B. Presumptions 1. People v. Magbanua (Murder Case) Facts: Generoso Magbanua is convicted for the murder Remegio Diaz.

The prosecution relies on the eyewitness accounts of Narciso Balucos and Narciso Rellin. Medico-legal officer Dr. Napoleon dela Pea and Salustiana Diaz, the victims mother, also testified for the prosecution. According to Balucos, he saw appellant get shot at the left cheek and at the forehead. Rellin corroborated this by saying that he saw appellant shoot at the victims face twice. These assertions were supported by the testimony of the victims mother, who submitted a picture of the victim showing injuries on the cheek and forehead. The medico-legal findings, however, disclose the victims injuries to be above the left and right jaws, and none at the forehead. Magbanua points out that the testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses regarding the victims injuries and the respective positions of the victim and appellant during the shooting are contradictory to the medico-legal findings of the government doctor. Such discrepancy, he claims, sufficiently raises reasonable doubt on the veracity of the eyewitnesses testimonies. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses, which is contrary to the finding of the medico-legal officer, shall prevail over the findings of the doctor. Held: No. The trial court correctly held that the eyewitness testimony prevails over the findings of the medico-legal officer. It is true that a government doctors post-mortem examination is presumed by law to have been regularly performed. This rebuttable presumption, however, cannot be successfully invoked in the present case, it appearing that the examining doctor was remiss in the performance of his duties as a medico-legal officer. The peculiar circumstances obtaining inevitably open to doubt the accuracy of the doctors findings, especially in light of the clear, positive and categorical declarations of the eyewitnesses. The trial court observed that the Necropsy Report is undated and appears to have been newly issued. When confronted about this, the government doctor explained that it was his practice not to issue immediately necropsy reports because he was always busy in his department. He admitted that it was only upon the receipt of a subpoena in 1996 that he issued the report, the contents of which he copied from a notebook on which he originally recorded his findings. As noticed by the trial court, the particular page of his notebook which indicated the aforesaid findings bore unexplained alterations. Moreover, the Court notes that the Necropsy Report failed to mention anything about an injury on the victims forehead, which is clearly shown in the close-up picture submitted by the prosecution.

2. Mabunga v. People (Robbery with force upon things) Facts: In the morning of October 2, 1994, employees of the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) including Davy Villaruel (Villaruel) discovered that the hasp of the door of the BFP office in Barangay Capaclan, Romblon, Romblon was destroyed, and that the only typewriter in their office, a "Triumph" bearing Serial Number 340118640, was missing. The typewriter was later found in a box of HOPE, which was allegedly brought by the accused Mabunga to a certain Villaruel for safe-keeping.

Appellant interposed alibi with respect to the date and place of occurrence of the alleged robbery. While he admitted bringing to the pier on October 15, 1994 a box, he claimed, however, that it bore the marking "CHAMPION," not "HOPE." Mabunga was convicted of Robbery with force upon things. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, relied on Section 3(j) Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. (j) That a person in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him Issue: Whether or not the prosecution proved Mabungas guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Held: No. The evidence for the prosecution is circumstantial. The alleged robbery was discovered when the employees of the BFP reported for work on October 2, 1994 and noticed that the hasp of the office door was broken and the typewriter was missing. And on the sole basis of the presumption laid down under above-quoted Section 3(j) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of appellant. A presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party who would be disadvantaged by a finding of the presumed fact. The presumption controls decision on the presumed fact unless there is counterproof that the presumed fact is not so. In criminal cases, however, presumptions should be taken with caution especially in light of serious concerns that they might water down the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. As special considerations must be given to the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, there should be limits on the use of presumptions against an accused. Although possession of stolen property within a limited time from the commission of the theft or robbery is not in itself a crime, it being possible to possess the same and remain innocent, such possession may be sufficient for the formation of an inference that the possessor is the thief unless the evidence satisfactorily proves that the property was acquired by the accused by legal means. To assume that in a busy place, such as the PPA terminal, the "HOPE" box that was opened by the police authorities and found to contain the missing typewriter is the same box allegedly entrusted by appellant to the cashier is to form an inference which is, however, doubtful, more than six hours having elapsed from the time the box was allegedly left at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon until it was opened by the police authorities at around 9:00 oclock in the evening after appellant had already boarded the ship. A presumption cannot be founded on another presumption. It cannot thus be concluded that from the time the box was left under the bench, appellant was still in constructive possession thereof, the exercise of exclusive dominion or control being absent. At all events, apart from appellants supposed possession of the "HOPE" box on October 15, 1994, no other evidence was adduced by the prosecution linking him to the robbery. The appellate court ruled that since it was sufficiently established that appellant was in possession of the typewriter two weeks after it was stolen, he had the burden of proving that he was not the one responsible for the heist. While a presumption imposes on a party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut such presumption, the burden of producing evidence

of guilt does not extend to the burden of proving the accuseds innocence of the crime as the burden of persuasion does not shift and remains throughout the trial upon the prosecution. 3. Ong v. Sandiganbayan (Forfeiture Case) Facts: Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-Affidavit, claiming that petitioner Jose U. Ong, then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), has amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income. In his Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31, 1989, Commissioner Jose U. Ong declared P750,000.00 as his cash on hand and in banks. Within a short period thereafter, he was able to acquire prime real estate properties mostly in the millionaires choice areas in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila costing millions of pesos. OMB ordered him to submit certain documents. Instead of complying with the Order, Ong filed a Motion for its recall, the voluntary inhibition of the handling investigators, and reassignment of the case. The Resolution directed the filing by the Ombudsman, in collaboration with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), of a petition for recovery of ill-gotten/unexplained wealth under RA 1379, in relation to RAs 3019 and 6770, against Ong and all other persons concerned. A Petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired property was accordingly filed before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic. Ong contends that the Petition, aside from his affirmative defenses, allegedly failed to state a cause of action because RA 1379 is unconstitutional as it is vague and does not sufficiently define ill-gotten wealth and how it can be determined in violation of the non-delegation of legislative power provision, and insofar as it disregards the presumption of innocence by requiring them to show cause why the properties in question should not be declared property of the state. Issue: Whether or not RA 1379 (Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Properties) is unconstitutional for vagueness and for violating the non-delegation doctrine as it disregards the presumption of innocence. Held: No. The law is not vague as it defines with sufficient particularity unlawfully acquired property of a public officer or employee as that "which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property." It also provides a definition of what is legitimately acquired property. Based on these parameters, the public is given fair notice of what acts are proscribed. The law, therefore, does not offend the basic concept of fairness and the due process clause of the Constitution. Neither is the presumption of innocence clause violated by Sec. 2 of RA 1379 which states that property acquired by a public officer or employee during his incumbency in an amount which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. As elaborated by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, under the principle of presumption of innocence, it is merely required of the State to establish a prima facie case, after which the burden of proof shifts to the accused. It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the State of some material fact or facts shall

constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention. 4. Pilipinas Bank v. Glee Chemical Laboratories (Loan with Real Estate Mortgage) Facts: Glee Chemical Laboratories, Inc. alleged that it applied for a loan with Pilipinas Bank in the amount of P800,000.00, payment of which would be secured, pursuant to a board resolution, by a mortgage of its real property. The Real Estate Mortgage specifically stated in Paragraph 1 thereof that "[t]he MORTGAGOR (herein respondent) shall not apply the amount obtained from the loans of this date but for the following purpose, viz: Additional working capital for the purchase of fertilizers." Respondent claims, however, that petitioner never delivered to it the loan proceeds and instead applied the amount to a debt owed by a certain Rustica Tan from petitioner. Petitioner insists that payment of Rustica Tans debt was secured by the real estate mortgage executed by respondent pursuant to a third-party liability inserted therein. Since a balance of Rustica Tans debt in the amount of P3,586,772.98 still remained unpaid, petitioner, through its agent Business Assistance Group, Inc., served on respondent a notice of foreclosure and auction sale of respondents mortgaged lot. Issue: Whether or not a notarized document, which has been registered with the Register of Deeds, is conclusive proof of its due execution. Held: No. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is not conclusive. As provided under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, such presumption is rebuttable. In this case, the testimony of petitioners own witness, Elpidio Guillermo, destroyed this presumption by admitting that when the document was notarized, Cheng Yong and Melecio Hernandez did not appear before the notary public. Hence, the notary public did not witness Cheng Yong affixing his signature on the document. Verily, such notarization is useless since there is no truth whatsoever to the notary publics statement or acknowledgment that the person who executed the document personally appeared before him and the same was his free and voluntary act. Such being the case, the Court must rely on the trial courts observation and conclusions regarding which witnesses are telling the truth.

5. Surtida v. Rural Bank of Malinao (Loan with Real Estate Mortgage) Facts: The spouses Pedro and Paz Surtida executed a real estate mortgage over their 1,750 square meters residential land. The deed was executed as security for the payment of the P100,000.00 loan the spouses Surtida had applied for. The deed was filed in the Office of the Registry of Deeds The spouses Surtida secured a loans evidenced by a Promissory Note and received cashiers checks. The spouses Surtida, however, failed to pay their loans. So, they executed Dation in Payments over a 300 sq m undivided portion of their property in payment of their loans.

In a letter, the Rural Bank informed the spouses Surtida that they were being given a preferential right to repurchase the property. The spouses Surtida rejected the offer. The Rural Bank demanded that the spouses Surtida vacate that portion of Lot 1635 which the spouses Surtida had ceded to it. The spouses Surtida rejected the Rural Bank's demand. This prompted the Rural Bank to file a complaint against the spouses Surtida for unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial Court. For their part, the spouses Surtida filed a complaint against the Rural Bank in the RTC of Legazpi City for the annulment of the promissory notes, real estate mortgage, and dation in payment. They alleged that they had never secured any loan from the bank; the said deeds were fictitious; and they were made to sign the documents to enable it to avail of rediscounting facilities from the Central Bank of the Philippines. They further stated that they never appeared before the notary public, who appeared to have notarized the said documents. The trial court concluded, the real estate mortgage and the subsequent dation in payment purportedly executed by the spouses Surtida was without any consideration. According to the CA, however, the spouses Surtida's claim that the assailed documents were executed merely to accommodate the Rural Bank is belied by the testimonial and documentary evidence on record. The spouses Surtida received the net proceeds of the loans as shown by their signatures at the dorsal portion of the cashier's checks. Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees executed the Dation in Payment without any protestation. Issue: Whether the Decision and Resolution of the CA are in accord with the evidence and the law. Held: Yes. Petitioners' bare denial that they had secured several loans from respondent cannot prevail over the testimonial and documentary evidence presented in the trial court. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. A presumption may operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut it. The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to create the necessity of presenting evidence to meet the legal presumption or the prima facie case created thereby, and which if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is, but by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted. The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by the bare uncorroborated and self-serving assertion of petitioners that it has no consideration. To overcome the presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by preponderance of evidence. Petitioners failed to discharge this burden. The contracts of Dation in Payment were duly notarized. It was only after respondent filed its complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners that the latter filed their complaint in the RTC. Obviously, the complaint of petitioners in the RTC was intended to derail the complaint for unlawful detainer.

II. Presentation of Evidence A. Examination of Witnesses 1. People v. Go (Rape Case) Facts: Accussed Go and de los Reyes were charged two and three counts of rape, respectively, against Imelda Brutas. Initially, only Go was apprehended, while de los Reyes remained at large. Go was convicted of said crimes. Later, de los Reyes was apprehended. In his trial, the trial court allowed prosecution witnesses to merely affirm on direct examination their previous testimonies taken during the trial of Go. Accused-appellant de los Reyes questions the regularity of this procedure adopted by the trial court. Such proceeding, he contends, violated his right to confront and cross-examine said witnesses. Issue: Whether or not the procedure adopted by the trial court in allowing prosecution witnesses merely to affirm on direct examination their previous testimonies during the trial of Go, to which de los Reyes is not a party, violated the latters right to confront and cross-examine said witness. Held: Yes. In People v. Estenzo, after the therein accused had testified, the defense counsel manifested that for the subsequent witnesses, he was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters therein and on all matters pertinent and material thereto. SC held that such procedure violated Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the then Revised Rules of Court, which required that the testimonies of witnesses be given orally. The Court elaborated that the main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity o f cross-examination. Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules requires that in determining the superior weight of evidence on the issues involved, the court, aside from the other factors therein enumerated, may consider the "witness manner of testifying" which can only be done if the witness gives his testimony "orally in open court." It is obvious that the purpose of these Rules, which is to protect the rights of litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts, may be subverted, and the orderly dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted, if trial judges are allowed to adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other than what is specifically authorized by the Rules of Court. The ruling in Estenzo was reiterated in Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan where, the Court held that the witness "should have been examined directly on the statements in her affidavit." The same rule applies in the present cases against accused-appellant de los Reyes where the prosecution witnesses were merely asked to confirm their testimonies given at the trial of another in which he took no part.

2. People v. Bisda (Kidnap for Ransom) Facts: Angela, the daughter of William Soriano, was kidnapped by the accused. The accused then called the Sorianos and told them that if they want to see their child again, they should prepare 5 million pesos. Later, through an informant, the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force was able to apprehend accused Alma Bisda. Later, co-accused Jenny Rose Basilan surrendered. In convicting them, the trial court relied on the testimony of the victim, Angela.

The appellants contend that the prosecution failed to establish that Angela understood the nature of an oath and the need for her to tell the truth must fail. Issue: Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish that Angela understood the nature of an oath and the need for her to tell the truth must fail. Held: No. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of evidence provides that the examination of witnesses shall be under oath or affirmation. An oath is defined as an outward pledge, given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The object of the rule is to affect the conscience of the witness and thus compel him to speak the truth, and also to lay him open to punishment for perjury in case he willfully falsifies. It cannot be argued that simply because a child witness is not examined on the nature of the oath and the need for her to tell the whole truth, the competency of the witness and the truth of her testimony are impaired. If a party against whom a witness is presented believes that the witness is incompetent or is not aware of his obligation and responsibility to tell the truth and the consequence of him testifying falsely, such party may pray for leave to conduct a voire dire examination on such witness to test his competency. The court may motu proprio conduct the voir dire examination ("To speak the truth." It may refer to a preliminary examination to ascertain whether he possesses the required qualifications, being sworn to make true answers). In United States v. Buncad, the SC held that when a child of tender age is presented as a witness, it is the duty of the judge to examine the child to determine his competency. And if a party admits proof to be taken in a case without an oath, after the testimony has been acted upon by the court, and made the basis of a judgment, such party can no longer object to the admissibility of the said testimony. He is estopped from raising the issue in the appellate court. In this case, Angela was six years old when she testified. She took an oath to "tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth" before she testified on direct examination. There was nary a whimper of protest or objection on the part of the appellants to Angela's competence as a witness and the prosecution's failure to propound questions to determine whether Angela understood her obligation and responsibility of telling the truth respecting the matter of her testimony before the court. The appellants did not even bother requesting the trial court for leave to conduct a voir dire examination of Angela. After the prosecution terminated its direct examination, the appellants thereafter cross-examined Angela extensively and intensively on the matter of her testimony on direct examination. It was only in this Court that the appellants raised the matter for the first time, that there was failure on the part of the prosecution to examine Angela on the nature of her oath, and to ascertain whether she had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong. It is too late in the day for the appellants to raise the issue.