INDEX

Executive Summary.1 Global Debt Crisis: An Introduction...3 Growth of Debt & Leverage before the crisis................................................6 Causes of the Debt Crisis.....11 European Sovereign Debt Crisis.....15 Impact of the Crisis....................................21 Government Measures to curb Recession....28 Greece Debt Crisis: An Introduction30 Crisis Responses36 Fiscal Consolidation and Economic Reforms in Greece..37 Central Bank Intervention..38 Evaluating the Policy Response..42 Broader Implications..47 Impact on U.S. Economy..50 Conclusion..54 Bibliography..........55

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
The Eurozone is facing a serious sovereign debt crisis. Several Eurozone member countries have high, potentially unsustainable levels of public debt. ThreeGreece, Ireland, and Portugalhave borrowed money from other European countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to avoid default. With the largest public debt and one of the largest budget deficits in the Eurozone, Greece is at the center of the crisis. The crisis is a continuing interest to Congress due to the strong economic and political ties between the United States and Europe. Build-Up of Greeces Debt Crisis In the 2000s, Greece had abundant access to cheap capital, fueled by flush capital markets and increased investor confidence after adopting the euro in 2001. Capital inflows were not used to increase the competitiveness of the economy, however, and European Union (EU) rules designed to limit the accumulation of public debt failed to do so. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 strained public finances, and subsequent revelations about falsified statistical data drove up Greeces borrowing costs. By early 2010, Greece risked defaulting on its public debt. Policy Responses with Limited Success EU, European Central Bank, and IMF officials agreed that an uncontrolled Greek default could trigger a major crisis. In May 2010, they announced a major financial assistance package for Greece, and the Greek government committed to far-reaching economic reforms. These measures prevented a default, but a year later, the economy was contracting sharply and again veered towards default. European leaders announced a second set of crisis response measures in July 2011. The new package calls for holders of Greek bonds to accept losses, as well as for more austerity and financial assistance.

These responses have prevented a disorderly Greek default, but the prospects for Greek recovery remain unclear. The economy is contracting more severely than expected, and, as a member of the Eurozone, Greece cannot depreciate its currency to spur export-led growth. Unemployment is close to 16%. Additionally, the policy responses have not contained the crisis. Ireland and Portugal turned to the EU and IMF for financial assistance. In the summer of 2011, interest rates on Spanish and Italian bonds rose sharply. Broader Implications Greeces economy is small, but its crisis exposes the problems of a common currency combined with national fiscal policies. Additionally, its crisis set precedents for responding to crises in other Eurozone countries; highlighted concerns about the health of the European financial sector; created new financial liabilities for other Eurozone countries struggling debt; and sparked reforms to EU economic governance. It has also revealed tensions among EU member states about the desirability of closer integration.

GLOBAL DEBT CRISIS: INTRODUCTION

A debt crisis deals with countries and their ability to repay borrowed funds. Therefore, it deals with national economies, international loans and national budgeting. The definitions of "debt crisis" have varied over time, with major institutions such as Standard and Poor's or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offering their own views on the matter. The most basic definition that all agree on is that a debt crisis is when a national government cannot pay the debt it owes and seeks, as a result, some form of assistance. 1. The Bond Market
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Standard and Poor's rates economic entities in terms of their credit worthiness. Credit worthiness internationally can be measured, among other ways, by following the divergence between long-term and short-term bond prices adhering to a specific country. Standard and Poor's defines debt crisis formally as the divergence between long- and short-term bonds of 1000 base points or more. Ten base points equal a 1 percent rate increase. Therefore, if the interest rate on long-term bonds is 10 percent above short-term bonds, the country is in a debt crisis. Less formally, this means that investors in international bonds see a country as failing economically. Therefore, the long-term prospects of the relevant national economy are bleak, meaning that the rate for long-term bonds rises quickly.

Default and Rescheduling

The International Monetary Fund, in its substantial literature on debt, rejects the concept of default as an important part of a debt crisis. This is because since Ecuador's default in 1999, there have been few of these. Banks are interested primarily in avoiding default, which would mean the total write off of the loan. Instead, banks want to see at least a portion of their money returned. Therefore, the IMF sees debt rescheduling as the main ingredient in debt crises. More formally, if a debt is renegotiated --- or rescheduled --- at terms less advantageous than the original loan, then the country is formally in a debt crisis.

Write Downs
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Another useful measure of debt crisis is the writing down --- or writing off --- a loan amount. This means that the creditors of a specific national economy have largely given up on the ability of the country to pay its debts, and therefore, renegotiate the loan such that the principle amount is lower. This will lower the country's credit rating substantially, but it will provide some debt relief.

Restructuring
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The loss of some national sovereignty is a more specifically political --- and less formal --- part of the debt crisis experience. The IMF states that coercive restructuring of a country's finances is a clear marker of a debt crisis. Banks and the national governments that protect them want to see their money
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returned, if not now, then some time in the future. Therefore, the World Bank, the IMF or even other countries can begin the process of forcibly restructuring a country's economy so as to produce more tax revenue, profit or whatever will lead to eventual repayment. The IMF, when assisting a country, only does so on the condition that the country radically revamps its financial and economic system. Therefore, the connection between receiving assistance from the IMF and forcible restructuring is a variable that points to a debt crisis that has reached a critical point.

Growth of the debt and leverage before the Crisis

Most analysis has focused on the cause of the crisis on the roles played by US mortgage lending and financial sector leverage. However, a large part in the picture is missing. Enabled by globalization of the banking sector and a period of unusually low interest rates and risks spread debt grew mostly after the year 2000 in most mature economies. By 2008, most mature economies such as UK, Spain, South Korea and France had higher level of debt as a percentage of the GDP than the US. Also, most of the debt was not in the financial sector but rather in household, business and some government sectors. Borrowing accelerated in most developed countries: The total debt relative to GDP in 10 mature economies has increased from 200%of GDP in 1995 to over 300% in 2008. Rise of debt mainly occurred in the Real Economy particularly in the real estate: Attention is focused mainly on the financial sector borrowing as a prime contributor to the crisis. Financial Institutions issued debt-rather short term debt- rather on the deposits to fund lending in the years before the crisis. This source of funding dried up when the credit markets seized up in the fall of 2008, wreaking havoc in the bank operations and contributing to the severity of the crisis. However in the mature economies, the increases in the financial sector borrowing were dwarfed by the collective growth in the debts of the
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households, corporations and government. Out of the total debt of about $40 trillion, almost 11 trillion accounted for financial institutions and the remaining $29 trillion were divided among the households, non-financial business and the government-the so called real economy. Real Estate played an important role in the growth of leverage across countries. Rising real estate were both a cause and consequence of the increased borrowing : as property prices rose, buyers borrowed more thereby pushing prices up even more. By 2007, bank lending for residential mortgages was equal to 81% of the GDP in the UK and 73% in the US. In comparision, bank lending to businesses was equal to 46% of GDP in UK and 36% in the US. In European countries, mortgage lending is lower but however acrosswestern Europe, it accounted for majority of growth in lending. In summary the breadth of the housing bubble was greater than its understood and should be monitored closely. DEBT AND LEVERAGE WITHIN HOUSEHOLDS, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT SECTORS: The aggregate measure of debt relative to GDP is not the only indicator of GDP. Using more granular measures, one observes that households became significantly more leveraged in many countries, while most of the corporations and the governments entered the crisis within stable or even declining levels of leverage. However total debt is rarely spread evenly within the sectors and that average levels of sector leverage mask pockets of highly leveraged borrowers. It was these borrowers in each of the sectors that got into trouble and caused most of the credit losses in the crisis.
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Household leverage increased significantly in many economies: Households in almost all mature economies boosted their borrowing significantly relative to their GDP since the year 2000. Although US household debt grew significantly to 96% of their GDP by 2008, UK and Swiss households had even larger amounts of debts at 102% and 121% of their GDP respectively. Canadian households also reached higher levels of debt to GDP in recent years. Exceptions were the households in Japan and Germany which had declining levels of debt relative to their GDP.

Within the household sector, there are some pockets of very highly leveraged borrowers. In the United States, contrary to conventional wisdom, the greatest increase in leverage occurred among the middle incomed households, not the poorest. Most borrowers who did not qualify for theprime mortgage category-were in fact the middle income and the high income households with poor credit histories, or no down payments or poor documentation of income not low income households buying a

house for the first time. In Spain by contrast, leverage increased mostly among the poorer households. The Corporate Sector entered the crisis with stable or declining levels of leverage, with 2 exceptions: Leverage ratio of nonfinancial business, measured as debt to book equity, were stable or declining in most countries in the years prior to the crisis, as businesses enjoyed higher profits and booming equity markets . However 2 exceptions stand out- commercial real estate and companies acquired in the recent years through leveraged buy outs. The commercial real estate sector, with its preponderance of fixed assets, has traditionally employed more leverage than the rest of the corporate sector. This increased to even higher levels before the crisis as underwriting standards were relaxed, commercial properties rose rapidly and interest rates remained low. Rapid appreciation in the prices of commercial property, just like residential property, has been the heart of many financial crises. There is a definite relation between real estate booms and banking crises. Several factors account for this empirical regularity. First is the positive feedback between asset values and credit availability through mechanisms such as loan-tovalue ratios. In addition, commercial real estate lending takes place with only limited disclosure available on the businesses of real estate developers, most of which are private companies. Third, long lead times in real estate can result in big price shifts when there is a change in demand. Finally real estate developers have an asymmetric pay-off due to limited

liability, with large potential profits if the project succeeds with losses in case are borne by borne by banks and other investors. Companies brought through leverage buy-outs are another exception to the pattern of stable leverage in the overall corporate sector. As private equity industry attracted new investors, the number and the size of buyout deals roseas did the leveraged employed in the deals. The Government Sector entered the crisis with steady levels of leverage: Most mature economies government debt relative to GDP did not change much from 2000 through 2008. In the US, for example, even with extra borrowing to pay for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, strong economic growth during the period caused the ratio of government debt to GDP fall by about 2% a year. Government debt relative to GDP also slightly fell in countries like Italy, Spain and Switzerland and rose slightly in Canada, France, Germany and the UK. While governments could have done more to reduce debt during booming years, it is fortunate that most entered the crisis with ample room to expand public spending, as they have done since.

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Causes of the Debt Crisis:

1) In the US:
A) Boom and bust in the housing market: Low interest rates and large inflows of foreign funds created easy credit conditions for a number of years prior to the crisis, fueling a housing market boom and encouraging debt-financed consumption.[46] The USA home ownership rate increased from 64% in 1994 (about where it had been since 1980) to an all-time high of 69.2% in 2004.[47] Subprime lending was a major contributor to this increase in home ownership rates and in the overall demand for housing, which drove prices higher. B)Homeowner speculation: Speculative borrowing in residential real estate has been cited as a contributing factor to the subprime mortgage crisis. During 2006, 22% of homes purchased (1.65 million units) were for investment purposes, with an additional 14% (1.07 million units) purchased as vacation homes. During 2005, these figures were 28% and 12%, respectively. In other words, a record level of nearly 40% of homes purchases were not intended as primary residences. David Lereah, NAR's chief economist at the time, stated that the 2006 decline in investment buying was expected: "Speculators left the market in 2006, which caused investment sales to fall much faster than the primary market." C) High-risk mortgage loans and lending/borrowing practices

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In the years before the crisis, the behavior of the lenders changed dramatically. Lenders offered more and more loans to higher-risk borrowers, including undocumented immigrants. Subprime mortgages amounted to $35 billion (5% of total originations) in 1994, 9% in 1996, $160 billion (13%) in 1999,and $600 billion (20%) in 2006. D) Inaccurate Credit Ratings:
Critics allege that the rating agencies suffered from conflicts of interest, as they were paid by investment banks and other firms that organize and sell structured securities to investors. E) Policies of central banks: Central banks manage monetary policy and may target the rate of inflation. They have some authority over commercial banks and possibly other financial institutions. They are less concerned with avoiding asset price bubbles, such as the housing bubble and dot-com bubble. Central banks have generally chosen to react after such bubbles burst so as to minimize collateral damage to the economy, rather than trying to prevent or stop the bubble itself

2) IN THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES:

A)A Continuing Legacy of Colonialism: The history of third world debt is the history of a massive siphoning-off by international finance of the resources of the most deprived peoples. This process is designed to perpetuate itself thanks to a diabolical

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mechanism whereby debt replicates itself on an ever greater scale, a cycle that can be broken only by canceling the debt. B) Odious Debt: Many poor countries today have started their independent status with heavy debt burdens imposed by the former colonial occupiers. South Africa as another example, has found it now has to pay for its own past repression: the debts incurred during the apartheid era are now to be repaid by the new South Africa. C) Mismanaged Lending Most loans to the third world have to be paid back in hard currencies (which do not usually change too much in value, e.g. the Japanese Yen, the American Dollar, etc.)

Poor countries have soft currencies (values which can fluctuate). Debt crises can also occur just by the value of the developing countrys money going down, which can be due to a variety of other inter-related factors.

Paying off loans implies earning foreign exchange in hard currencies.

Combined with falling export prices for many poor countries, debts become even harder to pay off.

Refinancing loans implies taking on new debts to service the old ones.

Structural adjustment advice in the past from the IMF and others, has led to the cut back on important spending such as health,

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education, in order to help repay loans. This has implied a downward spiral and further poverty. D) The Worlds Poor Are Subsidizing the Rich: Another cause for large scale debt has been the corruption and embezzlement of money by the elite in developing countries (who were often placed in power by the powerful countries themselves). These moneys are often placed in foreign banks (and used to loan back to the developing countries). Many loans also come with conditions that include preferential exports etc. In effect then, more money comes out of the developing countries than is given in. This depresses wages even further due to the spiraling circle downwards to ensure that enough exports are produced. E)Backbone to Globalization: The economic decisions and influence in various international agreements, treaties and institutions by the wealthy and powerful nations also help form the backbone of todays globalization. That such immense wealth and prosperity for some have come at a time when most nations in the world have steeped into further poverty and debt is no coincidence. The policies of those who have the power and influence have been successful to help raise standards for some in their own nations, but at a terrible cost. Rich nations as well as poor incur debts, but often the wealthier and more powerful ones are able to use various means to avoid getting into the dilemmas and problems the poor nations get into.

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THE EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS:

So What Is the Eurozone Debt Crisis?
The Eurozone Debt Crisis also known as the European Sovereign Debt Crisis or Sovereign Debt Crisis started almost 2 years ago now. Or even almost 3 years ago if you are including the 2008 Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis also known as the Credit Crunch, which some believe has contributed or kicked started to the Eurozone Debt Crisis. In saying that the Eurozone Debt Crisis first came to light around November 2009 when concerns were raised about some of the Eurozone countries level of sovereign debt with Greece being the first country identified with levels of debt they would not be able to repay. By December 2009 Greece's level of debt reaches to around $300 billion euros the highest on record which was amounting to 113% of GDP. Also in December three ratings agency cut Greeces rating, Standards & Poor (S&P) cut Greeces rating was down to BBB+ from a A-, Fitch Ratings cuts Greeces rating to BBB+ and Moodys cuts Greek Debt to A2 from A1. By January 2010 other European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland are beginning to make headlines showing concerns with their sovereign debt with Spain announcing public spending cuts and public sector pays to be cut by 4 percent. In February 2010 the EU commission backs Greeces stability and growth program which then results in general public service strikes that impact Greeces public services and transport. On top of that the IMF experts provide a dark outlook for Greece and its finances. In March 2010 Greeces issues continue to occur with Greece announcing more public service cuts, tax increases, and freezing state funded pensions
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which cause outrage in the community and more strikes. By now the Eurozone leaders and the IMF agree to begin to create a bailout plan for Greece with a 30 billion euro bailout plan approved in April 2010, with Greece requesting for disbursement which activates the plan on the 23rd of April 2010. Before the end of April 2010 S&P now cuts Greece rating to a "junk" bond status, but the S&P does not stop with Greece as they have another two countries on their radar Portugal and Spain. Portugals rating is downgraded by S&P to A- with further warnings of more downgrades possible, while Spain is downgraded from AAA to AA-. April was not a good month for the Eurozone and this was felt worldwide in the financial markets with more pain to come in the following months. In May 2010 more strikes against austerity measures occur in Greece which turn violent and global markets continue to fall with this news and fears that the Eurozone may be losing control of the debt crisis. By now more Eurozone countries (Italy, Spain, and Portugal) are announcing austerity measure to cut deficit with debate occurring in the UK House of Commons around concerns that the UK could face their own financial crisis. To help fight what looks like a losing battle with the Eurozone Debt Crisis and fears across global markets, policymakers create a financial emergency safety net worth approx. 750 billion euros. By the end of May 2010, Fitch rating agency also downgrades their rating of Spanish bonds to AA+ from AAA. In June 2010 the outlook is still dark and protests across the impacted Eurozone countries continue with Spain seeing a large number of public
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service workers staying home in protest. However for some there is still light at the end of the tunnel (unless you are Greece and that light is the train coming towards them) as Germany announced budget and tax cuts which will bring Germany's deficit in line with the EU standards over a three year period. Also in June 2010 Greece rating by Moodys is cut to BA1 or Junk Status and the Euro fell to a four year low. See Eurozone Debt Crisis Impacts on the Euro for an in-depth look at how the Euro has been impact on a daily, weekly and monthly view. July 2010 protests continue in Greece, Moodys cuts Portugal rating two notches to A1, and stress tests are given to 91 European banks with 7 falling and 17 just passing. By the end of July 2010 Italy announces its austerity measure in parliament. In August 2010 more countries were on the radar of rating agencies with S&P cutting Irelands long term rating to AA- with Moodys then following cutting their rating to AA2. September 2010, Greece begins to show signs that it may default on its bail out with the Finance Ministers of the EU countries approving a second instalment of the bailout for the country. Ireland also showing more signs of stress with its public deficit revised to a record high, the largest in the EU since 1999. By November 2010 the EU and IMF agree on an 85 Billion Euro aid package for Ireland. A new year and the outlook is still grim for the Eurozone with Fitch cutting
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Greeces rating to a junk status in January 2011. A new year and the outlook is still grim for the Eurozone with Fitch cutting Greeces rating to a junk status in January 2011 with the long term outlook for Greece not looking so good. By the time May 2011 and June 2011 comes Greece sees its ratings cut even further by S&P to a Junk Status B in May and then followed by Greece criticising Moodys further reduction of Greece rating to Caa1in the junk status. Market falls across the world and strikes continue in Greece in June 2011. In July 2011 EU leaders agree a new bailout plan of 159 billion euros for Greece. August 2011 see continual market falls and with both Spain and Italys borrowing costs soaring to a record high. September 2011 S&P cut Italy's to credit rating to A from A+. In September markets continue to be volatile and fall on fears of the Eurozone Debt Crisis and also with fears with the US economy. With concerns around the world there is more and more growing fears of another global recession.However with recent crisis talks of the Eurozone leaders are emerging details of a new rescue plan. Germany's parliament approve to increase the Eurozone bail out fund. However markets continue to fall under fears that Greece may partially default on their debt. October 2011 Italy's debt rating was cut further by Moody's rating agency from Aa2 to A2. A 24 hour public strike brings Greece to a standstill in protest against austerity measures.
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In addition the IMF warns of a global recession is possible in 2012. EU Leaders in Brussels agree to prevention measures to prevent EU members collapse due to spiralling debt. November 2011, Markets take another downward turn as Italy shows signs that it will struggle with its levels of debt. Once again December 2011 was not a good month for the Eurozone and the contining troubles due to the Eurozone Debt Crisis. A key summit in Brussels was held where attempts were made to get all 27 Eurozone countries to agree to strict new rules on deficiets and debt however the Uk would not sign up to the deal. 15 Eurozone countries were placed on S&P negative credit watch list including France, Germany & Austria. Also in December 2011 the Eurozone Debt Crisis was still being felt across the world with markets reacting to news coming out of the Eurozone. In Australia during the week before Christmas, all major banks were required to War Room worse case scenarios if the Eurozone Debt Crisis was to worsen. The purpose of this was to see how well the Australian banks would manage in a worst case scenario situation. January 2012, a New Year but same issues. This year did not get off to a good start for the Eurozone Debt Crisis with further downgrading by rating agency S&P. On Friday 13th ratings agency S&P downgraded 9 Eurozone countries, with France and Austria losing their high AAA rating by one notch to AA+. Markets initially reacted negatively to this news but soon rallied however the outlook for the Eurozone & the Eurozone Debt Crisis in 2012 does not look good. On the 18th January 2012, the World Bank slashing its global forecast and has warned of a new GFC greater than 2008.
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February 2012, Greece struggle to agree and come up with new austerity measure to secure its second bail out which was eventually approved on the 20th of Feb. However markets were still somewhat concerns on the risk of Greece still defaulting. Once again riots were hitting the headlines again in Greeze due to the latest austerity measures announced.

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IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS:

The global financial crisis, brewing for a while, really started to show its effects in the middle of 2007 and into 2008. Around the world stock markets have fallen, large financial institutions have collapsed or been bought out, and governments in even the wealthiest nations have had to come up with rescue packages to bail out their financial systems. On the one hand many people are concerned that those responsible for the financial problems are the ones being bailed out, while on the other hand, a global financial meltdown will affect the livelihoods of almost everyone in an increasingly inter-connected world. The problem could have been avoided, if ideologues supporting the current economics models werent so vocal, influential and inconsiderate of others viewpoints and concerns. A Crisis So Severe, The World Financial System Is Affected Following a period of economic boom, a financial bubbleglobal in scopehas now burst. A collapse of the US sub-prime mortgage market and the reversal of the housing boom in other industrialized economies have had a ripple effect around the world. Furthermore, other weaknesses in the global financial system have surfaced. Some financial products and instruments have become so complex and twisted, that as things start to unravel, trust in the whole system started to fail.

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Securitization And The Subprime Crisis The subprime crisis came about in large part because of financial instruments such as securitization where banks would pool their various loans into sellable assets, thus off-loading risky loans onto others. (For banks, millions can be made in money-earning loans, but they are tied up for decades. So they were turned into securities. The security buyer gets regular payments from all those mortgages; the banker off loads the risk. Securitization was seen as perhaps the greatest financial innovation in the 20th century.) As BBCs former economic editor and presenter, Evan Davies noted in a documentary called The City Uncovered with Evan Davis: Banks and How to Break Them (January 14, 2008), rating agencies were paid to rate these products (risking a conflict of interest) and invariably got good ratings, encouraging people to take them up. Starting in Wall Street, others followed quickly. With soaring profits, all wanted in, even if it went beyond their area of expertise. For example,

Banks borrowed even more money to lend out so they could create more securitization. Some banks didnt need to rely on savers as much then, as long as they could borrow from other banks and sell those loans on as securities; bad loans would be the problem of whoever bought the securities.

Some investment banks like Lehman Brothers got into mortgages, buying them in order to securitize them and then sell them on.

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Some banks loaned even more to have an excuse to securitize those loans.

Running out of who to loan to, banks turned to the poor; the subprime, the riskier loans. Rising house prices led lenders to think it wasnt too risky; bad loans meant repossessing high-valued property. Subprime and self-certified loans (sometimes dubbed liars loans) became popular, especially in the US.

Some banks evens started to buy securities from others. Collateralized Debt Obligations, or CDOs, (even more complex forms of securitization) spread the risk but were very complicated and often hid the bad loans. While things were good, no-one wanted bad news.

Creating More Risk By Trying To Manage Risk Securitization was an attempt at managing risk. There have been a number of attempts to mitigate risk, or insure against problems. While these are legitimate things to do, the instruments that allowed this to happen helped cause the current problems, too. In essence, what had happened was that banks, hedge funds and others had become over-confident as they all thought they had figured out how to take on risk and make money more effectively. As they initially made more money taking more risks, they reinforced their own view that they had it figured out. They thought they had spread all their risks effectively and yet when it really went wrong, it all went wrong.

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The Scale Of The Crisis: Trillions In Taxpayer Bailouts The extent of the problems has been so severe that some of the worlds largest financial institutions have collapsed. Others have been bought out by their competition at low prices and in other cases, the governments of the wealthiest nations in the world have resorted to extensive bail-out and rescue packages for the remaining large banks and financial institutions. The total amounts that governments have spent on bailouts have skyrocketed. From a world credit loss of $2.8 trillion in October 2009, US taxpayers alone will spend some $9.7 trillion in bailout packages and plans, according to Bloomberg. $14.5 trillion, or 33%, of the value of the worlds companies has been wiped out by this crisis. The UK and other European countries have also spent some $2 trillion on rescues and bailout packages. More is expected.

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A Crisis So Severe, The Rest Suffer Too Because of the critical role banks play in the current market system, when the larger banks show signs of crisis, it is not just the wealthy that suffer, but potentially everyone. With a globalized system, a credit crunch can ripple through the entire (real) economy very quickly turning a global financial crisis into a global economic crisis. For example, an entire banking system that lacks confidence in lending as it faces massive losses will try to shore up reserves and may reduce access to credit, or make it more difficult and expensive to obtain. In the wider economy, this credit crunch and higher costs of borrowing will affect many sectors, leading to job cuts. People may find their mortgages harder to pay, or remortgaging could become expensive. For any recent home buyers, the value of their homes are likely to fall in value leaving them in negative equity. As people cut back on consumption to try and weather this economic storm, more businesses will struggle to survive leading to further further job losses. The Financial Crisis And Wealthy Countries Many blame the greed of Wall Street for causing the problem in the first place because it is in the US that the most influential banks, institutions and ideologues that pushed for the policies that caused the problems are found. The crisis became so severe that after the failure and buyouts of major institutions, the Bush Administration offered a $700 billion bailout plan for the US financial system.

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This bailout package was controversial because it was unpopular with the public, seen as a bailout for the culprits while the ordinary person would be left to pay for their folly. The US House of Representatives initial rejected the package as a result, sending shock waves around the world. It took a second attempt to pass the plan, but with add-ons to the bill to get the additional congressmen and women to accept the plan. In Europe, starting with Britain, a number of nations decided to nationalize, or part-nationalize, some failing banks to try and restore confidence. The US resisted this approach at first, as it goes against the rigid free market view the US has taken for a few decades now. Eventually, the US capitulated and the Bush Administration announced that the US government would buy shares in troubled banks. This illustrates how serious this problem is for such an ardent follower of free market ideology to do this (although free market theories were not originally intended to be applied to finance, which could be part of a deeper root cause of the problem). Perhaps fearing an ideological backlash, Bush was quick to say that buying stakes in banks is not intended to take over the free market, but to preserve it. While the US move was eventually welcomed by many, others echo Stiglitzs concern above. For example, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Department in the Reagan administration and a former associate editor of the Wall Street Journal, Paul Craig Roberts also argues that the bailout should have been to help people with failing mortgages, not banks:
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The problem, according to the government, is the defaulting mortgages, so the money should be directed at refinancing the mortgages and paying off the foreclosed ones. And that would restore the value of the mortgagebacked securities that are threatening the financial institutions [and] the crisis would be over. So theres no connection between the governments explanation of the crisis and its solution to the crisis. Despite the large $700 billion US plan, banks have still been reluctant to lend. This led to the US Fed announcing another $800 billion stimulus package at the end of November. About $600bn is marked to buy up mortgage-backed securities while $200bn will be aimed at unfreezing the consumer credit market. This also reflects how the crisis has spread from the financial markets to the real economy and consumer spending. By February 2009, according to Bloomberg, the total US bailout is $9.7 trillion. Enough to pay off more than 90 percent of Americas home mortgages (although this bailout barely helps homeowners)

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GOVERNMENT MEASURES TAKEN TO CURB RECESSION:

Dealing with Recession Most economic regions are now facing recession, or are in it. This includes the US, the Eurozone, and many others. At such times governments attempt to stimulate the economy. Standard macroeconomic policy includes policies to

Increase borrowing, Reduce interest rates, Reduce taxes, and Spend on public works such as infrastructure.

Borrowing at a time of recession seems risky, but the idea is that this should be complimented with paying back during times of growth. Likewise, reducing interest rates sounds like there would be less incentive for people to save money, when banks need to build up their capital reserves. However, as the real economy starts to feel the pinch, reduced interest rates is an attempt to encourage people to take part in the economy. Tax reduction is something that most people favor, and yet during times of economic downturn it would seem that a reduction in tax would result in reduced government revenues just when they need it and then spending on health, education, etc, would be at risk. However, because higher taxes
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during downturns means more hardship for more people, increased borrowing is supposed to offset the reduction in taxes, hopefully affording people a better chance to weather the economic storm. Finally it is at this time that public infrastructure work, which can potentially employ many, many people, is palatable. Often, under free market ideals, government involvement in such activities is supposed to be minimal. Even the other forms of interference is usually frowned upon. However, most states realize that markets are not always able to function on their own (the current financial crisis, starting in the US, being the prime example); pragmatic and sensible adoption of market systems means governments can guide development and progress as required. Nonetheless, many governments have started to contemplate these kinds of measures. For example, South Korea reduced its interest rates, as has Japan, China, England, various European countries, and many others. Many have looked to borrow billions or in some way come up with stimulus packages to try and kick-start ailing economies.

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GREECE DEBT CRISES:

INTRODUCTION
Since early 2010, the Eurozone has been facing a major debt crisis. The governments of several countries in the Eurozone have accumulated what many consider to be unsustainable levels of government debt, and three Greece, Ireland, and Portugalhave turned to other European countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for loans in order to avoid defaulting on their debt.2 The crisis now threatens to spread to Italy and Spain, respectively the third and fourth largest economies in the Eurozone. Greece has been at the center of the Eurozone debt crisis. It has the highest levels of public debt in the Eurozone, and one of the biggest budget deficits. Greece was the first Eurozone member to come under intense market pressures and the first to turn to other Eurozone member states and the IMF for financial assistance. Over the past year, the IMF, European officials, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Greek government have undertaken substantial crisis response measures. At the behest of European leaders in July 2011, holders of Greek bonds have also indicated that they will accept losses on their investments to alleviate Greeces debt payments in the short-run. If these plans are carried out, Greece will be the first advanced economy to default in almost half a century. The Greek debt crisis is of continuing interest to the U.S. Congress. The United States and the European Union (EU) have the largest economic relationship in the world, and there are concerns about how economic turmoil in Greece and the Eurozone more broadly could impact the U.S. economy. There has been particular concern about the exposure of U.S. financial institutions to
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Greece. Additionally, the United States has the largest financial commitment to the IMF of all the IMF members. Some Members of Congress have raised questions about whether Greeces IMF program is an appropriate use of IMF resources. These concerns have led to a number of congressional hearings and legislation in the 111th and 112th Congresses. The Build-Up to Greeces Debt Crisis The Greek government has a long history of problems with its public debt it has spent more than half the years since 1832, when it gained independence from the Ottoman Empire, in default. Economists point to several deeply entrenched features of the Greek economy and Greek society in general that have prevented sustained economic growth and created the conditions underlying the current crisis. Chief among these are pervasive state control of the economy, a large and inefficient public administration, endemic tax evasion, and widespread political clientelism. An influx of capital at low interest rates during the 2000s and the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 further exacerbated these problems, straining public finances to an unsustainable degree. Euro Adoption, Capital Inflows, and Lax Enforcement of EU Fiscal Rules As Greece prepared during the 1990s to adopt the euro as its national currency, its borrowing costs dropped dramatically. Interest rates on 10year Greek bonds were dropped by 18% (from 24.5% to 6.5%) between 1993 and 1999. Investors believed that there would be widespread convergence among countries in the Eurozone. This belief was reinforced
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by the policy targets, called convergence criteria, that countries had to meet in order to be eligible to join the Eurozone. Additionally, the common monetary policy was to be anchored by economic heavyweights, including Germany and France, and managed conservatively by the ECB. EU member countries were also to be bound by rules in the Stability and Growth Pact that limited government deficits (3% of GDP) and public debt levels (60% of GDP). These limits were to be enforceable through fines of up to 0.5% of GDP. All of these factors created new investor confidence in Greece and other Eurozone member states with traditionally weaker economic fundamentals compared to, for example, Germany. The influx of capital and pursuit of meeting convergence criteria did not result in a fundamental change in how the Greek economy was managed or in investments that increased the competitiveness of the economy. The Greek government took advantage of greater access to cheap credit to pay for government spending and offset low tax revenue. The government also borrowed to pay for imports from abroad that were not offset by exports overseas. Government budget and trade deficits ballooned during the 2000s and borrowed funds were not channeled into productive investments that would generate future growth, increase the competitiveness of the economy, and create new resources with which to repay the debt. Instead, the inflows of capital were used to fund current consumption that did not yield streams of revenue with which to repay the debt. EU policies that had been put in place to provide a check on the accumulation of public debt failed to do so. Since 2003, the EU has initiated
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more than 30 cases against members in violation of the fiscal rules set out in the Stability and Growth Pact, including Greece. Through this process, EU institutions have reprimanded member states in violation of the deficit and debt limits and pressured them to consolidate public finances. It has never imposed a financial sanction against a member state in violation of these limits, however.

Greeces Twin Deficits: Budget and Current Account Deficits, 19992009

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2011.

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The Triggers: Global Financial Crisis and Revelations of MisReported Data The Greek governments reliance on borrowing from international capital markets to pay for budget deficits and trade deficits left it vulnerable to shifts in investor confidence. If investors lost confidence in the Greek governments ability or willingness to repay its debt, they would stop lending to the government or charge interest rates that were higher than what the Greek government could afford. Lack of access to new funds would make it difficult for the government to borrow to repay existing debt as it became due (called rolling over its debt), meaning that the government would have to implement austerity measures quickly or risk defaulting on its debt. Starting in 2009, investor confidence in Greeces ability to service its debt dropped significantly. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the related economic downturn strained the public finances of many advanced economies, including Greece, as government spending on programs, such unemployment benefits, increased and tax revenues weakened. Greeces reported public debt rose from 106% of GDP in 2006 to 126% of GDP in 2009. Additionally, in late 2009, the new government, led by Prime Minister George Papandreou, revealed that previous Greek governments had been underreporting the budget deficit. The new Government revised the estimate of 2009 budget deficit from 6.7% of GDP to 12.7% of GDP. This was shortly followed by rating downgrades of Greek bonds by major credit rating agencies.
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Allegations that Greek governments had attempted to obscure debt levels through complex financial instruments contributed further to a drop in investor confidence. Greeces 2009 budget deficit was subsequently revised upwards a number of times, finally to 15.4% of GDP. As investors became increasingly nervous that the Greek governments debt was too high, and that it would default on its debt, they started demanding higher interest rates for buying and holding Greek bonds. Higher interest rates compensated investors for the higher risk involved in holding Greek government bonds, but they also drove up Greeces borrowing costs, exacerbated its debt levels, and caused Greece to veer towards default. Greek Bond Spreads, 1993-2011
Spreads on 10-year Greek bonds relative to 10-year German bonds (%)

Source: Global Financial Data.

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Crisis Responses European leaders, the IMF, and the ECB agreed that an uncontrolled, disorderly default on Greek debt would be extremely risky and should be avoided at all costs. They feared that such a default could spark a major sell-off of bonds of other Eurozone members with high debt levels and that European banks exposed to Greece and other Eurozone governments would not be able to weather losses on those investments. Fear of contagion and financial turmoil drove a major policy response by the Europeans, the IMF, the Greek government, and central banks in May 2010 to avoid a Greek default. When Greece again veered towards default more than a year later, a second crisis response was announced in the summer of 2011. To date, the policy responses have succeeded in avoiding a disorderly Greek default. They have been less successful in putting Greece on a clear path to recovery and containing the crisis.

May 2010 The first round of crisis response measures focused on financial assistance from the Eurozone and the IMF, paired with austerity measures and reforms implemented by the Greek government. Central banks also played a role in providing liquidity in the region. Financial Assistance from Eurozone and IMF In May 2010, Eurozone leaders and the IMF announced a three-year package of 110 billion (about $158 billion) in loans to Greece at market36

based interest rates.13 Of the 110 billion, the Eurozone countries pledged to contribute 80 billion (about $115 billion) and the IMF pledged to contribute 30 billion (about $43 billion). Disbursement of funds was made conditional on implementation of economic reforms, as discussed below. Seeking to prevent the spread of the crisis beyond Greece, EU leaders also created in May 2010 a new European mechanism for providing financial assistance to Eurozone member states under market pressures. The mechanism consists of two temporary, three-year lending facilities that could make loans totaling 500 billion (about $718 billion) to Eurozone members facing debt crises. EU leaders also suggested that the IMF could provide additional support. IMF and EU programs were subsequently provided to Ireland and Portugal. In March 2011, EU leaders agreed to create a permanent lending facility, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), to replace the temporary facilities after they expired in mid-2013. Fiscal Consolidation and Economic Reforms in Greece As a condition of financial support from the IMF and Eurozone countries, the Greek government has undertaken ambitious fiscal consolidation measures and economic reforms. An austerity program outlined in May 2010 aimed to reduce the governments budget deficit by 11 percentage points through 2013, bringing it below 3% of GDP by 2014.The programs immediate objectives were a deep cut to public spending and enhanced revenue growth through tax increases and a crack-down on tax evasion. Most spending cuts have been to the civil service, including a reduction or freeze on civil service compensation and a civil service hiring freeze. On the revenue side, the government raised the average value-added tax rate
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and increased taxes on certain commodities (fuel, tobacco, and alcohol). The government aimed to raise additional revenues through strengthened tax collection and higher contribution requirements for tax evaders. The government has begun to implement healthcare and pension reforms deemed vital to consolidating public finances. The Greek pension system, considered one of the most generous in Europe, has long been a target of advocates of Greek economic reform. In July 2010, the parliament agreed to pension reform to increase the average retirement age and reformed how pension benefits would be calculated. Prime Minister Papandreou also launched a similar effort to reduce expenditures and strengthen accountability in what is considered an inefficient Greek healthcare system. Healthcare reforms have included a reduction in total expenditures and consolidation of hospitals. Structural reforms pursued in 2010 to boost Greek competitiveness were focused on the rigid and highly fragmented labor market. Central Bank Intervention The ECB and the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed) have also played a role in responding to the crisis. The ECB announced in May 2010 that, for the first time, it would start buying European government bonds in secondary markets to increase confidence and lower bond spreads for Eurozone bonds under market pressure. Between May 2010 and June 2011, the ECB purchased government bonds totaling 78 billion (about $112 billion), with the bulk purchased in the summer of 2010. Market analysts estimate that more than half (45 billion, about $65 billion) of the ECBs bond purchases were Greek bonds.The ECB has also provided substantial liquidity support
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to private banks in Greece and other countries in the Eurozone, and has provided more flexibility in doing so than it did before the crisis.19 ECB liquidity support for Greek banks climbed from 47 billion (about $68 billion) in January 2010 to 98 billion (about $141 billion) in May 2011, roughly 40% of Greeces 2011 GDP.20 The Fed has supported the crisis response by re-establishing temporary reciprocal currency arrangements, known as swap lines, with several central banks in order to increase dollar liquidity in the global economy. These swap lines had been previously used during the global financial crisis. The swap lines were set to expire but have been subsequently extended until August 2012 amid continuing concerns about the Eurozone. While the swap lines were used most heavily immediately after the Fed reestablished them, there has not been any amount outstanding on the swap lines between the winter of 2010 and summer of 2011. June and July 2011 Starting in the spring of 2011, it became clear that the Greek economy was contracting more severely than expected and would require more assistance in order to avoid defaulting on its debt. After requiring Greece to adopt additional austerity measures, EU officials, the ECB, and the IMF debated for several weeks about what a second package for Greece would include. They quickly reached an agreement after a speculative attack on Italy in July 2011 (a rapid sell-off of Italian bonds, resulting in rising bond spreads on Italian bonds). European officials decided that in addition to more austerity measures and financial

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assistance, the holders of Greek bonds would also share in the crisis response by accepting some losses on their investments. More Fiscal Consolidation and Economic Reform in Greece As economic conditions worsened in the spring of 2011, the Greek parliament approved an additional round of austerity measures and structural reforms in June 2011. These reforms were necessary to get the next disbursement of funds from the original Eurozone-IMF financial assistance package, as well as for securing a second assistance package. The cornerstone of Greeces so-called medium-term fiscal strategy (MTFS) is a consolidation program through 2015 worth 28 billion (about $40 billion, 12% of GDP), including 6.5 billion (about $9 billion, 2.9% of GDP) of additional spending cuts and revenue measures to be implemented in 2011. In all, the MTFS, together with previously announced measures, is designed to bring the government budget deficit down to 0.9% of GDP by 2015. The newly proposed consolidation measures aim primarily to reduce over-staffing in the public sector, improve the financial performance of state-owned enterprises, and streamline social transfers. The other major component of the new fiscal strategyand its most contentiousis an ambitious privatization and public real estate development program designed to raise 50 billion (about $72 billion) by 2015, including 15 billion (about $22 billion) by 2013. Concerns about the Greek governments administrative capacity have led to discussions that the sale of public assets will be, quite unusually, overseen by an independent privatization authority, which is expected to include EU and IMF representatives.
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More Financial Assistance In July 2011, European leaders announced a second financial assistance package for Greece totaling 109 billion ($157 billion). This second financial assistance program will provide loans to Greece on more favorable terms than the first package (lower interest rate and longer maturities), as well as extend the maturities on existing Eurozone loans to Greece. At the time of the announcement, it was unclear whether the IMF would be contributing to the second financial assistance package. The official European communiqu called on the IMF to continue to contribute to the financing of the new Greek program but subsequent news reports indicated that the IMF would refrain from contributing to the second package. To help contain the crisis, European leaders also announced that they would make the EFSF more flexible. Instead of just providing loans, they announced that the EFSF will be able to provide precautionary lines of credit to countries under market pressures, finance the recapitalization of Eurozone banks, and buy bonds in secondary markets with the consent of the ECB. These changes need to be ratified by national parliaments. Losses on Greek Bonds In July 2011, European leaders and the Institute for International Finance (IIF), an association of private financial institutions, announced that holders of Greek bonds would contribute 50 billion (about $72 billion) through 2014 to the crisis response. Specifically, they would participate, on a voluntary basis, in bond exchanges and bond rollovers (37 billion, about

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$53 billion) and debt buybacks (12.6 billion, about $18 billion) to lower Greek debt payments over the short-term. The IIF designed a menu of options for the bond exchanges and rollovers and expect 90% of private creditors to participate. Those that do participate are expected to take a loss of 21% in the net present value of their bond holdings. When the exchanges and swaps are carried out, the major credit rating agencies are expected to classify the Greek government as officially in default, since bondholders will not get paid in full and on time as specified in the original bond contracts.

Evaluating the Policy Response: The policy responses to Greeces debt crisis have not been taken lightly, and they have been reached only after months of negotiations among the ECB, Eurozone leaders, the IMF, and the Greek government. The policy measures aimed to prevent a disorderly Greek default, to restore debt sustainability in Greece, and to prevent the spread of the crisis to other Eurozone countries and the global economy. To date, they have succeeded in the first objective, but have had limited success in the second two. Ongoing Debates about Policy Responses Providing financial assistance to Greece has been controversial. Many Eurozone countries, including Germany, had to overcome considerable political resistance to providing support to Greece. Opponents of EU assistance to Greece expressed exasperation with the idea of rescuing a
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country that, in their perspective, has not exercised budget discipline, had failed to modernize its economy, and had allegedly falsified financial statistics. Opponents also raised the issue of moral hazard and wished to avoid setting a bail out precedent. Likewise, providing IMF funds to Greece sparked intense debate, because the IMF has not lent to developed countries in recent decades and the IMF program for Greece is quite large relative to the size of its economy. Economic reforms have also been difficult for the Greek government for domestic political reasons. Papandreous Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) came to office in October 2009 on a platform of social protection, promising to boost wages, improve support for the poor, and promote redistribution of income. The policies his government has since pursued to cut the budget deficit have required a full-scale retreat from these campaign pledges and are proving increasingly difficult to see through. Tens of thousands of public sector workers and their supporters have taken to the streets to protest the reforms. An opinion poll in June 2011 indicated that close to 50% of Greeks wanted parliament to reject new austerity measures, with only 35% in favor of parliamentary approval. Unemployment in Greece more than doubled between 2008 and 2011, rising from 7.7% to 15.8%. The inclusion of bondholders in the crisis response in July 2011 signaled a major shift in the approach to responding to the crisis, which previously had focused primarily on the provision of financial assistance to Greece and economic reforms in Greece. Private sector involvement in the crisis had long been resisted by some European officials and the ECB due to fears that it would spark broader contagion in the Eurozone. Others, including
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German Chancellor Angela Merkel, felt that the costs of the crisis should be shared with private creditors and not borne by Greek citizens and European taxpayers alone. Limited Success The policy responses have effectively prevented a disorderly default by the Greek government. Greece has continued to pay its debts in full and on time. Investors are expected to take losses on their investments, but a plan has been laid out with input from the private sector, and is expected to proceed in a controlled manner. To date, the policy response has not put Greece on a clear path to recovery. In July 2011, the IMF estimated that Greeces public debt increased substantially between 2010 and 2011, from 143% of GDP to 166% of GDP. It also forecasted that Greeces debt will rise again in 2012 to 172% of GDP, and only start declining in 2013. Most analysts agree that the path to debt sustainability in Greece has been hampered by lack of growth in the Greek economy. Growth would lower Greeces debt and deficit levels as a percentage of GDP, make investors more inclined to resume lending to Greece, and offset the contractionary effects of fiscal reforms, making them more politically palatable. However, fostering shortterm growth in the Greek economy has not been a central feature in the policy response to date, and growth in the economy is proving elusive, with the economy contracting at a faster rate than expected. In May 2010, the IMF estimated that the Greek economy would contract by 2.9% in 2011. Revised IMF estimates now project a sharper contraction for 2011 of 3.9%.
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Growth also contracted by 4.5% in 2010. 29 Growth is proving difficult because austerity measures have depressed domestic sources of growth. Moreover, Greece cannot easily rely on exports for expanding its economy. As a member of the Eurozone, it cannot depreciate its currency against its major trading partners to help spur exports. Additionally, the policy responses to Greeces debt crisis have not provided enough assurance to bond markets to prevent the spread of the debt crisis to other Eurozone countries. Nervousness about Greece has caused bond spreads to rise for other Eurozone members with weak public finances. Higher borrowing costs exacerbate their debt situation. In December 2010, Ireland turned to the IMF and EU for financial assistance, with Portugal following in April 2011. In the late summer of 2011, interest rate spreads on Spanish and Italian bonds started to rise. Belgium, Cyprus, and even France, whose fiscal position had been widely viewed as stable, have also come under scrutiny.

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EU-IMF Assistance for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal

European Financial Country Date Agreed Assistance

IMF Financial Assistance 30 Total Financial Assistance

80 Billion (About $115 GREECE May-10 billion)

Billion(About $43 Billion) 22.5 110 Billion( About $158 Billion)

45 Billion( About $65 IRELAND Dec-10 Billion)

Billion(About $32 Billion) 26 Billion 67.5 Billion (About $97 Billion)

52 Billion( About $75 PORTUGAL May-11 Billion)

Source: IMF press releases.

(About $37 Billion) 78 Billion(About $118 Billion)

There are different, but not mutually exclusive, views on why the policy responses to Greeces debt crisis failed to put a stronger firewall around the country and prevent the spread of the crisis. Some fault European leaders for failing to act decisively during the crisis. It has been argued that their slow, piecemeal approach to the crisis response, and public disputes about appropriate crisis response measures, have exacerbated investor anxiety rather than reassured markets. It may also be the case that the crisis spread not because of what was happening in Greece per se, but simply because other Eurozone countries faced fundamental fiscal challenges that were unsustainable. For example, Spain suffers from a serious housing bubble; Ireland, a bloated banking sector; and Portugal, a decade of anemic growth.

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Broader Implications Greece has a small economy, accounting for only 2.4% of total Eurozone GDP, but the implications of its crisis are far-reaching. Fundamentally, Greeces crisis has exposed some of the fears expressed by economists when the Eurozone was created. They worried about the tensions that could be created by a group of different countries sharing a common currency and monetary policy, while maintaining national fiscal policies. Greeces debt crisis showed that these concerns were valid and that European leaders and EU institutions were not prepared to swiftly respond to such a crisis. The Greece crisis has sparked larger discussions about how to resolve the tensions between a common monetary policy with national fiscal policies, while keeping the monetary union intact. Greeces crisis has also raised a number of more specific economic and political implications, detailed below: First, the policy responses to Greeces debt crisis have set precedents for how the debt crises in other Eurozone countries have been handled. The original crisis response for Greece focused on the provision of IMF and European financial assistance, in combination with austerity and structural reforms. This policy response was contentious and took weeks tonegotiate. When Ireland and Portugal needed assistance, however, their programs were easier to negotiate, because Greece served as a template for designing the crisis response. Now that bondholders are being asked to share in the response to Greeces crisis response by taking losses on their

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investments, markets are concerned that there will be losses on Irish and Portuguese bonds in the future. European officials deny this to be the case. Second, Greeces crisis has exacerbated concerns about the health of the fragile European financial sector. Several large European banks, such as BNP Paribas, Socit Gnrale, Deutsche Bank, UniCredit, and Intesa, are believed to be major private holders of Greek bonds. There have been continuing concerns about how these banks would be able to absorb losses on Greek bonds should Greece default or restructure its debt, particularly given widespread concerns that European banks may be undercapitalized.32 Specifically, there are concerns that the crisis could be transmitted through the European financial sector, triggering broader instability and requiring governments to recapitalize banks. European officials conducted two rounds of stress tests on European banks in June 2010 and July 2011. These tests examined how well European banks could absorb losses on distressed Eurozone bonds. Most banks performed well under the various scenarios laid out in the tests, but some questioned whether the tests were stringent enough. Third, Greeces debt crisis has created new financial liabilities for other European countries. Eurozone countries have extended bilateral loans to Greece, and made financial commitments to the broader European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). If these financial commitments are called on, they could substantially raise the debt levels in Eurozone countries, many of which are
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grappling with their own debt problems. For example, Frances total financial commitment to the rescue packages is 8% of GDP.33 Increasing the size of the EFSF, as some argue is necessary to give it the firepower it needs to respond to a potential crisis in Italy, for example, could increase Frances commitments to 13% of GDP. If these commitments were called upon, Frances debt level could rise to above 100% of GDP. Some argue that these commitments explain, at least in part, why French bond spreads have started to widen. Fourth, the Greek crisis has highlighted the policy constraints on members of the Eurozone. Many analysts have suggested that Greece would be better off if it could exit the Eurozone and issue a new national currency. A new national currency, devalued against the euro, could spur Greek exports and help growth return to the economy. As long as Greece is a member of the Eurozone, it does not have the exchange rate in its policy toolkit for responding to the crisis. Others, including the Papandreou government, argue that leaving the Eurozone would be a terrible economic decision for Greece, triggering a severe banking and financial crisis. They add that because Greeces debt burden is denominated in euros, a new, devalued national currency would increase the value of its debt in terms of national currency. Fifth, the Greek crisis has sparked a broader re-examination of EU economic governance, in order to improve the long-term functioning and stability of the currency union.

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The EU has been working on new legislation that would introduce significant reforms to economic governance. A proposed package of reform measures would strengthen enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact, introduce greater surveillance of national budgets by the European Commission, and establish an early warning mechanism that would prevent or correct macroeconomic imbalances within and between member states. Sixth, Greeces debt crisis has posed challenges to and opportunities for deeper EU integration. In some ways, the crisis has highlighted limits to EU integration, revealing fundamental disagreements between member states about how much EU integration is desirable and highlighting the power that member states, particularly Germany and France, still leverage compared to EU institutions. On the other hand, the crisis has spurred tighter integration, through increased powers of the ECB and the creation of a permanent European lending facility. Impact on U.S. Economy The bilateral economic relationship between the EU and the United States is one of the largest and strongest in the world, and economic turmoil in Greece and the broader Eurozone could have negative implications for the U.S. economy. At the start of the crisis, it was expected that austerity measures would slow growth in Europe and lead to a loss of confidence in the euro, causing a depreciation of the euro relative to the U.S. dollar. Both of these factors would depress demand for U.S. exports to the Eurozone and increase U.S. imports from the Eurozone, causing the U.S. trade deficit to widen. Likewise, slower growth rates in Europe could cause U.S.
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investors to look increasingly towards emerging markets for investment opportunities. On the other hand, a weaker euro could make European stocks and assets look cheaper and more attractive, attracting U.S. capital to the Eurozone. Figure given below shows that even though growth has lagged in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, the strong economic performance in the Eurozone core countries, including Germany, France, and the Netherlands, drove strong growth in the Eurozone through the first quarter of 2011. Real GDP growth in the Eurozone was 2.0% relative to the same quarter in the previous year in the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2010. Real growth increased to 2.5% in the first quarter of 2011, compared to the first quarter of 2010. Data releases for the second quarter of 2011, however, suggest that growth in the Eurozone may be starting to slow. GDP Growth in the Eurozone, Q4 2009Q1 2011

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Quarterly National Accounts

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There are a number of factors that affect the euro-dollar exchange rate (including U.S. policies, such as quantitative easing), and there has not been a clear, sustained depreciation in the euro against the dollar since the start of the crisis. Figure below shows upwards and downward swings in the euro-dollar exchange rate since May 2010, when Greeces financial assistance package was announced. As the crisis has continued, however, increased perceptions of risk have affected U.S. financial markets. Concerns focus on the interconnectedness of the U.S. and EU financial sectors, and the threat of the crisis spreading to larger Eurozone countries, including Spain or Italy. If the crisis does spread, the impact on the U.S. economy could be greater. US$/Euro Exchange Rate, January 2010July 2011

Source: European Central Bank.

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CONCLUSION:
Greeces Debt Crisis has put the EU under the scope, & it has shifted the attention to the efficiency & the success of the Euro-zone. Its considered as probably the biggest test the EU (& the EMU-in particular) has gone through. How the EU & Greece are handling the crisis with the whole bailout plan will reflect to what extent the EU is able to function on its own as a powerful economic entity. Today, the budget deficit of Greece stands at 8.7% of GDP. The government plans to cut it down to 3% by2012. A lot needs to be done if that is to be accomplished, and if Greece is to get back on her feet. The government needs to get rid of its spendthrift and corrupt nature, while the population needs to stop evading taxes. The unemployment rate and current account deficits need to get reduced, while small local businesses need more support from the government and the public. Most importantly, the government needs to regain the trust of the populace. A country distrustful of her leaders is bound for failure. At the end of the day, the citizens are the people who pay. Any progress made will only be gradual and will certainly not come easy. For everyone, the Greek debt crisis serves as a wakeup call for structural reform which, despite the inevitability of hard times ahead, can serve as a catalyst for targeting a more suitable growth model in the long run.

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