Historical institutionalism, critical realism and morphogenetic social theory towards a synthesis of explaining why history matters in organisations?

By Ian Greener, Department of Management Studies, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD Telephone 01904 434651, ig6@york.ac.uk

Abstract This paper explores the difficulties with both the theoretical content and application of the concept of path dependence in organization studies, but suggests that, by combining it with insights from morphogenetic social theory, we can provide a coherent framework for its use. After providing a brief survey of the literature on path dependence, it presents a summary of the most significant criticisms made of the approach. The paper then moves on to examine morphogenetic social theory and its potential to meet these criticisms before concluding by characterising the elements of a path dependent system incorporating insights from both new institutionalism and morphogenetic social theory.

Historical institutionalism, critical realism and morphogenetic social theory towards a synthesis of explaining why history matters in organisations?

Abstract This paper explores the difficulties with both the theoretical content and application of the concept of path dependence in organization studies, but suggests that, by combining it with insights from morphogenetic social theory, we can provide a coherent framework for its use. After providing a brief survey of the literature on path dependence, it presents a summary of the most significant criticisms made of the approach. The paper then moves on to examine morphogenetic social theory and its potential to meet these criticisms before concluding by characterising the elements of a path dependent system incorporating insights from both new institutionalism and morphogenetic social theory.

Introduction historical institutionalism and path dependence Path dependence is an increasingly widely used concept not only in economic and business history, but also in sociology and political science. But given its widespread use, it is striking how differently the concept is used from discipline to discipline. The first widely-cited cases using the concept were arguably those of Arthur, where abstract ideas based on Polya urns were used to show how positive feedback mechanisms meant that small changes in the initial settings of particular experiments had big implications for their form and structure later on (Arthur, 1989, 1990, Arthur et al, 1983). Arthur went on to show how economies had positive feedback mechanisms too, suggesting that stock markets and a range of other economic phenomena could be better modelled using

positive feedback mechanisms. Arthurs work on path dependence (1989, 1990, Arthur et al, 1983) provides a series of discussions on how positive feedback mechanisms pervade economics (in contrast to more traditional assumptions that are concerned with equilibrium concepts, and so negative feedback). Arthur is keen to demonstrate the suboptimality that can result from possible multiple equilibria being subject to positive feedback mechanisms, and so inferior technologies becoming locked- in to dominance through little more than chance (Arrow, 2000, David, 1985, 1997). Political studies based around Arthurs work tends to make extensive use of multiple equilibria and positive feedback, and so suggest a framework where there are initially multiple possibilities from which a sensitivity to the initial conditions of the political situation lead to a particular policy or institution becoming locked in through a series of contingencies, and then maintained through some kind of positive feedback mechanism (Goldstone, 1998).

Arthurs work appears to be a central influence on Nobel prize-winner Kenneth Arrow who began to incorporate positive feedback mechanisms into economics (Arrow, 2000). Paul David produced controversial accounts of the development of the QWERTY keyboard, wondering why despite the now existence of technologically superior alternatives, did we continue to utilise a layout the original adoption of which was based upon a constraint, the prevention of manual typewriter key levers from jamming, that was no longer relevant (David, 1985, 1997). Davids answers, again, were largely based on positive feedback mechanisms, the externalities that the adoption of the QWERTY keyboard, and the sunk costs that result from so many individuals learning to type using the layout. At the same time, he provoked an argument as to whether economic

rationality was a good model to be using in understanding technological development (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995).

In Business and Management, the Strategic Management Journal is now dominated by accounts of industrial development and change based on the resource-based view of the firm, which makes extensive use of path dependence in a similar guise to Arrow, David and Arthur, to explain how firms can achieve competitive advantage by developing difficult-to-replicate combinations of human and technological capital (Jocobides & Winter, 2005, Miller, 2002, Rouse & Daellenback, 2002, Vassolo et al, 2004). What these accounts share with Arthur, Arrow and David is their reliance upon the neoclassical theory of the firm, an approach that places at its centre the utility-maximising rational man. This undoubtedly has strengths in terms of creating opportunities for utilising economic theory as a theoretical underpinning for accounts of the development of business organisation, with the parsimony and simplicity this allows.

But in other academic disciplines a very different approach to path dependence is appearing. In sociology and politics path dependence tends to be used in a very different way with very different underpinning theoretical assumptions.

Within political studies, the most significant account of path dependence comes from historical institutionalism, t e central claim of which is that choices formed when an h institution is being formed, or when a policy is being formulated, have a constraining effect into the future (Hall & Taylor, 1996, Koelble, 1995, Peters, 2001). This dynamic

occurs because institutions and policies have a tendency towards inertia; once particular paths have been forged, it requires a significant effort to divert them onto another course. History matters because formations put in place in the early stages of an institutional or policy life effectively come to constrain activity after that point (Peters, 2001, Skocpol, 1992).

Arguably historical institutionalisms most distinctive feature is an image of social causation that is based around the notion of path dependence the means by which the historical gets into historical institutionalism. Path dependence has become, within a relatively short space of time, a widely- used concept (see, for example, Alexander, 2001, Arrow, 2000, Berman, 1998, Bruggeman, 2002, Garud & Karnoe, 2001, Greener, 2002a, 2002b, Hansen, 2002, Hedlund, 2000, Holzinger & Knill, 2002, Mahoney, 2001, O'Brien, 1996, Pierson, 2000a, Scott, 2001, Sterman & Wittenberg, 1999, Torfing, 1999, 2001, Wilsford, 1994), but studies often have remarkable lttle in common in terms of their i conceptual framework or approach.

Interestingly, it is not because writers on path dependence have ignored theory that so little consensus has appeared in writings concerned with the topic. Attempts have been made to try and consider how we might construct a framework for specifying what elements and circumstances combine to form a path dependent system (Goldstone, 1998), and how path dependent systems manage to reproduce their form (Mahoney, 2000, 2001, Pierson, 1993, 2000b, Thelen, 1999, Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). Mahoney (2000, 2001)

goes further than this, suggesting that maintenance might occur through either positive feedback or reactive mechanisms of interplay between interest groups.

Criticisms of path dependence A number of specific criticisms emerge from the literature that we must consider if we are to if we are to use path dependence as a coherent framework in organizational analysis. First, there is the problem we alluded to above. If much of the organisational literature on path dependence depends on rationalising economic man at its theoretical core, then we find ourselves st uck in attempting to construct ever more theoretically-elaborate considerations to attempt to come up with complex reasons why individuals in institutions are behaving in what is, according to the tenets of economics, such an odd way. We can see this in the work of Schwartz (Schwartz, 2003) which, although is logically rigorous and is clearly sincere in attempting to further the rational choice agenda into understanding path dependence, is unpersuasive as it is so clearly predicated upon homo economicus that it automatically discounts other ways of understanding path dependence that are surely relevant.

But the problems do not end if we place instead an alternative model of path dependence at the core of our modle. Many of the problems with what we might term the political studies approach to path dependence come from its intellectual roots in historical institutionalism. First, if path dependent processes preserve the history in their formation, how do we break free from them? If history matters so much, how do we break from it?

How does change occur (Gorges, 2001, Hira & Hira, 2000) ? In historical institutionalism, patterns of behaviour come to resemble punctuated equilibria (Krasner, 1984), where substantial change is only possible in critical junctures (Collier & Collier, 1991) or policy windows (Kingdon, 1995, Kingdon, 1996) before institutions and policies once again settle down onto a new path, and inertia becomes the norm. Hall and Taylor (1996 p. 942) admit that well-developed responses to the question of why critical junctures arise have not yet been formulated change is effectively an exogenous feature of the model.

Second, what exactly is the role of ideas in path dependence (and historical institutionalism generally) (Blyth, 1997)? What is the relationship between ideas and history, and how can they combine to create continuity and resist forces for change in the past? Path dependence often attempts to locate institutions in a causal chain that gives a substantial role the development of ideas (Hall, 1993, Mahoney, 2001, Torfing, 1999, 2001), but that has also led to some substantial criticisms of the approach with claims that ideas are not treated in a systematic and coherent way (Blyth, 1997), and that ideas are being used as a means of propping up the institutionalist research agenda without appropriate care.

Third, how can we characterise the feedback mechanism through which path dependent processes prevent change? Are they subject to increasing returns and positive feedback mechanisms (Arrow, 2000, Arthur, 1990, Pierson, 2000b) or can we include negative feedback mechanisms as well(Mahoney, 2000)? If we include both kinds of feedback mechanisms, are we at risk of losing the distinctiveness of path dependence as a concept

(Schwartz, 2003), so reducing its use to a loose metaphor rather than a clearly defined framework for analysis?

Finally, Pierson, one of the most significant writers on path dependence, (see, for example, Pierson, 1993, 1996, 2000b, 2000c), has commented that the diversity of studies now being published under its name, risks concept stretching (Pierson, 2000b p. 252) occurring, and the risk of it becoming meaningless.

These are considerable problems. To attempt to resolve them, we turn to morphogenetic social theory to argue that it holds considerable complementary explanatory power, and by incorporating key insights from it, we can more clearly elaborate what we mean by path dependence and so find solutions to many of the problems raised by its critics.

Morphogenetic social theory Morphogenetic social theory (Archer 1982a, 1982b, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 2000a, 2000b) provides an analytical approach based around the ontology of critical realism (Archer et al 1998). Archers ideas have been discussed extensively within sociology (King 1999, Reed 1997, 2001, Stones 2001, Willmott 2000), but appear to have not yet been applied to institutionalist approaches, even though there is an increasing body of work that that utilises the approach in organizational theory (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2004, Reed, 1997, 2001). The morphogenetic approach divides analysis into three inter-related stages. First it suggests we should analyse the structural and cultural conditionings that act as an influence on human actors, and which create emergent properties and situational

logics for their interactions with them (see below). Second, it explores how these conditioning factors influence actors within the system through their interactions with them, primarily in the form of their behaviour in vested interest groups. The third and final stage analyses the result of these interactions, and the resulting conditioning effects that will feed into the next morphogenetic cycle.

As well as having specific analytical stages, we can characterise the morphogenetic approach as having two particular ontological characteristics derived from critical realism that are especially distinctive. First, there is an analytical separation between structure and agency. Morphogenetic social theory recognises the interdependence of structure and agency, but claims that the two are analytically separable because of the additional insights that can be generated in this way. So in stage one of the morphogenetic cycle, we analyse the structural and ideational influences present in the organizational system, before considering how these interact with human agency in stage two, and the result of those interactions in stage three. As such, we have a distinctive means of approaching the debate between structure and agency that has been at the heart of debates on historical institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996, Hay & Wincott, 1998). In addition to this there is a genuine sense of the role of history in each morphogenetic cycle we analyse we see the interactions between pre-existing ideas and structures and human actors unfold before us (see Archer's extended examples in 1995, 1996).

Second, morphogenetic social theory also specifies an analytical separation between structural and cultural systems. This means that we examine the realm of institutions

(the structural system) separately from the realm of ideas (the cultural system), and so deal explicitly with Blyths (1997) criticism that ideas are not treated seriously within historical institutionalism, as they acquire an analytical dimension all of their own. As with structure and agency, morphogenetic social theory does not treat ideas and structures as systems that do not interact, but instead suggests they should be treated as being separable because of the additional analytical power that this approach creates. We will specify below how this applies to the specific area of path dependence.

Examining a morphogenetic cycle then, consists first of specifying the structural and cultural influences upon the organization that we are analysing. Morphogenetic social theory utilises two specific means of analysis in its first stage. First we must consider the emergent properties of the system in both structural and cultural spheres. An emergent property can be either necessary in which relationships between those dominating the system are recognised by all the parties involved as being inter-dependent, or contingent, in which vested interests in the dominant faction believe they are able to work relatively autonomously from one another. As well as this, emergent properties are either compatible, in which the dominant vested interests have a considerable amount either culturally or structurally in common, or incompatible, in which case they arent. By specifying the nature of the dominant vested interests in terms of the extent of their interdependence and compatibility in both the structural and cultural spheres we are able to assess the probability of their ability to preserve their position (we can hypothesise that necessary relationships tend to be longer- lasting than contingent ones) and their

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likelihood of conflict (we can hypothesise that compatible relationships tend to be less conflictual than incompatible ones).

Second, we must consider the situational logic that the emergent properties are likely to create. The combinational possibilities, along with their likelihood of path dependence, are shown in table one below.

Table one the likelihood of path dependence from structural and situational logics Emergent property (in Structural situational Cultural situational phase two of logic logic Likelihood of path dependence Protection Protection Highest

morphogenetic cycle) Necessary complementarities Necessary incompatibilities Contingent incompatibilities Contingent compatibilities Derived from Archer (1995, p.218) Opportunism Cultural free play Elimination Compromise

Correction leading High to syncretism Choice (forcing of) Medium Lowest

Low

A morphogenetic analysis of path dependence

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In morphogenetic terms we can hypothesise a path dependent system as most likely to emerge where both structural and cultural vested interest groups are dependent upon one another to hold power (a necessary emergent property). Where structural interest groups are dependent upon each other (necessary) and their goals are compatible, this leads to a situational logic where interest groups attempt to protect themselves. This is especially powerful where the dominant cultural ideas utilised by vested interests are also compatible and the greater the compatibility the greater the possibility of generating increasing returns in the system we are investigating. This combination of powerful structural interests plus mutually compatible ideas is the most stable of the morphostatic (or stable) cycles Archer posits (Archer, 1995 pp. 308-312), and so, is the most likely to condition path dependence.

The production of path dependence through increasing returns is therefore most likely to occur in systems where necessary complementarities exist in both the structural and cultural systems. It may also occur where there are necessary incompatibilities in either the structural or cultural system, especially when allied to a necessary complementarity in the other. Where there are contingent incompatibilities in both the structural and cultural systems (vested interests have rival structural or cultural loyalties based around differences of opinion that cannot be easily resolved), the likelihood is reduced, however. As we can see from the table above, emergent properties with contingent relationships (where vested interest groups are not dependent upon on another) tends to lead to situational logics that favour non-stable (morphogenetic) outcomes such as elimination of rival groupings, and so have a low likelihood of being path dependent. The results of

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the conditionings from these combinations are more likely to result in change than continuity.

We therefore have a means of explaining systemic continuity, but also need a clearly specified mechanism for change (Hira & Hira, 2000). In a morphogenetic- inspired model of path dependence, forces for change can come endogenously or exogenously, or both. If we have necessary and compatible relations in both structural and cultural spheres, we have the most powerful force for morphostasis (continuity), with actors engaged in a logic of protection i both areas. Even this, however, can eventually lead to change n because of the very limited range of legitimising ideas that are being drawn from (extreme specialism can ultimately lead to irrelevance), or through the structural vested interests groups becoming so insular that they engage in factional infighting, and wars on deviant groups or ideas to the extent that they actually cause these groupings to begin to establish separate identities and differentiated ideas (Archer, 1995 pp. 237-239). Change may also come from exogenous factors, such as a wider shift in structural societal relations at the level of international political economy (fiscal crises for example), or through the emergence of challenging ideas that are backed by vocal and powerful vested interests (this is more or less the argument as presently presented in most historical institutionalist analyses that utilise path dependency (Greener, 2002b) (.

Equally, in less stable versions of path dependence, where the structural or cultural systems have a built- in incompatibility, attempts at compromise or syncretism can break down, and vested interest groups attempt to achieve greater power for themselves.

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This, again, can come about as a result of either endogenous or exogenous factors. Endogenous change would come about as a result of a significant group no longer being able to sustain the incompatibility built into the system, and so fragmentation occurring despite attempts from structural or cultural vested interests to continue to compromise. Exposure of incompatibilities would tend to result in greater mobilisation from other vested interest groups against them, and the likelihood that actors would be forced into choices about whether or not they would continue to support the dominant coalition or idea.

Situational logics do not create compulsory rules for those operating within them, but actors do to have to work within the context where they prevail. As such, the opportunity cost of working against them is likely to be high in other words particular configurations of these emergent properties are more likely to lead to path dependence than others, and a change in emergent properties resulting from interaction between actors and the situational logics that they face will result in the system become either more morphogenetic (generating change) or morphostatic (generating continuity) , depending upon the new prevailing situational logic.

Towards a framework for the analysis of path dependence From the insights generated above from both existing path dependence literature and Archers morphogenetic approach, we are now in a position to specify a framework for considering path dependence in organizational processes.

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First, path dependent processes begin with multiple equilibria situation (Goldstone, 1998, Mahoney, 2000, Pierson, 2000a). We must be able to demonstrate that a number of viable alternatives existed for the development of the policy in question, or for the development of the institutions we are examining. Leading on from this is the second element; that contingent events must be shown to have played a substantial role in establishing the particular policy or institutional form that emerged.

Third, we must specify the conditions in which we would expect path dependent systems to reproduce their form and lock-in to occur. The use of insights from morphogenetic social theory allow us, through the analysis of the relationships between vested interests in the structural and cultural spheres, to begin to generate hypotheses about the likelihood of continuity occurring. After the period of production, a period of reproduction appears during which the policy or institution must generate feedback mechanisms that create inertia, or possible even increasing returns to lock out competing ideas and vested interests. Once the logic of path dependent policy or institution has been established, it will tend generate an inertial force where established vested and cultural interests have a high opportunity cost for challenging the system (based on a necessary relationship both within and between the groups). This will tend to lead to morphostasis, which is most likely to appear where necessary emergent properties are reproduced in the policy or institution.

Critics of path dependence have, as we noted above, made great store of the lack of specificity in the model of the nature of the returns that the model is specifying. Pierson

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(Pierson, 2000b, 2000c), basing his work on Arthur (1989, 1990), makes clear that he believes that path dependent systems are the study of positive returns, but this approach is logically flawed. Were positive returns to dominate a system for a considerable period of time, it would eventually lead to the removal of all opposition as the influence of the dominant idea or vested interest became so widespread that there would no longer be anywhere left for notions or interests that challenged them. This would effectively take away the opportunity for change completely, short of an exogenous shock. In the world of physics, where models of path dependence consider stable equilibria generated by the selection of coloured balls from bags, this lack of internal change be possible, but in the world of organizational studies we need some modification of the idea. As such, it makes sense to hypothesise, in line with the insights above, that a path dependent system might go through, in its creation phase, a period where increasing returns are generated. Once it enters its reproduction phase, however, it seems unlikely that anything greater than the preservation of the status quo is possible a situation more in line with constant than increasing returns. As Schwarz notes (2003) there are considerable costs involved in keeping things the same. We are able, by analysing emergent properties and their corresponding situational logics, the difficulties involved in keeping the system on its particular path, and the likely costs involved.

Finally, as we noted above, we have a mechanism for change in a path dependent system, located not in the cultural or structural spheres, nor in human agency, but in the interactions between all three. The analytical separation of cultural and structural systems allows us to examine the role of ideas as well as structure in organizational analysis, and

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the analytical separation of both from human agency through the three-step morphogenetic cycle allows us to see the process through which change unfolds from apparent continuity before us. We have no need to make the source of change an exogenous factor in our model, as historical institutionalism tends to do. The importance of path dependence a brief example We can illustrate the above approach through the use of a brief example based on the authors own research into the UK National Health Service (see for examples Greener, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004, Greener, 2005). The NHS at its creation in 1948 is perhaps regarded as an organization based on a compromise between the state and the medical profession within which both parties entered into a tacit agreement. The state agreed to allow the doctors considerable autonomy in the operational control of the NHS on the one hand, and the doctors allowed the state to set the budget for the NHS, within which they would endeavour to keep (Klein, 2001). The relation between the state and the medical profession was therefore necessary in nature the state needed the medical profession for the NHS to work, and the medical profession needed the state in a time of wholesale health organisation nationalisation. Between the consultant elite and the Secretary of State for Health, Anuerin Bevan, there was also a complementary emergent property they saw that each had the others interest at heart (Honigsbaum, 1989), and so a bargain was reached rather quickly in which Bevan famously claimed he had stuffed their mouths with gold. There was a strong contingent element in Bevans negotiating stance, being considerably based on the quick decisions that consultant representatives in the Royal Colleges could provide him versus the rather more democratic, ponderous decision made by the BMA, who largely represented the GPs. This meant that the relation

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between the state (as represented by Bevan in negotiations) and the GPs, however, was rather more difficult, and although it can still clearly be categorised as necessary, was rather more incompatible, because GPs wished to effectively remain independent contractors in the NHS, and balked at Bevans suggestion that they, like the consultants, should effectively become state employees.

This led to a situational and cultural logic of protection between the state and the consultants, and a high degree of path dependence in their relationships. Between the state and the GPs, however, it led to a structural logical of compromise, and a cultural logic of correction or syncretism, in which the two interests had something of a more abrasive relationship, and although the potential for path dependence was significant the relationship between the two had somewhat reduced capacity for mechanisms of reproduction than the mutually enforcing one between the state and the consultants.

This simple analysis sets the scene for the first forty years of the NHS remarkably well. Once established, consultants and the state did remarkably well in leaving one another alone, with the state constructing ever more elaborate means of allocating funding, and the consultants securing greater and greater representation and control over their hospital fiefdoms. Flashpoints between the two occurred if the state attempted to remove any of the privileges afforded to the consultants (see especially Klein, 1979, Klein, 1983), or over attempts to introduce reforms of which the cons ultants did not approve (Greener, 2001) but the main source of friction for the NHS was between the state and the GPs. This is because the situational logic of correctio n began to assert itself, especially as

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general practitioners got more organised in the 1960s, and began to demand greater equality of pay and conditions with their consultant colleagues (Rivett, 1998). We can see a series of compromises over contracts, pay and conditions that meant the GPs found themselves rather more often threatening industrial action.

By the 1980s, and the negotiations leading up to the creat ion of the first internal market in the NHS (Secretary of State for Health, 1989), the state appeared to be adopting a rather more confrontational approach than any of its post-war predecessors. Despite the concern of the Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Health Kenneth Clarke appeared to be more than prepared to confront and challenge both consultants and GPs in the name of improving efficiency in the NHS through the introduction of the internal market (Timmins, 1995a, 1995b). We can view this as the beginning of the state realising the potential to view its relationship with the medical profession as being contingent rather than necessary. This offered the state potential to put in place radical reform. Doctor representation groups, now themselves angered by the relatively low funding given to the NHS and a cumulative funding gap that was emerging (Ham, 1999), launched a campaign that attempted to get the government to back down, but failed. This period looked a lot like an unpleasant divorce, with a logic of elimination appearing, and of prominent representatives from both state and medical profession apparently presenting a cultural logic of choice you were either with the reforms or against them with little scope for any other position.

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The reforms, however, were not fully implemented as Clarke had planned (Greener, 2002b, West, 1998), and a logic of compromise appears to have been re-established for much of the 1990s. It is remarkable how conciliatory toward the medical profession New Labour were on their return to power in 1997 (Secretary of State for Health, 1997), presenting a consultative and almost Fabian approach to the NHS. But the contingent relationship appears to now be firmly entrenched; a series of NHS reforms since 2000 has meant that we now see widespread introduction of private sector providers into the NHS, the introduction of patient choice a second internal market apparently based around it, contracts with clearly defined duties on the part of doctors, and a structural logic that the state is prepared to directly challenge any attempt by the medical profession to stand in the way of reform. The logic cannot be one of elimination because the state clearly still needs the doctors for the NHS to function, but it is increasingly finding ways of breaking up local cartels created by the medical profession to allow private practice, and there is certainly a distinct lack of compromise. In short, the state appears to be doing all it can to reassert a contingent emergent property to the system, and create a situational logic where it is prepared to let individual hospitals follow the path of unsuccessful schools in education reforms, that is, to closure.

In sum, the path dependence present in the NHS can be successfully described in terms of the path dependence between the state and the medical profession established in 1948, but is now under serious threat because of the move from its relationship being necessary, to being more contingent. This has meant a movement from a situational logic of protection and compromise, to one instead of elimination and the forcing of choice, as the

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interests of the state and the medical profession appear to have diverged under the new public management (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994, Hood, 1991).

Conclusion Path dependence can be retrieved from the rather unsystematic use to which it is presently put. Its combination with morphogenetic social theory appears to be a potentially fruitful one. In providing a more coherent framework for its use, and combining it with coherent social theory and ontology, we can both deepen its analytical content as well as provide a basis from which hypotheses and comp arative studies about organizational continuity and change can be drawn. Path dependence has considerable potential for providing the basis for substantial empirical studies of the linkages between policy and organisation continuity and change with the relationships within institutions that shape the behaviour of agents and the structural and cultural conditionings that act upon them. Providing a more detailed framework than presently exists allows comparative cases to be constructed in a more systematic way, and for us to understand the complex processes making up organizational life to be better understood.

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Acknowledgements Thanks to Hugh Pemberton for organising the specialist stream on Path Dependence at the PSA Annual Conference at Leicester University in 2003, to Fiona Ross for her encouragement and criticism at that panel, and to Herman Schwartz for his provocative and incisive critique.

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