ASU 2011 Saudi DA Relations Resilient

ASU 2011 Steven Murray
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***Saudi Disad***
***Saudi Disad***.....................................................................................................................................................1
***Saudi Disad***..............................................................................................................................1
1NC Saudi DA............................................................................................................................................................4
1NC Saudi DA.....................................................................................................................................4

***Uniqueness***......................................................................................................................................................6
***Uniqueness***...............................................................................................................................6
UQ US-Saudi relations Low....................................................................................................................................6
UQ US-Saudi relations Low...........................................................................................................6

Relations UQ No one Trusts Anyone......................................................................................................................8
Relations UQ No one Trusts Anyone.............................................................................................8

***Links***................................................................................................................................................................9
***Links***.........................................................................................................................................9
2NC Link Wall............................................................................................................................................................9
2NC Link Wall....................................................................................................................................9

Link Democracy Assistance...................................................................................................................................10
Link Democracy Assistance..........................................................................................................10

Link Arab Spring....................................................................................................................................................11
Link Arab Spring...........................................................................................................................11

Link - Bahrain...........................................................................................................................................................13
Link - Bahrain...................................................................................................................................13
Bahrain Link UQ.......................................................................................................................................................14
Bahrain Link UQ..............................................................................................................................14

Link - Shiites in Bahrain...........................................................................................................................................15
Link - Shiites in Bahrain..................................................................................................................15

Link - Appeasing Iran...............................................................................................................................................16
Link - Appeasing Iran......................................................................................................................16

Link Egypt..............................................................................................................................................................17
Link Egypt......................................................................................................................................17
A/T: Relations Resilient Oil...................................................................................................................................18
A/T: Relations Resilient Oil..........................................................................................................18

A/T: Relations Resilient Security..........................................................................................................................19
A/T: Relations Resilient Security.................................................................................................19

***Impacts***..........................................................................................................................................................20
***Impacts***...................................................................................................................................20
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2NC Proliferation......................................................................................................................................................20
2NC Proliferation..............................................................................................................................20
Saudi Prolif Dominoes.............................................................................................................................................22
Saudi Prolif Dominoes.....................................................................................................................22

A/T: Deterrence.........................................................................................................................................................23
A/T: Deterrence.................................................................................................................................23
A/T: Saudi Prolif Inevitable......................................................................................................................................24
A/T: Saudi Prolif Inevitable.............................................................................................................24

A/T: Pakistan Gives the Bomb..................................................................................................................................25
A/T: Pakistan Gives the Bomb........................................................................................................25

A/T: Iran Prolif = Saudi Prolif inevitable.................................................................................................................26
A/T: Iran Prolif = Saudi Prolif inevitable......................................................................................26

Iran Prolif Good........................................................................................................................................................27
Iran Prolif Good................................................................................................................................27

Saudi Prolif Terrorism...........................................................................................................................................29
Saudi Prolif Terrorism................................................................................................................29

Impact - Terrorism....................................................................................................................................................30
Impact - Terrorism...........................................................................................................................30
Impact Dollar Heg..................................................................................................................................................31
Impact Dollar Heg.........................................................................................................................31

Ext: Relz key to dollar heg........................................................................................................................................33
Ext: Relz key to dollar heg...............................................................................................................33

EXT Oil Security...................................................................................................................................................34
EXT Oil Security............................................................................................................................34

Impact Regional Power Projection........................................................................................................................35
Impact Regional Power Projection..............................................................................................35

Impact Middle East Stability..................................................................................................................................36
Impact Middle East Stability........................................................................................................36

Impact China..........................................................................................................................................................37
Impact China..................................................................................................................................37
EXT China Fill-In..................................................................................................................................................39
EXT China Fill-In..........................................................................................................................39

***AFF Answers***................................................................................................................................................40
***AFF Answers***.........................................................................................................................40
Relations Low...........................................................................................................................................................41
Relations Low....................................................................................................................................41
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EXT No Link.........................................................................................................................................................42
EXT No Link..................................................................................................................................42
US-Saudi Relations Resilient....................................................................................................................................43
US-Saudi Relations Resilient...........................................................................................................43

EXT Relations Resilient: Oil and Security............................................................................................................44
EXT Relations Resilient: Oil and Security.................................................................................44

Saudi Prolif Good - Iran............................................................................................................................................46
Saudi Prolif Good - Iran..................................................................................................................46

Saudi Prolif Good - Stability.....................................................................................................................................47
Saudi Prolif Good - Stability...........................................................................................................47

EXT Saudi Prolif Inevitable...................................................................................................................................48
EXT Saudi Prolif Inevitable.........................................................................................................48

A/T: Saudi Prolif Incentive/Means........................................................................................................................49
A/T: Saudi Prolif Incentive/Means..............................................................................................49

A/T: Saudi Prolif Iran Alt Cause............................................................................................................................51
A/T: Saudi Prolif Iran Alt Cause.................................................................................................51

Prolif: Not Bad..........................................................................................................................................................52
Prolif: Not Bad..................................................................................................................................52

A/T: China Aggression.............................................................................................................................................53
A/T: China Aggression.....................................................................................................................53
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1NC Saudi DA
Unique Link - pushing democracy assistance will collapse US-Saudi relations Tarpley 2011 (Press TV interview with Webster Griffin Tarpley, author, journalist and lecturer from Washington,
June 18, "Saudi Arabia alarmed by US intentions" http://www.presstv.com/detail/189582.html, SRM) Webster Griffin Tarpley: Well, I think we have to start from the premise that the Saudi royal family is very afraid and they've been afraid of course for decades, but more recently they're very afraid because they've seen the Mubarak government brought down by a US-sponsored colored revolution run by Samantha Powell and Michael McDowell here from the National Security Council in the White House and they're horrified by that. So you could say that Saudi Arabia is in play and that's the big strategic factor at the present time. At the beginning of June we had a very interesting op-ed here in the Washington Post by Prince Turki al-Faisal saying that if the US blocks the creation of a Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly in September there would be disastrous consequences for US Saudi relations. And I take it that you look at Prince Bandar -- his trip to Pakistan and China -- Saudi Arabia is trying to find security solutions, which do not involve the US because they can see that the US is fomenting the troubles in Yemen; that the US has fomented the troubles in Bahrain -- both of those are means to destabilize the kingdom.
Relations decline over the Arab Spring will drive the Saudis to proliferate Guzansky July 1st, 2011 (Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at
Tel Aviv University. He joined INSS after serving at Israel's National Security Council; "TEHRAN TESTS SAUDIS' NERVE ON NUKES", LEXIS, SRM) UNTIL recently it appeared that US security guarantees would be a preferred alternative to Riyadh's pursuit of a nuclear option. However, the combination of Iran's steady nuclear progress and Riyadh's growing frustration with Washington's `Àrab Spring'' policies threaten to drive the Saudis in precisely this direction. As a leading Arab state and as Iran's ideological-religious rival and main competitor for regional influence, Saudi Arabia will find it difficult to sit quietly should Iran obtain military nuclear capability. The same week that the UN nuclear watchdog raised new concerns of `ùndisclosed nuclearrelated activities in Iran'' it was reported that Saudi Arabia was to build 16 nuclear reactors at a cost of more than $US300 billion.
Saudi prolif leads to fast regional prolif Center for Contemporary Conflict 2004 (Conference on WMD Proliferation in the Middle East: Directions and Policy Options in the New Century http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/si/si_3_8/si_3_8_ruj01.pdf)
James Russell from the Naval Postgraduate School presented an argument that the strategic problems facing Saudi Arabia are causing it to consider acquisition of nuclear capabilities in the context of upgrading and/or replacing its CSS-2 missiles bought from China in the late 1980s. Russell outlined a set of changing strategic circumstances, which are combining to bring the issue of nuclear and/or WMD proliferation into play in Riyadh. First, the U.S. relationship upon which Saudi Arabias security has been founded is in an uncertain state. Second, the region environment is becoming more threatening due to Irans nuclear aspirations and the prospect of a Shia-dominated state in Iraq. Third, internal politics in Saudi Arabia complicate and reduce the maneuver room available to the royal family in addressing its security conundrums. A decision by Saudi Arabia to go nuclear would cause a cascade of regional proliferation. Potential internal instability within the Kingdom also makes Saudi Arabia a particularly dangerous proliferation case. Rumors of Saudi involvement in Pakistans nuclear program, in addition to the existing relationship with China through the CSS-2 program are all suggestive of an interest in nuclear capabilities. Finally, U.S. policy options appear limitedthe United Stated cannot push Saudi Arabia too far away or hold it too close. Discussions of the issue raised the question, Are Saudi nuclear noises used as a means to ensure U.S. engagement?
Rapid prolif causes pre-emptive nuclear war. Heurlin 2005 (Jean Monnet Professor of European Security and Integration at the Department of Political
Science of the University of Copenhagen, and Sten Rynning, "Missile defence", p 162-3) Arms control and non-proliferation regimes have often been criticized for delaying but not preventing proliferation. However, delay may be worth while, as rapid proliferation in principle creates the most
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dangerous situations. Kenneth Waltz argued, in his famous and controversial |981 article, that more nuclear proliferation might be a better option than less, because the possession of nuclear weapons tends to make the politicians in charge more responsible and reduce the risk of war. Yet Waltz also argued that rapid proliferation is extremely dangerous, as it encourages pre-emptive strikes in order to prevent the proliferation as well as leaving the nuclear newcomers without the necessary security measures. By 2004, the basic Waltzian argument on the positive effects of proliferation still holds for major powers. However, we have had negative experiences in the Middle East with respect to the use of non-nuclear WMD, and terrorists have appeared on the international stage. Terrorists are actors different from states and governments, and except for nationalist terrorist groups, they do not have territories to defend. They are thus comparatively free to act in the era of proliferation, and a broad range of counter-proliferation measures are therefore to be preferred in addition to the cost-enhancing MD project.
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***Uniqueness*** UQ US-Saudi relations Low

Relations on the brink because of SQ democracy promotion Washington Post 2011 (7-14, "The Saudi Threat", LEXIS, SRM)
Prince Turki is not now in the government. Yet he is a member of the Saudi royal family and was once the kingdom's intelligence chief and its former ambassador to both London and Washington. The man is solidly credentialed. He is also angry as hell, and he lets America have it. He starts by citing what he calls President Obama's "controversial speech last month, admonishing Arab governments to embrace democracy and provide freedom to their populations." Saudi Arabia, he wrote, heard what Obama said and took it "seriously," and he noted, of course, that Obama had not demanded the same rights for Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Point taken. But the same kingdom that has taken Obama "seriously" is an absolute monarchy that, among other things, bans women from driving cars. It is also a country that offers no freedom of religion but offers, for the occasional criminal, a public beheading. Given that Turki has spent a good deal of time in the West, it's not possible that he was unaware that commentators like me would be picky about the lack of basic freedoms. He doesn't care. Indeed, that was the point. Turki - and by implication all of Saudi Arabia - has had it with the United States. The kingdom will not be lectured to. It is sick and tired of American favoritism to Israel - the exuberant congressional reception for Binyamin Netanyahu, for example - and the administration's decision to oppose any effort in the United Nations to create a Palestinian state. In this matter, America is doing what Israel wants.
Relations on the brink Financial Times 2011 (June 16, "Arab spring tests US-Saudi relationship"
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4082dc70-984d-11e0-ae45-00144feab49a.html#axzz1SlOYMHrW, SRM) Indeed, the two remain in sync on many issues ensuring stability in Yemen, combating al-Qaeda and containing Iran. And the military co-operation remains close. The Saudis are pressing ahead with a $60bn deal to buy arms and F-15 fighter jets, while the US is training a facilities security force to protect the kingdoms vital oil infrastructure. Its a fraught but critical relationship, said David Rothkopf, a foreign policy analyst and former Clinton administration official. My sense is that theyre trying to manage it because of what they used to call during the Thatcher era the Tina phenomenon There Is No Alternative.
Relations rocky Jerusalem Post, 2010 ("Saudi prince blasts US for not 'curbing' Israel" LEXIS, SRM)
Two days after the United States unveiled an arms deal with Saudi Arabia estimated at $60 billion, one of Riyadh's leading figures blasted the US for not living up to its commitments in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and not doing more to rein in Israel. "It has failed to curb the brutal Israeli policy of collective punishment, arbitrary arrests and killings," charged Prince Turki al-Faisal, former Saudi ambassador to the US and ex-director of Saudi intelligence. He also criticized American officials for not standing up to Israel, maintaining, "It is these officials who propose that the Netanyahu government should be rewarded for its intransigence rather than sanctioned." He said that Riyadh and other Arab countries had agreed to back the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations "under the United States-negotiated partial colony freeze" - whereby America had pushed Israel to impose a settlement freeze before talks started. That freeze expired on September 26, and Palestinians with the support of the Arab League have been unwilling to continue talks until the freeze is resumed. "The United States failed to stick to its assurances, and to add insult to injury, offered the Netanyahu government more money, arms, protection from UN sanctions and, shamefully, the stationing of Israeli troops on Palestinian territory as if the territory were part of American sovereign lands," Turki said of reported US proposals to get Israel to renew the freeze. Speaking to the annual conference of the National Council for US-Arab Relations, Turki also lambasted the Israel lobby, saying that "There has grown over the years a web of very tight and strong strings that bind the US to her client state, Israel." He led off his address, which followed a presentation on how Sesame Street uses muppets in children's television across the Middle East to foster tolerance and respect, by saying that puppets don't only appear on TV screens. "There are live human muppets in Washington here who are run by AIPAC, and unfortunately what they bring is war and suffering," he said. He also noted at the beginning of his
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remarks that some friends who had seen his speech suggested he be "princely," but that he had opted to go with "genuineness." In a talk dedicated to US-Saudi relations, he did praise America at times for its pursuit of peace and the good relations it has enjoyed with Riyadh. "Saudi Arabia's will and determination to continue its strong and fruitful relations with the United States [comes] not only because it is America which has shown the capability to bring Israeli craven ambitions to heel," he said, "but also because the United States has been a beacon of goodwill and progress to the rest of humanity and will continue to be so."
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Relations UQ No one Trusts Anyone

No one trusts anyone Bhalla, July 2011 (Reva, journalist for STRATFOR; Geopolitical Weekly: "The U.S.-Saudi Dilemma: Iran's
Reshaping of Persian Gulf Politics", http://www.rightsidenews.com/2011071914093/world/geopolitics/the-us-saudidilemma-irans-reshaping-of-persian-gulf-politics.html; SRM) The threat of a double-cross is a real one for all sides to this conflict. Iran cannot trust that the United States, once freed up, will not engage in military action against Iran down the line. The Americans cannot trust that the Iranians will not make a bid for Saudi Arabias oil wealth (though the military logistics required for such a move are likely beyond Irans capabilities at this point). Finally, the Saudis cant trust that the United States will defend it in a time of need, especially if the United States is preoccupied with other matters and/or has developed a relationship with Iran that it feels the need to maintain.
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***Links*** 2NC Link Wall

Not upsetting relations now, plan links Al-Masry Al-youm 2011 (march 3, Al-Masry Al-Youm for Journalism and Publication is an independent
Egyptian media organization established in 2003. "Egyptian democracy activists to urge Clinton to restrain Saudi Arabia" http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/354860 SRM) Egyptian democracy activists said on Tuesday that they will be urging US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to curb Saudi Arabias attempts to stop the democratic tide in the region. The activists are due to meet with Clinton during her forthcoming visit to Egypt, and are likely to raise the issue of troops sent by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to Bahrain to help it suppress an uprising. They fear Washington might turn a blind eye to the Saudi intervention so as not to jeopardize its relations with a strategic ally in a region that controls the global oil market. They also said that they and their counterparts in several Arab countries have noticed that Saudi Arabia has started to launch political and economic initiatives, as well as use the media, to thwart democratic revolutions in the region. One of the activists said that sending troops to Bahrain is an an example of how Saudi Arabia can use its economic power and its relations with Islamist groups to curb democracy in the Arab world. Another activist said: Washington should realize that such interventions by an ally will have an adverse effect on the way it handles the new situation in the region. The New York Times on Tuesday pointed to tension in US-Saudi relations against the backdrop of the latter intervening in Bahrain, adding that Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates had canceled a visit to Riyadh because of the matter. For its part, Saudi Arabia said it did not agree with the way the US administration has handled developments that led to the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak.
The key to relations has shifted from oil and security to democracy. Seriously. This evidence is awesome. Oil and Gas Journal, 2011 (March 28, "A 'proxy war' in Bahrain", LEXIS, SRM)
"The [friendly] relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia has been the key axis for the oil market over many decades," said Paul Horsnell, managing director and head of commodities research at Barclays Capital in London. "When an action by GCC governments elicits for different reasons an unveiled negative diplomatic response from the US and Iranian governments, that is so unusual an event it seems clear to us that something profound has changed in the normal dynamic. Indeed, events in Bahrain and the involvement of external forces there, in our view, potentially represent the evidence of a shift in the main parameters of key political and economic relationships in the region." Saudi King Abdullah was already furious at the haste of the US in abandoning Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak to his fate. The king returned from medical leave this month and has handed out billions of dollars in grants to stave off protestors.
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Link Democracy Assistance

Link - Democracy Assistance LA Times, 2001 (June 19, "U.S., Saudis in Mideast tug of war; Quest for greater influence intensifies as
uprisings in the region further drive a wedge between the longtime allies." LEXIS, SRM) The pivot has come after years of growing unhappiness with the U.S. approach to the region. Riyadh was alarmed when George W. Bush's administration allowed a Shiite-dominated government to take control in Iraq after an invasion it opposed. Saudi King Abdullah was outraged when President Obama urged Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to surrender power after 18 days of street demonstrations. The Saudis also have taken offense at other perceived slights, including a tough pro-reform speech by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in the Persian Gulf state of Qatar in January, in which she warned that the region's foundations are "sinking into the sand." The Saudis "are upset, they are frustrated, they are angry," said a former senior U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the Saudis' traditional reticence. "They don't know exactly what to do."
Disputes over democracy assistance hurt US-Saudi relations Bloomberg 2011 (July 17, "Arab Spring Pits Saudi Security Against U.S. Support for Change"
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-17/arab-spring-pits-saudi-security-concern-against-u-s-support-foruprisings.html; SRM) The Arab Spring might be turning chilly for the U.S.s alliance with Saudi Arabia. With the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and more Saudi oil sales to Asia, U.S. sway over Saudi Arabia has declined as their policies diverge, said Theodore Karasik, an analyst at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis. The popular uprisings in the Middle East this year tested their partnership by pitting U.S. support for democracy against Saudi Arabias desire for a status quo. Now, when push comes to shove, Saudi Arabia will pursue its own policies regardless of what the U.S and others think, Karasik said in a telephone interview from Dubai. Saudi Arabia backed former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak right to the end of his rule in February and sent troops to protect the Al Khalifa rulers in Bahrain. The U.S., which last year approved a $60 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia, called for a transition in Egypt and dialogue in Bahrain. President Barack Obamas government on June 16 put Bahrain on its list of human rights violators along with countries such as North Korea and Iran. The same day, Sheikh Khalid bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, a son of Bahrains King Hamad, signed a marriage contract with the daughter of Saudi King Abdullah. Saudi Arabia wasnt happy with the way the Obama administration dealt with Hosni Mubarak, Khalid al-Dakhil, a Saudi political science professor, said in phone interview. They also disagreed over Bahrain.
Democracy push in the arab spring cause a US-Saudi rift Business Insider 2011 ("What's Really Happening In Bahrain And Why It Matters" LEXIS, SRM)
It appears Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are willing to go the distance in terms of crushing protests in the country. Iran will continue to flap its wings, but will likely be constrained from acting due to the high military costs of any endeavor. What is most uncertain now is whether the U.S. continues in its support for democracy in the region, or retools and focuses on stability. If U.S. leadership chooses the former, it could lead to some difficult rifts with the Saudis, and a potential opening for Iran in the region.
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Link Arab Spring

Interference in the Arab spring crushes US-Saudi relations, overwhelms oil ties Bloomberg 2011 (July 17, "Arab Spring Pits Saudi Security Against U.S. Support for Change"
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-17/arab-spring-pits-saudi-security-concern-against-u-s-support-foruprisings.html; SRM) A day before Mubarak ceded power to the military, Saudi Arabia denounced the flagrant interference of some countries in the internal affairs of Egypt, the Saudi Press Agency said, citing Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal. Since then, the officials in Riyadh have said little publicly about Egypt or Syria, where the government this month said the U.S. was trying to incite rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad. Clinton said on July 11 that Assad had lost his legitimacy to rule amid a crackdown on dissenters. The changing relationship with the U.S. is also a reflection of how Saudi Arabia has increasingly turned toward Asia to tap new oil markets and for business expansion. About 65 percent of the kingdoms 2009 daily exports of 6.27 million barrels went to Asia and the Pacific, while North America received 17 percent, OPEC said in its 2009 statistical bulletin. In 2008, Asia received 58 percent of Saudi exports, while North America got 22 percent.
Continued interference in the Arab spring will collapse US-Saudi relations Bloomberg 2011 (July 17, "Arab Spring Pits Saudi Security Against U.S. Support for Change"
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-17/arab-spring-pits-saudi-security-concern-against-u-s-support-foruprisings.html; SRM) The Saudi government said on July 11 after a discussion on the continuing crises that it is keen on the security, stability, unity and independence of Arab countries. The Saudi government doesnt want to see further instability in the Middle East, said Karasik in Dubai. Nawaf Obaid, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research & Islamic Studies in Riyadh, wrote in an editorial for the Washington Post in May that a tectonic shift has occurred in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. He argued that Saudi Arabia will chart its own policy after U.S. missteps in the region since Sept. 11 and its ill- conceived response to the Arab protest movement.
Arab spring could be the deciding factor in relations - swamps security Financial Times 2011 (June 16, "Arab spring tests US-Saudi relationship"
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4082dc70-984d-11e0-ae45-00144feab49a.html#axzz1SlOYMHrW, SRM) Still, Washington and Riyadh could be at a turning point in their 60-year relationship as the Arab spring has laid bare its contradictions. The wave of democracy spreading across the Middle East is widely viewed as good news in America, but the onset of dislocating change in the region is anything but good news for the Saudis. The US support for democratic change means we have become a source of insecurity rather than security for Saudi Arabia, Mr Miller said. The relationship is founded on the core understanding that the US will provide security for Saudi Arabia, which in return will do its part to keep oil prices stable. It has come under strain from the outset, notably when the US recognised the state of Israel in 1948.
US and Saudis competing over arab spring LA Times, 2011 (June 19, "U.S., Saudis in Mideast tug of war; Quest for greater influence intensifies as
uprisings in the region further drive a wedge between the longtime allies." LEXIS, SRM) Senior U.S. diplomats have been dropping by the royal palace in Amman almost every week this spring to convince Jordanian King Abdullah II that democratic reform is the best way to quell the protests against his rule. But another powerful ally also has been lobbying Abdullah -- and wants him to ignore the Americans. Saudi Arabia is urging the Hashemite kingdom to stick to the kind of autocratic traditions that have kept the House of Saud secure for centuries, and Riyadh has been piling up gifts at Abdullah's door to sell its point of view. The Saudis last month offered Jordan a coveted opportunity to join a wealthy regional bloc called the Gulf Cooperation Council, a move that would give the impoverished kingdom new investment, jobs and
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security ties. To sweeten the pot, the Saudis wrote a check for $400 million in aid to Amman two weeks ago, their first assistance in years. The quiet contest for Jordan is one sign of the rivalry that has erupted across the Middle East this year between Saudi Arabia and the United States, longtime allies that have been put on a collision course by the popular uprisings that have swept the region. "We do have a lot of friction there," said a U.S. official who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. "The 'Arab Spring' has injected tension into the relationship."
US-Saudi competition over the arab spring diminishes US-Saudi relations and undermines US influence in the middle east LA Times, 2011 (June 19, "U.S., Saudis in Mideast tug of war; Quest for greater influence intensifies as
uprisings in the region further drive a wedge between the longtime allies." LEXIS, SRM) The Obama administration has generally supported the protests, and urged the region's governments to share more power. But when President Obama demanded reform from Arab regimes in a major speech last month, he carefully avoided any mention of Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy that brooks little or no dissent. Riyadh, which believes the U.S. is turning its back on loyal allies, is trying to step out of America's shadow. It is embracing a foreign policy that often diverges from Washington's -- and sometimes seeks to undermine it. On the key political issues "the Obama administration doesn't really listen to the Saudi views," said Abdullah Askar, who is vice chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the king's Consultative Council, or Majlis Shura, in Riyadh. This shift doesn't mean the end of the 70-year-old U.S.-Saudi alliance, which is built on a simple foundation: Saudi oil for U.S. military protection. But it means a further loss of influence for Washington in the Middle East at a time when other crucial relations -- with Egypt and Turkey, for example -- are facing new strains. The Saudis, who see their own stability threatened in the region's unrest, have shelled out billions of dollars to neighbors in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain and elsewhere in hopes they will resist political change. Saudi Arabia is expanding and strengthening ties to its fellow Sunni monarchies, charting a new course on both Arab-Israeli issues and its campaign to contain Iran.
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Link - Bahrain
Saudis fear a democratic Bahrain Business Insider 2011 ("What's Really Happening In Bahrain And Why It Matters" LEXIS, SRM)
Iran is the chief Shia power in the Middle East, with more that 90% of its population claiming adherence to the religion. The country is just across the Persian Gulf from Bahrain, and Iran's leaders ruled Bahrain for a significant part of that country's history. But if you look at a broader picture of the region, you'll note that it's really a faceoff between two powers: Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran has rejected the presence of Saudi Arabian troops in Bahrain. They're calling for democratic reforms in the country, in line with what protesters are asking for. But for Saudi Arabia, this would be a disaster. If Bahrain was to become more democratic, it would surely become Shia led (remember, majority Shia), and infect its sphere of influence. Success in Bahrain could also spur on protesters in Saudi Arabia, who have demanded democratic reforms in the Kingdom.
Aid to Bahrainian revolution destroys US-Saudi relations American Spectator 2011 ("Achieving the Impossible"; EBSCO, SRM)
U.S.-Saudi relations, meanwhile, have deteriorated to their lowest point in decades because of Riyadh's belief that the Obama administration is inadvertently strengthening Tehran at its expense. When sectarian protests first flared in Bahrain in February, the White House called for formal negotiations between the country's Saudi-backed royal family and members of its Shiite majority. Saudi officials angrily told their American counterparts that the protesters were Iranian proxies and that Riyadh would never accept a Shiite-dominated government in Bahrain, according to U.S. officials. Saudi Arabia then dispatched armored vehicles to help the ruling Khalifa family put down the protests, ignoring Washington's calls for restraint. "The Saudis are as angry at us now as they've been at any point since the shah fell in 1979," said Gregory Gause, a Mideast expert at the University of Vermont. "Victory for the protesters [in Bahrain] would be seen as a victory for Iran. And they know that everyone in the Middle East would read it as a defeat for Saudi Arabia."
Saudi's are sending a clear message not to intervene in Bahrain Institutional Investor 2011 ("Have Gulf Leaders Recognized The Need For Change?" LEXIS, SRM)
The ruling powers have responded to the pressures with iron fists and open checkbooks. At Riyadh's prompting, the Gulf Cooperation Council, a regional alliance of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, sent troops to Bahrain to suppress protests against the regime of King Hamad bin-Isa al-Khalifa. The move recalled the approach of the former Soviet Union, says Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, who chaired President Barack Obama's strategic review of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009. By intervening, Riedel contends, Saudi Arabia "invoked a 21st-century version of the old Soviet Brezhnev doctrine, ruling out revolution in the kingdom's sphere of influence just like the Russians tried to outlaw freedom in Eastern Europe."
More evidence LA Times, 2011 (June 19, "U.S., Saudis in Mideast tug of war; Quest for greater influence intensifies as
uprisings in the region further drive a wedge between the longtime allies." LEXIS, SRM) The tension has been most visible in Bahrain, where Riyadh ignored U.S. warnings and sent more than 1,000 troops in mid-March to suppress Shiite-dominated demonstrations. Saudi officials view the protests as an effort by Iran to gain a foothold on their border, and they believe Washington has failed to see the threat. [CONTINUES] Steven A. Cook, a Mideast specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations, said Riyadh's forceful response in Bahrain "demonstrates the Saudis have absolutely no faith in our position on the region, and are going to look after their own interests in a way they know how."
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Bahrain Link UQ
US is being ambiguous towards Bahrain now IPS, 2011 ("WASHINGTON'S PATCHWORK POLICY ON DEMOCRACY" LEXIS, SRM)
Despite this rhetoric, some analysts see Obama's approach to the uprisings in the region not as conforming to a broad strategic vision, but as hinging on concessions to regional partners' "red lines" for reforms - as in Bahrain, where U.S. ally Saudi Arabia fears that a more politically inclusive regime will tempt Iran to expand its sphere of influence. In the case of Bahrain, the Obama administration has taken a decidedly different approach than in Libya or even Egypt. Despite the Bahraini government's crackdown on civilians and popular calls for political reform, including representative governance, the U.S. has acceded to the Khalifa regime's minimal concessions and taken an ambiguous position on the presence of Saudi troops in the country, which critics say has only exacerbated sectarian tensions.
Link UQ - Bahrain under the influence of Saudis now The Times London, 2011 ("Bahrain must not be allowed to crush its way back to respectability", LEXIS,
SRM) Bahrain is the home of the American Fifth Fleet, a vital strategic interest in the region. The country falls heavily under the sphere of influence of its much larger neighbour Saudi Arabia, with Saudi troops having crossed the King Fahd Causeway bridge in mind-March to help quell protests. While Bahrain's ruling family is Sunni, the majority are Shia, leading Bahraini and Saudi elites alike to fear the spreading influence of Shia Iran.
Saudi influence in Bahrain strong now Energy Compass, 2011 ("Bahrain: Foreign Intervention" LEXIS, SRM)
Riyadh used a mixture of threats, shame and handouts to deflate the proposed "Day of Rage" in Saudi Arabia last Friday. Emboldened by that flop, Saudi Arabia is pushing a more assertive solution to the Bahrain problem. Following Monday's troop deployment, Bahrain declared a three-month state of emergency on Tuesday, used local forces to drive protesters out of Pearl roundabout early Wednesday and then banned public demonstrations. Onlookers insist that Riyadh is not directly calling the shots; rather, Bahrain has decided it needs a more authoritarian solution -- backed by the Saudis -- after its US-supported policy of dialogue faltered. By the end of the week, the Peninsula Shield troops had not participated in the crackdown and were just protecting infrastructure. Last week, the GCC also pledged $20 billion in aid to Bahrain and Oman, another country wracked by protests ( EC Mar.4,p4 ).
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Link - Shiites in Bahrain

Supporting the Shia rebellion in Bahrain would collapse US-Saudi relations Bhalla, July 2011 (Reva, journalist for STRATFOR; Geopolitical Weekly: "The U.S.-Saudi Dilemma: Iran's
Reshaping of Persian Gulf Politics", http://www.rightsidenews.com/2011071914093/world/geopolitics/the-us-saudidilemma-irans-reshaping-of-persian-gulf-politics.html; SRM) Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia is greatly unnerved by the political evolution in Iraq. The Saudis increasingly will rely on regional powers such as Turkey in trying to maintain a Sunni bulwark against Iran in Iraq, but Riyadh has largely resigned itself to the idea that Iraq, for now, is in Tehrans hands. This is an uncomfortable reality for the Saudi royals to cope with, but what is amplifying Saudi Arabias concerns in the region right now and apparently nudging Riyadh toward the negotiating table with Tehran is the current situation in Bahrain. When Shiite-led protests erupted in Bahrain in the spring, we did not view the demonstrations simply as a natural outgrowth of the so-called Arab Spring. There were certainly overlapping factors, but there was little hiding the fact that Iran had seized an opportunity to pose a nightmare scenario for the Saudi royals: an Iranian-backed Shiite uprising spreading from the isles of Bahrain to the Shiite-concentrated, oil-rich Eastern Province of the Saudi kingdom. This explains Saudi Arabias hasty response to the Bahraini unrest, during which it led a rare military intervention of GCC forces in Bahrain at the invitation of Manama to stymie a broader Iranian destabilization campaign. The demonstrations in Bahrain are far calmer now than they were in mid-March at the peak of the crisis, but the concerns of the GCC states have not subsided, and for good reason. Halfhearted attempts at national dialogues aside, Shiite dissent in this part of the region is likely to endure, and this is a reality that Iran can exploit in the long term through its developing covert capabilities.
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Link - Appeasing Iran

US-Iran deal collapses relations with Saudis Bhalla, July 2011 (Reva, journalist for STRATFOR; Geopolitical Weekly: "The U.S.-Saudi Dilemma: Iran's
Reshaping of Persian Gulf Politics", http://www.rightsidenews.com/2011071914093/world/geopolitics/the-us-saudidilemma-irans-reshaping-of-persian-gulf-politics.html; SRM) The Saudis cannot fully trust U.S. intentions at this point. The U.S. position in Iraq is tenuous at best, and Riyadh cannot rule out the possibility of Washington entering its own accommodation with Iran and thus leaving Saudi Arabia in the lurch. The United States has three basic interests: to maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, to reduce drastically the number of forces it has devoted to fighting wars with Sunni Islamist militants (who are also by definition at war with Iran), and to try to reconstruct a balance of power in the region that ultimately prevents any one state whether Arab or Persian from controlling all the oil in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. position in this regard is flexible, and while developing an understanding with Iran is a trying process, nothing fundamentally binds the United States to Saudi Arabia. If the United States comes to the conclusion that it does not have any good options in the near term for dealing with Iran, a U.S.-Iranian accommodation however jarring on the surface is not out of the question.
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Link Egypt
Saudis are fighting against the Muslim Brotherhood LA Times, 2011 (June 19, "U.S., Saudis in Mideast tug of war; Quest for greater influence intensifies as
uprisings in the region further drive a wedge between the longtime allies." LEXIS, SRM) In Egypt, while U.S. officials urge reform, Riyadh has given Cairo $4 billion to maintain the status quo and to counter the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, a powerful Islamist organization. The Saudis fear the group could challenge the religious doctrine that provides legitimacy to the Saudi monarchy.
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A/T: Relations Resilient Oil

Oil won't sustain relations - Saudi shift to Asia Bloomberg 2011 (July 17, "Arab Spring Pits Saudi Security Against U.S. Support for Change"
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-17/arab-spring-pits-saudi-security-concern-against-u-s-support-foruprisings.html; SRM) Saudi Arabias independence from U.S. foreign policy is not just from the Arab Spring, but also from the fact that oil demand has shifted from the U.S. to China more and more each year, said Sullivan at Georgetown University. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC)s Chief Executive Officer Mohamed al-Mady said in May that the worlds largest petrochemical maker, plans further expansions in China. King Abdullah, 86, picked China as the first destination on his maiden foreign tour in January 2006, months after becoming king.
The drive for Saudi dominance trumps relations concerns LA Times, 2011 (June 19, "U.S., Saudis in Mideast tug of war; Quest for greater influence intensifies as
uprisings in the region further drive a wedge between the longtime allies." LEXIS, SRM) The United States and Saudi Arabia are drifting apart on energy too. For decades both countries saw mutual benefit in holding down oil prices. But now, with Riyadh stepping up foreign aid and embarking on a $130-billion domestic subsidy program to prevent internal unrest, it needs steeper oil prices. "In the old days, you could call them and ask them to do something about high oil prices," said Herman Franssen, former chief economist at the International Energy Agency, a 28-nation organization that seeks to ensure stable energy supplies. "They are not going to be dictated to by the United States anymore." This month, the Saudis announced that they would break from OPEC's consensus by increasing their oil output. Their motive was not, however, Obama's repeated public calls for price relief, but their own need for revenue, experts say. U.S. officials are clear that they intend to tread lightly because of their appreciation that upheaval in the world's largest oil exporter could upend a fragile world economy. Yet diplomatic delicacy will accomplish only so much to repair the relationship, and analysts expect to see the Saudis strike out again on their own.
Interference in the Arab spring crushes US-Saudi relations, overwhelms oil ties Bloomberg 2011 (July 17, "Arab Spring Pits Saudi Security Against U.S. Support for Change"
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-17/arab-spring-pits-saudi-security-concern-against-u-s-support-foruprisings.html; SRM) A day before Mubarak ceded power to the military, Saudi Arabia denounced the flagrant interference of some countries in the internal affairs of Egypt, the Saudi Press Agency said, citing Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal. Since then, the officials in Riyadh have said little publicly about Egypt or Syria, where the government this month said the U.S. was trying to incite rebellion against President Bashar alAssad. Clinton said on July 11 that Assad had lost his legitimacy to rule amid a crackdown on dissenters. The changing relationship with the U.S. is also a reflection of how Saudi Arabia has increasingly turned toward Asia to tap new oil markets and for business expansion. About 65 percent of the kingdoms 2009 daily exports of 6.27 million barrels went to Asia and the Pacific, while North America received 17 percent, OPEC said in its 2009 statistical bulletin. In 2008, Asia received 58 percent of Saudi exports, while North America got 22 percent.
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A/T: Relations Resilient Security

Arab spring could be the deciding factor in relations - swamps security Financial Times 2011 (June 16, "Arab spring tests US-Saudi relationship"
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4082dc70-984d-11e0-ae45-00144feab49a.html#axzz1SlOYMHrW, SRM) Still, Washington and Riyadh could be at a turning point in their 60-year relationship as the Arab spring has laid bare its contradictions. The wave of democracy spreading across the Middle East is widely viewed as good news in America, but the onset of dislocating change in the region is anything but good news for the Saudis. The US support for democratic change means we have become a source of insecurity rather than security for Saudi Arabia, Mr Miller said. The relationship is founded on the core understanding that the US will provide security for Saudi Arabia, which in return will do its part to keep oil prices stable. It has come under strain from the outset, notably when the US recognised the state of Israel in 1948.
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***Impacts*** 2NC Proliferation

Loss of relations with the US leads to Saudi prolif Feldman 2003 (Yana, Senior research analyst at FirstWatch International, Country Profile 8: Saudi Arabia Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute; http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/cnsc1sau.html) The strategic situation of Saudi Arabia is such that the Kingdom might consider a nuclear alliance with a friendly nuclear power or its own nuclear deterrent an attractive option. The Kingdom is situated between two powerful regional rivals Israel and Iran. Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons while it is strongly suspected that the Iranian nuclear programme has been developed to create the option to develop nuclear weapons. As recently as 1991, Saudi Arabia may have depended on the nuclear umbrella of the United States to deter the possible use of chemical or biological
weapons against targets in Saudi Arabia by Saddam Hussein. The continued deterioration of security ties with the United States might well provide an incentive to secure a viable nuclear alternative. Although Saudi Arabia appears to be a low proliferation threat at this stage, given their considerable level of wealth, links to nations that have known nuclear programmes, the possibility that Saudi Arabia would consider a nuclear weapons option for the future remains a concern for some analysts.
Collapse of US alliance causes Saudi Prolif Luft and Korin 2004 (Gal Luft and Anne Korin, Commentary Magazine, Institute for Analysis of Global
Security, http://www.iags.org/sinosaudi.htm) There are some particularly alarming scenarios to consider here. If the Saudis were to begin worrying seriously about a future American seizure of their oil fields, they might well seek ways to deter it. Given the weakness of their own military, one option would be to acquire nuclear weapons. Although talk of a nucleararmed Saudi Arabia may, at this juncture, seem farfetched, it is not beyond the realm of possibility. Saudi Arabia could break its military dependence on the U.S. either by entering into an alliance with some other existing nuclear power or by acquiring its own nuclear capability. In either case, China would play a crucial role.
Loss of alliance Nukes Levi 2003 (Michael, Science and Technology Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies @ Brookings, Would the Saudis
Go Nuclear?, http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/levi20030602.htm
)
Why would Riyadh want nukes now? Because of a potentially dangerous confluence of events. The rapidly progressing nuclear program of traditional rival Iran has no doubt spooked the Saudi leadership. Last fall, dissidents revealed the existence of a covert Iranian uranium-enrichment program, forcing analysts to drastically revise down their estimates of how long it might take Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. Reacting to that development, Patrick Clawson, deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently wrote that "Saudi Arabia is the state most likely to proliferate in response to an Iranian nuclear threat" because, he argued, the Saudis fear a nuclear-armed Iran could have designs on Saudi Arabia, a Sunni monarchy that is home to a large number of oppressed Shia. After all, Tehran has for years allegedly supported Shia terrorist groups operating in Saudi Arabia and was blamed by many analysts for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. Holding back the Saudi nuclear program, of course, has been the kingdom's relationship with the United States. Though America has never signed a formal treaty with Riyadh, since World War II the United States has made clear by its actionsmost notably, by protecting Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf warand by informal guarantees given to Saudi leaders by American officials that it will protect the monarchy from outside threats. Since the September 11 attacks, though, that relationship has grown increasingly frail. When a RAND analyst last summer told the Defense Policy Board, then chaired by Richard Perle, that Saudi Arabia was "the kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent" in the Middle East, he not only raised hackles in Riyadh, he reflected the opinion of many close to the Bush administration. R. James Woolsey, former CIA director and White House confidant,
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was even more emphatic in a speech last November, referring to "the barbarics [sic], the Saudi royal family." The recent decision by Washington to pull most of its forces out of Saudi Arabia, reducing its deployment from 5,000 to 400 personnel and moving its operations to Qatar, has added facts on the ground to the rhetorical barrage. This recent decline in U.S.-Saudi relations can hardly make the Saudi royal family feel secure. Suddenly removing the U.S. security blanket just as regional rivalries are intensifying could push the Saudis into the nuclear club. That's a scary prospect, particularly when you consider the possibility of Islamists overthrowing the monarchy. Instead, the United States should be careful to maintain Saudi Arabia's confidence even as the two nations inevitably drift apart. The United States might even extend an explicit security guarantee to the Saudis, the kind of formal treaty it gave Europe to keep it non-nuclear during the cold war-and the kind of formal arrangement Washington and Riyadh have never signed before. Such a formal deal could raise anti-American sentiment in the desert kingdom. But the alternative might be worse.
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Saudi Prolif Dominoes

Saudi Prolif Snowballs McInnis 2005 (Kathleen J. coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a research associate at CSIS. Extended Deterrence: The U.S.
Credibility Gap in the Middle East The Washington Quarterly 28.3 (2005) 169-186. Muse.)
The emergence of a nuclear Iran would undoubtedly send shockwaves through the region that could result in a nuclear domino effect. Therein lies the crux of the problem: If Saudi Arabia were to follow Irans proliferation route, that would again change the calculations of every other state in the region in a cumulative and potentially dangerous manner. Continuing with Egypt, and with other dominos such as Turkey and Syria poised to fall, the proliferation challenge in the Middle East is uniquely daunting.
Perhaps most worrisome is that the United States is left, at present, with few good options in the region to thwart this dangerous trajectory.
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A/T: Deterrence
Saudi prolif wont be peaceful Rep. Markey 2008 (Edward J, D-MA chairman of the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global
Warming, Why Is Bush Helping Saudi Arabia Build Nukes?, Wall Street Journal/ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121305642257659301.html) Saudi Arabia's interest in nuclear technology can only be explained by the dangerous politics of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, a champion and kingpin of the Sunni Arab world, is deeply threatened by the rise of Shiite-ruled Iran. The two countries watch each other warily over the waters of the Persian Gulf, buying arms and waging war by proxy in Lebanon and Iraq. An Iranian nuclear weapon would radically alter the region's balance of power, and could prove to be the match that lights the tinderbox. By signing this agreement with the U.S., Saudi Arabia is warning Iran that two can play the nuclear game. In 2004, Vice President Dick Cheney said, "[Iran is] already sitting on an awful lot of oil and gas. No one can figure why they need nuclear, as well, to generate energy." Mr. Cheney got it right about Iran. But a potential Saudi nuclear program is just as suspicious. For a country with so much oil, gas and solar potential, importing expensive and dangerous nuclear power makes no economic sense.
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A/T: Saudi Prolif Inevitable

Saudis not proliferating now, but its possible in the future Front Page 2011 ("Saudis up the nuclear ante"http://frontpagemag.com/2011/07/22/saudis-up-the-nuclear-ante/,
SRM) Skeptics of the Saudi nuclear threat, however, point to the fact that these nuclear agreements only allow for the transfer of knowledge regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, they also note that the Saudis are a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, although so is Iran, and that factoid hasnt slowed down the Islamist states nuclear weapons pursuit.
Not proliferating now because of US-relations concerns Guzansky July 1st, 2011 (Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at
Tel Aviv University. He joined INSS after serving at Israel's National Security Council; "TEHRAN TESTS SAUDIS' NERVE ON NUKES", LEXIS, SRM) In terms of nuclear development, these two Sunni nations located on either side of Shia Iran have overlapping interests: Pakistan has knowledge and skilled manpower, but lacks cash, while Saudi Arabia has vast cash reserves but lacks the relevant infrastructures and skilled manpower. The two might seek to balance Iran's power by increasing co-operation, despite the political risks primarily to their already strained relations with the US and the fact that doing so would contradict Saudi international commitments and its own public position favouring a nuclear-free Middle East.
Saudis won't prolif now because of faith in US security umbrella, continued aggravation in the Arab spring pushes them past the tipping point Guzansky July 1st, 2011 (Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at
Tel Aviv University. He joined INSS after serving at Israel's National Security Council; "TEHRAN TESTS SAUDIS' NERVE ON NUKES", LEXIS, SRM) Signalling that it is prepared to go down this road may be an effective way of testing the US by pressuring the administration to demonstrate more strongly its commitment to defend the kingdom, especially after `àbandoning'' a longstanding regional ally like Mubarak. Saudi Arabia, at least for now, has no alternative but to rely on the American defence umbrella. However, it would be contrary to Saudi practice to put all its eggs in one basket. If in Riyadh's view its essential security interests are threatened, it may prefer to engage in a series of even contradictory steps to ensure its security. Given its enormous wealth and military weakness, it is a safe bet that Saudi Arabia will invest in security arrangements that help guarantee the continuity of the regime.
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A/T: Pakistan Gives the Bomb

Pakistan won't give Saudis the bomb ties with Iran Front Page 2011 ("Saudis up the nuclear ante"http://frontpagemag.com/2011/07/22/saudis-up-the-nuclear-ante/,
SRM) To that end, a recent report surfaced that Saudi Arabia long suspected of contributing to Pakistans nuclear program has already arranged for the use of two Pakistani nuclear bombs or guided missile warheads. However, given Pakistans recent dalliance with the Islamist Republic, the Pakistanis may prove to be less of a reliable option for the Saudis. Despite last minute appeals from Saudi Arabia, Pakistans president, Asif Ali Zardari , has twice in the last month made visits to Tehran to meet with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In both instances, Zardari has praised Iran as both a natural ally and important friend of Pakistan in the region.
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A/T: Iran Prolif = Saudi Prolif inevitable

Even if Iran gets nukes, US anti-prolif credibility would hold; Saudi prolif would kill this and result in rapid global spillover
Russell 2005 (Richard l, Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East:
Strategic Contest p. 118 google books.) The easing of a Saudi nuclear weapons programs opacity could occur gradually over time after it is firmly established and protected from potential preventive or preemptive strikes behind the scenes in diplomatic exchanges and in subtle public references. The Saudis would want to plant in the minds of potential rivals the suggestion that Riyadh is not to be diplomatically and militarily intimidated or coerced. Recent leaks to the media of unconfirmed reports of Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation, in fact, work toward this end. A Saudi nuclear deterrent could more blatantly be revealed in the midst of a future Gulf military crisis, perhaps one involving military posturing by Iran against the Gulf states. Eithier way, public awareness of a Saudi nuclear deterrent will put the West, and particularly the United States, in an awkward position. The United States would lose some prestige in light of a security partner choosing a policy course in direct opposition to the American policy to contain and stem the international proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Washington in the aftermath of revelations of a Saudi nuclear deterrent would be under strong domestic and international pressure to take measures to show its displeasure with Riyadh. The United States, however, must avoid steps that would completely rupture American-Saudi security ties: both Washington and Riyadh share the grand strategic interest of seeing that no one power ever grows to dominate the Gulf. The United States needs to recognize that Saudi Arabia will continue to be a major player in the regional competition for power in the greater Middle East region. More broadly, the recognition of a Saudi nuclear deterrent would be a major blow against international proliferation regimes. The global community would be forced to see that despite the best of intentions and efforts, the nuclear genie will not be put back into its bottle The West and the United States will have to face the fact that weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles will be an ever-present reality of the post-11 September world. Despite the arguments from some quarters that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will enhance international security by bolstering deterrence and lessening the chances for inter-state war, prudent statecraft would assume that deterrence in practice is unlikely to be as effective as envisioned in theory.
We control the internal link to prolif; Key players wont seek nukes unless they lose trust the US Alliance
McInnis 2005 (Kathleen j. researcher @ csis extended deterrence: the us credibility gap in the middle east
Washington quarterly 28:3 acc proj muse) U.S. relationships in the Middle East, however, have a strikingly different character, more akin to hesitant engagement than to Washington's well-established partnerships in Asia. A rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism, coupled with growing anti-U.S. sentiment, has strained these tenuous relations. As thenUnder Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton recently stated, "Iranian nuclear capabilities would change the perceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the [United States] in terms of deterrence and defense."3 One such challenge is the prospect of multiple nuclear powers emerging in an already volatile Middle East. The outcome of this scenario depends in part on the capacity and credibility of U.S. strategic capabilities, including the nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, if key "nuclear dominos" in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, decide that U.S. security guarantees are insufficient, they may be tempted to acquire their own nuclear weapons. A U.S. extended deterrent policy in the Middle East would lack credibility, not due to a lack of physical capability or presence in the region, but rather as a result of the fragility of U.S. relations with its allies in the region, creating a uniquely dangerous situation.
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Iran Prolif Good

Turn - Iran Prolif is key to middle east stability Weinberger 2009, Professor of International Relations and Political Philosophy at the University of Puget
Sound (Seth, October 2, Why does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?, http://securitydilemmas.blogspot.com/2009/10/why-does-iran-want-nuclear-weapons.html) The good news, however, is that Iran proliferating may not be such a problem. If Iran's main motivation is defense, proliferating may in fact stabilize the regional situation, as a state not fearful for its continued existence can be a more rational and well-behaved state. Indeed as Thomas P. M. Barnett notes: if history is any guide, both the United States and Israel are looking at the first real chance for a durable regional security architecture to emerge (now that you should expect a nuclear Saudi Arabia and Turkey to show up at the negotiating table, too). Yes, the hotheads on all sides seem desperate to freak out over this prospect, but, again, read your history: With the exceptions of our allies in Britain and France, the U.S. has looked down upon every rising power to ever get the bomb as constituting a loose canon capable of all manner of nefarious acts and strategic stupidity. And yet we're the only one that's ever pulled the trigger. Of course, a nuclear Iran may be a more dangerous Iran, especially if you're skeptical about the ability of the US to develop an effective deterrent relationship with a regional power like Iran (as I am). However, if Iran can't be stopped and if Iran's primary motivation is defense, the deterrence question lessens, especially as Israel will likely be able to create regional deterrence.
Turn - Israel A. Iranian nuclearization doesnt cause war and prevents Israeli strikes Morrison 2009 (David Morrison. political officer for the Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign. The elephant in
the room: Israel's nuclear weapons The Electronic Intifada, 29 June 2009. http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article10621.shtml) Rulers of Iran don't want their cities devastated and they know that if Iran were to make a nuclear strike on Israel, it is absolutely certain that Israel would retaliate by making multiple nuclear strikes on Iran and raze many Iranian cities to the ground -- so Iran won't do it. Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal, and the ruthlessness to use it, that is more than adequate to deter Iran from making a nuclear strike on the country. Likewise, it is unimaginable that Iran would attack the US, or US interests abroad, for fear of overwhelming retaliation. However, taking account of the elephant in the room puts a very different perspective on the impact of a nuclear-armed Iran. The significance of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is not that Iran would become a threat to Israel and the US, but that Israel and the US would no longer contemplate attacking Iran. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapons of self-defense -- a state that possesses nuclear weapons doesn't get attacked by other states. One thing is certain: attacking Iran, ostensibly to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons, would make the case for it acquiring them like nothing else. It would then be abundantly clear that Iran could not protect itself by other means -- and it can be guaranteed that it would then make a supreme effort to acquire them.
B. The impact is global war. Ivashov 2007 (General Leonid Ivashov vice-president of the Academy on geopolitical affairs. He was the chief
of the department for General affairs in the Soviet Unions ministry of Defense, secretary of the Council of defense ministers of the Community of independant states (CIS), chief of the Military cooperation department at the Russian federations Ministry of defense and Joint chief of staff of the Russian armies. Iran: the Threat of a Nuclear War Global Research April 9, 2007. http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5309) What might cause the force major event of the required scale? Everything seems to indicate that Israel will be sacrificed. Its involvement in a war with Iran - especially in a nuclear war - is bound to trigger a global catastrophe. The statehoods of Israel and Iran are based on the countries' official religions. A military conflict between Israel and Iran will immediately evolve into a religious one, a conflict between Judaism and Islam. Due to the presence of numerous Jewish and Muslim populations in the developed countries, this would make a global bloodbath inevitable. All of the active forces of most of the countries of the world would end up fighting, with almost no room for neutrality left. Judging by the increasingly massive acquisitions of the residential housing for the Israeli citizens, especially in Russia and Ukraine, a lot of people already have an idea of what the future holds. However, it is hard to imagine a quiet heaven where one might hide from the coming doom. Forecasts of the territorial distribution of the fighting, the
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quantities and the efficiency of the armaments involved, the profound character of the underlying roots of the conflict and the severity of the religious strife all leave no doubt that this clash will be in all respects much more nightmarish than WWII.
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Saudi Prolif Terrorism

Saudi prolif causes Nuclear Terrorism Blank 2003 (Stephen, Saudi Arabia's nuclear gambit Asia Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EK07Ak01.html)
Obviously, that kind of transformation of the proliferation situation raises
the possibility of several more crises in different regions of the world, all of which could occur in relatively simultaneous fashion and which would all involve the linked threats of either terrorists with access to nuclear weapons or states possessing those weapons which extend their protection and deterrence to those terrorists. Furthermore,
there are still more considerations. If one looks at the history of Pakistan's nuclear program there immediately arises the issue of Pakistan's widely-reported assistance to North Korea, which at the same time is apparently proliferating missiles all over the Middle East. Adding
Saudi Arabia to this chain of proliferators only extends the process of secondary or tertiary proliferation by which new nuclear powers assist other nuclear "wannabes" to reach that state. Thus, the threat expressed by the US of being at the crossroads of radicalism and technology becomes that much more real
Extinction Sid Ahmed 2004 (Mohamed, Al-Ahram Political Analyst, xtinction!,

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This would lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
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Impact - Terrorism
US- Saudi Relations solves terrorism Cordesman 2004 (Anthony, Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
and is Co-Director of the Center's Middle East Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC and a Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown Ten Reasons for Reforging the US and Saudi Relationship Saudi American Forum. Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is CoDirector of the Center's Middle East Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC and a Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown http://www.saudi-american forum.org/Newsletters2004/SAF_Item_Of_Interest_2004_02_01.htm) Both the US and Saudi Arabia now face a common threat from terrorism, both in terms of internal and regional threats. Saudi Arabia may have been slow to recognize how serious this threat is, but since the terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia in May 2003, it has become clear that it is as real for Saudis as it is for Americans. It is also clear that dealing with terrorism requires close cooperation between the two countries, that Saudi Arabia needs US assistance in modernizing many aspects of its internal security operations, and that the US needs Saudi cooperation in reducing the flow of money to terrorists and their ability to manipulate Islamic causes. Furthermore, it is clear that political, social, and economic forces are at work where this cooperation will have to go on for years if not decades after Bin Laden and Al Qaida have ceased to be a threat.
Relations solve terrorism USA Today 2002 (Barbara slavin, LEXIS)

The agreement to go after the two branches was reached while Treasury Secretary Paul ONeill was in Saudi Arabia last week and is meant to demonstrate growing U.S.-Saudi cooperation against terrorism before Vice President Cheneys scheduled arrival here on Sturday. U.S.-Saudi relations have been severely strained since Sept. 11, and both governments are eager to prove that their 50-year-old alliance remains strong. Fifteen of the 19 hijackers who destroyed the World Trade Center, damaged the Pentagon and crashed a jetliner in Pennsylvania were natives of Saudi Arabia, as is Osama bin Laden, the alleged mastermind of the terrorist attacks. Saudi cooperation is crucial in the war against terrorism in general and against terrorism financing in particular. Instructed by their Muslim faith to donate 2.5% of their net worth each year, the oil-rich Saudis give millions of dollars to religion-based charities that operate throughout the world.
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Impact Dollar Heg

Relations key to Petro Dollar and Global Economy Freeman 2004 (Chas, Middle East Policy Council President, Federal News Service, p. lexis)
The second matter, and far more grave in many ways, is the demonstration of the end of the special relationship with Saudi Arabia; the end of the discounts and the end of the Saudi emphasis on primacy in the American market signals -- because there's another issue you didn't mention, which we will get into, and that is the part of this special relationship has been the defense of the dollar by the Saudis. Twice within OPEC, other members, Iran in particular, have moved to eliminate the dollar as the unit of account for the oil trade. Were this to occur in the current context of massive budget, balance of trade and balance of payments, deficits for the United States, the results could be absolutely devastating to the global economy and to our own. The reason the Saudis defended the dollar on the two previous occasions was not economic analysis but political affinity for the United States. Question if that affinity is no longer there, will they play that role? And this is a large issue with people like Paul Volcker, saying there is a very substantial danger within the
next five years of some sort of dollar collapse, and this is not a minor, minor matter.
Petro Dollar key to Hege Looney 2004, (Robert E, professor of National Security Affairs, and Associate Chairman of Instruction,
Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. From Petrodollars to Petroeuros: Are the Dollar's Days as an International Reserve Currency Drawing to an End? Middle East Policy No. 1 Vol. 11, p. 26 http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/nov03/middleEast.asp Political power and prestige. The benefits of "power and prestige" are nebulous. Nevertheless, the loss of key currency status and the loss of international creditor status have sometimes been associated, along with such non-economic factors as the loss of colonies and military power, in discussions of the historical decline of great powers. Causality may well flow from key currency status to power and prestige and in the opposite direction as well.[8] On a broader scale, Niall Ferguson[9] notes that one pillar of American dominance can be found in the way successive U.S. government sought to take advantage of the dollar's role as a key currency. Quoting several noted authorities, he notes that [the role of the dollar] enabled the United States to be "far less restrainedthan all other states by normal fiscal and foreign exchange constraints when it came to funding whatever foreign or strategic policies it decided to implement." As Robert Gilpin notes, quoting Charles de Gaulle, such policies led to a 'hegemony of the dollar" that gave the U.S. "extravagant privileges." In David Calleo's words, the U.S. government had access to a "gold mine of paper" and could therefore collect a subsidy form foreigners in the form of seignorage (the profits that flow to those who mint or print a depreciating currency). The web contains many more radical interactions of the dollar's role. Usually something along the following lines: World trade is now a game in which the U.S. produces dollars and the rest of the world produces things that dollars can buy. The world's interlinked economies no longer trade to capture a comparative advantage; they compete in exports to capture needed dollars to service dollar-denominated foreign debts and to accumulate dollar reserves to sustain the exchange value of their domestic currencies. This phenomenon is known as dollar hegemony, which is created by the geopolitically constructed peculiarity that critical commodities, most notably oil, are denominated in dollars. Everyone accepts dollars because dollars can buy oil. The recycling of petrodollars is the price the U.S. has extracted from oil-producing countries for U.S. tolerance of the oilexporting cartel since 1973.[10] America's coercive power in the world is based as much on the dollar's status as the global reserve currency as on U.S. military muscle. Everyone needs oil, and to pay for it, they must have dollars. To secure dollars, they must sell their goods to the U.S., under terms acceptable to the people who rule America. The dollar is way overpriced, but it's the only world currency. Under the current dollars-only arrangement, U.S. money is in effect backed by the oil reserves of every other nation.[11] While it is tempting to dismiss passages of this sort as uninformed rants, they do contain some elements of truth. There are tangible benefits that accrue to the country whose currency is a reserve currency. The real question is: if this situation is so intolerable and unfair, why hasn't the world ganged up on the United States and changed the system? Why haven't countries like Libya and Iran required something like euros or gold dinars in payment for oil? After all, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 the International Monitary Fund's Standard Drawing Rights (unit of account) was certainly an available alternative to the dollar.[12]
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Heg Solves Nuclear War Khalizad, 1995 (Zalmay, Analyst at the RAND, Washington Quarterly, Spring)
Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange.
Economic collapse leads to nuclear extinction Bearden 2000 (Thomas E., Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel and director of the Association of Distinguished
American Scientists, CEO of CTEC Inc., Fellow Emeritus at the Alpha Foundation's Institute for Advanced Study, 6/24/2K, "The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly", http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisisBearden.htm ) History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea {[7]} launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China -- whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States -- attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself {[8]}. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
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Ext: Relz key to dollar heg

Relations key to petro dollar Islam 2003 (Faisal When will we buy oil in euros? The Observer
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/feb/23/oilandpetrol.theeuro)
'At various points in time since the early 1970s, oil producers have discussed this, especially in periods when the dollar has been weak. Opinions have tended to be wide-ranging, depending on the strategic and trade alliances certain members have with particular trade blocs,' said Yarjani. That was an elliptical reference to the overwhelming influence of Saudi Arabia, whose government is the staunchest ally of the US within Opec. 'The Saudis are holding the line on oil prices in Opec and should they, for example, go along with the rest of the Opec people in demanding that oil be priced in euros, that would deal a very heavy blow to the American economy,' Youssef Ibrahim, of the influential US Council on Foreign Relations, told CNN. Last year the former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia told a committee of the US Congress: 'One of the major things the Saudis have historically done, in part out of friendship with the United States, is to insist that oil continues to be priced in dollars. Therefore, the US Treasury can print money and buy oil, which is an advantage no other country has. With the emergence of other currencies and with strains in the relationship, I wonder whether there will not again be, as there have been in the past, people in Saudi Arabia who raise the question of why they should be so kind to the United States.'
Relations key to petro dollar Chanin and Gause 2003 (Clifford and Gregory; Middle East Policy U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS: BUMP IN THE ROAD OR END
OF THE ROAD? http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5400/is_200301/ai_n21341616/pg_6)
The Saudis get little credit in American public opinion for their energy policies. First, they almost always take initiatives quietly. They did not publicize their increased production either after 9/11 or in the lead-up to the recent war. The markets took immediate notice, but there was very little recognition outside of specialist circles. Second, there is a widespread cynicism in the United States about Saudi oil policy, which is seen as serving Saudi interests. This may be so, but the question remains whether the Saudis define their interests in ways compatible with American interests. Generally, the Saudi government pursues policies that aim at stability in price and supply. This emphasis corresponds with the stated policy goals of successive American administrations. A different government in Saudi Arabia might take a very different stance. It would certainly have to sell oil, but would it have to sell as much? Would it carry the costs of maintaining excess production capacity, so as to be able to bring oil immediately to the market in times of supply disruption? Would it continue to denominate oil transactions in U.S. dollars, thus shielding the United States from the effects of dollar fluctuation on energy prices? All these issues would be on the table if relations broke down or if a new government took power in Saudi Arabia.
A decline in relations means Saudi Arabia switches to the Euro, which tanks the economy.
Islam 03 (faisal when will we buy oil in euros? the observer 2/23 lexis)
At various points in time since the early 1970s, oil producers have discussed this, especially in periods when the dollar has been weak. Opinions have tended to be wide-ranging, depending on the strategic and trade alliances certain members have with particular trade blocs,' said Yarjani. That was an elliptical reference to the overwhelming influence of Saudi Arabia, whose government is the staunchest ally of the US within Opec. 'The Saudis are holding the line on oil prices in Opec and should they, for example, go along with the rest of the Opec people in demanding that oil be priced in euros, that would deal a very heavy blow to the American economy,' Youssef Ibrahim, of the influential US Council on Foreign Relations, told CNN. Last year the former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia told a committee of the US Congress: 'One of the major things the Saudis have historically done, in part out of friendship with the United States, is to insist that oil continues to be priced in dollars. Therefore, the US Treasury can print money and buy oil, which is an advantage no other country has. With the emergence of other currencies and with strains in the relationship, I wonder whether there will not again be, as there have been in the past, people in Saudi Arabia who raise the question of why they should be so kind to the United States.'
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EXT Oil Security

Pushing for political reform threatens the US-Saudi alliance - causes oil market instability that threatens economic recovery Herald, 2011 (International Herald Tribune, 3-19, "For Obama, Bahrain is Mideast's hottest spot; Region in
Revolt" LEXIS, SRM) ''In terms of concrete American national security interests, Bahrain-Saudi Arabia is the place,'' said Robert Malley, the Middle East and North Africa program director with the International Crisis Group. Saudi Arabia is the second largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States, and Bahrain is home to the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet. Even if the United States could wean itself from dependency on Saudi oil, the kingdom, home to the world's largest petroleum reserves, still can rock global markets and slow economic recovery in the United States and around the world. Beyond that, the United States has long viewed Saudi Arabia as a last bulwark against an ascendant Iran in a crucial region, and it does not want Tehran stepping in to back Shiites in Bahrain or Saudi Arabia. But where the United States and the Saudis split is over how to prevent Iran from gaining traction. While U.S. officials say the Saudi and Bahraini governments can head off trouble by making political reforms, the Saudis believe that political reforms would only open the door to greater instability.
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Impact Regional Power Projection

Saudi Relations are key to regional power projection Telhami and Hill 2002 (Shibley, Fiona Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter? Differing Perspectives on the
Kingdom and Its Oil Foreign Affairs, November/December 2002 http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20021101faresponse10002/shibley-telhami-fiona-hill/does-saudi-arabia-still-matterdiffering-perspectives-on-the-kingdom-and-its-oil.html) Given America's ongoing security interest in the Persian Gulf, it is highly likely that the U.S. military will retain a large presence in the region. Washington must therefore continue to place high priority on sustaining favorable relations with Riyadh, since Saudi approval and cooperation will remain essential to any continued American military presence. It is certainly possible that the United States will reduce the number of troops it keeps in Saudi Arabia, or will at least have them assume a lower profile, but it is hard to imagine that, with the exception of Kuwait, any of the smaller members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (which comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) could afford to host large American bases without Saudi acquiescence. In addition, U.S. options would be significantly handicapped if Saudi Arabia were to deny overflight rights to U.S. military aircraft, or prohibit ground troops from launching operations from Saudi soil in the case of a war with Iraq.
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Impact Middle East Stability

Saudi Influence key to US middle east strategy American Spectator 2011 ("Achieving the Impossible"; EBSCO, SRM)
The dispute has enormous strategic implications for the United States. Saudi Arabia, for all of its shortcomings, is an American ally that cooperates against groups like al-Qaida and has ensured the free flow of Middle Eastern oil to the West. Iran is a seemingly implacable American foe that supports such armed groups as Hezbollah and is widely believed to be pursuing a nuclear weapon. In the zero-sum game that is the modern Mideast, any political victory for Iran--bringing a Shiite government into power in Bahrain, for example--would represent a serious setback for both Riyadh and Washington. "The unpleasant reality is that our interests depend on the continued existence of a medieval monarchy in Saudi Arabia," said Robert Kaplan, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. "Our grand strategy for the Middle East comes down to doing what we can to ensure Riyadh's survival and what we can to bring about Tehran's demise."
Relations Key to regional stability Russel 2002 (James A. Deconstructing the US-Saudi Partnership? Strategic Insights Insights v. 1 i7, September,
http://www.ccc.npa.navy.mil/si/sept02/middleEast2.asp) U.S. and Saudi air forces might in the future operate together using a coalition operations space within the combined air operations center at Prince Sultan Air Base. Perhaps officers from other Gulf Cooperation Council militaries could join together with Saudi and U.S. counterparts in this facility to coordinate joint and combined air defense efforts across the theater. If U.S.-Saudi operational cooperation can be established at PSAB, it could provide a model that could be replicated in other Gulf States, leading to activities that would promote mutual confidence and collective security. While regional military integration among friendly coalition partners may today seem a remote scenario, the scenario is at least plausible if Saudi Arabia and the United States lead the way. Regional security integration will surely never flourish without positive U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations. Conclusion Fundamentally altering the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship would have serious consequences for Saudi security and peace in the Middle East. It could potentially render the U.S.-trained and equipped Saudi military unable to defend the Kingdom and would deny the United States the opportunity to continue working with the dominant regional power to achieve collective defense and regional military integration. Any serious suggestions that the 50-year partnership needs to be fundamentally altered should carefully consider these costs.
And these regional conflicts escalate to a global nuclear war Steinbach 2002 (John Steinbach in March 2002 (Source: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htm)
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of
Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)
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Impact China
Loss of US relations increases Saudi relations with China Luft, 2006 (Gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) a Washington based think tank focused on
energy security, specializes in strategy, geopolitics, terrorism, Middle East and energy security. Fueling the dragon: China's race into the oil market, http://www.iags.org/china.htm)
A key component of China's strategy to guarantee access to Persian Gulf oil is the special relations it has cultivated with Saudi Arabia. The ties with Riyadh go back to the mid-1980s when China sold Saudi Arabia intermediate range ballistic missiles. Since then, the relations have grown closer. High-level visits of Chinese leaders to Saudi Arabia culminated in 1999 with President Jiang Zemin's state visit in which he pronounced a "strategic oil partnership" between the two countries. China has offered to sell the Saudis intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Saudis have so far preferred to turn down many of the proposals and limit their procurement from China in order to maintain their special relations with the U.S. But continuous deterioration in Saudi-American relations or, in the longer run, a regime change in the oil kingdom, could drive the Saudis to end their reliance on the U.S. as the sole guarantor of their regime's security and offer China an expanded role.
War between the US and China Luft 2004 (Gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) a Washington based
think tank focused on energy security, specializes in strategy, geopolitics, terrorism, Middle East and energy security, Los Angeles Times, US, China Are on Collision Course Over Oil http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oil/2004/0202collision.htm) Optimists claim that the world oil market will be able to accommodate China and that, instead of conflict, China's thirst could create mutual desire for stability in the Middle East and thus actually bring Beijing closer to the U.S. History shows the opposite: Superpowers find it difficult to coexist while competing over scarce resources. The main bone of contention probably will revolve around China's relations with Saudi Arabia, home to a quarter of the world's oil. The Chinese have already supplied the Saudis with intermediate range ballistic missiles, and they played a major role 20 years ago in a Saudi financed Pakistani nuclear effort that may one day leave a nuclear weapon in the hands of a Taliban-type regime in Riyadh or Islamabad. Since 9/11, a deep tension in U.S.-Saudi relations has provided the Chinese with an opportunity to win the heart of the House of Saud. The Saudis hear the voices in the U.S. denouncing Saudi Arabia as a "kernel of evil" and proposing that the U.S. seize and occupy the kingdom's oil fields. The Saudis especially fear that if their citizens again perpetrate a terror attack in the U.S., there would be no alternative for the U.S. but to terminate its long-standing commitment to the monarchy - and perhaps even use military force against it. The Saudis realize that to forestall such a scenario they can no longer rely solely on the U.S. to defend the regime and must diversify their security portfolio. In their search for a new patron, they might find China the most fitting and willing candidate. The risk of Beijing's emerging as a competitor for influence in the Middle East and a Saudi shift of allegiance are things Washington should consider as it defines its objectives and priorities in the 21st century. Without a comprehensive strategy designed to prevent China from becoming an oil consumer on a par with the U.S., a superpower collision is in the cards. The good news is that we are still in a position to halt China's slide into total dependency
Super Extinction Strait Times 2k (No one gains in war over Taiwan; June 25, lexis)
The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration
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may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a fullscale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. .
39 Saudi DA
EXT China Fill-In

China has a comparative advantage over the united states for allying with Saudi Arabia Luft and Korin 2004 (Gal Luft and Anne Korin, Commentary Magazine, Institute for Analysis of Global Security, http://www.iags.org/sinosaudi.htm)
Even if Saudi Arabia does not pursue nuclear status, however, it has abundant reasons for looking east to China both for markets and for military assistance, just as China has abundant reasons for looking west to Saudi Arabia for continued access to Middle Eastern oil. And aside from these mutual interests, an alliance with China would hold other attraction for the Saudis. Unlike the U.S., the Chinese do not aspire to change the Arab way of life, or impose freedom and democracy on regimes that view such ideas with skepticism and fear. Indeed, Chinese attitudes toward the open societies of the West are markedly similar to those of the Arab despotisms themselves. The Chinese also have at their disposal immense reserves of manpower, which they can deploy to protect the oil resources of any new allies they acquire. Thousands of Chinese soldiers disguised as oil workers, for example, are used today to guard petroleum facilities in Sudan. With 11 million men reaching military age annually, China could easily replicate this elsewhere. Finally, while the U.S. is continually castigated by the Arabs for its closeness to Israel, China's ties with Jerusalem have never risen above the level of indifference.
China will fill the regional security vacuum Luft 2004 (gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, fuelling the dragon
http://www.iags.org/china.htm ) A key component of China's strategy to guarantee access to Persian Gulf oil is the special relations it has cultivated with Saudi Arabia. The ties with Riyadh go back to the mid-1980s when China sold Saudi Arabia intermediate range ballistic missiles. Since then, the relations have grown closer. High-level visits of Chinese leaders to Saudi Arabia culminated in 1999 with President Jiang Zemin's state visit in which he pronounced a "strategic oil partnership" between the two countries. China has offered to sell the Saudis intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Saudis have so far preferred to turn down many of the proposals and limit their procurement from China in order to maintain their special relations with the U.S. But continuous deterioration in Saudi-American relations or, in the longer run, a regime change in the oil kingdom, could drive the Saudis to end their reliance on the U.S. as the sole guarantor of their regime's security and offer China an expanded role.
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***AFF Answers***
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Relations Low
Relations at an all time low Herald, 2011 (International Herald Tribune, 3-19, "For Obama, Bahrain is Mideast's hottest spot; Region in
Revolt" LEXIS, SRM) The brutal crackdown in Bahrain poses the greatest Middle East democracy dilemma yet for the administration of President Barack Obama, deepening a rift with its most important Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, while potentially strengthening the influence of its biggest nemesis, Iran. Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia are at their coldest since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Saudi officials, still angry that Mr. Obama abandoned President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in the face of demonstrations, ignored U.S. requests not to send troops into Bahrain to help crush Shiite-led protests there. A tense telephone call between Mr. Obama and King Abdullah on Wednesday, Arab officials said, failed to ease the tensions. ''King Abdullah has been clear that Saudi Arabia will never allow Shia rule in Bahrain - never,'' an Arab official who was briefed on the talks said. He said King Abdullah's willingness to listen to the United States had ''evaporated'' since Mr. Mubarak was forced from office.
Relations low now - countless reasons Washington Post 2011 (May 16, "The U.S.-Saudi split", LEXIS, SRM)
A tectonic shift has occurred in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Despite significant pressure from the Obama administration to remain on the sidelines, Saudi leaders sent troops into Manama in March to defend Bahrain's monarchy and quell the unrest that has shaken that country since February. For more than 60 years, Saudi Arabia has been bound by an unwritten bargain: oil for security. Riyadh has often protested but ultimately acquiesced to what it saw as misguided U.S. policies. But American missteps in the region since Sept. 11, an ill-conceived response to the Arab protest movements and an unconscionable refusal to hold Israel accountable for its illegal settlement building have brought this arrangement to an end. As the Saudis recalibrate the partnership, Riyadh intends to pursue a much more assertive foreign policy, at times conflicting with American interests. The backdrop for this change are the rise of Iranian meddling in the region and the counterproductive policies that the United States has pursued here since Sept. 11. The most significant blunder may have been the invasion of Iraq, which resulted in enormous loss of life and provided Iran an opening to expand its sphere of influence. For years, Iran's leadership has aimed to foment discord while furthering its geopolitical ambitions. Tehran has long funded Hamas and Hezbollah; recently, its scope of attempted interference has broadened to include the affairs of Arab states from Yemen to Morocco. This month the chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, Gen. Hasan Firouzabadi, harshly criticized Riyadh over its intervention in Bahrain, claiming this act would spark massive domestic uprisings. Such remarks are based more on wishful thinking than fact, but Iran's efforts to destabilize its neighbors are tireless. As Riyadh fights a cold war with Tehran, Washington has shown itself in recent months to be an unwilling and unreliable partner against this threat. The emerging political reality is a Saudi-led Arab world facing off against the aggression of Iran and its non-state proxies.
42 Saudi DA
EXT No Link
Other issues swamp democracy assistance, the plan wont crush relations CNN July 3, 2011 ("Obama adviser discusses 'scratchy' ties with Arab allies" http://articles.cnn.com/2011-0703/us/mideast_1_saudi-arabia-saudi-monarchy-washington-and-riyadh?_s=PM:US, SRM) "We did have some scratchy periods with some partners in the region who are wrestling with this and trying to work through their own views on this. I again would be less than candid with you if I didn't say that we didn't have some points of friction or disagreements with some of our partners in the region," he said. "But I think this, and based on my direct conversations with the leadership of Saudi Arabia about the kinds of common strategic interests that we have that I laid out earlier in the conversation, I think that our relationship is in pretty good shape." Washington and Riyadh "have a shared interest in seeing that no country or force in the region seeks or tries to achieve dominance," he said. "We have a very important shared interest in seeing restrictions on weapons of mass destruction proliferation in the region. We have a shared interest in counterterrorism cooperation. We have a shared interest in the pursuit of peace. We have a shared interest in a stable supply of energy and in a healthy global economy. And that's the basis on which we work with the Saudis."
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US-Saudi Relations Resilient

Empirically proven relations will weather the storm Satloff 2011 ("Filling the Strategy Vacuum in the Middle East" Washington Institute Policy Alert, June 14, 2011.
Robert Satloff is executive director of The Washington Institute. South Asian Pulse, http://www.sapulse.com/new_comments.php?id=3061_0_1_0_C, SRM) Recent events, of course, suggest precisely the opposite. In last year's test run for this autumn's diplomatic crisis, there was no visible backlash from Riyadh after the Obama administration vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlement activity. And just this past week, after the president enunciated his clear opposition to the Palestinians' UN strategy, Saudi leaders put their strategic priorities on display by bucking an anti-Western OPEC decision and helpfully agreeing to increase domestic oil production, thereby denting the continued windfall that Iran has been earning from the recent rise in oil prices.
US-Saudi relations resilient LA Times, 2011 (June 19, "U.S., Saudis in Mideast tug of war; Quest for greater influence intensifies as
uprisings in the region further drive a wedge between the longtime allies." LEXIS, SRM) A senior State Department official insisted that on security and energy issues, the alliance remains "rock solid." The two countries also continue to cooperate closely on counter-terrorism, and have collaborated on the political crisis enveloping Yemen that has raised the specter of a resurgent Al Qaeda, officials note. The United States is selling the Saudis $60 billion in arms and other military hardware in a multiyear deal, the largest U.S. weapons transaction ever.
Concern over Iran will sustain relations Bronson 2006 (Rachel, former Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, Bronson: Saudis Deeply
Concerned Over Irans Nuclear Program, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10328/bronson.html) The important thing to remember with the U.S.-Saudi relationship and one of the key points in my book is that, while oil is very important, the relationship is also supported by two other very important pillars: Saudi Arabias strategic locationwhere it actually physically sits on the maphas been very important going back to World War II and remains that way in the present. The fact is that it borders on Iraq and is across the Persian Gulf from Iran, and is quite close to Israel. In addition, Saudi Arabias religiosity has been very important in the region. For example, in terms of its strategic location in the contemporary period, Saudi Arabia is extremely concerned over the possibility of Irans nuclear proliferation, and about its seeming relentless bid to acquire a successful nuclear program. So it shares a U.S. concern? On Iran it most certainly does. One of the things weve seen from the Saudis is a call for a nuclear-free Arabian gulf. In the past theyve talked about a nuclear-free Middle East with clear reference to the Israelis. Now theyre very focused on their immediate neighbor to the east and their immediate efforts are to try to ensure a nuclear-free Arabian or Persian gulf.
44 Saudi DA
EXT Relations Resilient: Oil and Security

Relations strong despite democracy assistance CNN July 3, 2011 ("Obama adviser discusses 'scratchy' ties with Arab allies" http://articles.cnn.com/2011-0703/us/mideast_1_saudi-arabia-saudi-monarchy-washington-and-riyadh?_s=PM:US, SRM) The United States has had "scratchy periods" with Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern allies over its support for reform movements in the region, National Security Adviser Tom Donilon acknowledged in a TV interview that aired Sunday. But Donilon told CNN's "Fareed Zakaria GPS" that Washington and the Saudi monarchy have common interests that keep relations "in pretty good shape." "Our conversations with our partners in the region -- including the Saudis -- I think have become very constructive and productive," Donilon said. "And I can tell you that from personal conversations with King Abdullah."
Giant arms deal ensures US-Saudi relations Front Page 2011 ("Saudis up the nuclear ante"http://frontpagemag.com/2011/07/22/saudis-up-the-nuclear-ante/,
SRM) To that end, the Saudis have entered into a $60 billion arms deal with the United States, one which calls for the Saudi purchase of 84 US-built F-15 combat aircraft and an upgrade of 70 existing Saudi F-15s. The arms deal is also said to include an upgrade of the Saudi Patriot short-range missile defense in favor of a system to defend against higher-flying, medium-range ballistic missiles. In addition to the arms deal, reports have recently surfaced that the US has been secretly training and equipping an elite Saudi Arabian force of 35,000 troops to provide security for Saudi energy production facilities, desalinization pants and nuclear reactors. The newly developed force is separate from the Saudi military, as well as the Saudi Arabian National Guard.
Ignore talk of fluctuation: security and oil are the only relevant issues in US/Saudi relations
West 2001 (J. Robinson Former Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and currently Chairman of the Petroleum
Finance Co The Saudi problem: ignore the press reports http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2633/is_6_15/ai_82005574) The American public has recently been served up a stream of articles about strains in the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia and the imminent demise of the Saudi royal family. Americans are troubled by repons of violent opposition, as well as the fact that many of Osama bin Laden's terrorists were born in Saudi Arabia, and funded from there. The impression has been created that America is bearing the consequences of Saudi incompetence, corruption, and inaction. This picture is outdated and complicates U.S.-Saudi relations. Close U.S.-Saudi relations are a keystone of U.S. Middle East policy. The two countries enjoy a long-standing strategic alliance, founded on a simple exchange: Saudi Arabia would provide an uninterrupted flow of oil to the United States, which in return would insure regional security, guaranteeing that Saudi resources would not fall prey to hungry predators. Since the alliance was formed by President Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz near the end of World War II, differences of opinion have occurred from time to time, but the underlying foundation remained solid. The kingdom does have serious economic and political problems. Sentiment on the ground is certainly more charged than before September 11th. But this is a long way from concluding that Saudi Arabia is an unreliable partner, or that the royal family's days are numbered. The kingdom has begun to put internal and external policies in place in recent years to stabilize the situation they now face. Media reports partly reflect frustration in Washington political circles with Saudi Arabia's hesitant cooperation in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. In actual fact, the kingdom has provided cooperation, albeit not as publicly as the Bush administration might have liked. And its most important contribution has been on the oil side, cajoling OPEC into accepting lower prices immediately after September 11th.
American and Saudi security interests are the basis of relations
Dris-Ait-Hamadouche 2007 (Louisa "US-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP AND THE IRAQ WAR: THE
DIALECTICS OF A DEPENDENT ALLIANCE, THE". Journal of Third World Studies. Spring 2007. FindArticles.com. 06 Oct. 2007. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3821/is_200704/ai_n19431912)
45 Saudi DA
This security assistance from the United States rests on two requirements: a/supply of arms, equipment, and training; and, b/the maintenance of an American security umbrella over the kingdom and its GCC neighbors.41 If the first element does not cause any trouble, the second one is quite problematic, notably because of the internal contestation (the well-known opposition of Islamist movements to the presence of foreign troops in the Holy Land). Yet, this mission remains possible even outside the borders, going from Qatar or other GCC states. The military cooperation explains in part the value of US-Saudi trade. In 1999 Saudi exports to the US were estimated at $7.9 billion and imports from the US at $7.6 billion. This two-way traffic is dominated by oil flows to the US and arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The total value of US arms agreements with Saudi Arabia from 1950 through March 1997 was some $94 billion, while arms agreements in the period 1991-1997 alone amounted to nearly $23 billion. According to the Washington-based Congressional Research Service, the number of US personnel in Saudi Arabia (military forces and contractors working with the local armed forces) revolves between 35,000 and 40,000. American arms and military assistance have gone largely to protect the royal family42 from internal and external threats. More recently, close observers of the Saudi scene43 estimated that Saudi Arabia operates more than 750 US main battle tanks, 4,800 other armored vehicles, and some 200 advanced combat aircraft. US training and support is critical to all of Saudi Arabia's military services and the Saudi National Guard. Moreover, Saudi Arabia signed some $7.7 billion worth of new arms agreements with the US between 1995 and 2002, and the Saudi need for US training and technical support will continue for at least another decade. The spectacular "military withdrawal" announced after the end of major operations in Iraq in May 2003 has yet to occur. In fact, American military personnel and civilian contractors on military-related projects remain at their jobs in Saudi Arabia. Some 30.000 Americans continue to live and work there, as do thousands of Britons, Irish, and other Europeans. The number of US instructors is likely to be increased, and the joint general staff committee, which has not met since 2001, resumed meetings in summer 2003. Even where Westerners are not directly involved, it is obvious that the country's development strategy, oil policy, security arrangements, and commercial interests are driven by Western-educated and Western-influenced Saudis. "There was no US base here before 1990, and a US military presence on the horizon was sufficient to guarantee our security."44 There is also the "continuing need" for US and Saudi security cooperation. In American and Saudi thinking, removing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein helped reduce the security risks in the Gulf, but it has not completely eliminated them. Both sides expect instability in the years or even decades to come. This is precisely why some analysts feel that isolating Saudi Arabia is not in US interest and that Congress and media bashing of the kingdom is counterproductive.45
46 Saudi DA
Saudi Prolif Good - Iran

Saudi prolif deters Iran nuclearization Lalwani 2008 (Sameer, Another Take on Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Agenda, June 10/
http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2008/06/another_respons) Finally, though its true that nuclear assistance might be playing with fire, there seems to be a very legitimate strategic calculus to assisting the Saudi government -- namely, signaling to Iran the cost of going nuclear. Right now Iran has conventional weapons superiority in the region but a drive to nuclear weapons that results in proliferation would eliminate their advantage through nuclear-provided strategic parity. If Iran actually believes that other states in the gulf region are ready and capable of also going nuclear, it might rethink its strategic calculations and turn back from weaponization. Certainly one must be wary of this spiraling into an arms race, but there is also a conceivable strategic logic to the moves being played by the US and Saudi Arabia. Saudi and the GCC have already indicated interest in this nuclear project but also in dissuading Iran from its nuclear ambitions and ultimately developing a regional security architecture for the Gulf states as Thomas Lippman has argued. If some sort of Saudi/GCC peaceful nuclear
venture is inevitable, its better the US be involved in guiding it -- commanding greater influence and knowledge of capabilities -- rather than China or Russia stepping in to assume the role of nuclear patron.
Iranian proliferation leads to Israeli launch and nuclear war Schoenfeld 1998 (Gabriel, the senior editor of Commentary, Commentary, LEXIS)
Now, once again, the question has arisen of what forcible steps Israel might take in order to deny nuclear weapons to its enemies. This past September, Ephraim Sneh, a general in the Israeli army reserves and a leading member of the opposition Labor party, spoke publicly of the possibility that the IDF might be compelled to "deliver a conventional counterstrike or preemptive strike" against Iranian atomic facilities.
This was not long after Teheran tested its Shahab-3 missile--to the yawns of the international community--and then displayed the missile in a military parade with banners draped from it reading, "Israel should be wiped from the map"--to still more yawns by the international community. Sneh was roundly criticized at home for his remarks, not because he was wrong but because, as Uzi Landau, the chairman of the Knesset's foreign-affairs and security committee, explained, "unnecessary chatter" could heighten the likelihood of Israel's being targeted for attack. But whether or not Sneh should have spoken out, the option he referred to may be less viable than it once was. Both Iran and Iraq have already taken measures--concealment, dispersion, hardening, surface-to-air defense--to ensure that the feat performed by Israel's air force in 1981, and for which it was universally condemned at the time, including by the United States, could not easily be repeated. If preemption is largely ruled out as an option, what then? To reduce its vulnerability--enemy
missiles can arrive within ten minutes from firing--Israel may well be compelled to adopt a "launch-onwarning" posture for both its conventional and nuclear forces. For the purpose of considering this eventuality, we may
assume that Israel has indeed developed a secure retaliatory force of the kind Tucker saw as essential to stability. Even so, however, this would not offer much reassurance. Unlike its neighbors, and unlike the U.S., Israel is a tiny country, and in a nuclear environment it would not have the luxury of waiting to assess the damage from a first strike before deciding how to respond. Thus, in any future crisis, at
the first hint from satellite intelligence or some other means that a missile fusillade was being prepared from, say, Iran or Iraq, Israel, to protect its populace, would have to punch first. And it would have to strike not only at
missile sites, some of which it might well miss, but at a broader range of targets--communications facilities, air bases, storage bunkers, and all other critical nodes--so as to paralyze the enemy and thus rule out the possibility of attack. These are the implications of launch-onwarning. Clearly, such a posture presents grave problems. Lacking secure second-strike forces of their own, and aware that Israel would no doubt try to hit them preemptively, Iran and Iraq would be under tremendous pressure to launch their missiles
first--to "use them or lose them." In other words, what this scenario leads to is the prospect of both sides' moving to a permanent position of hair-trigger alert. It is a nightmarish prospect. The possibility that nuclear war might break out at any moment--by accident, miscalculation, or design--would inevitably place an intolerable strain on Israel's freedom of military movement, and take a no less heavy toll on civilian morale.
47 Saudi DA
Saudi Prolif Good - Stability

Saudi prolif is inevitable and secures Middle East instability by deterrence Blank 2003 (Stephen, analyst of international security affairs, Saudi Arabia's nuclear gambit, Asia Times)
Another consideration is that a possible Saudi nuclear deterrent might also check Iran, with whom Pakistan has issues, especially over Afghanistan. Thus, a possible Riyadh-Islamabad axis would offer those two capitals, both of which continue to sponsor terrorism in Palestine and Kashmir respectively, a way to check India and its allies or partners, Iran and Israel. Although both governments have firmly denied these allegations of nuclear cooperation, the explosion of reports from different sources in the US and Europe, many allegedly based on sources with access to these governments, appears to have some basis in reality.
Middle East instability ensures nuclear war Steinbach 2002 (John Steinbach in March 2002 (Source: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htm)
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of
Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)
48 Saudi DA
EXT Saudi Prolif Inevitable

Pakistan will give Saudis the bomb The Nation, 2011 ("Pakistan and the Bomb: whose finger is on the button?" LEXIS, SRM)
Pakistan may also continue to contribute to nuclear proliferation. There are persistent, but unverified, reports of an understanding between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for Islamabad to provide nuclear weapons to Riyadh if the Saudis feel threatened by a third party with nuclear weapons. Then Saudi defence minister and now also Crown Prince Sultan Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud visited Pakistan's laboratories amid great publicity in the late 1990s. Some sensationalist reports claim the Saudis keep aircraft permanently deployed in Pakistan to rush a bomb or two to Riyadh if needed. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia deny any secret deal, but rumours continue to surface as Iran moves closer to developing its own bomb.
Saudis proliferating now because of Iran Front Page 2011 ("Saudis up the nuclear ante"http://frontpagemag.com/2011/07/22/saudis-up-the-nuclear-ante/,
SRM) Fearful that he will soon face a nuclear-armed Iran, Saudi Arabias Prince Turki al-Faisal recently warned that the Saudi Kingdom would have no choice but to develop its own nuclear weapons, a move he said would lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences. While the Saudis have long voiced the strategic goal of a nuclear-free Middle East, they have also unequivocally stated that they wont sit back and allow themselves to be the only nonnuclear nation in the region. So, the remarks by al-Faisal a former Saudi intelligence official simply echo that view, one espoused by Saudi King Abdullah in 2006 when he said that if Iran ever developed nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would, including Saudi Arabia. However, with Iran now edging ever closer to acquiring its own nuclear weapons, it appears the Saudis have actually begun laying the groundwork for a similar pursuit. For example, in April 2011, the Saudis purchased from China advanced ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. One of the missiles, the DF-21, can carry a 500kT nuclear warhead over 1,800 kilometers.
49 Saudi DA
A/T: Saudi Prolif Incentive/Means

No Saudi prolif - prefer nuclear energy Nucleonics Week 2010 ("Middle Eastern nuclear growth expected, but obstacles remain" LEXIS, SRM)
The GCC countries are compliant with international conventions and have in the past all said they prefer not to enrich nuclear fuel, a key concession being sought by the US as a condition for 123 agreements, Rogner said. Saudi Arabia may be waiting to see how the UAE nuclear program develops before placing an order for its first nuclear power plant, Rogner said. In May, Naif bin Bandar Al-Sudairy, head of the Saudi delegation to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, said in a speech at the United Nations in New York that a new nuclear and renewable energy center would oversee peaceful uses of those energy sources. The center, known as the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, "is mandated to supervise, monitor and control all usages of atomic energy and the resulting radioactive waste," Bandar Al-Sudairy said.
No Saudi Prolif pushing non-proliferation now BBC 2010 (April 14, "Saudi intelligence chief addresses nuclear security summit" LEXIS, SRM)
Prince Miqrin said the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had submitted a report that highlighted its views on measures to make the Middle East a free zone from nuclear weapons, which conforms closely With this initiative of the Summit. 'This report of the Kingdom was issued as an official document of the Sixth Review Conference of States' Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2000.' He said, 'In this regard, the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has repeatedly confirmed the concerns raised in this report which are compatible with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, and adopted at each session of the General Assembly by consensus since its 35th session in 1980, including the resolution which calls for declaring the Middle East and Arab Gulf region free from all weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.'
Saudis cant proliferate no tech Front Page 2011 ("Saudis up the nuclear ante"http://frontpagemag.com/2011/07/22/saudis-up-the-nuclear-ante/,
SRM) Still, it should be noted that even if the Saudis are seriously intent on pursuing a nuclear weapons course, a myriad of obstacles abound. For starters, the Saudis have the money to build a nuclear weapons system, but they presently lack the technological capacity, in particular an absence of highly skilled technicians, engineers and scientists. As such, the final development of a nuclear weapon could take one to two decades.
Saudi Arabia cant and has no incentive to proliferate Lippman 2008 (Thomas, former Middle East correspondent and a diplomatic and national security reporter for
The Washington Post, "Nuclear Weapons and Saudi Strategy", http://www.susris.com/articles/2008/ioi/080209lippman-nuclear.html) It is far from certain, however, that Saudi Arabia would wish to acquire its own nuclear arsenal or that it is capable of doing so. There are compelling reasons why Saudi Arabia would not undertake an effort to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, even in the unlikely event that Iran achieves a stockpile and uses this arsenal to threaten the Kingdom. Money is not an issue if destitute North Korea can develop nuclear weapons, Saudi
Arabia surely has the resources to pursue such a program. In the fall of 2007, the Saudis reported a budget surplus of $77 billion, and with oil prices above $90 a barrel, Riyadh is flush with cash. But the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons would
be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultimately would likely weaken the kingdom rather than strengthen it. Such a course would be directly contrary to the Kingdoms longstanding stated goal of making the entire Middle East a nuclear weapons free zone.
According to Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz, the Defense Minister and Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, nuclear weapons by their nature contravene the tenets of Islam. Pursuing nuclear weapons would be a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabias
commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and would surely cause a serious breach with the United States. Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and technological base to develop such weapons on its own. An attempt to acquire nuclear weapons by purchasing them, perhaps from Pakistan, would launch Saudi Arabia on a dangerously inflammatory trajectory that could destabilize the entire region, which Saudi Arabias leaders know would not be in their countrys best interests. The Saudis always prefer stability
to turmoil. Saudi Arabia and the NPT Saudi Arabia, like Iran, is a signatory to the NPT and participates in the safeguard regime of the
50 Saudi DA
International Atomic Energy Agency. It signed the treaty only under duress, but its reluctance was not based on a desire to develop nuclear wepons. The Kingdoms position was that it would be happy to join the NPT system when Israel did so. But then in 1988 it was virtually forced to sign the NPT because of intense pressure from the United States.
51 Saudi DA
A/T: Saudi Prolif Iran Alt Cause

Iran, not the US, will be the deciding factor in Saudi proliferation Guzansky July 1st, 2011 (Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at
Tel Aviv University. He joined INSS after serving at Israel's National Security Council; "TEHRAN TESTS SAUDIS' NERVE ON NUKES", LEXIS, SRM) The Saudi strategy perhaps depends most of all on if and how Iran crosses the nuclear threshold. Should Iran not cross the nuclear threshold, Saudi Arabia may be able to turn a blind eye or aspire to become a threshold state itself. However, should it become certain Iran is a nuclear weapons state, Saudi Arabia would feel obligated to acquire similar capability. Former head of the Saudi intelligence service and ambassador to the US, Turki al-Faisal, stressed recently that if Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon ``Saudi Arabia might feel pressure to acquire a nuclear deterrent of its own''. Earlier this month The Wall Street Journal reported another Saudi threat to go nuclear or ``to pursue policies that could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences'', should Iran do the same.
52 Saudi DA
Prolif: Not Bad

Deterrence prevents escalation in the middle east Feldman, 1995 (Shai, Senior Research Associate at Tel Aviv Universitys Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies and
Director of the Centers Project on Security and Arms Control in the Middle East, Middle East Nuclear Stability: The State of the Region and the State of the Debate, Journal of International Affairs, 49:1, Summer) The uncertainty regarding current and future Middle East nuclear proliferation trends is compounded by even greater uncertainty regarding the likely effects of such proliferation should it take place.[18] In an earlier work, this writer portrayed the logic of nuclear deterrence from the perspective of a single small state seeking security and survival.[19] It was argued that effective deterrence requires-robust capabilities and considerable determination. Thus, the outcome of deterrent confrontations is determined by states' relative capacity to inflict punishment and their relative willingness to absorb such costs. Generally, and despite the clear constraints addressed below, nuclear weapons provide states with far more robust deterrence than conventional arms.[20] First, a state equipped with nuclear weapons enjoys a nearly unlimited capability to inflict punishment, since the level of damage that can be caused by a small number of nuclear weapons is -- for all practical purposes -- unlimited. Nuclear weapons can cause significantly greater damage than conventional explosives, since the blast-weight ratio of nuclear devices is on the order of magnitude of a million times greater. Second, nuclear weapons leave far less room for misperceptions about the damage that can be caused. This is because a simple extrapolation from the widely-recognized horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to today's far larger-yield nuclear weapons leaves little doubt about the catastrophic effects of any use of nuclear arms. Indeed, these perceptions were merely reinforced by the nuclear disaster at Chemobyl -the effects of which were very modest in comparison with the expected outcomes of a possible nuclear weapons exchange. Third, conventional deterrence is vulnerable to variations in the sensitivity to costs among different states. Indeed, conventional deterrence often fails because countries and regimes may be insensitive to the level of costs involved in the execution of the threat to use conventional forces. By contrast, the enormous damage that would be caused by nuclear weapons makes it easier to overcome the impact of these variations. Put simply, it is difficult to envisage a regime so insensitive to costs that it would ignore credible threats to inflict nuclear punishment.
53 Saudi DA
A/T: China Aggression

China is pursuing a peaceful entrance into the international order Heller 2003 (Eric Nathaniel, published international security author University of Illinois, Power Projections of
the Peoples Republic of China: An Investigative Analysis of Defensive and Offensive Realism in Chinese Foreign Policy https://www.ideals.uiuc.edu/bitstream/2142/34/1/HellerOP.pdf) However, realists also argue that a competitor will strive to emulate the policies and general characteristics of the state to which they aspire in order to be viewed as similar and non-threatening by the hegemon and international community.8 To support this argument is Chinas bid for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing and the drive for admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Neither policy would seem to improve the security of China drastically; however, being a member of the WTO and hosting the Olympic Games bring economic implications and prestigesigns of a powerful nation on the rise. No longer would the PRC be viewed as a rogue power, engaged in diplomatic tiffs over Taiwan and a downed US Navy plane, but as a mainstream country capable of rivaling what is at times viewed as a heavy-handed United States. Great powers are rewarded if they appear both strong and potentially dangerous because states ally with the strongest and most threatening powers.
No US-China conflict in the Middle East Luft and Korin 2004 (Gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, and Anne,
director of policy and strategic planning at IAGS, The Sino-Saudi Connection, Commentary Magazine, http://www.iags.org/sinosaudi.htm) Of course, many other factors must be weighed in the balance. The Chinese may well find fishing in Middle Eastern waters to be a risky business, entailing high costs in relations with other powers, and in particular with the U.S. Already there are signs of growing disquiet in Washington over China's role in the Middle East. The U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, a group created by Congress to monitor relations between the two countries, issued a warning in 2002 over China's provision of "technology and components for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems" to such Middle Eastern states as Iran, Syria, Libya, and Sudan. This was characterized as "an increasing threat to U.S. security interests." Significantly, the report took special notice of China's growing dependence on imported oil, calling it a "key driver" impelling relations with "terrorist-sponsoring governments" in the region. If such concerns continue to mount, China could find itself gaining in
one region only to lose in another. The Chinese economy may be heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil, but it is also heavily dependent on trade with the U.S. The shelves of Wal-Mart alone account for 10 percent of China's exports to the U.S. and 1 percent of China's GDP. Whether and under what circumstances the U.S. would ever choose to exercise its leverage is another matter. Right now, any collision over Middle Eastern oil is more a potential than an actual threat. Besides, if predicting the future is risky at all times, the present moment makes the exercise almost foolhardy. That the Middle East is in an exceptionally volatile condition goes without saying. And as for China, its astonishing economic growth may yet turn out to be a bubble; if it pops, so will its high rates of energy consumption. Then, too, even if stellar economic growth continues, the Chinese may find attractive alternatives to oil: the country is extremely rich in coal and natural gas, and, since it has not yet invested heavily in an expensive petroleum infrastructure, it could develop ways to harness fuels produced from coal and biomass (both of which it has in abundance) and thus overcome its dependence on imported oil altogether.

ASU 2011 Saudi DA Relations Resilient

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ASU 2011 Steven Murray

1NC Saudi DA.....................................................................................................................................4

UQ US-Saudi relations Low...........................................................................................................6

Relations UQ No one Trusts Anyone.............................................................................................8

2NC Link Wall....................................................................................................................................9

Link Democracy Assistance..........................................................................................................10

Link Arab Spring...........................................................................................................................11

Bahrain Link UQ..............................................................................................................................14

Link - Shiites in Bahrain..................................................................................................................15

Link - Appeasing Iran......................................................................................................................16

A/T: Relations Resilient Oil..........................................................................................................18

A/T: Relations Resilient Security.................................................................................................19

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

Saudi Prolif Dominoes.....................................................................................................................22

A/T: Saudi Prolif Inevitable.............................................................................................................24

A/T: Pakistan Gives the Bomb........................................................................................................25

A/T: Iran Prolif = Saudi Prolif inevitable......................................................................................26

Iran Prolif Good................................................................................................................................27

Saudi Prolif Terrorism................................................................................................................29

Impact Dollar Heg.........................................................................................................................31

Ext: Relz key to dollar heg...............................................................................................................33

EXT Oil Security............................................................................................................................34

Impact Regional Power Projection..............................................................................................35

Impact Middle East Stability........................................................................................................36

EXT China Fill-In..........................................................................................................................39

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

US-Saudi Relations Resilient...........................................................................................................43

EXT Relations Resilient: Oil and Security.................................................................................44

Saudi Prolif Good - Iran..................................................................................................................46

Saudi Prolif Good - Stability...........................................................................................................47

EXT Saudi Prolif Inevitable.........................................................................................................48

A/T: Saudi Prolif Incentive/Means..............................................................................................49

A/T: Saudi Prolif Iran Alt Cause.................................................................................................51

Prolif: Not Bad..................................................................................................................................52

A/T: China Aggression.....................................................................................................................53

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

***Uniqueness*** UQ US-Saudi relations Low

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

Relations UQ No one Trusts Anyone

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

***Links*** 2NC Link Wall

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

Link Democracy Assistance

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

Link Arab Spring

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

Link - Shiites in Bahrain

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

Link - Appeasing Iran

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

A/T: Relations Resilient Oil

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

A/T: Relations Resilient Security

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

***Impacts*** 2NC Proliferation

ASU 2011 Steven Murray

Uniqueness UQ US-Saudi relations Low

Links 2NC Link Wall

Impacts 2NC Proliferation