for a 2000-foot radius have been listed

.
'

7)

" ";

~;

PART II

Sp
1.

. TION OF THESE CRITERIA TO OPERATIONTS SINCE 1 AN ARY 1983

Review of Operations as a Whole. In Part I of this memorandum we have described the methods of

measurement employed with respect to individual Group formation patterns. In making cumulative comparisons, however, the additional problem arises as to the selection and classification of the data. This involves bear-

ing carefully in mind the objective of the particular comparison sought. Thus, if the objective is to compare the intrinsic performance during one time period with another from an accuracy point of view, significant differences may be completely masked by differences in weather conditions or by the purely fortuitous circumstances of better photographic coverage during one period than the other, if no discrimination is used in the selection of the data. In.general, we have adopted three classifications of the data insofar as direct counts about the aiming point-are concerned: Missions; Points; (1) All

(2) Successful Missions on Targets with Pre-Assigned Aiming and (3) Successful Group-Attacks on Targets with Pre-Assigned

Aiming Points. All Missions: Here we express as a percent, of all bombs dropped

over enemy territory, those known to have fallen within 1000 and 2000 feet, respectively, of pre-assigned aiming points. It is obvious that this

classification results in.a very conservative appraisal of bombing accuracy. Successful Missions on Targets with Pre-Assigned Aiming. Points: By "successful mission" we mean any mission in which one or more of the participating Group formations in a task force (i.e., a force, regardless of size, designated to attack a specified target at or about the same time) succeeds in placing some bombs within 1000 feet of a pre-assigned aiming point. place Conversely, where no Group formation of an attacking force s of the aiming point, it is classified

~-ih-

as a "mission failure" and all data from such attaking. Groups are excluded from this second classification. Our purpose in setting up this

classification is to isolate and reject those instances in which some overriding situation, affecting all components equally, made normal bombing of a pre-assigned target virtually impossible. This includes

such factors as weather, smoke screens, and faulty navigation, The particular line of demarcation employed was adopted only after investigation of a reasonable number of cases disclosed that some such factor was present in almost all instances where no Group succeeded in placing any bombs within 1000 feet of a pre-assigned aiming point. Hence, it is evident that a table showing the average performance of the Command or any unit thereof on days where no such factor was present is more revealing as to intrinsic "bombing ability" than one in which all operations are lumped together. By the same token, attacks on targets without pre-assigned aiming points (all targets of opportunity and a relatively small number of assigned secondary or last resort targets) must be excluded for this purpose. Due to the absence of a pre-determined reference point, there

is no completely objective standard for measuring performance. The classification thus set up is designed to answer the question "What measure of accuracy is achieved by our force, or any component thereof, against pre-assigned targets when conditions are such as to make reasonably accurate bombing possible?" Successful Group-Attacks on Targets with Pre-Assigned Aiming Points: In a preceding section (p.7)we have defined and discussed It should be fairly evident that for certain purposes,

"gross error."

particularly in isolating causes and developing plans for improvement, it is also of interest to know the rate of performance achieved when neither the overriding influences which affect an entire force nor the disturbing influences which affect particular formations and interfere. with normal aiming operations are present. flect by isolating those cases in This we have sought to re-

lhich neither influence appears to be

operating..

ix Twe have indicated (under Column 18) for each

attack by a Group formation since 1 January 1943, whether it falls under the category of successful attack, gross error, mission failure, attack on a target without a pre-assigned aiming point, or for some reason cannot be appraised. One further fact should be borne in mind. In all instances

counts have been made about a single point and in no case have such counts been made about any point other than a pre-assigned aiming point. With the foregoing considerations in mind, we set forth below a general review of the experience of the B-17 units of this Command on daylight attacks on European targets. (This review is limited to the theoperations of the B-2L

B-17 units only because lack of continuity in

units, since these studies were started, has made any genuine appraisal of the latter impossible.) From a time point of view, the experience of this Command falls into four reasonably distinct periods: 1943; 1943; (2) (1) 17 August 1942 to 1 January (3) 15 May 1943 to 1 August

1 January 1943 to 15 May 1943; 1 August 1943 to date.

and (4)

The first period was one of

adaptation of our bombing technique to unusually severe conditions of defense and weather; the second was one in which a relatively small force

(L groups) reached a reasonably high degree of efficiency in the employment of techniques which had evolved from the earlier period; the third

was one in which a large number of new Groups and combat inexperienced personnel joined the Command and in which techniques were being found and perfected for the most efficient use of large attacking forces; the

fourth and last period has been one in which new policies in the use of the overall force have been in effect and the techniques of group bombing have been in process of refinement. As to the first period, 17 August 1942 to 1 January 1943, resuits cannot be expressed with the same degree of assurance as for the remaining periods. The methods of analysis heretofore described had

not yet been developed and estimates must of necessity be based upon

-163-

composite results of the entire attacking force (in. contrast to the Group components), as shown by photographic covrge taken following the operations. As to the remaining three periods, however, the basis the same methods of anal-

of comparison is in all respects identical --

ysis have been employed and the same measurements applied. The results for these periods, broken down into the three classifications referred to above are as follows:

(1)

All Missions

% of HE

Bombs Which Fell Within 1000' . 20001 of A.P. of A.P.

-

No. of Group Attacks

-

Aug.
Jan. May Aug.

17, 1942 - Jan. 1, 1, 1943 - May 15, I 5 1943 - Aug,. 1, 1, 1943 - Oct. 15,

1943 19143 19143 1943

11.3
6.3

24.6

17.6
28.7

130O

113 191 228

(2)

Successful Missions on Targets with Pre-Assigned Aiming Points

-

Aug. 17, 1942

Jan. 1,

12143

Jan. 1, 1943 - May l, 1943 May 15,. 1943 - Aug. 1, 1943 Aug. 1, 19143 - 0ct.l5, 1943
(3)

16.7

l 5016" 36.4
29.6

10.6
21.9

48.5

76 114 135

Successful Group-Attacks on Targets with Pre-Assigned Aiming Points 19142 1943 1943 1943 - Jan. 1, - May 15, -. Aug. 1, -,0ct.l1, 1943 19143
-

Aug. 17, Jan. 1, May 15, Aug. 1,

1943
1943

27.0 18.3

59,0

51.0
63.5

28.7

47 ;66 103

The striking thing, of course, is that in the latter period, despite the problems which size of force alone'impose, 16 groups have been brought to a level of efficiency somewhat above that attained after six months' experience by a much smaller force,

* These figures are estimates based upon certain selected missions for

'which post-operation photographic coverage was sufficient to make reasonably accurate judgments. Corresponding figures cannot be given for the remaining two classifications because (1) the coverage was not sufficient to give a judgment on all missions and (2) in the absence of Group breakddwns, segregation 6f gross errors was impossible.

p--m-

2.

Certain Specific Relationships Which Have Been Shown to Affect Bombing Results in This Theater Bearing in mind that, from the point of view of an operating

theater, probably the most important objective of studies of this nature is as a guide to improvement in results, we have deemed it a matter of interest to set forth some of the specific relationships which have clearly emerged from the analyses heretofore described. be discussed under three headings: (A) These will

Effect of Different Techniques (B) Effect of Pattern

of Releasing Bombs, When Attacking in Formation,

Sizes on the Percent of Bombs Placed Within 1000 Ft. of the Aiming Point, and (C) Relationship between Size of the Overall Attacking

Force and Bombing Efficiency. A. Effect of Different Techniques of Releasing Bombs When Attacking in Formation When, for defensive reasons, it is found necessary to attack a target by formation of planes rather than by individual aircraft, the question immediately arises as how to determine most effectively the time of release for the various aircraft in the formation. When air-

craft attack a target individually, it is obvious that the release of bombs from each aircraft must be-the result of independent aiming operations both as to range and deflection. On the other hand, where

several airplanes attack a target in formation, it is equally obvious that, except for the lead ship, no individual aircraft exercises control over its deflection course. As to time of release (range sighting), (1) all ships in the

however, several alternative courses are open:

formation may determine time of release by independent sighting operations; (2) all ships may release on signal from the lead ship which (3)" some combihation intermediate

alone performs a sighting operation;

between (1) and- (2)- may be adopted, such as all ships in,.each element or squadron dropping on signal from their respective leaders who in turn will have performed a range sighting operation. "Squadron leader"

dropping as used in this memorandum covers only cases where the squadron

has bombed as part of a Grcp formationy as distinguished from individual

1 --

-.

I
-18-

.,,
u-: Q-'~ec~s -~i~:;

"squadron runs" which have been used only very infrequently -nthis~
Theater. Each of the three alternatives listed above has actually been employed numerous times in this Theater, and records have been kept of the resulting performances. The following table sets forth the comparative

performance, in terms of percentage of total weight of bombs dropped which fell within 1000 and 2000 feet respectively of the aiming point, under

each of the various techniques.

For each categQry all cases between 1

January 1943 and 15 October 1943, forwhich positive information is available, have been included, except cases where there was no pre-assigned aiming point or wherd no participating Group formation dropped any bombs within 1000 feet of the aiming point. % of HE Bombs Dropped Which Fell Within 2000' of A.P. 1000' of A.P. 24.6 11.8 8.3 53.0 32.2 28.0 No. of Group Attacks 132 100 21

Technique of Sighting Group Leader Squadron Leader Independent Range

The relative effectiveness of the three methods seems to cut across all other known variables, such as the order of the Groups over target, the degree of opposition, and particular Group differences. For

instance, a comparison of the results under the several techniques where Group formations were 1st or 2nd over the target is as follows:*

% of HE Bombs Dropped
Technique of Sighting Group Leader 1000 Which Fell. Within 2000' of A.P. of A.P. 25.6 56.0

No.

of.

Group Attacks 71

Squadron Leader Independent Range

17.5 12.0

41.0 31.6

45
10

Similarly, where individual Groups have tried more than one technique over a 'sufficient period of time, the same relationship appears. The

contrast between dropping on the Group Leader and each aircraft making individual range sightings is illustrated by the experience of the following two groups:
* The effect upon bombing efficiency of the order in which the several

Groups of an attacking force go over the target is discussed later (p. 25 ).

F Group
306th

HE BombsiUhich ithin 1000' of A. P.

% of HE Bombs Which
Fell Within 2000' of. A. P. Range 32.6 39.0

Group
Leader 21.5 16.7

Independent
Range 1.9 8.0

Group
Leader l.0

Independent

100th

47.5

While the contrast between dropping on the Group Leader and dropping on
Squadron Leaders is illustrated by the experience of the following two groups:

Group 91st

%of HE Bombs Which Fell TJithin 10001 of A. P. Squadron Group Leader Leader
33.9

% of HE Bombs Which Fell Within 20001 of A.P. Squadron Group Leader. Leader
66. 67.0 30.5 32.4

94th

41.0

11..0 10.4

Thus, it appears fairly certain that, at least under the operating conditions which have prevailed in this Theater, there is a significant advantage to the technique of dropping on the Group leader when bombing from group formations. The question as to why this should be so is more difficult to answer with assurance. In searching for reasons probably one of the most

significant facts is that, except for the lead ship, aircraft flying in formation under combat conditions seldom provide a stable platform from which to perform a sighting operation. ship, Aircraft, other than the lead

are faced with the prime necessity of keeping in formation, "often

while under attack and on bomb runs which of necessity must be of relatively short duration. Synchronization on a target becomes a virtually

impossible task i'here the platform itself is

hot

hod lovel and at a It, may also be true,

constant speed fQr, a reasonable period of time.

of course, that under combat conditions differences in skill between bombardiers become greatly magnified, such that a carefully selected lead.bombardier will consistently do a considerably better sighting job than the average of all the other bombardiers in the Group formation. But whatever the reasons, the evidence pointed to above would

indicate quite conclusively that,at least as long as attacks must be in formatiop under conditions approximating those that have prevailed in

this Theater for the past year, a substantial advazntage in effectiveness

.. ,;

~nis~'~S~,B~.

20

rests with the technique of releasing bombs on theGroup formation leader. B. Effect of Pattern Sizes on the Percent of Bombs Placed Within 1000 Feet of the A. P. We.have heretofore .discussed various techniques employed by Group formations in laying down a bomb pattern. We are here concerned with the

relationship between the size of the pattern and the percent of bombs placed within 1000 feet of the aiming point. Analysis shows that on the

average the smaller the pattern the greater the percentage of bombs within 1000 feet of the aiming point, at least where the radial error of the center of the bomb pattern is less than 1200 feet. Two different measures of the compactness of a bomb pattern have been employed. The dimensions of a rectangle (sides parallel to the track

of the formation across the target) which encloses the bomb fall have been recorded. For the same bombfall patterns, the.percent of the bombs lying

within a circle of 1000-foot radius which encloses the greatest number of bombs, was also determined. It is apparent that there will be a close connection between the dimensions of the pattern and the percent of bombs in the circle so placed as to circumscribe the greatest number of bombs. are associated with small percents and vice versa. Large dimensions

The relation of

pattern size with the percent of bombs in a circle of 1000-foot radius about the aiming point is not so immediately discernible. Small patterns

well aimed will give large percentages, and poorly aimed may give zero percent. Large patterns cannot give high percentages even if well aimed

but will tolerate greater aiming errors. To ascertain the relation as shown by the patterns made in operations against enemy targets, the patterns have been classified in a twoway scheme as follows: The patterns were first divided into five classes

based on their area as computed from the dimensions of the rectangle. Each of these five classes was then subdivided into six sections depending on the aiming error as measured by the radial distance from the aiming

point to the center of the pattern.

All patterns thus fall in one of 30

L,

qyal L

a given aiming error and area, The average

percent of bombs in the 1000-foot circle about the aiming point for each of these categories is. given below: Average Percent of Bombs in l000Ft. Circle About the Aiming Point as Related to Area and Aiming Error Area of Pattern Radial Error hal0 800 100 in Feet of Center of Pattern 1601- 200112018012000 2900 1600 1200 32% 31% 23% 22% 21% 26% 20% 19% 12% 15% 15% 17% Ave. for All Errors

5 Million Sq. 70% Ft. or Less 5 to 72-Million Sq. Ft. 53%. 72 to 10 Mil43% lion Sq. Ft. 10 to 12 Mil39% lion Sq. Ft. Over l2 Mil35% lion Sq. Ft. Ave. All Areas 56a

58%

3%
7% 6% 10% 6% 7%

1% 2% 4% 7%

39%
"28%, 20% 20% 20% 27%

42%
37%

34%
31%

4%
3%

l%

The averages are based on from 17 to 3 instances, there being 183 patterns available for classification. given in detail in Appendix The individual figures are

HI.

The tabulation shows that, at all levels of aiming error up to 1200 feet. (which is the average aiming error), patterns of 122 million square feet or over were only half aseffective as patterns of 5 million square feet or less in area. The correlation between aiming error and That is, there is

pattern area is negligible; (.12) and not significant.

no tendency of small aiming errors to be associated with s mall patterns. The proportion of gross errors is quite constant for all pattern sizes. For these reasons, attention is di.rectedto the column at the right which shows the average percent of bombs in the thousand foot circle about the aiming pcint for the five different area classes averaged over all aiming errors. I. is inescapable that any technique of dropping which would

reduce the pattern area to 5 million square feet or less Would raise the air force average of 27% for aimed patterns very considerably, possibly

q;without requiring. any improvement in the accuracy of aiming.

This is brought out forcibly by cassifying the 183 patterns into three groups: namely, small compact patterns, large patterns, and

t-22
V

a.

..

patterns intermeiathird fall in each classification.

of the patterns The average dimensions, aiming errors,

and percent of bombs within 1000 feet of the aiming point are shown below:
Average Aiming Error Average

Within 1000
Feet of.A.P.

2500' 1100 Feet

2050

3550,

1270 Feet

23.8%

2350

h8o0'

1250 Feet

20.2%

57

Large Patterns

3200'
.

The effect of shortening the pattern is

illustrated by the ad-

vantage, already pointed out, Qf Group leader dropping over the techniques of squadron leader dropping or independent range sightings.. The following

table makes it clear that longer patterns have resulted from squadron leader dropping and independent range sightings:

-2-,r

Average % of
' ' verage Pattern imensions (feet) Along Track Across Track Bornbfall 1000' of Pattern Center 58 50 4.6
iithin

Technique Group Leader Squadron Leader Independent Range 3200 4200 2500 2500 2600

2000' of Pattern Center 86 76 68

4600

The average radial distance of the pattern centers from assigned aiming points for all categories is essentially the same, i.e., 1.200 and 1300 feet. between

The advantage of shortening the pattern resulting , where

from Group leader dropping is graphically illustrated in Fig. 5

percentage of bombs within 1000 feet of the aiming point is plotted against errors of the center of the pattern for group leader dropping cases as opposed to all other cases. It will be noted that for errors

up to at least 2500 feet, an advantage rests with the more compact patterns resulting from dropping on the Group leader, such advantage becoming increasingly greater as the errors become smaller. The present overall average dimensions of the pattern are approximately 2500 feet across track and 3500 feet along track. Both these

dimensions, particularly the length, appear to exceed the dimensions occupied by the formation in the air. The increased length is in part

accounted for by the length of the train of bombs dropped by each aircraft. To offset this, efforts have been made to use minimum inter-

valometer settings and to emphasize the advantage of a tight formation. However, perhaps the single most important factor in accounting for the increased length is the lack of simultaneity of bomb release by the various aircraft in the Group formation. For example, since one squadron

flies above the lead ship, there is inevitably some delay occasioned by using the appearance of the bombs from the lead ship as a release signal. There appears to be some difficulty in finding a satisfactory visual signal, especially since the bombardiers may be otherwise engaged at the time. The idea of a radio activated release relay has been suggested

but such adevice has not yet been used operationally. The evidence which is now available to show the degree of improvement which could be attainedd6 T the bombing pattern is

y 4

iA!tuJ

a strong inducement for exploring every possible method to achieve this result. C. Relationship of Size of the Overall Attacking Force on Bombing Efficiency. In addition to the problem of obtaining the maximum effectiveness from individual Group formations there is the problem of obtaining the maximum effectiveness from an overall attacking force where such force is composed of several Group formations. Of course, if it were

true that the performance of individual Group formations were independent of the size of the overall attacking force, identical.. the two problems would be

It early became apparent, however, that such independence

did not exist, at least under the methods of attack then being employed. Again, without in the first instance attempting to give reasons, the experience of this Command for the first seven months of this year

has demonstrated conclusively that the practice of sending several Group formations over a target in trail and in close succession results in a rapid decline in the bombing efficiency of successive Groups.. This is

quickly seen by reference to the following table where the average performance of formations in various positions over the target from 1 January 1943 to 1 August 1943 are set forth for comparison. (As in

other tables, all instances have been included, except cases where there was no pre-assigned aiming point or where no participating Group formation dropped any bombs within 1000 feet of the aiming point.)

% of HE Bombs Dropped
Order Over Target 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th and Over Overall Average Which Fell Within 1000' of A. P. 2000' of A.P. 23.14 16.3 9.9 7.8 4.2 13.4 9.9 37.1. 32.0 20.1 19.8 33.2

No. of Group Attacks 48

43
36 33 32 192

Throughout the entire period represented by the above table, a policy of rotation of Groups in the respective positions was followed; Thus,

hence, each Group is about equally represented in each position.

p11

the relationship is independent of Group differences. The si:nificance of the steady decline in performance as the position in efficiency of Group

the overall attacking force becomes apparent. The net effect must be that

further removed from the lead is

the overall efficiency of an attacking force must be considerably below that of its period in component Groups when in the lead position. question, Thus, during the of their

the groups of this Command averaged 23.h4%

bombs within 1000 feet of the aiming point when in

the lead position,

while the overall average of the Command was only 13..h%. Furthermore, the phenomenon in question must also mean that the larger the attacking forces employed, the lower will be the overall efficiency of our operations. This is illustrated by a comparison of the

average performance of attacking forces where h or less Group formations participated and where more than L participated during this same period. This comparison is as follows:

% of HE Bombs Which Fell Within

10000 of A.P. 4 or less Group formations 5 or more Group formations 16.6 10.h 2000 of A.P. 37.6 29.h

In this connection, it should also be pointed out that there is no evidence that would indicate that the preceding Group formations are better because there are other Groups behind them. If this were

so, the performance of the first two Group formations should vary with the total size of force. That this is not the case is shown by the

following table where the average performance of the first two Groups in the attacking force is listed according to the total number of formations in the attacking force. (For the purpose of this table, our employed.)

entire experience from 1 January to 1 October is

Percent of HE Bombs Dropped by First Two Group Formations Over the Target which Fell within 1000 Feet of AP Related to Number of Groups Attacking

% in
1000' 2 Group Force 3 Group Force L Group Force 5 or More Group Force 19 19 22. 19

% in 2000' 50 6 L6

No. of Instances 10 10 13 23 23

~-

Thus, it

appears reasonably clear that the performance of the

leading Group formations is independent of the number of Groups behind them. This being true, it is quite apparent that one way to increase

the overall efficiency of the Command would be to split the available force into as many independent attacking forces as possible, thereby increasing the proportion of lsts and 2nds. .This would be true what-

ever may be the reasons for a decline in efficiency in larger attacking forces. Bearing in mind, however, that defensive considerations may

well dictate a minimum size force and that strategical considerations may frequently require an attack upon a single target at approximately the same time by relatively .large forces, it is of the utmost importance to try to isolate the causes for the lowered efficiency of succeeding Groups. In this connection, it is important to note that by far the major factor in the decline of succeeding formations is the increasing proportion of bad misses or gross errors; i.e., where the pattern center misses by over 3000 feet. The following table shows for each position

the percentage of gross errors between 1 January 1943 and 1 August 1943. (Again excluding attacks where no Group formation placed any bombs within 1000 feet of the aiming point and attacks on targets without pre-assigned aiming points.) % of Total Attacks Which Were Gross Errors 10% 37% 39% 58% 72%

Position 1st 2nd 3rd hth 5th and Over

On the other hand, while there is some indication of an enhancement of the aiming error in positions beyond second place where normal aimings have been made, it is much less significant the effect of gross errors. than

The following table reflects the rela-

tive performance during the same period (January 1 - August 1) where gross errors are excluded.

..... _K1

n Positio
'

A ?._
101fA..

__

__

__

__

of HE Bombs Whfkiich Fell Within

201oAP.

No.of
Instances

Position

18t

26. 2

55.5

43
28 22

2nd 3rd.

25sO 16.4
18.3

57.0

4th
5th and Over
Thus, it

51

5.0

50.0

appears to be a fair conclusion that the primary

factor is something which results in frequent complete misses which

probably has little or nothing to do with the'aiming operation as such.

investigation has revealed two factors which probably account,

at least in large part, for the phenomenon here in question: increasing likelihood of mistake, confusion,

(1)

The

and actual interference

with the.bombing run the farther back in the procession

a Group

forma-

tion may be, resulting from the fact that its actions are inevitably

in-

fl.uenced

to a greater or less degree by the actions of preceding Groups;

and (2) the increasing difficulty of target identification resulting from obscuration of the target and surrounding terrain by the bombfalls of preceding Groups. So far as (1) is concerned, assuming'it. is desirable for other reason: to put several Group formations on

single target at or about

the same time, the first correction that suggests itself is sufficient spacing over the target between attacking units to give greater freedom of action and eliminate the danger of interference, point of view, however, From a defensive

this is probably not feasible at present for It has actually been tried,

units as small as a single group formation, however,

with combat wing units, i.e., units composed of twpo or three

group formations. Since approximately 1 August, the policy has been ' fairly consistently followed of spacing combat wings over the target by intervals of 1 to
5

minutes.

It is thereforeof interest to compare the results

achieved under this system with the previous policy of sending Group formations over in trail and in close succession,. This comparison is reflected in the following table where the experience for the period

ry -g~to~l h-28

uut

~ J~htor 8 COn~t~ras~

th e p er-iod 1 August

Order Over Target 1st

% of HE Bombs Which Fell Within 1000' of A.P. Jan. 1 Aug. 1 Aug. 1 - Oct. 15 23.4 26.5

% of Improvement 13%

2nd
3rd hth 5th and Over Overall Average

16.3
9.9 7.8

19.8
22.2 20.119.8 21.9

21%
12h% 158% 370% 63%

h.2
13.1

The striking thing, of course, is that while there has been some improvement in Group performance in Ist and 2nd position, the performance in succeeding positions has improved to a much greater extent. Bearing in mind that Groups and combat wings have been consistently rotated so far as position is' concerned, the inference is reasonably compelling that the major portion of the improvement in succeeding positions is in large measure due to the tactic in question rather than an intrinsic improvement in individual Group performances. It is likewise of significance to point out that a major factor in the improvement has been the reduction of gross errors. Thus, whereas

from 1 January to 1 August, hOt of all group attacks were gross errors, from 1 August tol5 October only 24% of such attacks were gross errors. On the other hand, after eliminating gross errors for both periods, only a 28% improvement over the earlier period appears as against a 63% improvement if gross errors are not excluded. The average percentage of

bombs which fell within 10001 of the aiming point on this basis during the earlier period was 22.h% as against 28.6% in the later period. Thus, it appears to be a reasonable inference that the practice of spacing combat wings over the target has had the effect of cutting down the incidence. of gross errors and thereby increasing the overall bombing efficiency of a total attacking force. Two observations remain to be made: (1) While the practice of spacing combat wings over the target

has gone a long way to eliminate the differential between the early and late Group formations, there still remains a substantial

'

IC

PR1

n &ge

in favor of the first. combat wing over the target.

The dif-

ficulties that remain are probably largely associated with the problem of target obscuration by early bombfalls. where strategically and defensively feasible This means, of course, that

further gains can be ex-

pected by (a) attacking several targets at once or (b) by increasing the spacing to intervals which are sufficient to allow the target to clear. (2) The differential between Groups. within a combat wing still

persists as illustrated by the relationship.between the performance of the lst and 2nd Groups. it Assuming that defensive considerations make

impossible to increase the spacing between the groups within a combat remains to be solved. Conclusion With the type of bombing which has been developed in this

wing, this problem still

Theater,

there

are

three principal ways in which results may be improved: (2) by reducing the

(1) by reducing the proportion of gross errors; aiming errors 6f formation patterns; due to the formation pattern.

and (3) by reducing the dispersion

As to (1), great strides have already been made by recent developments in tactics. However, there still remain 2L of our group

attacks which are gross errors.

To reduce this figure to 15% -- an

objective which does not seem unreasonable -- would increase the overall effectiveness of our bombing by'at least 20%, even without any further improvement in individual group efforts. There are at least two causes

of gross errors in visual bombing which it seems can be still further minimized in order to approach this result: target or surrounding 'terrain; (a) misidentification of

and (b) confusion between formations

approaching a target in cldse sequence. As to (2) -improvement in the aiming

of patterns

-.

little

can be said at this time.

While there has been considerable variation

among Groups in this regard, indicating the possibility of overall improvement, the average for the entire force has tended to remain fairly

1 4

-30-

"

jk,2t

constant. le "Phy;m

nz

pffc

dzirction in -which improvement

can be looked. for in this respect is more careful selection and training of lead combat teams. As to (3) -- reduction in the dispersion within a Group formation pattern -- great improvement still seems possible. Indeed,

it is in this respect that there is reason to hope for a striking advance in effectiveness. Every device at our disposal should be employed There is every

to cut down the length of Group formation patterns.

reason to believe that any success in this direction will immediately reflect in substantial improvement in results.

Operational Research Section

Prepared by: Dr. 1W. J. Youden, Dr. J. A. Clarkson, Major P C. Scott, OR.S. Consultants. Approved for release by: John M. Harlan, A.C. Lt. Col. Section Chief, O.R.S.

-.31

ni- t~~Si s

jl-:

~-

c -.

vi
:

Operational Research Section Hq. VIII Bomber Coimnand 15 October 1943

LJEGxEN
(1) Targeta

FOR COLUviN Heyh

(2)

Date of attacko

(3)

order over target.

Number of aircraft attaokingo

(4)

(5) i' pe of bomb:

(6)

Number of bombs carried by each aircraft,

(7)
(8)

Altitude in hundreds of feet,

Percent of identified bombs which fell pre-assigned aiming point 0 within 1000 feet of the

(9)

Percent of identified bombs which fell within 2000 feet of the pre-assigneed aiming point. Percent of identified bombs which fell within 1000 feet of the "Pattern Centers " Percent of identified bombs which fell within 2000 feet of the "Pattern Center."

(10)

(11)

(12)
(13)

Range error of "Pattern Center,," expressed in hundreds of feet.

Deflection error of "Pattern Center," expressed in Radial error of "Pattern Center," expressed in hundreds of feet.

(14)
(15) (16) (17)

hundreds of feet..

Length of pattern along track, expressed in hundreds of fet, Width of pattern across track, expressed in hundreds of feet. Technique of sighting employed: L; S

Al

SR: I:

ships dropped on signal from the formation leader. .Ul ships in each squadron dropped on signal from their respective squadron leaders, who in turn had made independent range sighting operations, (Included in this classification are all cases where some ship or ships other than the lead ship made independent range sightings, provided the number of such ships was less than 50 of the total in the formation.) Each squadron made an independent run on target with all ships in squadron formation dropping on signal from the squadron leader. Mere than 50o of the ships in the formation made independent range sightings.

(18)

Classification of attacks: A: B: C: D: Cases wrhere the radial error of the "Pattern Center" was less than 3000 feoto Cases where for some reason, such as smoke or cloud cover, the degree of success of the attack could not be measured. Cases of attacks on targets of opportunity. Cases of "Mission Failures," i.e., where an effort was made to bomb an assigned target but no participating formation placed ny bombs within 1000 fee;t of the pr-assined aiming point.

E:

Cases of "Gross 'Errors," i.e., wshere the radial error of the "attern Cener" w~s 300 feet or more, even tehurh 0ome othecr partciating fomation plced some bomnbs ithin 1,000 feeti of the pr~-s signed aming pont~i.a _

Operational Research Section Hq,. VIII Bomber Command. B-17 Groups Total Nuber of Group AQSuccessful B, 91 92 303

S1JiV' AIY OF LItS

E iNTS ON BOLBFALL PATTEPNIS "

15 October.

305

306
59 21

351

379

381
28

384Com.1st 26
26

B J..94
31

9
33 11

96

100

385 16

388

390
15

Cor

3.rd

. BD.
205 85
21

VIII

B.C.

Attacks

58
21 2
12 11

28

61

58 31
4
10 8

37 9 2
10 6

29 12 2 9
1

410

37 15 3

25 11
1

23
11

25

615 233

Attacks

8 1
10

20
2
13

10 2
8 2

7 3 4
0

148
21

12 3 8 5 3 11 23 29

7
2

8
1

10
3 8
0

C.~ Attacks on largetis of

fl, E

Attacks Unable to A raise S, o-s

3
10 10. 15

0
9

5
8 5 4

3 6
1

42
151

95 55 91

9
4

8
1

6
1

3
1 2

56

Attacks ITjhen All1 on

lion :t a!led =Grass Errors-

4 5 8
18

10 16

12 9
16
25

5 14. 22
25

10

7 9
15

4 9
17

12 5
7 18 12 16 43

6 9
15
21

4
2511.6

Total
imb i

Attacks

8
13

7
12
21

6
12
25

10 17
25

8.7
15.0
2l- 2

8,
13 17
24.

13
31
31

12
22 26

20 30 37

14
25 35

S 3 i'3 a

Attacks Listed.

19
26

rTaE

-n.ier a and. E Attacks Listed. Under A al Attac ks

29
17

2419

27 20 36 63

23 21 40 55

Tot
T

22 38
60

32
52
60

17

15 29 62

21

20.x. 2 35.0
56o 6

23
48
60

2.

2443
60

33
76 76 500
800

29
52
61 850 660
1270

40
61 76 630
390
770

25
45 63 640
480
900

Y~i

attacks Listed.
. A ane.

38
61

32
58

29
49

37
52

45
62 910 710

40

~ 1ttacks
Average I

Listed3

55
800 670

i ific tion
&e .
c l1020

nu er

670
670

1070
860

Errcor

Feet
;~of
Bo

i n SLrcle

'10001-l
2000
f.1tL'Jj25
are

Aroux id .t t-n Cente Average J: ,evn

Hundred. Feet
Note:

11480 53 77 42 33

56 80

25

835 800 1070 810 725 600 850 1030 7T-0 750 780 610 1120 860 850 960 795 1280 1230 1270 1360 1090 1450 1190 1270 1700 51 53 62 63 57 47 56 47 80 76 79 89 91 84 71 86 73 40 44 34 33 44 4+0 38 42 36 25 26 21 23 23 25 28 27 27

84.0

500
850
1110

530

810
5~6
84 31 25

675
685 1110

775
755
1210

1360
55 5
85

1080 1190

1040
68
93 28 22

43

83 2y.

50 75
42 25

60
92 33 25

67
98 24 23

56
83 31 26

57

55

39
26

37

25

Error mneasuremen'ts

for

Class A

only.

The

last four lines exclud~e fragment;ation bombs.

Section 'Operational Research Hq~ VIII Bober Cor:inm n'.

Operationa AUIMFIHMOF BOhvLThLPTIIS Research.Section 9ist 0roup

15 October 19.E3 (L)

(2
3. 13. 23. 27r 16.
2J.

(3)
1 3 41 -I

(4-)

(5)

(6)
10

(7)
220 24.0 234-. 235 255 230 250 21205
225

(8) 32 30

(9) 62

(10)
52

(II)

(12)

(13)

(4)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

St~ Xazaire
Lorien~t v~i11?e!:shaven Brest venes . may, buen

27.
4-0

12. 130 22a 28a

R>'Iouen

12 10 9 1416 13 2 3 16 15 2 1 15 13 2 3 12 1 13 4- 18 3 16 18 2 L:15
LL

1000 ?.E
T500 L'

5 5 5 5

500

4-5

26 s 2S

16 R
8L

31-

4-5
30

1000
1000

'iH~

1i'
iE

500 i 1000 HE~

10

39

59
78 0

41

3
1! S

50

35
20 0

4-9
50

72
88

5
5
1000

7S
535

o6- L 2L
26

35
7
Ii

35
35
4-5 3 20

D D

42
SR A
Can

Tom'

5
6

1000 E

5 5
6

210 240C 265 230 260

'V+2r

73
61 08 50

4-8 63
55
57 55

33

79
82 97

P,.

7
1 L5

25 20 35 55
25 25
20 20
20

21

7T 14-L1
4-IR

6!

20

~orienit
t.

167
17. . 1314-, 15Q 17.
19.

1 1 1

16

100 0
1000 EB 1000

6 6

(Thaiecuato 100 64-

85 61 L 231
2L

48

SR
SR

A
A

L5

13
28 4- 2

6429 100

89

BE

5 5
5
10

JIc z sie

424

15

J-8 16

4-

17

1000I 1000 HE 200E1000 100 Il 500 23 500 I

270 257 255 2513

92-

1CR

73

100

2 .6

3-

4-0
25

30 35
25

SR

A
A

A Ai

53

31:
70 32 S 60. 4-6 81j. 58 53 75 13 S
511L

18

215
270 252 225 32

0 C.

35 L 12 R
5R
(2MIdles)

S
,S11m'

3230

30'

54 35

L5

s
D

*{Loient K oery t Wiilhelms ha:en St. I.T4 ar he !i shave r. N'az i e m Brcrfes

1
2

17
16 1 18

4-

21.

29. 11. 13e 22.

47

16
18 17

14-

10 10 2 10 10 10

73,

9 69 57

30
25

250
215 280 L 30 86R

15 s

273
244-

44-

251L

RP~earch Section ;aeration Hq. VIII Boib er CO rtemn. 15 October 1913 (1)

IST2
(. 15 17. 16

iJ}IJThTT -"NS

OF B9OK"LAJL

PAT.1 7.-2IV

_"JJ11
(Continsued)

TiTh
(1) (8)

91st Group (5)

500I E 2000 Eh 50 i~

f2
230.6 28. 6 4.7 14.7

(3
4. 1

(6)
10 2 10 24 16 10 10 10 10 16

(7)
20 262 245 1L,52 280 273 278 2.6 275 198 190 210 161
2_4

(s)

(9)

(lo)

(I)

(12) (14 (13)

(is

(1)

St.

Nazaire

25

7L
7L.
63s

8R
5RZ

.Amiens T/O

3
6
4

18

17.7
2. 7

100E 250 ,,

67 52 0 0
(Cloud.

28 RI

(~erya
Hamburg e 4asel ishing

14
17 11 12

9,00 r
500

Cover)
60

25.7
26. 7 29.7 4

500 ,E
I-

31 79
8

5R
6L.

69

40

40

500 Hz
500TH1 X00 i 300lF. 300TH: 1000 H 2000 E~ 500

52

79
Coherent

30.7 12. 8
15.8

2 6 5
1

17
10
19

(No

Pattern)

16. 8

19
12

67
U 0

17D .fcBourg
.

27. 8 31.8

4.

11

6.
tnien .lens r

9
9

7 9 5
6
3 11
18

500-"

12 12 10 38) 2) 12 12

and 351st Bo bfalls impossible) (Coverage Thsufficient to riot Complete Pattern) (Cove~rage Ji.suffici ent to m~ot Complete Patten)
(segregation of 91st

C D

A
A
0

B
0CUN

15. 9
16. 9
23. 9

500 E"I 100 1B

220 240 24.4 197

160

60
C

37

30

20 SE

10 0HE.
14
15

0 69 98

50B3

Naneur

27. 9
2.10

5OI~
500
100
17

15
15

228 223 265 252 121 256 230 8

(Blind Bombing)J
(Blind.
82
Borthing )

5- L

0G

20

20

Brenen Anklam Munster Schw~eifurt

4+.10 8.10

11

15.

9.10
10.10 14.10

9
10

100 500 1 1000 is 100 lB100 13

1000

nBE 1B

40)
2}

4.2
12 3) 5) 42) 2) 10

100

25

20

1L
it

B
B.
A

HE

500 1

62

70

70

15 S

2R

15

L.

Bob

C
Oerational TRcsearch Section ?"ian& ' "ovi. r- V._..f_ 1. 15 October 191.

MiJSE?

, JTS

OF

BQ1rrCBWALL PAT

.S

92nd Croup
(4) 8 8 12 13 16 15, 5 7 (5) E 1000 E 250 TB 2000 500 BE HE 500 E 500 2000 E 500 E 500 HE
500

(1) lieligoland Lorient

Kiel

(2) 15 17.

(3)

(6) 10 16 2

(7) 260 253 260 238 250 266 255 257 262 282 2i 2 196 210 220 170 240 20 24.0 250
24-7

(8) 4
29

(9)
38

(12)

(13)
21

(z4)

(.19)
25

(16)

(17)

(18) C

76
47

100

4S

11

22 10

20 20

19.
29. 1325. 26. 28, 26, 12. 16. 17. 19. 24. 27. 31. 3.

St azaire Bremen

94

82

6L4

8 L

30

A
C
ry

10

Vii1acoub1E~y
St.

Nazaire

*'~Nantes Hanover

15
13 11 12 17 21 17 17 15 18
10L

~V~Kiel

Ruhr FlushJng .~

500 HE
300 T-E 500 E 300 500
iT

10 10 2 10 10 10 10 10

6
0 0. 0

C
E

2 0 0 0)
'100

71
42

88

13

(Unable to Plot Cc~q 1e oePattern) 123 50L 112L4 41 38

65

22 R R s IC-10

26
101

30

453
80

25 30 30

,Ti

C 14 A

Le Bourget
Sch weinfurt
Filushing <3 V;11acoubJ ay

16
10 12 12 12 38 . 144
-L

76 0 47
0

78' 52
50

100 76 84

I s
iO
1s

0. 84 0

4514
ZR

2R

47

40

20

SWatten R 'omilly ST/O

"~Vend.eville -

(i CoherenbtSPattern) o
SL J

200

.LB.

VNantes

Emden E den Frankfurt Bremen Gdyniia Munster Schweinfurt

23. 27. 2.10 2 9.10 14.10

13 18 15

20 Frage.
11

22

38

70

2-1L

13 R

25

60

25

16
19

100 TB 100IL( , 1 000 10030 100

1000 B

4v) 2)

225 2414
24+0

(
15

~i. 1

Boming)

40)
2). 40 12.

17 18
21

F FE

(Blind Bombing)

45

28

61

TB

16 13

FE 500 F

1000 F

264 225 257 228

1+L 501L

5L 65 R

15

50

45

L4

85

L4 L4

53

80

( Impossible

to

Segregate

Falls

of 92nd and. 306th)

Operational Research Aection Hq. Viii Som~ber Coimiai d 15 October 19L.3 (1) St. Nazaire Lille Lorient G Tilheln shavenl Tmden St. Nazaire Wilhelmshaven Brest Rotterdam :Lorient (2) 3.1i 13. 1i 23. 1 27, 1 16. 2
27.

:SURE ITTS O OLi:BF~.:L 303rd. Group

PyTI&RlS

(3) (4+)
1 2 2 10 18 14

(5)
1000 12 1000 12 500 Iii
1000

(6)
5 5
5

(7)
205 235 23 0 250 220 255 240 225 210 210 210 24F0 220 240 272 225 240 235 245 260 255 230 230 245 205 230 251 260 245 240 247 270 20

(8)0

(9)

(ic)

(Ui)

(12)

(13)

(14.)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(Inadequate

Photogr~aphic

Coverage)

(Inaadecuate Photogrwphic Coverage)

3 1. 4
2

H12

6
13 12

41.3

3
1

15
16 17 12
12

El, Rennes
-Rouen omnens ~-Vege sack Rouen $' Rotterdar Renault .. tvz.erp n Lorient
SBremen

6. 8. 12. 13. 18. 22. 28 c. 31.

4
2

3
3

4.
2 1

5
3 3 3

19 20

4.
2 1 2

15
17 17 20

500E2 500 BE 500 12 1000 12 1000 12 1 000 12 500 12 500 12 1000 12 1000 12 1000 12
500 1000

10 10 10

0 33

(To

Coherent

Pattern)

10 10

5 5 5

1 0 22 22

H12

1000 12

16. 4 17. 4

-3 St.' Nazaire Antwerp isletsulte Kiel, Heligolanid L~orient Kiel 'jilhlnshavcfl St. Nazaire W4ihemshaven Bremen Hiuls

1.
13a

3 3 5
2 1 2 2

17 16 21
10 15 21 18

BE

12 6 6

6 6 5

53 38 76
0 0

( Impossible to Segregate Bombflls of- 303rL ~nd 305th) SR (1'To Coherent Pattern) SR 20 50 9 6R 7S 57 SR 15 70 6 4R 4L 38 25

L2
{59

C7-

53
0 0 13 0 0 0 31 28 10 0

(No

79 7L Coherent pattern)

14R
4,2R

7
L42

30

25

I I I D "M

28

55

tS

39
0 0 0

(No Coherent -Pattern)

(I o Coherent

7020

5
5 5 5 5

14. 13. 17. 19. 21.

1000 121 1000 12 2000 12 2I 1000 12 500 IM~ 500 12

500

6 5 5
2

Pattern)
38 S
3L 3L 1L

(No Coherent pattern)

37

54

19 R 7R 12 R 17 R

42

65

30

I
D

56

4
2 3

7 18
19

1000

500
500 2000
1000 500

5 2.5

7
1

18
19
16 17 15

11. 6 13. 6 22., 6

500

10 10 1210 10 12 5 10 12 10 BE 2 12 12 5 10 H2 H.11 10

67 35 0

(No Coherent Patteprn)

S 12 R 13 R 29 26

E D

97 100

175S 235S

33

69

59

82

85S

6R

10

35

30

Ay

Operational Researc~h Section Eq. VIII Bomber Cormian& 15 Octcober 194.3 (1) T/0 Beaumont Le Mans Abbeville Villacoublay Heroya Hamrburg (2) 2 .6 2 .. 6 4. 7 1c. 7 14. 7

MEASUBi'iTS OF BOIBffi

T~hL

303rd Group (Cntinued)

(3)
2 6 3 1 9 .2

(z,,)
18 17 20

(5)
500 fl 300I1 500 HE loo 1 5001BE 500I

(6)
10 16 10 24 10 10 10

(7)
230 2.0 222 235
214-0

(8)

(9)

(10)
38

(1i)
78
34+

(12)

(13)

(14-)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

3
18
20

13 L 26 L (Inadequate Photographic

28

1OL

50 R

17 58 4.8 18 21

Coverage)
21 R 16 R 17 R

37

87

4COL

35

35

24,7
2 .7 26. 7
2 .7

153

5S
11S

L S

20

500I1
501 500 HE 250 lB 500 HE 250 IB
100Im

280)
271 230 275 244 217 24.0
195

S
.

Hamburg
T/0 T/1 F~Kas se1 SRuhr = jrens

15 4 3
1 11 1

10
10 16 10 16 24

25. 7

3C 7 12. 8
1r:.8

20 17 19
18

39

64
100

25 s
4. 2S

120 R

125

80 50

25
4.0

E L L

54.

:m.Le Bourget ME Schweinfurt

OGi1ze-Rijen Watten
-Amiens-

16. 8
17.8 15 8 2 .8

20 16
10

300 H 250 1B
100

16
16 24 2 10

6R 1 L

7 5 10

A
. B B
C rs.

30
20

20 20
20

HE

215
190

19

1Romi11y

3.8 3, 9

9. 4
2
1 2

15 18 19
15

2000HE 500 1I 500 HE 20 Prag. 500 fI

12
10 14l. 12 12 2) 12

162 230 222

29

58
100

59
58

59 100 79

78

5R
7R

IO

44
22

78
8L

9
i11

25
65

T,0r Mantes Nantes Emden Emden Frankfurt Bremen

.tunklaml

55
1E . 9
2.9

245 228
199 264 235

A 0C00
, A__

69

37

8L

20

500 HE
100 Th 1000 HM 500 1z
500H

27.9

6
5
12

(Blind. Bombing)

x.019

237
250

4.10

12
42

0 30

0 83

(Blind Bombing) 14 L 4.2 75

33 L

36 11

35 25

25
25 L

f.10 ~.1 1
1(). 0 1 ,10 9

20
18 20

100 IB

1000 HE
100 lB 100 lB
1000

Munster Schweinfurt

3) 5) 40)
2

247 135 24+5

24+0

72

100

8s

7L

A
G A

16

1000 JI 100 lB

_3. 5)

44

94
-W

56

91

2L

2R

25

20

-------

--

0perytcma
H~o

Research Sectlion
c:II .I
913
ysAL

,' 1;

'T2 IhLL P?. ;RAS \1TS OF B0Z B .

Oct -,r r 71''15 (1)

305th
(2)

Group

(3) 3
1 1

(4.) 21
22

(5)
100012 500 115 500 112 1000 1

(6)
5
10

(7)
220
220 230 25 24 .0 230 215
24.0

(8)

(9)

(10)
4.8

(11
0 3S Co ?erent Pattern)

46) 8R
8R

(17)

(I8)

St. Nazaire Lille

33
0 0 31

Lorient

23

W._'helmshaven
~iihelmshaven
Rotterar Lorient Rennes Rouen
i~anE

2-1.

18

4.

17
15

5
10

16c

3
1 2

2r/
40

17
12 14. 15 14. 17 17 17 18 16 18 15

500 FE'. 500 1E* 1000 i11

(!To

SR

6.
La

3
1

ens

123
18, 2L-@ 2 31, 16 170 1.

3
2

1rege sack
Mi1helrnshaven Rotuen R~tt eriaanz

3
1

2 1 4.

1000 i-I 500 lE 500 .t 1000 ".115' 1000 1I 1000 H: 500 115 1000lI 1000 HE

5 5
10

74.
81 27

2_00 230
210

(Itiwjossible to Segregate Eombf ails of 305th and 303rd.) 7 1L 35 7S 79 62 5 4.0 4 3R 2 L 819 78 SS1 IR T (N10 Coherent Pattern)
r .

6
6

5
12 6

250 260 220

220

79,

97

1 L
Lt,

20

25

L
S
CA

60 29

5L
8R
3R

35
50

4-5
30
20

19 s

1000

uS

6
6

220 260 250 210 24i 0 225E

275

93
56 100 0

4.
3

18
19

4.

.Naaire

5
17

1000 1HE 1000 1HE 2000 Li

5 5
2 10 10 10 10 10

13 5L 1L 5 65 100 5L (Inadequate lPhotograjhic Coverage) 63 70 12 L 3s 3L 14.L 19 3R 4.R

66

100

23S

4.

25 4.0 20

S
L

30 30 20 25
25

NOW"

1000

.i.US

3
1

16
20 17 14. 19 16 15 19 14.
15

500 500

HE1
TE

55
89

35
30 30 25 30 20

5
15

S L
L
L

..

11 en'
Wilhelmshaven

St.

Nazaire

Wilhelmashaven iBremnen Huls T/ O

1r 17, 19 21. 2t11_2 13. 22,,

5
1 4. 1

500 115 1000 112I

500 115

250 24.5
25.

73
0 0

5
9

60

95

8L

34

35

25

500 1HE
2000 115 500 HE 500 HE

4.5 31L 2

9v
100

8s 8S

11 R1

4.1R

14-

~.500 112E
500 1HE

259

19

10 10 10 10

250 260 2F-4.

36

35

53

10OL

17 L

21

4.0

30

A
C

n
0pzerat .:a_1 Research Section omber Command Bi Hq0 15 October 194"3 1V ~SUR J EI4TS OF BO IFx1LL PA.TTEPITS 305th Group (Continued)

(1)
St. Naza~ire Nantes Caen Villacoublay Heroya Hanover Kassel Kiel Ruhr Flushing Le ]Bourget Schweinfurt Flushing a1",lc.oablay 7,7tten

(2) 28. 6

(3)
1

(4-)
16 16
16 16

(5)
2000 HE

(6)
2 10 16 10 10 16 10 10 10 16 16 16 16 12 2 12 .2 10 12) 12) 10 12 4.0) 2) 6 12

(7)
255 24.5 24.0 230

(8)

(9)

(10)

(I1)

(12)

(13) 0 1R

(14.)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

7 1C# 7 14.~7
4Q 24.0 7

500HE
300 HE 500 HE

s. 9L

4. 3
6 1

4.7

96

18
114.
20

500 HE
250 TB

17h.
290 270 270 290 220 220 230 200 21:0 160 230 24.0 260 228

(nImpossible

16 13 R 95S to Plot Complete Bombfall) 10OS 0 20 L 25 R 22

25

30

L L

26. 7 28.. 7 29. 7 12.,8 15. 8 16, 8 17. 8 19. 8 2Z-0 8 27. 8

500 HE
500 H 500 H-E 300 B 30 HE X50 TB

35
70

30

1 3

18
16 16

25

35
20 20 L

9
9 5

18 20

20

4.5

100 12 L 2 R 13 25 (Imp ssible to Plot from Strike Photographs)

86

18 7
1

300) rte 2000

50'0 HE
HE

17

16

4-6 95 3L (Hao Coherent Pattern)

o
0 1

13 R

14.
36 30 22

4.0

31. 8
} 9 E. 9
JC

17 16

2
2

11 17
18 16 16 2 16

500 hE 500FI '500l B 20 Frag 0

500 1000

0
20 25
26

33 L 30 67
80

13 L
2R 15 L

3uL

65

30 25

L L S

15., 9 <~tes 1E. 9 2'. 9 27. 9

1. .10

IE

HE

231
206 165

4+2

153
Pattern)

4.5

4.
2

500

HE

500 I
100 lB 1000 HE 100 lB 1000 HE 1000OHE 500 HE 1000 HE 500HBE

(TNo Coherent

(Blind Bombing) 220 260 254. 0 17 (Blind Bombing)

(Inadeqjuate

emen Gdynia Mvuns ter

1,.10 1 .10 x.10 10.10

3
7

13
17 17

32-

63

Photographic Coverage) 15 13 R 7 L

E
A 0C C

50

4.0

5
12

14.

232 264.

L L L

Opor anal Research Section I. Bomber Corand J 15 0c ober 19L.3

Hq6

1V

TSTJ i I TS3 OF EQi BPJI 1'ITT.R ~ TT.RNS 306th

Group

(1)
St. Nazal-re Lille Lorierit i lhelmshaven Emde~n St. Naizaire mshaven Brest Lorient Re rMne s Rouen ,'miens, Vege sack 1a ven fiihe

(2)

(3)

(L4.)

(5) 1000 HI 1000 HE 500 HE

1000

(6)
5
10 10

(7)
21 5 235 230 230 190 2320 235 230 220 220 210 230 230 24.0 24,.0 24.0 230 270 255 244

(8)

(9)

(10)

(Z1)

(12)

(13)

(4.)

(15)

(16)

(17)
SR

(18)

3.
1323. 270
4.,

4. 17 4. 14. 14. 3 14. 2 17 2

1 18
13

.5
5 5

(Inadiequate Photographic Coverage) (Inadequate Photographic Coverage)

HE

500 HE
1000 HE 500 HE 1000 HE
1000

Wilheo

16, 26. 274

28

4.0

33

424

2S 3L

35
50
4.-0 30 4..0 4.0

20

t1

4.
1 1

10

16
19

6. 8.
12.

HE
HE

5 5
10

4.
2

15
19

500 HE 1000 HE

1 33
18 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 29 38 0 12 63

7S
8L

15

3R~
9L

20 20

t: J

1318.
22. 28,.

4.
1

20 20
19

1000

5
5

4.0 35
4.0

-_;

4.0

3
3 2 2
2

20 27 16
12 18 12 16 18 19

17o 13,

1000 IHUT 1000 HE 1000 HE 1.000 HE 1000 HE 10004I-

5 5
0

1000 HE
2000 500 1000 500 1000 250 500 2000 500 500 500 500 HE HE HE H HE lB HE

3
1

6 6 5 5 2
10

(Inadequate P'hotographic Coverage) 27 L . 29 S3 66 4.-2 6 2L 6s 60 t+3 (No Coherent Pattern) (No Coherent Pattern) (No Coherent Pattern)
(Inadequate

<"

Photographic Coverage)
IL
18 L

13,a
Bremen HlSt.i Kiel

15.

216
250 236

6
1 5

5
10

100 78

71

5L

5
11
25

S1111 23

4.5 25
25

35
20
20 I
A

. a :.

14$.
r

17
21

5
16 10

230
250 220

16 R

12.
13.

3
6

21.

141. 16 18 18
16

HE
HE
HE

2
10 10

252
259 275 24.3

83.

1Os
21 L

(2 Niles) 15 ilL 29 L

30

20

E A

HE
HE

10
10

36

20

.n

._rr.

C
Q

_' .4: 01

earth

Section

hM SI-HTS'
(6)
16 2 10 16 4.0 10

OF BUTiBFAILL P iT!RMNS

Hcq4VII Bos er Con nand. 15 October 1943 (1) Tricqueville

306th Group (Continued) (3 ) 3 (4)

19

(2)
26.

(5) 300 BE 2000 HE

500
300

(7)
230

(8) 17 30, 0

(9) 28

(10)

(U)

(12) 12 L

(13) 28 L
2 R

(14.) 30

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

St.

Nazaire

17
16
15

Nantes Caen Villacoublay Heroya Hanover Kas sel KiSel Rluhr Flushing Le Bourget Schweinfurt

4.
1C. 24. 2E. 2 . 25. 1'. 1 .
1E.
150

1 6
1

BE HE

265 235
233

55
0 100

3S

4
7
11 37
25 60

30 30
20 20
T

15

100
1000

IB

235
154. 279 259 280 270 24.2 200 210 200 230 150 24-7 262

( Inadeqjuate Photographic Coverage)

4
2

'20

17
14.

50HI
HE 500 Hz 10013B 500 I

53
8 0

75
18
38

100 63

5
10 40 10 16 16 5 16 12 2 12 10 10 124 12 12 4t0) 40; 2) 6 12

36
0

43

7R
11L

A
A E B

2S
1iL

37 L

S S

3
2 7

13

16
20 19

300 HE'

3001-2
1000 az 3 00 10 50HII 2000 i 500 IlM

36
32 0

6s
22 L 4.7 94. 335S

15 L
6L 9L

16
23

7 3 27.

.21
20 18

3
0

80 35
30

40

25

34.

35

7
2

9
16

57
0 0 0 25

57
0 0 0

Rol

(No Coherent Pattern) (Inadequyate Photographic Coverage) 41 L 61 4.L 41 4.1 (Inadecjuatc Pho to raphic Coverage) 50

E. Bru s

20 8
1 1 17

7C.
C

500 I 50I 20 Frag.

500 H
500 HE 500 HE 100 lB 1000 H
100

265
241.7

25
35

S
La

17
18 14. 18
18

UE. 21. 27.

5 5

220 194. 250 223 230 250 24.0 24.0 240 225

77

57

96

123

1iL

12

30

'E

(Blind Bombing) (Blind Bombing) 18S (No Coherent Pattern)

Mrter,
Schweinfur

4..10
4.10
1

111

1000 I1~
14+
1000HE

18L

20 La La 'a

8.10

8
5

9.10

10. 10

20 20 18 5

50OOHE 1000 HJ 500 HE

1000CHE

L A A.
CC

5
12 6

53

80-

(Impossible to Segregate Falls of 306th and 92nd)

H-q.

Section 'anal Research VIII Bomber Col land.

SUU_.'I SctiI GDct '~aiThcscarhTTS OF

B03LB
Group

PJIL TL.NS

15 October 194+3

351st
(3)
1 (4) (5)

(1)
Courtrai
Braden

(.2)

(6)
10 10 10 10 2

(7) 220
240 260 260 230 263 234 250 230
210

(8) 36

(9)

(ltd)
47

(11)
58

(12) L

(13)

(1k4) 6

(15) 65

(16) 25

(17)

(18)

Kiel

St. Nfaaire jilihel mshr veia Bremen Ilul S T/0 St. Nazaire Le :'fans .miens Heroya ~Ha burgC Hamburg Masse].~

ji1helmshaven

14. 15.. 19. 21. 29. 11 1322.

13
18 14 12 16 18 12 15 17 19 17

500 IE
500 I0,

57

5?.

2 3 5 5
8

500 1 500 Mi
2000 H-3 1000 I 500 BE 500 I{H

(Inadequate Pho tographic Coverage) 82 61?R 55 S 0 10 '9 26 0 0 0 67 98

383S

5
10

25.
28.

5
2
1

500 TI 2000F2
50007-L

4.*
1;.
17.0

10 10 2 10 10 10 40o 16 16 10
10

10 R

40.

25

20 20

S3

57 57
-9

10
15 21 17 15 18 1
14

100 ThE

210

81 85 85

10OS

8 S 33S

13 L
15 L 7?R

15

15
13

35
50

25
25

S
L
S

A :,.

35

500rm~
100 TB 25,0 TB 250 TB 500 Hi~

250
162 260 260 260 260
290

2.

25. 26.
29.

4 5

(Inadequate Photographic coverage) (

3G. ~-t 12. 15. 16. 17. 24. 27. 31.

J

6 3

Ruhr Schw~ei

4
2 6 4 1 6 8 2

ViI aco k ay

T/O Brussels Lille

E.

7.
90

18 21 18 16 20 19 16 19 18 19

500 300
1000

mI

0 38 0
59

44

86 51

233S 103S 373S 73

24?.

32

30
70 40

30
25 20 25

S
S

300 I

IE

500 Ih 2000 BE 500 I 500 BE 500 IE 500 IE 20 Frag.

16 16 5 12 2 12 12 10 12 144-

212 212 210 210

39
47

15 R
27?. 0 70 R 39R.

18
46

154 241
244 253 229 246 0 0

0 0 0

7 6z4 40 (Inadequate Photographic Coverage) 54

38 81 63 453
2L

93

55

A
L
E

81 39

45
70

35 30

S
L S

C E C
B

Operati.onal Research Section

Ho~ VIII flomber Command 15 October 194.3

IvfEASHiNTS of BOMBFMIL P.T.RTNS

11UL1

__

351st Group (Continued)

(1)
Romnilly Nantes Nantes
Emd~en

(2)

(3) (4f)

(5) 500 BE
1000 HE 500 HS

(6)
10) 2) 12 12 12 2) 42

(7)
220 210 181 246 234 256 259 134 24.6 235

(8) 21 21i.

(9)
68

(10) 62

(11) 75 4s 7Lj
1lL

15.9
16. 9
23.9 27.9 2.10 44D10 8.10 9.10 10.10 141l0

4.
7
1

14
19
13

12

25 35

20 20

s L

A D A

500OHE
500 HE 100 lB

65

Emden Fra ikf'urt Bremen Anklani Munster Schweinffurt

17 19
8

93 74(Blind Bomrbing)
(Blind Bombing)

5R

10

1000oBE
14.
100 lB

S
(No Coherent

D 0

14

20

500 HE 1000 HE

Pattern)
25 S 27 L 39

SL
L

100 lB
8

10

100 IB 1000 HE 500 HE

2) 6

58

64

73

75

2L

2R

52j

Operational Research

Section
(6)
2

ii

''.,DNTSOP

BOi

'-I~L PATTRPNS

HCI. VIII Bomber Conpand 15 October 1943 (1) St. Nazaire Vilhelishaven Huffs T/b Villacoublay Beaumont Le Mans Abbeville VillacoubJlay Heroya Hamburg (2) 29. 5 Ui. 6 22.6

JNF~
(2
2S
Miles Short)E

379th Group

(3)
8 '2 3

(i )
16 18 14

(5)
200 B 1000 iF7 500 HE 5001TBE 500 H 300HBE 500H 100OHE 500BE

(7)
225

(8) 0 0 0
0 0 10 19 8

(9) 0 0

(10)

(11)

5
10 10 10 16
10

255 240
250 260 240 210 230 240 174 270 260 235 280 220 200 210 150 235 230 272 245 215 24-5 230 254 244 251 120 268 233

79R1

79

25. 6
26.6 28.6

19

4. 7
10.7
14.7

5
1

13 13 17 19
19

(Inadequate Photographic Coverag

2
7 1

24 10
10 10

53 45
60

22 S
(3

LMiles)
2L 131R 10 L 21

9R

24+

60 70 25
30

24+.7

var
L Bourget S-chveinfurt Wtaten
4~en8

25.7 29.7 30. 7 12. 8 15. 8

16. 8
17.8

21 20 12

500OHE
500 HE 500 I

14.
19

62

25

5
2 3 10 2
3

13 19 21
18
15

27.8
31.

21
16 20

W1iily

3.

8
9

C..ary
jMtaL te s :..I, an te s UP. nden den Frankfurt Bremen .Anklam Munster Schweinf'urt

6. 9 9. 9 16.9

1
2

23.9

17 18 14 19
18

27., 9
2.10

17

4.10
.10 5,10

4 4
2

16 20
20

10 16 250ThB 16 20 Frag. 144x l6 300 I 250ThB 16 2 2000 BE 12 500OH12 500 HE 36 100ThB 20 Frag. 14 12 500 HE 12 500 M 40Q) 100 lB 2) 1000 BE 12 500 HE 12 500 HE 12 500 HE

250 1B

10 17

58

100
100 92 67

22 L~ 15 S
0 11IS

14 L 0 0 21 R 0 23 15 25 15 40

95 0
21

100
11

100

z
L

69
28

65

7L

3R1

75

30

L
S

A
D

S
(Blind Bombing) (Blind Bombing) 61 94

C.

0
14 70

0 63
100

92
82 100

1000

HE

10.10 1,,10 6

15 17

100 lB 100 lB 1000 HE 100OCHE 100 lB

3) 5)
4.2) 2)

61 14

30

4*0 25

s
31 69

0 A

3)
5)

66

100

93

2L

30

20

41,00,

--mmalmlim-

r
0per.tiona1 Research Section Hcj, ',0I1lBomber Con~rnand. 15 October 1943 (1) Antwerp T/O St. Nazaire
Le
E2) t3) Q4.)

L ESIJHi L-HTS

OF BO0 BF--LL P-T 1I'RTS

-W- M-MI
(16)

381st Group

(5)
1000 HE 500OHE 2000 HE
50OOHE

(6)
10 2 10 16 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 16 10

(7)
250 280 240 210 221 267 170 250 270 270 250 285 200 210, 160 2).0 220 260 240
230

(8)
44

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

('h)

(15)

(17)

(18)

22. ,6 25a 6 28. 6

2 6 3 2

19 17 17
19 17

96

79

96

6s

6_

30

20

L S L

A
E A C E C B
A

Mans

4c'7
14. 7 17 72. 7

miens T/O Heroya Hamburg Hamburg Kiel rasel

3 00 HE
500THE

(Inadaequiate Photographic Coverage) 88 44 L 76 L 75 60 15 14R 6, 88 45 0 0 0 80 82 29 S 20 L 21 S

5 5

25.7
26.7

14 20 14
15

500 HE

41 R
357L IL

50
42 21

25

20 30

L S

500

I 500BE

29.7
30.7

18

5f00 HE

18
16
19

500 HE
500 HE 300 BE
500OHE

8
29 15 0 0

40 50

35

12.8
16.8 17.8 27. 8 31.8 3.9

cLe

Bourget

4
2 -5

13 1Q 19
16

5
1 1

2illy 11 ri.tes Ntes en Emnden Frankf'urt Bremen Anklam Munster Schweinfurt

6. 9
(1

9. 9 15 9
16.9

19 15
18 17
1s

3 4

23.9

11
18

2.9
2.-10 4.10
80,10 9.10 6

19
12
18 16

10,110
11;.10 2

5 15

2 2000 HIF 12 500 HE 12 500 HE 100ThB 42 12 .500 HE 20 Frag. 144 12) 500 HE 2) 1000 HB 12 500O19 12 500OH-E 12 500 HE 40) 100 lB 2) 1000 HE 12 HE 500 12 500 Hu 3) 1000 HE~ 100 Th 5) 40) 100 lB 2) 1000 HE 6 500 HE

(Impossible to Segregate Bombfalls of 381st and 9lst)S S 20 65 11 O0R 68 5L 54 SR (Inadequate Photographic Coverage)

A B G

67

96 98
88

43S
7s

0 8R
9L 0

43
11 26 0

30 25 25 30

20 22 25 25 L L L
1

34
0 52

842

77 54
52

213 192 186 225 243 255 24+3 14;5 255 218

24S

A
D .3

99

99,

(Blind. Bombing) (Blind Bomabing) 72

84
100

31 L 0

54L
5R

75
5

30 25

20 25

L
L

D A

G
c
B

57

100

60

L L L

95

100

48 s

39 R

61

20

20

- -E

Operational. Research Section ar Hq. VIII BcuiL Cormand 15 October 194.3

(1) A3-twerp T/O Beaumont Le Mans Abbevil~le Villacoublay Heroya Hamburg

1: JRU1.TNTS OF DOT BFI;LL P-i.TRNS .,

38th Group

t
(12)

rnr
(16)
(17)

(2)
22,.6 25. 6 2E, 6

(3)
1

(4.)
20

(5)
1000OHE 500 HE

(6)
10 16 10 24. 10 10 16 10 10 16 16 2416 10 2 12 10 144. 12 10 2) 12 4.2 4.2

(7) 234.
24.0 234. 219 220 253 139 260 230 250 256 300 234. 190 190 1t0 2j,0 238 255 197 235 226 24.3 263 239 14.5 253 215

(8)
0

(9)
11

(1Q) 80

(ii) 91

(13)

(1k-)

(15)

(18)

5
1 4.
2 13 16

25 S
(3

13 R

29

30
70

15 - 35 25
15

L
L S s

A 0

300 HE

0
0

Miles)
3R 19 R 15R

4p 7
1C. 7
14.7

500 HE
100 HE 500MHE 500 HE 250 lB 500 HE 500 HE 250 1B

3
8

14. 14.
19

5
14 0

2;i,7 2C. 7

98 12 12 36

65

35

L
Li C B

10OL (4. Miles)

2E o 7
2c, 7
3C.7

11. 4.
6
1 2
5

12 11

12. 8 15.8
1E.8

11,
17

250 IB. 100MHE

300

36
27 28 0

17.08
27.8

3 3 3
1

3. 9
6. 9

19 12 18 12

500MB

20
15 12 17

90 9
160 9

23.9
27. Emden Frankfurt Bremen Anklam Munster' Schweinfurt

9
6 5 3

183
18 16

2000 HE 500 B 500 HE 20 Frag. 500 B 500 HE ,100 lB

1000

1L 1L . 1 61 4.2 6 81 6R 4~5 1s 10 10R 3L 98 50 (Inadequate Photographic Coverage)

60

4.5
30 B

30

37 S
(BIind Bombing) (Blind Bombing)

5R

37

.H~T'm

80

30

s L L

FE

2.10
L,.10

X3.10

19
19

9.10
10.10

15
8
1.0

14.10

500 100 100 1000 100 100 1000 1000 100

HE lB lB B lB. lB HE
HE

4.8 16

%4
37'

6L 4R 7 4.5 (Impossible to Plot from Strike Photographs)

(No Coherent Pattern)

25

L L

3) 5)
4.2)

L
L

A 0 A

lB

5)

50

95

83

1IL

20

15

Operational Research Section Wj. VIII Bomber Coinrnand. 15 October 194-3 (1)

1st Bomb Division Cori osites

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(UI)

(12)

(13)

(3z)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(z.8)

1st Coixibat VTing Schweinfurt Gi1ze-Rijen

17. 8
19. 8

12

13

500 HE 100 HEP 20 graga

10 5)

225 215

15

31

42

82

3S

29 L

29

50

20

40th
St. Nazaire Wilhelmshavenl 29, 11, 13. 22.

Cobat ling

6
5
3

1~7
18

2000 500
500 500 HE

13 17
11~ 14. 1a 16

2 10 10

0 27i0 250 137 0

0 0

76
52

100

82$S 52 S

48 R 0

95
52

25

20

1L0
10 10 10 10 12

4.
V:acoublay S hweinfurt
selo s

14, 24, 17C

5
2

70

23

500 B 500 500 HE 500

217
250

0 0
Combat

3$S 6t. Photographic Coverage) (Inadequate 70 1OL 70R 66 35

55 49

21S
12L

6L
R K 29 L

23
13 30

40

30

41st
~
e azaire lmshaven en.

'ing
59 70

2cJ.
11. 1. 22. 17j.

9
3 12

li4 1.5
17

.15
14+
18

teinfurt Brussels Brussels

2000 1000 500 500 250

500

7. 7.

4f 5

20

500

24-0 250 277 280 210 250 21+0

0
0

32 S

6R

32

30

25

(Inadequate

Photograp~hic
9s

Coverage)

24 0

44
0

3L

10

4-0 30

30 30

-.---

-.

Operational Research Section VIII Bomber 0Ocnaa& 15 October 194.3

Hq.

M AStI MrrNHS OF BOIfl3T.ALLT 4

TIPI S

1st Bomb Division Coxnposit es (Continued)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1.)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

0 o)

(Ui)

(12)

(13)

(14.)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

Composites Bremen

Which

Can Not Be Assigned to Combat Wings 0

Bremen
Antwerp Meaulte Kiel Kiel
Gilze--Ri.jen

17e
l1 143f

1000 IH 1000 HIg 1003;I~I

500 18

5 5
5 10 10 5 7)
12

19 2!4.

8
$

15

500 Ifl L000 H 100 hB

260 270 240 250 270

270

60
42-

0 0 0

(Inadequate Photographic Coverage) 12S 66 3R 13 4.5 28 9L 10 39 54.

37 4.7 65 68

51 62

6Gs

38 R

39

92 100

16 L 188S 88s

31 R 32 R 18 L

35 36 20

35 70 60 4.5
30 25

s
20 35 I, S

B A
A

25 30
20 20

S
s S S

E
E E B

Villacoublay

13

20 ~g 50: T

214. 210

4.3

fimuda va 60 ramm

;Hmm-

cry
p-sir

Operation~al

Research 19".3
(2)

Section

)MSUR f~Ts of BOihBFAsc: PATTE?.NS 4 94th 0Group

Hq[

V TII Boimer Comiand&

LEL
(11) (12)

15 October

(3)
1
2

(4.)
16
17

(5)
300 HE 500 HE 250 lB 500 HE
500 HE 500 HE 500 HE 1000 HE 500 HE 500 HE 300 H 250 lB 250 lED 500 HE 500 HE 100IH 100 HE 1001HE 500 HE 500 HE
500

(6)
16
10 16 10 10 10 10

(7)
230
228 264. 230

(8)

(9)
0

(z0)

(3.3)

(14.)
32

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

St, Omer

Ar werp
Ema1en. Lori_'nt Fensrig Emlen Rennes Cuxhaven Kiel

134 5 5 14._.

4.9

71

29 S 7L
IL

13 L
4R 2IL

60
90

20

S
S

D) D A A D

151, 5
17'e 5 19. 5

3
2 1 2 1 2

15
16 14. 18 16 15 8 14.

231
234.235 265 255 230 220 24+5 24.5 190

40

Le
Le

Mans

21. 5 29 5 li. 6 13 , 6 296 6

14.0 7 250 7 26, 7 28. 7 12. 8
11,

5
10

10
16 16 16 10 10 24. 12 12 10 10 12 10 14.4 12 10 12 12 8 38 12 10 4.0

7IL
35 L

4.6L

Bourget

2 1

19
19 18 11 17 21

14.IL

4.6
38

80

35
B

T/O T/O 0Ochersleben Bonn Abbesvie Regens Bordea B .auva. "$ Paris T/O e

5
1

232
215 210

19 77

(N'o Coherent Pat tern )

3461

160 8 16. 8

17.* 8 24. 8 3: 9 60 9

3 3 7

19 19 19
12 18 16 21 20 21 21

220
180

33 76
30

38 56

82 90 83
100

L0 16 S
2+ S

18 R
5R

5
>5

4.R

50 4.0 25 30

30

20

S s S

30
25

230
230

1HE4

50
15.

9
9
9

1 2 2

16. 9

23,

27. 9
T/O Bremen MIarienb urg M~unster Schweinfurt 23.0 L:.10 E.10 1410 1(.10

6
19 17 2
L6

500 H! 20 Brag, 500 HE 500 HE 500 HE 500 HE 500 HE 100 IBI

500

230
24.0

27

69

220 210 226 216

75 62 98 76

95

25 S 15

2R

?6

70

30

7R

7 5

30
25

20
20

L IL
L

5s

19 18
'8

HE

500 HE 10o0 TB

1L 1.J0

21

10oo IB

38

24.3 233 24.2 113 24.6 229

ag) (Blind IBombinr (Blind Bombin L C

55

65

62 69

65
94

25S 6s

2 7

25 30

30
235

IL
L

A
B

37

'86

4-IL

IL

0~a~%RS aroL Section Conm and IiqA Vii : Bombr 15 Of,:tobar 19':3 (c)
St.* 0mn r Anltwerp?

N :_ 5

12- TS OF BOL-IBFALL PA.ThTS

(2) 1;;" 5

(3)
2

(f)
15

(5)
300

14. 5

21
7

500 E:
250 lB 500 E:
500

BE

(6) 16
10

(7)
24. 215 270 24.5

(8)

(9) 77
7

(10)
58
39

(11)

(12) 7s
2L

(13)
4L 25 L

(3.4

(15)

(&}6)

(1 ) B
S

Lorient
Emdena
Rernies

17. 5

4
1

16
10

33 0

79
61

8
25

5Q
50

20

21..5
5

10

3 3

6
18 15

BE:

10
10 10 10 10

240
240 275 260 120 210 250 240 1390 230 250 180 250 213 210 180 210
240

40

Wtilhelmshaven. Kiel T/O Le Mans

La Pallice. Le Bourget

11. 6 12.6 2! . 6 25. 14. 7

25. 7 26. 7
'4.

13 3
2

16 21

500 HE: 100010E 500 HE 500 HE: 5001H0

1000

18,
22 21 20

3
2 3 2

HE:

Trondheimi l3brsleben lzi1e eville ~nburg

24. 7

300 HE: 500 liE

4
16 10 10

0 0 8

0 0 44
100

43

96

(8 !alies)

(No Coherent ipattern)

7S

72

(2

4.0

:fies)

50

57

50010~
250 lB
500 HE

C
B

2E. 7
1+, 8
1F. 8 17. 8

15
9 21 21 14 20

16
10 10 12 12 16 10 12

3
3

5
1 1

500 BE 3.00 BsE 100 HE: 250 13

500 HE:
500

0 29

0 81

0 8

20 i44 100

61 55
42 85

Coherent Pattern) 98 4.L

10 R

10
24
A. A

97
79 100

6L

23 R
1 R

2A. 8

711.

6..9 11.. 9 if*. 9 23. 9 27. 9 2.1.0 #x.10 8.10 9.10 10.10 14..10

14

7..9 5. 9

21 18 21 20
18

HE: 1000 HE: 2000 HE~

18L
53

18

40
7 25

40 Cr
20

5
2 12 12 10 12 12 1.2

500

BE:

500 HE

500 HE.

210 24+0 230 24.6 245

240

65

4R

500 HE
500lBE: 500 HE: 1000 HE:

Emden~ glden ~rO Bremen Mrienburg euster Schweinf'urt

21 22 19 19

6
38

100 lB
100 13

-24.0 233 24 252

44

46

88.

15

lOR

20

35

25

a.

SBlind Bombing) Blind Bombing)

L
L

C
B A
A.

4.
1

23 17
20

500 HE:
1000 lBE

38
12

113
24.7 220

4Q0

l0OR 531 79 78

10

36
0

4-11
66 s 1.7L

14.

83

7 80

40 25

L
L

Operational Research Section Hq. VIII Bomber Con iand 15 October 194.3 (1) Courtrai Emden Lorient Flensburg Emden Rennes Vilhellshaven Kiel Huls Le vIans Le Bourget T/O Hanover Oschersleben Bonn Merville Vendevij~ l abbevi1 Regen Borde Mardyo Mveulan~ fatten'
C0

!'rASUR 'IL2NTS OPFOBUT;I396th Groin

LPATTRNS

(2) 14.. 15. 17. 19. 21. 29. 11.

(3)
2 1

(4.)
21
19

(5)
300 HE
500: HE 500l HE 500; HE 500 HE 500 HE 1000 500 BE 1000: HE 500 HE 300 BE 500: HE 1000 12 250 12 250 HE 100 12 100' 100: HE 100: HE 500 BE 500 HE 500 HE 500: I1In 500: H2 2000 HE 500 HE 500 HE 500 HE 500 HE 500 BE 1000 HE 500 HE 500 HE 500 HE HE 100 13

(6)
16 10 10 10 10

(7)
230
248

(8)
0

(9)
03

(10)

(u)

(12)

(13)

(14.)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(Inadequate Phots ographic Coverage)R

D 0 16 (Inadequate Photographic Coverage) 11 1R 11 L 78 36 35 35 Li Li

3 3
1 2

12

19
21 20 16 10

5
10

13. 22!
29. 1+.

250 250 24+. 220 250 256

9
1

18 20
21 16 12

5
10 16 10

24.0
220
230 230 24.0

4.7
1472

1 1

74. 4.0 4.8

100

59 72

(No Coher ~ent Pattern) 4.L 5 3L 3R 6S

4.S

L9L :1

20

20 35

20 15

L S

A
A

25.
26. 28. 12. 15.

5
6
2 2

4 16
19

16

32 1 0 0 2

51 32 0 0
62 (No Coherent Pattern) (No Coherent Pattern) (No Coherent Pattern) 14.S 96 71 98 60 5L 7S 97 75

A
Ain
L L B P,

195
24.2

16

12
12 12 12 10 10 12 12 10 2 12 12 10 12 12)

150 16. 16.

17a

1
1 1

19 23
23 19 14. 18

24. 2
7"

19
20

4. 2
1

16 18
19 19 12
19

153 T/O0

16. 23.
26. 27. 9 L.10 8,10

209 210 200 200 190 230 190 205 230 230 230 233 200 213

4.6
4.8

99 84. 0 0 36 93

9 R 1R

16

20

25

AC0

6
7

35
25

20

15 20

L L

AMP

72 4.7 66
4.2

99 56
9
77 80 P1hotographic Coverage)"' 16 L2 L 103S 8 0 8L 103s lOS 5L 7L 12 12

30

(Inadequate

A 25 25 L
L

A C
A

16
28

55

2)
12 12 12

254. 253
233 232

74.

4.1

35 35

35
30

L L

EmJden Emden 0ee Bemen

2,10

39
20 20

(Blind Bombing) (Blind Bombing) (Inadquate(5 (IndeqatePhotographic Coverage)

8.10

12 38

Mviles)

Operational Research Section Hg.. VIII Bomber Comand. 15 October 194.3

IT SITh t1 I TS O' BOIIBFhLL ]&T T2RI\S 96th cGrou jqontinuoct)

(1)
Gdynia Muns ter Schweinfurt

(2)
9,10 1010 1.,10

(3)

(4) 18 20
18

(5)
1000

(6)

(7) 235
247
240

(8)
31

(9) 63 63

(70)

(ii)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18) C
L A A

6
l L2 1.0

4
10

500HT

500 H

19

30 10 45 9S 4 R 51 81 (Impossible to Segrecgate Falls of 96th arnd. 388th)

L
L

I m
C-, C/*

:277-17-s
C7

"t'

hIIEb

Operational

Resec)rc

Section

T IRNS J SctoniS OF B .: R::IJ.1 esarL O~eatonJ. 1 100th CGroup

274V2TS
(C

Hi. VIII Bom~ber Conan aid. 15 October 1943

(1) T/0 St. Nvazaire Le !.!axis La Pallice Le Bourget Tr~ondheimf T/O T/O ;tarnemund e Bonn Merville Vendeville Regensburg Bordea~ux (2) 2f.

(3)
6
6

(4i) 5
16 19 20 22

(3)
500 IHE
2000 500 1000 300 1 HM

(6)
10 2 10

(7)
24 0 278 200 260 250 203 220 200 220 261 202 232

(9)

(l0)
67 35

(1U)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15) 30 80
410

(1G)

(17)

(18)

2E,

10

2;5. 6 14 . 7 24. 7
2r-

4. 7
7

4 44
1

0
2 0 30

H
H

19
13

26.,'7 25. 7 12. 8 15 8 17. 8 24. 8

16

14 1 20 21 4 4 21 6 "14

5
17 11
2

2.9
(d..9

WWatten
Beauvis lei

7. 9
c.

18,
19 18

2
1 1

15... 9

U3~ 9
;mden .j

17
16

23. 9 27. 9
2.1O 1;.. 10 83.10 x.10 10.10

18
20 17

Emden T/0 ivfarienburg Munster

16 6
2 13 12

16 10 10 500 IHE 10 500 H 10 500 HE 10 500 1H 12 100 HE 12 100 Ih 16 250 lB 500 HE 10 12 500 BE 16 250 lB 2 2000 IR 20 .raga 14.4 12 500 HE 10 500 IE 12 500 HE 12 500 IH 12 500 THE 6 1000 HE 100 lB 38 100 lB 38 12 500 HE

500 Th

4L 13 R 14. 90 4? 90 L (N~o Coherent Pattern) 23 (Ina~dequate Photogra Bric Coverage) 10 9L 4L 91 air 100 47 34
71 80 27 66

20

A
E
+A
A

30
20

I I

1
I

1+L
5 L 4.S
1S

4.3 83 73

L9

14 R 10 L 8L 6L

A,

-180
20.5

230 210 225 230 230 204 229 245 250 230 24.6

50 60. 22

34

15
51 73 (Blindi Bombing) (Blind Bombing)

12 S 23S 23 L 8L

12 R
2 L 2L 3 24f 10

30 70
30

20 30

jo~kA

VMA

17

55

4R

35

35

10
C

0
30 20L 23L (Inaaccuate Photographic Coverage)

138
230

-U

c.

Operational Research Section Hq. VIII Bomber Coriirand 15 October 191.3 (1) Amsteram T/O T/O Oscherslebena Bonn Vitry Regensburg
1
r

iiJAST

1N TSof BOIliBPJLL P..TTPJTS 385th QGroup

1--(12)

(2) 17. 25. 26 28, 112.

t
r E r

(3)
2

(4)

(5)
500 H

(6)
10 10 10 10 10 24 10 10 14-4 12 12 12 12

(7). 213
240 225 200 24-3 201 24.0 180

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(13)

(iL

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

7 7 7
8
8

5
19 15

500 Hi
500

7
3
2

IE

2
11 20

115. 1

17. 8

43
1 1

20
11.E

T/O

6. 9

Beauvais/Tille Paris Kerlin-Bastard Emd~en Emnden T/O Bremen Marienbur ; J~lunster Schweinfur

91
1
r

19
21 20 18 18 15 18 21 17

500 I' 500 HO 100 E.~ 500M, 500 IT 20 .Drag.

500 500

53
98

82
100

b,-s
12 L 3S 16 S 5S

3R
8L

15
17 4-0

20 20

S L L

0
A

L5.c

HE
E

500 I

230 234230
223

55

76

2L

27~ 9 2L n10 4 _10

1

C.10 1-C.10 12j,10

1 15

20

500)BE 1000 TJ 100 TB 500 FE 100 lB 100 lB

6
38 10 38 38

233 243
252 123

98 58 (Blind. Boy bing) (Blind. Bombing)

69 32

98

75
69

100 100

28S 14- S

1 R

20

236
230

77

Operation~al Research Section

Hqn VIII Bomber COoin 15 October 19L,.3 (1) Am1sterdam T/O Hanover Oschersleben Bonn lIerville

La UE1 5iNTS

OF

BOL.,ILL P ,MORNS

388th Group (3)

1 2 4.

(2)
:17. 7
25.

('4)
16
19

(5)
500: HE
500

(6) 10
10 HE TB HE HE

(7)
220 220 230 195 232 215 220 190

(8)

(9)

(10) 53 57 66 56
64

(I)
88

{l }

{z3)

(1 0
19 6

(i)

{ 6

tip

{I$

32
79

17 L 2L 0

8R
5Lj

4.0

25
25

S
L

26. 28 12.

15.

7 7 7 8 8

15 9
18 21. 21 21 21
2).

500
500 250 100 100 100 100

10
10 16 12 12 12 12 10 10 12 12 10 12 12 12 4.0 12 12

41.
43 4.6
0 68

87
100

40
35

A.
B

7
1 I

Vendeville
Poix Abbeville Regensburg Bordeauxc Dlenain Meulan T/O Beaumont

15. 8 16.8 16. 8 17. 8

2
2 2
1 1

99 91 12
100

20

100

93
100

4.L
0

24. 8
2, 9

15

HE 500' HE 500 HO
500

190
180 200 165

38

78 44
58

75
96

10 s 2S
11L

35 35 30 35
12 25 25

25
20

20 30 30 25
L L

16
19

6. 9 9. 9 15. 9 16. 9 26. 9 27. 9

2.10

3. 9

20
13
18

2
2

16 21
16

500 HE 500 500 HE HE 500 HE

230
215
24.0

35

83

500
100

21
15 21

4.10
8.10
9010

IVY

er

10,10

5 11

17 18
16

100o0
500

TB 500 HE 100 HE 500 TB HE 100 HE 500

500 HE

42
12-

222 211 224. 226 232 254.

(Inadequate Photographic Coverage) 24. 2.L 24.L 88 62 27

69
(f1ind. Bombing) (Blind Bombing)

1s

232
226 231 220

5 38)
12) 10

0
19

0
63

(32~ Miles)

14.10

(impossible

to Segregate Falls of' 388th and 96th)

.rrr..

Operational Researcl Section Hcj. VIII Bormber Ooirand 15 October 194-3

(l)

haMuR1-1iN2'T01? Or,BF.wlluPTlk1P- T

..

.r

.n

390th Group (4.) 19 20

19

(2)
1.

(3) 3

(5)
500
100
500 flo

(6)
10 24L 10 10

(7)
278 226 200 200 230 230
24.8

(8)

(9)

(10)

(ui)
94.

X12}

- }

(1h.)

(15)

16)

(17)

(18)

Bonn Vitro? Regensburg Bordeaux Watten Beaumont Paris La Pa11ic~e Vannes Widen Emden T/0 Bremen M arienburg Mvunster
Shwein~.

38 0

R-

100 1

15 8 17.8

3
3 3 2

96
0 0 (Inadequate Photographic

24. 8
6. 9

9 5". 9 15. 9 16. 9 .

9 20 3 20 21
21

500
500

1000
2000 500

5
2 I1M

coverage)
9L

L 20 2
25

12 12
12 12 12 4.0 38 10 12

L B

500
500

2~". 9
27. 9 4410 40 10
E.10

21
20

500 B 500 BE

218 216 219

220 24.3

27

79 72

71

99
100

3L

10
14.

L L

A
C
A

21

(Blind. Bombing)
(Blind Bombing)
L

53

13R

25

21
16

c.10 1C.10
11~.10

3
3 13

19 20 21

100 100 500

500 1000

254. 232 123

250 230

C.
A

10
100

18

17 19

73
85

100 61
58

100
100

2
10

15 25
25

L5

.L

A A

25
25

95

4-

-Crrnn

CH''
C-,
a i

Lit' d

.. rrr

;L.;

-,

esearc1

Section

!I~ 11WBomber Corniand

15

October
(1)

194-3

3rd
(2) 2. 27t. (3)

Bomb Division Composites

(4.)
13 12 21 15

(5) 500 H
250 lB
2000

(6)

(7)
24.0 24.3 155 24.0

(8)
78 5

(9)
100 4.0

(10)

(Ui)

(12)

(13)

(14.)

(15)

(i6)

(17)

(18)

4th Cormbat 2~I&

Waremunde Kassel Watten T/O Kassel vhrewc Conches ;fatten. ylarnemunde Kassel Gdyn a

7
3

3C. 7 4.10

4 L 75
100
2L 20 R 20 25 25

L L

9
10

HE

100 lB
500 H

A
C

3C. 24
24. 27

7
1 .2

17
18 19

10 144. 2 10 10 2

237
230 230 167 225 215 175

2 26 0 45th

11;.

(110 Coherent Pattern) 82 12 L 12 L 17 (Inadequate Photographic Coverage)

S 60

A
G

21

20 rag. 20 Frag. 2000 HT 500 HE 500 HE 2000 HE 1000 H

53
0
',ing

51.

25
L

Cobat

25. 7 3C. 7
27. 8 5.10

56
80

99
100

64.
100

99

IL Is

Lk R
3R

4.4.

20 15

25 15

A
B

1 21

100

A.

5
10

24.5
Composites wJhich Can Not Be assigned to Combat ' ings

FlensbrgJ (ilh&1anhaven Kiel Kiel Hula Huls ~ La xa1 l T/O0 ,arnemunde

15.
ie 15.

22 17 15 13

500 HE 1000 HE

235
255
265 24.0 250

36

70

39 L

6L

39

4.5

1000 HE 5001HE

5
10 10

22s
22. 2L. 28.

10 11 1
2 1

8 19 13 17
18 14.

500
2000

i-,

1000 HE 1000 H0

HE H

5 5
2 2

235

233
255
260 250 250 24.0 217

4.2

0
55

86 72 96 78S 36L (Inadequate Photographic Coverage) 4.5 61 2s

1IL 7L

25 .50
30

2000 HE 1000 HE
1000

3 25.

290

19 12 12

250 lB 250 lB

4. 4. 16
10

35. 16 14.

75

39 53

35
4-3

75
68
79

4.1

171S

6L

18

-------

- pmr-m

I T OF B LIBS iAp i R l 110 1 T ING 3DINT WS .} Z30 M

0-FT. 1T

CIRO
{O .J1lG . IUD

RR of
Pattern 2900
.', 2000

Area of
Pattern

4.00

0-

Radial Error in. Feet 800 1200

of~

Center'

1600 23

6 *

5 Million Sq. Ft. or Less

32
29 44.

38

21 27

5 to 7- Million
Sq.

Ft.

30
4.0 4.9 1+6 28 44. 51

53

31
29 4.5

23

34.
26 29 28 32

38 1+2

35
24. 31

32

7~ to 10 Mvillion
Sq. Ft.

4.7 4.8

36
37 27 1+6

25 22

14.

35

33

33
30

0 0 0

10 10 to 122jtrillioni Sq. Ft.

38
36

17

4. .7

2
14

4.2

Over 122- Million

ScL' Ft.

39 30

31 38 33
26 29 24.

10

36
31 27

36
ka Fr G

gp

'

,;