Marcos vs Comelec The petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, applied as a candidate to contest elections to the House of Representatives in the district

of Leyte. The incumbent representative of the constituency of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo (a candidate for the same position) applied to Commission on Elections *COMELEC+ to have Imelda Romualdez-Marcoss application rejected on the grounds that it did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The constitutional requirement for residency for election purposes stated that in order to contest a position, the candidate must have resided in the location for which they are standing for a period of one year or more. The purpose of the provision was to prevent the possibility of strangers or newcomers who were unacquainted with the needs of a community standing for office. In her original application form, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos had stated that she had resided in Leyte for seven months. In response to the complaint fled by Cirilo Roy Montejo she amended the time of residency in her application from seven months to since childhood. She claimed that the entry of the word seven in her original Certifcate of Candidacy was the result of an honest misinterpretation, which she now sought to rectify. She further stated that she had always maintained Tacloban (in the district of Leyte) as her domicile or residence. COMELEC, after considering the petition of Cirilo Roy Montejo to have the candidacy of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos rejected, found the claim meritorious and refused the petitioners original application for candidacy and her amended version. COMELEC rejected the petitioners application for candidacy on the basis that her conduct revealed that she did not intend to make Tacloban her domicile, that she had registered as a voter in different places, and on several occasions had declared that she was a resident of Manila. COMELEC stated that although she spent her school days in Tacloban she had abandoned residency when she chose to stay and reside in other places. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court requesting a declaration that she had been a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time she applied to contest the 1995 elections. She argued that the meaning of residency in the Constitution, which designated the requirements for candidacy for election purposes, was that of domicile. She argued that she had domicile in Leyte because that was her place of original domicile and she had not acted to replace that domicile with another. She also argued that her marriage and changes of residency alongside her husband when he changed residency did not result in a change in her place of domicile. In support of that argument she claimed that section 69 of the Family Code 1988, which gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile, illustrates the intent of the Philippines Parliament to recognize the rights of women. She claimed therefore that since she had domicile in Leyte she automatically fulfilled the requirements for a one-year residency for election purposes. The respondents argued the meaning of residency in Article 110 of the Civil Code 1950 was the meaning that should be applied to the constitutional requirement for a one-year residency prior to qualifying for candidacy for the elections. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, they argued, had changed her residency to that of her husband upon her marriage and at the same time automatically gained her husbands domicile. After returning to Leyte she had resided there for only seven months and she therefore did not satisfy the one year requirement for candidacy. HELD: The majority of the Supreme Court (eight judges in favor, four against) held that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court held that the term residence in the context of qualifying for certain elected positions is synonymous with the term domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which one intends to return after an absence. A person can only have a single domicile, although they can abandon one domicile in favor of another. To successfully change domicile, one must demonstrate three (3) requirements: an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and one must act in accordance with that intent. Only with clear and positive evidence that all three requirements have been met will the residence of origin be lost, otherwise residency will be deemed to continue. The Court held that the meaning of residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code, which states that the husband shall fix the residence of the family, is different therefore to the meaning of residence in the Constitution. The term residence may have one meaning in civil law (as under the Civil Code) and another different meaning in political law as represented in the election requirements identified in the Constitution. Residency is satisfied under the Civil Code if a person establishes that they intend to leave a place when the purpose for which they have taken up their abode ends. The purpose of residency might be for pleasure, business, or health and a person may have different residences in various places. However, residency in the Constitution as opposed to the Civil Code means domicile and therefore the key issue is to determine the domicile of the petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. The Court held that Article 110 does not create a presumption that a wife automatically gains a husbands domicile upon marriage. When the petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos in 1954, she was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husbands actual place of residence as fixed by him. The right of the husband to fix the residence was in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family. It recognised the fact that the husband and wife bring into the marriage different domiciles and if the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may live together. However, the term residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code does not mean domicile and therefore it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The Court also held that it would be illogical for the Court to assume that a wife cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband, if she has not positively selected a new one during the subsistence of the marriage itself. The Court held that the new Family Code, which was introduced to replace the Civil Code, confirmed the petitioners argument that marriage does not automatically change a wifes domicile to that of her husband. The Family Code replaced the term residence (used in the Civil Code) with the term domicile. Article 69 of the Family Code gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile. The provision recognised revolutionary changes in the concept of womens rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. The provision recognised the right of women to choose their own domicile and removed the automatic transfer of a husbands domicile to his wife. Aquino vs. Comelec

Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution Held: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. EN BANC

[G.R. No. 157870, November 03, 2008] SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), PETITIONER, VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No. 158633] ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No. 161658] AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. DECISION VELASCO JR., J.: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows: SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: (c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x; (d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test; (g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test. In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act. G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections) On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follws: WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x (g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test. WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x. NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:] SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health. SEC. 3. x x x On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x. SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.Before the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate.No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states: SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency) In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions. G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency) Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees. The Issue on Locus Standi First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.[2] It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.[3] But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.[4] To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5] The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[6] There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165. The Consolidated Issues The principal issues before us are as follows: (1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and (2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power? Pimentel Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486) In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,[7] or alter or enlarge the Constitution. Pimentel's contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9] Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.[10] Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.[11] The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators. In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for noncompliance with the drug-testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever. While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance. It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and projects."[14] The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point: Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program.A drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions: School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.[15] The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure[16] under Sec. 2, Art. III[17] of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a statedecreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression. US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),[18] both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search. In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment[19] of the US Constitution. The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non-athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth[20] and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy constitutional. In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school students desiring to join extra-curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-testing policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non-athletes are entitled to more privacy. The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non-athletes on the basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non-athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug-testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage. In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the people,[21] particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a druginfested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost

everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"[23] has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.[24] Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration: The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.[25] The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities.[27] And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against `unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power.[29] As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.[30] And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.[31] In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question. The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?[32] The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place." For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.[33] In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the "need to know" basis;[34] that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results."[35] Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal. To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.[36] To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.[37] And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.[38] Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established. Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted. The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.[39] In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here. Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165) Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.[40] To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-15905

August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal. The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not. The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)

The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.1

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged. Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the communication began with the following paragraph: In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose. It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter says are "available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds: It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.) Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other operational technique the following: (a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;

(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in two (2) typewriters only" to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";

(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration; (d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique; (e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration. Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments". Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support. The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers. It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners". Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered. G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

SERGIO OSMEA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said

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members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him. The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads as follows: WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia; WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of Cebu stated the following:. The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose said office to contempt and disrepute; . . . . Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmea, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines. In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House. Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmea a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved on the same daybefore closing its sessionHouse Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months. Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committeewhose members are the sole respondentshad thereby ceased to exist. There is no question that Congressman Osmea, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.

Resolution No. 175 states in part: WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the dignity of the House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . . As previously stated, Osmea contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned

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and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate." Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.) For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign country. And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year. Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings. This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent. Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed. The situation might thus be compared to laws4 extending the period of limitation of actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any rate, court are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a particular measure."6

The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee: The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holt vs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888; McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.] It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the resolution, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)

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On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmea may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.) SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. The principle is well established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . . The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.]. The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language: Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do. We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere. Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in several instances, it took action against offenders, even after other business had been considered.9

Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective." The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator. It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the GovernorGeneral, who had appointed him. It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were granted to it by the Jones Law10; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercisedthe power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress

13

has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949. The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .) In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.12 Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic.13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15 At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and decisive. ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered. G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985

HOMOBONO ADAZA, petitioner, vs. FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent

ESCOLIN, J.:

The issues posed for determination in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order are: [1] whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously; and [2] whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.

The factual background of the present controversy is as follows:

Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Elected vice-governor for said province in the same elections was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.

On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while respondent lost.

Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 1 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office.

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On July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Ferdinand E. Marcos, 2 and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.

Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.

Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa elections; and since respondent had reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume the office of governor.

1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from holding any other office or employment in the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. ...

The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The only exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom or expediency of the said provision is a matter which is not within the province of the Court to determine.

A public office is a public trust. 3 It is created for the interest and the benefit of the people. As such, a holder thereof "is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office." 4 It is therefore of no avail to petitioner that the system of government in other states allows a local elective official to act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people in whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. It provides no exceptions save the two offices specifically cited in the above-quoted constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be said that within the purely parliamentary system of government no incompatibility exists in the nature of the two offices under consideration, as incompatibility is understood in common law, the incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than the constitution itself. In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has been discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oftmentioned constitutional provision, this fact operated to vacate his former post and he cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions.

2. The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that respondent Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner's election to the Batasan Pambansa. He maintains that respondent should be considered as having abandoned or resigned from the vice-governorship when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Batas Pambansa elections. The point pressed runs afoul of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law governing the election of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office." Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The reason the position of vicegovernor was not included in Section 13[2] of BP Blg. 697 is explained by the following interchange between Assemblymen San Juan and Davide during the deliberations on said legislation:

MR. DAVIDE. governors?

If I was able to get correctly the proposed amendment it would cover only governors and members of the different sanggunians? Mayor,

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MR. SAN JUAN.

Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunian or barangay officials. A vice-governor is a member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan.

MR. DAVIDE.

All. Why don't we instead use the word, "Local officials?

MR. SAN JUAN.

Well, Mr. Speaker, your humble representation ...

MR. DAVIDE.

And, secondly, why don't we include the vice-governor, the vice-mayors?

MR. SAN JUAN. Because they are members of the Sanggunians, Mr. Speaker. They are covered by the provision on members of sanggunian. [Record of Proceedings, February 20, 1984, p. 92, Rollo]

Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the Batas Pambansa elections, he was acting within the law. His succession to the governorship was equally legal and valid, the same being in accordance with Section 204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code, which reads as follows:

SECTION 204. Powers, Duties and Privileges:

1]

xxx

2]

He shall:

a] Assume the office of the governor for the unexpired term of the latter in the cases provided for in Section 48, paragraph 1 6 of this Code;

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED. Avelino vs. Cuenco On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Avelino. He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the next session however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Protempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?

There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.

**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.

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Justice Feria: (Concurring)

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business" and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words "of all the members" as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required "concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member" was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require "the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House". Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority. G.R. No. 22041 September 11, 1924

JOSE ALEJANDRINO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.

The petitioner in this original proceeding in mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor-General to represent the Twelfth Senatorial District. The respondents are Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate; Isabelo de los Reyes, Santiago Fonacier, Alejo Mabanag, Bernabe de Guzman, Ramon Fernandez, Emiliano T. Tirona, Antero Soriano, Juan B. Alegre, Vicente de Vera, Jose Ma. Arroyo, Francisco Enage, Tomas Gomez, Sergio Osmea, Celestino Rodriguez, Francisco Soriano, Jose A. Clarin, Hadji Butu, Espiridion Guanco, Hermenegildo Villanueva, Jose Hontiveros, Teodoro Sandiko, and Santiago Lucero, all members of the Philippine Senate; Faustino Aguilar, Secretary of the Philippine Senate; Bernabe Bustamante, Sergeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate, and Francisco Dayaw, Paymaster of the Philippine Senate. The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, on February 5, 1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first of January, 1924. The resolution reads as follows: Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of the debate regarding the credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino; Resolved, further: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino be, as he is hereby, deprived of all of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments as such Senator during one year from the first of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-four; And, resolved, lastly: That the said Honorable Jose Alejandrino, being a Senator appointed by the Governor-General of these Islands, a copy of this resolution be furnished said Governor-General for his information. The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the order of suspension, into effect. By special appearance, the Attorney-General, in representation of the respondents, has objected to the jurisdiction of the court, and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same point. In order that an obvious angle to the case may not subsequently embarrass us, we desire first of all to say that looking through the form of the action to the substance, this is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the Philippine Senate against the Philippine Senate and certain of its official employees. May the Supreme Court of the Philippines Islands by mandamus and injunction annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position? Without, therefore, at this time discussing any of the other interesting questions which have been raised and argued, we proceed at once to resolve the issue here suggested.

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There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the Government of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to students of public law. It is here only necessary to recall that under our system of government, each of the three departments is distinct and not directly subject to the control of another department. The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other departments. With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised to find the general rule of mandamus to be, that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that there where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 222, 515; 18 R. C. L., 186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 190; French vs. Senate [1905], 146 Cal., 604; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass., 468; Ex parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs. Bolte [1889], 151 Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of Delegates [1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17 Colo., 156; State ex rel. Cranmer vs. Thorson [1896], 33 L. R. A., 582; People ex rel. Billings vs. Bissell [1857], 19 Ill., 229; People ex rel. Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., 441; People ex rel. La Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612.) The authorities which support the doctrines above announced are numerous and instructive. They are found among the decisions of our own court, of the United States Supreme Court, and of other jurisdictions. If some of these cases relate to the chief executive rather than to the legislature, it is only necessary to explain that the same rules which govern the relations of the court to the chief executive likewise govern the relations of the courts to the legislature. The controlling case in this jurisdiction on the subject is Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros ([1910], 16 Phil., 366). This was an original application made in this court praying for a writ of mandamus to the Governor-General to compel him to call a special election as provided by law. The Attorney-General demurred to the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the court, after an elaborate discussion, reached the conclusion that "we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these Islands, as the head of the executive department, in the performance of any of his official acts." The demurrer was accordingly sustained and the complaint dismissed. It is noted that in this decision reliance was placed on the cases of Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord ([1867], 4 Wall., 475, and Sutherland vs. Governor ([1874], 29 Mich., 320), which we will now proceed to notice. State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, supra, concerned a bill praying the United States, Supreme Court to enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General Commanding in the District of Mississippi and Arkansas from executing certain Acts of Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivering the opinion of the court said the single point which required consideration was this: Can the President be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional? He continued: The Congress is the Legislative Department of the Government; the President is the Executive Department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the Judicial Department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance. The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon consideration of its possible consequences. Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the court and refuses to execute the Acts of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur between the Executive and Legislative Departments of the Government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And in that case could this court interfere in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public wonder of an attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in that court? These questions answer themselves.

We are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us. It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if the relief sought cannot be had against Andrew Johnson, as President, it may be granted against Andrew Johnson, as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is plain that relief as against the execution of an Act of Congress by Andrew Johnson, is relief against its execution by the President. . . . Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan, supra, well known to the legal fraternity on account of being written by Judge Cooley, related to an application for mandamus to the Governor to compel him to perform a duty imposed upon him by statute. Judge Cooley, in part, said: . . . Our government is on whose powers have been carefully apportioned between three distinct departments, which emanate alike from the people, have their powers alike limited and defined by the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their respective spheres of action equally independent.

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It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all respects independently of the others, and that what are called the checks and balances of government constitute each a restraint upon the rest. . . . But in each of these cases the action of the department which controls, modifies, or in any manner influences that of another, is had strictly within its own sphere, and for that reason gives no occasion for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The Legislature in prescribing rules for the courts, is acting within its proper province in making laws, while the courts, in declining to enforce an unconstitutional law, are in like manner acting within their proper province, because they are only applying that which is law to the controversies in which they are called upon to give judgment. It is mainly by means of these checks and balances that the officers of the several departments are kept within their jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any case, and power is usurped or abused, the remedy is by impeachment, and not by another department of the government attempting to correct the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the constitution is its equal. It has long been a maxim in this country that the Legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such judgments after they have been rendered. If it could, constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the Legislature could in like manner override executive action also, the government would become only a despotism under popular forms. On the other hand it would be readily cancelled that no court can compel the Legislature to make or to refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any action whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws. In these cases the exemption of the one department from the control of the other is not only implied in the framework of government, but is indispensably necessary if any useful apportionment of power is to exist.

It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the relators that any other course than that which leaves the head of the executive department to act independently in the discharge of his duties might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts, if not to something worse, should the courts undertake to enforce their mandates and the executive refuse to obey. . . . And while we should concede, if jurisdiction was plainly vested in us, the inability to enforce our judgment would be no sufficient reason for failing to pronounce it, especially against an officer who would be presumed ready and anxious in all cases to render obedience to the law, yet in a case where jurisdiction is involved in doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of the court to pronounce judgments which may be disregarded with impunity, nor with that of the executive to place him in position where, in a matter within his own province, he must act contrary to his judgment, or strand convicted of a disregard of the laws. We only take space to notice on more case, which concerns specifically the right of the judiciary to control by mandamus the action of the legislature. French vs. Senate of the State of California, supra, was an original proceeding in mandamus brought by the petitioners who were duly elected senators of the state to compel the Senate of California to admit them as members thereof. It was alleged that the petitioners had been expelled without hearing or opportunity for defense. The writ was denied, Mr. Justice Shaw delivering the opinion of the court, saying: Even if we should give these allegations their fullest force in favor of the pleader, they do not make a case justifying the interposition of this court. Under our form of government the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of their house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the constitution. . . . There can be noted as specific corroborative authority, State vs. Bolte, supra, Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury ([1923], 262 U. S., 447), the latest expression of opinion by the United States Supreme Court. The record discloses that it was the firm opinion of the late Chief Justice that the court should not assume jurisdiction of the proceedings. So as to be perfectly fair to the petitioner, it is but proper to state that the principles laid down in some of the preceding authorities have been the subject of adverse criticism. It is said that the fallacy of the argument lies in the statement that the three departments of the government are independent of each other. "They are independent in so far as they proceed within their legitimate province and perform the duties that the law requires; yet it has never been held that the executive was the sole judge of what duties the law imposes upon him, or the manner in which duties shall be exercised. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." (2 Bailey on Mandamus, pp. 926-927.) But these were arguments which should have been presented years ago in this court, and which when recently presented by counsel in his argument for the petitioner in the case of Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No. 20867, 1 met with no favorable response from the court. It is now too late to go back and revise previous decisions and overturn them; in fact this would be not only impracticable but impossible since at least two decision of the United States Supreme Court seem to us to be controlling. No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold that it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular action. If a court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on the domain of either of the other departments, it will be the end of popular government as we know it in democracies. It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference to the right of the Supreme Court to issue mandamus directed to the Philippine Senate, yet we would be justified in having our mandate run not against the Philippine Senate or against the President of the Philippine Senate and his fellow Senators but against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Senate. But this begs the question. If we have no authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, we might

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have the spectable presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95 Mich., 314; Abueva vs. Wood, supra.)

The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing difficulty. On the one hand, no consideration of policy or convenience should induce this court to exercise a power that does not belong to it. On the other hand, no consideration of policy or convenience should induce this court to surrender a power which it is its duty to exercise. But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should not be awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should not be awarded where mischievous consequences are likely to follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts or which might be disregarded with impunity. This court should offer no means by a decision for any possible collision between it as the highest court in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a branch of a coordinate department, or between the Court and the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive and the Legislature. On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the GovernorGeneral." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature. It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not in all its long history suspended a member. And the reason is obvious. Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filed but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the Organic Law. This was, in effect, our holding in the comparatively recent case of Concepcion vs. Paredes ([1921], 42 Phil., 599), when we had under particular consideration a legislative attempt to deprive the Chief Executive of his constitutional power of appointment. What was there announced is equally applicable to the instant proceedings. While what has just been said may be unnecessary for a correct decision, it is inserted so that the vital question argued with so much ability may not pass entirely unnoticed, and so that there may be at least an indication of the attitude of the court as a restraining force, with respect to the checks and balances of government. The Supreme Court, out of respect for the Upper House of a coordinate branch of the government, takes no affirmative action. But the perfection of the entire system suggests the thought that no action should be taken elsewhere which would constitute, or even seem to constitute, disregard for the Constitution. Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend on appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It would hardly be becoming for the judiciary to assume the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of legislation and of administration giving heed to those who have grievances against the Legislature and the Chief Executive. We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered. US vs. Pons Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case. Arroyo vs. De Venecia Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

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Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution)* which has been considered as an **enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. Petitioners pray that the said resolution be prevented. Respondents argue that the same can no longer be prevented as entered in the Journals. The Journal of each house is conclusive to the courts.

*this is in contrast to Art 15 of the Constitution as well

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.

HELD: If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification. There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification. On the other hand, as far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez and Mathay

FACTS:

On July 1, 1959, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2609 (Foreign Exchange margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc., a manufacturer of resin glues, had bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde raw materials for the said glues and were thus paying for the margin fees required.

Relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the said bank declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from the said fee, the petitioner sought for a refund of the margin fees that had been paid. This was denied by the Auditor of the said Bank stating that the claim was not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of R.A. 2609.

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ISSUE: Whether urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee

HELD/RULING:

Urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from law.

The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:

xxx

xxx

xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. (Emphasis provided.)

Urea formaldehyde is different from urea and formaldehyde, the former being a finished product. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. The courts cannot speculate that there had been an error in the printing of the bill as this shall violate the principle of separation of powers. Shall there have been any error in the printing, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. PJA vs. Prado

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Facts: Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the constitutionality of Sec 35 of RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its being discriminatory because of withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the President, the VP, members of Congress, the Comelec, former Presidents, and the National Census and Statistics Office. Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as the franking privilege has also been withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language, the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Historical Commission, the AFP, the AFP Ladies Steering Committee, the City and Provincial Prosecutors, the Tanodbayan (Office of the Special Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay, the Commission on the Filipino Language, the Provincial and City Assessors, and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354 Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional. The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee.

In the SCs view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. Astorga vs. Villegas In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said law passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly enacted.

HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made

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into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body Farinas vs. Exec Sec NATURE OF THE CASE: Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides: SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006. The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus: SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that *t+his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective. Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers: Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy. ISSUES: W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider. W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

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W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that *t+his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective. HELD: To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effect immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule: ... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended. Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation. In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case. Abbas vs. SET

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This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed. On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga. On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the same contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the motion for disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now complained of. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the hearings and deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET Case No. 00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another contest filed by Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party in the two cases. The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought. We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers. Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hall be its Chairman. It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." 1 The other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court. Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators. To our mind, this is the overriding considerationthat the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

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It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively. Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Separate Opinions FELICIANO, J.:, concurring: I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his opinion for the Court. I would merely like to carry forward however slightly the analysis found in the penultimate paragraph of his opinion. Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal would result that would be balanced between the three (3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still constitute more than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the considerations of public policy and fair play raised by petitioners and the constitutional intent above noted concerning the mixed "judicial" and "legislative" composition of the Electoral Tribunals would appear to be substantially met and served. This denouement, however, must be voluntarily reached and not compelled by certiorari. G.R. No. 84297 December 8, 1988

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LORENZO G. TIMBOL, respondents. Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC resolution before this Court in a petition entitled "Carmelo F. Lazatin v. The Commission on Elections, Francisco R. Buan, Jr. and Lorenzo G. Timbol," docketed as G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on January 25, 1988, the Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as HRET an election protest, docketed as Case No. 46. Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it had been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by private respondent. A. The Main Case This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeks the annulment and setting aside of (1) the resolution of the HRET, dated May 2, 1988, in Case No. 46, holding that the protest filed by private respondent had been filed on time, and (2) its July 29, 1988 resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

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Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of the HRET while the private respondent filed his comment with a motion to admit counter/cross petition and the petitioner filed his consolidated reply. Thereafter, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition, taking the comments filed as the answers to the petition, and considered the case submitted for decision. Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing protests in the HRET. Should Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondent's election protest would have been filed out of time. On the other hand, if Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable, the filing of the protest would be timely. Succinctly stated, the basic issue is whether or not private respondent's protest had been seasonably filed. To support his contention that private respondent's protest had been filed out of time and, therefore, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it, petitioner relies on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides: Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. [Emphasis supplied.] Petitioner argues that even assuming that the period to file an election protest was suspended by the pendency of the petition to annul his proclamation, the petition was filed out of time, considering that he was proclaimed on May 27, 1987 and therefore private respondent had only until June 6, 1987 to file a protest; that private respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation on May 28, 1987 and the period was suspended and began to run again on January 28, 1988 when private respondent was served with a copy of the decision of the Court in G.R, No. 80007; that private respondent therefore only had nine (9) days left or until February 6, 1988 within which to file his protest; but that private respondent filed his protest with the HRET only on February 8, 1988. On the other hand, in finding that the protest was flied on time, the HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to wit:

Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed at the post office as registered matter addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal, together with twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each protestee, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these Rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation. Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections filed with the Secretary of the House of Representatives and transmitted by him to the Chairman of the Tribunal shall be deemed filed with the tribunal as of the date of effectivity of these Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof. [Emphasis supplied.] Thus, ruled the HRET: On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest should have been filed within fifteen (15) days from November 22, 1987, or not later than December 7, 1987. However, on September 15, 1987, the COMELEC acting upon a petition filed by the Protestant (private respondent herein), promulgated a Resolution declaring the proclamation void ab initio. This resolution had the effect of nullifying the proclamation, and such proclamation was not reinstated until Protestant received a copy of the Supreme Court's decision annulling the COMELEC Resolution on January 28, 1988. For all intents and purposes, therefore, Protestee's (petitioner herein) proclamation became effective only on January 28, 1988, and the fifteen-day period for Protestant to file his protest must be reckoned from that date. Protestant filed his protest on February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days after January 28. The protest, therefore, was filed well within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of this Tribunal. (Rollo, p. 129.] The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it. Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in unambiguous terms and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read together with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides that the COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973 Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the 1973 Constitution there was no provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC. That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election ode, as far as contests regarding the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)]. Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the conduct of the election were generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11, 1987. It must be emphasized, however, that such does not necessarily imply the application of all the provisions of said code to

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each and every aspect of that particular electoral exercise, as petitioner contends. On the contrary, the Omnibus Election Code was only one of several laws governing said elections. * An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders specifically applicable to the May 11, 1987 congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within which to file election protests in the respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether the rules governing the exercise of the Tribunals' constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute. The Court is of the considered view that it may not. The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms:

... [The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. [At p. 177; emphasis supplied.] A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted either to the legislative body itself [i.e., the Philippine Assembly under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Senate and the House of Representatives under the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law)] or to an independent, impartial and nonpartisan body attached to the legislature [i.e., the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution and the Electoral Tribunals under the amended 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions]. Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative body. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states it in this wise: See. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 1621. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 1401. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the powers of the three branches of government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the legislature in an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, supra]. It was only under the 1973 Constitution where the delineation between the powers of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional experimentation that the jurisdiction over election contests involving members of the Legislature was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of elections for all elective national and local officials. That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully to the Electoral Tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, consonant with the return to the separation of powers of the three branches of government under the presidential system, is too evident to escape attention. The new Constitution has substantially retained the COMELEC's purely administrative powers, namely, the exclusive authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections; to deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities for election purposes; to register political parties and accredit citizens' arms; to file in court petitions for inclusion and exclusion of voters and prosecute, where appropriate, violations of election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making power. In this sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code are fully applicable, except where specific legislation provides otherwise. But the same cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide

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election contests. This has been trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution. Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself. Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case. B. Private-Respondent's Counter/Cross Petition Private respondent in HRET Case No. 46 prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner herein from discharging his functions and duties as the Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the pendency of the protest. However, on May 5, 1988, the HRET resolved to defer action on said prayer after finding that the grounds therefor did not appear to be indubitable. Private respondent moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the HRET on May 30, 1988. Thus, private respondent now seeks to have the Court annul and set aside these two resolutions and to issue a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction on the premise that the grounds therefor are too evident to be doubted. The relief prayed for in private respondent's counter/cross petition is not forthcoming. The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. Necessarily, the determination of whether or not there are indubitable grounds to support the prayer for the aforementioned ancilliary remedies also lies within the HRETs sound judgment. Thus, in G.R. No. 80007, where the Court declined to take cognizance of the private respondent's electoral protest, this Court said: The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Moreover, private respondent's attempt to have the Court set aside the HRET's resolution to defer action on his prayer for provisional relief is undeniably premature, considering that the HRET had not yet taken any final action with regard to his prayer. Hence, there is actually nothing to review or and and set aside. But then again, so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier, the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and "excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same." (Lachica v. Yap, supra, at 143.] As early as 1938 in Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429, 431 (1938)), the Court declared that '[the judgment rendered by the [Electoral] Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." Under the 1987 Constitution, the scope of the Court's authority is made explicit. The power granted to the Court includes the duty "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government (Art. VIII, Sec. 11. Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's collective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private respondent's Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED. .R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011

RENALD F. VILANDO, Petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES, Respondents. This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the March 24, 2010 Decision1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the petitions for quo warranto and declaring private respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of Negros Oriental and its Resolution2 dated May 17, 2010, denying the motion for reconsideration.

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In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras. On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec Resolution No. 80623 issued on May 18, 2007. On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which reached the Court. The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis Biraogo (G.R. No. 179120);4 Olivia Paras (G.R. Nos. 17913233);5 and Renald F. Vilando (G.R. Nos. 179240-41).6 These three (3) petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong (G.R. Nos. 178831-32) assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases against her.

On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack. On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives. Pertinent portions of the HRET decision reads: By and large, petitioners failed to satisfy the quantum of proof to sustain their theory that respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified as Representative of the First District, Negros Oriental. This being so, their petitions must fail. WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DISMISSES the instant petition for lack of merit and declares that respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental. As soon as the Decision becomes final and executory, notice of copies thereof shall be sent to the President of the Philippines, the House of Representatives through the Speaker, the Commission on Audit through the Chairman, pursuant to Rule 96 of the 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Chairman, Commission on Elections, for his information and appropriate action. SO ORDERED. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET in its Resolution dated May 17, 2010. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando anchored on the following GROUNDS: THE ONE-SIDED RESOLUTION OF THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO AND THE UTTER FAILURE OF THE HRET TO DISQUALIFY LIMKAICHONG AS MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DESPITE MANIFEST EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS NOT A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN IS WHIMSICAL, CAPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARY BECAUSE: 1. THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO DOES NOT OPERATE AS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF LIMKAICHONGS FATHER FOR THE REASON THAT HER FATHERS CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION IS OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, HENCE, THERE IS ACTUALLY NOTHING BEING ATTACKED OR ASSAILED BY THE SAME.

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2. LIMKAICHONG CANNOT DERIVE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FROM HER MOTHER GIVEN THAT AT THE TIME OF HER BIRTH, HER MOTHER IS NOT ALREADY A FILIPINO CITIZEN AS A RESULT OF HER MARRIAGE TO HER FATHER AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 1 (7) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 2 (1) CHAPTER II OF THE CHINESE REVISED NATIONALITY LAW OF FEBRUARY 5, 1959. 3. HAVING THE PLENARY, ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE, AMONG OTHERS, THE QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE HRET CAN LOOK INTO THE ELIGIBILITY OF LIMKAICHONG EVEN IF, AS AN INCIDENT THERETO, IT WOULD MEAN LOOKING INTO THE VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION.8 It should be noted that Limkaichongs term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. As such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold office has been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of her term. Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.9 Thus, the petition may be dismissed for being moot and academic.

Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, a supervening event, in a sense, has also rendered this case moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness. 10

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime.11 For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This position finds support in the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."12 The question on Limkaichongs citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition. In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives. Vilandos argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichongs father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is devoid of merit. In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.13 The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs father should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. As held in Limkaichong v. Comelec,14 thus: As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,15 where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and not in the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held that: x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case. Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant. Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of naturalization. True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Rule 14 thereof restates this duty, thus: Rule 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

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Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.16 The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.17 Such power is regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.18 Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible. The HRET properly resolved the issue with the following ratiocination:

xxx We note that Jocelyn C. Limkaichong, not the father Julio Ong Sy, is the respondent in the present case. The Tribunal may not dwell on deliberating on the validity of naturalization of the father if only to pursue the end of declaring the daughter as disqualified to hold office. Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said issue, it cannot do so because its jurisdiction is limited to the qualification of the proclaimed respondent Limkaichong, being a sitting Member of the Congress. Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the naturalization proceedings for a determination of the citizenship of the ascendant of respondent. A petition for quo warranto is not a means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo warranto proceeding will not only be a clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also a blatant violation of due process on the part of the persons who will be affected or who are not parties in this case.19 Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote that "a collateral attack against a judgment is generally not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals."20 Under the present situation, there is no evidence to show that the judgment is void on its face: As to the Order of the CFI, Negros Oriental dated July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 that were offered in evidence, far from proving an invalid oath of allegiance and certificate of naturalization, being public records, they do in fact constitute legitimate source of authority for the conferment of status of the father of respondent as naturalized Filipino. Absent any contrary declaration by a competent court, the Tribunal presumes the validity of the CFI Orders of July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959, and the resulting documentations of Julio Sys acquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization as valid and of legal effect. The oath of allegiance and certificate of naturalization are themselves proofs of the actual conferment of naturalization.21 The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.

Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof, reads: Article IV Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. Indubitably, with Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father. Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen: Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong finds support in paragraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.

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Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship, respondent can be considered a natural born citizen of the Philippines, having been born to a mother who was a natural-born Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent was able to elect citizenship informally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voters affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution provisions, i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2, Article [IV] were enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred natural-born status. It was the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to treat equally those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority either before or after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, those who would elect Philippine citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV] of the 1987 Constitution are now, under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also natural-born Filipinos. The following are the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution:

Article IV Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.22 Vilandos assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, must likewise fail. As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship. Verily, Vilando failed to establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling. Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of Philippine citizenship. It is well to quote the ruling of the HRET on this matter, to wit: An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is not a Filipino citizen. It is obtained only when applied for. It is in a form prescribed by the agency and contains a declaration by the applicant of his or her personal information, a photograph, and physical details that identify the applicant. It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of change to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of registration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration. Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and much less like other public records referred to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of registration is not a public document that would be prima facie evidence of the truth of facts contained therein. On its face, it only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself or herself to registration. Therefore, there is no presumption of alienage of the declarant. This is especially so where the declarant has in fact been a natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or her status as such.23 1avvphi1

Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship.24 For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.25 Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.

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Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial interference. The only instance where this Court may intervene in the exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.26 In this case, there is no showing of any such arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere of its power when it dismissed the quo warranto petition. In fine, this Court finds sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the HRET which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of Limkaichong. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental. Bondoc vs. Pineda Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Bondoc is a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista Party. Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal. One member of the Electoral Tribunal, Juanito Camasura Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. jose Cojuangco (LDPs leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice Herrera. ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion? HELD: The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As the SC pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. And the tribunal was not supposed to comply with the proposal of the LDP. But since the HRET did then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the case.

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1.

Powers in general Express o Plenary legislative power (Sec. 1) o Non-legislative power Implied (e.g., power to punish for contempt) Inherent (e.g., determination of rules of proceedings; discipline of members; exercise of inherent powers: police power, taxation, and eminent domain) Composition Senate (Sec. 2) House of Representatives (Sec. 5) o District representatives o Party-list representatives Read RA 7941 (The Party-list Law) Party-List Jurisprudence 1. VFP vs. Comelec, Oct. 6, 2000 2. PM vs. Comelec, GR 164702, 3/15/06 3. Cibac vs. Comelec, GR 172103, 4/13/07 4. Banat vs. Comelec, GR 179271, 4/21/09

When constituted (See also Sec. 19) BOTH legislative (political) and judicial component: required Exclusive right to promulgate its own rules of procedure Generally: No appeal of decisions of Electoral Tribunals Expulsion of its members

2.

Legislative and Judicial Components of ETs 1. Abbas vs. SET, 166 SCRA 51 ETs Exclusive right to promulgate rules 1. Lazatin vs. HRET, 168 SCRA 391 Appeals from decisions of ETs 1. Aznar vs. HRET, G.R. 65000, 1/1/90

Expulsion of Members of ETs 1. Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792

3.

Qualifications (Sec. 3 & 6) Natural-born citizen Age Residence Additional qualifications: unconstitutional Meaning of Residence 1. Marcos vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300 2. Aquino vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 Additional Qualifications 1. Pimentel vs. Comelec (consolidated w/ SJS vs. DDB), GR 161658, 11/3/08

Significance of proportional representation 1. Taada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101

18.

Commission on Appointments (Sec. 19; See also Sec. 16, Art. VII) When constituted Meetings: only while Congress is in session o Effect of by-passing ad interim presidential appointments Effect of political realignments Proportional representation of the political parties

4.

Term of Office of the Members (Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 2, Art. XVIII; Sec. 7) Elections of members of Congress Salaries/Accounts of Members (Sec. 10 and 20) Parliamentary Immunities of the Members (Sec. 11) Privilege from arrest Privilege of speech and debate Parliamentary Immunity 1. Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 2. Osmena vs. Pendatun, supra

Effect of political realignment in CA composition 1. Daza vs. Singson, supra How to compute the proportional representation

5. 6. 7.

1. Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales,

8. 9.

Conflict of Interest (Sec. 12) Incompatible and Forbidden Offices (Sec. 13) Exception: ex oficio capacity 1. Adaza vs. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431

10.

Inhibitions and Disqualifications (sec. 14) 1. Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 33 Sessions (Sec. 15, Art. VI; See also Sec. 4 and 10, Art. VII) Officers [Sec. 16 (1)] Quorum [Sec. 16 (2)] 1. Avelino vs. Cuenco, supra Discipline of Members [Sec. 16 (3)] 1. Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra

11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

Journals [Sec. 16 (4)] Enrolled Bill doctrine Journals 1. US vs. Pons, 34 Phil 729 2. Arroyo vs. de Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 3. Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1

Enrolled Bill Doctrine 1. Casco vs. Jimenez, 7 SCRA 374 2. Tolentino vs. Sec., 235 SCRA 630 3. PJA vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 4. Astorga vs. Villegas, GR L-23475, 4/30/74 5. Farias vs. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003 16. 17. Adjournment (Sec. 15) The Electoral Tribunals (Sec. 17)

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