DFID's Programme in Zambia - Volume 2

House of Commons International Development Committee
DFIDs programme in Zambia

Fifth Report of Session 2012-13
Volume II
Additional written evidence
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published 6 and 27 March and 24 April in the previous session of Parliament and 13 June and 10 July
Published on 6 September 2012 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited
The International Development Committee

The International Development Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Office of the Secretary of State for International Development. Current membership Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Bruce MP (Liberal Democrat, Gordon) (Chairman) Hugh Bayley MP (Labour, York Central) Richard Burden MP (Labour, Birmingham, Northfield) Mr Sam Gyimah MP (Conservative, East Surrey) Richard Harrington MP (Conservative, Watford) Pauline Latham MP (Conservative, Mid Derbyshire) Jeremy Lefroy MP (Conservative, Stafford) Mr Michael McCann MP (Labour, East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow) Alison McGovern MP (Labour, Wirral South) Fiona ODonnell MP (Labour, East Lothian) Chris White MP (Conservative, Warwick and Leamington) The following members were also members of the committee during the parliament: Mr Russell Brown MP (Labour, Dumfries, Galloway) Mr James Clappison MP (Conservative, Hertsmere) Ann McKechin MP (Labour, Glasgow North) Anas Sarwar MP (Labour, Glasgow Central)
Powers The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk. Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/parliament.uk/indcom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume. The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are David Harrison (Clerk), Louise Whitley (Inquiry Manager), Rob Page (Committee Specialist), Anita Fuki (Senior Committee Assistant), Annabel Goddard (Committee Assistant), Paul Hampson (Committee Support Assistant) and Nicholas Davies (Media Officer). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the International Development Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 1223; the Committees email address is indcom@parliament.uk
List of additional written evidence

(published in Volume II on the Committees website www.parliament.uk/indcom) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Global Humanitarian Assistance Integrated Disaster Management International Development Enterprises (iDE) Jonathan Coulter Mark ODonnell RESULTS UK and International HIV/AIDS Alliance United Church of Zambia Zambian Ornithological Society Marie Stopes International Ev w1 Ev w2 Ev w4 Ev w4 Ev w7 Ev w8 Ev w10 Ev w14 Ev w17 Ev w19
International Development Committee: Evidence Ev w1
Written evidence
Written evidence submitted by Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Zambia 1. In response to the International Development Committees review of DfIDs programme in Zambia. 2. Parliamentary Strengthening should be integral to development assistance, as Parliament plays a central and crucial role in overseeing government policy, programmes and expenditure. 3. Zambias 2011 National Assembly Elections saw a substantial turnover resulting in approximately 60% new parliamentarians. There is a clear requirement to assist capacity building of Members of Parliament to ensure that their professional ability to work effectively in holding the government to account. 4. In January 2012 the new Speaker of the Zambian Parliament, Hon Justice Patrick Matibini QC visited Westminster. During discussions with Westminster colleagues (including Speaker Bercow, the Lord Speaker, the Clerk of the House of Commons and numerous other members of Parliament and parliamentary ofcials) he expressed a strong interest in establishing opportunities for Zambian Members of Parliament to undertake professional development training in order to establish an effective, credible and powerful National Assembly. 5. There is a clear role for the Westminster Parliament in supporting the Department for International Developments priorities in Zambia. Member to Member peer exchanges (inter-parliamentary dialogue) are an effective capacity building mechanism for parliamentarians. Westminster is still perceived as the mother of parliaments in many Commonwealth countries, and the opportunity to develop best practice with support from Westminster parliamentarians and ofcials is a motivating and inspiring factor in itself. However, there is a requirement for a systematic rather than an ad hoc approach in assessing need, designing and delivering an appropriate programme taking into account the following: 6. Ownershipthe programme should be owned by the Zambian Parliament, which has identied a need to improve capacity with support from partners. 7. AlignmentThe programmes must be aligned with existing Government and Parliament development plans and strategic objectives. They must also be aligned with political and parliamentary timetables. 8. Harmonisationan assessment of existing stakeholders in parliamentary assistance in Zambia, looking at areas of focus and priority. 9. Managing ResultsOutputs and Outcomes will be monitored and evaluated. 10. In follow up to Speaker Matibinis visit, the following suggestions have been forwarded by CPA UK to the Clerk of the Zambian Parliament: (a) A two to three year programme which might include the subjects below and involve short working exchange visits of MPs and Clerks: The roles of an MP Challenges facing new MPs Empowering women MPs Holding the Executive to account and scrutiny Committee work The role of the Whips Communications within Parliament Relationships with the media Relationships with Civil Society
Parliamentary Strengthening and the MDGS 11. For developing countries parliamentary strengthening is inextricably linked with development towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The Africa APPG 2008 Report on Parliamentary Strengthening in Africa identied this as a crucial reason for strengthening parliament. Most aid is channelled through Governments and they have a responsibility to be accountable for its use of this money. For Governments to credit the role of parliaments in nancial oversight and the budget process, parliamentarians must be seen as directly representing the taxpayer and have the operational capacity to provide transparency and accountability. 12. Working with partner parliaments in support of achieving the Millennium Development Goals is closely aligned with CPA UK strategic objectives. March 2012
Ev w2 International Development Committee: Evidence
Written evidence submitted by Global Humanitarian Assistance Major Development Aid Recipients1 Table 1 MAJOR ODA RECIPIENTS, 200009
Iraq Afghanistan Viet Nam Ethiopia Tanzania Pakistan China India Pales nian Adm. Areas Mozambique Bangladesh Uganda Sudan Indonesia Serbia Congo, Dem. Rep. Ghana Egypt Kenya Zambia Morocco South Africa Bolivia Nicaragua Senegal Burkina Faso Mali Jordan Colombia Nigeria Sri Lanka Bosnia-Herzegovina Madagascar Malawi
Total ODA 2000-2009 Total by country 667.7 33.7 28.7 23.6 22.2 19.0 18.6 17.8 17.8 16.6 16.1 14.6 14.2 14.0 13.6 12.4 11.9 11.5 11.4 9.5 9.5 8.8 8.4 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.3 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.6
% of total ODA 2000-2009
% ODA that is humanitarian 2000-2009 Average 11.3% 14.9% 17.1% 0.5% 21.3% 4.2% 12.1% 1.7% 3.5% 37.6% 3.3% 4.6% 10.6% 60.6% 16.1% 12.4% 28.1% 0.7% 0.6% 17.2% 3.8% 0.7% 0.6% 1.5% 3.7% 1.2% 1.6% 1.4% 16.8% 9.7% 1.2% 21.3% 7.5% 2.3% 3.9%
5.0% 4.3% 3.5% 3.3% 2.9% 2.8% 2.7% 2.7% 2.5% 2.4% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0%
AID TO ZAMBIA YEAR-ON-YEAR

Year Recipient Zambia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
908.9
796.8
1108.2
653.5
904.4
938.2
886.2
941.9
1073.2
1256.9
907.9
All data in this note is Development Initiatives, based on OECD DAC, constant 2009 prices.
Aid to Zambia Volumes over 10 years Figure 1 VOLUMES OF AID TO ZAMBIA, FROM UK AND ALL OTHER DONORS
1400 1200 1000
US$ millions
Zambia (rest of donors) Zambia (Uk)
800 1148.6 600 773.2 400 200 0 135.7 102.3 2000 2001 62.8 2002 105.8 2003 76.7 2004 109.2 165.5 2005 2006 88.5 2007 93.8 2008 108.3 2009 694.5 1045.4 827.7 547.7 829.0 720.8 853.3 979.4
Proportions over 10 Years Figure 2 PROPORTIONS OF AID TO ZAMBIA, FROM UK AND OTHER DONORS
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2000 2001 135.7 102.3 62.8 2002 105.8 2003 76.7 2004 109.2 2005 165.5 2006 88.5 2007 93.8 2008 108.3 2009
Zambia (rest of donors) Zambia (Uk)
March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Integrated Disaster Management Sub Saharan Africa has an optimistic forecast for its economic futureall current analyses suggest that the availability of resources, emerging young and educated populations and the abundance of uncultivated agricultural land mean the region could enjoy excellent economic growth. However regional Governments are voicing one increasingly important challenge: how do we ensure the region maximises the benets that the emerging economic opportunities present for states, communities and individuals? Private sector organisations operating in the region have an aligned challenge: talent localisationhow do we get local people managing our local operations; how do we get regional people leading our regional operations? This has become an increasingly repeated and pressing strategic concern. Corporates can no longer accept the lack of sustainability and cost of having to use ex-pats to lead their regional operations. At the same time they do very much want the reputational and cost benets of building skills in their local employees. The solution to these challenges lies in talent developmentbut there is little or no institutional leadership, management or professional development outside of South Africa. Indeed the SA Business Schoolsas a result of their traditional business modelnd it nancially non-viable to be designing and delivering learning for these emerging economies. But we have to address the emerging professional middle managementthe backbone of any emerging economyif the region is going to benet from these opportunities. DFID can play a role in this essential development opportunity through the support of public and private sector leadership, management and professional education. IDMs ambition is to help shape the future generation of leadership and management capability and so realise the economic opportunities in the region. IDM is establishing a new educational institution targeted to respond exactly to these challenges. 1 June 2012
Written evidence submitted by International Development Enterprises (iDE) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND TO IDE IN ZAMBIA We have deliberately kept our submission short, sharp and focused on answering as specically as possible the questions posed in the terms of reference. We would be more than happy to supplement the information provided with examples from the eld to demonstrate our points. Furthermore, we would be delighted to bring our Country Director from Zambia to speak to the Inquiry from a practical, eld level perspective. The iDE approach worldwide is to use market-based approaches to address the fundamental barriers to poverty reduction and livelihood improvement for the poorest. In our experience of over 30 years of work in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, agricultural growth does not come from aid but by enabling small farmers to produce and sell cash crops in the market place. A major iDE initiative is to support local businesses to deliver the products and services smallholder farmers need to haul themselves out of food insecurity and transform subsistence farming into production for the market at a prot. iDE has been working in Zambia since 1997 and currently works with approximately 16,000 smallholder farming families across four provinces along the line of rail in Zambia. Our programme focuses on assisting poor smallholder farming households to move from subsistence farming to higher-value market oriented production, thereby increasing their incomes and providing a route out of poverty. To achieve this goal we work with local private sector enterprises to ensure that the services and products farmers need to grow highvalue crops (agricultural inputs, equipment, agronomic advice and lines of credit) are available from the market place at affordable cost. iDE also then assists farmers access markets for their produce. Assessments show small-holder farming households participating in iDE Zambia high-value irrigated crop production programmes achieved an annual household crop income increase of between 198 and 333 in 2011. iDE is a global consortium of non-prot organisations with the mission to create income and livelihood opportunities for the rural poor. iDE UK is the British member of the global partnership and a UK registered charity. Our major partners in Zambia include: the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, AGRA, USAID and Comic Relief. In this submission we approach key themes that have been highlighted as priority areas for DFID in its operational plan 201115, in which iDE has expertise and experience and make brief comments on each of these priority areas based upon our on the ground experience working with small scale farmers and ongoing research being undertaken. 1. Rural Wealth Creation 1.1 We very much welcome the increased focus on rural wealth creation in the DFID Zambia operational plan, and in particular the focus on assisting small-scale farmers to access improved agricultural inputs and advice. Increasing the incomes of small-scale farmers in Zambia is going to be critical to the achievement of MDG 1 (Poverty) which is seriously off-track. We encourage DFID to view small-scale farmers as business
people rather than beneciaries of charity only capable of receiving handouts and to promote the development of private sector service providers for small-scale farmers. 1.2 We encourage DFID to view the private sector as a key partner in the delivery of agricultural inputs and advice to small-scale farmers and to focus on delivery of these goods and services through the market without direct subsidy. We note that there is an increasing emphasis on encouraging small-scale service (including input) provision though strengthening the supply chains for goods and services. We welcome this. However, we are concerned that the emphasis risks sidelining the farmer as key to the agricultural value chain. We believe that to be most effective all parts of the value chain need to be strengthened, (including the farmers) if the entire value chain is to provide maximum benet. 1.3 In recent years iDE has worked with others to strengthen the network of rural input dealers which has expanded signicantly in recent years (eg through the ADAPT small-scale agro-dealer programme which iDE has implemented with CARE). This work has included a number of innovative ways to enable the poorest and most isolated farmers to access agricultural inputs, through mobile dealers, small farmer/dealers etc and pack sizes which are appropriate to their small farms. We would encourage DFID to build upon this work in the coming years. We contend, however, that there is still a challenge in achieving last mile distribution in many rural areas in Zambia. We are currently working with industry to see how this can be addressed through linking up the supply chain even closer to the farmer. 1.4 Rural agricultural extension provision remains a challenge in Zambia. While there is a certain amount of Government extension advice available for rain-fed crop production there is practically no uniform and widespread government extension system serving producers (or potential producers) of higher value crops. We would encourage DFID to look at initiatives which embed extension and training provision within these input and output value chains and in particular at the opportunities to provide cost-effective agricultural extension advice through rural entrepreneurs. iDE has pioneered the Farm Business Advisor model in Cambodia of individual rural entrepreneurs making a living selling inputs to farmers and also providing advice. iDE is currently piloting this approach in Zambia and sees good potential for sustainable scale-up. This model shows promise as a lower cost option than investment in government extension workersespecially in Zambia where there is a highly dispersed, and expensive to reach population. 1.5 The experience of iDEs programmes on the ground point to a number of opportunities for small-scale farmers to utilise their assets effectively. Small-scale farmers in many areas of Zambia are particularly suited to production of high-value horticultural crops, and there are increasing market opportunities from the growing urban population and to neighbouring countries for fresh fruit and vegetables. We also note that a signicant proportion of small-scale farmers specialising in horticultural production are women and that production of fruits and vegetables has a positive nutritional impact on the household from consumption of a more varied diet. Not only do farmers produce a wider range of crops for consumption but more cash available to the household allows the purchase of foodstuffs with a higher nutritional value. 1.6 Zambia has an abundance of available ground and surface water that can be easily accessed by smallscale farmers through low-cost water lifting technologies such as treadle and rope pumps for irrigating horticultural produce. For a relatively low level of upfront investment small-scale farmers can move to irrigated farming and see their productivity and incomes increase substantially. 1.7 There is good potential in Zambia to utilise Information and Communication Technologies effectively to reduce the costs of reaching the rural population with information and services. iDE is currently engaged in a project supported by the Gates Foundation to develop a mobile phone based market information system. Given the high penetration rates of mobile telephonythis intervention has the potential to create signicant efciencies improving market access to the small-scale farmers. These technologies offer particular benets to small scale cross border traders where they allow barriers caused by the different ways market information is available to be overcome and seller linked to buyer before the transaction costs of export are incurred. 2. Access to Rural Finance 2.1 Lack of access to nancial services for Zambian small-scale farmers is a major constraint in enabling these farming families to move from subsistence agriculture to higher-value market oriented production. 2.2 Micro-nance in Zambia has largely missed out the rural areas of the country and small farm businesses in particular. Most Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) provide nancial products which are more suited to urban business activities and not designed with the cashow of the small-farmer in mind. 2.3 iDE, in partnership with the Zambian MFI CETZAM, has pioneered the development of credit products and services specically designed for small-scale farmer business. Contrary to most expectations the results of this partnership have been impressive, with repayment rates of over 97% on a loan portfolio of $1.4 million and over 2,800 client farmers. This cooperation model has demonstrated that commercial agricultural credit provision to small scale farmers is possible. There are enormous opportunities further to scale credit products across the country with further inputs of capital and technical support.
3. Sanitation 3.1 The MDG on sanitation is seriously off track in Zambia and as the DFID operational plan points out there are 6.5 million Zambians without access to adequate sanitation, half the population of the country. We welcome the new focus in the DFID operational plan on sanitation. The DFID target of enabling three million people sustainably to access improved sanitation facilities by 2015 (just three years) is ambitious and is going to require new thinking and approaches to reaching scale in latrine take-up from the under-performing subsidybased approaches, largely used in the past. 3.2 iDEs award-winning work with marketing approaches to the provision of sanitation in Asia by stimulating the private sector to provide latrines to rural households on a prot-making basis may offer a mechanism by which large-scale sanitation uptake can be encouraged in Zambia. In a number of Asian countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Timor Leste, Nepal) iDE has used Human Centred Design principles to develop latrine products acceptable to and affordable by poor rural communities. iDE has then encouraged existing market actors to provide these products on a for prot basis. The results of this approach have remarkable. In one pilot project in Cambodia this approach known as Sanitation Markets or SanMark delivered over 12,700 latrines manufactured and installed by small-scale private enterprises in just one yeardramatically increasing coverage rates in the target community. We are currently developing plans to take this approach to Zambia and would be pleased to share our Asian experience with DFID Zambia. 4. Climate Resilience 4.1 The key to promoting climate resilience among the rural population in Zambia is facilitating the smallscale farmers to diversify their production towards climate resilient farming systems. In particular a move away from dependence on rain-fed low-value stable crops such as maizehighly vulnerable to droughttowards production of high-value production such as horticulture using irrigation can promote far greater economic and climate resilience. 4.2 There are a number of technologies available on the market in Zambia now that promote greater climate resilience for small-scale farmers through highly efcient use of water for agriculture. Drip irrigation uses 50% less water than ood irrigation and increases crop yields by up to 20%. Micro-irrigation water lifting and storage technologies not only allow farmers to engage in dry season horticultural cropping but also, importantly, allow investments in rain-fed horticultural crops to be protected from the risks posed by irregular rainfall. 5. Gender 5.1 The promotion of womens economic empowerment is key to sustainable poverty reduction and rural economic growth in Zambia. Evidence from iDE programmes in Zambia2 where small-scale farmers were introduced to micro-irrigation technologies demonstrates that women were very signicant beneciaries when irrigation technologies were adopted. While female- and male-headed households both had positive and robust impacts on crop incomes, female-headed household treatment effects were bigger. This suggests the potential for irrigation technologies to offset the difculties faced by female-headed farmer households in Zambia. 6. Budget Support 6.1 We welcome a decreased emphasis on Budget Support in the new DFID operational plan. There is little empirical evidence to prove that budget support is a cost-effective way of reducing poverty. We believe that a greater return on investment can be obtained through measures to stimulate and encourage greater private sector participation in the economy. Given that Zambia has recently achieved lower middle income status and donors are planning medium term exit strategies we believe that a vibrant private sector serving all levels of society also offers the most sustainable route to sustainable poverty reduction. 7. Source Documentation Documents referred to whilst preparing this submission include: (a) iDE UK/Royal Agricultural College study sponsored by Comic Relief Identifying Market Opportunities for Small Scale Farmers in Zambia, 2011 (four reports unpublished). Report 1: Desk Review of the constraints faced by small scale farmers in transitional economies to access high value horticultural markets. Report 2: An overview of the Zambian horticulture industry and constraints faced by small scale farmers to participate in high value domestic, regional and international markets. Report 3: Agronomic review of fresh produce to be supplied to Shoprite Supermarkets and Mack Multiples UK by Zambian small scale farmers. Report 4: Scoping study for the production and marketing of identied fresh produce to domestic and international markets by Zambian Small Scale Farmers.
2
Nicoletti, C K. As yet unpublished MSc thesis.
(b) International Development Enterprises (iDE), Dr Clifford Zinnes, University and Christopher Nicoletti Rural Prosperity Initiative Impact Study in Zambia 2011, Sponsored by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (unpublished). (c) International Development Enterprises (iDE), Creating Impact through Irrigation Solutions for Family Farmers: Learning from the iDE Rural Prosperity Initiative, 2011 (unpublished). March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Jonathan Coulter THE ZAMBIAN FOOD GRAINS DEBACLE HOW MUCH RESPONSIBILITY SHOULD DONORS BEAR? 1. I am submitting this note in response to the International Development Committees call for evidence on Zambia of 21 February 2012, as I wish to comment on a serious problem that has occurred in the food grains area. 2. Zambia along with some other countries of Eastern and Southern Africa is largely dependent on a single crop maize, the production and marketing of which has been heavily supported by Governments since Independence. Not surprisingly maize policy and pricing has been a very sensitive political issue, and immensely important to the standing of Governments on both the producer and consumer side. 3. In the years leading up to the 2011 elections, Government of Zambia (GoZ) spent massively on subsidies for this crop, including a very generous Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) input and purchasing (through the Food Reserve AgencyFRA) at prices far superior to local market prices, and way above export parity prices (what it could hope to sell the same product on regional and international markets). The consequence of these policies was that FRA accumulated large unsold food stocks, much of which it had to store outdoors and was subject to deterioration and, which due to the countrys underdeveloped transport logistics, was difcult to shift to export markets. 4. I have yet to see an estimate of Zambias overall nancial losses resulting from these policies, but some idea can be gleaned from the following: According to a recent report by FAO,3 FRA is having to sell the stock at about $200 below cost price; if one applies this to total purchase of 1,745,000 tonnes of maize in 2011, one gets a total loss of $350 million. The same report estimates that the total costs of the FRA operation during 2011 alone are above $350 million representing over 8% of the 2011 GRZ budget. The same report indicates that there are high physical losses, ie grain which may need to be written off due to poor storage conditions, and suggests that such losses may be as high as 3050% of last years crop. According to another source I consulted in February 2012, FRA had 1.5 million tonnes of maize, of which only 700,000 tonnes was currently t for human consumption. The cost of writing off 800,000 tonnes of maize worth $150 per tonne would be about $120 million. To this one needs to add the cost of FISP which has been supplying farmers with between 46,000 and 84,000 tonnes of heavily subsidised fertiliser per year, building up large unmarketable grain surpluses. 5. These gures suggest that the total nancial losses of these policies is likely to be well in excess of $500 million, which is large in relation to DFIDs annual bilateral aid programme of 55 million. Apart from the immediate nancial cost, there is a longer term cost, as these policies have distorted private sector development in the agricultural sector. The constant subsidisation of a single low-value crop results in misallocation of resources, discouraging diversication to crops that might have better market prospects, eg soybeans. Government subsidisation has crowded private sector players out of input and output markets, and discouraged them from investing in storage and handling. Resources invested in maize subsidies might have been devoted to sorting out Zambias logistical constraints, making it easier to move surpluses in and out of the country. 6. But does DFID have any responsibility in this matter? I understand that under the last Government DFID was not supporting any directly relevant projects, so the appropriate answer to this question is not directly. Lately DFID has got very active in this area, seeking to engage with GOZ to restructure FRA activities, but it is doing this after the harmful policies have taken effect. 7. At a more indirect level, DFIDs past policies may have contributed to the problem. Along with other donors, DFID and other donors have been involved in budget support, which is largely fungible, and seems to be correlated with the resurgence of GOZs marketing board and input subsidy operations. 8. There is also a question as to whether DFID (along with other donors and multilateral institutions) could have done something to restrain the former GoZ in the rst place. It may be argued that when the Government of an aid-dependent country implements policies that grossly damage the local economy, aid donors should
3
Kalinda, T., Stubbs, I. and Van de Ven, F. (2012) A Brief Assessment of the Agricultural Market and Trade Environment in Zambiaan Indicative Action Plan for Agricultural Market Reform. Report by the FAO Representation in Zambia to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Government of the Republic of Zambia.
come together and collectively express a view about and if necessary exert to pressure to get the policies rectied. I am not aware that the donor community (including the UN) took signicant action. By providing aid with few strings, do we not share responsibility in the former GoZs immensely damaging and costly political grandstanding? 9. Anyone who has worked in the development business will know that in cases of this kind, aid donors are normally very reluctant to blow the whistle or exert pressures on host Governments. There are always good reasons to keep on doing more of the same; there is pressure to spend budgets and it is very awkward to hold up the ow of resources to Government departments and projects, particularly those that are not related to the problem in question. There may also be geopolitical considerations or donor-country business interests at stake. However this raises the question as to whether donor countries have been acting in a responsible manner or simply taking the path of least resistance. 10. I do not live in Zambia, or pretend to have the last word on this matter. However, I think Parliamentarians need to investigate and debate the Zambian food-grain crisis, and its broader implications for British aid policyincluding the support is provides through multilateral agencies and the UN. At the present point of time, DFID seems to be playing a very positive role by engaging GoZ in policy discussion, but the lessons of the past need to be durably factored into future policies. Jonathan Coulter Specialist in agricultural marketing & post-harvest economics 6 April 2012
Written evidence submitted by Mark ODonnell I would like to thank you for being given an opportunity to meet with you and to discuss some of the challenges that I believe stand in the way of Business and Development in Zambia. By way of introduction I was born in Zambia and have been in business for 35 years in Zambia. I have built up a company which by Zambian standards is considered large with some 1,800 employees. My company has investments in Hospitality, Retail, Construction, Manufacturing and Property Development. I have lived through the era of extreme socialism, which created an excessively protected economy, and I witnessed the introduction and implementation of the Free Market. The transition in the 1990s from a protected economy where 80% of all economic activity was controlled by the State to a privatised Free Market was harsh to say the least. Having said this, I believe this was the right thing to do and that there was no other way of transforming the economy. Since 2000 the change in the economy is quite unbelievable. I have witnessed the emergence of a middle class of people. People, who, because of their skills, have been able to obtain better paying jobs, people who have disposable income, and people who have better access to housing, education and medical facilities. The middle classes are certainly having a positive impact on the economy and are responsible for a signicant portion of the GDP growth the country has enjoyed in recent years. Despite the emergence of a middle class, many people still nd themselves outside the mainstream economy and are living very difcult lives. Many of these people are very young with the average age in the country being about 15 years old. There are growing levels of desperation among these young people who are failing to nd employment and a means to support themselves. Unfortunately they are now looking to apportion blame for their plight. Most of them are too young to remember where Zambia came from, all the changes that have taken place and the fact that today, we are far better off than we were in 1990, just prior to structural adjustment and economic transformation. The business community in Zambia acknowledges the challenges that the government faces in dealing with the plight of the under privileged. We continue to urge the government to stay the course and put in place policies that allow the economy to continue to grow and expand. Although the average GDP growth rate over the last decade has been 6%, I believe that this is not enough to see an end to excessive levels of poverty. The country has the resources to sustain a growth rate much higher than this and in the order of 910%. Such a growth rate would generate many new investment opportunities and would lead to new job creation and more wealth distribution. In all of this, I have observed the role of co-operating partners and in particular of DFID. Over the last decade, it appears to me, that DFID and the Business Community have drifted far apart in their thinking and their actions. The business community is concerned about GDP growth, Investment Policies, the high cost of doing business, the lack of a level playing eld, high interest rates, high taxes (for those who pay tax) excessive bureaucracy, lack of skills, inconsistent policy statements and corruption. In short, macro-economic conditions that, if improved, would lead to higher levels of investment and job creation.
DFID on the other hand appear to have embarked on symptomatic treatment programmes, rather than programmes that address the causes of low economic activity, although I do acknowledge that some work in the areas of infrastructural development, education and health have had a positive economic impact. In my opinion, what is lacking in the area of cooperation is an understanding that in order to eliminate poverty, you have to create investment and jobs. The economies of Europe are extremely concerned about unemployment and when unemployment reaches double digits, the governments of their respective countries begin to panic. In Zambia we have an unemployment rate of a staggering 80% in the formal sector. (There is economic activity taking place in the informal sector but the benets are hard to quantify). We need to see programmes in place that drag people out of the informal sector and allow them to establish themselves in the formal sector where their contribution to the economy will be far more substantial. I simply fail to see why the UK, through DFID has not seen the connection between unemployment and poverty in countries like Zambia. Why is not more effort being made to channel DFIDs valuable resources into programmes that will lead to investment and job creation? Why is DFID not working with business to ensure the obstacles to investment and job creation are removed, and business is given the economic freedoms it needs to expand and grow? What none of us in business want to see is either governments or aid organisations getting directly involved in business. Business is best left alone in a well-structured enabling environment with clear, stable and predictable policies. When I have had this discussion with people in the Aid Industry, I have been told that these remarks are typical of a businessman and that I dont understand!! It is true, I simply dont understand what these organisations are doing or achieving! I rmly believe that business is all about people. People have to be able to interact in order to be able to transact. The stronger these links are the more chance business will be done. It saddens me that over the last decade, the business links between Zambia and the UK have got progressively weaker. The High Commission has been substantially reduced in size, the visa ofce has been moved to South Africa making it ever more difcult for Zambians to obtain visas to visit UK and there is no business desk in the High Commission. At the same time the economy of Zambia has become substantially stronger with exports increasing 10 fold in the decade. Other countries are seeing their companies expanding in Zambia, but I get the impression that British companies are not aware of the opportunities that are being created in Zambia. Why is DFID not working on broad based programmes that will strengthen economic ties between the UK and countries like Zambia? Why can there not be a preferential trading agreement between the two countries like we have within SADC or COMESA? These are the topics that should be on the agenda if both countries are to see mutual benet through trade and investment. I believe there is ample evidence that correlates the wealth of a country with the levels of education in the country. Basic education in Zambia is in a sad state, but unfortunately vocational training is in an even worse state! Vocational training has just about completely collapsed and there is very little skills training taking place. We are no longer training artisans like plumbers, carpenters, butchers, mechanics and electricians. None of the aid organisations seem to have any interest in looking at skills training and yet there are many available jobs for people who have these skills. Working with industry, there are many ways that an affordable vocational training programme, along with competent certication could be put in place. Industry is already paying huge sums of money in order to meet their own training needs and with a little imagination, a substantial skills development programme could be put in place. Numerous meetings with stakeholders and cooperating partners have unfortunately not yielded any tangible results. DFID could play a signicant role in such a programme but this would require them to work alongside industry! At the meeting there was much talk about tax. The tax structure of Zambia was designed in the 1960s and over the years this has simply been patched up to try and make it work in todays modern environment. The system is in a shambles and does not meet the needs of a modern economy. In addition to it being in a shambles, it is enormously complicated and the very best tax advisors struggle to establish denitive positions with the authorities. This opens many loop holes and leads to accusations about organisations not paying enough tax!! The entire system needs to be modernised, simplied and implemented properly. If this were to be done, then the tax system could become a powerful development tool for growth, investment and job creation. Again, this is an area of activity where DFID could have a profound effect on the economy of Zambia. Finally I would like to raise a point about the Aid Industry in Zambia. In the UK many organisations are collecting money for projects in Zambia and other African countries. In order to do this, the common theme is to put a photo of a mother holding a sick child on the cover of a magazine or newspaper. This is creating a very negative image of Africa and is not reective of the many good things taking place in Africa. It also serves as a deterrent for investment as it is the ONLY message that is being given about Africa. At the same time, these organisations that are raising money for projects in Africa are not informing the public how much of the money that they raise actually goes into projects versus how much is spent on administration. In the UK money raised by aid organisations and charities is a very small part of the economy, whereas in Zambia, it is a very signicant part of the economy. We have hundreds of organisations operating here that claim to be NGOs, Charities, and Church organisations. Many of them, if not most of them, are not paying taxes and in some cases they are misusing their status and they are running commercial enterprises in competition to the private sector. There is a great deal of abuse and misuse and I believe that the public in the
UK should have the right to know how the money they give is being spent. Surely it would not be asking too much, to make it a legal requirement for any organisation raising money from the public to indicate to the public how much of it goes into the project and how much is spent on administration, advertising and other non-project costs. There is really a need for greater accountability in this area and for the same standards that are being applied to companies to be applied to these aid organisations that work in Africa 16 March 2012
Written evidence submitted by RESULTS UK and the International HIV/AIDS Alliance Background on Submission Contributors International HIV/AIDS AllianceEstablished in 1993, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance (the Alliance) is a global partnership of nationally-based linking organisations working in over 40 countries, to support community action on AIDS in developing countries. The Alliance opened a Country Ofce in Zambia in 1999. This ofce is currently in the process of becoming a Linking Organisationan independent national NGO to be known as Alliance for Community Action on HIV and AIDS in Zambia (Alliance Zambia). Over the last 10 years, Alliance Zambia has mobilised community responses on HIV by providing technical support, training, mentoring and funding communitybased organisations (CBOs). The key focus of its work is community and government health systems strengthening. It has developed signicant experience in the following programme areas: promotion of comprehensive treatment access and adherence and positive living, stigma reduction, orphan and vulnerable children protection and youth prevention. More recently, Alliance Zambia has developed policy experience in broader health issues. RESULTS UKis a non-prot advocacy organisation which works internationally to generate the public and political will to end poverty. Currently, our work focuses particularly on education, health, micronance and water and sanitation. We currently lead a network of more than 30 organisations in the UK Coalition to Stop TB provide the secretariat to the APPG on Global Tuberculosis, and belong to the Advocacy to Control TB Internationally (ACTION) network and the Stop TB Partnership. The following documents are supporting evidence to this application and are attached the email: Zambian CSO Petition to the Minister of Health Honourable Kasonde on the 10th Anniversary of the Global Fund; and Dont Stop Now: How underfunding the Global Fund to ght AIDS, TB and Malaria impacts on the HIV response (2011).
Summary 1. Despite progress made towards child mortality and HIV in Zambia, signicant challenges remain in reaching the MDGs.4 2. Tuberculosis (TB) and HIV place huge social and economic burden on communities in Zambia and affect human and social development investments. The impact of TB and HIV on women and children in Zambia has to date not been adequately addressed, and unless there is emphasis placed on this area within domestic and donor policy, the effect of these diseases will continue to hamper progress towards MDGs 4 and 5. 3. Zambia is currently on track to meet the MDGs on HIV and TB, and recent advances in HIV prevention and treatment and progress towards better diagnosis of TB offer the opportunity to scale up the response to these diseases, saving thousands more lives. 4. However, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM), which is the principle mechanism for delivery of UK commitments on TB, HIV and Malaria, and whose funds are critical to addressing these diseases and strengthening health systems in Zambia, is in crisis. 5. Lack of funding and increasing demands on scarce resources put Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), central to the disease response, at risk of closure; leading to thousands of people not able to access essential life saving treatment and basic support services. Strategies to address barriers to health care, particularly for women and at risk populations will also be threatened. 6. The Zambian Government, multilateral and bilateral donors and CSOs need to urgently work together ensure that funding is made available to meet the needs of affected populations. As gaps in services are identied, money will need to be channeled directly to affected communities and CSOs who play an important role in their delivery.
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UNDP Zambia MDG Factsheet 2011, can be accessed here: http://www.undp.org.zm/joomla/attachments/144_ MDG%20R%202011%20factsheet.pdf?8e2474a80d13c9785641fc2923161380=wnpfzqni
7. Recommendations to DFID Zambia and the International Development Committee (IDC) need to be urgently addressed if the UK and Zambian Government are to fulll their commitments on TB, HIV and malaria. Recommendations DFID Zambia 8. Safeguard against funding shortages for TB, HIV and malaria 8.1 Support the Zambian GFATM Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), and Zambian Government, in urgently identifying the impact of the cancellation of round 11 on current and future TB, HIV and malaria programming and the national health system. 8.2 Work with other donors and the Zambian Government to ensure that current and planned scale up of disease programming is achievable. 8.3 Support the Zambian government to protect budgets for strategies to address social and economic determinants increasing vulnerablity to TB, HIV and malaria, such as anti-stigma programmes, nutritional support and community care givers renumeration. In some cases DFID bilateral support might be necessary. 9. Strengthen civil society organisations 9.1 Assess opportunities to provide urgent funding and support to CSOs in Zambia, safeguarding innovative projects aimed at reaching the most vulnerable and at risk populations. 9.2 Provide support to CSOs to strengthen capacity to oversee implementation of national policy and use of funds. For example, through DFIDs planned strengthening civil society voice Project. 9.3 Monitor projects supported in Zambia through DFIDs Civil Society Challenge Fund and Global Poverty Action Fund. Assess at country level the potential for expansion. 10. Integration of TB and HIV in current and future programming on maternal and child health 10.1 Ensure that current international guidelines on TB/HIV integration are adhered to in all their existing and future bilateral programming on HIV, maternal and child health.5 10.2 Support the Zambian government to ensure that strategies to address TB/HIV co-infection are a routine component of reproductive and maternal and child health policy and programming. 10.3 Ensure appropriate indicators on TB, HIV and maternal health integration are included within domestic and DFID policy, with associated monitoring and evaluation to assess progress and impact. IDC 11. Task DFID to assess the implications of the cancellation of Global Fund round 11 on UK goals and objectives relating to TB, HIV, and malaria and maternal and child health. This should include individual country level investigation of where gaps in services may occur and the role DFID should play in meeting current and future funding needs. HIV and TB in Zambia 12. The Zambian HIV response has improved greatly including; a reduction in mother-to-child transmission, increase in ART coverage and an increase in HIV screening from 29.7% in 2006 to 50% in 2009. 39% of TB/ HIV co-infected persons now receive treatment, and 15% of women and men aged 1549 received an HIV test and results in the last 12 months.6 13. Despite these accomplishments, huge gaps remain. HIV prevalence in Zambia remains at 14.3%7 among adults; one million people are living with HIV (PLHIV). At least 53,634 adults and 5,516 children still do not have access to treatment. Thousands of PLHIV do not have access to good-quality home-based care and palliative care and support that they need.
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Soon to be published policy brief on TB/HIV integration produced by the UK Consortium on AIDS and International Development. See the International HIV/AIDS Alliance report (attached as PDF) Dont Stop Now for more information http://www.aidsalliance.org/newsdetails.aspx?id=291198 Republic of Zambia. Zambia Country Report. Monitoring the Declaration of Commitment on HIV and AIDS and the Universal Access Biennial Report.
14. Zambia has a high prevalence of TB with notication rates of 425 per 100,000 people in 2009.8 TB remains the leading cause of morbidity and mortality for PLHIV. The high burden of TB reduces productivity, affecting people in the prime of their working life. 15. To date, Zambia has achieved success in TB control, increased its TB treatment success from 86% in 2008 to 88% in 2010,9 the highest rate in sub-Saharan Africa. However, Zambia is only able to detect 80% of their cases annually, due mainly to geographically dispersed populations, poor infrastructure, and lack of adequate diagnosis tools for use in low resource settings and amongst PLHIV.10 HIV and TB in Women 16. Women are disproportionately affected by HIV and TB. 60%11 of PLHIV in Zambia are women. Among young people aged 1524, nearly four times as many women are living with HIV than men.12 Women often delay access to treatment, having fewer resources to access care and facing greater disease related stigma.13 In addition to being more vulnerable to disease, women also carry the biggest burden of TB and HIV care in the household.14 17. Recent efforts to reduce maternal mortality in Zambia have achieved notable success.15 Internationally, there is increasing recognition of the need for TB integration to be a core component of national HIV and maternal health (MH) programming and donor policy.16 However, there still remains a gap in policy at country level.17 Zambia will not reach the MDGs on MH unless the effects of TB and HIV on women are more directly addressed within donor and country policy and programming strategies. Policy in Zambia on TB and HIV 18. The Ministry of Health implements TB control activities through the NTP through the Sixth National Development Plan, National Health Strategic Plan and the National TB Strategic Plan 201115. The National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework (NASF) 201115 aims to provide a multi-sectoral, multi-layer and decentralised response to HIV and AIDS in Zambia.18 DFID Policy 19. In Towards Zero Infections: The UKs position paper on HIV in the developing world DFID state that bilateral support for HIV will be provided in fewer countries, with a focus on prevention, key populations and integrated services.19 The GFATM is cited as the principle mechanism the UK uses to drive its response to TB and HIV, signaling a shift from investment in bilateral programming on TB and HIV to channeling more funds through multilateral organisations. 20. The DFID Zambia Operational Plan, states that they will be shifting funding from the National AIDS Council to focus on AIDS prevention programmes, without giving details of where funding will be directed in future. Budget lines for HIV/AIDS and Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health are included (TB is completely absent), but there is little indication about how bilateral investment will be maximised through integration. Nor is there a mention of how bilateral and multilateral funding and programmes for health in Zambia will be coordinated. DFID Zambia are currently in the process of developing a Gender Strategy, it is not clear whether the effects of TB and HIV on women will be addressed through this policy. 21. In line with DFIDs aid reviews and AIDS position paper, the principle mechanism for UK support for the national HIV and TB response in Zambia is through the GFATM.
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UNDP Zambia MDG Factsheet 2011. 2010 Zambian National TB programme review. The TARGETS (Team for Applied Research Generating Effective Tools and Strategies for Communicable Disease Control) previously funded by DFID trialed new interventions in Zambia to improve case detection. A summary of the ZAMSTAR project can be found here: http://targets.lshtm.ac.uk/resources/Publications/TARGETS_TBBrochure.pdf UNAIDS. Zambia Country Situation 2009. Available at: http://www.unaids.org/ctrysa/AFRZMB_en.pdf UNAIDS. Report on the global AIDS epidemic. 2008. ACTION Women and tuberculosis: taking a look at a neglected issue (2010). More information can be found here: http://c1280432.cdn.cloudles.rackspacecloud.com/Women & Tuberculosis.pdf; as well as here: http://www.who.int/hhr/information/A%20Human%20Rights%20Approach%20to%20Tuberculosis.pdf Evidence from studies conducted in Malawi. See this link for more information http://www.healthlink.org.uk/PDFs/tb_vulnerable.pdf Evidence from Alliance Zambia taken from the Zambian Demographic Health Surveys. Tackling TB and HIV in women: An urgent agenda. The Global Coalition of Women and Girls (2010). For example, Zambias Reproductive Health Strategy provides no explicit policy advice to integrate maternal health, child health, HIV and TB and in-country partners state that the Zambian National AIDS Strategic Framework 201115 does not go far enough to adequately address the effects of HIV on maternal health. National AIDS Strategic Framework 201115. Can be accessed here: http://hivaidsclearinghouse.unesco.org/search/resources/iiep_zambia_nasf_2011_2015.pdf In reality there remains a lack of clarity on how this integration is occurring at country policy or programming level as insufcient detail of integrated services has so far been provided in DFID country operational plans.
The Global Fund to Fight AID, TB and Malaria (GFATM) 22. Zambia is a recipient of ve GFATM grants, a total of $613,391,092 of approved funding ($399,932,893 dispersed).20 GFATM money is critical to the delivery of TB, HIV and malaria services and the strengthening of core health systems in Zambia.21 23. Following the identication of fraud by the GFATM Ofce of the Inspector General in October 2010, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, and the Zambian National AIDS Network were barred from being GFATM Principal Recipients (PRs) and country funds were frozen. Although alternative PRs have now been found, impact has already been felt on services. 24. In November 2011 the GFATM board announced the cancellation of round 11 due to nancial constraints. 25. Zambias CCM had been relying on round 11 to strengthen drug suppy and supply management to ensure uninterrupted treatments for the three diseases. To date this management process is weak, and DFID (in partnership with USAID) are providng bilateral funding to avoid stock outs of malaria commodities. The government has already had to respond three times with an emergency procurement to ll the gap. Gaps in drug supply affect treatment adherance for patients and increase the risk of drug resistance. 26. The Zambian CCM were also depending on round 11 funding to strengthen intensied TB case nding; TB diagnostic capacity in facilities; quality assurance of TB microscopy training; the scale-up of remote diagnosis of TB using mobile technology; improve accuracy in monitoring of TB cases;22, 23 and increased scale-up of isoniazid preventive therapy.24 This round was seen as critical to achieving increased community involvement, better coordination of civil society, and the engagement of private sector stakeholders in the national HIV response.25 27. The affects of the cancellation (and previous freeze on funding) have already impacted CSOs in Zambia. A number of hospices that provide palliative care and ARVs will be closing in the next few months. CSOs in Zambia are calling on the government to develop policy to protect these hospices and in the interim provide ART, TB treatments and social support to clients to avoid treatment default.26 Existing services are already under threat, before the Zambian Government can even consider scaling up programmes to utilise recent advances in treatment, diagnosis and prevention for TB and HIV. The Transitional Funding Mechanism 28. As an emergency measure the GFATM have announced a Transitional Funding Mechanism, (TFM) which, they state, will support current GFATM grants facing signicant program disruption between now and March 2014. The TFM will only account for continuation of essential prevention, treatment and/or care services, with no scale up of services beyond the existing levels of patients, geographic areas or populations. Countries that decide to maintain existing scale of early diagnosis should demonstrate how alternate sources of funding, (domestic or from other donors) will be deployed to cover the costs of placing additional people on treatment. 29. Applications are only for a period of two years and applicants must demonstrate that there are no alternative sources of funding available. Countries are also required to adhere to counter-part nancing, with the Zambian government required to reach 20%. 30. In-country partners report that the Government has strong political commitment to funding work on health and there is to be a 46% increase in the health budget for 2012 (compared to 2011). This is encouraging momentum towards increased domestic nancing, but the Government still face signicant challenges to meet the needs of the population. 31. The Zambian government currently provides only 2% of the resources put towards the National AIDS Strategic Framework between 2011 and 2015 and is now under pressure to increase its budget allocation to health (still below the desired 15%).
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A breakdown of the grants can be found on the Global Fund website accessed here: http://portfolio.theglobalfund.org/en/Country/Index/ZAM For example, Zambia is currently implementing a health systems strengthening grant which seeks to address some of the barriers to integrated services, such as shortage of human resources for health, weaknesses in the drugs supply chain (anecdotal evidence from DFID Zambia). The Global Fund round 11 was to be used to support a TB prevalence survey, seen as critical for an informed response to the disease in Zambia. Evidence from an unpublished survey conducted by the Stop TB Partnership suggests that Zambia will face a disruption to current TB services with the cancellation of round 11. Recent evidence has shown positive results in the initiation IPT and the need for integration of IPT within antenatal programmes and HIV service delivery. A policy brief on IPT use can be found here: http://www.zambart.org/wp-content/uploads/ZAMBART-IPT-Policy-Brief.pdf See the International HIV/AIDS Alliance report for more information http://www.aidsalliance.org/newsdetails.aspx?id=291198 Anecdotal evidence from Community Initiative for TB, AIDS and Malaria (CITAM+), Zambia.
32. The cancellation of round 11 and the restrictive conditions of the TFM come at a time when signicant advances provide the promise of a scaled up response to the three diseases.27 Below outlines only some of the potential implications in Zambia. 32.1 There is an estimated gap of $13,587,379 for malaria commodities between 201315. 32.2 The restriction on scale up of services threatens integration of TB/HIV services within MH programmes. 32.3 In addition to current resource constraints, the Zambian government will be placed under even more nancial strain to implement new ART guidelines. 32.4 Zambia will struggle to take advantage of new technologies for better diagnosis of TB within high risk groups. 32.5 The provision of nutritional support and initiatives such as cash transfer programmes to patients may no longer be possible. 32.6 There will be an impact on strengthening health systems such as infrastructure development, vehicle procurement etc. which is essential to servicing hard to reach groups and rural communities in Zambia. 32.7 Funding will not be available for generalised/untargeted training, which may result in the loss of community health workers. 33. Zambia is eligible, and has intention to apply to the TFM for both TB and Malaria (they are not eligible for HIV funding due to current grants). TFM applications close on 21 March; until the results are known it is difcult to determine the full implications of funding constraints and where gaps in service provision and scale up will be. It is clear that the cancellation of round 11 and the restrictive conditions of the TFM will have a profound effect on the ability of Zambia to deliver on the National Health Strategic Plan 2011015. The Zambian Government along with bilateral donors need to urgently identify a contingency plan for gaps in future services, whether or not Zambia receive funds through the TFM. 34. To mark the 10th anniversary of the GFATM, CSOs in Zambia called on the Government28 to put in place mechanisms for local resources to protect HIV services through the establishment of a National AIDS Trust Fund which needs to safeguard against treatment shortages across the three diseases, not just HIV. Role of Civil Society 35. CSOs and affected communities in Zambia are critical to the countrys ability to meet the health MDGs. In-country partners stress that the success of national plans on TB and HIV and the new National Health Strategic Plan (20112015) will depend on CSO capacity to hold government to account on commitments made and use of funds. 36. CSOs and community caregivers are critical to de-centralised TB, HIV and malaria services. In addition to mobilising communities to access services, they strengthen linkages between community-based interventions and health facilities, including client follow-up. 37. DFID identify CSOs as crucial to delivering policy change, and DFID Zambias country operational plan commits to involve beneciaries in the design, monitoring and evaluation of our programmes [] Specically in the health sector, we will provide support to civil society to conduct voices of the poor user surveys to assess whether health services are meeting the needs of beneciaries on the ground. March 2012
Written evidence submitted by United Church of Zambia 1. Taxes in Zambia are mainly levied in order to raise revenue to fund government developmental operations, to assist in reducing disparity between rich and poor, and to reduce poverty. This means that the funds that are realised from taxes assist the government in funding the national budget. Therefore, interferences with the collection of these taxes have an adverse effect on meeting the national budget. 2. Zambian taxes are broadly categorised into three groups as follows: income taxes, consumption taxes and trade taxes. These taxes make up the domestic revenue base for the country. These taxes contribute up to 70% to the national budget. Other revenues that Government mobilises to supplement tax revenue come from funding from external donors through budgetary support, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and debt provision. Apart from these revenue sources, other sources are not fully exploited yet. These include local government revenues and alternative taxes such as a wealth tax. However, these alternative sources of revenue have challenges that need to be addressed if they are to be reliable and predictable sources of revenue. 3. In Zambia, income taxes are the major sources of revenue followed by consumption taxes (domestic VAT, import VAT and excise duty) and trade taxes (customs duty and export duty), as shown in gure 2. Up until
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Such as conclusive data on treatment as prevention, early initiation of ART, male circumcision, pre-exposure prophylaxis, microbicides, use of IPT and diagnosis tools such as Genexpert. Global Fund 10th Anniversary statement from Zambian CSOs (attached to this submission).
10 years ago, international trade taxes used to account for the bulk of the taxes collected but now there has been a shift to income taxes, particularly Pay As You Earn (PAYE). During this same period, the proportion of consumption taxes (domestic VAT, import VAT and excise duty) has also increased steadily. These are the taxes that have been widely evaded, Cobham (2005). In addition, Schneider (2005, 2007) conrms that developing countries lose US$285 billion per year due to tax evasion in the domestic shadow economy. This is the main reason why Jubilee-Zambia called on the Government and church leaders within to help nd the lost sense of nancial accountability and patriotism by civil servants in Zambia. This was as a result of shocking revelations of massive evidence of negligence and irresponsibility demonstrated by many Zambian ofcials in the handling of the debt Zambia owes Donegal International (originally owed to Romania) in the just-concluded trial where the Zambian Government was sued by a commercial creditor over an unpaid debt. 4. The public services and infrastructure are key factors in the economic development and growth of a country. Many developing countries like Zambia fail to raise the tax revenue required to fund their public sectors due to many bottlenecks found in the process. According to Christian Aid (2009), tax avoidance and tax evasion are widely believed to be important factors limiting revenue mobilisation to nance the sectors especially seeking to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This proposed case study shall review existing empirical data on tax revenue losses due to tax avoidance and tax evasion in developing countries, and discuss the role of tax expenditure and other determinants of revenue mobilisation. 5. Existing empirical studies on tax revenue losses due to tax avoidance and evasion in developing countries distinguish between a domestic component and an international component. The domestic component includes tax evasion, which occurs due to the domestic shadow economy. The international component includes protshifting by corporations and offshore holdings of nancial assets by private individuals. 6. The United Church of Zambia is aiming to study this issue in more depth, motivated by the poor performance of the revenue system in Zambia in the last decade. In particular, there has been an evident decline in the share of tax revenue to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The performance of some tax types, such as domestic VAT and trade taxes, has also progressively declined. The performance of the mining sector taxes has equally not been impressive and there has been concern as to whether it is being taxed optimally. Another factor that motivated the study was the need to analyse the role of the informal sector in the tax system and how it can sustainably contribute to domestic revenue mobilisation. This is because, up until now, the tax system has relied solely on revenues from the formal sector while the informal sector remains largely untaxed. The last motivating factor was the need to explore how Zambia can raise extra revenue from its traditional exports, like copper, through a nancial transaction tax. 7. The premise of our more detailed study is that Zambia has the potential to raise more tax revenue and improve social justice by employing prudent policies and practices that improve tax revenue administration. The major objective of the study is to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the tax system in Zambia by identifying the key challenges and possible success factors. The Methodist Tax Justice Network shall use the information generated by this study as research, education, and advocacy tools to lobby relevant authorities on how the current tax system can be best utilized and reorganised in order to attain social justice for the people of Zambia. 8. There is evidence of serious loss of income for Zambia by tax-dodging, for example in the 2010 report from Christian Aid, Blowing the Whistle, which highlighted signicant copper exports to Switzerland disappearing to the tune of billions of dollars. There was also in Eurodads 2011 report Missing Billions information on Swiss-based commodity trader Glencores alleged tax evasion in Zambia worth around $150 million. 9. Increasing the tax-take from international trade and from wealth transactions can increase the tax base and allow the government to reduce the highly unequal burden on the formally employed, which is unfair and creates economic distortions. The closest tax that reects wealth transaction in Zambia is the property transfer tax. However, this tax has not performed well because properties are mostly undervalued, which negatively affects tax revenue realized from property transactions. The lack of well-trained tax inspectors in property evaluation compounds the problem and as such, tax evasion is common. 10. The tax administration system faces several challenges, among them the following: a large informal cash economy; low taxpayer compliance; complexities associated with taxation of international transactions; poor traceability of taxpayers; smuggling; and inadequate funding to the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) for infrastructural and technological development. The Zambian tax system has numerous tax types and rates that can result in high effective taxation. The many taxes and rates also have the potential to make the tax system complex, and therefore increase the cost of compliance and encourage non-compliance. 11. Further, the tax system is mature and has undergone several administrative and policy reforms. The tax formulation process is inclusive (both government and private sector participate in the formulation process), although it still has some challenges. Zambias windfall tax is a tax on mining sales revenues. However, such a tax regime can put rms under nancial strain when costs rise relative to the mineral prices. With a windfall tax, operators of more costly mines, such as underground and old mines, would be inequitably taxed compared to those with relatively less costly mining operations, such as open-pit and new mines. A windfall tax may, therefore, pose a threat on the viability of some mines and lead to closure and related job losses.
12. Zambia has another option for taxing the mining sector, using the variable prot tax regime. Consistent with the principle of taxation, it is a much better instrument as it is more focused towards prots, unlike windfall tax which is insensitive to the cost structure of the mines. This notion of variable prot tax or taxing super-prots is currently applied in the nancial sector and will be applied to the telecommunication sector, as announced in the 2011 budget. In both the nancial and telecommunications sectors, it is congured on prots and not revenues. 13. Zambias debt has been brought down to nancially sustainable levels because of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives. The countrys growth and stability records are largely favourable and have been projected by the International Financial Institutions to remain stable over the medium term. However, Zambia continues to face many challenges that will make its progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) more difcult. Economic growth in Zambia has been hampered by many domestic and external factors that have limited its size and quality, and ultimately it has not been pro-poor. 14. Even if Zambia may yet nd herself in an MDG trap because of extensive debt relief, resulting in insufcient access to predictable nancing to address the MDGs, domestic resource mobilization and external grants have been limited and the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility conditionalities have continued to restrict both external and domestic borrowing. However, Zambias return to creditworthinessthe objective of the HIPC initiativemeans that Zambia will need to assess carefully how much it borrows in future and for what purpose. At the same time, more progress needs to be made on increasing Ofcial Development Assistance (ODA) and improving its quality. 15. Analysing the trends in income poverty, the UNDP (2003) concludes that Zambia shall not meet this MDG and observes that the state of national support to meet this goal is weak but improving. This improvement is attributed to the creation and the implementation of the PRSP which has improved governments focus on poverty reduction priorities. 16. Using the same ofcial poverty line, the UNDP (2003) shows that the goal to eradicate extreme poverty, and particularly halving it between 1990 and 2015, implies a target of reducing extreme poverty from 58.1% in 1991 to 29.1% in 2015. Yet, the key question remains, how much growth must be generated in order to reach the set target? 17. According to UNDP (2003), universal primary education (UPE) is one of the MDGs that may be achieved by Zambia. Net enrolment rate (NER) at primary education level stood at 76% in 2003. The target is to reach an NER of 100% by 2015. There was a slight disparity between boys and girls as regards enrolments at primary education level. During 2003, the NER for boys was 71% while that for girls was 75%. Although enrolment levels for girls look high, the number of girls who completed primary school (grade seven) is lower than for boys. During the same in the year, 2003, the proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 7 was 80% for boys and only 66% for girls. Thus achieving UPE also implies ensuring all children are accorded full primary education, regardless of gender. 18. Zambias PRSP (2002) and the Transitional National Plan (2003) identify education as the key social sector in the countrys poverty reduction effort. This prioritisation helped Zambia focus her attention on the education sector. However, there is still more that is needed to be done in terms of earmarking resources for the sector, if the MDG for UPE by 2015 is to be met. 19. Gender equality is an important goal if Zambia is to achieve the full potential of development. Females lag behind males in education attainment, non-agricultural employment and participation in politics (UNDP, 2003). The ratio of literate females to males (1524 year olds) declined between 1990 and 2002, while the Zambian education system is characterised by a gender disparity especially at secondary school level and higher, these disparities are later manifested in the labour market where women are disadvantaged. The score of women in formal wage employment in the non-agricultural sector declined from 39% in 1990 to 35% in 2000. 20. The consistent adverse experience felt disproportionately by females in the education, employment and health sectors culminates in a situation in parliament where, despite some improvements even after being a signatory to many international protocols, in 1991 only 6% of the members of parliament were female. This gure rose to 10% in 1996 and to 12% in 2001 but still falls well below the SADC requirement of 30% (UNDP, 2003). A good education system needs money. 21. In order to ascertain whether Zambia will meet this goal rst requires an assessment or projection of how much economic growth is required to meet it. Estimating this growth involves two steps. First, it involves calculating the elasticity of poverty to economic growth and inequality. Secondly, using the elasticity estimates, the required growth of the economy is estimated. To estimate the required economic growth, this study relies on the ndings of McCulloch et al (2000). Using CSO household surveys of 1991, 1996 and 1998, McCulloch et al estimate the relationship between poverty, growth and inequality. Therefore, some exploration to assess whether Zambia shall attain the MDGs, and the related extent of tax collection in our country, would be a welcome idea considering that (ibid) a $1 a day poverty line would be extremely high in the Zambian context. We therefore hope to undertake a further more in-depth study.
Recommendations (a) Increased support for the Zambia Revenue Authority to enable it to collect effectively the taxes due, especially from international trade. (b) International rules requiring the automatic exchange of information from tax havens to national tax authorities. (c) A requirement for corporate transparencycountry-by-country reporting of where costs fall and prots are made. (Submitted to the UK Parliament Select Committee for International Development enquiry, February 2012, by the Methodist Tax Justice Network) References Christian Aid (2008), Death and taxes: The true toll of tax dodging. Christian Aid (2009), False Prots: robbing the poor to keep the rich tax free. Christian Aid (2010), Blowing the Whistle. Clausing, K (2003). Tax-motivated transfer pricing and US intrarm trade prices, Journal of Public Economics 87, 22072223. Cobham, A (2005). Tax evasion, tax avoidance, and development nance, Queen Elisabeth House Working Paper No. 129. Eurodad (2011). The Missing Billlions. McCulloch, N, Baulch, B and Cherel-Robinson M (2000). Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s. An IDS Working Paper No 114. Michael, A, Clemens et al, (2004). The Trouble with the MDGs: Confronting Expectations of Aid and Development Success. Centre for Global Development (CGD), Working Paper No. 40, May 2004. Millennium Development Goals. 2005. Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieving the Millennium Development Goals. By the Millennium Project, New York. Ministry of Education (1996). Educating Our Future. Zambia National Policy on Education May 1996. Lusaka. Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MFNP), 2002. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 20022004. National Policy Paper for the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ), Lusaka. Ministry of Health (2003). Strategic Plan 200307. February 2003. Lusaka. National Water Supply and Sanitation Council (NWASCO) (2003), Urban and Peri-urban Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Report 20022003. Lusaka. Sachs, Jeffrey (2004). Doing the Sums on Africa, The Economist, May 20, 2004, see also www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents Schneider, F (2005). Shadow Economies of 145 countries all over the world: What do we really know? Mimeo, University of Linz. Schneider, F (2007). Shadow Economies and Corruption all over the World: new estimates for 145 countries, Economics, The Open Access, Open Assessment e-Journal, No. 20079, July 24, 2007. Tsoka, G, Nyirenda, N, Hayes, E and O Chulu (2002). Malawi 2002 Millennium Development Goals Report, UNDP Country Ofce. UNDP (2003). Zambia Millennium Development Goals. Progress Report for 2003. March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Zambian Ornithological Society 1. Executive Summary 1.1 Zambia is listed amongst Least Developed and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. It was at the bottom segment of the Human Development Index for 2010, where it ranked 150th out of 169 countries. The country is off-track or regressing on achieving MDG 1 and off-track on achieving MDG 7 (African Economic Outlook 2010). The country needs substantial support to boost its efforts towards eradicating poverty and ensuring environmental sustainability. To a large extent, this amongst other initiatives means improving environmental planning, creating environmentally friendly and sustainable jobs and improving the delivery of goods and services to the poor.
1.2 We note that DFIDs support to Zambia has been substantial though a lot more needs to be done to scale up programs aimed at helping the country need its obligation of attaining MDG 7. DFIDs support towards institutional development and that towards the Zambia Civil Society Climate Change Network (ZCSCCN) in particular is appreciated and noted to be one input toward MDG 7. This support is however not sufcient to create a critical mass for environmental sustainability. The inclusion of biodiversity conservation and management with the inclusion of bio-prospecting and community engagement is recommended. 1.3 A very strong interrelationship exists between MDG 7 and other MDGs. MDG 1 in particular exhibits a direct cause-effect relationship since environmental sustainability would to a greater extent translate into increased prospects for reducing poverty and hunger. 1.4 There is need for cooperating partners and the Zambian government alike to allocate substantial funds towards programs and activities focusing on MDG 7. The questions however are; How committed is the Zambian government and DFID towards environmental management and sustainability? How much could the Zambian government and DFID commit towards such a cause? 1.5 The Civil Society in Zambia has over the years developed and was capable of engaging government on various issues pertaining to environmental sustainability. DFID could strengthen working ties with both government and the civil society. 2. Introduction 2.1 The Zambian Ornithological Society (ZOS) is a membership-based environmental NGO established in 1969. The organisation is a member of a global environmental and conservation network through its partnership with BirdLife International. 2.2 The main objective of ZOS is to promote the study, conservation, and general interest in birds and their habitats in Zambia. ZOS works with people to conserve wild birds, habitats and global biodiversity while striving towards promoting sustainable use of natural resources and sustainable livelihoods. 2.3 The organisation has four (4) thematic areas of focus namely; species conservation, conservation actions for Important Bird Areas (IBAs) in partnership with local conservation groups, habitat/biodiversity monitoring and taking actions aimed at enhancing sustainable linkages between biodiversity conservation, natural resource utilization and rural livelihoods. 3. Factual Information 3.1 Development support made by the Department for International Development (DFID) in Zambia is substantial and undisputable. Signicant support focusing on education, water and sanitation, poverty alleviation, health & HIV/AIDS, governance and institutional development is evident. DFID has made signicant efforts in helping Zambia address Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) particularly; MDG 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. A lot, however, still needs to be done in addressing MDG 7, a goal on environmental sustainability. There is also a challenge of linking all other MGDs to MDG 7. 3.2 We are aware of DFIDs support towards the development of the Zambia Civil Society Climate Change Network (ZCSCCN), a network to which ZOS is a member and has been active from its inception. ZCSCCN has been successfully established, strengthened and was taking a center stage on the Climate Change agenda at national level. Though this network and its institutional arrangements have the potential of contributing towards MDG 7, a lot in Zambia is yet to be done if MDG 7 and indeed MDG 1 were to be attained. 3.3 In Zambia and perhaps Africa as a whole, environmental sustainability, poverty, hunger and health were interrelated. For instance Chidumayo 2010 states that a survey conducted in a few African countries including Zambia suggested that 65% of original wildlife habitat had been lost as a result of agricultural expansion, deforestation and over grazing, which were fueled up by rapid population growth and poverty. The rate at which Zambia was losing forests which are an important niche for biodiversity stands 6% per year. This is on the higher side by any standard. In Zambia biodiversity loss was ever on the increase with insufcient efforts being undertaken to avert the situation. 3.4 It has been recorded that protected areas across Africa were becoming increasingly ecologically isolated while wildlife and biodiversity on adjacent lands were being actively eliminated (African Forest Forum, 2011). This scenario is true for Zambia where protected areas are being encroached for charcoal production, poaching and agriculture activities thereby exacerbating environmental instability. A wide variety of species of animals and birds; some with the potential of providing information on environmental stability and contributing to poverty alleviation in a variety of ways were increasingly being threatened. 3.5 At national level, monitoring of biodiversity, habitats and species, some of which are under extreme pressure was lacking. Monitoring information, however, is critical for the effective management of protected areas including Trans-Frontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs). 3.6 Inadequacy of up-to-date information on biodiversity and limited ability to handle the available information makes it difcult to effectively plan, manage and monitor biodiversity conservation and its sustainable use.
3.7 Information on trends, extents, severity of threats, distribution and suitability of habitats can only be acquired through regular and sustained monitoring of biodiversity. Information obtained through such can be used to advocate and lobby for better management and protection of key biodiversity sites. However, past and on-going attempts to monitor Zambias biodiversity by various institutions have been uncoordinated and limited to the scope of individual institutions. 3.8 In 2010 for instance, the Zambia Wildlife Authority was monitoring vegetation in National Parks, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) was monitoring wildlife corridors and the presence of Human-wildlife conicts, the Community Based Natural Resources Forum was monitoring livelihoods and natural resources use through Management Oriented Monitoring Systems (MOMs) while the Zambian Ornithological Society was monitoring habitats and bird populations. The need for coordinated efforts, shared data and information protocols and integrated planning aimed at helping the country attain MDG 1 and 7 cannot be overemphasized. 3.9 Protected areas are a cornerstone of biodiversity conservation in Zambia. However, existing legislations preclude neighboring communities from accessing goods and services from them. This has created islands of green surrounded by degraded communally owned landscapes. The result has been increased illegal harvesting of timber and game and proliferation of illegal settlements in some areas. 3.10 It should also be noted that the bulk of the countrys biodiversity lies outside protected areas and is under extreme pressure from various threats. In spite efforts to conserve biodiversity outside protected areas through joint management, especially in forestry, wildlife and sheries sectors, efforts to improve management of biodiversity in non-protected areas through CBNRM initiatives continue to be hampered by the inadequacy of incentives to local communities. 4. Recommendation 4.1 DFID should expand its support for environmental programs to include biodiversity management as a way of helping Zambia move towards attaining MDG 1 and 7. 4.2 The country should be helped in developing and implementing a comprehensive but simple biodiversity inventory and monitoring programmes covering key species and habitats. 4.3 Skills to handle and package the information are needed to improve knowledge and improve management of biodiversity. 4.4 In addition to health, education and other elements of the MDGs, Zambia urgently requires concerted R & D efforts that would unleash the economic potential locked up in the countrys biological resources through bio-prospecting, value addition and nding innovative ways to equitably share benets there from. There is also need to help build capacities of local communities that live with the biological resources in management of common property resources. 4.5 There is need to help government formulate policies, legislation and bye-laws that regulate access to and use of biological resources. 4.6 In order to ensure results and impact, DFID should explore partnerships with Civil Society Organizations. 4.7 Funds should be allocated towards environmental management and biodiversity conservation in particular. March 2012
Written evidence submitted by Marie Stopes International 1. Introduction 1.1 Zambia is changing. A population growth rate of almost 3% per year is leading to rapidly growing urban slums and increasing numbers living in remote rural areas. In addition to greater focus on reproductive health, Zambias health system needs to adapt and modernise to meet this challenge. This must involve new models of service delivery that can function effectively in areas lacking basic infrastructure, and integrating the service providers with experience in these systems into government plans for public healthcare. This submission identies four key ways in which DFID can have a transformative impact upon both reproductive health and the health system as a whole in Zambia. 2. MSI Zambia 2.1 MSI Zambia (MSIZ) is a relatively young member of the MSI partnership having opened its rst clinic in 2008. Nevertheless, it is already a major agency in the delivery of sexual and reproductive health services in Zambia, including HIV/AIDS and family planning. In 2011 MSIZ delivered reproductive health services to over 38,000 clients including more than 21,000 young people. 2.2 Geography presents a major obstacle to accessing services across much of Zambia. Rural communities are typically situated long distances from public health infrastructure with poor road networks. Urban slums
grow at a rapid rate with large areas without power or fresh water supply. MSIZ therefore plans to launch a network of mini-clinics situated within the communities that are underserved. These mini-clinics will provide essential SRHR services and provide a point for referral to larger clinics. Nevertheless, the clinics would be able to achieve an even greater impact if various government restrictions on non-state health service providers were removed. Examples of these restrictions with recommendations for UK action are given below. 3. DFID in Zambia 3.1 DFIDs strategic commitment to improving the lives of women and girls is in strong evidence in Zambia. Key interventions by DFID in this eld include partnership with Population Council for support to adolescent girls; with Abt Associates for family planning service delivery; and with MSIZ for reproductive health services including family planning. 3.2 DFID is also making strategic interventions to strengthen the overall health system. Notably, DFID is helping to address the chronic shortage of health workers in Zambia with support for training and recruitment of nurses and community health assistants. 3.3 MSI applauds DFIDs investments for both the empowerment of women and girls and for health system strengthening. We urge DFID to build upon this strong platform by leveraging its inuence as a health sector partner to the Government of Zambia to support policy reform for stronger health systems. A stronger policy environment within the Zambian health system would enable DFIDs investments to achieve even greater impact. We outline three key ways in which political support from DFID can have a catalytic affect on improving health services for women and girls. We also identify two key strategic interventions where additional DFID resources would have maximum impact upon access to RH services in Zambia. 4. Recommendations 4.1 Support for task-sharing long-acting and permanent methods of family planning (LAPM) The shortage of doctors in Zambia is particularly acute yet many LAPM, such as contraceptive implants, are restricted by national health policy to provision by doctors only. This is exceptionally restrictive in rural areas because the vast majority of Zambias few doctors are based in urban centres. Relaxing these restrictions so that mid-level providers, such as non-physician clinicians, nurses and midwives can be trained to provide LAPM in line with health care researchas many countries in the region have safely donewould remove a key bottleneck constraint on improving access to family planning. DFID should use the political capital obtained through its support for the health workforce to persuade the Ministry of Health to task-share LAPM with doctors and nurses and midwives. 4.2 Fostering more constructive engagement between government and non-state health providers The Zambian medical authorities continue to rely upon a number of outdated and unnecessary restrictions on health service delivery. These include restrictions on the ability of clinics to publish basic information to the public about the availability of the services they offer. Importantly, minimum standards for clinics around stafng and infrastructure have not yet been adapted for small, local clinics (such as the MSIZ mini-clinic), leading to a number of obstacles and impracticalities for any provider attempting to serve hard-to-reach populations. We urge DFID to be pro-active in encouraging government to evolve its understanding of the health system to be more inclusive of the non-state providers at their disposal. This should include utilisation of convening power to facilitate dialogue between government and non-state providers with regards to a more enabling policy environment. 4.3 Constitutional support for womens empowerment We urge DFID to encourage the Government of Zambia to ensure that Zambian constitutional reform, currently in process, is used to advance womens rights and leads to no erosion of rights already established. 4.4 New targeted interventions Government investment in RH remains substantially below what is required for Zambia to achieve its MDG5 targets. Under investment in services is particularly acute for both the large rural population and for services accessible to Zambias large youth cohort. We urge DFID to focus upon the following areas for additional strategic investment in order to maximise their impact upon RH in Zambia: 1. Mobile RH services for rural communities 2. Youth-focused initiatives to raise awareness of the availability of RH services and reduce social stigma April 2012
Printed in the United Kingdom by The Stationery Ofce Limited 09/2012 019506 19585

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House of Commons International Development Committee

DFIDs programme in Zambia

The International Development Committee

List of additional written evidence

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DFID's Programme in Zambia - Volume 2

DFID's Programme in Zambia - Volume 2