THE EUROMISSILES

CRISIS AND
THE END OF THE
COLD WAR,
1977-1987
DOCUMENT READER
PART I
Embassy of the
United States in Rome
10-12 DECEMBER 2009
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ROME, ITALY
Convened by t he Machi avel l i Cent er for Col d War St udi es ( CI MA) ; t he Woodrow
Wi l son Cent er s Col d War I nt er nat i onal Hi st or y Proj ect ( CWI HP) ; Fondazi one Craxi ; t he
George Washi ngt on Uni versi t ys Nat i onal Secur i t y Archi ve; t he Uni versi t y of Par i s I I I -
Sor bonne Nouvel l e; and t he Uni versi t y of Par i s I - Pant heon Sor bonne; i n cooperat i on wi t h
Bundeskanzl er Wi l l y Brandt St i f t ung; and under t he sponsorshi p of t he I t al i an Mi ni st r y of
Forei gn Af f ai rs and t he Embassy of t he Uni t ed St at es i n Rome.


The Euromissiles Crisis and
the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

Dear Conference Participants,

We are pleased to present to you this document reader, intended to facilitate discussion at the
upcoming conference on the Euromissiles Crisis, to be held in Rome on 10-12 December 2009.

This collection was compiled by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the
Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) with indispensable support from conference participants,
outside contributors, and institutional sponsors. It is by no means comprehensive. In selecting the
documents, we sought to include some of the most important materials available and to provide a broad
overview of the Euromissiles Crisis from a variety of perspectives.

This reader is divided into four parts: The Peace Movement highlights the perspective of the grass-
roots activists from both sides of the Iron Curtain who opposed the Euromissiles deployment and the arms
race generally, and the three chronological sections on International Diplomacy focus upon the actions and
views of the policy-makers and world leaders who were at the very center of the Euromissiles Crisis.

We are extremely grateful to everyone who contributed documentary evidence to this reader,
including Gianni Battimelli, William Burr, Malcolm Byrne, Elizabeth Charles, Lodovica Clavarino, Helge
Danielsen, Ruud van Dijk, Matthew Evangelista, Nathan Jones, Holger Nehring, Leopoldo Nuti, Giordana
Pulcini, Bernd Rother, Giles Scott-Smith and James Graham Wilson. Piero Craveri, Laura Pizei and Serena
Baldari played a key role in making documents from the Craxi Foundation available in this reader.

Once the documents were in hand, a number of people worked to ensure that this collection was
ready for dissemination, including Christian Ostermann, Bernd Schaefer, Mircea Munteanu and Kristina
Terzieva at CWIHP, the German Historical Institutes German History in Documents and Images Project
Manager Kelly McCullough, Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein from the London School of Economics, as well as
an extraordinarily capable team of CWIHP Research Assistants, including Pieter Biersteker, Amy Freeman,
Ekaterina Radaeva, Elizabeth Schumaecker, and Katarzyna Stempniak.

This reader and the larger conference to which it is connected benefited immensely from the
support of Fondazione Craxi, the National Security Archive at the George Washington University, the
University of Paris III-Sorbone Nouvelle, the University of Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne, Bundeskanzler Willy
Brandt Stiftung, the London School of Economics Cold War Studies Centre, and BCC Roma. The Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States in Rome deserve special thanks for their
central roles in sponsoring and hosting this conference.

Finally, we would also like to recognize the efforts of those whose hard work has made this
conference possible, including Matteo Gerlini for his pioneering research at the Fondazione Craxi, and of
course Leopoldo Nuti, and his outstanding staff, Giordana Pulcini, Lodovica Clavarino and Flavia Gasbarri,
as well as the Wilson Centers Diana Micheli, who designed the conference poster and program.


Tim McDonnell
Washington, D.C.
November 2009
The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Part One: The Peace Movement

1) 15 March 1975, The Ostensible End of the Protest Movement, by Bernd Guggenberger, German
Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., (www.ghi-dc.org), Contributed by Holger Nehring.

2) 28 October 1977, The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, by Helmut Schmidt, published in the
Jan/Feb. 1978 issue of Survival, Contributed by Holger Nehring.

3) 22 September 1 October 1979, A Dialogue with the Soviets: Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament and
Nuclear Energy, by Everett Mendelsohn, American Friends Service Committee, Contributed by
Matthew Evangelista.

4) c. February 1980, Protest and Survive, by E.P. Thompson, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
and the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.

5) April 1980, Freeze Appeal, by Randy Forsberg, Archivio Amaldi, Dipartimento di Fisica
dellUniversit di Roma, La Sapienza, Contributed by Lodovica Clavarino.

6) c. January 1981, European Nuclear Disarmament, by Ken Coates, the Bertrand Russell Peace
Foundation, Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.

7) 8 October 1981, Statement of the Consequences of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, formulated at the
conclusion of a meeting of the Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, Vatican City, Archivio Amaldi,
Dipartimento di Fisica dellUniversit di Roma, La Sapienza, Contributed by Lodovica Clavarino.

8) 12 October 1981, Bonn: Half Fortress, Half Festival, Die Welt, German Historical Institute,
Washington, D.C., (www.ghi-dc.org), Contributed by Holger Nehring.

9) 16 October 1981, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

10) 19 October 1981, This Crisis is the Most Serious One of All, by Alfred Grosser, Der Spiegel,
German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., (www.ghi-dc.org), Contributed by Holger Nehring.

11) 27 November 1981, Appeal to President Pertini, Archivio Amaldi, Dipartimento di Fisica
dellUniversit di Roma, La Sapienza, Contributed by Lodovica Clavarino.

12) 23 December 1981, Beyond the Cold War, by E.P. Thompson, European Nuclear Disarmament,
Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.

13) c. Fall 1982, END Special Report, Comiso, by Ben Thompson, European Nuclear Disarmament,
Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.

14) c. Late 1982, END Special Report, The New Hungarian Peace Movement, by Ferenc Koszegi and
E.P. Thompson, European Nuclear Disarmament, Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.

15) c. November 1982, END Special Report, Moscow Independent Peace Group, by Jean Stead and
Danielle Gruenberg, European Nuclear Disarmament, Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.

16) November 1982, END Special Report, The Nuclear North Atlantic, by Olafur Grimsson and Angus
McCormack, European Nuclear Disarmament, Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.

17) 7 December 1982, Young Christians Propose a Social Peace Service as an Alternative to
Compulsory Military Duty, Frankfurter Rundschau, German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C.,
(www.ghi-dc.org), Contributed by Holger Nehring.

18) April 1983, END Special Report, Turkey: Peace on Trial, edited by Jean Furtado, European Nuclear
Disarmament, Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.

19) 21 July 1983, Interview with Roland Jahn, An Expelled East German Dissident Explains the Peace
Movement, Tageszeitung, German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., (www.ghi-dc.org),
Contributed by Holger Nehring.

20) Unknown, 1983, [Founding] Statute of the [Italian] Union of Scientists for Disarmement, Personal
collection of Professor Giani Battimelli, Contributed by Giana Battimelli and Lodovica Clavarino.

21) 9 June 1984, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

22) September 1984, Return Address: Moscow, Issue 1, Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.

23) c. November 1984, Return Address: Moscow, Issue 2, Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.

24) c. February 1985, Return Address: Moscow, Issue 3, Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.

25) November 1985, Letter by Vera and Knud Wollenberger, Silvia Mller, Thomas Klein, Reinhard
Schult, and Wolfgang Wolf, Peace and Human Rights, German Historical Institute, Washington,
D.C., (www.ghi-dc.org), Contributed by Holger Nehring.

26) 6 September 1993, Signature Page of 1987 INF Treaty, Presented to International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War founder Dr. Bernard Lown by M.S. Gorbachev, Contributed by Matthew
Evangelista.


The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987















Part One:
The Peace Movement




























Rome, Italy, 10-12 December 2009
1


Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
The Ostensible End of the Protest Movement (March 15, 1975)



In the following article, political scientist Bernd Guggenberger analyzes the protest movement of
the previous years. He explores its motivations and strategies, as well as the reasons behind its
apparent loss of momentum in the mid-1970s. On the basis of this analysis, Guggenberger
predicts a revived Biedermeier era, referring to a period in the early nineteenth century when
people at least publicly made a turn away from politics and towards private life.




The Return to Reality


Where is the protest movement going? A definite answer to this question is impossible, if for no
other reason than our temporal and spatial proximity to this phenomenon. The discernible
approaches, motivations, and directions are too diverse and ambiguous: the development also
proceeded too breathlessly; the passage of time left so many things outdated, things that the
culturally-critical social sciences had already deemed all but certain knowledge.

One only has to remember the theory of the end of ideologies, which was proclaimed with
missionary zeal until well into the 1960s. What remained of it when one took stock of things at
the end of that decade? Not only did a new right-wing party establish itself here in the Federal
Republic in the mid-1960s in the wake of the economic recession; a New Left also emerged,
and as a worldwide movement at that. Its criticisms were ignited precisely by the anti-ideology
stance of industrial society, the complacency of the older generation, the sobriety and everyday
pragmatism of the politicians, and the general quest for affluence [Wohlstandsorientierung] that
was prevailing everywhere.

What remains when we look back at the doctrines of the early 1970s today? And when we
think of slick formulas such as re-ideologization, polarization, anarchy, and class struggle?

Today, in 1975, is the ideological permeation of broad areas of social life, indoctrination and
political polarization, class struggle and anarchy still the central issue in schools and
universities?

Reproduced from the German
History in Documents and Images
Collection by permission of the
German Historical Institute,
Washington, D.C. (www.ghi-dc.org)
-Thanks to GHDI Project Manager
K. McCullough and her staff for
ensuring the quality of the
translations.
--Contributed by Holger Nehring.
2
What is immediately obvious to everyone is that, outside the walls of our universities, and in
large part even within them, things have gotten noticeably quieter. Gone is the pure excitement,
the hectic revolutionizing, the outpouring of emotions. Gone, too, is the lightness, the optimism,
the brilliant carefreeness that was thoroughly characteristic of this collective escape from the
despised world of the fathers. Initially, the spokespeople of the New Left included many more
artists and poets than politicians and functionaries of organizations. This has changed
fundamentally. No longer does the talented loner, the critical, well-read, original, sharp-tongued,
articulate individualist dominate the scene, but rather the often meticulously tidy wooden, but
well-prepared, narrow-minded dogmatist of an SED-friendly Marxism-Leninism.

With the new Spartacist formation (and some other large and small groups that call
themselves Communist), the revolution has lost its cosmopolitan flair. It has become
provincial, petty-minded, bigoted, and is mostly consumed by arguments about the proper
exegesis of each respective text that promises liberation. It no longer feels responsible for all
the worlds problems, but contents itself sometimes in a way that is almost pushy and petty
with the articulation of student interests. At first glance, this new student generation doesnt
seem all that different from the older, quiet, or skeptical generation of the 1950s and early
1960s, which, from time to time, also took to the battlefield with neatly printed cardboard
placards to protest increases in streetcar fares and cafeteria prices.

Despite all of the revolutionary slogans that remain (and can still be seen on university walls
today), it is hard to overlook the fact that there is hardly anyone who still seriously believes in
revolutionary interpretations of current situations. The revolution has been put on ice, and the
revolutionaries are taking a breather. This breather served above all to push the revolution off
the public stage. It is taking place once again here in this country with typical German
thoroughness in auditoriums, in lecture halls, and at meetings of SPD leftists. The unusual
sobriety actually points more to exhaustion than to a deceptive calm before a new storm. The
revolutionaries are tired, sad, disillusioned. In the end, it is more draining to be against
everything than to totally subordinate yourself to one idea, one mission, or one commitment, to
dedicate yourself fully to one thing.

What the antiauthoritarian New Left never really managed to find, however, was precisely this
sense of security and identification that springs from dedication to a cause. They never found a
clear-cut theme, their own distinct purpose. For a while, they seemed to have found it in a
concern for the Third World, in dealing with war, need, hunger, and suffering on the margins of
the affluent world. Identification with the revolutionaries of the Third World promised guidance
and a boost to ones own revolutionary efforts. By feigning participation in a worldwide, unified
front of the oppressed, they gained courage and at the same time found a purpose and a
direction for their own rebellious desires again. And they saw themselves as an important factor
in the global struggle.

It was precisely the more far-sighted and critical theorists of the New Left who saw how much
secret safeguarding of interests, how much private interest accompanied this orientation, how
3
unsustainable this strategy would thus be in the long run. Failure in the real world of politics and
the accompanying frustration, the relapse into discouragement and desperation were not hard
to prognosticate. On top of that, the political developments in Cuba, China, and Vietnam also
made their own contribution. What had begun so full of hope, what had suddenly made the
world seem so young again: the rediscovery of humanity, the feeling of being connected
globally, the return to individuality, spontaneity, and the power of the human will to move
mountains all of this went off like fireworks. The antiauthoritarian exuberance has dissipated.
People are finding a new point of orientation somewhere between subculture and party
Communism.

The promising revolt against the constraints of the alienating world of technology and science
was just a short flirt with freedom. All of a sudden, among the supporters of sub-culturalism, a
privatistic cultural pessimism started to appear from behind the well-justified criticism of
industrial society. The blind and desperate flight from reality and the future led to the total
exclusion of any all-connecting social reference to the rest of the world.

The situation looks a little different on the other side, among the champions of an orthodox
cadre strategy. Here, it is not the return to the individual person that offers evidence of
capitulation in the face of the real tasks and problems that industrial society poses to socially
imaginative citizens, regardless of their political orientation; instead, it is the escape into
believing in the security-bestowing Marxist historical philosophy of the nineteenth century.
Partaking of a more than century-old understanding of structure and law, which leads to an
avowal of the social teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, has less to do with criticism and
intellectual freedom than with a deeply rooted need for security, safety, and a clear orientation
with regard to the origins and goal, the meaning and future course of history. Believing in a law
of history that works behind the participants backs and ultimately remains inaccessible to them
always also involves some fear of freedom and some fear of the infinite openness and
uncertainty of historical existence.

So what remains; what should remain? What is there to preserve beyond all the fronts and
factions?

First and foremost, the protest of the young generation did away with a host of long-outdated
taboos once and for all. What had often been regarded as unspeakable up to that point was
called by name, without hesitation. Language and general behavior have become freer, if not
always also more tolerant; but on the whole there was an increase in openness and the
willingness to engage in criticism. This can certainly be entered as a win on the overall balance
sheet, even if the losses cannot be ignored: a persistent lack of understanding of the need for
governance, rash denouncements of the formal, of superficiality in social relations, of
tradition in particular, and a general readiness to rebel that prevents authority from being able to
be experienced as a source of enrichment and self-enhancement as well.

4
What was new and often unfamiliar: a basic, underlying moral sensitivity to need and misery, to
the disenfranchised and oppressed, a sense of the one-ness of the world, of universal concern
no matter where evil should emerge. But unconditional side-taking turned all too easily into
aggression, knowledge into know-it-allness, and justifiable criticism into sweeping accusation.

And yet: the sometimes downright hectic openness to the problems of the time and the day
would not fail to leave a lasting impression. Most of the problems that were raised were not the
fantasies of pessimists or hysterics; they were about the basic survival of humanity. It was
definitely not superfluous to point urgently, again and again, to the errors and weaknesses of
our system, to imminent hunger catastrophes, psychological threats, the situation in the Third
World, the self-destructive arms race, and a lot more. These things were not new in the sense
that no one had ever recognized them or given them precise names. But they were brought into
the public eye, the veil of indifference was torn away, and the disastrous adjustment to misery
and worldly catastrophe was prevented, sometimes dramatically this is certainly the
unquestionable contribution of this movement. All of this is the original moral and emancipatory
achievement of the New Left.

But what will happen now? To be sure, the comparatively less spectacular long march through
the institutions that we are experiencing now is not a carefully planned and systematically
implemented strategy of overcoming the system by treading softly. The revolution of yesterday
and today is taking place partly in radio studios, newspaper editorial offices, publishing houses,
educational institutions, political party groups, and the headquarters of associations. This
definitely has something to do with political strategy, but far more with the transitory status of the
mostly student rebels and the psychological constitution of the movement as a whole. After the
relatively unproductive theoretical assault, most are now concerned with the concrete
application and practical testing of system critique. Effective work in the neighborhood and the
workplace, social involvement among apprentices and pupils, project-related teamwork in small
groups in the present phase of development all of this ranks far ahead of the distant goals of
the revolution and is regarded as more important and more meaningful than comprehensive
theoretical analyses and sweeping diagnoses of the era [Zeitdiagnosen].

What we are presently experiencing is a new, totally unfamiliar modesty with respect to
political demands: an orientation toward what is closest at hand, toward whatever is directly
important to ones life at the present time. It is a concentration on whatever seems just within
the realm of the politically possible.

This return to modesty is no coincidence. It is part of a larger and more general shift in direction:
the limits to growth, an appeal to a moderating reason that cannot be ignored. The energy
crisis, with its long-term repercussions for the stability of the entire global economy, has been a
decisive factor in raising general awareness of the risks facing our planet. We are beginning to
realize that the pathological cycle of the arms race, that the global resources, environmental,
and food crises, that the stultification of cities, the social, cultural, and psychological crises that
find expression in neuroses, drug addiction, asocial behavior, crime, and increasing suicide
5
rates, that all of these indicators of decline and self-destruction ineluctably force humanity to
confront the question of survival.

The reality of crises and the growing awareness of crises also influence the development of the
protest movement. In contrast to older social-revolutionary movements, this movement, from its
very beginning, was not the product of shortage but rather of abundance. Therefore, the crisis of
this affluent society [Wohlstandgesellschaft] is also its very own crisis, because only a
prospering society can afford the luxury of a protest against affluence and its consequences.
The end of the ideology of growth and prosperity also means the end of the manifestations that
ignited the protest.

Added to this is the growing pressure that rising student numbers are exerting on universities.
The practice of numerus clausus, which students in all disciplines will certainly be faced with
soon, has already led students to worry so much about their own university admission and
major that they barely have any leftover energy for other activities.

Because of this additional pressure, the protester sees himself as being entirely caught up, for
the very first time, in a situation that has been ruled an overall crisis. He shares in the general
fear of the future and experiences the doubt and uncertainty that plagues everyone. It can
therefore be expected that his reactions will not deviate substantially from those coming from his
social environment. He, too, will initially react to the dreaded situation of a general shortage of
means by restricting his expectations and demands, also and particularly in the area of
politics. He will be prepared to live with contradictions and compromises in a way that he would
not be during times of carefree prosperity.

So, as for the prognosis for the further development of the protest movement: for the near
future, a new Biedermeier era is more likely than a new chapter in the great battle for freedom. It
remains to be seen whether our epoch, whether the heirs to the former protest generation, in
particular, find their way to that happiness based on melancholy that literary historian Paul
Kluckhohn attributed to the historical Biedermeier era in the period leading up to the March
Revolution of 1848. Traces of worn-out, hypochondriac, privatist tendencies, a good dose of
thinking about individual security, and the tendency to approach the inevitable with resignation
albeit without panic are in any case easy to make out in current guiding models.




Source: Bernd Guggenberger, Rckkehr in die Wirklichkeit [The Return to Reality],
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 15, 1975.

Translation: Allison Brown

Survival Jan/trea. L978
The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture
HELMUT SCHMI DT
The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lectures have been established as a tribute to the Institute's
frst
Director. The 1977 l*cture was delivered by Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of
Germany, on 28 October 1977.
In his address the Chairman of the Institute's Council, Professor Ernst van der Beugel, welcomed the
speaker as
follows:
'Mr
Chancellor, to goyern implies a keen sense of priorities, the priority you have
chosen in delivering the second Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, is a very high tribute to Alastair's
memory and a great privilege
for
this Institute. Our welcome is twofold. IVe, of course, welcome you tts
Head of Government of the Federal Republic. We are, however, proud to v,elcome you also as Helmut
Schmidt, member of this Institute since 1959. In welcoming you as Federal Chancellor, we would like to
express our conviction that what happens in the Federal Republic will, to a very greal extent, determine
the
fate
of Europe and of the Vl/estern Alliance. lVe admire your achievements
;
we trust your policies
; we
share your concerns; you inspire our confidence, nol in the least with regard to that central moral
problem of Government: to strike a
just
and
ffictive
balance between.freedom and authority. In welcom-
ing our member, Helmut Schmidt, we think of the many intellectual contributions you have made to the
work of this Institute by preparing papers and by participating in our discussions. In spite of the enor-
mous burden of your high
ffices
-
Parliamentary Leader of your Party, Federal Minister of Defence,
Federal Minister of Finance and,
finally,
Federal Chancellor-you have always
found
time
for
this
Institute.
Alastair was primarily a scholar, but, at the same time, deeply interested in acts of policy. . . . It is,
therefore, more than
fitting
thot a man of action, dedicated to the conceptional basis on which policy
should rest, honours with his l*cture this afternoon, the scholar, who never lost his link with concrete
acts of policy'.
It is a privilege and a challenge for me to
deliver to you today the 1977 Alastair Buchan
Memorial lecture.
I consider it a very special privilege because
in this way I can pay ttibuie to Alastair Buchan
and at the same time indicate my appreciation
and admiration for the work carried out by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Alastair was a brilliant thinker on subjects
concerning war and peace. He was an outstand-
ing
journalist. He was also a good pedagogue.
When I first participated in an international
meeting organized by the IISS there were
several working groups among which was one
on nuclear strategy and another on conventional
warfare. I had volunteered for the latter but
Alastair said,
'No,
you go to the first one
because this is what you have to learn'. And so I
did. He was the fine Director of the Institute
when I became a member 18 years ago; I came
to be his friend because I shared his deep
concern about maintaining world peace and
2
global security as a major pre-requisite for human
freedom and happiness.
At the same time I consider it a challenge
to try to analyse within the short space of this
memorial lecture some important aspects of
Western security. I know that there are many in
the audience today who have devoted more time
and intellectual power to the dimensions of
Western security about which I propose to
speak: strategic and political aspects on the one
hand, economic and social aspects on the other.
New Dimensions of Security
In preparing for this lecture I picked up again
Alastair Buchan's book Power and Equilibritm
in the I970s.L It is an important and a very
thoughtful book in which Alastair analysed the
structure of world politics only five years ago.
His main concern was with the balance of power
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Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s (London and New
York: Praeger, 1972). The Russell C. Leffingwell I-ectures,
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between the United States, Western Europe,
Japan, the Soviet Union and China. Brilliant
thinker though he was, he did not at that time
devote much attention to the economic, the
social and the internal aspects of Western
security, which I will discuss today as new
dimeusions of security. These aspects do not
replace the earlier models of balance and
imbalance of power around the globe. But I
believe that they must be added to those concepts
which, in time, they will change and modify. I
know, of course, that Walter Bagehot once
stated:
'One
of the greatest pains of human
nature is the pain of a new idea'. Yet I believe
that it is in the best interest of a tradition
established and promoted by Alastair to try to
understand these new dimensions of security now
rather than to discover in the future that we
made the wrong decisions because we failed to
understand them and take them into considera-
ti on.
What are these new dimensions ? First, economic
development. By this I mean the necessity to
safeguard the basis of our prosperity, to safe-
guard free trade access to energy supplies and to
raw materials, and the need for a monetary
system which will help us to reach those targets.
There was a feeling net too long ago that we had
few problems in this field. However, the oil
crisis, the phasing out of the Bretton Woods
agreement, world-wide infl ation, unemployment
and inadequate economic growth, have together
changed the picture and have created widespread
feelings of insecurity.
Second, social security. By this I mean the
necessity to achieve and maintain social peace at
home, making goods and
jobs
available for our
people and at the same time telling them bluntly
ttrat there are limits to what the state can do for
them. It is in this connection that I would like to
congratulate my friends Jim Callaghan and Denis
Healey on their success in fighting inflation and
restoring confidence in Sterling. The battle is not
yet over, but you, the British, have come a long
way since last year and I firmly believe that the
outlook is good.
Third, domestic security. By this I mean the
necessity to strengthen and defend our society
against terrorists whose sole aim is to destroy its
fabric with acts of brutal killing and kidnapping.
You have had your share of terrorist activity in
this country and you have faced up to it. Now
we in Germany are faced with a different, but
equally ugly, form of terrorism. So are the
Dutch and other nations. We are determined to
put an end to it without sacrificing the liberal
qualities of our society. In connection with this
I would like to point to and applaud the work
done by the IISS in analysing terrorism, and I
want to urge more international co.operation to
stop terrorist activities.
J. B. Priestly in his book The English quotes
himself
-
because he believes his idea is impor-
tant, and I fully agree
-
to the effect that
foreigners often only see the walls around the
gardens of Britain and fail to appreciate the
beauty of what lies within them. Here indeed is
one of the main reasons why many foreigaers
misjudge Britain and the British. But in the
framework of this Iecture the analogy has
anotler application: in the past we have all
worked towards maintaining and mending our
outward defences but have possibly neglected tle
economic structure of our gardens, the impor-
tance of the well-being of its plants and the
threats to their roots. Therefore, while I do not
mean to suggest that we should drop our guard
of outward defence, I shall devote most of this
lecture to the internal considerations of Western
security. I shall concentrate on the economic
dimensions, but first I shall analyse some current
strategic and political issues.
The Necessity of Arms Confrol
Most of us will agree that political and military
balance is the prerequisite of our security, and I
would warn against the illusion that there may
be grounds for neglecting that balance. Indeed,
it is not only the prerequisite for our security
but also for fruitful progrcss in East-West
detente.
In the first place we should recognize that
-
paradoxical as it may sound
-
there is a closer
proximity between a hazardous arms race, on
the one hand, and a successful control of arms, on
the other, than ever before. There is only a
narrow divide between the hope for peace and
the danger of war.
Second, changed strategic conditions confront
us with new problems. Sert codifies the nuclear
strategic balance between the Soviet Union and
the United States. To put it another way: sALr
neutralizes their strategic nuclear capabilities.
In Europe this magnifies the significance of the
disparities between East and West in nuclear
tactical and conventional weapons.
Third, because of this we must press ahead
with the Vienna negotiations on mutual balanced
force reductions (wrn) as an important step
towards a better balance of military power in
Europe.
No one can deny that the principle of parity is
a sensible one. However, its fulfilment must be
the aim of all arms-limitation and arms-control
negotiations and it must apply to all categories
of weapons. Neither side can agree to diminish
its security unilaterally.
It is of vital interest to us all that the nego-
tiations between the two super-powers on the
limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic
weapons should continue and lead to a lasting
agreement. The nuclear powers have a special, an
overwhelming responsibility in this field. On the
other hand, we in Europe must be particularly
careful to ensure that these negotiations do not
neglect the components of NATo's deterrence
strategy.
We are all faced with the dilemma of having to
meet the moral and political demand for arms
limitation while at the same time maintaining a
fully effective deterrent to war. We are not una-
ware that both'the United States and the Soviet
Union must be anxious to remove threatening
strategic developments from their relationship.
But strategic anns limitations confined to the
United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably
impair the security of the West European members
of the Alliance vis-ri-vrs Soviet military superiority
in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the
disparities of military power in Europe parallel
to the s.lm negotiations. So long as this is not
the case we must maintain the balance of the full
range of deterrence strategy. The Alliance must,
therefore, be ready to make available the means
to support its present strategy, which is still the
right one, and to prevent any developments
that could undermine the basis of this strategy.
At the meeting of Western heads of State and
Government in London last May I said that the
more we stabilize strategic nuclear parity between
East and West, which my Government has
always advocated, the greater will be the neces-
sity to achieve a conventional equilibrium as well.
Today, again in London, let me add that when
the sillr negotiations opened we Europeans did
not have a clear enough view of the close
4
connection between parity of strategic nuclear
weapons, on the one hand, and tactical nuclear
and conventional weapons on the other, or if we
did, we did not articulate it clearly enough.
Today we need to recognize clearly the connec-
tion between sALT and r'grn and to draw the
necessary practical conclusions.
At the same meeting in May I said that there
were, in theory, two possible ways of establishing
a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact
states. One would be for the Western Alliance to
undertake a massive build-up of forces and
weapons systems; the other for both N,c.ro and
the Warsaw Pact to reduce their force strengh
and achieve an overall balance at a lower level.
I prefer the latter.
The Vienna negotiations have still not
produced any concrete agreement. Since they
began the Warsaw Pact has, if anything, increased
the disparities in both conventional and tactical
nuclear forces. Up to now the Soviet Union has
given no clear indication that she is willing to
accept the principle of parity for Europe, as she
did for ser.t, and thus make the principle of
renunciation of force an element of the military
balance as well.
Until we see real progress on MBFR, we shall
have to rely on the effectiveness of deterrence.
It is in this context and no other that the public
discussion in all member states of the Western
Alliance about the
'neutron
weapon' has to be
seen. We have to consider whether the
'neutron
weapon' is of value tothe Alliance asanadditional
element oI the deterrence strategy, as a means of
preventing war. But we should not limit ourselves
to that examination. We should also examine
what relevance and weight this weapon has in
our efforts to achieve arms control.
For the first time in history arms-control
negotiations are being conducted when there
exists a weapon capable of destroying all living
things. Failure of such negotiations can no
longer be compensated for by banking on military
victory. That is why it is of such crucial impor-
tance that all should realizn the seriousness of the
Vienna negotiations, and why results must be
achieved there. I would like to list seven
'musts'
and
'must
nots'for these negotiations:
1. Both sides, all participants in the MBFR
negotiations, must state their willingness
to
bring the negotiations to a positive con-
clusion and to be party to reductions on an
equal basis.
2. Priority must be given to the aim
-
and it
must be achieved without delay
-
of pre-
venting any further increase in the military
confrontation, and thus dispelling appre-
hensions.
3. The threat of a surprise attack must be
eliminated.
4. The confidence-building measures volun-
tarily agreed at the cscn must be accepted
with binding effect.
5. It must remain the principal objective of
I.{BFR to achieve, by means of reductions, a
balance of forces at a lower level.
6. Forcr reductions must be oriented to the
principle of parity and must be verifiable.
Parity and collectivity must be recognized
as the fundamental and determining prin-
ciples.
7. The capability of both Alliance systems to
organize their defence must not be impaired.
We should also consider whether it is neces-
sary to extend the confidence-building measures
beyond the agreed scope. Even if we should
achieve conventional parity within the lt'mrn
reduction area, this will still fall considerably
short ofparity ofconventional forces in Europe
as a whole. This is underlined by the fact that the
Soviet Union has substantially increased her
strategic reinforc.ement capabilities and could
rapidly bring forwards forces concentrated out-
side the reduction area whereas American forces,
if reduced in uBrn, would be cut offfrom Europe
by the Atlantic.
Since the West formulated its double strategy
ofdeterrence and detente ten years ago, progress
along the road to detente has been respectable.
The
'Ostpolitik'
of the Federal Republic of
Germany, based firmly on the Alliance, has
promoted and helped to shape this development.
The
Quadripartite
Agreement on Berlin has been
another step towards stability and security in
Europe. Berlin, once a major source of crisis, is
not tle problem it was. Security in Europe has
been reinforced by bilateral agreements in which
the parties undertake not to resort to force.
The American commitment to Europe no
longer stems solely from rights and obligations
arising from World War II. Rather, that com-
mitment rests on the securitv interests of the
United States and Western Europe alike. The
Soviet Union and her allies have explicitly
recognized this fact by putting their signatures to
the Final Act of the cscB in Helsinki. For us in
Germany, the German question remains open;
we are called upon to achieve 16s mnification
of Germany. But the German question cannot,
and must not, have priority over pace. This is a
contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany
to stability in Europe.
World Economy and Security
The need for deterrence and detente cannot,
however, detract from the fact that a sound
economy
-
and for me this includes full employ-
ment
just as much as social
justice -
is the
foundation of all security. This is true in two
ways: unless our economy flourishes we can
maintain neither the military equilibrium nor the
stability of our free and democratic institutions.
The Western economies have been profoundly
shaken by the serious recession following world-
wide inflation, the collapse of the international
monetary system, and the oil crisis. Today our
primary task is to restabilizp the economic
foundations of the democratic state and thus not
least the foundations of our common security
policy. Irt me stress what Henry Kissinger said
in his 1976 Alastair Buchan Memorial lecture
before this Institute:
A world that cries out for economic advance,
for social
justice,
for political liberty and for a
stable peace needs our collective commitment
and contribution.z
Today,
just
as in the immediate aftermath
of World War II, the economic and military
aspects of our security policy are again on a par
witheachother. In 1947 George Marshallcalled
for a working economy to establish the political
and social conditions under which free institu-
tions can exist. That task presents itself anew
today under different conditions. Since the end of
World War II the Western democracies, favoured
by constant economic growth, have experienced
the full effects of democratic equality; they have
transformed themselves into open societies with
more social
justice.
For the individual citizen,
the State is today the guarantor of social
t'The
1976 Alastair Buchan Memorial l-ecture', Survival,
Vol. XVIII, No. 5, September/October 1976 (London:
trSS), p. 194.
security and social
justice.
Never before has the
working population had so large a share of the
nation's economic prosperity.
We have to ask ourselves, however, whether
this redistribution process has not cut profits
unreasonably and thus caused the decline in
investment and capital expenditure in recent
years. One cause of our economic problem
-
that
of insufficient investment and capital expenditure
-
lies, I believe, in the greater risks for companies
arising from the faster rate at which the world
economic structure is changing, rising oil and
energy prices, and the partial saturation of
important markets in the industrial countries.
Owing to the development of the social
security network, public expenditure in this area
has risen at a faster rate from year to year than
the gross national product. Today we have, I
believe, reached the load limit in many of our
countries, at least for the time being.
On top of this, the developing countries are
stepping up their demands on the Western
industrial world. They demand both full control
over their raw materials and higher prices; they
demand more development aid; they demand the
biggest possible share of the benefits of Western
investment in the Third World; and they
demand unrestricted access for their industrial
products into our markets. In the last analysis,
these are claims on the gross national product of
the Western industrial countries.
For years the Western countries have been
exposed to the pressure ofinflation, the result of
excessive demands on their cNp. It was the
monetary crisis of 1971 that exposed challenges,
which existed earlier, in concrete form. In the
following years inflation was fuelled by an
unprecedented boom in the commodity sector,
and ultimately by the price policy of-tle onnc
cartel. All this led to a structural upheaval in thC
global balances of payment network, to a
structural upheaval in world trade, in world
demand and thereby in employment.
The dangers of inflation are still with us today.
Throughout the world, the days ofcheap energy
and raw materials are over: prices are very
likely to continue to rise in real terms, and this
means relative to the price of the goods which the
industrial countries manufacture and export.
The answer to our problems cannot lie in
dismantling our social achievements, in rolling
back social progrcss. The stability of liberal
6
democracy depends on the extent to which we
can secure greater social
justice.
If the Federal
Republic of Germany is today enjoying con-
siderable stability it is because she has made
social
justice a broad reality.
There are three problems which the West will
have to resolve in the economic sector, not least
for the sake of its security.
The first is to construct and safeguard a
liberal, flexible and hence working world
economic system. The international economic
order we created after 1945 enabled the Western
democracies
-
and also some developing coun-
tries
-
to expand their economies at a speed and
with a constancy which have no parallel in
economic history. Through their free trade and
capital transactions the Western countries have
grown more and more into one vast market. The
ever-increasing international division of labour
was, and still is, the main source of progress and
prosperity. National economies have thus become
increasingly interdependent. But this inter-
dependence, of a hitherto unknown degree, has
not only provided stronger impulses for growth
in an expanding world economy, but has also
now led to grcater inflation and recession. The
effects of the world recession have been greatest
for those countries whose economic structure is
least ffexible and whose political management
has been least able to adjust to the new situation.
This crisis has deepened the disparities between
the Western countries. It has exacerbated the
divergence of rates of inflation, and created
payments imbalances which have gtown steadily
worse.
The recession has thus become a great threat
to our world economic system: the tendency to
try to solve problems unilaterally with protec-
tionist measures has increased, and is increasing
daily. We must ward off this threat in a united
effort.
Protectionism offers no solutions. World
economic interdependence has led to a syn-
chronization of economic fluctuations between
all nations. Where, as in the countries of Western
Europe, exports in important branches of
industry account for half or more of total
production, no single country can free itself
from the vortex of world economic recession by
its own efforts. In practice, nations have lost
their economic autonomy. An attempt to return
to unilateral national measures would be
disastrous. The only way out is through closer
economic co-operation.
The Western democracies are about to embark
on this road. Since the beginning ofthe recession
we have successfully intensified our efforts to
co-ordinate economic policy. We have agreed to
pursue growth and full employment without
repeating the old inflationary mistakes.
To achieve this consensus is essential. kt me
make this point clear: there are no economic
panaceas which can be recommended to, or
prescribed for, governments by majority deci-
sions, as it were. Each government must, in
consultation with its partners, take those steps
which take into account the special situation of
its country.
In this
joint effort a major aim must be to
restore foreign trade equilibrium. The present
payments imbalances originate only partly from
the oil price explosion. In the three years 1974-4,
the accumulated opr,c surplus amounted to
145 billion US-dollars, whereas the deficit
countries were in the red on current account to
the amount of 210 billion. The oil price explosion
can, therefore, explain only part ofthe deteriora-
tion of the global balance of payments network.
The current account deficits of the oil-con-
suming industrial and developing countries in
relation to opEc cannot be rectified by traditional
instruments of adjustment. The prime remedy
is to consume less oil. Other measures are the
development of alternative sources of energy and
the stepping up of exports to the oil-exporting
countries in line with their own development
and the increase in their capacity to absorb
goods from the industrial oil consumers.
In the meantime we must provide adequate
facilities for financing these deficits but in a way
which does not delay the reduction of non-oil
deficits. The creation of the Witteveen facility is
an important step to this end.
Today, the structural modification caused by
the progressive international division of labour
coincides with other structural changes, such as
in demand, or technical changes on the supply
side. This has no doubt led to an aggravation of
the employment situation and a strengthening of
protectionist forces.
However, we must realize that trade policy
cannot serve as a national instrument for
creating
jobs.
Such a solution could only have.
short-term success
-
that is. onlv until such time
as the trade partners take countermeasures.
These considerations apply to Europe in parti-
cular. The European Community, being the
world's biggest exporter and importer, depends
on open markets. To yield to protectionist
temptations would be suicidal for Europe.
Markets must be kept open for industrial
exports from the Third World as well. The
Western countries need co-operation with the
Third World on a basis of trust, and it is in their
own uppermost interest to integrate tle develop-
ing countries fully into the system of world trade.
What is more, in view of saturation in our
own markets, the markets of the developing
countries with their unlimited demand potential
could become an important pillar of our future
growth. However, if one wants to export one
must import as well. We should therefore enable
the developing countries, by more imports and
greater transfers of capital, to buy more from us.
The opco countries have so far, on the whole,
withstood the temptation of protectionism and
kept their markets open. This success is of
crucial importance. It contrasts our present
situation with that of the 1930s when the
Western countries, by destroying free world
trade, drove each other into a state ofpermanent
depression and permanent unemployment.
As far as my own country is concerned, we are
resolved to continue to keep our markets open.
On 1 July 1977 tbe West-European Free Trade
Zone was implemented. It is the world's largest
free trade area for industrial products. The open
system of world trade must be maintained.
Access to Raw Materials
The second major task which confronts us is to
ensure our raw material and energy supplies.
Let us bear in mind that whereas the Eastern
industrial countries are self-sufficient as a
group, at least in raw material and energy
supplies for the time being, the West, apart from
foodstuffs, consumes more raw materials and oil
than it produces. The Western countries depend
on massive imports from the Third World.
There are thus two sources of danger for our
raw material supplies. These supplies can be
endangered, for one thing, by the outbreak of
war or civil war in Third World regions, and, for
anotber, by insufficient production due to
insufficient investment in the Third World.
We have all been conscious of the first sourc
of danger since the Middle East war of 1973 and
the oil crisis. Another region which is of vital
importance to the security of our raw material
supplies and which has become a trouble spot in
international affairs is Southern Africa.
Conflisls in the Third World give the Soviet
Union an opportunity to expand her
influence.
Imagine the implications for Western ssonsmic
security if the Soviet Union, with South Africa
and Rhodesia, as her allies, were to monopolize,
for example, world chromium supplies. To avert
the dangers arising out of Third World instability
the West has to pursue a policy aimed at tle
peaceful solution 61 sonflicts and a peaceful
conciliation ofinterests in those regions.
The conflicts in the Middle East and Southern
Africa have long attracted the attention of
Western foreign policy. The United States is
making every effort to mediate in the Israel-
Arab conflict. Europe supports this by an effort
of its own and by its willingness to play an active
part in the economic reconstruction and develop-
ment of the region following a peace settlement.
In Rhodesia, London and Washington in
particular are trying to bring about a peaceful
transfer of power to the black majority; in
Namibia the five Western members of the
Security Council are trying to find a solution.
The Federal Republic of Germany is playing an
active part there. The Western powers are
endeavouring to convince South Africa of the
need for fundamental and rapid reforms.
Even if political stability can be assured,
however, one can only import what has been
previously produced. Here lies the second source
of danger for our raw material supplies.
Raw material investment in developing
countries is no longer financed and promoted as
it once was. In tFe mining sector in particular,
exploration and prospecting in the Third World
have largely come to a standstill. There can be
no doubt about the long-term consequences.
Henry Kissinger warned at uNcrAD rv against
an explosion of raw material costs
-
he should
rather have said prices
-
should the current
investment trends continue. The lead-time for
large-scale mining projects is six to eight years
and sometimes more. In other words, the said
danger to our raw material supplies does not hit
us today
-
but it is today that we must act.
The indispensable co-operation between in-
dustrial and developing countries in the exploita-
8
tion of raw material resources must be restored
and intensified. To provide stable and close
co-operation between industrialized and deve-
loping countries it is, I believe, necessary and
justified
that guarantees for those private
investments should be given by the host coun-
tries. This should become a general rule and, in
the framework of the North-South dialogue, a
necessary quid pro quo
How should we ensure our energy supplies?
If there is a cardinal problem for the economic
security of the West, it is that of energy. More
than half of the Western world's energy require-
ments is at present being met by mineral oil.
But we must face a fact which no policy can
change: this is the exhaustion of world oil
reserves which is now becoming apparent.
Recent studies by the oEcD, Mlr and no<orq
agree that predictable oil supplies may not even
suffice to cover requirements in the 1980s. And
I am afraid this fundamental fact will not be
notably changed even by the new oil fields
which you in Britain have discovered in the
North Sea.
The main consequenc is that the wasteful use
of energy, of which we have made a habit, must
stop. We must be quick to make decisive
progress on energy conservation and the
development of new types of energy.
In this situation the industrial countries cannot
afford to forego any option for energy policy.
This is particularly true for nuclear energy. But
I would add that a key role in this respect falls to
the United States who uses half of the energy
consumed by the Western world. It is therefore
in our interest that President Carter should be
successful with his energy conservation pro-
gramme.
Trade with the East
The third major task of Western security policy
in economic terms is to establish balanced and
stable economic relations with the Communist
state trading countries of the East.
Since 1970 East-West trade has practically
quadrupled. The Federal Republic of Germany
is the most important Western trade partner of
each of the Communist Eastern countries. This
strong intensification of trade and co-operation
is the result of political detente and also of the
economic interests of both sides. The economies
of the Communist East have reached a stage of
development where their growth also depends
more and more on an increase in productivity.
That is why the East has a strong and lasting
interest in importing Western technology.
The East, due to its large potential of raw
materials and energy, affords the West the
possibility of diversifying, to a certain extent its
raw material and energy imports. At the same
time it offers markets which are especially
attractive for the West because they are no! or
not fully, involved in the synchronization of
Western business cycles. In 1975, for instance,
due to the world recession, German exports
dropped by almost 4 per cent in nominal terms
whereas the exports to the Soviet Union rose by
46 per cent, thus making a valuable contribution
towards improved use of capacities and a better
employrnent situation in my country.
Who, then, derives the greater benefit from
East-West trade? There are critics in the West
who say that the West, by its technology exports,
indirectly helps the Soviet military build-up.
Critical voices in the East will probabJy object
that helping the West to preserve jobs is support-
ing the capitalist system. I believe that these
conflicting arguments in themselves indicate
that East-West trade benefits both sides. And
so, after all, it should and must be.
A couple of decades ago the American writer
Ambrose Bierce said:
'Calamities
are of two
kinds: misfortune to ourselves and good fortune
to others'. I do not think that this applies in
modern economic conditions of interdependence.
I would say today: economic misfortune to
others will cause calamity to ourselves. And
good fortune to others will also cause good
fortune to ourselves.
If the Western countries act
jointly,
the
development of trade relations and of industrial
co-operation with the East can, I am convinced,
be essential for both our own economic security
and the safeguarding ofpeace.
Another urgent task I have often mentioned is
to get the East to assume a constructive role in
the North-South issue. So far, the Soviet Union
and her allies have supported verbally the
demands of the developing countries, but as
regards financial support they have been trying
to pin the responsibility entirely on the West.
The development aid of the East is negligible
compared with its economic potential, and even
more so compared with Western contributions.
2.
ln 1976, for instance, the amount of official
development assistance transferred by the Federal
Repubtc of Germany alone was two and a half
times as high as the total transfer made by the
Soviet Union plus all the other Eastern bloc
countries together. Or to give you another
example: the official development assistance of
all the orco countries in 1976 was 27 times as
high as that of the Comecon countries including
the Soviet Union.
The integration of the Eastern countries into
the world economic system has already pro-
gressed so far that they can feel the direct impact
of inflation and recession in the Western indus-
trial countries. They should recognize, therefore,
ttrat world economic stability is in their own
interest. But this stability, and ultimately the
stability of world p&, can no longer be
ensured unless hunger and distress in the Third
World are overcome. This is a goal which
requires the
joint
efforts of all industrial coun-
tries. The Eastern bloc countries c:tn no longer
retain the role of disinterested onlookers in the
North-South dialogue, limiting their support to
the supply of military weapons.
Terrorism
Finally, let me say a few words about the deep
shock we have all felt over the last four weeks as
a result of terrorist action. The focal point of the
events themselves was my country, but from day
to day it became increasingly clear to people in
all corners of the world tlat terrorisn is not a.
problem of exclusively German concern but an
international problem of global dimension.
In my country, we have experienced with
gratitude what it means in such a situation when
other countries rally round with advice, with
active assistance. And it has been an exercise and
a very fine experience in practical solidarity.
During those days, gestures were made, I feel, for
co-operation among the world's nations and for
a common stand, a common effort to overcome
the plague of international terrorism with its
contempt for human life and with its aim of
destroying democratic society.
I would like to express the hope that this
terrible experience will prompt the Unitd
Nations to adopt quickly the convention which
we have proposed against the taking of hostages.
Nobody today can any longer make light
of terrorist violence as the work of people who
have simply been led astray by allegedly political
motives, and on top of that grant them political
asylum. Jonathan Carr in the Financial Times
wrote the other day:
'The
German terrorist
cannot really be classed with any political wing.
If they can be compared to anything it is to
Dostoievski's devils, people who by their own
admission are ready even to throw acid into a
child's face if it will help their cause. What is
that cause? Beyond destroying society it is
impossible to say'.3 I think he is right. Moreover,
the effect is not only on domestic politics. In
extreme circumstances terrorism might even
trigger off international conflict.
Therefore, we should act together to confront
the blindness of terrorist killers with the stead-
fastness of our democratic convictions. kt us
together continue to defend human dignity and
human rights as inviolable and inalienable
values; and let us defend the right to live and to
enjoy personal freedom, rights we all identify as
inalienable principles.
Ladies and gentlemen, I have tried to outline
the dimensions of a policy aimed at establishing
and maintaining a state of affairs in which our
free democratic institutions can survive and
prosper.
The industrial democracies of the West
produce 65 per cent of the world's goods and
tleir share in world trade is 70 per cent. They are
the motive force of world economic growth and
technological progress. The power and moral
superiority of our belief in the freedom and
diguity of Man is evident.
This is why, inspired by a constructive will for
reform, all of us endeavour perpetually to renew
democracy. Only in this way can we remove
weaknesses, obsolete conditions, and injustices.
The industrial democracies of the world must
further intensify their co-operation: in the
European Community, in the Atlantic Com-
munity and in the Trilateral Community formed
by Europe, North America, and the Pacific
region embracing Japan, Australia and New
Znaland. This cohesion is of crucial importance
for peace, for economic
Fowth
and the cause of
freedom,
justice
and human dignity.
t
The Financial Times,24 October 1977, p. 16.
No less decisive, however, is the relationship
between the two big powers. because on them
depends how much of the surface of our globe
will be covered by the policy of detente and to
what extent its substance will be strengthened by
a policy aimed at preserving peace. We feel
encouraged by the statements made by the two
leading personalities of both sides.
Jimmy Carter gave the assurance that in the
search for world peace the United States will be
found in the forefront and stand by her com-
mitment to the freedom of Man. The following
passage from his speech before the United
Nations on 4 October 1977 appears to me to be
of particular signifi cance.
We must look beyond the present, and work to
prevent the critical threats and instabilities of
the future. If the principles of self-restraint,
reciprocity and mutual sscammodstion of
interests are observed, then the United States
and the Soviet Union will not only succeed in
limiting weapons, but will also create a
foundation for better relations in other
spheres of interests.a
Leonid Brezhnev said early this year:
The allegations that the Soviet Union goes
beyond its defence requirements and is seeking
military superiority to be able to deal the first
blow are malicious and unfounded.
And in the same speech Brezhnev rightly stated:
There is no more burning and vital task than
that of making peace durable and indestruc-
tible.
He added:
As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we
shall not be found wanting.6
In our quest for security and peace in Europe
and world-wide, we shall take the two statesmen
by their word. For, in the last resort, the survival
of mankind depends on the strengthening of
world peace.
'
Address by President Carter to the rrN General Assemb
ly, 4 Oaober 1977 (uss).
s
Leonid Brezhnev,
'Outstanding
Exploit of the Defend-
ers ofTula' , Provdo,19 January 1977.
10
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Protest and survive
Messages. to the British Public
Second (Revised) edition
Fourth printing
Keep this booklet handy
Prepared for the People of England by E.I'. Thompsun 19RQ
Pllnted in England for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 29 Great
James SlIeel, Lmuon weI and the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation,
Bertr:lnd Russell Hlluse, Gamble Street, Noltingham by the Russell Press
Ltd, Nottingham.
From the Right Han. William Whitelaw, MP, Home Secretary:
"Most houses in this country offer a reasonable degree of protection against radioactive fall-
out from nuclear explosions and protection can be substantially improved by a series of
quite simple do-it-yourself measures."
(TImes, 12 February 1980)
From Mr William Rodgers, MP, Labour parliamentary spokesman for Defence:
"It was the view of the previous Government that theatre nuclear modernisation was essen
Ual, and that is our view today."
(Hansard, 24 January 1980)
From Dr Alan Glyn, MP for Windsor and Maidenhead:
"I welcome the decision to instal 40 bases in Britain,"
(Hansard, 24 January 1980)
From Mr Stephen Ross, MP for the Isk of Wight, Liberal parliamentary spokesman
for Defence:
"I shall mention hovercraft, which are built in the Isle of Wight. We need a large hovercraft
capable of quickly conveying tanks on to beaches, particularly in the Middle East. The
quickest solution is to buy those for sale from Hoverlloyd, which operates between Ramsgate
and the Continent."
(Hansard, 24 January 1980)
From the Right Han. James Callaghan, MP, Leader of the Opposition:
"We must welcome the intention of President Carter to set up a task force of 100,000 men
which could move quickly into position, if only because of the utter dependence of the
West on oil"
(Hansard, 28 January 1980)
From Mr Eldon Griffiths, MP for Bury St Edmunds:
"In the event of . , . demonstrations by political zealots it is better that British military
police rather than Americans should be doing the job of protection."
(Hansard, 24 January 1980)
From Mr James ScottHopkins, Euro-MP for Hereford-Worcester:
"Releasing details to the general public of a Home Office pamphlet, Protect and Survive,
describing what to do in a nuclear attack would cause unwarranted panic and be an irrespon-
sible action. With the iimited amount of spending money available, Britain should place
priority on building up its armed forces."
(Worcester Evening News, 19 February 1980)
From Mr W. Blake, in another place:
"Then old Nobodaddy aloft Farted & belch'd and cough'd, And said, '. love hanging &
drawing & quartering Every bit as well as war & slaughtering'."
1
I
Protest and Survive
by E.P. Thompson
The following letter appeared in The Times on January 30,1980, from an eminent
member of Oxford University:
Reviving Civil Defence
From Professor Michael Howard, FBA
Sir,
The decision to provide bases in this country for United States cruise missiles;
the future of our own "independent" strategic deterrent; the extent of our pro- "
visions for civil defence: all these have surely to be considered together as part of a
single defence posture. No evidence emerged in the course oflast Thursday's debate
(January 24) that this is being done by the present Government.
The presence of cruise missiles on British soil makes it highly possible that this
country would be the target for a series of pre-emptive strikes by Soviet missiles.
These would not necessarily be on the massive scale foreseen by Lord Noel-Baker
in your columns of January 25. It is more likely that the Russians would hold such
massive strikes in reserve, to deter us from using our sea-based missiles as a "second
strike force" after the first Soviet warheads had hit targets in this country.
This initially limited Soviet strike would have the further objective, beyond
eliminating weapons in this country targeted on their own homeland, of creating
conditions here of such political turbulence that the use of our own nuclear weapons,
followed as this could be by yet heavier attacks upon us, would become quite
literally "incredible".
Civil defence on a scale sufficient to give protection to a substantial number of
the population in the event of such a"limited" nuclear strike is thus an indispensable
element of deterrence. Such measures should not be covert and concealed. On the
contrary, they should be given the widest possible publicity; not only so that the
people of this country know that they will be afforded the greatest possible degree
of protection in the worst eventuality, but so that the credibility of our entire
defence posture should not be destroyed through absence of evidence of our
capacity to endure the disagreeable consequences likely to flow from it.
In the absence of a serious civil defence policy, the Government's decision to
modernise or replace our Hindependent deterrent" will be no more than an expensive
bluff likely to deceive no one beyond these shores, and not very many people
within them.
Yours faithfully,
M.E. Howard,
Chichele Professor of the History of War,
All Soul's College, Oxford.
2
This letter contains a number of very serious assertions and speculations, and I
will proceed to examine these. We must first note that the letter is composed of
two distinct elements, althqugh these are so interwoven that the inattentive reader
might be confused into taking them as a single progressive argument. One element is
a speculative scenario as to future events; the other concerns the postures and
pretences appropriate in the theatre of nuclear diplomacy. We will attend now to
the first.
According to the scenario, the enemy - which enemy is plainly stated to be
the Russians for as many years ahead as speculation can go - will make a pre
emptive strike against Britain with nuclear missiles. This is not anticipated to occur
before 1982, since the decision that 160 or more United States cruise missiles
should be based on British soil was taken by NATO (without consultation with the
British parliament) on December 12, 1979, at Brussels; and it will take about three
years before their manufacture is complete and they have been transported and
sited in this country.
Professor Howard considers that the presence of these missiles on our soil will
make it "highly possible" that this country will be the target, not for one, but
for a series of pre-emptive strikes, at some time in 1982 or thereafter. So far from
"deterring" the Russians, he supposes that the presence of these missiles here will
provoke and draw down upon us these strikes. We may agree that his reasoning
here is sound.
I am less happy with the next step in his reasoning. He does not suggest that
there will be any counter-strikes by British-based missiles against the Russians. On
the contrary, he supposes that the Russian strikes, although "limited", would
succeed in "eliminating" all of these I 60 cruise missiles. And that the Russians
will hold more "massive strikes" in reserve to "deter us from using our sea-based
missiles" against them. In the absence of adequate measures of civil defence, these
first "limited" strikes would create conditions of "political turbulenco" in this
country, preventing "us" (but I am not now sure who H US" can be, unless the type
setter has inadvertently dropped the capitals into the lower case) from massive
nuclear retaliation. If, however, a sufficient proportion of the surviving population
were prevented from acts of "political turbulence" by measures of civil defence,
then a proper military strategy could be pursued by NATO, and massive second
stage nuclear exchanges could freely commence.
It will be seen that the purpose of civil defence is political and provisional. It is
to ensure the necessary degree of stability in that short interval between the first
and the second (retaliatory) nuclear strike. Professor Howard does not take his
scenario any further. He does not tell us whether the Umassive strikes" of the
second stage would seal the entrances to the air-raid shelters and block up their air
ducts.
We may suppose, at least, that these second strikes will be effective in bringing
"political turbulence" to a prompt end, and thereby in removing the necessity for
further civil defence. At this stage the professor passes over to the consideration
ofthe correct degree of mendacity to be exercised in our current defence "posture",
and we will consider that element in his argument later on.
3
Now, as to the scenario, we will commence by noting that Professor Howard, in
a letter to The Times whose intent is to advocate much greater expenditure and
publicity on civil defence, does not, in any single clause, indicate any detail of
what such defence might consist in, nor how effective it might be. His terms are all
general. He wishes there to be "measures", which afford "the greatest possible
degree of protection", and "evidence" of "our capacity to endure the disagreeable
consequences likely to flow from" our present military and diplomatic strategies.
But he does not indicate what measures might be possible, nor does he even explain
what could be "disagreeable" about the expected event.
Professor Howard is perhaps himself a little uneasy on this count. For he re
assures us that these pre-emptive strikes by Russian missiles "would not necessarily
be on the massive scale foreseen by Lord Noel-Baker in your columns of January
25". He wishes us to suppose that this "series of strikes", which "eliminate" the
160 cruise missiles scattered on our soil, are to be, as these things go, a mild and
local affair.
I have therefore consulted the letter from Philip Noel-Baker in The Times of
January 25. Lord Noel-Baker is the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for his work
for international conciliation over very many years. We may take it that he keeps
himself well-informed. In his letter he notes that "many voices are being raised in
the United States, Britain and elsewhere to argue that nuclear wars could be fought
without total disaster; some even suggest that nuclear war could be won". He then
goes on to detail the fmdings of Mr Val Peterson, who was appointed United States
Civil Defence Administrator twenty-five years ago, and who organised many exer
cises, national, regional and local, at the height of a previous Cold War.
Mr Peterson drew the following conclusions from his successive exercises. In
1954 the national exercise was estimated to have had a yield of twenty-two millions
of casualties, of whom seven millions would have been dead. In 1956 fifty-six
millions, or one-third of the population of the United States, were presumed as
casualties. In 1957:
"If the whole 170 million Americans has Air Raid Shelters, at least 50 per cent of them
would die in a surprise enemy attack. In the last analysis, there is no such thing as a nation
being prepared for a thermonuclear war."
Froll}evidence of this order Lord Noel-Baker concludes:
"Any use of nuclear weapons will escalate into a general war ... There is no defence against
such weapons; and ... nuclear warfare will destroy civilisation. and perhaps exterminate
mankind. To hope for salvation from Civil Defence is a dangerous selfdeluding pipe dream."
I do not know whether Professor Howard is a pipe-smoker or not. But he has
at least taken care to cover himself against this argument. The series of strikes
envisaged in his scenario "would not necessarily be on the massive scale" which
Lord Noel-Baker foresees. What he foresees is possible (we should note), and
perhaps even probable, but not "necessarily" so. That is a large relief. But, then, on
what scale are we to suppose that a more "limited" attack might be? If we are to be
futurist authorities on war, or even historians of war, then we should be exact as to
weaponry and as to its effects.
UWhen radiological conditions permitted movement, district and borough
London controllers shoul.d assume that one of the priority tasks for their
staff, in areas where survivors were to continue residing, would be to collect
and cremate or inter human remains in mass graves.
"Once the initial clearance of corpses has been completed, there would
be still a problem of several weeks, and perhaps months, of an above average
rate of dying from disease and radiation effects. Nevertheless, a return to the
pre-attack formalities shuuld be the objective in the longer term."
Home Office circular No.ES 8/1976, issued on a "need to know"
basis to chief executives of Councils.
There is a good deal of talk around today, from "defence correspondents", military
strategists and the like, which leads us to suppose that the military, on both sides of
the world, are capable of delivering very small nuclear packs, with the greatest
accuracy and with no lethal consequences outside the target area. Professor Howard's
scenario is evidently supported by some such assumptions: the Russians are to
"eliminate" 160 cruise missiles, but only local damage will be done.
Now there are two points here which require examination. The frrst concerns the
known power and probable effects of these weapons. The second concerns the
strategic assumptions of those "experts" who suppose that any nuclear war could
be limited in this way. We will now turn to the first.
It will not have passed Professor Howard's notice that there appeared in The
Times, nine days before his own letter, a major article ("The Deterrent Illusion",
January 21) by Lord Zuckerman. The author was the Government's chief scientific
advisor from 1964 to 1971, and, in addition to drawing upon his own extensive
experience, he also draws, in this article, upon that of eminent United States
scientists and advisors.
Lord Zuckerman's testimony (which should be read in full) is wholly dismissive
of the notion of a "limited" nuclear strike, confined to military targets only:
"It is still inevitable that were military installations rather than cities to become the objec
tives of nuclear attack, millions, even tens of millions, of civilians would be killed, whatever
the proportion of missile sites, airfields, armament plants, ports, and so on that would be
destroyed. "
And he explains that strategists, in calculating the estimated effects of missile
strikes, employ the acronym CEP (Circular Error Probable) for the radius of a circle
within which 50 per cent of strikes would fall.
Thus we have to deal with two factors: the 50 per cent of missiles which fall
within the CEP, and the 50 per cent which fall without and which "would not
necessarily be distributed according to standard laws of probability". Lord
Zuckerman does not tell us the presumed CEP for a "limited" strike aimed at
a single missile base, and this is perhaps an official secret. But in the debate that
was eventually held in the Commons (Hansard, 24 January) after NATO's decision
4
5
to base cruise missiles here, statements were made which enable an impression to
be offered.
I must first explain that the strategy of nuclear warfare has now become a highly
specialised field of study, which has developed its own arcane vocabulary, together
with a long list of acronyms: CEP, MIRV (multiple independently-targetted re
entry vehicle), ICBM (inter.continental ballistic missile), ECCM (electronic counter
counter measures), MEASL (Marconi-Elliott Avionics Systems), and, as the plum
of them all, MAD (mutual assured destruction).
In this vocabulary nuclear weapons are sub-divided into several categories:
strategic - the inter-continental missiles of immense range and inconceivable
destructive power, which may be submarine-launched or sited in silos and on
tracks behind the Urals or in the Nevada desert: theatre (long, middle or short
range), which may be bombs or missiles, carried on aircraft or permanently sited,
or moved around at sea or on land on mobile launch platforms: and tactical.
Sometimes NATO strategists refer to "theatre" weapons as "tactical" ones, and
sometimes they are referring to smaller battlefield nuclear (and neutron) devices
land-mines, artillery shells, etc., which could be mixed in with "conventional
weapons" .
These several degrees of weaponry form "a chain of deterrence". Mr Pym, the
Defence Secretary, spoke in the House of Commons on January 24 of "an inter
locking system of comprehensive deterrence . .. a clear chain of terrible risk", with
the pistol and the grenade at one end and the MX missile at the other.
It is generally agreed that "the West" has the advantage in strategic weapons,
although this fact has been concealed from the Western public in recent months in
order to direct attention to long and medium-range theatre weapons, where it is
said that the Soviet Union has recently attained an advantage by replacing the
SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the very deadly SS-20, and by introducing the Backfire
bomber. It is to meet this "threat" to parity in the middle link of the chain that
cruise missiles are to be introduced by NATO all over Western Europe.
On December 3,1979, Mr David Fairhall, the Guardian's defence correspondent
and a very zealous apologist for NATO, published a map (reproduced on page 7)
which illustrates how NATO apologists perceive the European "balance". It will be
seen from this map that the Soviet threat is very serious, since it is marked in heavy
dotted lines and thick arrow-heads, whereas NATO's response is delicately etched.
It will also be seen that NATO's existing, pre-modern weaponry (the Pershing I,
the F III and the Vulcan) is pitiful, and will not even be able to destroy Rome or
Naples, nor any part of Greece. So that if it were not for the submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (Polaris and Trident), NATO would be reduced in a nuclear war to
stinging itself, like a scorpion, to death.
Either NATO or the map is pretty silly, or both. The point, however, is that
present strategic thinking supposes a "limited" nuc1earwar, with "theatre" weapons.
This limited war will be localised to a small area from the Urals to the Western coast
of Ireland. In this scenario, "strategic" weapons (ICBMs and the like) will be held
back for a "second strike", so that neither Siberia nor the North American con
tinent will be under any immediate threat. Professor Howard has adopted this
scenario, in supposing the Russians will employ their own "theatre" weapons
(SS-20 or Backfire bombers) in a pre-emptive strike upon our cruise missile
("theatre") bases.
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With grateful acknowledgements to The Guardian.
Let US now examine this scenario more exactly. Sir Frederic Bennett (Torbay)
affirmed in the Commons debate on January 24 that the warheads of these Russian
theatre missiles "have at least the destructive capacity of the bombs dropped
on Nagasaki and Hiroshima", although Mr Churchill (Stretford) had different
information: "By today's standards Hiroshima's bomb was a puny and miserable
weapon" and (he said) each SS-20 missile carried a pack equivalent to 100 Hiroshima
bombs.
It will be seen that two well-informed Conservative spokesmen differed in their
information by a factor of one hundred. This is a trivial disagreement (since both
are agreed that these missiles are capable of very great destruction). But it serves
to illustrate the fact that, when we come to hard information, the air is very much
fouled up today.
The reasons for this are easy to identity, but they illuminate a part of the
problem, so we will digress to explain them. First, it is axiomatic that each military
bloc has an interest in misleading the other, and this is done both by concealing
information and by deliberately spreading disinformation.
In general, each bloc is at pains to deny and conceal its own areas of greatest
6 7
military strength, and to advertise a pretence to strength in areas where it is weak.
The intelligence agencies which report on each other's resources are themselves an
interest-group, with high ideological motivation, and on occasion they deliberately
manufacture alannist reports.
Lord Zuckerman gives evidence as to the steady flow of "phoney intelligence"
and Hfar-fetched" predictions as to Soviet military power which have influenced
United States planning over the past twenty years. There is no reason to suppose
that this fouling-up of information takes place only in Western capitals.
The name of the game, on both Sides, is mendacity. Indeed, "deterrence" might
itself be defined as the biggest and most expensive lie in history; and it was, in
effect, dermed in this way by our Defence Secretary, Mr Pym, in the debate on
January 24: "Deterrence is primarily about what the other side thinks, not what we
may think".
The debate on that day was the first to be held in parliament on the subject
of nuciear weapons for fifteen years, and it lasted for about 5\2 hours. It was
distinguished throughout by the paUcity of hard information, although it should
be said that Mr Pym imparted some new information, and more than had come at
any time from the previous administration.
Mr Pym announced the near-completion of the "Chevaline" programme to
"modernise" the warhead of our Polaris missiles - a programme costing 1,000
millions, which had been carried out in the deepest secrecy, and without the
knowledge of the full Cabinet, and in defiance of official Labour policy, on the
authority of Mr Callaghan and two or three of his particular friends.
Thus the House was given this information after the decision had been taken, the
money had been spent, and the work had been done. I do not know how 1,000
millions was tucked away in a crease in the estimates and hidden from view Gust as
the many millions expended on internal security services, telephone-tapping, etc.,
are hidden from view), but it suggests that the level of official mendacity is today
very high indeed.
In any case, let us be fair, Mr Pym did give the House this information, and we
may suppose that he did so in order to embarrass Mr Callaghan, Mr Fred Mulley,
Mr Healey and Mr David Owen (the co-partners in this expenSive deception), and to
reduce them to silence or assent on other matters of nuclear weapon "'modern
isation" in the ensuing debate.
In this he succeeded very well. (We may suppose that he held other, "second
strike", secret material back as a further deterrent.) But apart from this malicious
little political detonation, the yield of new information in the debate was low.
The House was not informed where the cruise missiles are to be sited, nor, most
importantly, whether the British Government will have any effective control over
their operation and launching. But this is another matter.
The second reason why the air is fouled-up is that the military and security elites
in both blocs, and their political servitors, cannot pursue their expenSive and
dangerous policies without continually terrifying the populations of their own
countries with sensational accounts of the war preparations of the other bloc.
To be sure, the plain facts are terrifying enough without any embroidery. But it
is necessary to persuade the native populations that the other side is stealing a lead
in order to justify even greater preparations and expenditure at home.
This is as necessary in the Soviet Union as it is in the West, despite the absence
of any open public debate over there on the issues. For the Soviet military budget is
very heavy, and this entails the continual postponement and disappointment of
people's expectations as to improving services and goods. In particular, a quite
disproportionate concentration of the nation's most advanced scientific and tech
nological skills takes place in the military sector - as it does, increasingly, even in
this country. The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (aAd in Soviet
perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for the power of
the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and social failures, and an
argument to isolate and silence critics within their own borders.
In the West we have "open debate", although it is contained by allparty "can.
sensus" and is not permitted to intrude in any sharp way into our major media. I
have discussed elsewhere (New Statesman, December 1979) the ways in which
this is carefully controlled by the preparation and selective release of "official
information".
An interesting example of this manipulation came out towards the end of
the Commons debate. In responding, Mr Barney Hayhoe, the Under-Secretary for
Defence, sought to allay fears expressed by the patriotic Mr Peter Shore (Labour's
shadow Foreign Secretary) that the NATO programme of missile "modernisation"
might not be large enough to keep up with Soviet missile programmes. Mr Hayhoe
replied:
"The United States is planning to introduce cruise missiles, carried on B 52 bombers, for the
strategic role. It is planning an armoury of 2,000 or 3,000 missiles ... forming only one part
of a huge strategic triad alongside ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and all
due to enter service in two or three years' time."
This programme is to be in addition to the existing United States
resources (which are generally agreed to be already in excess of Russia's, and which
have always been so).
Now I am not an expert in these matters, and I do not usually follow the specialjst
press. But in the past three months, and especially in the weeks preceding the
NATO decision of December 12, I followed the general press with care. I have on
my desk now a thick fIle of clippings from the defence correspondents of the more
serious daily, weekly and Sunday papers. Vet this is the first mention I have met
with of these rather substantial United States plans, which are to be added to
NATO's little provision.
liThe Alliance should plan to maintain an adequate conventional defence
as long as necessary to negotiate an acceptable peace. If not successful in
achieving its aims with conventional forces, NATO will employ nuclear
weapons as necessary."
Document INA TO 'secret') DPC/DI74/30, Appendix B, Item t.
8 9
The entire "debate" in Britain was conducted in the press and television on the
basis of letting the people believe that there was a massive build-up of Soviet SS-20s
and Backfire bombers, all aimed at "NATO" (but with the United States, the
dominant power in NATO, removed from the equation), and that NATO's pro
gramme of nuclear weapon "modernisation" was a tardy and inadequate response
to this. Nothing at all was mentioned, in the general press, as to this little addition
to the Western sum ("2,000 or 3,000 missiles") as part of "a huge strategic triad".
In fact, NATO's "modernisation" programme, taken together with that of the
United States, was one of melUlce. It was certainly perceived by Soviet leaders as
menacing. This perception hardened, on December 12, when NATO endorsed the
full programme at Brussels. In response, the hard arguments and the hard men had
their way amongst the Soviet leadership, and, two weeks later, the Soviet inter
vention in Afghanistan took place. It is a textbook case of the reciprocal logic of
the Cold War.
I am not suggesting that Russian missiles are not multiplying, nor that they are
not menacing to us. They are both. My point has been to illustrate the logic of
"deterrence"; and to emphasise that the whole basis of our information is corrupt,
and that every official statement, on both sides, is either an official lie or a state
ment with direct propagandist intent which conceals as much as it reveals.
As to the actual facts of the "nuclear balance", objective research by such bodies
as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute give rise to conclusions
more complex than anything that we have been offered in our press or on our
screens. Thus, in one count ofstrategic weapons, by individual bombers and missiles,
the Soviet Union appears to be a little ahead of the United States; whereas by a
different count of actual warheads (for the US Poseidon missile carries an average
of ten warheads, each capable of being independently targeted) the United States
appears as having twice as many weapons (8,870 to 3,810) as Russia. This is, of
course, before "modernisation". The available information has been examined with
care by Dan Smith in The Defence ofthe Realm in the 1980s(Croom Helm, 1980),
and his fourth chapter, "Of Numbers and Nukes", is essential reading. Please get
it, and read it.
We are now in a position to conclude this digression, and to return to Lord
Zuckerman and to Professor Howard.
Lord Zuckerman has shown that we must take into account two variables when
considering the effect of the "series of pre-emptive strikes" which Professor Howard
envisages as being drawn upon us by cruise missile bases: the ~ O per cent of missiles
falling within the CEP, and those falling without.
We have seen that the S8-20 is the "theatre" missile which we must expect to
strike Britain, and that the lowest estimate of its destructive capacity is "at least"
that of the bomb dropped upon Hiroshima. This bomb (Mr Churchil1 reminded the
House) caused the death of 100,000 persons within hours, and of a further 100,000
who have died subsequently, in the main from radiological1y-related diseases.
I do not know the CEP of a missile of this very smal1 yield. I would guess that if
it was buffeted about and wobbled a little - and if the. aiming and homing devices
were a trifle inexact (as Soviet electronic technology is reputed to be) - then it
could miss the target by several miles. The meditated strategy of both sides is to
send, not one accurate m i ~ s i l e at each target, but missiles in clutches of thirty or
forty.
These strikes would be made against the major bases from which these missiles
are deployed. Currently, Lakenheath and Upper Heyford are being mentioned as
these. Upper Heyford is less than fifteen miles as the crow or the SS-20 flies from
the centre of Oxford city, and Lakenheath is, by crow or cruise, just over twenty
miles from Cambridge. It is possible that Cambridge but less probable that Oxford
will fall outside the CEP. Within the CEP we must suppose some fifteen or twenty
detonations at least on the scale of Hiroshima, without taking into account any
possible detonations, release of radio-active materials, etc., if the strike should
succeed in finding out the cruise missiles at which it was aimed.
This is to suppose that the Soviet strike is homing onto clearly-defined and
immobile targets. Now this matter is unclear, since we have been told a number
of contradictory things by defence "experts", some of which are perhaps dis
information (to set the public mind at rest) but most of which are whistlings in the
dark, since United States military personnel will take the decisions in their own
good time.
We have been told that they will all be housed at Upper Heyford and Laken
heath, and will be moved out to launching positions in times of emergency, perhaps
on mobile transporters carrying four at a time. We have been told that they will be
permanently sited, in six, or twelve, or forty different stations. The latest statement
to come to hand is from Mr Pym, and was given, not to the House of Commons,
but on a BBC TV phone-in programme:
"I think you will find that there may be a certain spread of these weapons, but no decision
is yet taken ... Because they would be scattered it would be an impossible task. in the
foreseeable future for the Russians to knock them out. This is part of the merit of these
particular weapons!' (Cambridge Evening News. 6 February 1980)
The poor fellow was really saying that he does not know, and he is waiting for
an American officer to teU him. He added that:
"From the point of view of siting the cruise missiles 1 don't think it makes a great deal of
difference. It is really a security and defence and strategic consideration, and of course one
must take public opinion into account as far as one f,;)ssibly can."
This is a politician's way of saying that the military will take the decision, and
that public opinion will be disregarded. Three weeks before this Mr Pym gave a
somewhat more honest reply to questions from the Member for Swindon (Mr
David Stoddart) who had discovered that Greenham Common, near Newbury
(Berks) and Fairford (Glos.) are being considered by US military as convenient
places for little batches of missiles: "I urge the Secretary of State to keep these
updated nuclear weapons well away from Swindon". Mr Pym responded thus:
"The siting of these weapons in no way affects the vulnerability or otherwise of a par
M
ticular place. It is a mistake for anyone to think that the siting of a weapon in a particular
10 11
place . .. makes it more or less vulnerable. We are all vulnerable in the horrifying event of a
holocaust:' (Hansard, 15 January 1980)
I do not know whether the citizens of Swindon find this reassuring or not. Mr
Pym was saying that he thinks that the Americans will decide to "spread" and
"scatter" these weapons, so that the enemy will have to spread and scatter his
strike over a very much larger area in order to have any hopes of "eliminating"
them. If the Russians really want to find the cruise missiles out, then there will be
CEPs dotted all across southern, central and eastern England. There is nothing very
special being prepared by NATO for Oxford, Swindon and Cambridge: Luton,
Sheerness and Southampton will be just as "vulnerable", and there is no way of
describing a series of nuclear strikes against cruise missiles except as "a holocaust".
This is before we take account of Lord Zuckerman's other variable - the 50 per
cent of strikes which would fall outside the Circular Error Probable. These will be
missiles whose navigational or homing devices are inaccurate or which, perhaps,
are brought down on their path. It would be over-optimistic to suppose that every
one of these would fall on Salisbury Plain or on that barren patch of the Pennines
around Blackstone Edge. I have taken a ruler to a map of Europe, and I cannot see
any way in which an SS-20 despatched from Russia could home in on Newbury or
Fairford without passing directly over central London.
If by misadventure a strike outside the CEP fell on a major city the damage
would be considerable. Lord Louis Mountbatten told an audience in Strasbourg in
May 1979 that "one or two nuclear strikes on this great city ... with what today
would be regarded as relatively low yield weapons would utterly destroy all that we
see around us and immediately kill half of its population". And Lord Zuckerman
adds that "a single one-megaton bomb" - and the warhead of the SS-20 is said to
be B ~ megatons - "could erase the heart of any great city - say, Birmingham _
and kill Instantly a third of its citizens".
There is no room in this island to "scatter" missiles without bringing multitudes
into mortal danger, and there is no room to "search" without inflicting a holocaust.
As Lord Zuckerman has said:
"There are no vast deserts in Europe, no e ~ d l e s s open plains, on which to turn war-games in
which nuclear weapons are used into reality. The distances between villages are no greater
than the radius of effect of lowyield weapons of a few kilotons; between towns and cities,
say a megaton."
We are now at last prepared to cast a more realistic eye upon Professor Howard's
scenario.
According to this, the "initially limited Soviet strike" might, in the absence of
civil defence precautions, create conditions of '''political turbulence" which would
prevent "us" from using our Own nuclear weapons in retaliation. This would be
regrettable, since it would inhibit the escalation from "tactical" or "theatre" to
"second-strike", sea-based nuclear war. But he enVisages civil defence measures "on
a scale sufficient to give protection to a substantial number of the population",
enabling this number to endure the "disagreeable consequences" which would ensue.
The object of civil defence, then, is not so much to save lives as to reduce the
12
potential for "political turbulence" of those surviving the first strike, in order to
enable "us" to pass over to a second and more fearsome stage of nuclear warfare.
It is Professor Howard's merit that he states this sequence honestly, as a realist, and
even allows that the consequences will be disagreeable.
We are still entitled, however, to enquire more strictly as to what measures
would be on a scale suffiCient, what proportion of the population might constitute
a substantial number, and what may be indicated by the word disagreeable.
It is not as if nuclear weapons are a completely unknown quantity, which have
only been tested in deserts and on uninhabited islands. They have been tested upon
persons also, in 1945, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and to some effect. These effects
have been studied with care; and the beneficiaries of this sudden donation of
advanced technology were so much struck by the disagreeable consequences that
they have continued to monitor its effects to the present day.
One remarkable consequence of those two detonations is that the survivors in
those two cities, and the descendants of the sufferers, were transformed into
advocates, not of revenge, but of international understanding and peace. To this
day work for peace is regarded as a civic duty, and the mayors of Nagasaki and
Hiroshima regard this work as the principal obligation of their office.
For example, in 1977 an International Symposium on the Damage and After
Effects of the bombing of these two cities was inaugurated, and a number of
reports of this work are now in translation. I have read condensations of these, as
well as other materials from Nagasaki.
It had been my intention to condense this material still further, and to remind
readers of the effects of the first atomic bombings. I have now decided to pass this
matter by, for two reasons. The first is that I have found the task beyond my
powers as a writer. After reading these materials, whenever I approached my
typewriter I was overcome by such a sense of nausea that I was forced to turn to
some other task.
The second reason is that, at some point very deep in their consciousness, readers
already know what the consequences of these weapons are. This knowledge is
transmitted to children even in their infancy, so that as they run around with their
space-weapons and death-rays they are re-enactlng what happened thirty years
before they were born.
There is, however, one area of convenient forgetfulness in this inherited memory.
The moment of nuclear detonation is remembered vaguely, as a sudden instant of
light, blast and fire, in which instantly tens of thousands of lives were quenched. It
is thought of as a stupendous but instantaneous moment of annihilation, without
pain or emotional suffering.
But this is not accurate. It is now estimated that 140,000 were killed "directly"
by the bomb on Hiroshima, and 70,000 by that on Nagasaki, with an allowance for
error of 10,000 either way in each case. But the bombs were dropped on August
6 and 9, and the accounts for immediate casualties were closed on December 31,
1945. This reflects the fact that a very great number of these deaths - especially
those from burns and radioactivity - took place slowly, in the days and weeks
after the event.
13
Michiko Ogino, ten years old, was left in charge of his younger sisters when his
mother went out to the fields to pick eggplants. The bomb brought the house down
on them all, leaving his two-year-old sister with her legs pinned under a crossbeam:
"Mamma was bombed at noon
When getting eggplants in the field,
Short, red and crisp her hair stood,
Tender and red her skin was all over."
So Mrs Ogino, although the clothes were burned from her body and she had received
a fatal dose of radiation, could still run back from the fields to succour her children.
One after another passing sailors and neighbours heaved at the beam to release the
trapped two-year-old, failed, and, bowing with Japanese courtesy, went on their
way to help others.
"Mother was looking down at my little sister. Tiny eyes looked up from below. Mother
looked around, studying the way the beams were piled up. Then she got into an opening
under the beam, and putting her right shoulder under a portion of it, she strained with all
her might. We heard a cracking sound and the beams were lifted a little. My little sister's legs
were freed.
"Peeled off was the skin over her shoulder
That once lifted the beam off my sister.
Constant blood was spurting
From the sore flesh appearing ... "
Mrs Ogino died that night. Fujio Tsujimoto, who was five years old, was in the
playground of Yamazato Primary School, Nagasaki, just before the bomb dropped.
Hearing the sound of a plane he grabbed his grandmother's hand and they were the
first into the deepest part of the air raid shelter. The entrance to the shelter, as well
as the playground, was covered with the dying. "My brother and sisters didn't get
to the shelter in time, so they were burnt and crying. Half an hourlater, my mother
appeared. She was covered with blood. She had been making lunch at home when
the bomb was dropped".
"My younger sisters died the next day. My mother - she also died the next day. And then
my older brother died ...
"The survivors made a pile of wood on the playground and began to cremate the corpses.
My brother was burned. Mother also was burned and quickly turned to white bones which
dropped down among the live coals. I cried as I looked on the scene. Grandmother was also
watching, praying with a rosary ...
"I am-now in the fourth grade at Yamazato Primary School. That playground of terrible
memories is now completely cleared and many friends play there happily. I play with my
friends there too, but sometimes I suddenly remember that awful day. When I do, I squat
down on the spot where we cremated our mother and touch the earth with my fingers.
When I dig deep in the ground with a piece of bamboo, several pieces of charcoal appear.
Looking at the spot for a While, I can dimly see my mother's image in the earth. So when I
see someone else walking on that place, it makes me very angry."
I will not quote any more of the testimony of the children of Nagasaki (Living
Beneath The Atomic Cloud). What it makes clear is that the "instant" of detonation
was protracted over days and weeks, and was full, not only of physical misery, but
of unutterable yearning and suffering. A great river runs through Hiroshima, and
14
each year the descendants set afloat on it lighted lanterns inscribed with the names
of the family dead, and for several miles the full breadth of this river is one mass of
flame.
After this we still have to consider the future tens of thousands who have died
subsequently from the after-effects of that day - chiefly leukemia, various cancers,
and diseases of the blood and digestive organs. The sufferers are known as Hiba
kashu, a word which ought to be international. Some hibakashu suffer from the
direct consequences of wounds and bums, others from premature senility, others
from blindness, deafness and dumbness, others are incapable of working because of
nervous disorders, and many are seriously mentally deranged. Only two comforts
can be derived from the expert Nagasaki Report: hibakushu have been distinguished
by their mutual aid, sometimes in communities of fellow-sufferers: and the genetic
effects of the bomb (which are still being studied) do not as yet appear to have
been as bad as was at first apprehended.
"Radiological conditions may be expected to prevent any organised life
saving operation for days or weeks following an attack. Trained health service
staff would be vital to the future and should not be wasted by allowing them
to enter areas of high contamination where casualties WOUld, in any case, have
small chance of long-term recovery."
Home Office circular on the preparation of health services
for nuclear war, ES1/1977.
We may now push this distressing matter back into our subconscious, and re
consider the possible effect of "a series of pre-emptive strikes", with scorel) of
weapons very much more powerful than those bombs, upon this island.
It is true that the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were very little pre
pared for this advanced technology, and, indeed, in Nagasaki the "All Gear" had
sounded shortly before the detonation, so that the populace had trooped out of
their conventional shelters and the women were working in the fields and the
children playing in the playgrounds when the bomb went off.
Our own authorities might be able to manage the affair better. With greater
warning, stronger houses, and with some more effective measures of civil defence,
some lives might be saved, and perhaps even "a substantial number". Indeed, two
Conservative MPs have calculated that effective measures might reduce deaths in a
nuclear war in this country from about thirty-five millions to just twenty millions,
and I will allow that fifteen millions in savings is a substantial number indeed.
Nevertheless, two comments must be made on this. The first is that the death or
mortal injury of even the small figure of twenty millions might still give rise to the
conditions of "turbulence" which Professor Howard is anxious to forestall. The
incidence of disaster would not be evenly spread across the country, with hale and
hearty survivors in all parts standing ready, with high morale, to endure the hazards
of the "second strike".
15
Air Marshal Sir Leslie Mavor, Principal of the Home Defence College, addressing
a civil defence seminar in 1977 said that "the main target areas would be so badly
knocked about as to be beyond effective self-help. They would have to be more or
less discounted until adjoining areas recovered sufficiently to come to their aid".
Those parts of the country "holding no nuclear targets" might come through "more
or less undamaged by blast or fire".
"Their difficulties would be caused by fall-out radiation, a large influx of refugees, survival
without external supplies of food, energy, raw materials _. ." (The Times, 16 January 1980)
This seems a realistic assessment. There would be some total disaster areas, from
the margins of which the wounded and dying would flee as refugees; other inter
mediate areas would have energy supplies destroyed, all transport dislocated, and
persons, food and water contaminated by fall-out; yet others would be relatively
immune. But even in these immune areas there would be some persons in a state of
hysterical terror, who would be ready (if they knew how) to intervene to prevent
the second stage of Professor Howard's scenario.
The second comment is that we do not yet have any realistic notion of what
might be a scale sufficient to effect substantial savings, nor what measures might
be taken. We may certainly agree with the professor that no such measures are
either planned or contemplated. The defence correspondent of The Times, Mr Peter
Evans, in an illuminating survey in January, discovered that measures have been
taken to ensure the survival of the high personnel of the State. This has long been
evident. There will be bunkers deep under the Chiltems for senior politicians, civil
servants and military, and deep hidey holes for regional centres of military govern
ment. That is very comforting.
The population of this country, however, will not be invited to these bunkers,
and it is an Official Secret to say where they are. The population will be issued,
some three or four days before the event, with a do-it-yourself booklet (Protect
and Survive), and be sent off to wait in their own homes. They will be advised to
go down to the ground floor or the cellar, and make a cubby-hole there with old
doors and planks, cover it with sandbags, books and heavy furniture, and then creep
into these holes with food and water for 14 days, a portable radio, a portable
latrine, and, of course, a tinopener.
I have for long wondered why sociologists and demographers keep writing about
"the nuclear family", but now it is all at length set down and explained, and there
is even a picture in illustration of the term (see page 17).
Now this might save some lives, but it will also make for an unhappy end to
others. For the principal effects of nuclear weapons are very intense heat, blast
and radioactive emissions. Within a certain distance of the centre of the detonation
aU houses, cars, clothes, the hair on dogs, cats and persons, and so on, will spon
taneously ignite, while at the same time the blast will bring the houses tumbling
down about the cubby-holes. We must envisage many thousands of nuclear families
listening to Mr Robin Day's consensual homilies on their portable radios as they are
bumed, crushed or suffocated to death.
Those outside this radius might be afforded a little temporary protection. But
16
A Nuclear Free Europe
We are entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world war is not
merely possible, but increasingly likely. Economic and social difficulties in advanced
industrial countries, crisis, militarism and war in the third world compound the political
tensions that fuel a demented arms race. In Europe,the main geographical stage for the
East-West confrontation, new generations of ever more deadly weapons are appearing.
For at least twenty-five years, the forces of both the North Atlantic and the Warsaw
alliance have each had sufficient nuclear weapons to annihilate their opponents, and at
the same time to endanger the very basis of civilised life. But with each passing year,
competition in nuclear armaments has multiplied their numbers, increasing the proba
bility of some devastating accident or miscalculation.
As each side tries to prove its readiness to use nuclear weapons, in order to prevent
their use by the other side, new more "usable" nuclear weapons are designed and the
idea of "limited" nuclear war is made to sound more and more plausible. So much
so that this paradoxical process can logically only lead to the actual use of nuclear
weapons.
Neither of the major powers is now in any moral position to influence smaller
countries to forego the acquisition of nuclear armament. The increasing spread of
nuclear reactors and the growth of the industry that installs them, reinforce the
likelihood of worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby multiplying the
risks of nuclear exchanges.
Over the years, public opinion has pressed for nuclear disarmament and detente
between the contending military blocs. This pressure has failed. An increasing propor
tion of world resources is expended on weapons, even though mutual extermination is
already amply guaranteed. This economic burden, in both East and West, contributes
to growing social and political strain, setting in motion a vicious circle in which the
arms race feeds upon the instability of the world economy and vict' versa: a deathly
dialectic.
We are now in great danger. Generations have been born beneath the shadow of
nuclear war, and have become habituated to the threat. Concern has given way to
apathy. Meanwhile, in a world living always under menace, fear extends through both Support for END
halves of the European continent. The powers of the military and of internal security
forces are enlarged, limitations are placed upon free exchanges of ideas and between
persons, and civil rights of independent-minded individuals are threatened, in the West
as well as the East.
We do not wish to apportion guilt between the political and military leaders of East
and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. Both parties have adopted menacing
postures and committed aggressive actions in different parts of the world.
The remedy lies in our own hands. We must act together to free the entire territory
of Europe, from Poland to Portugal, from nuclear weapons, air and submarine bases,
and from all institutions engaged in research into or manufacture of nuclear weapons.
We ask the two super powers to withdraw all nuclear weapons from European territory.
In particular, we ask the Soviet Union to halt production of the SS-20 medium range
missile and we ask the United States not to implement the decision to develop cruise
missiles and Pershing II missiles for deployment in Western Europe. We also urge the
ratification of the SALT II agreement, as a necessary step towards the renewal of
effective negotiations on general and complete disarmament.
At the same time, we must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East or West,
to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange.
We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and persuasion, to consider
urgently the ways in which we can work together for these common objectives. We
envisage a campaign, in which every kind of exchange takes place; in
which representatives of different nations and opinions confer and co-ordinate their
activities; and in which less formal exchanges, between universities, churches, women's
organisations, trade unions, youth organisations, professional groups and individuals,
take place with the object of promoting a common object: to free all of Europe from
nuclear weapons.
We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists.
We must learn to be loyal, not to "East" or "West", but to each other, and we must
disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.
It will be the responsibility of the people of each nation to agitate for the expulsion
of nuclear weapons and bases from European soil and territorial waters, and to decide
upon its own means and strategy, concerning its own territory. These will differ from
one country to another, and we do not suggest that any single strategy should be
imposed. But this must be part of a trans-continental movement in which every kind
of exchange takes place.
We must resist any attempt by the statesmen of East or West to manipulate this
movement to their own advantage. We offer no advantage to either NATO or the
Warsaw alliance. Our objectives must be to free Europe from confrontation, to enforce
detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, ultimately, to dissolve
both great power alliances.
In appealing to fellow Europeans, we are not turning our backs on the world. In
working for the peace of Europe we are working for the peace of the world. Twice in
this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilisation by engendering world war.
This time we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace. .
This appeal will achieve nothing if it is not supported by determined and inventive
action, to win more people to support it. We need to mount an irresistible pressure for
a Europe free of nuclear weapons.
We do not wish to impose any uniformity on the movement nor to pre-empt the
conSUltations and decisions of those many organisations already exercising their
influence for disarmament and peace. But the situation is urgent. The dangers steadily
advance. We invite your support for this common objective, and we shall welcome
both your help and advice.
The appeal for a nuclear-free zone in Europe was launched at a special press con
ference in the House of Commons on April 28 1980, and simultaneously in four
other capitals. At that time it was supported by 61 Labour Members of Parliament,
two Welsh Nationalist MPs, one Scottish Nationalist and an Ulster Nationalist.
Many distinguished people in literature and the arts, scholarship and public life
were among the initial supporters. II members of the Labour Party's National
Executive and 5 members of the General Council of the TUC signed the appeal
before publication.
Hundreds of additional signatures have been arriving at Bertrand Russell House
every week ever since the publication of the appeal. They include such distinguished
scholars as Professor Sir Moses Finley, Sir Joseph Hutchinson, Dr Joseph Needham
and Professor Peter Townsend; eminent Churchmen, such as the Bishop of Dudley,
the Dean of Canterbury and Canon Paul Oestreicher; the well-known cricket
commentator and writer, John Arlott; prominent personalities from the world of
theatre, entertainment and broadcasting, like Juliet Mills, Helen Shapiro and
Susannah York; military men such as Brigadier Harbottle. Since the end of April
more parliamentarians have endorsed the appeal, including David Alton, Liberal
Member for Edgehill.
In Europe the response reaches across an extraordinary breadth of opinion.
Among those who have expressed support for the general objectives of the campaign
are Gunnar Myrdal, the eminent Swedish economist and Roy Medvedev, the Russian
historian and defender of civil rights. Rudolf Bahro, recently imprisoned in East
Germany, and now working with the Green Party in West Germany, is a signatory,
and so also are leading exponents of liberal "Eurocommunist" policies in West
Europe - Pierre Joye (Belgium), Professor Lombardo Radice (Italy) and Manuel
Azcarate (Spain). In France signatories include Dr Alfred Kastler, the physicist and
Nobel laureate, Professor Pierre Bourdieu, the eminent sociologist, theologians,
priests, artists and scholars. Growing support in West Germany has been encouraged
by Professor Ulrich Albrecht, the Professor of Peace Studies at the Free University.
Famous artists include Joan Miro (Spain), Victor Vasarely (France), and Piero
Dorazio (Italy); while among distinguished political figures, we find Artur London
(Czechoslovakia), Professor B. de Gaay Fortman, the leader of the Dutch Radical
Party in the Senate, Maarten van Traa, the International Secretary of the Dutch
Labour Party, Andras Hegedus (former Prime Minister of Hungary), Melo Antunnes
(recently Portugal's foreigu minister) and Francisco Marcelo Curto (former Minister
of Labour in Portugal), Albert de Smaele (former Belgian Minister) and J. Pronteau
(executive member of the French Socialist Party). From Greece up to Finland, and
from Ireland to Moscow, the END appeal is being discussed by an ever-growing
circle of concerned men and women.
In order ro express your support for the appeal please complete and return the
section overleaf
I tNDORSE THE STATEMENT ON A EUROPEAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE
AND CONSENT TO THE PUBUCATION OF MY NAME IN TillS CONNECTION:
Signed
....... " " " .
Name (in block capitals)
............... " " .
Address
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .. . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . ..
" '" '" .
Designation
" " "
I enclose " to help with the Campaign (if you possibly can!)
Please return to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Bertrand Russell House,
Gamble Street, Nottingham, NG7 4ET. (Lists of additional signatories can be
attached.)
To assist the development of the European Nuclear Disarmament
Campaign in Britain and abroad a Bulletin of Work in Progress is
being produced bi-monthly, price 40p.
Also
Protest and Survive: E.P. Thompson (Spokesman Pamphlet No.71)
45p
European Nuclear Disarmament: Ken Coates (Spokesman Pamphlet
No.72) 50p
Available from bookshops or directly from Russell House, Gamble
Street, Nottingham NG7 4ET.
Tel: 0602-708318 (Bulk rates on request)
Remittances should include an addition to cover postage/packing.
T
when they eventually emerge (after some fourteen days) they will fmd the food and
water contaminated, the roads blocked, the hospitals destroyed, the livestock dead
or dying. The vice-chairman of Civil Aid, who is a realist, advises thus: HIfyoll saw
a frog running about, you would have to wash it down to get rid of active dust,
cook it and eat it". (The Times, 14 February 1980.) And, according to Professor
Howard's scenario, people will still be living in expectation of "yet heavier attacks".

The Nuclear Family
If we are to learn from the experience of the people of Nagasaki and Hiroshima,
then I think it is, after all, unlikely that many survivors will be devoting their
energies to "political turbulence", since, unless they know the entrances to the
governmental deep bunkers, they will have nothing to turbul against. Most will be
wandering here and there in a desperate attempt to find lost children, parents,
neighbours, friends. A few of the most collected will succour the dying and dig
among the ruins for the injured.
The measures outlined in Protect and Survive do not seem to me to be on a scale
sufficient to reduce the consequences of a nuclear strike to the compass of a small
word like "disagreeable". It is possible to imagine measures on a greater scale. The
evacuation of whole cities, as is planned in the USA and perhaps in the Soviet
Union, is inoperable here because this island is too small. But one might imagine
the excavation of vast subterranean systems beneath our towns - and perhaps
beneath All Soul's - complete with stored food and water, generating systems, air
purifying systems, etc.
This might save a substantial number of lives, although one is uncertain what it
would save them for, since above ground no workplaces, uncontaminated crops
or stock would be left. The logic of this development, then, will be to remove these
activities underground also, with subterranean cattle-stalls, granaries, bakeries, and
munitions works.
17
"I
!
It is certainly possible that, if civilisation survives and continues on its present
I
trajectory until the midtwenty-first century, then the "advanced" societies will
have become troglodyte in Some such fashion. But it wouid not be advisable to
suppose. that our descen.dants will have then at length have attained to "security",
m the sImultaneous realisatIon of the ultimate in "deterrence" with the ultimate in
"defence". For the military will by then have taken further steps in technology.
Neutron weapons and Earth Penetrators already exist, which can drive death
underground. All this will be perfected, "modernised", and refmed. There will be
thermonuclear capable concussing a whole underground city.
And, m any case, by the time that humamty becomes troglodyte, it will then have
been already defeated. "Civilisation" will then be an archaic term, which children
can no longer construe.
We will now tum to the second assumption which underpins Professor Howard's
arguments. This concerns "tactical" or "theatre" nuclear war.
The professor supposes a "theatre" war confmed to Europe, which does not
escalate to confrontation between the two superpowers. We will not chide him too
on this witless supposition, since it is now commonplace in the strategic
thmkmg of both blocs. Indeed, it is commonplace not only as idea but also as fact
since immense sums are spent on both sides to match each other's weapons at
"tactical" and Htheatre" levels.
We have seen that poor Mr Pym (who is still waiting to be told by an American
officer what to do) is quite as simple on this matter as Professor Howard. Both
suppose a "chain of deterrence", according to which war may not only start at any
level but it may be confined to that level, since at any point there is a further
fearsome threshold of "deterrence" ahead.
This is not the same as the proposal that local or regional wars with nuclear
weapons may take place. That is a reasonable proposal. If the proliferation of these
weapons continues, it is possible that we will see such wars: as between Israel and
Arab states, or South Africa and an alliance of African states. Whether such wars
lead on to confrontation between the superpowers will depend, not upon the logic
of weaponry, but on further diplomatic and political considerations.
This proposition is different. It is that nuclear wars between the two great
opposed powers their allies could be confmed to this or that level. This is a silly
notion at first sIght; and, after tedious and complex arguments have been gone
through, it emerges as equally silly at the end. For while it might very well be in
the interests of either the USA or the USSR to confine a war to Europe, or to the
Pers13n gulf, and to prevent it from passing into an ultimate confrontation we are
not dealing here with rational behaviour. '
. Once "theatre" nuclear war commences, immense passions, indeed hysterias,
will be aroused. After even the first strikes of such a war, communications and
command posts will be so much snarled up that any notion of rational planning will
gIve way to panic. Ideology will at once take over from selfinterest. Above all it
will be manifest that the only one of the two great powers likely to come out of the
contest as "victor" must be the one which hurls its ballistic weapons first, furthest
and fastest - and preferably before the weapons of the other have had time to
lift off.
This was the commonsense message which L"'d Louis Mountbatten, shortly
before he was murdered, conveyed to the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) at a meeting in Strasbourg. He referred to the introduction of
"tactical" or "theatre" weapons:
"The belief was that were hostilities ever to break out in Western Europe, such weapons
could be used in field warfare without triggering an all-out nuclear exchange leading to the
final holocaust.
"I have never found this idea credible. 1 have never been able to accept the reasons for
the belief that any class of nuclear weapons can be categorised in terms of their tactical or
strategic purposes ...
"In the event of a nuclear war there will be no chances, there will be no survivors - all
will be obliterated. I am not asserting this without having deeply thought about the matter.
When I was Chief of the British Defence Staff I made my views known ... I repeat in all
sincerity as a military man I can see no use for any nuclear weapons which would not end in
escalation, with consequences that no one can conceive."
The same firm judgement was expressed by Lord Zuckerman in The Times
on January 21: "Nor was I ever able to see any military reality in what is now
referred to as theatre or tactical warfare":
"The men in the nuclear laboratories of both sides have succeeded in creating a world with
an irrational foundation, on which a new set of political realities has in turn had to be built.
They have become the alchemists of our times, working in secret ways which cannot be
divulged, casting spells which embrace us all."
Professor Howard takes his stand on these irrational foundations, and practices
alchemy in his own right. The spells which he casts on the public mind are presented
as "civil defence". He calls for measures (unnamed) which must be "given the
widest possible publicity", in order to ensure "the credibility of our entire defence
posture", a posture which might otherwise be seen to be "no more than an expensive
bluff" .
The professor supposes that he is a tough realist, who is drawing conclusions
which others, including politicians, are too timorous to draw in public. If we spend
thousands of millions of pounds upon nuclear weapons, then we either intend to
use them or we do not. If we intend to use them, then we must intend to receive
them also.
But, as he knows, there are no practicable civil defence measures which could
have more than a marginal effect. He is therefore telling us that "we" must replace
one expensive bluff by a bluff even more expensive; or he is telling us that "we"
have decided that we are ready to accept the obliteration of the material resources
and inheritance of this island, and of some half of its inhabitants, in order to further
the strategies of NATO.
These are two distinct propositions, and it is time that they were broken into
two parts. For a long time the second proposition has been hidden within the
mendacious vocabulary of Hdeterrence"; and behind these veils of "posture",
"credibility" and "bluff" it has waxed fat and now has come of age.
18
19
The first proposition is that nuclear weapons are capable of inflicting such
"unacceptable damage" on both parties to an exchange that mutual fear ensures
peace. The second is that each party is actually preparing for nuclear war and is
searching for some ultimate weapon or tacticai/strategic point of advan
tage which would assureltsvlCtory. We have lived uneasily with the first proposition
years:,We are l?oking directly into the second proposition's eyes.
Deterrence has plauSibility. It has "worked" for thirty years, if not in Viet.
nam, Czechoslovakia, the Middle East, Africa, Cambodia, the Dominican Republic
Afghanistan, then in the central fracture between the superpowers which run;
across It may have inhibited, in Europe, major "conventional" war.
But It has not worked as a stationary state. The weapons for adequate "deter
already existed thirty years ago, and, as the Pope reminded us in his New
Vear s. Mes:'age for 1980, only 200 of the 50,000 nuclear weapons now estimated
to be m eXIStence would be enough to destroy the world's major cities. Vet we have
upwards to 50,000, and each year new sophistications and "modernisations"
are Introduced.
"The exercise scenario foresaw and developed a declaratory policy by the
Warsaw Pact of no first nuclear use and a related NATO negation of this
policy. The Alliance was therefore able to start from the assumption that its
strategy of flexibility in response could take nuclear weapons fully into
account as a means to attempt war termination and restitution of the
status quo .
"A
message sent to an enemy during hostilities with strong ultimate
features (demanding an end to hostilities and threatening to use nuclear
weapons) should not be sent without a definite use decision by the nuclear
power actually having been taken."
Report of NA TO WINTEX 1977 exercise, prepared by the staff
committee of the NA TO Nuclear Planning Group ('secret').
The chatter about "theatre" or "tactical" nuclear war is not a sophisti
cated varIant of the old vocabulary of "deterrence"; it is directly at variance with
that vocabulary. For it is founded on the notion that either of the superpowers
might engage, to Its own a "limited" nuclear war which could be kept
below the threshold at which retnbution would be visited on its own soil.
. Thus it is thought by persons in the Pentagon that a "theatre" nuclear war
might be confIned to Europe, in which, to be sure, America's NATO allies would be
oblIterated, but in which immense damage would also be inflicted upon Russia west
of Urals, while the soil of the United States remained immune. (In such a
scenano It IS even supposed that President Carter and Mr Brezhnev would' be on
the :'hot line" to each other while Europe scorched, threatening ultimate inter.
contmental ballistic retribution, but at last making "peace".) This has been seen as
20
the way to a great "victory" for "the West". and if world-wide nuclear war seems
to be ultimately inevitable, then the sooner that can be aborted by having a little
"theatre" war the better.
The cruise missiles which are being set up all over Western Europe are weapons
designed for exactly such a war, and the nations which harbour them are viewed,
in this strategy, as launching platforms which are expendible in the interests of
"Western" defence. In a somewhat muddy passage, Mr Pym assured BBC listeners
that:
"It is never envisaged that these weapons are in any sense a response to a nuclear attack
from the Soviet Union which comes out of the blue. This is a lesser weapon, which would
be deployed from these bases in times of tension, not only from the United Kingdom but
throughout the other countries in Europe." (Cambridge Evening News, 6 February 1980)
Mr Pym has also confirmed to the House of Commons (Hansard, 24 January
1980) that the cruise missiles "are to be owned and operated by the United States".
Their use must be sanctioned by the President of the United States on the request
of the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, who is always an American general.
It was for this reason that Senator Nino Pasti, formerly an Italian member of the
NATO Military Committee and Deputy Supreme Commander for NATO Nuclear
Affairs, has declared: "I have no doubt that the tactical nuclear weapons deployed
in Europe represent the worst danger for the peoples of the continent":
"In plain words, the tactical nuclear weapon would be employed in the view of NATO to
limit the war to Europe. Europe is to be transformed into a 'nuclear Maginot line' for the
defence of the United States." (Sanity, JulYI August 1979)
Meanwhile the United States is urgently seeking for similar platforms in the
Middle East for another smali "theatre" war which might penetrate deep into the
Caucasus. And an even uglier scenario is beginning to show itself in China, where
greed for a vast arms market is tempting Western salesmen while United States
strategists hope to nudge Russia and China into war with each other - a war which
would dispell another Western phobia, the demographic explosion of the East.
The idea here is to extract the West, at the last moment, from this war - much
the same scenario as that which went disastrously wrong in 1939.
These little "theatre" wars (not one of which would obediently stay put in
its theatre) are now all on the drawing-boards, and in the Pentagon more than in
the Kremlin, for the simple reason that every "theatre" is adjacent to the Soviet
Union, and any "tactical" nuclear strike would penetrate deep into Russian territory.
The plans for the European "theatre" war are not only ready - the "modernised"
missiles designed for exactly such a war have been ordered, and will be delivered to
this island in 1982. And at this moment, Professor Howard makes a corresponding
political intervention. u,t us see why this is so.
Professor Howard wishes to hurry the British people across a threshold of mental
expectation, so that they may be prepared, not for "deterrence", but for actual
nuclear war.
21
..
The expectations supporting the theory of deterrence are, in the final analysis,
that deterrence will work. Deterrence is effective, because the alternative is not
only "unacceptable" or "disagreeable": it is "unthinkable".
Deterrence is a posture, but it is the posture of MAD (mutual assured destruction),
not of menace. It does not say, "If we go to nuclear war we intend to win": it says,
"Do not go to war, or provoke war, because neither of us can win". In consequence
it does not bother to meddle with anything so futile as "civil defence". If war
commences, everything is already lost.
Those who have supported the policy of deterrence have done so in the con
fidence that this policy would prevent nuclear war from taking place. They have
not contemplated the alternative, and have been able to avoid facing certain ques
tions raised by that alternative. Of these, let us notice three.
First, is nuclear war preferable to being overcome by the enemy? Is the death of
fifteen or twenty millions and the utter destruction of the country preferable to an
occupation which might offer the possibility, after some years, of resurgence and
recuperation?
Second, are we ourselves prepared to endorse the use of such weapons against
the innocent, the children and the aged, of an "enemy"?
Third, how does it happen that Britain should find herself committed to policies
which endanger the very survival of the nation, as a result of decisions taken by a
secret committee of NATO, and then endorsed at Brussels without public discussion
or parliamentary sanction, leaving the "owning and operation" of these "theatre"
weapons in the hands of the military personnel of a foreign power, a power whose
strategists have contingency plans for unleashing these missiles in a "theatre" war
which would not extend as far as their own homeland?
The first two questions raise moral issues which it would be improper to intro
duce into an academic discussion. My own answer to them is "no". They are, in
any case, not new questions. The third question is, in some sense, new, and it is also
extrao.rdinary, in the sense that even proposing the question illUminates the degree
to whIch the loss of our national sovereignty has become absolute, and democratic
process has been deformed in ways scarcely conceivable twenty years ago .
. But P r o f ~ ~ o r Howard's arguments are designed to hurry us past these questiol1S
wIthout notIcmg them. They are designed to carry us across a threshold from the
unthinkable (the theory of deterrence, founded upon the assumption that this
must work) to the thinkable (the theory that nuclear war may happen, and may
be lIDmment, and, WIth cunning tactics and proper preparations might end in
"victory"). '
More than this, the arguments are of an order which permit the mind to progress
from the unthinkabie to the thinkable without thinking - without confronting
the arguments, their consequences or probable conclusions and indeed without
knowing that any threshold has been crossed. ",
At each side of this threshold we are offered a policy with an identical label:
"deterrence". And both policies stink with the same mendacious rhetoric _
"posture", "credibility", "bluff'. But mutual fear and self-interest predominate
on one side, and active menace and the ceaseless pursuit of "tactical" or "theatre"
22
advantage predominate on the other. Which other side we have crossed over to, and
now daily inhabit.
"Nuclear weapons must be employed . .. to convey a decisive escalation of
sufficient shock to convincingly persuade the enemy that he should make the
political decision to cease the attack and withdraw. To evidence our solidarity,
I am considering use in all regions employing both UK and US weapons using
primarily aircraft and land-based missile systems. The initial use would be
restricted to GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria."
Telex message from General Alexander Haigh, then Supreme Allied
Commander Europe to the NA TO Command, during the WINTEX
77 exercises.
Professor Howard himself has certainly thought the problem through. His letter
was a direct political intervention. He called on the British authorities to rush us all,
unthinkingly, across this thought-gap. His language - his anxiety as to possible
"political turbulence", his advocacy of measures which are not "covert or con
cealed" - reveals a direct intention to act in political ways upon the mind of the
people, in order to enforce a "posture", not of defence but of menace; and in this it
corresponds, on a political level, with the menacing strategic decisions of NATO last
December at Brussels.
The high strategists of NATO are busy in the Pentagon and the Hague, and
Professor Howard is busy at All Soul's, but they are both working away at the
same problem. One end of the problem was clearly stated, at the height of the old
Cold War, by John Foster Dulles:
"In order to make the country bear the burden, we have to create an emotional atmosphere
akin to a war-time psychology. We must create the idea of a threat from without."
But that was when the probiem was only in its infancy. For the country - that is,
this country - must now not only be made to bear a burden of heavy expense,
loss of civil liberties, etc., but also the expectation, as a defmite and imminent
possibility, of actual nuclear devastation.
Hence it becomes necessary to create not only "the idea of a threat from with
out" but also of a threat from within: "political turbulence". And it is necessary to
inflame these new expectations by raising voluntary defence corps, auxiliary
services, digging even deeper bunkers for the personnel of the State, distributing
leaflets, holding lectures in halls and churches, laying down two-weeks supplies of
emergency rations, promoting in the private sector the manufacture of Whitelaw
Shelters and radiation-proof "Imperm" blinds and patent Anti-Fall-Out pastilles
and "Breetheesy" masks, and getting the Women's Institutes to work out recipes
for broiling radio-active frogs. And it is also necessary to supplement all this by
beating up an internal civil-war or class-war psychosis, by unmasking traitors, by
23
threatening journalists under the Official Secrets Acts, by tampering with juries and
tapping telephones, and generally by closing up people's minds and mouths.
Now I do not know how far all this will work. There are tactical problems,
which those who live outside All Soul's are able to see. Whitehall's reluctance to
issue every householder with a copy of Protect and Survive is eloquent testimony to
this. For there is a minority of the British people who are reluctant to be harried
across this threshold. These people have voices, and if they are denied access to the
major media, there are still little journals and democratic organisations where they
are able to speak. If the mass of the British public were to be suddeniy alerted to
the situation which they are actually now in - by "alarmist" leaflets and by broad
casts telling them that they have indeed every reason for alarm - then the whole
operation might backfire, and give rise to a vast consensus, not for nuclear war, but
for peace.
I suspect that, for these reasons, Professor Howard is regarded, by public
relations-conscious persons in the Establishment, as a great patriot of NATO and an
admirable fellow, but as an inexperienced politician. The people of this country
have been made dull and stupid by a diet of Official Information. But they are not
all that stupid, and there is still a risk - a small risk, but not one worth taking
that they might remember who they are, and become "turbulent" before the war
even got started.
I suspect that the strategy of high persons in the Cabinet Office, the security
services, and the Ministry of Defence, is rather different from that of Professor
Howard. There is preliminary work yet to do, in softening up the public mind, in
intimidating dissidents, in contfollinginformation more tightly, and in strengthening
internal policing and security. Meanwhile planning will go forward, and at the
next international crisis (real or factitious) there will be a cOMordinated univocal
obliterating "civil defence" bombardment, with All-Party broadcasts, leafleting and
the levying of volunteers, and with extreme precautions to prevent any dissenting
voices from having more than the most marginal presence.
So that I think that Professor Howard is a little ahead of his times. But the
arguments which Mr Howard has proposed, are, exactly, the arguments most deeply
relevant to the present moment. That is why I have spent all this time in examining
them.
I have sought, in these pages, to open these arguments up, to show what is inside
them, which premises and what conclusions. I have not been trying to frighten
readers, but to show the consequences to which these arguments lead.
Nor have I been trying to show that Professor Howard is a scandalous and
immoral sort of person. I do not suppose myself to be a more moral sort of person
than he. I think it unlikely that he put forward his ghastly scenario with any
feelings of eager anticipation.
And, finally, although I am myself by conviction a socialist, I have not been
grounding my arguments on premises of that kind. I do not suppose that all blame
lies with the ideological malice and predatory drives of the capitalist "West",
although some part ofit does.
24
Socialists once supposed, in my youth, that socialist states might commit every
kind of blunder, but the notion that they could go to war with each other, for
ideological or national ends, was unthinkable. We now know better. States whiCh
call themselves "socialist" can go to war with each other, and do. And they can use
means and arguments as bad as those of the old imperialist powers.
I have based my arguments on the logic of the Cold War, orofthe :'deterrent"
situation itself. We may favour this or that explanation for the origm of this sItuation.
But once this situation has arisen, there is a common logic at work in both blocs.
Military technology and military strategy come to impos:, their own upon
political developments. As Lord Zuckerman has wntten: The deCISIOns which we
make today in the fields of science and technology determme the tactlcs, then the
strategy, and finally the politics of tomorrow". . .
This is an inter-operative and reciprocal logic, which threatens all, Irnpartlally.
If you press me for my own view, then I would hazard that the Russian is
the most dangerous in relation to its own people and to the people of Its chent
states. The rulers of Russia are police-minded and security-nunded people, 1tn
prisoned within their own ideology, accustomed to meet argument with repression
and tanks. But the basic postures of the Soviet Union seem to me, still, to be those
of siege and aggressive defence; and even the brutal and botching intervention in
Afghanistan appears to have followed upon sensitivity as to United States and
Chinese strategies.
"1 can think of no instance in modern history where such a breakdown
of political communication and such a triumph of unrestrained military
suspicions as now marks Soviet-American relations has not led, in the end,
to armed conflict."
George Kennan, former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, a.nd
Professor Emeritus, Princeton Institute of Advanced Studies.
Observer, 10 February 1980.
The United States seems to me to be more dangerous and provocative in its
general military and diplomatic strategies, which press around the Soviet Union
with menacing bases. It is in Washington, rather than 10 Moscow, that scenanos are
dreamed up for "theatre" wars; and it is in America that the of
superkill, the clever technologists of "advantage" and ultimate weapons, press
forward politics of tomorrow".
But we need not ground our own actions on a "preference" for of the
blocs. This is unrealistic and could be divisive. What is relevant 1S of
process common to both, reinforcing the ugliest features of each others
and locking both together in each others' nuclear arms in the same degenerative
drift.
What I have been contending for, against Professor Howard, is this. First, I have
25
shown that the premises which underlie his letter are irrational
Second, I have been c?ncerned throughout with the use of language.
What makes the extinctIon of civilised life upon ti,is island probable is not
a propenSIty for evil than in previous history, but a more formidable
destructive technology, a deformed political process (East and West) and also
a deformed culture. '
The deformation of culture within language itself. It makes possible
a dIsjunction between the rationalIty and moral sensibility of individual men and
and. effective political and military process. A certain kind of "realist"
and techmcal vocabulary effects a closure which seals out the imagination and
prevents the reason. from following the most manifest sequence of cause' and
consequence. It habItuates the mind to nuclear holocaust by reducing everything
to a flat level of normahty. By habItuating us to certain expectations it not only
- it also beckons on the event. '
kmd cannot bear very much reality". As much of reality as mOst of us
can IS what is most proximate to us - our self-interests and our immediate
affectiOns. threatens our interests - what causes us even mental unease _ is
seen as outSIde ourse!;es, as the We can kill thousands because we have first
learned to call them the enemy . Wars commence in our culture first of all, and
we
kIll each other In euphenusms and abstractions long before the first missiles
have been launched.
It has never been true that nuclear war is "unthinkable". It has been thought
and the thought has been put Into effect. This was done in 1945, in the name
of alhes fighting for the Four Freedoms (although what those Freedoms were I
cannot. now recall), and it was done upon two populous cities. It was done by
profeSSing ChnstIans, when the Western AlIies had already defeated the Germans
and when victory against the Japanese was certain, in the longer or shorter run:
The longer run would have cost some thousands more of Western lives, whereas
the short run (the bomb) would cost the lives only of enemy Asians. This was
perfectly thinkable. It was thought. And action followed on.
What is is that nuclear war could happen to us. So long as we can
suppose that thIS war WIll be inflicted only on them, the thought comes easily. And
If we can also suppose that thIS war will save "our" lives, or serve our self-interest
or even save (if we live in California) from the tedium of queueing every othe;
day for gasoline, then the act Can easily follow on. We think others to death as we
defme them as the Other: the enemy: Asians: Marxists: non-people. The deformed
human IS the ultImate doomsday weapon - it is out of the human mind that
the llllssiles and the neutron warheads come.
For this reason it is necessary to enter a remonstrance against Professor Howard
and those who use his kind of language and adopt his mental postures. He is pre
our nunds as launchmg platfonns for exterminating thoughts. The fact that
.are domg much the same (thinking us to death as "imperialists"
and capltahsts ) IS no defence. This is not work proper to scholars.
Acadenuc persons have little influence upon political and military decisions, and
less than they suppose. They do, however, operate within our culture, with ideas
26
and language, and, as we have seen, the deformation of culture is the precedent
condition for nuclear war.
It is therefore proper to ask such persons to resist the contamination of our
culture with those terms which precede the ultimate act. The death of fifteen
millionsoffellow citizens ought not to be described as "disagreeable consequences".
A war confmed to Europe ought not to be given the euphemisms of Hlimited" or
"theatre". The development of more deadly weapons, combined with menacing
diplomatic postures and major new political and strategic decisions (the siting of
missiles on our own territory under the control of alien personnel) ought not to be
concealed within the anodyne technological term of "modernisation". The threat
to erase the major cities of Russia and East Europe ought not to trip easily off the
tongue as "unacceptable damage".
Professor Howard is entitled to hold his opinions and to make these public. But I
must enter a gentle remonstrance to the members of the University of OXford
nonetheless. Does this letter, from the Chichele Professor of the History of War,
represent the best thoughts that Oxford can put together at a time when human
culture enters a crisis which may be terminal? I have no doubt that members of that
University hold different opinions. But where, and how often, in the last few
months, have these other voices been heard?
I am thinking, most of all, of that great number of persons who very much
dislike what is going on in the actual world, but who dislike the vulgarity of exposing
themselves to the business of "politics" even more. They erect both sets of dislikes
around their desks or laboratories like a screen, and get on with their work and
their careers. I am not asking these, or all of them, to march around the place or to
spend hours in weary little meetings. I am asking them to examine the deformities
of our culture and then, in public places, to demur.
I am asking them whether Professor Howard's letter truly represents the voice
of Oxford? And, if it does not, what measures they have taken to let their dissent
be known?
I will recommend some other forms of action, although every person must be
governed in this by his or her own conscience and aptitudes. But, first, I should, in
fairness to Professor Howard, offer a scenario of my own.
I have come to the view that a general nuclear war is not only possible but
probable, and that its probability is increasing. We may indeed be approaching a
point of no-return when the existing tendency or dISPOSItion towards this outcome
becomes irreversible.
I ground this view upon two considerations, which we may define (to borrow
the terms of our opponents) as "tactical" and "strategic". .
By tactical I mean that the political and military conditions for su?h war eXISt
now in several parts of the world; the proliferation of nuclear weapons Will contInue,
and will be hastened by the export of nuclear energy technology to new markets;
and the rivalry of the superpowers is directly inflaming these .
Such conditions now exist in the Middle East and around the Peman Gulf, Will
shortly exist in Africa, while in South-East Asia Russia and China have already
27
engaged in wars by proxy with each other, in Cambodia and Vietnam.
might stop just short of general nuclear war between the superpowers.
And ill theu aftermath the great powers might be frightened into better behaviour
for a few years. But so long as this behaviour rested on nothing more than mutual
fear, then .IDlhtary technology would continue to be refined, more hideous weapons
would be illvented, and the Opposing giants would enlarge their control over client
states. The strategic pressures towards confrontation will continue to grow.
. considerations are the gravest of the two. They fest upon a
view of power and of the social process, rather than upon the instant
analySIS of the commentator on events.
In this view it is a superficial judgement, and a dangerous error, to suppose tpat
deterrence "has worked". Very possibly it may have worked at this or that
.preventing recourse war. But in its very mode of V:orking, and in its
postures ,11 has brought on a senes of consequences within its host societies.
"Deterrence" is not a stationary state, it is a degenerative state. Deterrence
has repressed the export of violence towards the opposing bloc, but in doing
so the repressed power of the state has turned back upon its own author. The
repressed VIolence has backed up, and has worked its way back into the economy,
the polity, the Ideology and the culture of the opposing powers. This is the deep
structure of the Cold War.
logic,,of this deep structure of mutual fear was clearly identified by William
Blake ill hIs Song of Experience", The HUlrUln Abstract:
And mutual fear brings peace;
Till the selfish loves increase.
Then Cruelty knits a snare,
And spreads his baits with care ...
Soon spreads the dismal shade
Of Mystery over his head;
And the Catterpiller and Fly
Feed on the Mystery.
And it bears the fruit of Deceit,
Ruddy and sweet to eat;
And the Raven his nest has made
In its thickest shade.
In this logic, the peace of "mutual fear" enforces opposing selfinterests, affords
room for "Cruelty" to work, engenders "Mystery" and its parasites brings to fruit
the "postures" ofDeceit, and the death-foreboding Raven hides the Mystery.
Within the logic of "deterrence", millions are now employed in the armed
.security organs and military economy of the opposing blocs, and corres
pondmg mterests exert immense influence within the counsels of the great powers.
Mystery envelops the operation of the technological "alchemists". "Deterrence"
has normal, and minds have been habituated to the vocabulary of mutual
extemunatlon. And within this normality, hideous cultural abnormalities have been
nurtured and are growing to full girth.
28
The menace of nuclear war reaches far back into the economies of both parties,
dictating priorities, and awarding power. Here, in failing economies, will be found
the most secure and vigorous sectors, tapping the mos! advanced teclmological
skills of both opposed societies and diverting these away from peaceful and produc
tive employment or from efforts to close the great gap between the world's north
and south. Here also will be found the driVing rationale for expansionist programmes
in unsafe nuclear energy, programmes which cohabit comfortably with military
nuclear teclmology whereas the urgent research into safe energy supplies from sun,
wind or wave are neglected because they have no military pay-off. Here, in this
burgeoning sector, will be found the new expansionist drive for "markets" for arms,
as "capitalist" and "socialist" powers compete to feed into the Middle East, Africa
and Asia more sophisticated means of kill.
"The MX missile will be the most expensive weapon ever produced - some
estimates run as high as $100 billion to deploy 200 missiles. Building its 'race
track' bases will involve the largest construction project in US history ..
More than 20,000 square miles may be involved for this system ... in the
sparsely inhabited states of Utah and Nevada Some 10,000 miles of heavy
duty roadway will be required, and perhaps 5,000 additional miles of road
... The MX will thus require the biggest construction project in the nation's
history, bigger than the Panama Canal and mueh bigger than the Alaskan
pipeline. "
Herbert Scoville, Jr., "America's Greatest Construction: Can It Workl",
New York Review of Books. 20 March 1980.
.
The menace of this stagnant state of violence backs up also into the polity of
both halves of the world. Permanent threat and periodic crisis press the men of the
military-industrial interests, by differing routes in each society, towards the top.
Crisis legitimates the enlargement of the security functions of the state, the intimi
dation of internal dissent, and the imposition of secrecy and the control of infor
mation. As the "natural" lines of social and political development are repressed,
and affirmative perspectives are closed, so internal politics collapses into squabbling
interest-groups, all of which interests are subordinated to the overarching interests
of the state of perpetual threat.
All this may be readily observed. It may be observed even in failing Britain,
across whose territory are now scattered the bases, airfields, camps, research stations,
submarine depots, communications-interception stations, radar screens, security
and intelligence HQ, munitions works - secure and expanding employment in an
economic climate of radical insecurity.
What we cannot observe so well - for we ourselves are the object which must be
observed - is the manner in which three decades of '"deterrence", of mutual fear,
mystery, and state-endorsed stagnant hostility, have backed up into our culture and
29
our ideology. Information has been numbed, language and values have been fouled
by the postures and expectations of the "deterrent" state. But this is matter for
close and scrupulous enquiry.
These, then, are among the strategic considerations which lead me to the view
that the probability of great power nuclear warfare is strong and increasing. I do
not argue from thIS local episode or that: what happened yesterday in Afghanistan
and ,:"hat is happening now in Pakistan or North Yemen. I argue from a general and
sustamed hlstoncal process, an accumulative logic, of a kind made familiar to me in
the. study of history. The episodes lead in this direction or that, but the general
lOgic of process IS always towards nuclear war.
The local crises are survived, and it seems as if the decisive moment either of
war or of peace-making and reconciliation - has been postponed and pushed
forward mto the future. But what has been pushed forward is always worse. Both
change for the worse. The weapons are more terrible, the means for their
c!:,ver: The notion that a war might be fought to "advantage", that it
mIght be. won , gams ground. George Bush, the aspirant President of the United
States, tnes It out U1 election speeches. There is even a tremour of excitement in
OUf culture as though, subconsciously, human kind has lived with the notion for so
long that expectations without actions have become boring. The human mind, even
when It assents more easily to its own defeat. All moves on its degenerative
course, as If the outcome of civilisation was as determined as the outcome of this
sentence: in a full stop.
I am reluctant to accept that this determinism is absolute. But if my arguments are
correct, then we cannot put off the matter any longer. We must throw whatever
resources still exist in human culture across the path of this degenerative logic. We
must protest If we are to survive. Protest is the only realistic form of civil defence.
"!'e .generate an logic, an opposition at every level of society.
ThIS oPPOSitIOn must be rntemational and it must win the support of multitudes
It must bring to bear upon the rulers of the world. It must act, in ver;
dIfferent .condltIOns, wlthrn each national state; and, on occasion, it must directly
confront ItS own national state apparatus.
Recently the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has issued an all-European
Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament. The objective of this Appeal will be
the establishment of an expanding zone in Europe freed from nuclear weapons
air and submarine bases, etc. We aim to expel these weapons from the soil and
waters of both East and West Europe, and to press the missiles, in the first place,
back to the Urals and to the Atlantic ocean.
The tactics of this campaign will be both national and international.
In the national context, each national peace movement will proceed directly to
contest the nuclear weapons deployed by its own state, or by NATO or Warsaw
Treaty obligatIOns upon Its own soil. Its actions will not be qualified by any notion
of bargatnmg. Its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons by its own
state will be absolute. Its demands upon its own state for disarmament will be
umlateral.
30
---,
In the international, and especially in the European, context, each national
movement will exchange information and delegations, will support and challenge
each other. The movement Will encourage a European consciousness, in common
combat for survival, fostering informal communication at every level, and
regarding national considerations of interest or "security".
It is evident that this logic will develop unevenly. The national movements will
not grow at the same pace, nor be able to express themselves in identical ways.
Each success of a unilateral kind - by Holland in refusing NATO cruise missiles or
by Romania or Poland in distancing themselves from Soviet strategies - will be met
with an outcry that it serves the advantage of one or other bloc.
This outcry must be disregarded. It cannot be expected that initiatives on one
side will be met with instant reciprocation from the other. Very certainly, the
strategists of both blocs will seek to turn the movement to their own advantage.
The logic of peace-making will be as uneven, and as fraught with emergencies and
contingencies, as the logic which leads on to war.
In particular, the movement in West and East Europe will find very different
expression. In the West we envisage popular movements engaged in a direct contest
with the policies of their own national states. At first, Soviet ideologues may look
benignly upon this, looking forward to a weakening of NATO preparations which
are matched by no actions larger than rhetoric from the East.
But we are confident that our strategy can turn this rhetoric into acts. In Eastern
Europe there are profound pressures for peace, for greater democracy and inter
national exchange, and for relief from the heavy burden of siege economies. For a
time these pressures may be contained by the repressive measures of national
and Soviet security services. Only a few courageous dissidents will, in the first place,
be able to take an open part in our common work.
Yet to the degree that the peace movement in the West can be seen to be effective,
it will afford support and protection to our allies In Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. It will provide those conditions of relaxation of tension which will weaken
the rationale and legitimacy of repressive state measures, and will allow the pressures
for democracy and detente to assert themselves in more active and open ways.
Moreover, as an intrinsic part of the European campaign, the demand for an opening
of the societies of the East to information, free communication and expression, and
exchange of delegations to take part in the common work will be pressed on every
occasion. And it will not only be "pressed" as rhetoric. We are going to find devices
which will symbolise that pressure and dramatise that debate.
Against the strategy which envisages Europe as a "theatre" of Hlimited" nuclear
warfare, we propose to make in Europe a theatre of peace. This will not, even if we
succeed, remove the danger of confrontation in non-European theatres. It offers, at
the least, a small hope of European survival. It could offer more. For if the logic of
nuclear strategy reaches back into the organisation and ideologies of the super
powers themselves, so the logic of peace-making might reach back also, enforcing
alternative strategies, alternative ideologies. European nuclear disarmament would
favour the conditions for international detente.
31
l
As to Britain there is no need to doubt what must be done to protest and survive.
We must detach ourselves from the nuclear strategies of NATO and dispense
with the expensive and futile imperial toy of an "independent" deterrent (Polaris).
We must close down those airfields and bases which already serve aircraft and
submarines on nuclear missions. And we must contest every stage of the attempt
to import United States cruise missiles onto our soil.
Although we know that 164 cruise missiles are planned to be sited in Britain by
1982, Mr Pym (as we have seen) is still waiting for a United States officer to tell
him where they will be sited. Official leaks suggest that the major bases for the
operation will be at Lakenheath in Suffolk, at Upper Heyford in Oxfordshire, and
possibly at Sculthorpe (Norfolk).
Whether they are permanently sited at these spots, or dragged around on mobile
platforms in "emergency" to subsidiary bases (asat Fairford or Greenham Common),
we can be sure that there will be a permanent infra-structure of buildings and
communications devices, wire and ferocious guard dogs. It should be easy to find
out what is going on. As a matter of course, in a question of national survival, any
responsible and patriotic citizen should pass his knowledge of these matters on,
whether they call it an "official secret" or not. How can a question which may
decide whether one's children live or not be anyone's official secret?
There will also be a flurry of preparations, such as road-building and the strength
ening of culverts. As Mr Churchill noted in parliament, the transporters for Pershing
missiles weigh 80 tons, and are heavy enough to crush 90 per cent of the German
road network. All this they will have to attend to, and there will be time not only
for us to find it out but also to do our best to bring it to a stop.
The first necessity of Protect and Survive is to contest the importation of these
foul and menacing weapons, which are at one and the same time weapons of
aggression and invitations for retaliatory attack. [n the course of this, there must be
great public manifestations and direct contestations - peacefully and responsibly
conducted - of several kinds. We must also take pains to discuss the question with
the United States personnel manning these bases. We must explain to these that we
wish them to go home, but that they are welcome to return to this country, as
visitors, in any other role.
As it happens, these major bases are to be placed in proximity to the ancient
universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and it seems to me that there is useful work
to be done from these old bases of European civilisation. There will be work of
research, of publication, and also work of conscience, all of which are very suitable
for scholars.
Upper Heyford is a few miles out of Oxford on the Kidlington road (A43):
take the left fork by Westonon-the-Green, and then turn left again at Stone. The
fellows of Camb ridge who wish to inspect their fiendly neighbourhood base at
Lakenheath must drive a little further. One route would be on the AIO through
Ely to littleport, then turn right on the Al 101 and wiggle across that flat fenny
land alongside the little Ouse. Gum boots should be taken.
Oxford and Cambridge, then, are privileged to initiate this campaign: to plot out
the ground: and to recommend which measures may be most effective. But they
32
may be assured that thousands of their neighbours can he brought to take a share. in
the work. And there are plenty of other places which will need visiting, alongSIde
the general work of education, persuasion and creat.ing a sharp pohtlCal weather
through which the politicians will have to saiL Our aIm must ?e to ensure that, by
1982, any politician who still has a cruise missile on board WIll fear to put out to
sea at all.
As for the international work, this is in hand, and I hope that before the summer
is out we will receive news from - and exchange delegations with - the movement
in other nations. The Dutch already have a start on us. They are, in a sense, the
founders of this movement. Their torchlight processions were out force last
November, in Amsterdam, Heeden, Groningen and Utrecht; and an allIance ofleft
wing organisations and of the Dutch Council of Churches proved to be strong
enough, in December, to defeat the government and to a postponement
the Dutch decision on cruise missiles. In Belgium also there IS a movement, and 10
West Germany the "green" movement against nuclear power is looking in same
direction. Indeed, a movement is astir already in West Europe, and only BntaIn, the
first home of CND, has been yawning on its way to Armageddon. .
A finaL and important, consideration is that this work not walf
upon governments, nor should it all be routed through centralIsed orgamsatIons. What
is required, and what is now immediately possible and strategy.
lndeed, this strategy, even more than the conventionally pohtlcal , is the .m?st
appropriate for exchanges between Western and Europe. eXlstmg
organisation, institution, or even individual. can look out tor any number
and get on with the work. Universities and colleges "-- .or groups these - can
comme nce to exchange ideas and visits wi th colleagues 10 Warsaw, Kiev or Budapest.
Students can travel to Poland or to Prague. Trade unionists, women's organisations,
members of professions, churches, practitioners of Esperant.o or of chess - and
every kind of more specialised group can urge, al,ollg with their mo.re partlcular
common interests, the general common interest in European Nuclear DIsarmament.
Before long, if we get going, we will be crossing frontiers, exchanging an?
songs, busting open bureaucratic doors, making the telephone-tappr:rs SpIn 10 then
hideaways as the exchanges jam with official secrets, and up the old
stoney Stalinist reflexes of the East by forcing open dehate dialogue, not on
their mendacious "peace-loving" agendas hut on ours, and yet 10 ways that cannot
possibly be outlawed as agencies of the imperialist West. If we to do so, then
we must be ready to inspect each others' jails. We must act as If we are, already,
citizens of Europe.
It would be nicer to have a quiet life. But they are not going to let us have that.
If we wish to survive, we mu st protest.
The acronym of European Nuclear Disarmament is END. I have explained why I
think that the arguments of Professor Howard are hastening us towards a different
end. [ have outlined the deep structure of deterrence, and diagnosed its outcome as
terminal. I can see no way of preventing this outcome but by immediate actions
throughout Europe, which generate a counter-logic of nuclear disarmament.
Which end is it to be?
If you wish to help with the British Campaign contact Camp'aign for Nuclear Disarma.ment, ?9
Great James Street London WCI N 3E Y. If you can help WIth the European CampaIgn.. wrIte
to Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Bertrand Russell House, Gamble Street, Nottingham
NG74ET.
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Contributed by
Matthew Evangelista.
European Nuclear isarmament
Published by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation,
Bertrand Russell House,
Gamble Street,
Nottingham.
Printed by the Russell Press Ltd., Nottingham.
"Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies
open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal
death."
Russell-Einstein Manifesto, 1955.
I The Most Dangerous Decade in History . ..
At the end of April 1980, following some months of consultation and
preparation, an appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament was
launched at a press conference in the House of Commons, and at meet
ings in a variety of European capital cities. The text of the appeal reads:
We are entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world
war is not merely possible, but increasingly likely. Economic and social dif
ficulties in advanced industrial countries, crisis, militarism and war in the third
world compound the political tensions that fuel a demented arms race. In Europe,
the main geographical stage for the East-West confrontation, new generations of
ever more deadly nuclear weapons are appearing.
For at least twenty-five years, the forces of both the North Atlantic and the
Warsaw alliances have each had sufficient nuclear weapons to annihilate their
opponents, and at the same time to endanger the very basis of civilised life. But
with each passing year, competition in nuclear armaments has multiplied their
numbers, increasing the probability of some devastating accident or
miscalculation.
As each side tries to prove its readiness to use nuclear weapons, in order to
prevent their use by the other side, new more 'usable' nuclear weapons are
designed and the idea of 'limited' nuclear war is made to sound more and more
plausible. So much so that this paradoxical process can logically only lead to
the actual use of nuclear weapons.
Neither of the major powers is now in any moral position to influence smaller
countries to forego the acquisition of nuclear armament. The increasing spread
of nuclear reactors and the growth of the industry that installs them, reinforce
the likelihood of world-wide proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby multi
plying the risks of nuclear exchanges.
Over the years, public opinion has pressed for nuclear disarmament and
detente between the contending military blocs. This pressure has failed. An
increasing proportion of world resources is expended on weapons, even though
mutual extermination is already amply guaranteed. This economic burden, in
Third impression 1/81.
1
both East and West, contributes to growing social and political strain, setting in
motion a vicious circle in which the arms race feeds upon the instability of the
world economv and vice versa: a deathly dialetic.
We are now in great danger. Generations have been born beneath the shadow
of nuclear war, and have become habituated to the threat. Concern has given
way to apathy. Meanwhile, in a world living always under menace, fear extends
through both halves of the European continent. The powers of the military and
of internal security forces are enlarged, limitations are placed upon free ex
changes of ideas and between persons, and civil rights of independent-minded
individuals are threatened, in the West as well as the East.
We do not wish to apportion guilt between the political and military leaders
of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. Both parties have
adopted menacing postures and committed aggressive actions in different parts
of the world.
The remedy lies in our own hands. We must act together to free the entire
territory of Europe, from Poland to Portugal, from nuclear weapons, air and
submarine bases, and from all institutions engaged in research into or manufac
ture of nuclear weapons. We ask the two super powers to withdraw all nuclear
weapons from European territory. In particular, we ask the Soviet Union to halt
production of the SS-20 medium range missile and we ask the United States not
to implement the decision to develop cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles
for deployment in Europe. We also urge the ratification of the SALT II agree
ment, as a necessary step towards the renewal of effective negotiations on
general and complete disarmament.
At the same time, we must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East or
West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of
exchange.
We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and persuasion, to con
sider urgently the ways in which we can work together for these common
objectives. We envisage a European-wide campaign, in which every kind of
exchange takes place; in which representatives of different nations and opinions
confer and co-ordinate their activities; and in which less formal exhanges,
between universities, churches, women's organisations, trade unions, youth
organisations, professional groups and individuals, take place with the object of
promoting a common object: to free all of Europe from nuclear weapons.
We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already
exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West', but to each other, and
we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national
state.
It will be the responsibility of the people of each nation to agitate for the
expulsion of nuclear weapons and bases from European soil and territorial
waters, and to decide upon its own means and strategy, concerning its own
territory. These will differ from one country to another, and we do not suggest
that any single strategy should be imposed. Bu t this must be part of a trans
continental movement in which every kind of exchange takes place.
We must resist any attempt by the statesmen of East and West to manipu
late this movement to their own advantage. We offer no advantage to either
NATO or the Warsaw alliance. Our objectives must be to free Europe from
confrontation, to enforce detente between the United States and the Soviet
Union, and, ultimately, to dissolve both great power alliances.
In appealing to fellow Europeans, we are not turning our backs on the world.
In working for the peace of Europe we are working for the peace of the world.
Twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilisation by
engendering world war. This time we must repay our debts to the world by
engendering peace.
This appeal will achieve nothing if it is not supported by determined and in
ventive action, to win more people to support it. We need to mount an irresistible
pressure for a Europe free of nuclear weapons.
We do not wish to impose any uniformity on the movement nor to pre-empt
the consultations and decisions of those many organisations- already exercising
their influence for disarmament and peace. But the situation is urgent. The
dangers steadily advance. We invite your support for this common objective,
and we shall welcome both your help and advice.
Several hundred people, many of whom were prominent in their own
field of work, had already endorsed this statement before its publica
tion. They included over sixty British MPs from four different political
parties, and a number of peers, bishops, artists, composers and univer
sity teachers. The press conference, which was addressed by Tony Benn,
Eric Heffer, Mary Kaldor, Bruce Kent, Zhores Medvedev, Dan Smith
and Edward Thompson, launched a campaign for signatures to the
appeal and by Hiroshima Day (August 6th, the anniversary of the
dropping of the first atomic bomb on Japan) influential support had
been registered in many different countries. Writers such as Kurt
Vonnegut, Olivia Manning, John Berger, Trevor Griffiths,J.B. Priestley
and Melvyn Bragg had joined with church leaders, political spokesmen,
painters Uoan Miro, Vasarely, Josef Herman, David Tindle, Piero
Dorazio), Nobel Prize winners and thousands of men and women
working in industry and the professions. British signatories included
the composer Peter Maxwell Davies, the doyen of cricket commentators,
John Arlott, distinguished soldiers such as Sir John Glubb and Brigadier
M.N. Harbottle, and trade union leaders (Moss Evans, Laurence Daly,
Arthur Scargill and many others). It was generally agreed that a Euro
pean meeting was necessary, in order to work out means of developing
the agitation, and in order to discuss all the various issues and problems
which are in need of elaboration, over and beyond the text of the
appeal.
The Bertrand Russell Foundation is working on the preparation of
this Conference. A small liaison committee has been established to co
ordinate the work in Great Britfiin, and various persons and groups have
accepted the responsibility for co-ordinating action in particular fields
of work. For instance, a group of parliamentarians will be appealing to
their British colleagues, but also to MPs throughout Europe; academics
will be writing to their own immediate circles, but also seeking inter
national contacts; churches are being approached through Pax Christi;
and an active trade union group has begun to develop. Lists of some of
these groups will be found at the end of this pamphlet, which has been
2
3
prepared in order to outline some the issues at greater length than
proved possible in the appeal itself.
II "A Demented Arms Race . .. "
1980 began with an urgent and concerned discussion about rearmament.
The Pope, in his New Year Message, caught the predominant mood:
"What can one say", he asked, "in the face of the gigantic and threaten
ing military arsenals which especially at the close of 1979 have caught
the attention of the world and especially of Europe, both East and
West?"
War in Afghanistan; American hostages in Teheran, and dramatic
pile-ups in the Iranian deserts, as Europeanbased American commandos
failed to 'spring' them; wars or threats of war in South East Asia, the
Middle East, and Southern Africa: at first sight, all the world in turbu
lence, excepting only Europe. Yet in spite of itself Europe is at the fixed
centre of the arms race; and it is in Europe.that many of the most fear
some weapons are deployed. What the Pope was recognizing at the
opening of the decade was that conflicts in any other zone might
easily spill back into the European theatre, where they would then
destroy our continent.
Numbers of statesmen have warned about this furious accumulation of
weapons during the late 'seventies. It has been a persistent theme of such.
eminent neutral spokesmen as Olof Palme of Sweden, or President
Tito of Yugoslavia. Lord Mountbatten, in his last speech, warned that
"the frightening facts about the arms race ...show that we are rushing
headlong towards a precipice".' Why has this "headlong rush" broken
out? First, because of the world-wide division between what is nowa
days called "North" and "South". In spite of United Nations initiatives,
proposals for a new economic order which could assist economic
development have not only not been implemented, but have been stale
mated while conditions have even been aggravated by the oil crisis.
Poverty was never morally accep&ble, but it is no longer politically
tolerable in a world which can speak to itself through transistors, while
over and again in many areas, starvation recurs. In others, millions
remain on the verge of the merest subsistence. The third world is thus
a zone of revolts, revolutions, interventions, and wars.
To avoid or win these, repressive leaders like the former Shah of Iran
are willing to spend unheard of wealth on arms, and the arms trade
paradoxically often takes the lead over all other exchanges, even in
countries where malnutrition is endemic. At the same time, strategic
considerations bring into play the superpowers, as "revolutionary" or
"counter-revolutionary" supports. This produces some extraordinary
4
alignments and confrontations, such as between the
military, and Somalia and Eritrea, where direct Cuban and Soviet mter
vention has been a crucial factor, even though the Eritreans have been
engaged in one of the longest-running liberation struggles in all Africa:
or such as the renewed Indo-China war following the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia, in which remnants of the former Cambodian
communist government appear to have received support from the
United States, even though it only came into existence in opposition to
American secret bombing, which destroyed the physical livelihood of
the country together with its social fabric. A variety of such direct and
indirect interventions owes everything to geo-political expediency, and
nothing to the ideals invoked to justify them. Such processes help
promote what specialists call the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear
weapons, to new, fonnerly non-nuclear states, at the same time that
they add their pressure to the "vertical" proliferation between the
superpowers.
Second, the emergence of China into the community of nations (if
this phrase can nowadays be used without cynicism) complicates the old
pattern of interplay between the blocs. Where yesterday there was a tug
o'war between the USA and the USSR, with each principal mobilising its
own team of supporters at its end of the rope, now there is a triangular
contest in which both of the old-established contestants may, in
future, 'seek to play the China team. At the moment, the Chinese are
most worried about the Russians, which means that the Russians will
feel a constant need to augment their military readiness on their
'second' front, while the Americans will seek to match Soviet prepared
ness overall, making no differentiation between the "theatres" against
which the Russians see a need for defence. It should be noted that the
Chinese Government still considers that war is "inevitable", although it
has apparently changed its assessment of the of .threat. (it is
the more interesting, in this context, that the Chmese military budget
for 1980 is the only one which is being substantially reduced, by $1.9
billion, or 8.5%).
Third, while all these political cauldrons boil, the military-technical
processes have their own logic, which is fearsome.
Stacked around the world at the beginning of the decade, there
were a minimum of 50,000 nuclear warheads, belonging to the two
main powers, whose combined explosive capacity exceeds by one million
times the destructive power of the first atomic bomb which was
dropped on Hiroshima. The number grows continually. This is "global
overkill". Yet during the next decade, the USA and USSR will be
manufacturing a further 20,000 warheads, some of unimaginable
force.
World military spending, the Brandt Report on North-South economic
5
development estimated, ran two years ago at something approaching
$450 billion a year or around $1.2 billion every day.2 More recent
estimates for last year show that global military expenditures have
already passed $500 billion per annum or $1.3 billion each day. Re
cently both the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation both decided to increase their military spending
annually over a period of time, by real increments of between 3% and
4.5% each year. That is to say, military outlays are inflation-proofed,
so that weapons budgets will automatically swell to meet the deprecia
tion of the currency, and then again to provide an absolute increase.
It is primarily for this reason that informed estimates show that the
world-wide arms bill will be more than $600 billion per annum or
$1.6 billion each day very early in the 1980s.
As a part of this process, new weapons are continuously being
At least 53 nuclear tests took place in 1979. South Africa may also have
detonated a nuclear device. New missiles are being developed, in pursuit
of the ever more lethal pin-pointing of targets, or of even more final
obliterative power. In 1980 the Chinese have announced tests of their
new intercontinental missile, capable of hitting either Moscow or Los
Angeles. The French have released news of their preparations to deploy
the so-called "neutron" or enhanced radiation bomb, development of
which had previously been held back by President Carter after a storm
of adverse publicity. In the United States, the MX missile, weighing
190,000 pounds and capable of throwing ten independently targeted and
highly accurate 350 kiloton (350,000 tons of TNT equivalent) war
heads at Russia, each of which will be independently targeted, with
high accuracy, is being developed. The Rand D costs for this missile in
1981 will amount to $1.5 billion, even before production has started.
This is more, as Emma Rothschild has complained,' than the combined
research and development budgets of the US Departments of Labour,
Education and Transportation, taken together with the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Federal Drug Administration and the Center for
Disease Control. The MX system, if it works (or for that matter even if
it doesn't work) will run on its own sealed private railway, involving
"the largest construction project in US history".
4
It will, if completed,
"comprise 200 missiles with 2,000 warheads, powerful and accurate
enough to threaten the entire Soviet ICBM force of 1,400 missiles".
5
No doubt the Russians will think of some suitable response, at similar
or greater expense. As things are, the United States defence budget
from 1980-1985 will amount to one trillion dollars, and, such is the logic
of the arms race, an equivalent weight of new weaponry will have to be
mobilised from the other side, if the "balance" is to be maintained.
All this frenetic activity takes place at a time of severe economic
cnSlS, with many western economies trapped in a crushing slump and
hF ......
quite unable to expand civilian production. Stagnant or. shrinking
production provides a poor basis for fierce rearmament, which nowa
days often accompanies, indeed necessitates, cuts in social investment,
schools, housing health. The price of putting the Trident system
into Britain's arsenal will probably be outbreaks of rickets among
our poorer children.
But military research takes priority over everything else, and the
result is staggering. In the construction of warheads, finesse now passes
any reasonable expectation. A Minuteman III multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicle (or MIRV, as such a vehicle is conveniently
described) will carry three warheads, and each warhead has an explosive
power of 170,000 tons of TNT (170 kilotons, or kt). A Minuteman
weighs 220 lbs. The first atomic bomb ever used in action had an
explosive force of 12kt, and it weighed four tons.
Miniaturisation of megadeath bombs has made fine progress. So has
the refinement of delivery systems. This is measured by the standard
of Circular Error Probability (CEP), which is the radius of that circle
centred on the target, within which it can be expected that 50% of
warheads of a given type might fall. Heavy bombers of the second
world war, such as those which visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had a
very large CEP indeed. The Minuteman III system exoects to land half
its projectiles within a 350 metre radius of target, having flown more
than 8,000 miles to do it. The MX, if it goes according to plan, will
have a CEP of only a hundred metres. Such accuracy means that it will
be perfectly possible to destroy enemy missile silos, however fortified
these might be. The Russians are catching up, however. Their SS 18 and
SS 19 missiles are already claimed to have CEPs of 450 metres.
If rocketry has advanced, so too has experimental aviation. The
Americans have already tested Stealth, an aeroplane which "is
virtually invisible to Soviet radar". Critics say that invisibility has been
purchased at the cost of multiple crashes, since the new machines are
fashioned into shapes which are decidedly unfunctional for flying, in
order to elude detection. Stealth is a fighter, but plans have been
leaked (in the course of the American elections, during which,
apparently, votes are assumed to be attracted to the most
contender) for a similarly-wrought long-range bomber. OffiCials III the
US Defence Department insist that contorted shapes are only part of
the mechanism which defeats radar detection: apparently new materials
can be coated onto aircraft skins, to absorb radio waves. By such means,
together with navigational advances, it may be hoped to secure even
greater accuracy of weapon delivery.
Two questions remain. First, as Lord Zuckerman, the British Govern
ment's former chief scientific advisor, percipiently insists, what happens
to the other 50% of warheads which fall outside the CEP? The military
,
6
7
may not be interested in them, but other people are. Second, this re
markable triumph of technology is all leading to the point where
someone has what is politely called a "first-strike capability". Both
the Russians and the Americans will soon have this capability. But
what does it mean? It clearly does not mean that one superpower has
the capacity to eliminate the possibility of retaliation by the other, if .
only it gets its blow in first. What it does signify is the capacity to
wreak such destruction as to reduce any possible response to an "accept
able" level of damage. This is a level which will clearly vary with the
degree of megalomania in the respective nationalleaderships.
All informed commentators are very wary about "first strike capa
bility" because with it the whole doctrine of mutually assured destruc
tion (appropriately known under the acronym MAD) will no longer
apply. With either or both superpowers approaching "first strike"
potential, the calculations are all different. Yesterday we were assured,
barring accidents, of safety of a bizarre and frightening kind: but now
each new strengthening of the arsenals spells out with a terrifying rigour, a
new, unprecedented danger. Pre-emptive war is now a growing possi
bility. It is therefore quite impossible to argue support for a doctrine of
"deterrence" as if this could follow an unchanging pattern over the
decades, irrespective of changes in the political balance in the world,
and irrespective of the convolutions of military technology.
In fact, "deterrence" has already undergone fearsome mutations.
Those within the great military machines who have understood this have
frequently signalled their disquiet. "If a way out of the political
dilemmas we now face is not negotiated", wrote Lord Zuckennan, "our
leaders will quickly learn that there is no technical road to victory in
the nuclear arms race"." "Wars cannot be fought with nuclear
weapons", said Lord Mountbatten: "There are powerful voices around
the world who still give credence to the old Roman precept - if you
desire peace, prepare for war. This is absolute nuclear nonsense."7
Yet serious discussion of disarmament has come to an end. The
SALT II agreements have not been ratified. The Treaty on the non
proliferation of nuclear weapons is breaking down, and the non-m;,cle.ar
powers are convinced that all the nuclear weapon states are floutmg It,
by refusing to reduce their nuclear arsenals. It is true that following the
initiative of Chancellor Schmidt talks will open between Senator
Muskie and Mr Gromyko in order to discover whether negotiations can
begin on the reduction of medium range nuclear arsenals in Europe. But
unless there is a huge mobilisation of public protest, the outcome of
such talks about talks is completely predictable.
p
III Limited War: the End of Europe?
In spite of detente, and the relatively stable between its two
main halves during the past decade, Europe remams by far the most
militaristic zone of the contemporary world.
At least 10,000, possibly 15,000, warheads are in
for what is called "tactical" or "theatre" use. The Amencans have In
stalled something between 7,000 and 10,000 of these, and the
between 3,500 and 5,000. The yields of these weapons range, It IS
believed, between something less than one kiloton and up to three
megatons. In terms of Hiroshima bombs, one three megaton
would have the force 01 such weapons. But nowadays this IS
seen as a "theatre" annament, usable in a "limited" nuclear war.
"Strategic" bombs, for use in the final stages of escalation, may be as
large as 20 megatons. (Although of course those destined for certain
types of targets are a lot smaller. The smallest could.be a "mere" 30 or
40 kilotons or two or three Hiroshimas). Towns m Europe are not
commonly far apart from one another. There exist no vast unpopulated
tracts, plains, prairies or tundras, in which to confine a nuclear war.
Military installations nestle among and between urban centres. As
Zuckerman has insited "the distances between Villages are no greater
than the radius of effect of low yield weapons of a few kilotons;
between towns and cities, say a megaton".
General Sir John Hackett, a former commander of the Northern
Army Group of NATO, published in 1978 a fictional history of the
Third World War.
s
In his book this was scheduled for August 1985,
and cuhninated in the nuclear destruction of Birmingham and Minsk.
At this point the Russians obligingly faced a domestic rebellion, and
everyone who wasn't already dead lived happily ever after. The General,
as is often the case, knows a lot about specialised military matters, but
very little about the sociology of communism, and not much more
about the political sociology of his own side. Of course, rebellions are
very likely in every country which faces the immediate of
nuclear war, which is why the British Government has detailed con
tingency plans for the arrest of large numbers of when
such a war is about to break out. (These may be discovered, m part,
by reference to the secret County War Plans which have been prepared
on Government instructions, to cope with every problem from water
rationing to the burial of the uncountable dead). But there is no good
reason to imagine that subversives are harder to arrest in the USSR than
they are in Britain, to put the matter v,:ry mil.dly. Nor is there any very
good reason to think that that the Soviet Umon stands on the brmk of
revolution or that such revolution would be facilitated by nuclear war.
, .
The contrary may be the case. General Hackett's novel has Poles teanng
8
9
non-existent communist insignia out of their national flag, and con
tains a variety of other foibles of the same kind: but we may assume
that when it speaks of NATO, it gets things broadly right.
The General discusses the basis of NATO strategy which is known as
the "Triad". This is a "combination of conventional defence, battlefield
nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear action in closely coupled
sequence". Ruefully, General Hackett continues "This was as fully
endorsed in the United Kingdom as anywhere else in the Alliance.
How far it was taken seriously anywhere is open to argument. There is
little evidence that it was ever taken seriously in the UK ... an observer
of the British Army's deployment, equipment and training could
scarcely fail to conclude that, whatever happened, the British did not
expect to have to take part in a tactical nuclear battle at all ... ".
General Hackett's judgements here are anything but fictional ones.
The Earl Mountbatten, in the acutely subversive speech to which we
have already referred, spoke of the development of "smaller nuclear
weapons" which were "produced and deployed for use in what was
assumed to be a tactical or theatre war". "The belief was", said Mount
batten "that were hostilities ever to break out in Western Europe, such
weapons could be used in field warfare without triggering an all-out
nuclear exchange leading to the final holocaust. I have never found this
idea credible". If a former Chief of Staff and one-time Chairman of
NATO's Military Committee found the idea unbelievable, this is strong
evidence that General Hackett is quite right that NATO's basic strategy
waS indeed not "taken seriously" in the UK. Yet the doctrine of
"flexible response" binds the UK while it remains in force in NATO,
because it is enshrined in NATO's 1975 statement for Ministerial
Guidance, in article 4:
"4. The long-range defence concept supports agreed NATO strategy by calling
for a balanced force structure of interdependent strategic nuclear, theatre
nuclear and conventional force capabilities. Each element of this Triad perfonns
a umque role; in combination they provide fiU tual support and reinforcement.
No single element of the Triad can substitute for another. The concept also calls
for the modernisation of both strategic and theatre nuclear capabilities; howeverJ
major emphasis is placed on maintaining and improving Alliance conventional
forces."
Article lIb develops this beyond any possible ambiguity:
"b) the purpose of the tactical nuclear capability is to enhance the deterrent and
defensive effect of NATO's forces against large-scale conventional attack, and to
provide a deterrent against the expansion of limited conventional attacks and the
possible use of tactical nuclear weapons by the aggressor. Its aim is to convince
the aggressor that any fonn of attack on NATO could result in very serious
damage to his own forces, and to emphasise the dangers implicit in the continu
ance of a conflict by presenting him with the risk that such a situation could
escalate beyond his control up to all-out nuclear war. Conversely, this capability
should be of such a nature that control of the situation would remain in NATO
hands."
Yet so jittery and.mobile are military techniques, and so rapidly does
their leapfrog bring both superpowers to the unleashing of ever newer
devices, thatthe settled NATO principles of 1975 were already, in 1979,
being qualified:
"All elements of the NATO Triad of strategic, theatre nuclear, and conventional
forces are in flux. At the strategic level, with or without SALT, the US is
modernising each component of its strategic forces. And, as will be described
below, the other two legs of the Triad are being modernised as well.
Integral to the doctrine of flexible response, theatre nuclear forces provide the
link between US strategic power and NATO conventional forces - a link that, in
the view of many, poses the ultimate deterrent against a European war.
With Strategic parity codified in the recent SALT II agreement, and with
major Soviet theatre deployments such as the Backfire bomber and the S8-20
missile, some have perceived a loose rung near the top of the flexible response
ladder. Thus, consideration is being given to new weapons systems: Pershing
II, a nuclear-anned ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), and a new mobile,
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)."lO
This fateful decision came at the end of a long process of decisions,
beginning with Richard Nixon's arrival in the United States Presidency.
So it was that NATO finally determined, at the end of 1979, upon the
installation of nearly 600 new Pershing II and Tomahawk (cruise) mis
siles." The cruise missiles are low-flying pilotless planes, along the
lines of the "doodlebugs" which were sent against Britain in the last
years of Hitler's blitzkrieg, only now refined to the highest degree,
with computerised guidance which aspires to considerable accuracy.
1 And, of course, they are each intended to take a nuclear bomb for a
distance of 2,000 miles, and to deliver it within a very narrowly deter
I
mined area. There is a lot of evidence that in fact they don't work in
the manner intended, but this will increase no-one's security, because it
merely means that they will hit the wrong targets.
President Nixon first propounded the doctrine of limited nuclear
war in his State of the World message of 1971. The USA, he said,
needed to provide itself with "alternatives appropriate to the nature
and level of the provocation ... without necessarily having to resort to
mass destruction". Mountbatten, of course, is quite right to find it all
incredible. "I have never been able to accept the reasons for the belief
that any class of nuclear weapons can be categorised in terms of their
tactical or strategic purposes", he said.
As Lord Zuckerman put it to the Pugwash Conference
"[ do not believe that nuclear weapons could be used in what is now fashionably
called a 'theatre war'. I do not believe that any scenario exists which suggests
10
11
that nuclear weapons could be used in field warfare between two nuclear states
without escalation resulHng. I know of several such exercises. They all lead to
the opposite conclusion. There is no Marquess of Queensberry who would be
holding the ring in a nuclear conflict. I cannot see teams of physicists attached
to military staffs who would run to the scene of a nuclear explosion and then
back to tell their local commanders that the radiation intensity of a nuclear
strike by the other side was such and such, and that therefore the riposte should
be only a weapon of equivalent yield. If the zone of lethal or wounding neutron
radiation of a so-called neutron bomb would have, say, a radius of half a kilo
metre. the reply might well be a 'dirty' bomb with the same zone of radiation,
but with a much wider area of devastation due to blast and fire. n12
Pressure from the Allies has meant that Presidential statements on
the issue of limited war have swung backwards and forwards. At times
President Carter has given the impression that he is opposed to the
doctrine. But the revelation of "directive 59" in August 1980 shows
that there is in fact a continuous evolution in US military policy,'
apparently regardless of political hesitations by Governments. Directive
59 is a flat-out regression to the pure Nixon doctrine. As the New York
Times put it:
"(Defence Secretary) Brown seems to expand the very meaning of deterrence
alanningly. Typically, advocates of flexible targeting argue that it will deter a
sneak attack. But Brown's speech says the new policy is also intended to deter a
variety of lesser aggressions, ... including conventional military aggression . .. "
Obviously, as the NYT claims, this is liable to
"increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used.,,13
.
Where would such weapons be used? That place would experience total
annihilation, and in oblivion would be unable to consider the nicety of
'tactical' or 'strategic' destruction. If 'limited' nuclear exchanges mean
anything at all, the only limitation which is thinkable is their restriction
to a particular zone. And that is precisely why politicians in the United
States find 'limited' war more tolerable than the other sort, because it
leaves a hope that escalation to the total destruction of both super
powers might be a second-stage option to be deferred during the nego
tiations which could be undertaken while Europe burns. It does not
matter whether the strategists are right in their assumptions or not.
There a,re strong reasons why a Russian counter-attack ought (within
the lights of the Soviet authorities) to be directed at the USA as well as
Europe, if Soviet military strategists are as thoughtful as we may
presume. But the very fact that NATO is being programmed to follow
this line of action means that Europeans must awaken to understand
what a sinister mutation has taken place, beneath the continuing
official chatter about "deterrence".
The fact that current Soviet military planning speaks a different
language does not in the least imply that Europe can escape this
dilemma. If one side prepares for a "theatre" war in our continent, the
other will, if and when necessary, respond, whether or not it accepts
the protocol which is proposed for the orderly escalation of annihila
tion from s u p e r p o w ~ r peripheries to superpower centres. The material
reality which will control events is the scope and range of the weapons
deployed: and the very existence of tens of thousands of theatre
weapons implies, in the event of war, that there will be a 'theatre war'.
There may be a 'strategic' war as well, in spite of all plans to the con
trary. It will be too late for Europe to know or care.
All those missiles and bombs could never be used in Europe without
causing death and destruction on a scale hitherto unprecedented and
g
inconceivable. The continent would become a hecatomb, and in it
would be buried, not only tens, hundreds of millions of people, but also
J
the remains of a civilisation. If some Europeans survived, in Swiss shelters
or British Government bunkers, they would emerge to a cannibal
universe in which every humane instinct had been cauterised. Like the
tragedy of Cambodia, only on a scale greatly wider and more profound,
the tragedy of post-nuclear Europe would be lived by a mutilated
people, prone to the most restrictive and destructive xenophobia,
ganging for support into pathetic strong-arm squads in order to club a
survival for themselves out of the skulls of others, and fearful of their
own shadows. The worlds which came into being in the Florentine
renaissance would have been totally annulled, and not only the monu
ments would be radioactive. On such deathly foundations, "communism"
may be installed, in the Cambodian manner, or some other more
primary anarchies or brutalisms may maintain a hegemony of sorts.
What is plain is that any and all survivors of a European theatre war
will look upon the days before the holocaust as a golden age, and
hope will have become, quite literally, a thing of the past.
A move towards European Nuclear Disarmament may not avoid this
fearful outcome. Until general nuclear disarmament has been agreed
and implemented no man or woman will be able to feel safe. But such
a move may break the logic of the arms race, transform the meanings of
the blocs and begin a unified and irresistible pressure on both the
superpowers to reverse their engines away from war.
1
J
IV We Must Act Together . ...
If the powers want to have a bit of a nuclear war, they will want to
have it away from home. And if we do not wish to be their hosts for
such a match, then, regardless of whether they are right or wrong in
supposing that they can confine it to our "theatre", we must discover a
new initiative which can move us towards disarmament. New technolo
12
13
gies will not do this, and nor will introspection and conscience sud
denly seize command in both superpowers at once.
We are looking for a political step which can open up new forms of
public pressure, and bring into the field of force new moral resources.
Partly this is a matter of ending super-power domination of the most
important negotiations.
But another part of the response must involve a multi-national
mobilisation of public opinion. In Europe, this will not begin until
people appreciate the exceptional vulnerability of their continent. One
prominent statesman who has understood, and drawn attention to, this
/extreme exposure, is Olof Pahne. During an important speech at a t
V Helsinki Conference of the Socialist International, he issued a strong
warning. "Europe", he said "is no special zone where peace can be
..
taken for granted. In actual fact, it is at the centre of the arms race.
Granted, the general assumption seems to be that any potential mili.
tary conflict between the super-powers is going to start someplace other
than in Europe. But even if that were to be the case, we would have to
count on one or the other party - in an effort to gain supremacy _
trying to open a front on our continent, as well. As Alva Myrdal has
recently pointed out, a war can simply be transported here, even
though actual causes for war do not exist. Here there is a ready theatre
of war. Here there have been great military forces for a long time. Here
there are programmed weapons all ready for action ..."14
Basing himself on this recognition, Mr Palme recalled various earlier
attempts to create, in North and Central Europe, nuclear.free zones,
from which, by agreement, all warheads were to be excluded. (We
shall look at the history of these proposals, below). He then drew a
conclusion of historic significance, which provides the most real, and
most hopeful, possibility, of generating a truly continental opposition
to this continuing arms race:
"Today more than ever there is, in my opinion, every reason to go on working
for a nuclear-free zone. The ultimate objective of these efforts should be a
nuclear-free Europe. (My emphasis). The geographical area closest at hand
would naturally be Northem and Central Europe. If these areas could be freed
from the nuclear weapons stationed there today, the risk of total annihilation in
case of a military conflict would be reduced."
Olof Palme's initiative was launched exactly a month before the
United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, whiGh gave rise to a
Final Document which is a strong, if tacit, indictment of the arms
race which has actually accelerated sharply since it was agreed. A
World Disarmament Campaign was launched in 1980, by Lord Noel
Baker and Lord Brockway, and a comprehensive cross-section of
voluntary peace organisations: it had the precise intention of securing
14
the implementation of this Document. But although the goal of the UN
Special Session was "general and complete disarmament", as it should
have been, it is commonly not understood that this goal was deliberately
coupled with a wholeseries of intermediate objectives, including Pahne's
own proposals. Article 33 of the statement reads:
"The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or
arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned, and the
full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the
zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by
nuclear-weapons States, constitute an important disannament measure."
Later, the declaration goes on to spell out this commitment in
considerable detail. It begins with a repetition:
"The establishment Qf nuclear-weapons-free zones on the basis of arrangements
freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, constitutes an import
ant disannament measure,"
and then continues
"The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be
encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of
nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of
each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones
should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and
principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring
that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.
With respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called upon
to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the com
petent authority of each zone, in particular:
(a) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-free zone;
(b) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States
of the zone ...
States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a
reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring, or in any other way, possessing
nuclear explosive devices, and from pennitting the stationing of nuclear weapons
on their territory by any third party and agree to place all their nuclear activities
under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards."
Article 63 of this final document schedules several areas for considera
tion as nuclear-free zones. They include Africa, where the Organisation
of African Unity has resolved upon the "the denuclearisation of the
region", but also the Middle East and South Asia, which are listed
alongside South and Central America, whose pioneering treaty offers a
possible model for others to follow. This is the only popUlous area to
have been covered by an existing agreement, which was concluded
the Treaty of T1atelolco (a suburb of Mexico City), opened for signature
from February 1967.
There are other zones which are covered by more or less similar
agreements. Conservationists will be pleased that they include Antar
15
tica, the moon, outer space, and the seabed. Two snags exist in this
respect. One is that the effectiveness of the agreed arrangements is
often questioned. The other is that if civilisation is destroyed, the
survivors may not be equipped to establish themselves comfortably in
safe havens among penguins or deep-sea plants and fish, leave alone
upon the moon.
That is why a Martian might be surprised by the omission of Europe
from the queue of continents (Africa, Near Asia, the Far East all in
course of pressing; and Latin America, with the exception of Cuba,
already having agreed) to negotiate coverage within nuclear-free zones.
If Europe is the most vulnerable region, the prime risk, with a dense
concentration 0 f population, the most developed and destructible
material heritage to lose, and yet no obvious immediate reasons to go
to war, why is there any hesitation at all about making Olof PaIme's
"ultimate objective" into an immediate and urgent demand?
If we are agreed that "it does not matter where the bombs come
from", there is another question which is more pertinent. This is, where
will they be sent to? Qearly, high priority targets are all locations from
which response might otherwise come. There is therefore a very strong
advantage for all Europe if "East" and "West", in terms of the deploy
ment of nuclear arsenals, can literally and rigorously become coter
minous with "USA" and "USSR". This would constitute a significant
pressure on the superpowers since each would thenceforward have a
priority need to target on the silos of the other, and the present logic
of "theatre" thinking would all be reversed.
V Nuclear-free Zones in Europe
If Europe as a whole has not hitherto raised the issue of its possible
denuclearisation, there have been a number of efforts to sanitise smaller
regions within the continent.
The idea that groups of nations in particular areas might agree to
forego the manufacture or deployment of nuclear weapons, and to
eschew research into their production, was first seriously mooted in
the second half of the 1950s. In 1956, the USSR attempted to open
discussions on the possible restriction of annaments, under inspection,
and the prohibition of nuclear weapons, within both German States and
some adjacent countries. The proposal was discussed in the Disarma
ment Sub-Committee of the United Nations, but it got no further. But
afterwards the foreign secretary of Poland, Adam Rapacki, took to the
Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly a plan to outlaw both the
manufacture and the harbouring of nuclear arsenals in all the territories
of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the
16
Federal German Republic. The Czechoslovaks and East Germans
quickly endorsed this suggestion.
. Rapacki's proposals would have come into force by four separate
unilateral decisions of each relevant government. Enforcement would
have been supervised by a commission drawn from NATO countries,
Warsaw Pact adherents, and non-aligned states. Inspection posts, with a
system of ground and air controls, were to be established to enable the
commission to function. Subject to this supervision, neither nuclear
weapons, nor installations capable of harbouring or servicing them, nor
missile systems, would have been permitted in the entire designated area.
+
Nuclear powers were thereupon expected to agree not to use nuclear
weapons against the denuclearised zone, a.nd not to d e p l ~ y their . o ~
atomic warheads with any of their conventIOnal forces statIOned WIthm
it.
The plan was rejected by the NATO powers, on the grounds first,
that it did nothing to secure German reunification, and second, that it /
failed to cover the deployment of conventional armaments. In 1958, V
therefore, Rapacki returned with modified proposals. Now he suggested
a phased approach. In the beginning, nuclear stockpiles would be
frozen at their existing levels within the zone. Later, the removal of
these weapon stocks would be accompanied by controlled and mutually
agreed reductions in conventional forces. This initiative, too, was
rejected.
Meanwhile, in 1957, Romania proposed a similar project to de
nuclearise the Balkans. This plan was reiterated in 1968, and again in
1972.
In 1959, the Irish Government outlined a plan for the creation of
nuclear-free zones throughout the entire planet, which were to be
developed region-by-region. In the same year the Chinese People's
Republic suggested that the Pacific Ocean and all Asia be constituted a
nuclear-free-zone, and in 1960 various African states elaborated similar
proposals for an all-African agreement. (These were retabled again in
1965, and yet again in 1974).
In 1962 the Polish government offered yet another variation on the /
Rapacki Plan, which would have maintained its later notion of phasing, V
but which would now have permitted other European nations to join in
if they wished to extend the original designated area. In the first stage,
existing levels of nuclear weaponry and rocketry would be frozen, pro
hibiting the creation of new bases. Then, as in the earlier version,
nuclear and conventional armaments would be progressively reduced
according to a negotiated timetable. The rejection of this 1962 version
was the end of the Rapacki proposals, but they were followed in 1964
by the so-called "Gomulka" plan, which was designed to affect the
same area, but which offered more restricted goals.
17
Although the main NATO powers displayed no real interest in all
these . they did arouse some real concern and sympathy in
Scandmavla. As early as October 1961, the Swedish government tabled
became as the Plan (named after Sweden's foreign
minister) at First Committee of the UN General Assembly. This
supported the Idea of nuclear-free zones and a ''non-atomic club" and
advocated their general acceptance. Certain of its proposals, conce;ning
non-proliferation and testing, were adopted by the General Assembly.
But the Unden Plan was never realised, because the USA and others
maintained at the time that nuclear-free zones were an inappropriate
approach to disarmament, which could only be agreed in a compre
hensive "general and complete" decision. Over and again this most
desirable end has been invoked to block any less total approach to dis
covering any practicable means by which it might be achieved.
In 1963, President Kekkonen of Finland called for the reopening of
talks ':In the Unden Plan. Finland and Sweden were both neutral already,
he Said, while Denmark and Norway notwithstanding their membership
of NATO, had no nuclear weapons of their own, and deployed none of
those belonging to their Alliance. But although this constituted a de
facto commitment, it would, he held, be notably reinforced by a
deliberate collective decision to confirm it as an enduring joint policy.
T?e premier responded to this demarche by calling for
the mciuslO.n .of sectIOns of the USSR in the suggested area. As long ago
as 1959, Nlklta Khrushchev had suggested a Nordic nuclear-free zone,
but no approach was apparently made to him during 1963 to discover
whether the USSR would be willing to underpin such a project with
any concession to the Norwegian viewpoint. However, while this argu
,?e':"t was unfolding, again in 1963, Khrushchev launched yet another
similar proposal, for a nuclear-free Mediterranean.
T.he fall of Khrushchev took much of the steam out of such diplo
forays, even though proposals continued to emerge at
mtervals. In May 1974, the Indian government detonated what it des
cribed as a "peaceful" nuclear explosion. This provoked renewed
proposals for a nuclear-free zone in the Near East, from both Iran and
the United Arab Republic, and it revived African concern with the
problem. Probably the reverberations of the Indian bang were heard
m New Zealand, because that nation offered up a suggestion for a
South Pacific free-zone, later in the same year.
Yet, while the European disarmament lobbies were stalemated the
Latin American Treaty, which is briefly discussed above, had
been concluded in 1967, and within a decade it had secured the ad
herence of 25 states. The last of the main nuclear powers to endorse it
the USSR, which confirmed its general support in 1978. (Cuba
WIthholds endorsement because it reserves its rights pending the evacua
tion of the Guantanamo'base by the United States). African pressures
for a similar agreement are notably influenced by the threat of a South
African nuclear military capacity, which is an obvious menace to neigh
bouring Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola, and a standing threat to
the Organisation of African Unity. In the Middle east, Israel plays a
similar catalysing role, and fear of an Israeli bomb is widespread
throughout the region.
Why, then, this lag between Europe and the other continents? If the
j pressure for denuclearised zones began in Europe, and if the need for
them, as we have seen, remains direst there, why have the peoples of the
third world been, up to now, so much more effectively vocal on this issue
than those of the European continent? Part of the answer surely lies in
1
the prevalence of the non-aligned movement among the countries of
,
the third world. Apart from a thin scatter of neutrals, Europe is the
seed-bed of alignments, and the interests of the blocs as apparently
disembodied entities are commonly prayed as absolute within it. In
reality, of course, the blocs are not "disembodied". Within them, in
military terms, superpowers rule. They control the disposition and
development of the two major "deterrents". They keep the keys and
determine if and when to fire. They displace the constituent patriotisms
of the member states with a kind of bloc loyalty, which solidly implies
!'
that in each bloc there is a leading state, not only in terms of military
supply, but also in terms of the determination of policy. To be sure,
each bloc is riven with mounting internal tension. Economic competi
tion divides the West, which enters the latest round of the arms race
in a prolonged and, for some, mortifying slump. In the East, divergent
interests are not so easily expressed, but they certainly exist, and from
time to time become manifest. For all this, subordinate states on either
side find it very difficult to stand off from their protectors.
But stand off we all must. The logic of preparation for a war in our
Utheatre" is remorseless, and the profound worsening of tension
between the super-powers at a time of world-wide economic and
social crisis all serves to speed up the gadarene race.
VI A Step Towards New Negotiations . ..
Of course, the dangers which already mark the new decade are by no
means restricted to the peril arising from the confrontation between
the superpowers. In the past, these states shared a common, if tenuous,
interest in the restriction of nuclear military capacity to a handful of
countries. Once they were agreed upon a non-proliferation treaty they
were able to lean upon many lesser powers to accept it.
America, the Soviet Union and Britain tested their first successful
18
19
atomic bombs in 1945, 1949 and 1952. France joined the 'club' in
1960, China in 1964 and India in 1974, when it announced its 'peacet\tl
explosion'. After a spectacular theft of plans from the Urenco plant in
Holland, a peaceful explosion is now expected in Pakistan. Peaceful
explosions in South Africa, Israel, Libya, Iraq, Brazil: all are possible,
and some may be imminent.
One by-product of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the resump
tion of supply of American weapons to Pakistan (so much for President
Carter's campaign for "human rights") in spite of clear presumptions
involved in the agreement on non-proliferation.
And there is worse news. The announcement of a major programme
of development of nuclear power stations in Britain, at a cost which
commentators have assessed as 20,000 million or more, does not entail
simply a headache for English environmentalists. It seems at least think
able, indeed plausibly thinkable, that some entrepreneurs have seen the
possibility of launching a new boom, supported on technological inno
vation, following the random exportation of nuclear powerplants to the
Third World.
With such plants and a meccano set, together, if necessary, with some
modest bribery or theft, by the end of the eighties there may be a
Nigerian bomb, an Indonesian bomb, not a proliferation but a plague of
deterrents.
Solemnly, we must ask ourselves the question, knowing what we
know of the acute social and economic privations which beset vast
regions of the world: is it even remotely likely that humanity can live
through the next ten years without experiencing, somewhere, between
these or the other conflicting parties, an exchange of nuclear
warheads?
The moral authority of the superpowers in the rest of the world has
never been lower. Imperatives of national independence drive more and
more peoples to accept that their military survival requires a nuclear
component. Even if Afghanistan had never been invaded, even if NATO
had not resolved to deploy its newgeneration of missiles, this burgeoning
of destructive power would remain fearful. As things are, the super
powers intensify the terror to unimagined levels.
In this new world of horror, remedies based on national protest move
ments alone can never take practical effect, while Governments remain
locked into the cells of their own strategic assumptions. Yet something
must be done, if only to arrest the growing possibility of holocaust by
accident.
We think the answer is a new mass campaign, of petitions, marches,
meetings, lobbies and conferences. The fact that talks on disarmament
are stalemated, that United Nations decisions are ignored, and that con
frontation has replaced negotiation only makes it more urgent that the
peoples of Europe should speak out. Allover Europe the nations can
agree, surely must agree, that none will house nuclear warheads of any
kind. The struggle for. a nuclear free Europe can unite the continent,
but it can also signal new hope to the wider world. With an example
from Europe, non-proliferation will no longer be enforced (and in
creasingly ineffectively enforced) by crude super-power pressures, but
also, for the first time, encouraged by practical moral example. A Euro
pean nuclear free-zone does not necessarily imply reduction of conven
tional weapons, nor does it presuppose the demolition of the two major
alliances. But the absence of warheads all over Europe will create a
r
multinational zone of peaceful pressure, since the sUlvival of the zone
will be seen to depend upon the growth of detente between the powers.
No-one believes that such a campaign as this can win easily, but
where better than Europe to begin an act of renunciation which can
reverse the desperate trend to annihilation?
I
FOOTNOTES
1. Apocalypse Now? Spokesman, 1980,p.3.
2. Estimates vary markedly, because it is difficult to know what values to assign
to Soviet military production costs. If budgets are taken, then Soviet ex
penditure is apparently greatly reduced, because under a system of central
planning prices are regulated to fit social priorities (or cynics might say,
Government convenience). The alternative is to cost military output on the
basis of world market or United States equivalent prices, which, since the
USA still has a much more developed economy than the USSR, would still
tend to underestimate the real strain of military provision on the Soviet
economy.
3. New York Review 0/ Books, April3rd 1980: "Boom and Bust", pp.31-4.
4. Herbert Scoville, Jr: America's Greatest Construction: Can it Work? New
York Review of Books, March 20th 1980, pp.12-17.
5. "The MX system can only lead to vast uncontrolled anns competition that
will undennine the security of the US and increase the dangers of nuclear
conflict", says Scoville.
6. Apocalypse Now? ibid, p.27.
7. Apocalypse Now? p.13.
I'
8. The Third World War, Sphere Books, 1979.
9. Op.ci'., p.5 O.
10. NATO Review. No.5, October 1979, p.29.
II. The acu te problems which this missile has encountered in development make an
alanning story, which is told by Andrew Cockburn in The New Statesman,
August 22nd 1980.
12. F. Griffiths and J.C. Polanyi: The Dangers 0/ Nuclear War, University of
Toronto Press, 1980, 1980, p.164.
13. Editorial, August 1980.
14. This speech is reproduced in full in European Nuclear Disarmament: A Bulle
tin a/Work in Progress (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation), No.1, 1980.
20
21
The European Disarmament Campaign is structured in a series of 'lateral' com
possible steps towards the objective, and help in the development of a
mittees. For example, the parliamentarians who have already supported the appeal
major popular campaign for peace and disarmament.
in Brita2'n are forrm'ng an Inter-Party Parliamentary Committee. which will canvass
further support in the House of Commons. and also write to MPs in all the other
We think such a meeting should be convened as soon as the
European Parliaments.' An Inter-Party Trade Union Committee has been established organisational and financial problems can be resolved.
for the same purpose, and there already exist committees of Churches and Uni
versity Teachers, which are working 2'n the same way. We urgently need volunteers
who are able to coordinate similar efforts in other fields of work. The existing
coordinators are:
Parliamentary: Stuart Holland and Michael Meacher,
House of Commons, Westminster, London, SWl
Churches: Mike Moran,
t
Pax Christi, Blackfriars Hall, Southampton Road, London. NW5
Universities: lolyon Howorth.
19 Princethorpe Close, Shirley, Solihull, West Midlands
Trade Unions: Walt Greendale,
1 Plantation Drive East, Hull, HU4 6XB
In England a small Committee has been established to co-ordinate the various
initiatives which are developing. It conS2'sts of E.P. Thompson, Mons2gnor Bruce
Kent and Dan Smith (of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament). Peggy Duff (of
the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace), Mary Kaldor, Stuart
Holland, MP. and Ken Coates (of the Russell Foundation).
In Europe, it is hoped that national liaison groups will be formed, in order to
help the preparatory work for a w2'dely representative conference. There follows
a preliminary list of European signatoT2'es, which gives some idea of the early
responses to this initative.
International Supporters of E.N.D.
International Supporters of END have signed an endorsement of the
appeal "A common object: to free all Europe ...", which states that:
We have received with sympathy the proposal of the Bertrand Russell
Peace Foundation for an all European campaign to free the soil and
territorial waters of all European states from nuclear weapons.
In our view, this proposal merits urgent attention, and we support its
object. While consultation must take place within each country, to take
into account the particular conditions of each nation's life, we urge that
this be pressed forward immediately, with a view to the ecouragement
of such an all European movement.
To facilitate this work we should welcome a European meeting to
explore the problems involved in creating a nuclear-free zone, to discuss
a variety of intermediary proposals which are already being suggested as
AUSTRALIA
R. Arnold. Metalworkers and
Shipwrights union
Prof 'Noel G.. Baptisl. Biochemist
and Pugwash member
Ken Bennelt, Assl. Nal. Sec.
Labor Party
Prof C. Birch, Univ. of Sydney
Hon. Lionel Bowen, Dept.
Leader, Fed. ParI. Labor Parly
Dr J. Camilleri. Latrobe Univer
sity
J.L. Cavanagh, Senator
Don Chipp, Senator, Leader
Auslralian Democrats
Manning Clark, Hislorian
RUlh Coleman, Senator
Prof R. W. Connell. Macquarrie

Dr A. Davidson, Author
Peter Duncan, MP, former At
torney General, S. Australia
Doug E'Ieringham,MP and
former Vice-Pres. World
Health Organisalion
Herbert Feilh. Monash University
George Georges, Senator
A.T. Gielzelt, Senator
Hugh Hamilton, Building _
Workers Indusuial Union
Joe Harris, BRPF, Auslralia
Harry Hauenschild, Pres. Trades
and Labour Council,
Queensland
Mark D. Hayes. Researcher
Ian Hinckfuss, Queensland
University
Clyde Holding, MP
M.F. Keane, MP
James B. Keefe, Senator
Ken Kemshead, BRPF, Australia
J. Kiers, Peace Liason Committee
Prof B.J. McFarlane. Adelaide
A.J. Mclean, Building Workers
Induslrial Union
G.D. Mcintosh, Senalor
C.V.J. Mason, Senator. Leader
Auslralian Democrats
Jack Mundy, Trade Unionisl,
leader of Green Bans
George Petersen, MP
Cyril Primmer, Senator
M.F. Reynolds, Depuly Mayor,
Townsville
Mavis Roberton. National Ex
ecutive, CPA
P.A. Rogan, MP
Dr Keith SUler, Vice-Pres. UN
Association
Mark Taft, Assislanl Nal. Sec.
CPA
R.C. Taylor, Nal. 5. Railways
Union
M.E. Teichmann. Monash
UniversilY
D. Watson, lecturer
Bob Webb
Rev John Woodley, Uniting
Church
Richard WOOllon, Uniting
Church. Auslralian Council of
Churches
AUSTRIA
Dr Gunther Anders, AUlhor
Prof Paul Blau, Pugwash
member
Dr Engelbert Broda. Chairman,
Auslrian Pugwash Group
Leopold Gruenwald. Author
Harald Irnberger, EdilOr in Chief
of Extrob/oft
Prof Roberl Jungk, Author. and
teacher at Technical University,
Berlin
Prof Eduard Mllrz, Economic
Hislorian
Prof Dr Ewald Nowotny, Kepler
UniversilY
Theodor Prager. Author
BELGIUM
Baron Allard, Anti-war and
disarmament campaigner
Jos Deni, President of CIDePE
Ghislain Deridder
Luc Heymans
Alois Jespers. Presidenl of
IKaVE
Pierre Joye, Editor of Cohiers
Morxistes
Paul Lansu, Sludent
Roger Leysen and lwenly-three
cosignatories
Ignaas Lindemans, President, Pax
Christi (Flanders)
Roberl Pollel, Gen. Sec. Belgian
Fellowship of Reconciliation
Dr A. de Smaele, Fonner Government
Minister
Y. Testebrians, Teacher
CANADA
Prof Gerry Hunnius, Sociologist
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Arlur London, AUlhor. viclim of the
Siansky show trial
Ivan Hartel, Artisl
DENMARK
Villum Hansen, Chainnan, Danish
Committee for Peace and 5urity
Dagmar Fargerholt of Rungsted Kyst
and fifty-two co-signalories
lise von Kruedener
Sven Moller Kristensen. Writer. edilor
and literary critic
Niels Madsen, Emeritus Professor of
Chemical Engineering
Thorkild Johs. Nielsen
FINLAND
Prof Erik Allardl, Sociologist
Prof Dag Anckar, Political Scientist
Prof Osmo Apunen, Specialisl in In
ternational Relations
Prof GOran von Bonsdorff,
Scientist, Chairman of the Finnish
Peace Union
Prof Antero Jyrlinki, Specialist in
Public and Constilutional Law
Prof Jorma Miettinen, Radiochemist
and Pugwash member
Pekka Oivio, Chairman, Finnish
Trades Union Congress
Erkki Tuomioja, Associate Mayor of
Helsinki
Tapio Varis, Direclor of TAMPRI
Prof Raimo Vliyrynen. Specialist in
Internalional Relalions and Inlerna
tional Peace Research Association
Prof Georg Henrik von Wright,
Historian and Philosopher of
Science
FRANCE
Jean Barbut, Engineer
Bruno Baron-Renault. Mouvement des
Radicaux de Gauche
Maurice Barth, Dominican Priesl
Jacques Berthelet. AUlhor
Paul B1anquart, Journalist
Jacques Paris de Bollardiere, General
(retired)
Claude Bourdet, Editor, journalisl
Pierre Bourdieu, Sociologist
Pierre Bourquin, General Secrelary
MDPL
Maurice BUtlin, Advocale
B. Calvinhac
A. Carrougel
Georges Casal is, Theologian
Jean Casou, Writer
Francois Cavanna, Writer
D.E. Chanlal
Jacques Chalagner, Nalional
Secretary, Movemenl for Peace
Bernard Clavel. Writer
Claude Corvi
C. Cosla-Gavras. Film Director
C. Delbo, Writer
Robert Dave:zies, Catholic Priest and
wriler
Paul Duraffour, MP (Radical Party).
chairman of Disarmament Group in
National Assembly
B. Enos
Jean-Jacques de Felice, Advocale
Madeleine Guyol, Nat. Se1;. Move
ment for Disarmament. Peace &
Liberty
Guy Guynol, Member of Executive,
Electrical Trade Union, CFDT
Marrianne Herblol
Pierre Jalee. Economisl
Andre Jeanson, Fonner Trade Union
leader
22 23
Michel Jermann
Alain JOI:, Pugwash associate,
secretary French Peace Research
Association '
Prof Albert Kuller, Nobellaureale
(Physiq)
Claire Larriere
Henri Larriere, Scuipfor
Sylvain Larriere
Claude Larsen, teacher
Yves Lebas, Pard Socialisle
Victor Leduc, Member Nalional Exec
futive, PSU
Prof Henri Lefebvre, Philospher
Michel Leiris, Philosopher
Albert-Paul Lentin, Editor, Polilique
d'Aujourd 'hui
D. Lepeuple, Elecfrician
Marie-Rose Lipmann, Civil Uberties
Commitlee
Alfred Manessier, Painter
Leo Matarasso, Advocate
Michele Maltelarl, Sociologist
Annand Mallelart, Sociologist,
J. Meunier, Quaker
Jacques Mitterrand, ConseiJIer
Honoraire de l'Union Fran<;aise
Prof Theodore Monad, Member,
A<;ademy of Scien<:e, Natural
Historian
M & Mme G. Moreau
Prof Jean-elaude Pe<:ker, Member,
A<:ademy of Scien<:e
Louis PerilHer, Former Resident
general in Tunisia
Jean Pronleau, Former MP (Socialisl
parly)
JeanPierre Quartier, Engineer
Bernard Ravenel
Madeleine Reberioux, Historian
Georgette Risser, Dire<:lor of Resear<;h
at INRA
Frandne Roussel
Rolande Roussel
Bertrand Sansepee
M & Mme A. SaverOI
Delphine Seyrig, A<;tress
Patri<;k Silberstein. medkal doctor
Prof Albert Soboul, Historian
Gerard Soulier, Jurist
Haroun Tazieff, Director of Research
at CNRS
Clara Thalmann
MireilJe Thuegaz
M. Touraine, Sociologist
Victor Vasarely, Painler
Ver<;ors, Writer
Roger VilJemaire
Yvonne ViUemaire
J. Villeneuve, Pea<;e Researcher
M. VergnioUe
Bernard Wallon, Comite Droits et
Ubertes dans I'lnstitulion Mililaire
GERMANY
Prof Ulrich Albreehl, Political Scien
tist and spe<:ialisl in pea<;e studies
Rudolf Bahro, Author
Manfred Bannow
Joseph Beuys
Dr Carola, Peace researcher
Heinz Brandt, Trade Unionist
Delohone Brox
Dr Hans Gunter Brauch, Peace resear
cher and political sciendst
Volker BOrger, A<:ademic
Prof Andreas Dress
Dr Ingeborg Drewitz, Author
Prof Ossip K. Fle<:htheim
Volker Gekeler, BiOl;:hemist
Prof Dr Helmut Gollwitzer,
Theologian
Guido Grunewalde, Peace researcher
Sophie Guyot
Martin Harnisch, Lecturer
Wilfried' HeidI
Prof Dr Klaus Horn
Willie Hoss
Susanne V. Imhoff, Educationalist
Herr Krippendorf
Bernd KUbbig, Peace researcher
Rudolf Leineweber
Roomarie Mayershofer
Prof Dr Oskar Negl
M.J. Paul
Dr Barbara Putz Germaine Richter
Prof Dr Jens Rohwer
JOrgen Roth, Journalist and aUlhor
Olto Schily
Dr P. &hlin, Peace researcher
Brigitte SOllner
Prof Gerda von Staehr, Edu<;ationalist
Rudolf Steinke, Bahro Commillee
Edellrud Stommel
Thea Theonges
GI'lsta von Uexkilll, Journalist
Bernd Walter, Journalist and editor
Christian Willman, Academic
Dr Herbert Wulf
Peter Zcx:h, Aeademk
Dieler S. Zutz, Academic
Prof Dr F. Vilmar, Author
GREECE
Prof Saras Agourides, Theologian
Manolis Andronicos, University of
Thessaloniki
Ch. Argyropoulos
Babis DTal:opoulos, KKE Esoterikou
Odysseus Elytis, Nobel Prize Winner
Dimilris Falouros, University of
Thessaloniki
Kostas Filinis, KKE Esoterikou
Dr Panayotis KanelJakis
Dion Kazayiozgas, Professor of
&onomics
Takis Kyrkos, Lawyer
V.N. Maronitis
S.J. Nestor, Lawyer
Slefanos Pantelakis. Paediatriclan
Andreas Papandreou, PanhelJenie
Socialist Organisafion (PASOK)
Manolis Papalhomopoulos, University
of loannina
Marios Ploritis, Wriler and Journalist
Michel Raptis, Fonner se<:retary,
Fourth International
Dr Oem Rokos, VicePresident,
Te<:hnical Chamber of Greece
Cosla Stamadou, Journalist, Literary
& Film Crlti<;
Prof Alice Yotopoulos
Marangopoulus
Pavlos Zannas, Writer
HOLLAND
Prof Ben Dankbaar
H.H. Deunk
James H. Forest, Co-ordlnalor,lnter
national FOR
Prof B. de Gaay Fortman, Leader,
Dut<;h Radical Party in the Senate
Frans Janssen
Jaap van Kempen, jazz musician
Julia Lovelle, Musician
Linda Page, Teacher, Creative dance
Rev R. Ringnalda, Pastor
Prof Berl V.A. Roling, Former inter
national judge in Far Easl Military
Tribunal
Maarlen van Traa, Int. Sec. Labour
Party
Dr H.W. Tromp, Dire<:tor,
Polemologicallnslitute, Gronigen
Hans van der Velde, Sociologist
HUNGARY
Prof Andras Hegedus, Former Prime
Minister
ICELAND
Siglaugur Brynleifsson
H.T.H. Eldjarn, Agriculturalist
Svavar Geslsson
Tryggvi Gislason, Pedagogue (Nordi<;
Languages)
Thorsteinn O. Stephenson, Actor and
Broadcasler
IRELAND
Dr Noel Browne, Former Minister of
Heahh
T. Fitzgibbon, Wriler
John de Courcy Ireland, Maritime
Historian
P. Alan Heussaff, Se<:retary General,
Cellic League
George Morrison, Film Archivist
Sean MacBride, Nobel Laureate
ITALY
Prof Giovanni Ahrami, Ecologist
Prof Achille Abbati, Consultant,
Ospedale Maggiore, Bologna
Dr Zanini Antonio, Consultant,
Ospedale Maggiore, Bologna
Fabrizio Ballistelli, Author
Patrida Farinelli, student
Vita Franceschi
Prof NorberlO Bobbio, Professor of
Philosophy, TUrin
Senalor Giuseppe Branca, Former
President, Constitutional Court
Senator Arrigo Boldrini. Presidenl,
Nat. Assoc. of Italian Partisans
Av. Francesco Berti, President, In
stitule of History of the Resistance
Dr G. Codrignani, MP
Dante Cruicrhi, Mayor of Marzabotto
Prof Piero Dorazio, Artist
Prof Giovanni FavilJi, Acrademia dei
Lincei, Pugwash member
EJio Gabbuggiani, Mayor of Florence
Prof Carlo Ginzburg, Sociologist
Prof (Emerifus) Bernard Mehzer
Prof Gia<:omo MOllura, Pathologisl
(retired), Turin
Anlonio Mezzac<iui, Vicar of Misano
Prof Giorgio Prodi, Direclor. InSlitute
of Cancerology, University of
Bologna
Dr Raniero La Valle, Senator
Prof Luclo Lombardo Radice,
Mathemmician, member of Central
Ctlee, PCI
Giusieppe Sanloro, In,lilule for
Political Co-operalion
Mas,imo Teodori, MP (Radical
Romano Ledda, PCI Cenlral Commit
lee Member
Prof RenalO Langheri, Mayor ot
Bologna
Comune di GreveProvincia di Flrelue
JAPAN
Norihisa Arai, Director, Political
DiviSion of Sohyo (Sociliasl Trade
Union Federation)
Prof Yo,hio;hige Koala, Philosopher
Prof Sabum Kugai, Wriler
Dr Nobuo Kmano, Pathologist
(rclired) Oire(lol General, (,EN
SUIKYO
1"'a01al,u, Japane,e
repre,enlative, R(L"ell Founualion,
(halrman, GENSUIKIN (Japan
(ongres, againsl A & H BOIT1l)I)
Keiko MilOguchl
Saloko Ianaka, Gcneral Secretary,
NationalleUeralioll ot Women',
Organi,ation,
NORWAY
Odd Andreaw,:ll, Nor,k KOtllll\1I1efor
bUllu Unl(111 01
Municipal bnpluyecs)
l:lJllIg l:lerg, Quaker, Illell,her \VILPI'
(Women', lnlernatioll"dl Le,;!!ue for
Peace and Freedom)
(icrd Ho!cng
Liv Liuem
bgc !::id,vag
Ole 1Ie,vi!!, Prc'>idel11
Union oj' (,eneral Worker,
Prof J"han GahuTlg
J.:ari' (jarman",lund, AUlhor
l'ubli,hcl
Vna (,Tlluland, Foundl'f & Leaucr 01"
Ihe political pany hie I'olkevalgte
Ingeborg Rellillg Hagell, Author
Arne HaU!!e,lad, Judge
Solveig Helle
Per Chr. Hemmer, Profe"or 01
rhcorelieal Phy,ics
",Nell Holden
<;,ri Sverdrup LUlluen, Prole"or 01
Slavic Language" Oslo UniversilY
A,laug (jrovl'n Mt<;hael,cn.
AUlhore,s, Prot' in
Lilerature, nllllilcr and granul110lher
Dr hn Nordland, Fdu,ulI<l1luh,t
Li' Nygaard
Haakon A. Ol,en, Phy,iti,l and
I'llgwash Member
A,E. Slmen,en
Wen<:he Sorangr. Teacher
Dr Marek Thee, Edilor, Bulle/in
Peace Proposuls
Harlvig Swelra
Han, Marek Solli, Medical doclor
Vanubakk
Erling Vinem, Hi,hop
Harald Wergeland, Prot of Physics
Many olber ,upporler, by
jiJf fred (\\'omen for
Pea<:e)
POI.A'\l1l
Anna Lmnomi,l, Polish
Academy of SCience,
Jer/y
PORTlJ(;AI.
Melo Al11une,>, former foreign
mini,ler
G.V. Bu"hll, MI'
A. da Lawyer
J.C".h Cravllllo. \lP
R. Crespo, MP
I.M, Cuno. MP
Dr CUriO, (hen1l\l
J,M.A.A, Leitau, MP
V.M. Marque" JOIlr1lah>t
PmlO
A.C Sil\a
\1.A, I ilO ue :V]orai, ""w
SI'Alro\
Manual Alcarale, LC tnembel,
Spanj,h C011l1l11l1lj,1 P,HI)'
Joaquin Rui/-(;ll11enl COrlC', Author
1'101 hmlana, HI'lorian
Dr D,iI1lel EdiwT,
10.\
Dr Solana M<Juariaga, DepUI},
Parly
Joan M"ll, Puililer
JOlt: Sandoval Mori,. I're,i'.knl hlll
uacion ue In'e>tlgaci"lIe, Mani"a,
Prof Vicenle Romano,
Univer,ity
lo.,c Migud Bumo
P"lOE
SWEI)Ei'
Anila Gradin, r--IP
Prof brad,
Orf\al1lwr oj' hI Ru,.lt:ll
rribunal
(;u<lnar Myrdal, rtOT,()I1I"1
Bcnil MP
JaIl Obcrg, Sociologill
Colin Ril:hard" tOn.lulllng enginecr
SWITZERLAI'II)
Lliwoelh Ca"cllalH
Claire Barry
Manin Herrman
Danielle Hicks
Simon Hick;
Dr J. Avery Joycc, AUlhor
TURKEY
Mehmel N. Uca
USA
Elise Boulding, Professor of
Linguislies
Nicholas Hurge, New York
Prof Noam
Wjlliam C. Davidon, Pugwash panici
pam
Robell K. Davi" AUlhor, Pre,. Ber
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Howard Fa,!. AUlhor
Marf\arel Auem'
Joyce & (jahricl Kolko
Helen Lane
S.L. Luria, Dircclor, Centre for
Rewardl, Nobel laurea1e
Philip Morri>on, Re>earcher
Morn,on, Researcher
Robell J. Setn,an/, Chairman, New
YOI')" SAN!::
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Flllol A. JUrl>I
Kurt Vonlleglll, AUlhor
Howald Zinn, i\mhol
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YUGOSLAVIA
O'Olllik, delegate 10 lhe
i\tlllhly or lhe ... FRY,
or lhe Yugo,lav for Peace,
lndcpenuellce al1u Lquality oj
People,
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24
If you want more information, or wish to offer help, please write to:
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1


Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
Protest March in Bonn (October 12, 1981)



Between 250,000 and 300,000 demonstrators gathered in Bonn on October 10, 1981, to protest
NATOs Dual-track Decision, thereby forming the largest rally in West German history to date.
Despite the differing political platforms of the various groups participating in the rally, the
demonstrators exhibited a surprising degree of solidarity and were determined to conduct a
peaceful march.




Bonn: Half Fortress, Half Festival
Observations at the March of 250,000 in the Hofgarten
1



Some have already spent the night on Poppelsdorfer Allee. Its cold and rainy. At 5:26am, the
first chartered train arrives at the main train station. The residents of Bonn have parked their
cars on side streets. The police are standing by: white helmets, pistols, but no rubber clubs.
Three thousand civilian marshals. As the hours go by, the city is transformed into a combination
of fortress and festival.

Five columns of marchers form and set off toward the Hofgarten. Only a quarter of the 250,000
protesters (or 300,000? Or even more?) find space there. The rest of them spread out all over.
Bonn has 285,000 residents. You can see them provided that they themselves are not outside
on the streets behind their curtains; some wave happily, others look doubtful and frightened.
What will this day bring?

On the streets, the first information booths start springing up. Two young people are schlepping
a two-meter-long, papier-mch bomb on a moped. It reads, This is the cross of our time. The
people from the Committee for Peace and Disarmament have painted skeletons on their white
tunics. Mothers are carrying infants in their arms. Even some dogs, well-behaved on leashes,
are wearing signs. For example: I sh** on the neutron bomb.


1
A park in Bonns city center trans.
Reproduced from the German History
in Documents and Images Collection
by permission of the German
Historical Institute, Washington,
D.C. (www.ghi-dc.org)
-Thanks to GHDI Project Manager
K. McCullough and her staff for
ensuring the quality of the translations.
--Contributed by Holger Nehring.
2
People are laughing a lot. Total strangers link arms. White flags and banners outnumber red
ones. Even the DKP [German Communist Party] refrained from using its color [red] here and
there: little white doves flutter on the background of its flag. The lettering is green.

Pre-march rallies are taking place all over. Helmut Gollwitzers
2
voice comes through the
loudspeaker, loud and full of emotion: Helmut, were coming. Helmut, were coming.
3
He
makes reference to the Easter March movement. Resist! he calls out. You can hear words like
peoples struggle and revolt of the masses being shouted out.

[ . . . ]

Many stores, especially jewelry, clothing, and fur stores, are not only closed, but some
storefront windows have also been boarded shut to protect against possible stone-throwing.
Demonstrators spray-paint their comments on these wooden planks. One reads: Dear business
owner, even a second wooden wall wont help when a neutron bomb is dropped. A driver who
couldnt find a secure parking spot in front of his home put a sign on his windshield for safetys
sake: Trade unionist for peace. Some of the people marching here want to wait a while before
they do what they have planned. At the Douglas perfumery on Kaiserplatz, you can read
slogans like: You have the might; we have the night and Break a leg! Whos afraid of the first
stone?

Music is everywhere: Irish folk music with bagpipes, workers songs, chansons. Suddenly its all
drowned out. Peoples of the world, hear the signals. The song of the American civil rights
movement We shall overcome. Young DKP people try to sing along, but they apparently dont
know the words.

The speeches at the main event are virtually impossible for many to hear. For those who never
make it to the Hofgarten, theres no such thing as shared euphoria. But even those who didnt
see or hear anything and finally went to a pub to escape the rain arent disappointed. They
halfway expected that to happen. It isnt so important. The main thing is that so many people
have come, thats really great.

Celebrities on folding chairs. Erhard Eppler, Heinrich Bll, retired general [Gerd] Bastian,
military theorist [Alfred] Mechtersheimer, who has been threatened with expulsion from the CSU,
Professor Gollwitzer, actor and singer Harry Belafonte, Coretta King, widow of the murdered
Martin Luther King. In her speech, Petra Kelly, the federal chair of the Greens, demands that
Chancellor [Helmut] Schmidt step down, and she declares Eppler, so to speak, the new
chancellor. Eppler folds his hands under his chin and rolls his eyes upward. The only speaker
up there who slips into screeching demagogy is Uta Ranke-Heinemann, the daughter of the

2
Lutheran theologian and pastor, and critic of the Vietnam war and the arms race trans.
3
Gollwitzers forewarning is to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt trans.
3
former federal president. An embarrassing appearance: Our politicians dont notice that theyre
crazy. We dont want people dying for foreign megalomania.

Eppler gives interviews backstage in German, English (fluent), French (not quite as fluent): The
SPD presidium met five weeks ago. I told them I was going to be speaking here, and no one
had any problem with it, not even Herbert Wehner. Eppler is the most important speaker here,
it seems. Pastor [Heinrich] Albertz refers to him as the possible leader of a new party to the left
of the SPD. And when senior FDP politician William Borm gives his speech, he is confronted
with chants of Eppler! Eppler!

The rally is over at around 5:30pm. Only the Communist Workers League of Germany (KABD)
continues to expatiate along Poppelsdorfer Allee on the subject of a nuclear-free Europe from
the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. Their rendition of their hymn We are the young guard of the
proletariat is slightly disrupted by members of the Hare Krishna sect who dance by, passing out
cookies to onlookers.

At the Hofgarten, the most unlikely thing happens. A message goes out over a loudspeaker on
the stage and in response hundreds of people crawl through the mud collecting paper and trash.
It is gathered in huge piles to facilitate the great clean-up by Bonns sanitation department. At
Hotel Bristol, which not only let the marchers use the bathroom but the patio as well, the
doorman praises the discipline of the peace demonstrators.

People are looking for their buses. Others are running to catch their trains. Some drop the
stones they brought from home, as Heinrich Bll warmly requested in his closing words.

Train station, 6 pm. A young blond boy of five is waiting for the train with his parents. The
message I dont want any atomic bombs is written on the back of his long white shirt. A dove is
painted on the front. Many demonstrators cant find their departure meeting-points. Many of the
numerous people who are wandering around lost in the Auswrtiges Amt [Foreign Ministry]
subway station have set up a night camp. The next day is stormy and rainy, and the city is back
to normal.




Source: Bonn, halb Festung halb Festival. Beobachtungen beim Aufmarsch der 250 000 im
Hofgarten [Bonn: Half Fortress, Half Festival. Observations at the March of 250,000 in the
Hofgarten], Die Welt, October 12, 1981.

Translation: Allison Brown









[Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 44.]

Friday, October 16 [1981]
This was a day that didnt stop 1 on 1 with 8 different Sens.
on AWACs. A meeting with the P.M. of Mauritius. Then one with Dr.
Kohl leader of the opposition party to Helmut Schmidt. He said the
250,000 demonstrators in Bonn against the U.S. came from all over
Europe and it was an affair orchestrated by the Soviet U. He made a
good point that propaganda is painting us as a militaristic people
when the truth is we are the most moral & generous people on earth.
We should be appealing to the world on the basis of morality.
Lunched with a group of editorial page editors from all over the
U.S. Did a Q&A.
An NSC meeting that has left me with the most profound
decision Ive ever had to make. Central America is really the worlds
next hotspot. Nicaragua is an armed camp supplied by Cuba and
threatening a communist takeover of all of Central America. More
meetings & finally home with an arm full of homework & my problem.
1


Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
The Peace Movement and German Foreign Policy (October 19, 1981)


In the following essay, Alfred Grosser, a French political scientist and expert on German affairs,
examines the origins and motivations of the West German peace movement, which he
interprets as part of a broader not with us attitude that was evident in the countrys foreign
policy. This article first appeared in the Paris daily Le Monde.




This Crisis is the Most Serious One of All

French political science professor Alfred Grosser, 56, is among the most knowledgeable experts
on Germany. The following article was taken from the Paris daily Le Monde.


It might well be that Helmut Schmidt remains chancellor until the 1984 elections. But it could
also be that he soon falls either to the right or to the left. To the left would mean that his liberal
allies let him down because the governments social policy was too lax and the budget policy
not restrictive enough. To the right would mean that his own party let him down on account of
military policy.

It cannot be ruled out that the pacifists and the CDU opposition will triumph at the same time;
this would lead to an explosive situation. At the moment, though, most of the attention is being
directed at the schism between the demonstrators in Bonn and the totality of the three
parliamentary parties.

The most reliable ally of the United States within the alliance has become the country with the
liveliest anti-Americanism. The country in which neither reunification nor Europe were primary
concerns, but rather security, has become a country in which the not with us attitude and the
refusal to view foreign policy from the perspective of defense seem to be triumphant. What a
surprise!

Nevertheless, two constant factors, which could serve to explain the turnaround to a great
extent, cannot be ignored.

First of all, the [West German] relationship to the past is very different from the French one.
When Franois Mitterrand said at his press conference: France does not confuse pacifism as a
postulate with peace as a result, hardly anyone contradicted him: this was because of 1938,
Reproduced from the German History
in Documents and Images Collection
by permission of the German Historical
Institute, Washington, D.C.
(www.ghi-dc.org)
-Thanks to GHDI Project Manager
K. McCullough and her staff for
ensuring the quality of the translations.
--Contributed by Holger Nehring.
2
when France and England capitulated in Munich because they were weak
1
; and because they
were pacifists, they got war.

In the Federal Republic, the two comparisons are 1939, the start of the war, and 1945, the
catastrophe, the dead and the ruins that resulted. If so many Germans are demonstrating now
for the idea of peace, then it is partly because so many Germans had once been stirred to cheer
the war.

Furthermore, there is the continuation of a movement that started in 1950 with the
announcement of rearmament, an announcement that surprised an entire generation a
generation that was convinced that militarism must be atoned for with anti-militarism.

There is definitely a connection between the not with me of the 1950s and the huge crowds in
Bonn. Between the two lies the no of the nuclear scientists manifesto of 1956, as well as the
entire anti-nuclear movement: Whereas in France the word nuclear has a predominantly
positive connotation, above all because of the sacrosanct notion of national independence, in
Germany the peaceful use of nuclear power was poisoned by the totally negative symbolic
impact of nuclear weapons.

But how did it reach the scale of the Bonn demonstration and the support it met with? Because
people are more likely to demonstrate in Germany than in France? Certainly. And that applies to
all kinds of demonstrations. With or without violence. With the affirmation of aggressive marginal
groups by youths, or, as in Frankfurt, with a multi-generational demonstration aimed at
peacefully preventing the construction of a new airport runway that would harm the
environment.

There is a contrast to note here. Sometimes, a demonstration signifies the rejection of the
political system; at other times, it is an expression of the democratic spirit, because the
democratic will should not be asserted only on election days. At the march in Bonn, both
aspects were united reason enough not to place too much importance on the vigorous efforts
of the small Communist party and its few small satellite parties to infiltrate the demonstration.

When both currents are able to flow together, it is not just because of the aims of the
demonstration, but because institutions have not functioned properly. In the institution of
parliament, the large majority party offers little reason for hope and hardly any incentive for
participation.

Justice, as an institution, rules too often on the side of authorities who treat people as deviants
and enemies when they are simply critical thinkers or young people guided by exacting ethics.

1
In the Munich Agreement (September 1938), France and England allowed Germany to take the
Sudetenland, in an attempt to avoid war with Hitler. Hitler violated the agreement the following March by
seizing the rest of Czechoslovakia trans.
3

Thus, a court recently decided in favor of the Bavarian government when it did not want to
accept a young woman into state service as a teacher. This woman insisted on swearing to
uphold the constitution only on the condition that this loyalty did not lead to a conflict with the
principles of her Christian faith.

This case is characteristic for two reasons. First, because of the totally new scope of womens
activism, but especially because of the religious component of the German not with us
movement. This was already noticeable in the spring at the church conference in Hamburg, and
it will become even more obvious, because the Sermon on the Mount is constantly being cited
in justification of the peace lovers as opposed to the belligerent missile-deployers.

Here, too, the situation can be explained through a comparison with France: If German
churches, especially the Catholic Church, had not become so dissociated from matters of
justice, if, for example, on the evening before the Bundestag elections they had spoken of
unemployment as, for example, the French bishops did instead of divorce, and about the
Third World instead of public finances, then the schism with the demanding grass roots might
not have given that very grass roots occasion to refer to the Holy Scripture without regard for
the political consequences.

This is of course only one of many explanations. German democracys own logic also creates
points of vulnerability for itself: Refusing military service for reasons of conscience immediately
became so respected that it could almost become the rule.

And the instruction provided by a whole generation of young teachers, in which existing society
was presented as inherently perverted, has had just as great an impact as the Establishments
refusal to grant justice and its lack of understanding.

The Establishment, in turn, also advocates a not with us attitude in its own way. For its
members, it is self-evident that the Federal Republic should not assume any responsibility
anywhere in the world, no matter how strong its economic power might be. The outside world
will only accept a timid and cowering Germany.

Certainly, fear of nuclear death plays a role. In a different international, social, and political
climate it would doubtless be less intense. The infighting among the leaders of social
democracy, rising unemployment, the seething tide in Poland that seems to suggest that some
leeway is possible under Soviet rule: The points of departure for destabilization are manifold.

It is still too soon to say that the firmly-anchored, thirty-year-long stability of the Federal
Republic has already been supplanted. The Federal Republic has previously withstood other
moral crises without losing its basic orientation. But the present crisis is without a doubt the
most serious one of all.

4
Source: Alfred Grosser, Diese Krise ist die schwerste [This Crisis is the Most Serious One of
All], Der Spiegel, October 19, 1981, pp. 34-35.

Translation: Allison Brown

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.
Contributed by Matthew Evangelista.
'"'
BEYOND THE COLD WAR
by
E P Thompson
MERLIN PRESS
jointly with END
London
Available from Merlin Press, 3 Manchester Road, London E14.
1982 E P Thompson
First published jointly by
European Nuclear Disarmament
227 Seven Sisters Road, London N4
and The Merlin Press Ltd
3 Manchester Road, London E 14
2nd impression January 1982
3rd impression March 1982
and printed by Black Rose,
27 Clerkenwell Close
London Eel
typesetting: H Hems
The Malt House, Chilmark, Wilts. SP3 SAD
Author's Note
This lecture was delivered in Worcester City Guildhall on
November 26th 1981. I have corrected it and extended it at
some points. It is an extended version of the lecture which
I would have delivered on the BBC if the original suggestion
that I might give the 1981 Dimbleby Lecture had not been
withdrawn. My particular thanks are due to the Worcester
Citizens Committee-a non-political committee representing
individuals from the City Council, local societies and
churches-which invited me to give the lecture in my own
city; to Councillor Jeff Carpenter, its chairman; to the Mayor
and Mayoress of Worcester, who were in attendance on the
platform; and to Mr Jonathan Dimbleby who encouraged me
to go ahead and to ensure that the Dimbleby Lecture (even if
an unofficial one) was delivered in 1981.
It will be very clear to readers that this lecture was written
before the tragic events-the imposition of martial law and
the repression of Solidarity-commenced in Poland. It is
impossible to foresee the outcome of these events as this
lecture goes to the press. It may be thought that they confirm
the more pessimistic part of my analysis and refute the more
optimistic alternatives which I proposed.
I am uncertain. I will only say that these events make an
analysis, on the lines of this lecture, more relevant and more
urgent. The outcome may still depend on our own actions.
The movement for peace, West and East, can no longer be
content with contesting missiles. We must strive to loosen
Europe from the military hegemony of both super-powers,
and to press forward measures of demilitarisation in every
part of our continent. Peace and freedom must now, more
than ever, be seen as one cause. There is no other way.
E.PT
23 December 1981
BEYOND THE COLD WAR
I am honoured to have been invited to deliver this lecture,
here in my own city, by a committee of fellow-citizens of
no particular political persuasion, united by their concern for
serious and open discussion. It is kind of you to open the
Guildhall to me, and to make me so much at home.
My difficulty is that I have been favoured with so much
publicity for a lecture which I did not deliver that any
lecture which I do now deliver is bound to come as an anti
climax. It is as if the bishops were finally to assemble and
open Joanna Southcott's mysterious box, and find nothing
within it but a recipe for making muffins.
And yet I can glimpse, out of the comer of my eye, some
thing which may be important. I wish I could see it more
clearly, and describe it clearly to you. I think that we may
now be living, this year and for several years ahead, through
episodes as significant as any known in the human record.
I will not dwell on the perils. We are well aware of these.
Human ingenuity has somehow created these immense
destructive powers, which now appear to hang above us,
alienated from all human control. They are now talking of
siting laser weapons on the moon-weapons which, in a
literal sense, will be lunatic.
We are aware, all of us, of the overplus of this nuclear
weaponry, much of it crammed into our own continent:
land-mines, artillery, torpedoes, depth-charges, missiles
launched from the ground, from submarines, from the air.
We may differ as to the exact 'balance' of weaponry held by
the adversary parties. But we are also aware that, when the
overkill capacity of weaponry is such as to enable the
destruction of civilised conditions for life on our continent
thirty times over, calculations of 'balance' are becoming
I
irrelevant.
We may also, after two years of mounting anxiety, begin
to feel slight twinges of hope. The superpowers have at last
been brought to the negotiating table. Something might even
be done to halt or to reduce the weaponry in Europe.
This is good. But what an effort it has taken to get the
politicians there! And what a discrepancy there is between
the procedures of war and those of peace! The decisions to
develop new deploy the SS-20, to put the
neutron bomb into production, to go. ahead with cruise
taken by a few score people-at the most by a
few behind closed doors, on both sides.
But to check, or to reverse, anyone of those decisions,
nothing will do except the voluntary efforts of hundreds of
thousands-late into the night and through weekends, month
after month-addressing envelopes, collating information,
raising money, meeting'in churches or in school halls, debat
ing in conferences, lobbying parliaments, marching through
the streets of Europe's capital cities.
In the past 18 months I have visited fellow workers for
peace in the United States, in Czechoslovakia, in Finland,
Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Germany and France.
The story is always the same. People are determined. They
are encouraged by growing support. But they are running out
of puff. How long can they go on?
And if they relax, then in two or three years the
accompanied by new weapons of equal barbarity, nerve-gas,
bacteriological begin to come back. We are
running the wrong way down an escalator: if we stop running
we will be carried up to the top.
To check the missiles is something. But the political
launch-pad for all these missiles is the adversary posture of
the two great rival alliances, grouped around the USA and
USSR: that is, the Cold War. If this adversary posture were
to be modified-if it were to be undermined by new ideas
and movements on both sides-then, not only the weapons,
but the launch-pad for them would be taken away. And
many of the difficulties attending disarmament, whether
nuclear or conventional, would fall also.
This is what I shall examine in this lecture. I do not intend
2
to rehearse the history of the Cold War, nor to examine,
once again, why it started.. I will enquire into its real 7.mtent
today. What is the Cold War now about? Is it necessary! And,
if it is, whose is the need?
Let us go back, first, not to the origin of the Cold War, but to
a moment just before it broke out. My own generation is the
last which witnessed that moment as adults. Our perception
of 'Europe' remains, to this day, a little different from that of
younger generations. Europe, for us, included Warsaw, Prague
and Budapest and, more distantly, Leningrad and Moscow.
But for many young Westerners, 'Europe' now means, first of
all, the EEC.
The young have grown up within a fractured continent.
The Cold War has been a received condition, which has set
the first premises of politics and ideology from before the
time of their birth. It is now a settled and unquestioned
premise: a habit. Most people assume that the condition will
persist-far into the 21st century, for the full length of their
own lifetimes-if war does not supervene. It has always
been there.
But it has not always been there. I do not suggest that
Europe, before the Cold War, was in any way, politically or
culturally, united. It was the seat of rival imperialisms which
extended over the globe. It was the seat and source of two
devastating world wars. It was a battlefield for opposing
ideologies.
Yet the savage divisions among Europeans did not exist
as a fracture splitting the continent in half. They ran deeply
within the political and cultural life of each nation-state.
European states went to war; yet Europeans remained within
a common political discourse.
This was true, most of all, in the climactic years of the
second world war. From 1941 to 1944 Nazi Germany and its
allies occupied an area and commanded resources very much
greater than the EEC. Yet, paradoxically, there grew up
within occupied Europe a new internationalism of common
resistance.
From Norway to Montenegro, from the coast of Kent to
the suburbs of Stalingrad-and it is necessary to recall, with
3
an effort, that Britain and Russia then were allies and that it
was the prodigious sacrifice of Soviet life which turned the
tide of that war-there was a common movement of resistance.
Polish and Czech units served alongside British forces; British
liaison groups-among them Churchill's son, Randolph, and
the Conservative M.P., Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean-served
with the Yugoslav partisans.
It is the fashion to be cynical about all that now, and for
good reasons. The expectations and hopes of that moment
were naive. The alliance of anti-fascist resistance-the alliances
of liberals, Communists, agrarians, social-democrats, Conser
vatives-were later dishonoured, and on both sides.
But we might also recall that they were honoured for a
while, and honoured with sacrifice of life. The aspiration for
a democratic Europe-extending the good faith of those
alliances forward into the peace-was authentic.
Some of these expectations were to be betrayed. But they
remain there, in the record. I have said that others now seem
to us as naive. Here is a young British officer-aged twenty
two-writing in a private letter from the Middle-East in 1943:
How wonderful it would be to call Europe one's fatherland, and
think of Krakow, Munich, Rome, Arles, Madrid as one's own cities.
I am not yet educated to a broader nationalism, but for a United
States of Europe I could feel a patriotism far transcending my love
for England.
This Union he saw as 'the only alternative to disaster.' And
later in the same year he wrote:
There is a spirit abroad in Europe which is finer and braver than
anything that tired continent has known for centuries, and which
cannot be withstood. You can, if you like, think of it in terms of
politics, but it is broader and more generous than any dogma. It is
the confident will of whole peoples, who have known the utmost
humiliation and suffering and have triumphed over it, to build their
own lives once and for all. . . There is a marvellous opportunity
before us-and all that is required from Britain, America and the
U.S.S.R. is imagination, help and sympathy...
4
What sad reading this makes today! Some will find it
Euro-centric, others will find it sentimental or innocent 1..1 its
view of the motives of politicians and states, all will know
that the hopes were to be defeated, within two or three years,
by events. But the expectations were commitments, to the
extent of life itself, and they were shared by many thousands
across the continent.
In January 1944 this officer wrote to his brother:
My eyes fill very quickly with tears when I think what a splendid
Europe we shall build (I say Europe because iIla!'s the oniy continent
I really know quite well) when aU iIle vitality and talent of its
indomitable peoples can be set free for co-operation and creation.
Ten days later he parachuted onto a high plateau in East
Serbia-in the region of Tsma Trava-where he was to serve
as liaison officer with a contingent of Bulgarian partisans.
It is not my business now to record the savage warfare and
the privations of the next months, as these partisans and their
small British support-group were driven backwards and
forwards across the snow-fields by superior forces. It is a
complex story, clouded by the refusal of the British autho
rities, to this day, to release some archives. In May small
Bulgarian partisan forces set off on an ill-planned and ill
fated drive directly into the heart of Bulgaria. They were
overwhelmed; most of them were massacred; and the British
officer, my brother, was executed. He was subsequently
proclaimed a National Hero of Bulgaria, and despite some
nasty twists and turns in Bulgarian politics, he remains that
to this day. I have been, twice, along the route of that march;
my wife and I two years ago visited the mountains around
Tsrna Trava and talked with surviving partisans. The events of
that time have not been forgotten, although they have been
clouded by Cold War mythology, and on both sides. But that,
again, is a different and complex story.
My point is this. My brother's aspirations for the future
were not unusual, although his fate exemplified the cause of
this common resistance in an unusual way. Throughout
Europe men and women looked forward to the fruits of
victory: a continent both democratic and at peace. There
5
would be different social systems, of course. But it was
supposed that these systems would be chosen by each nation,
with popular consent. The differences need not be occasions
of war.
These expectations were becoming casualties when British
forces confronted Greek partisans in Athens in December
1944. None survived the shock of the onset of the Cold War.
The polarisation was absolute. I am not concerned, now, to
examine why this happened. But happen it certainly did.
Communists were expelled from the political life of the West:
in France, in italy, and to the prison islands of Greece.
Liberals, social-democrats, agrarians, and, then, Communists
who had proved to be too sympathetic to the alliance with
democracy or too critical of Stalin: all these were purged
from the political life of the East. Some were subjected to
monstrous faked trials, were executed or imprisoned. The
Cold War era, of two hostile Europes, commenced.
I will make only one, over-simplified, comment on that
moment. The cause of freedom and the cause of peace
seemed to break apart. The 'West' claimed freedom; the
'East' claimed the cause of peace. One might talk for hour
upon hour in qualification of both claims. Each is made up of
one part of truth and another part of hypocrisy. 'The West',
whether directly through NATO or indirectly through the
arrangements of the United States military, co-existed and
co-exists easily enough with regimes notorious for their
abuse of freedom and of human rights: with Salazar's
Portugal, Franco's Spain, the Greece of the Colonels, or with
the military tyranny in Turkey today. And this is before we
look to Latin America, Asia or Africa. The Soviet Union's
dedication to 'peace' co-existed with the military repression
of unacceptable motions towards democracy or autonomy
within its client states: notoriously in Hungary, 1956, and
Czechoslovakia, 1968. And this is before we look towards the
military support given to Third World regimes within the
Soviet sphere of influence, or towards Afghanistan. .
But, in the time open to me, I can only note both claims,
which have long underpinned the ideological contestations
of the Cold War. And I must add that, when every allowance
is made for hypocrisy, both claims have a little colour. it is
6
not that 'the Free West' has been an exemplar of democratic
practice. But it is in the West that certain important demo
cratic practices have persisted, whereas in 'the East'-after
gulag and faked trial, the repression of the Hungarian in
surrection and of the Prague Spring, the psychiatric confine
ment of dissidents, and the monotonous State-licensed idiocy
of Communist intellectual orthodoxy-the very term 'People's
Democracy' became sick.
That is familiar, and a source of much self-congratulation
to Westerners. What is less familiar-for the young are not
taught this carefully in our schools-is that the West was per
ceived by the East-and perceived for good reasons-as the
most threatening and irresponsible military power. The first
atomic detonation over Hiroshima, by the United States (but
with the assent of our own government) sent panic-waves
across the Communist world which contributed much to the
onset of Cold War. From that moment, and for over twenty
years, there was no question of 'balance' in the nuclear
arsenals of the two parties: the West had an overwhelming
superiority in destructive nuclear power.
We have been reminded of this recently by two inde
pendent voices of authority, each of them dissenting voices
from the opposed superpowers. George Kennan, the former
American ambassador to Moscow whose famous despatch (by
'Mr. X' in Foreign Affairs, July 1947) contributed to the post
war policies of United States' 'containment' of the Soviet
Union, has reminded Americans that 'it has been we... who,
at almost every step of the road, have taken the lead in the
development of this sort of weaponry.' (This is not, by the
way, as the BBC Reith Lecturer for 1981 has alleged in his
know-all way, 'at best a half truth': it is a plain, and easily
verifiable, fact). And Roy Medvedev, the Soviet supporter of
free intellectual enquiry and civil rights, has commented that,
with the brief exception of the Soviet advance in satellite
technology in 1957-8, the United States has always led in
weapons technology-
obliging the USSR to try to catch up from a position of inferiority.
This permanent dynamic has structured Russian responses deeply,
creating a pervasive inferiority complex that has probably prevailed
over rational calculations in the 70s.
7
It is a dramatic instance of the trajectory of our times that
these two distinguished men, starting from such different
presuppositions and passing through such differing exper
iences, should have now come to a common point of commit
ment in support for the active peace movement.
From August 1945 onwards there were voices enough to
argue that 'the West' should put its advantage in nuclear
weapons technology to use. These voices went on for many
years-calling for a 'preventive war' or for the 'liberation' of
Berlin or of East Europe. Some voices were influential
enough-John Foster Dulles, James Forrestal (the paranoid
United States Secretary for the Navy who went mad in
office)-to induce a legitimate 'paranoia' on the other side.
The United States has rattled its nuclear weapons in their
scabbard, as a matter of state policy, on at least 19 occasions.
By the end of the 1940s it had surrounded the Soviet Union
with a ring of forward strategic air-bases, all-with the
exception of Alaska-outside United States' territory. The
only attempt by the Soviet Union to establish a comparable
forward base was repelled by the direct ultimatum of nuclear
attack: the Cuban missile crisis. The humiliation suffered
then by the Soviet rulers powered the upward build-up of
Soviet missiles in the I 960s.
I am not endorsing either claim without qualification. I
mean only to repeat that both claims had colour: the West
to 'freedom' and the East to 'peace'. And this placed the
political culture of Europe in a permanent double-bind.
Those who worked for freedom in the East were suspected
or exposed as agents of Western imperialism. Those who
worked for peace in the West were suspected or exposed as
pro-Soviet 'fellow travellers' or dupes of the Kremlin. In this
way the rival ideologies of the Cold War disarmed those on
both sides, who might have put Europe back together. Any
transcontinental movement for peace and freedom became
impossible. Such a movement glowed fo, a moment in 1956
and, again, in 1968. Each time it was, ironically, the 'peace
loving' Soviet forces which ground out the sparks under an
armoured heel.
Let us move back to our own time. For I am addressing the
8
question-not what caused the Cold War, but what is it about
today? And it is no good trying to answer this by standing at
its source and stirring it about with a stick. For a river gathers
up many tributaries on its way, and turns into unexpected
courses.
Nor is it any good asking me to deliver to you some
homilies called 'the lessons of history'. History teaches no
simple lessons, because it never repeats itself, even if certain
large themes recur.
In fact, received notions of the 'lessons' of recent history
are often actively unhelpful in dealing with the present, since
these establish stereotypes which interfere with contemporary
vision. This is very much the case with today's Cold War.
Because it was widely believed in the 1930s that World War I
was 'caused' by an arms race and by inflexible structures
of alliances, essential measures of collective security were not
taken to halt Hitler and to prevent World War II. Today the
'lesson' of World War II has stuck in the public mind while
the 'lesson' of World War I has been forgotten. Because it is
widely believed that military weakness and appeasement
'caused' World War II, many people now condone new forms
of militarisation which will, if unchecked, give us World
War III.
At the same time there is, in both West and East, a simple
transference ofremembered images to the present. The 1930s
burned in memory the image of a major militarist and expan
sionist power (Nazi Germany) whose appetite was only fed
by each new scrap of appeasement; which had an insatiable
drive to conquer all Europe, if not the world. Politicians and
ideologists, West and East, have renamed this insatiable
potential aggressor as (respectively) Russia or America. It is
a compelling identification. Yet it rests on the assent of
memory rather than upon analysis or evidence. It appears
plausible simply because it looks so familiar.
But to understand the present we must first resist the
great suggestive-power of memory. This is, surprisingly,
where the historical discipline may be helpful, may teach
'lessons' of a different kind. For historians deal always with
long-term eventuations-social, political, economic process
which continually defeat or contradict the expectations of
9
the leading historical actors themselves.
History never happens as the actors plan or expect. It is
the record of unintended consequences. Revolutions are
made, manifestos are issued, battles are won: but the out
come, twenty or thirty years on, is always something that
no-one willed and no-one expected. Boris Pasternak, the
great Russian poet, reflected in Dr Zhivago on the 'indirect
results' of the October Revolution, which 'have begun to
make themselves felt-the fruits of fruits, the consequences
of consequences.'
I like this phrase, 'the consequences of consequences',
and wish we could see the Cold War in this way and not in
terms of the intentions of the actors in 1947. We might see
it, then, more clearly, as an abnormal political condition. It
was the product of particular contingencies at the end of
World War II which struck the flowing rivers of political
culture into glaciated stasis, and struck intellectual culture
with an ideological permafrost. The Cold War frontiers
were fixed, in some part, precisely by 'deterrence'-by the
unprecedented destructive power of the nuclear weaponry
which, by coincidence, was invented at this historical
moment.
It is an odd and very dangerous condition. A line has been
drawn across the whole continent, like some gigantic geo
logical fault, with one great capital city catapulted across the
fault and divided internally by a wall. On each side of this
l i ~ e there are not only vast accumulations of weaponry
duected against the other, but also hostile ideologies, security
operations, and political structures. Both sides are preparing,
and over-preparing, for a war in which both would share in
mutual ruin. Yet both parties deny any intention of attacking
the other: both mutter on about 'deterrence' or 'defence.'
If we ask the partisans of either side what the Cold War is
now about, they regard us with the glazed eyes of addicts. It
is there because it is there. It is there (they might say)
because of the irreconcilable antagonism between two
political and social systems: totalitarianism versus demo
cracy-or Communism versus capitalism or Western imperial
ism. Each must be motivated, of its own inherent nature, by
the desire to vanquish the other. Only the mutual fear of
10
'deterrence' can stave off a total confrontation.
The trouble with these allswers is that they are phrased in
terms of the ideological justifications for the Cold War at
the moment of its origin. They remain fixed, in the perma
frost of that icy moment.
A brief survey will show us that the notion of two mono
lithic adversary systems conforms uneasily with the evidence
of the past decades. To take the Communist bloc first: if it
is aiming to vanquish Europe and then the World, it is making
a bad job of it. It has lost Yugoslavia. It has lost Albania. The
Soviet Union and China have split bitterly apart. From the
time of the post-war settlement, which established a protect
ive belt of client Communist states around Russia's western
frontiers, there has been nO further expansion into European
territory. Twenty-five years ago Soviet and NATO forces
were withdrawn from Austria, and the peace treaty which
guaranteed Austria's neutrality has been honoured by both
sides.
There has also been a major recession in pro-Soviet
Communist movements in the West. The Cominform,
established in 1947, was seen by Western ideologists as a
Trojan horse within Western societies: or a whole set of
Trojan horses, the largest being in Italy and France. The
Cominform has long been broken up. Disgusted by the
events of 1956, by the Soviet repression of the 'Prague
Spring' in 1968, most Western parties have turned in ~
'Eurocommunist' direction: they are sharply critical of the
Soviet denial of civil rights, oppose Soviet military policies
(including the intervention in Afghanistan), and in general
have supported Polish Solidarity. This is true of the huge
Italian Communist Party (which endorses a critical commit
ment to NATO), of the influential Spanish party, and of the
small British party. The French Communist Party, which
has been ambiguous on questions of civil rights has steadily
lost support in the French electorate.
Or take the question of Marxism. In Cold War fiction
Soviet Communism is supposed to be motivated by a
philosophy, 'Godless Marxism', with universal claims. The
strange development here is, not only that religion appears
to be reviving in most parts of the Communist world, but
II
that the intellectual universe of Marxism is now in chaos.
In the Warsaw Pact countries there is something called
Marxism-Leninism, learned by rote, which is a necessary
rhetoric for those who wish to advance within the career
structures of the state. It provokes, in the public generally
nothing but a yawn. I can think of no Soviet intellectual
who, as a Marxist, commands any intellectual authority
outside the Soviet Union.
Yet, in an odd sideways movement, Marxism as an intellect
ual system has migrated to the West and to the Third World
just as certain liberal beliefs have been migrating to dissident
circles in the Communist world. Marxism in the West has
fragmented into a hundred argumentative schools. And most
of these schools are profoundly critical of the Soviet Union
and of Communist practice. Marxism is certainly a vigorous
intellectual influence in the West and in the Third World-an
influence at work in many universities, journals, and works of
scholarship. But whatever this Marxism may be-and it is
becoming difficult to say what it is-it has nothing whatsoever
to do with Soviet expansionism.
Look where we will, the evidence is at odds with the Cold
War fictions. Poland is only one of several East European
nations which are now deeply indebted to Western banks.
What are we to make of a 'people's democracy' in hock to
the capitalists? The Soviet Union depends for grain upon the
prairies of the Mid-West of America, and the farmers of the
Mid-West depend, in turn, upon these annual sales. West
Germany has recently completed an agreement which will
bring natural gas from Siberia, to the extent of close on
lO% of the country's energy needs. The French government
is at present negotiating a similar agreement for natural gas
which 'would make France depend on Soviet gas for 26% of
its requirements in 1990.' (Times, 11 November 1981).
Long-standing trade agreements traverse both blocs and
there is even that phenomenon, which one observer has
described as 'vodka-cola', by which Western multinationals
have invested in Soviet and East European enterprises, taking
advantage of the low labour costs and the absence of
industrial conflict in the Communist world. Even the Soviet
ICBMs may incorporate components of United States design
12
or manufacture. Of course the American military reserve
the top-flight computers and technology for their own use. I
do not know whether the' American public should draw
comfort from the fact that the ICBMs directed at them may
be guided by second-rate components of their own design.
I am not saying that the social and political systems of
East and West are identical or even comparable. I am saying
that the first Cold War premise-of irreconcilable adversary
posture between the blocs across the whole board-has
become a fiction. And in the course of last year, events in
Poland have made the old fiction look even odder. We now
have a Polish pope. We also have a huge, nationalist and
Catholic, but also socialist, Polish trade union movement,
Solidarity, a great deal more insurgent, and more far-reaching
in its demands, than any union movement in the West. To
be sure, the Russians do not like this at all. But they have
not, as yet, been able to stop it, and the longer it succeeds
the more its example is likely to prove contagious. Once
again, if we assume that the aim of Soviet Communism is to
overrun all Europe, then it is not doing very well. It can't
even hold what it has.
If we turn the picture around, and look at the West, we
discover other contradictions. At the moment of the Cold
War's origin-when the permafrost set in-the United States
had emerged from the second world war, alone of all the
advanced economies, with a huge unimpaired productive
capacity. The 'American Century' was, exactly, then:
economic and military strength were overwhelming, and
diplomatic and cultural influence ensued. NATO, perforce,
was an alliance expressive of United States hegemony, and,
in its military structure, under direct American command.
But the American Century was not to last for a hundred
years. In past decades the American economy has entered
into a long secular decline in relation to its competitors:
Japan, the EEC powers (notably West Germany and France).
The cultural influence and the diplomatic authority of the
United States has entered a similar decline. And United States
conventional military forces also suffered a catastrophic
defeat in Vietnam. Only the overwhelming nuclear strength
has been maintained-has grown year after year-has been
13
protracted beyond the moment of its ongm. United States
militarism seeks to extend forward indefinitely-to cast its
shadow across Europe-a supremacy of economic and political
force which existed thirty years ago but which has long
ceased to exist. In one sense the present crisis in Western
Europe can be read in this way. The United States is seeking
to use the muscle of its nuclear weaponry to compensate
for its loss of real influence.
This crisis has been reflected first, and most sharply,
within Western European Social-Democratic and Labour
movements. When the Cold War first struck, there was a
fierce contest within these movements. This was (I must
simplify) seen as a contest between pro-American and pro
Communist tendencies. A small and honourable tendency
argued for a 'third way' or 'third force' between both tenden
cies: it lost all influence when the Two Camps finally took up
their adversary stance.
As a general rule, the pro-American, or Atlanticist
tendency won, and the pro-Communist tendency was
expelled or reduced to a grumbling opposition. But victorious
Atlanticism placed Social-Democracy in an odd position. It
entailed the submission of Social-Democratic and of Labour
parties to the hegemony of the most vigorous capitalist
power in the world in military, diplomatic, and even in some
economic, political and cultural affairs. This did not extinguish
the humanitarian impulse in the programmes of those parties.
So long as the economies continued to grow, it was possible,
despite this overarching hegemony, to re-distribute some
wealth within the native economy, and to assert some
priorities in the fields of welfare, health or education. It was
possible to keep electorates-and party activists-satisfied.
This is no longer possible. The reasons are self-evident.
Some are directly economic: recession no longer affords space
for humanitarian programmes, while it also stimulates direct
competition between United States and EEC economies.
Others are ideological: there has been a resurgence of the
uninhibited reproductive drives of capital, from its United
States strongholds, taking directly imperialist fonns in its
pursuit of oil, uranium, scarce resources, and markets in the
Second and Third Worlds, and propping up client military
14
tyrannies. These reasons alone might have brought
Atlanticism to the point of .crisis. But the crisis, today, is
above all political and military.
It no longer makes any sense for American hegemony to
be extended over Western Europe through the institutions of
NATO when, in the intervening thirty-five since the
Cold War set in, the balance of real forces has tipped back
perceptibly towards this side of the Atlantic. It makes no
sense at all for decisions as to the siting of missiles-and as
to the ownership and operation of American missiles on
European soil-to be taken in the Pentagon, when these
decisions affect the very survival of Europe.
I have crossed the Atlantic a good many times in the past
15 years; and I can testify that, while the is
getting less, the Atlantic ocean is getting wider. The Umted
States has many virtues, and, among these, it is a more open,
less secretive, less stuffy society than our own. But its political
culture is now at an immense distance from that of Western
Europe. It is, for example, the only major advanced society
which has never had a political Labour movement, or Soclal
Democratic party, participating directly in national
ment. Its electorate is apathetic, and each successive
President, in the past four elections, has been returned by a
steadily declining proportion of the eligible electorate.
President Reagan came to power with the support of little
more than one-quarter of the possible total.
American political life in the past two decades has been
vulgarised (I am tempted to say brutalised) and domestica
ted: that is, increasingl subordinated to the demands of
domestic log-rolling. The average American citizen
nothing of European affairs in his local newspaper or on hiS
local TV channels. The present United States administration
is, in its preoccupation with domestic issues and
domestic public image, effectively isolationist in its mentality;
but it is an isolationism anned with nukes. Military muscle,
nuclear weapons, are seen as a substitute for, not a supple
ment to, diplomacy.
How is a European Atlanticist today to bring any influence
to bear upon such an administration? No Senators or
Congressmen for Europe sit in Washington. Nor can they
15
deliver any votes to the President, and ask for little services in
return. When President Reagan wanted to site the MX missile
on its giant tracks in Nevada and Utah he was forced to
back away because he was losing the support of hard-core
Republican electors. The Senator for the state of Nevada was
one of his own political inner-set. But Chance]]or Schmidt
and Mrs Thatcher (if she were ever to harbour an un-American
thought) are not part of his set. West Germany or Britain
may be in an uproar about cruise missiles, but they have no
voices in the Presidential electoral college.
It is this tension which is pulling Western European
political formations-and especially those of Social
Democracy-apart. Atlanticism has outlived the rationale of
its moment of formation: neither the socialist nor the Euro
pean liberal tradition can consort easily any more with an
overarching American hegemony, whose priorities are, ever
more nakedly, determined by the reproductive needs of
American capital. Some European socialist parties have
simply opted out. The Spanish Socialists are now campaign
ing to revoke the entry of Spain into NATO, and in Greece
the victorious socialist party, PASOK, is committed to expel
US nuclear bases. In other countries-West Germany, Britain
-the battle has been joined within the parties. It is the issue
of Atlanticism, and not the issues which the media favour
constitutional squabbles, the personality of Tony Benn
which has contributed most to the formation of the British
Social Democratic Party and the continuing conflicts within
the Parliamentary Labour Party. An inherited ideological
formation, an Atlanticist dogma, has come under challenge;
the challengers are not pro-Soviet although they are the
inheritors of the grumblers and the third wayers who lost out
at the Cold War's origins; they are looking for a new alter
native, but they cannot yet spell its name.
What, then, is the Cold War, as we enter the 1980s, about?
The answer to this question can give us no comfort at all. If
we look at the military scene, then nothing is receding. On
the contrary, .the military establishments of both super
powers continue to grow each year. The Cold War, in this
sense, has broken free from the occasions at its origin, and
16
has acquired an independent inertial thrust of its own. What
is the Cold war now about? It is about itself.
We face here, in the grimmest sense, the 'consequences of
consequences'. The Cold War may be seen as a show which
was put, by two rival entrepreneurs, upon the road in 1946
or 1947. The show has grown bigger and bigger; the entre
preneurs have lost control of it, as it has thrown up its own
managers, administrators, producers and a huge supporting
cast; these have a direct interest in its continuance, in its
enlargement. Whatever happens, the show must go on.
The Cold War has become a habit, an addiction. But it is a
habit supported by very powerful material interests in each
bloc: the military-industrial and research establishments of
both sides, the security services and intelligence operations,
and the political servants of these interests. These interests
command a large (and growing) allocation of the skills and
resources of each society; they influence the direction of
each society's economic and social development; and it is
in the interest of these interests to increase that allocation
and to influence this direction even more.
I don't mean to argue for an identity of process in the
United States and the Soviet Union, nor for a perfect
symmetry of forms. There are major divergencies, not only
in political forms and controls, but also as between the
steady expansionism of bureaucracy and the avarice of
private capital. I mean to stress, rather, the reciprocal and
inter-active character of the process. It is in the very nature
of this Cold War show that there must be two adversaries:
and each move by one must be matched by the other. This
is the inner dynamic of the Cold War which determines that
its military and security establishments are selfreproducing.
Their missiles summon forward our missiles which summon
forward their missiles in turn. NATO's hawks feed the hawks
of the Warsaw bloc.
For the ideology of the Cold War is self-reproducing also.
That is, the military and the security services and their
political servants need the Cold War. They have a direct
interest in its continuance.
This is not only because their own establishments and
their own careers depend upon this. It is not only because
17
ruling groups can only justify their own privileges and their
allocation of huge resources to 'defence' in the name of Cold
War emergencies. And it is not only because the superpowers
both need repeated Cold War alarms to keep their client states
in NATO or the Warsaw Pact, in line. All these
have force. But, at an even deeper level, there is a further
explanation-which I will describe by the ugly word 'psycho
ideological' -which must occasion the grimmest pessimism.
The threat of an enemy-even recourse to war-has always
afforded to uneasy rulers a means of internal ideological regula
tIon and social discipline. This was a familiar notion to
Shakespeare. The dying Henry IVth, knowing that the
succession was beset with enemies, advised his son-
Therefore, my Harry,
Be it thy course to busy giddy minds
With foreign quarrels...
This advice led Henry Vth to Agincourt.
The fear or threat of the Other is grounded upon a pro
found and universal human need. It is intrinsic to human bond
ing. We cannot define whom 'we' are without also defining
'them'-those who are not 'us'. 'They' need not be perceived
as threatening: they may be seen only as different from 'us'
from our family, our community, our nation: 'they' are others
who do not 'belong'. But if 'they' are seen as threatening to
us, then our own internal bonding will be all the stronger.
This bonding-by-exclusion is intrinsic to human socialisa
tion. 'Love and Hate', William Blake wrote, 'are necessary to
Human existence.' This will not go away because we do not
think it nice. It is present in every strong human association:
the family, the church or political party, in class formation
and class consciousness. Moreover, this bonding-by-exdusion
establishes not only the identity of a group, but some part of
the self-identity of the individuals within it. We belong to a
family, we are citizens of Worcester, we are middle-class or
working-class, we are members of a party, we are British: and
some of this is internalised, it is our own identity.
Throughout history, as bonding has gone on and as
identities have changed, the Other has been necessary to this
18
process. Rome required barbarians, Christendom required
pagans, Protestant and Cathplic Europe required each other.
The nation state bonded itself against other nations. Patriot
ism is love of one's own country; but it is also hatred or fear
or suspicion of others.
This is not, in itself, a pessimistic finding, since we have
developed very strong regulatory or counter-vailing influences
to inhibit the aggressive constituent in bonding. We have
'civilised' ourselves, sometimes with success. In the early 19th
century, a stranger or 'outcomling' walking through
Lancashire might be hooted or pelted with stones. Or if a lad
were to court a girl in the next village, in the West Riding, he
might expect to be beaten up or driven out by the local
youths. We do better today. We sublimate these aggressions
In pop concerts or in football crowds. New racial conflicts in
our society are alarming, but we do not despair of over
coming these ugly tensions also. We can even co-exist, except
in disputed fishing-grounds or in academic philosophy, with
the French.
Yet let us not take comfort too easily. War has been a
constant recourse throughout history. It is an event as
common in the human record as are nettles in the hedgerows.
Despite all our 'civilisation' this century has seen already the
two bloodiest wars in history, both engendered in the
continent which prides itself most upon its civilised forms.
Let us return to today's Cold War. I have argued that the
condition of the Cold War has broken free from the 'causes'
at its origin: and that ruling interests on both sides have
become ideologically addicted, they need its continuance.
The Western hemisphere has been divided into two parts,
each of which sees itself as threatened by the Other; yet at
the same time this continuing threat has become necessary
to provide internal bonding and social discipline within each
part.
Moreover, this threat of the Other has been internalised
within both Soviet and American culture, so that the very
self-identity of many American and Soviet citizens is bound
up with the ideological premises of the Cold War.
There are historical reasons for this, which have less to do
with the actualities of communist or capitalist societies than
19
we may Suppose. Americans, for a century or so, have had a
growing problem of national identity. America has a popula
tion, dispersed across half a continent, gathered in from the
four corners of the globe. Layer upon layer of immigrants have
come in, and new layers are being laid down today:
Vietnamese and Thailanders, Cubans and' undocumented
Hispanic workers. Internal bonding tends to fall, not upon
horizontal nationwide lines-the bonding of social class
remains weak-but in vertical, fissiparous ways: local,
regional, or ethnic bonding-the blacks, the Hispanics, the
Poles, the Irish, the Jewish lobby. The resounding, media
propagated myth of United States society is that of an open
market society, an upwardly-mobile free-for-all: its objective
not any communal goal but equality of ego-fulfilment for
everyone.
But where, in all these centrifugal and individualistic
forces, is any national bonding and sense of American self
identity to be found? American poets and novelists have
suggested better answers-America (they have suggested)
might be the most internationalist nation in the world-but
the answer which has satisfied America's present rulers is,
precisely, in the Cold War. The United States is the leader
of 'the Free World', and the Commies are the Other. They
need this Other to establish their own identity, not as blacks
or Poles or Irish, but as free Americans. Only this pre-existent
need, for bonding-by-exclusion, can explain the ease by
which one populist rascal after another has been able to float
to power-and even to the White House-on nothing but a
flood of sensational Cold War propaganda. And anti
Communism can be turned to other internal uses as well. It
can serve to knock trade unions on the head, or to keep
dissident radical voices or peace movements ('soft on
Communism') on the margins of political life.
But what about the Soviet Union? Is there a similar need to
bond against the Other within Soviet culture? I can speak with
less confidence here. But there are indications that this is so.
. Th.e Soviet Union is not 'Russia' but a ramshackle empire
mhented from Tsarist times. It also has its own fissiparous
tendencies, from Mongolia to the Baltic states. It has no need
to invent an Other, in some fit of paranoia. It has been struck
20 '
within active memory, by another, to the gates of Moscow,
with a loss of some 20 million dead. One would
that Soviet rulers, while having good reason for. a defensIve
mentality, would need the Cold War like a hole m the head.
They would want it to go away. And, maybe, some of
them do. . f . .
Yet the Cold War, as ideology, has a bondmg unctIOn m
the Soviet Union also. This huge collocation of peoples feels
itself to be surrounded-it is surrounded-from to
the Arctic ice-cap to its Western frontiers. The bondmg, the
self-identity, of Soviet citizens comes from .the notIOn
they are the heartland of the world's first
threatened by the Other-Western m alhance
with 1,000 million Chinese. The pOSItIve of thIS
rhetoric-the Marxist-Leninist, revolutIonary bIt-may
have worn exceedingly thin; but the negative part remams
compelling. The one function of the Soviet rulers
commands consensual assent througlrout the populatIon IS
their self-proclaimed role as defenders of the Fatherland
and defenders of peace. .
There is nothing sinister about that. But. the. bondmg
function of Cold War ideology in the Soviet Umon IS dIrectly
disciplinary. The threat of the Other legitimat,:s,
measure of policing or intellectual control. In Stahn s tIme
this took the fonn of indiscriminate terror
revolutionaries'. The measures of terror or of dISCIpline
now been greatly modified. This and thIS IS
hopeful. But the function of thIS dIScIphnary Ideology
remains the same.
What it does is to transfonn every social or intellectual
conflict within the Soviet Union into a problem affectmg the
security of the state. Every critic of Soviet every
'dissident', is defined as an ally of the Other: as un
patriotic, and perhaps as an agent of.the West. Every Impulse
towards democracy or autonomy m Eastern Europe-the
Prague Spring of 1968, the Polish renewal-is defined a
security threat to the Soviet frontiers and to the defenSIve
unity of the Warsaw powers. ..,. ,
Like the populist American denUnCIatIOn of CommIes,
the Soviet denunciation of 'Western' penetration can be
21

turned to every purpose imaginable in the attempt to impose
internal discipline:-but with the important difference that in
the Soviet Union the attacks of the media and of political
leaders are supplemented by more powerful and more
intrusive security forces. Even juvenile delinquency, or the
new wave of consumerism in the Soviet white-collar and
professional groups can be denounced as Western attempts to
'subvert' Soviet society. And General Semyon Tsvigun, first
deputy chairman of the KGB, writing recently in Kommunist.
has instanced the 'negative influence' of Western styles and
pop music upon Soviet young people as examples of the
'subversive' activities of the external 'class enemy'.
This is the double-bind which the Soviet people cannot
break through. It is weary but it works. And it works
because the Cold Warriors of the West are eager to be in the
same card-game, and to lead into the strong suits of their
partners, the Cold Warriors of the East. The Western Warriors,
by championing the cause of 'human rights', in the same
moment define the dissidents of the East as allies of the West
and as security risks. It is a hypocritical championship on
several counts, but we will leave this aside. It is utterly
counter-productive, and perhaps it is intended to be so. It
does no-one, except the Cold Warriors of the other side
any good. '
The boycott of the Moscow Olympics is a case in point.
Initially this may have been welcomed by some dissident
intellectuals in Eastern Europe and among some Soviet Jews.
It was to do them no good. A Russian friend tells me that, as
an operation promoting liberty, it was a disaster. The boycott
bonded the Soviet people against the Other. In a state of
siege and isolation for half-a-century, the Olympics offered to
open international doors and to give them, for the first time,
the role of host on the world stage. They were aggrieved
by the boycott, not as Communists, but in their latent
patriotism. They had allocated resources to the Olympics,
they had rehearsed their dancers and their choirs. They were
curious to meet the world's athletes and visitors. Critics of
the Olympics were felt to be disloyal, not only by the
security services, but also by theirworkmates and neighbours.
The boycott hence made possible the greatest crack-down
22
upon all critical centres of opinion in the Soviet in a
decade. It was a gift, from the CIA to the KGB. Lord KJilanan
and the British Olympic team, who ignored President Carter
and Mrs Thatcher, did the right thing, not only in support of
the Olympic tradition but also in support of the cause of
peace. But 'dissent' in the Soviet Union has not yet recovered
from the Western Cold Warriors' kind attentions.
It can be seen now, also, why the most conservative
elements in the Soviet leadership-the direct inheritors of
Stalin-need the Cold War. This is not only because some part
of this leadership has arisen from, or spent some years in the
service of the bureaucratic-military-security complex itself.
And it is' not only because the very heavy allocations to
defence running to perhaps 15% of the gross national pro
duct be justified in the eyes of the deprived public. It
is because these leaders are beset on every side by
difficulties by pressures to modernise, to reform or to
Yet these pressures threaten their own position
and privileges-once commenced, they might pass bo:yond
control. The Polish renewal will have been watched, m the
Soviet Union and in other Eastern European states, as an
awful example of such a process-a process bringing in
stability and, with this, a threat to the security of the
Communist world.
Hence Cold War ideology-the threat of the Other-is the
strongest card left in the hand of the Soviet rulers. It is
necessary for bonding. And the card is not a fake. For the
Other-that is, the Cold Warriors of the West-is continually
playing the same card back, whether in missiles or in arms
agreements with China or in the suit of human nghts.
We could not have led up to a more pessimistic conclusion.
I have argued that the Cold War is now about itself. It is
ongoing, self-reproducing condition, to which both adversanes
are addicted. The military establishments of the adversanes
are in a reciprocal relationship of mutual nurture: each
fosters the growth of the other. Both adversaries need to
maintain a hostile ideological posture, as a means of internal
bonding or discipline. This would be dangerous at any time;
but with today's nuclear weaponry it is an immensely danger
ous condition. For it contains a built-in logic which must
23
always tend to the worse: the military establishments will
grow, the adversary postures become more implacable and
more irrational.
That logic, if uncorrected, must prove terminal, and in the
next two or three decades. I will not speculate on what
accident or which contingency will bring us to that terminus.
I am pointing out the logic and thrust of things, the current
which is sweeping us towards Niagara Falls. As we go over
those Falls we may comfort ourselves that it was really
no-one's fault: that human culture has always contained
within itself a malfunction, a principle of bonding-by
exclusion which must (with our present technologies of
death) lead to auto-destruct. We might have guessed as much
by looking at the nettles in history's hedges.
All this perhaps will happen. I think it at least probable that
it will. We cannot expect to have the good fortune of having
our planet invaded, in the 1990s, by some monsters from
outer space, who would at last bond all humanity against an
outer Other. And short of some science-fiction rescue opera
tion like that, all proposals look like wish-fulfilment.
Yet I would ask you to cast your minds back to the
considerations in the earlier part of this lecture. I have
offered you a contradiction. I argued, at first, that a whole
era of Cold War might be drawing to an end. Today's military
confrontation is protracted long after the historical occasion
for it has come to an end. And my argument here is close to a
recent editorial comment in the London Times (2 October
1981 ):
The huge accumulations of weaponry which the two brandish at
each other are wholly out of proportion to any genuine conflict
of interests. There is no serious competition for essential resources,
or for territory that is truly vital to the security of either, and the
ideological fires have dwindled on both sides. In strictly objective
terms a reasonable degree of accommodation should be easily
attainable.
But I argued, subsequently, that the Cold War, as adversary
military establishments and adversary ideological posture,
was an on-going, self-reproducing road-show, which had
become necessary to ruling groups on both sides. Can we
find, within that contradiction, any resolution short of war?
Perhaps we can. But the resolution will not be easy. A
general revolt of reason and conscience against the instru
ments which immediately threaten us-a lived perception,
informing multitudes, of the human ecological imperative:
this is a necessary part of the answer. Such a revolt, such a
shift in perception, is already growing across Europe. But
this cannot be the whole answer. For if the Cold War has
acquired a self-generating dynamic, then, as soon as public
concern is quietened by a few measures of arms control, new
dangers and new weapons will appear. We must do more
than protest if we are to survive. We must go behind the
missiles to the Cold War itself. We must begin to put Europe
back into one piece.
And how could that be done? Very certainly it can not
be done by the victory of one side over the other. That
would mean war. We must retrace our steps to that moment,
in 1944, before glaciation set in, and look once again for a
third way.
If I had said this two years ago I would have despaired of
holding your attention. But something remarkable is stirring
in this continent today; movements which commenced in
fear and which are now taking on the shape of hope; move
ments which cannot yet, with clarity, name their own
demands. For the first time since the wartime Resistance
there is a spirit abroad in Europe which carries a trans
continental aspiration. The Other which menaces us is being
redefined-not as other nations, nor even as the other bloc,
but as the forces leading both blocs to auto-destruction-not
'Russia' nor 'America' but their military, ideological and
security establishments and their ritual oppositions.
And at the same time, as this Other is excluded, so a new
kind of internal bonding is taking place. This takes the form
of a growing commitment, by many thousands, to the
imperative of survival and against the ideological or security
imperatives of either bloc or their nation-states. In the words
of the Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament of April
1980:
24
25
r
We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe
already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West',
but to each other.
This is a large and improbable expectation. It has often
been proclaimed in the past, and it has been as often dis
appointed. Yet what is improbable has already, in the past
year, begun to happen. The military structures are under
challenge. But something is happening of far greater signifi
cance. The ideological structures are under challenge also,
and from both sides.
I said, at the beginning, that the Cold War had placed the
political culture of Europe in a permanent double-bind: the
cause of 'peace and the cause of 'freedom' fell apart. What
is now happening is that these two causes are returning to
one cause-peace and freedom-and as this happens, so, by a
hundred different channels, the transcontinental discourse of
political culture can be resumed.
The peace movements which have developed with such
astonishing rapidity in Northern, Western and Southern
Europe-and which are now finding an echo in the East-are
one part of this cause. They have arisen in response not only
to a military and strategic situation but to a political situa
tion also. What has aroused Europeans most is the spectacle
of two superpowers, arguing above their heads about the
deployment of weapons whose target would be the 'theatre'
of Europe. These movements speak with new accents. They
are, in most cases, neither pro-Soviet nor manipulated by the
Communist-influenced World Peace Council. Their objective
is to clear nuclear weapons and bases out of the whole
continent, East and West, and then to roll back conventional
forces. Nor is it correct to describe them as 'neutralist' or
'pacifist'. They are looking for a third way. A third way is an
active way: it is not 'neutral' between the other ways, it goes
somewhere else.
The Western peace movements, in majority opinion, bring
together traditions-socialist, trade unionist, liberal, Christian,
ecological-which have always been committed to civil rights.
They extend their support to the Polish renewal and to
Solidarity, and to movements of libertarian dissent in the
26
Warsaw bloc. And from Eastern Europe also, voice after
voice is now reaching us-hesitant, cautious, but with growing
confidence-searching for the same alliance: peace and
freedom.
These voices signal that the whole thirty-five-year-old era
of the Cold War could be coming to an end: the Ice Age
could give way to turbulent torrents running from East to
West and from West to East. And within the demands of the
peace movements and also in movements of lower profile
but of equal potential in Eastern Europe there is maturing a
further-and a convergent-demand: to shake off the hege
mony of the superpowers and to reclaim autonomy.
This demand was glimpsed by Dr Albert Schweitzer in a
notable broadcast appeal from Oslo in April, 1958:
Today America with her batteries of nuclear rockets in Europe is
present with mighty military power in Europe. Europe has become
an in-between land between America and Russia, as if America by
some displacement of a continent had come closer to her. But if
atomic rockets were no longer in question, this unnatural state of
affairs would come to an end. America would again become wholly
America; Europe wholly Europe; the Atlantic again wholly the
Atlantic Ocean-'-a sea providing distance in thne and space.
In this way could come the beginning of the end of America's
military presence in Europe, a presence arising from the two world
wars. The great sacrifices that America made for Europe during the
second world war, and in the years following it, will not be for
gotten; the great and varied help that Europe received from her, and
the thanks owing for this, will not be forgotten. But the unnatural
situation created by the two world wars that led to a dominating
military presence in Europe cannot continue indefinitely. It must
gradually cease to exist, both for the sake of Europe and for the
sake of America.
Now there will be shocked voices from all sides. What will become
of poor Europe if American atomic weapons no longer defend it
from within and from without? What will happen if Europe is
delivered to the Soviet? Must it then not be prepared to languish in a
communist babylonian form of imprisonment for long years?
Here it should be said that perhaps the Soviet Union is not quite
so malicious as to think only of throwing itself on Europe at the
first opportunity in order to devour it, and perhaps not quite so un
intelligent as to fail to consider whether there would be any
27

advantage in upsetting her stomach with this indigestible meal.
What Europe and the Europeans have to agree is that they belong
together for better or for worse. This is a new historical fact that
can no longer be by-passed politically.
Albert Schweitzer argued this, twenty-three years ago,
from the perspective of a West European. In the long interval
that has now passed it is possible to make this same argu
ment from an Eastern European perspective also. We no
longer speculate upon the old ambition of John Foster
Dulles-the 'West' liberating the 'East'. Eastern Europe has
commenced its own self-liberation. In cautious ways
Romania, Hungary and East Germany have established small
areas of autonomy, of foreign policy, economy or culture,
while the Polish renewal signals a social transition so swift
and far-reaching that speculation upon its outcome is futile.
In Czechoslovakia, where social renewal was ruthlessly
reversed in 1968, the hegemony of Soviet military power
remains decisive. But here also courageous voices of dissent
are beginning to consider a strategy in which the cause of
freedom and the cause of peace can draw strength from each
other as allies.
On November 16th, 1981, there was issued in Prague a
statement by three spokespersons of Charter 77, the
courageous organisation defending Czechoslovak human
rights: Vaclav Maly, Dr Bedrich Placlik, and Dr Jiri Hajek.
This stresses the mutual interdependence of the causes of
peace and of liberty. The Helsinki accord on human rights is
an 'integral and equal component' of the cause of peace, since
without respect for these rights 'it is impossible to speak of
an attitude to peace worthy of the name'. Yet (the statement
continues) 'it is difficult to regard as genuine champions of
these rights and freedoms those who are stepping up the arms
race and bringing closer the danger of war.' 'Our continent
faces the threat of being turned into a nuclear battlefield,
into the burial-ground of its nations and its civilisation which
gave birth to the very concept of human rights.' And it
concludes by expressing the solidarity of Charter 77 with all
those in the peace movement who are also upholding the
rights endorsed by the Helsinki accord:
28
'It is our wish that they should continue their struggle for peace in
its indivisibility, which not only applies to different geographic
regions but also covers the various dimensions of human life. We do
not have the opportunities which they have to express as loudly our
common conviction that peace and freedom are indivisible.'
The question before Europeans today is not how many
NATO forward-based systems might equal how many Soviet
SS-20s. Beneath these equations there is a larger question: in
what circumstances might both superpowers loosen the
military grip which settled upon Europe in 1945 and which
has been protracted long beyond its historical occasion? And
how might such a retreat of hegemonies and loosening of
blocs take place without endangering peace? Such an out
come would be profoundly in the interest, not only of the
people of Europe, but of the peoples of the Soviet Union and
the United States also-in relaxing tension and in relieving
them of some of the burdens and dangers of their opposed
military establishments. But what-unless it were to be our
old enemy 'deterrence' -could monitor such a transition so
that neither one nor the other party turned it to advantage?
We are not, it should be said, describing some novel stage
in the process known as 'detente'. For in the early nineteen
seventies 'detente' signified the cautious tuning-down of
hostilities between states or blocs, but within the Cold War
status quo. Detente (or 'peaceful co-existence') was licensed
by the superpowers: it did not arise from the client states, still
less from popular movements. The framework of East-West
settlement was held rigid by 'deterrence': in the high noon of
Kissinger's diplomacy detente was a horse-trade between the
leaders of the blocs, in which any unseemly movement out of
the framework was to be discouraged as 'de-stabilising'.
Czechs or Italians were required to remain quiet in their client
places, lest any rash movement should disturb the tetchy
equilibrium of the superpowers.
But what we can glimpse now is something different: a
detente of peoples rather than states-a movement of peoples
which sometimes dislodges states from their blocs and brings
them into a new diplomacy of conciliation, which sometimes
runs beneath state structures, and which sometimes defies
29
the ideological and security structures of particular states.
TItis will be a more fluid, unregulated, unpredictable move
ment. It may entail risk.
The risk must be taken. For the Cold War can be brought
to an end in only two ways: by the destruction of European
civilisation, or by the reunification of European political
culture. The first will take place if the ruling groups in the
rival superpowers, sensing that the ground is shifting beneath
them and that their client states are becoming detached,
succeed in compensating for their waning political and
economic authority by more and more frenzied measures of
militarisation. This is, exactly, what is happening now. The
outcome will be terminal.
But we can now see a small opening towards the other
alternative. And if we thought this alternative to be possible,
then we should-every one of us-re-order all our priorities.
We would invest nothing more in missiles, everything in all
the skills of communication and exchange.
When I first offered a synopsis of this lecture to the BBC, I
promised 'some practical proposals and even a programme, as
to how this could be done'. But I realise now that, even if
time permitted, such a programme would be over-ambitious.
This cannot be written hy anyone citizen, in Worcester. It
must be written by many hands-in Warsaw and in Athens,
in Berlin and in Prague. AIl I can do how is indicate, briefly,
programmes which are already in the making.
One such programme is that of limited nuclear-free zones.
I have the honour to speak now in the Guildhall of the
nuclear-free city of Worcester. I need not say here, Mr Mayor,
that this is not just a gesture of self-preservation. It is a signal
also, of international conciliation, and a signal which we
hope will be reciprocated. Such signals are now arising across
our continent. A Nordic nuclear-free zone is now under
active consideration. And in the South-East of Europe, the
incoming Greek government is pledged to initiate discussions
with Bulgaria and Romania (in the Warsaw Pact) and with
non-aligned Yugoslavia, for a further nuclear-free zone.
Such zones have political significance. Both states and local
authorities can enlarge the notion to take in exchanges
30
between citizens, for direct uncensored discourse. In Central
Europe a zone of this kind might go further to take in
measures of conventional disarmament also, and the with
drawal of both Soviet and NATO forces from both Germanys.
This proposal is now being actively canvassed in East Germany
as well as W e s t ~ t h e East German civil rights supporter,
Dr Robert Havemann has raised the question directly in an
open letter to Mr Brezhnev-and is now being discussed, in
unofficial circles, in Poland and Czechoslovakia as well.
The objectives of such larger zones are clear: to make a
space of lessened tension between the two blocs: to destroy
the menacing symbolic affront of nuclear weapons: to bring
nations both East and West within reciprocal agreements:
and to loosen the bonds of the bloc system, allowing more
autonomy, more initiative to the smaller states.
But at the same time there must be other initiatives,
through a hundred different channels, by which citizens
enlarge this discourse. It is absurd to expect the weapons
systems of both sides to de-weaponise themselves, the
security systems of both sides to fall into each other's arms.
It is, precisely, at the top of the Cold War systems that
deadlock, or worse, takes place. If we are to destructure the
Cold War, then we must destabilise these systems from
below.
I am talking of a new kind of politics which cannot (with
however much goodwill) be conducted by politicians. It
must be a politics of peace, informed by a new internationalist
code of honour, conducted by citizens. And it is now being
so conducted by the international medical profession, by
churches, by writers and by many others.
Music can be a 'politics' of this kind. I will take an
example from this city. We had the honour here, at the last
Three Choirs Festival, to hear the first British performance of
Sallinen's Dies Irae. This work is a setting of a poem about
the threat to our planet from nuclear weapons by the Finnish
poet, Arvo Turtianen, commissioned by the Ensemble of the
Hungarian People's Army-l don't much like armies but I
can't object to a military Ensemble which commissions a
work on peace-first performed in Budapest, and then per
formed in our own city.
31
If this is a small, but beautiful, sound of reconciliation,
then other sounds are large and loud. For across our continent
the world of popular music is now making its own sounds of
peace and freedom. There is, today, some generational
cultural mutation taking place among the young people of
Europe. The demonstrations for peace-Bonn, London,
Madrid, Rome, Amsterdam-have been thronged with the
young. The young are bored with the Cold War. There is a
shift at a level below politics-expressed in style, in sound,
in symbol, in dress-which could be more significant than
any negotiations taking place in Geneva. The PA systems of
these popular music bands are already capable of making
transcontinental sounds. The bands may not be expert arms
negotiators; but they might blast the youth of Europe into
each others' arms.
It has been proposed that there might be a festival-it
might be called 'Theatre of Peace' -somewhere in Central
Europe in the summer of 1983. Young people (although
their elders would not be excluded) would be called to
assemble from every part of the continent, bringing with
them their music, their living theatre, their art, their posters
their symbols and gifts. There would be rallies, workshops:
and informal discussions. Every effort would be made to
invite youth from 'the other side', not in pre-selected official
parties but as individual visitors and strays. For 1982 the
project may be too ambitious: but as a 'primer' for this plans
are now afoot for a popular music festival on an island in the
Danube close to Vienna early in August 1982. Already the
first responses to the plan are such that the problem is one of
keeping the numbers within the limits requested by hospitable
Austrian authorities.
I return, in my conclusion, to the most sensitive and the
most significant, issue of all. How do we put the 'causes of
freedom and of peace back together?
This cannot be done by provocative interventions in the
affairs of other nations. And it certainly cannot be done by
the old strategy of Cold War 'linkage'. If we look forward to
democratic renewal on the other side of our common world
then this strategy is plainly counter-productive. No-one will
32
ever obtain civil or trade union rights in the East because the
West is pressing missiles against their borders. On the
contrary, this only enhances the security operations and the
security-minded ideology of their rulers. peoples. of the
East, as of the West, will obtain their own nghts and liberties
for themselves and in their own way-as the Portuguese,
Spanish, Greek and Polish people have shown us. What is
needed, from and for all of us, is a space free of Cold War
crisis in which we can move. ." ,
There might, however, be a very kmd of cItizen s
linkage in which, as part of the people's detente: the move
ment for peace ,in the West and for freed.om m the
recognised each other as natural allies. For thiS to be pOSSible,
we in the West must move first. As the military pressure upon
the East begins to relax, so the old double-bind would
to lose its force. And the Western peace movement (which
can scarcely be cast convincingly by Soviet as an
'agent of Western imperialism') should press steadily upon
the state structures of the East demands for greater openness
of exchange, both of persons and of ideas. . .
A transcontinental discourse must begm to flow, m both
directions with the peace movement-a movement of un
official p:rsons with a code of conduct which disallows the
pursuit of political advantage for either --:as the condUit.
We cannot be content to criticise nuclear missiles. We have to
be, in every moment, critics also of the adversary posture of
the powers. For we are threatened, not only by. weapons, but
by the ideological and security structures which divide our
continent and which tum us into adversaries. So that the
concession which the peace movement asks of the Soviet
state is-not so much these SS-20s and those Backfire
bombers-but its assistance in commencing to tear these
structures down. And in good time one might look forward
to a further change; in the Soviet Union itself, as the long
outworn ideology and structures inherited from Stalin's time
gave way before internal pressures for a Soviet renewal.
It is optimistic to suppose so. Yet this is the only way in
which the Cold War could be brought to an end. I have also
conceded that an end of glaciation-with new and turbulent
torrents across the East-West divide-will entail new risks. We
33
have observed this for a year as the Polish crisis has unfolded.
To those who have been habituated to Cold War stasis this
looks like dangerous 'instability'.
Yet I will argue, against these critics, that in such an
emergency the peace movement itself may prove to be the
strongest force making for stability. Only a non-aligned peace
could moderate this great social transition, enabling
our polItIcal cultures to grow back together, and restraining
both NATO and Warsaw power rulers from intervening to
check the change or from seeking to gain advantage from the
discomforture of the other side. The peace movement must
say- and has already been saying-'Let Poland be Polish and
let Greece be Greek!'
We may be living now, and in the next few years, in the
very eye of crisis. The Cold War road-show, which each year
enlarges, is now lurching towards its tenninus. But in this
moment changes have arisen in our continent, of scarcely
more than one year's growth, which signify a challenge to the
Cold War itself. These are not 'political' changes, in the usual
sense. They cut through the flesh of politics down to the
human bone.
Dr Nicholas Humphrey, in his remarkable Bronowski
lecture, warned us of one possible outcome. I have been
proposing another. What I have proposed is improbable. But
if !t. commenced, it might gather pace with
rapidity. There would not be decades of detente as the
glaciers slowly melt. There would be very rapid un
predictable changes; nations would become unglued from
their alliances; there would be sharp conflicts within nations;
there would be successive risks. We could roll up the map of
the Cold War, and travel without maps for a while.
[ do not mean that Russia would become a Western demo
cracy, nor that the West would go Communist. Immense
differences in social system would remain. Nations, unglued
from their alliances, might-as Poland and Greece are now
showing us-fall back more strongly into their own inherited
national traditions. I mean only that the flow of political and
intellectual discourse, and of human exchange, would resume
across the whole continent. The blocs would discover that
they had forgotten what their adversary posture was about.
34
Where Dr Humphrey and I are united is in our conviction
that we do not live in ordinary times. To work to bring the
Cold War to an end is not one among three dozen things
which we must remember to do. It must be, for tens of
thousands of us in Europe in this decade, the first thing we
must do; and it must infonn everything we do.
Our species has been favoured on this planet, although we
have not always been good caretakers of our globe's resources.
Our stay here, in the spaces of geological time, has been brief.
No-one can tell us our business. But I think it is something
more than to consume as much as we can and then blow the
place up.
We have, if not a duty, then a need, deeply engraved
within our culture, to pass the place on no worse than we
found it. Those of us who do not expect an after-life may
see in this our only immortality: to pass on the succession of
life, the succession of culture. It may even be that we are
happier when we are engaged in matters larger than our own
wants and ourselves.
We did not choose to live in this time. But there is no way
of getting out of it. And it has given to us as significant a
cause as has ever been known, a moment of opportunity
which might never be renewed. If these weapons and then
those weapons are added to the huge sum on our continent
if Poland drifts into civil war and if this calls down Soviet
military intervention-if the United States launches some
military adventure in the Middle East-can we be certain that
this moment will ever come back? I do not think so. If my
analysis is right, then the inertial thrust of the Cold War,
from its fonnidable military and ideological bases, will have
passed the point of no return.
The opportunity is now. when there is already an en
hanced consciousness of danger infonning millions. We can
match this crisis only by a summoning of resources to a
height like that of the greatest religious or political move
ment's of Europe's past. I think, once again, of 1944 and of
the crest of the Resistance. There must be that kind of
spirit abroad in Europe once more. But this time it must
arise, not in the wake of war and repression, but before these
take place. Five minutes afterwards, and it will be too late.
35
Humankind must at last grow up. We must recognise that
the Other is ourselves.
36
E.P. Thompson, who has taken a leading part in t
resurgence of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
here questioning the fundamental condition of contemporarY
life, the Cold War and the adversary posture of the
His analysis of our current predicament will, we beHeve. h
the process both of preserving peace and of restoring freedom
to Europe. Edward Thompson brings to the ubJect a
historian's knowledge. a writer's skill and the commitment of
an activist in the Peace movement.
Beyond the Cold War is the text of what was origma
intended as the Dimbleby Lecture. Readers may now form
their own judgement on why the BBC decided to have no
Dimbleby Lecture in 1981.
Together we European
stop the bomb, Nuclear
Join eND! Disarmament
Send in your membership No cruise
subscription:- NoSS2Os
Adults 6 No Pershlngs
Students E3 A Nuclear Free Europe
Unwaged E2
End Bulletin 5 p.a. post free
Send cheque, cash or postal
order to Write for more information to
CND END
11 Goodwin Street 6 Endsleigh 51.
LondonN4 LondonWC1
'Magnificent pamphlet. The trouble with E.P. Thompson is
that he actually makes us all start to think. That isa disturbing
experience' BRUCE KENT
'One of the few genuinely engaged intellectuals that we have.
Passionate, illuminating, elequent and provoking precisely
what a Dimbleby Lectureought to be' JONATHA DIMBLEBY
The jacket was designed by Louis Mackay
The photo on the front cover (by courtesy ofthe Associated Press) haws Ihe
first meeting ofthe Russian and American soldiers on the Elbe April /945.
ISB 085036286 5
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First published by
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Ben Thompson 1982
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tel: 966256
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COMISO
Ben Thompson
THE PLACE
Comiso is a meJium sized town, of 27,000 inhabitants,
situated' near the Southern coast of Sicily facing towards
Africa. In August 1981 it was announced that Italy's share
of the 464 cruise missiles earmarked for Europe were to be
placed here, at the nearby derelict airport of Magliocco.
Sicily's exposed position deep in the mediterranean basin
has attracted the interest of military men since time
immemorial. Although nowadays we naturally think of
Sicily as a part of Italy, she has been occupied in her history
by Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Normans and Spaniards, finally
coming under the rule of Naples for about a century and a
half before being liberated by Garibaldi in 1860 during the
campaign which led to the unification of Italy. Archimedes
was buried there at Syracuse; and at Gela, about thirty
kilometres up the coast from Comiso is the tomb of the poet
Aeschylus who is reputed to have died when a short-sighted
eagle mistook his head for a rock and dropped a tortoise
on it. Sicily has its own language, quite distinct from Italian
and incomprehensible to Italians, which comprises bits of
French, Arabic, Spanish and Italian. The local dialects vary
so mUCh, however, that Sicilians from different regions
generally speak Italian to each other
ii
During the war years the fascist regime used special police
powers to suppress the mafia, but after the occupation the
Allies allowed it to flourish again, encouraging prominent
mafiosi to take positions of power in local government as a
baulk against the communist threat. These elements, fearful
I
that Rome might compromise their power, raised a separatist
anny and attempted to force a breach with Italy. Although
the attempt was unsuccessful, the predominance of the
mafia was re-established, to become a pennanent bane in the
life of post-war Sicily. The mafia now carry out over 100
murders a year on the island, most of them arising out of
internal feuds over the lucrative heroin trade. The killings go
mainly unpunished, largely because of the rule of 'omerta'
(underworld law of silence) which forbids recourse to the
rules of authority. Sicilian society in general is rigidly
structured and patriarchal, with great emphasis being placed
on home life and the family. Something of the traditional
attitude towards women in Sicily can be gathered from the
fact that until after 1960, when the custom was first
challenged in a court of law, it was regarded as quite honour
able for a young man to forcibly abduct the girl of his choice
and rape her, after which it was assumed that her only choice
would be to marry him.
iii
Comiso today
The present day town of Comiso is relatively prosperous by
Sicilian standards. Although the terrain is semi-tropical with
clumps of huge 'figodindia' cacti dotted around an almost
treeless landscape, the region is highly fertile. Vineyards
abound, and large areas of land are cultivated under poly
thene cloches, producing early season fruits for export all
over Europe. Although there is no heavy industry, a major
source of employment is provided by the marble and granite
sawmills, of which there are fifty-five. The products of these
mills, as well as the early fruits are transported on to the
continent by over 1,000 articulated lorries, mainly owned
by their drivers. Unemployment is minimal, and educational
facilities good. Politically, the town has a strong Communist
Party vote (43Ao).Yisitors coming into Comiso for the huge
demonstration on April 4th saw 'No ai missW' written on
the hillside behind the town in enonnous sheets of agri
cultural polythene.
2
THE BASE
Mussolini used many sites in Sicily which are now being re
developed as part of NATO's southern flank. He had an
ambitious scheme for using the island of Pantelleria to
control the whole Mediterranean; his propaganda efforts on
behalf of this island garrison were so successful that on June
II th 1943 the entire British I st Infantry Division were sent
on landing craft to invade the island, which promptly
surrendered claiming to have run out of drinking water. A
more effective outpost is now being prepared on Pantelleria
in the form of one of the most powerful and advanced radar
stations in the world, which will operate in support of the
US Sixth Fleet in anti-submarine warfare operations. The
airport at Comiso was also used by Mussolini, and the citizens
of Comiso experienced aerial bombardment as a result.
Magliocco airport was one of the first objectives of the US
Seventh Army in the July 10th invasions, and the walls of
the surviving airport buildings are said to bear still-visible
pock marks from the American machine guns.
Sicily took on an especial strategic significance for the
south flank of NATO with the expiry of Britain's military
agreements with Malta in March 1979. A serious flaw in
NATO's southern defences was discovered in July 1980,
when a Libyan spy plane crashed after having overflown
Sicily and Calabria without being detected. The new radar
station on Pantelleria, as well as others, on the island of
Lampedusa as well as mainland Sicily are designed to
strengthen the 'NADGE' (Nato Air Defence Ground Environ
ment) network and eliminate such 'holes' in NATO's radar
coverage in the south.
1
ii
The strategic position of Comiso at the southernmost tip of
Italy points to a special feature of this site which could have
great significance. Cruise missiles based here would penetrate
a good 800 miles further south than any other cruise planned
for deployment, to take in the whole of Morocco, Algeria,
Libya and Egypt. In comparison, missiles based in West
Gennany would hardly touch Libya and Egypt. This means
3
that the missiles in Comiso could be used either in a conflict
in Europe, or a conflict arising from one of the flashpoints
in the Middle East, a generous choice of two 'limited nuclear
wars'. After the Gulf of Sirte incident, when aircraft from the
US Sixth Fleet clashed with Lybian fighters dUring a dispute
over the extent of Lybian territorial waters, Italians were
awakened to the possible threat of involvement in a war
emanating from this quarter. A cartoon in 'La Repubblica'
showed a terrified Prime Minister Spadolini hiding behind
his desk:
'I'm in favour of cruise, it's an extra defence against the Sixth
Fleet.'
While Quedaffi's threats against the United States were
treated with some derision, the idea that he might have a
go at Magliocco didn't seem so far fetched.
iii
Magliocco
The site itself hardly looks like a promising location for a
'superbase' in 1983. The front of the base sports a fine iron
gate suspended between massive concrete pillars and guarded
by 'carabinieri', but the perimeter is bounded on three sides
only, the back being quite open and accessible. Until recently
farmers used to grow wheat on the airfield rather than let
it lie idle, and there are still vineyards running right up to
the unfenced rear of the base. Some demolition works have
been going on in the base since April '82, but there's little
sign of activity; one or two lorries trundling back and forth
in the heart of the massive wasteland looking like dinky
toys. As far as the local opposition have been able to discover
there are no contracts so far issued to builders for anything
resembling a cruise missile hangar, although large barracks
are planned, and, according to an article in the newspaper
'Paese Sera'2 there are plans for a hospital centre with
3,470 beds, for the exclusive use of US personnel. (Comiso
itself has 120 beds for 27,000 people!) If this is true it
could mean that Comiso has been surreptitiously lined up
to play some other role, not yet announced, perhaps as a
4
barracks for the Rapid Deployment Force. To confuse
matters still further, Francesco Rutelli of the Radical Party,
who has published one of the first comprehensive peace
research manuals to appear in Italy3 told me that he believes
that some or all of Italy's 112 cruise missiles may in fact be
installed elsewhere. He suggested four sites:
Aviano (near Vicenza); Camp Darby (near Livorno); Gioia del
Colle (Bad) and the appropriately named Perdas de Fogu ('Stones
of Fire') in Sardinia.
i
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Italian politics works on a multi-party system, with parlia
ment being controlled by whoever can form a workable
coalition government. The post-war years have seen a large
number of such coalitions, which often last only for a matter
of months. However, the dominant force has always been
the Christian Democrats, Italy's largest political party. The
Communist Party (PCI) is second in size, and the Socialists
third. At the moment (September '82) the government is a
five-party coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists,
Republicans, Liberals and Social Democrats under the leader
ship of a Republican Prime Minister, Giovanni Spadolini.
The major political party which opposes the base is the
PCI. Originally formed as a breakaway from the Socialists
in 1921, this party is now about twice the size of the Socialist
Party, and exerts a powerful influence even when not directly
involved in the governing coalition. Although it was originally
conceived of as a revolutionary party, towards the end of the
war the PCI decided that there was no chance of achieving
communism through revolution in Italy, and the then leader,
Togliatti, joined the government and signed the traditional
oath of allegiance to the king. The present PCI leadership
stress their belief that every country should be allowed to
develop its own form of communism without interference
from foreign powers. This has led them into bitter con
frontation with the Soviet leadership, with whom relations
could hardly be worse. The PCI is thus a 'Eurocommunist'
5
party rather than a 'Soviet communist' one, in distinction
to some other Communist Parties in Europe, for instance
those in Denmark and West Germany, which still adhere to
Soviet policies and promote peace movements affiliated to
the World Peace Council. It might be fair to say that the
position of the PCI on the installation of cruise missiles is
broadly similar to that of the Dutch and Belgian Labour
Parties. After preliminary debates in parliament in October
and December 1979, when the ruling coalition approved the
new missiles, the PCI asked the government to take the
initiative of requesting NATO countries to postpone the
decision for at least six months, to give the USSR time to
consider a suspension of SS20 installations. There is a parallel
with our own Labour Party also in that although the PCI
have been responsible for mobilising enormous numbers of
supporters at the big demonstrations in Rome and Comiso
and elsewhere, they are still regarded with caution by many
non-aligned peace movement activists, both for their failure
to take a clear-cut unilateralist stance, and as a major parlia
mentary party which might turn out in the final analysis to
be more interested in gaining power in government than in
stopping the missiles. In this respect it seems that the quality
of opposition to be found amongst local political leaders of
the PCI varies considerably from region to region. I mention
this because the major tension in the Italian peace movement
arises from conflict between established parties of the tra
ditional left and politically non-aligned groups, mainly
adhering to pacifist traditions. Italy has a strong movement
of conscientious objectors, which struggled hard for many
years to win the right to opt out of military service. (Since
1972 it has been legal for young Italians to choose an alter
native form of civil service, rather than bear arms, for their
obligatory year of national service.)
ii
The political parties opposing deployment of cruise in Italy
are the PCI, PdUP (Partito di Unita Proletaria), some small
independent left-wing groups and the Partito Radicale. The
Radicals, however, refuse to join a PCI dominated alliance,
maintaining that the Communists' sudden interest in
disarmament is hypocritical. The Partito Radicale is consistent
in that throughout the '70s they campaigned actively against
nuclear arms and against compulsory military service. Recent
ly they organised a plebiscite in Avetrana, near Apulia, where
80% of the population turned out, and a stunning 98.8%
voted against the construction of a nuclear power plant.
There is as yet no single unifying body in the peace move
ment in Italy. Peace activities have been carried out by a
proliferation oflocal groups, some dominated by the political
parties, others of a more pacifist or religious orientation.
At the time of the large demonstration in Rome in October
1981 a group called the 'October 24th Committee' was
formed, which is perhaps the nearest thing to a representative
committee presently existing, but the breadth of its member
ship seems to prevent it from taking up clear-cut positions,
and it has therefore tended to become a co-ordinating body
for the organisation of large demonstrations, rather than a
unified secretariat capable of operating on all political levels
against nuclear re-armament. The Trades Unions have been
fairly sluggish in offering support, although the local T.U.
federation in Sicily now opposes the base. The Catholic
Church has also been backward in offering support, with
the exception of certain individual bishops. However, the
Christian Workers Association (ACLI) , with a majority of
Catholic members, has consistently opposed the base, both
in the Sicilian region and nationally. After the lIth October
demonstration at Comiso their National Secretary, Domenico
Rosato, wrote an angry letter to the management of RAI TV
complaining that while the RAI news report was dismissing
the demonstration as a Communist conspiracy the ACLI
banner was passing right across the screen! Also worthy of
mention is ARCI (Italian Recreational and Cultural Associa
tion), a nationwide organisation with over 1,000,000 mem
bers drawn from the left which operates courageously in
many parts of Italy on a whole variety of issues, and has
frequently given invaluable help to the peace movements.
These patterns operate in Sicily, broadly speaking, as
elsewhere; however, although members of the Sicilian
Regional Assembly generally follow party discipline in
formal motions of the Assembly, there are many Socialists
6 7
r
and even Christian Democrats who personally oppose the
base and who support the peace movement.
THE CAMPAIGN
From 1952 until 1978 Comiso voted for a left-wing council
with a Communist mayor. The present council, which is
currently supporting the base, is a coalition of Socialists,
1
Christian Democrats, Republicans, Liberals and Social
1
Democrats, with a Socialist mayor. When the first rumours
went around that Comiso had been chosen as a missile base
(in April '81) this council voted unanimously in favour of
an 'ordine di giorno' rejecting the base. However, after the
official announcement party discipline prevailed and the
Socialist mayor made an about-turn to support the base.
Shortly after the official announcement, on August 7th
1981, CUDIP (Comitato Unitario per iI Disanno e la Pace)
was fonned, with representatives from Comiso, Ragusa,
Pachino, Catania and Palermo. The president of the Com
mittee is Giacomo Cagnes, who was the mayor of Comiso
for most of the twenty six year period preceeding the new
administration. The first project which CUDIP undertook
was to organise a demonstration at Comiso on II th October.
They expected about 10,000 people, and got'about 35,000.
The press was relatively uninterested, but the government
were so a1anned that a month later they sent a high-ranking
official of the Christian Democrat Party, complete with
hired pop-group, to try and talk them out of it. About a
thousand people turned up. The Hon. Piccoli compared the
demonstrators to 'The geese of Capitol Hill, stupid beasts
who cackle pointlessly'. CUDIP pointed out that it was the
geese of Capitol Hill who, in 390 B.C. awakened sleeping
sentries thereby saving Rome from being taken by the
besieging Gauls. The Hon. Piccoli scratched his head and
went home.
ii
Guidelines
After the success of the October demonstration, CUDIP
set up a permanent office in Palermo, with the aim both of
developing a documentation centre, and also international
ising the campaign in Comiso by bringing it to the attention
of the growing peace movements elsewhere in Europe. On
December 6th members of CUDIP attended a working group
in Brussels on 'local opposition to nuclear anns: the Comiso
example'. It's worthwhile listing the conclusions of this
working group here, because they have an important bearing
on the way the campaign has run so far, and may run in
the future:
a) The peace movement should internationalise itself; exchange
information; co-ordinate timetables for international demon
strations; develop adequate strategies for mass communications
(getting the national press to report on events in other countries);
practise international solidarity in situations of crisis.
b) Above all it is important that the resistance should arise from the
local population. Any activity or action in the locality should be
co-ordinated together with them.
c) Resistance must always commence in a non-violent fasmon if we
wish to leave open the possibility of following through to success.
In Comiso this resistance, particularly in the final stages, must be
internationalised to avoid being marginalised and suffocated as a
purely regional conflict.
d) To achieve the cancellation, or at least the suspension of the
cruise missiles at Comiso is of great importance, not just for
Comiso and for Italy, but for the whole of Europe.
e) The petition for the cancellation of the base must be signed at
an international level. The population of Comiso must know
that they are not being isolated
f) The movement at Comiso in Sicily needs a permanent office of
information. The possibility of an international fund.raising
effort should be investigated.
g) It is essential that Comiso support committees should appear in
Europe, not instead of the European peace movement, but as a
part of it.
4
Above all it is important that resistance should arise from the local
population.
This point has been made to me many times in conversation
with CUDIP members, both in Palenno and Comiso. The
population of Comiso are by no means apathetic about the
8 9
;
construction of the missiles base. Two-thirds of them signed
the petition which called for the cancellation of the base.
Press coverage of the campaign is now fairly extensive, even
if frequently inaccurate. Everyone in Comiso has an opinion
about the base, and the local propaganda battle is fierce. If
there is an enemy here it is not apathy, but quiet despair;
the feeling that this has been decided in Rome and that
nothing can be done about it. Hence the importance which
CUDIP attaches to the internationalisation of the campaign.
Since there are so many local political conflicts in Italy, and
so many strikes and demonstrations, they believe that the
only way to make central government sit up and take notice,
and at the same time relieve the people of Comiso of their
feeling of isolation in confrontation with Rome, is to attract
international solidarity and pressure. But this international
support is not, and cannot be, a substitute for a well
organised local campaign. A problem arises here, because
Italy does not have a single powerful umbrella movement
such as, for example, CND in Britain. Hence there is a
tendency for individual groups to arrange actions in isolation
without co-ordinating their efforts with other groups. This
obviously can lead to dissipation of resources, particularly
when rival groups start trying to canvass international
solidarity for their actions.
iii
Sources of Opposition
There are several interwoven strands in the local opposition
to the base. Of course the fear of becoming involved in
another World War is a very important determinant. Sicilians
with memories of the Allied air attacks on Palermo and
Comiso were not amused when the 'Trinacria 2' exercise
last November exploded hypothetical H-bombs over Palermo
and Catania. Perhaps a more immediate source of opposition
amongst this population (as yet largely uneducated in the
niceties of 'counterforce' doctrines, etc.) is their fear of the
effect which a large influx of US service people would have
on their lives in terms of the importation of the drug trade,
prostitution and organised crime into an area which has
hitherto been mafia-free. A third very important determining
10
feature is the knowledge that the building of the base will
involve the expropriation of large areas of highly fertile land.
In Sardinia, for instance, bases once established have shown
an alarming tendency to grow and grow, so much so that
they have now swallowed up 9.2% of the island, and the
authorities have taken to closing large areas of the coast to
fishermen for months at a time so that naval exercises can
be carried out with live ammunition.
If the Sicilian people now have to confront mafia interests
in relation to the various construction contracts relating to
the base their dilemma is partly the result of an earlier
struggle ~ v e r land rights, in the late '40s and early fifties.
At that time a fierce campaign of land occupations was
carried on, mainly dominated by the PCI, in an attempt to
break up an archaic form of land distribution persisting
from the Roman occupation whereby large estates known as
'Iatifondi' were parcelled out to the peasant farmers at
exhorbitant rents by 'gabelloti' -middle men who were
often also mafiosi. The result of the campaigns was the
setting up of an agency for land reform, which, while not
highly successful from the peasants' point of view, had the
effect of persuading the rural mafia to sell up their country
estates and move into the cities, putting the proceeds of the
sales into urban activities such as building and the drug
trade. For many Sicilians, the struggles against the mafia,
and landlords and the missiles appear as parts of a single
battle with roots going back into the nineteenth century
and beyond. Latter-day poets who arrive in Comiso obsessed
with the fate of Aeschylus are often not equipped to appre
ciate this immediately, which is why it is so important that
activities carried out in the area should be co-ordinated with
the local peace movement, who know the population they
are dealing with, and not simply imposed from outside.
IV
For the most part, the points outlined in the conclusions to
the Brussels working group have been taken up with
exemplary efficiency. Although the Dutchman Laurens
Hogebrink, in a report on a visit to Sicily in October '81
described himself as 'the first representative of the new peace
II
$
movement north of the Alps to visit Comiso',' the town has
since been visited by representatives of the IKV (Dutch
Interchurch Peace Council), CND, END, Pax Christi, Die
Grilnen, Le Cun du Larzac, SCAT and many other groups.
Comiso support groups have appeared in many countries,
including West Germany and Holland. A petition was launch
ed, calling for the cancellation of the base, and on April 4th
a second large demonstration attracted between 50 and
100,000 people, making it the largest demonstration seen
in Sicily since the war.
The response of the authorities to the April 4th demon
stration was to announce, a few days before the event, that a
contract had been finally awarded for the clearing of the site
at Magliocco, and that work would begin, officially, on April
5th. The night before the demonstration, 1,000 carabinieri
spent the night at the base for fear of a preventative occupa
tion by the protesters. Eventually the work was put back a
few days, to allow people who had come from other parts
of Italy to disperse.
Throughout April, peaceworkers all over Sicily collected
signatures for the Comiso petition.
After months of silence, the decision of the Italian government to
install cruise missiles in one of the most productive zones of Sicily
has become official.
The opposition of the popuiaiion and their iegitimate repre.
sentatives, never consulted, has been of no avail.
In the Paris Peace Treaty (1947), it is explicitly forbidden to use
Sicily for military ends.
We ask that the decision to install missile bases at Comiso be
revoked.
On April 29th, to intensify the campaign several members of
CUDIP went on hunger strike. The day after they started
their fast the head of the regional PCI in Sicily, Pio la Torre,
was shot by the mafia in Palermo along with his driver
Rosario di Salvo. At their funeral in Palermo on May 3rd his
deputy and successor, Luigi Colajanni, pledged that the
Sicilian PCI would carry on the struggle against the mafia and
the missiles; Ninni Guccione of ACLI said 'Those whom in
Sicily, try and spark off powerful new unitarian processes like
12
La Torre did, can now expect this sentence of death'. While
the funeral was going on, members of CUDIP were passing
through the huge crowd in the Piazza Politeama collecting
signatures for the petition.
By about the beginning of June, the petition had reached
its target of one million signatures. The hunger strike was
called off after the strikers achieved their demand of audiences
with the head of the Regional Assembly, Salvatore Lauricello,
and Prime Minister Spadolini. So far only the audience with
Lauricello has taken place, though it achieved little result
since Lauricello himself is well known to be against the base
and has expressed his views openly. The signatures were
handed in to the Regional Assembly, and then taken to
Rome by a deputation en route to the Brussels Convention.
A special session of the Sicilian Regional Assembly was
called, but disappointingly voted again in favour of the base.
Twenty-nine deputies, including Lauricello, absented them
selves rather than vote.
THE MAFIA
The death of Pio la Torre was a blow to the peace movement
in Sicily. He had been a leading supporter and campaigner
in the fight against the base since his return to Sicily to lead
the regional PCI some eight months earlier. It's unlikely
that his involvement with the peace movement was the
primary motive for the murder. He was a dedicated opponent
of the mafia, and had served on the anti-mafia commission
in Rome. At the time of his death he was said to be preparing
investigations into the bank accounts of suspected mafiosi,
and it was mainly due to pressure from la Torre and the PCI
that the Rome government had agreed to send a powerful
new police chief, General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, to
Palermo to lead investigations into the mafia.
As a Sicilian, born in Palermo just a few hundred yards
from where he was murdered, la Torre had been involved in
the land occupations in the early fifties, even serving a spell
in prison as a result. Many newspapers, reporting on his
death made a connection between the date of his assassina
tion a ~ d that of the massacre of Portella della Ginestra on the
13

1st of May 1947, when peasants celebrating a recent left
wing election victory were machine-gunned by bandits on
the orders of the mafia. It may not be too far-fetched to
suppose that the choice of timing for the murder was intend
ed as a deliberate warning to the new rapidly growing mass
movement not to oppose mafia interests in the base. Crowds
at la Torre's funeral chanted:
La Torre has been killed, the missiles have already been fired.
ii
The mafia pose real problems for the peace movement in
Sicily, not just in terms of assassinations and direct physical
threats, but because they can also make life difficult for any
thing or anyone that they don't like by means of 'ambiente',
pressure applied through a complicated system of social
contacts which can include the police, tax inspectorate,
or local government. When a number of Sicilian peace groups
decided they wanted to set up a peace camp near Magliocco
airport they were unable to find a site because local farmers
were too frightened to let them on the land; it was rumoured
that some of them had been threatened with dynamite.
Eventually the peace camp was set up in late July, in the
nearby nuclear-free zone of Vittoria, 10 kilometres from
the base.
iii
I was in Palermo on September 3rd of this year, and I went
to visit an anti-mafia documentation centre called the 'Centro
Giuseppe Impastato', after a member of the Italian new left
who was killed by the mafia several years ago. The director
of the centre, Dr Umberto Santini, took me afterwards to
eat in an open air pizzeria owned and run by Impastato's
brother Giovanni. While we were eating, two men came over
to our table and told us that General Dalla Chiesa and his
wife had just been shot in the centre of Palermo.
At his first meeting with journalists after he arrived to take
up his new post Dalla Chiesa had recalled Pio la Torre's
involvement in the land reform struggles over thirty years
before, adding:
14
I also was there on those fields of Corleone, fighting banditry and
the mafia.
Less than five months later, in a dimly lit square behind the
Piazza Politeana he found himself following la Torre through
the same doorway into history.
COMlSO '82-'83
Comiso has now become a prime focus of interest for the
European peace movements, who believe that a victory here
could make deployment of the new missiles in West Germany
politically very difficult, thus perhaps holding up the missiles
altogether.
The campaign on the ground in Comiso itself is still in a
rudimentary stage of organisation. The peace camp has
moved from Vittoria and found a temporary site in an olive
grove about half a mile from the base, and some non-violent
actions have begun in an attempt to block traffic and obstruct
the works. These have achieved some success; for instance
the construction work on the site, due to start on September
Ist had to be put back several days when the campers
organised a sit-in. However, these actions have mainly in
volved young people from other parts of Italy and Europe,
without much support from the local population. During
the next year CUDIP will be appointing a full-time organiser
in Comiso. Fundraising efforts are being stepped up, and
funds are arriving from Comiso support groups in different
parts of Europe and America. An appeal has been launched
to buy a piece of land for a permanent international peace
camp, though it is possible that owing to the difficulties of
maintaining such a camp in the area the plan may eventually
be commuted into the establishment of a peace centre in
Comiso itself. Conditions for the development of a strong
mass-movement seem good. The local population are funda
mentally opposed to the base. They spend time in the streets
and the piazzas talking to each other, they are curious of
strangers. However, the organisational task of realising this
potential is formidable. Before the September I st blockade
the peace campers arranged a meeting with some peasant
farmers; none of them came. At the blockade itself there
15
were only 200 people, about half of them foreigners. The
town council have taken to describing the campers as
'pacifisti' and 'filosovietichi'.
Here also pressure and support from the international
peace movements can have a helpful effect. We need to assist
the Italian peace movement in its struggle to develop a
unified structure, both by encouraging those peace workers
in Italy who are currently working on the possibility of
creating a CND type structure in that country, and also by
locating the reliable and established local committees and
suggesting that they act as clearing houses for actions planned
on an international scale. In this way some of the diverse
groups might be encouraged to co-operate more closely and
much waste of time and effort could be spared.
A Comiso support group has been recently formed in the
UK, and would welcome enquiries and support. Details
from END.
GOING TO COMISO
A member of CUDIP in Palermo once gave me an excellent
single-sentence description of Sicily:
'Sicily is very far away', he said, 'and very expensive to get to.'
Palermo is further from London than Warsaw or Belgrade,
or the Straits of Gibraltar. However, there is a good air link
and many cheap flights operate for the benefit of Sicilians
living and working in this country. It should be possible to
get a return flight to Palermo or Catania for around 140,
even in the high season. If at first you don't succeed, try
again, because there are lots of charter firms operating
them. END may be able to assist with advice. If going over
land remember that Italian trains are very cheap (though
unbearably crowded in high season). To take a bus to Milan
or Rome and then travel to Catania by train would probably
cost about 100 return. There are also ferry services to the
island. Boats leave several times a week from Genova, taking
24 hours to travel down the West coast of Italy (cost about
20 each way for a foot passenger) and a daily ferry service
leaves Naples each evening at 8.30 p.m., crossing in 10 hours
16
to Palermo. There are regular shuttle flights from Rome also,
cost about 65 return. AJitaiia in London keep timetables,
and take bookings for these flights. Up-to-date train and
ferry timetables are kept by the Italian State Tourist Depart
ment, 201 Regent Street, London WI (tel: 01-439 23II).
Buses run twice a day from Palermo Piazza Marina to
Comiso, every day except Sunday and bank holidays;
6.30 a.m. and 2.50 p.m. The cost is about 3.50. Buses run
from Catania, Piazza Patro Massimo at 10 a.m., 1.30 p.m.
and 6.30 p.m., Sundays and bank holidays 1.30 p.m. only.
There may be a camp-site at Comiso or there may not;
efforts are being made to continue the peace camp, but it is
possible that hostile pressures may cause it to be abandoned.
Best check the state of play with END in London or CUDIP
in Palermo before going.
And finally, I have been asked to remind you that Comiso
is a quiet town in an as yet unspoiled rural area which follows
a traditional pattern of life which is quite alien to visitors
coming from the insalubrious conurbations of Northern
Europe. For a maximum of worthwhile contact and effective
discourse with the local population, a minimum of hippy
gear is required.
NOTES
1. 'Stranamore-Lagorio in Sicilia'-Gianluigi Cortese Pace e Guerra, No.3,
January. 1982. . .
2. 'L'American compra la Sicilia per uso nuc1eare'-Franco Tmton, Paese Sera,
6 August, 1982.
3. 'Per it Disarmo' -Francesco Rutelli edizione Gammalibri, July, 1982.
4. Quoted from CUDIP bulletin No.1, 'Elements for an analysis of the situation
in Comiso', (available in English from END).
5. Memorandum on a visit to the new peace movement in Sicily, October, 1981,
Laurens Hogebrink (IKV).
17
C
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
d

b
y

M
a
t
t
h
e
w

E
v
a
n
g
e
l
i
s
t
a
.
C
o
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i
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M
a
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E
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a
.
Jean Stead, Gabrielle Grunberg, 1982
The excerpts from New York Times, The New Yorker and
The Guardian reproduced by kind permission.
Distributed by The Merlin Press, 3 Manchester Road,
London E 14 and END, 227 Seven Sisters Road, London N4.
Joint Merlin/END publication. First published November 1982
Printed by Black Rose and set by H. Hems
''''' 'bar .. ..-.. .,,_,...""--,....,............
MoScOw's Police Arrest
FOWlder of Peace Group
MOSCOW, Aug, CAP) -'!be PQUce
&n"e5ted a founder of the Soviet 'Union's
anIy independent peace croup lOtlay
and put him in a psychiatric Ilaspital
acainst his will, fellow p'll'Itp m=ben
~ ~ Serae! Batcwrin. a 2S-yai.
old artist who .pent time in psychiat.
ric baspltaJ Ile'Ye'D years 1.10. WIS 1aten
from tile apartment of Yurt Medved
kov. a fellow croup member. ahortJy
after 1IOOrI. CoUeapes said the police
acclIsed.bim of trading mlUwy.ery-
Ice. . t.. .
The peace croup. DumbertDg about 15
iDteUeauaJs. bas faced continuDus po.
lice harassment aiDce 8!1!1C'A1!!t'1D1 its
bmaticmin JUDI",' t
New York Times, 8 July 1982
When the news first came to us early in June that an
independent peace group had been formed in Moscow, and
that it was sending urgent signals to the peace movements in
the West, we were presented with difficulties. What should be
our response?
The news came to us through the Western press, and some
times through sources hostile to the peace movement, The
first announcement of the group was made to a press con
ference by word of mouth in the flat of one of the group.
As the news trickled out, it appeared that several of the
small group were 'refuseniks'-that is, they had applied in
recent years for permits to emigrate from the USSR and their
applications had been refused. The young artist, Sergei
Batovrin, who helped to start the group, was the son of a
Soviet diplomat at the United Nations and had spent some of
his school years in New York.
This suggested one possible 'profile ': a small group of
refuseniks and dissidents, who were being made use of by
Cold War propagandists in the West in order to deflate the
Soviet leaders' professions of peaceful intent, to stir up
dissension in the Western peace movement (and especially in
the United States), and to provide a distraction at the time
of the Peace March of the Scandinavian Women from Stock
holm to Minsk.
Of course we had to take account of this possible profile.
This kind of Cold War propaganda game has been going on
for years, and on both sides, often defeating the intentions
of sincere and disinterested people. At the same time we
asked ourselves-How could a new, unofficial group get its
message out without recourse to the Western press? And why
on earth should the Soviet authorities make such a fuss about
a small group of this kind? If they had played it cool, what
possible harm could have been done to Soviet-American
relations? (A gesture of toleration would in fact have
improved the Soviet image in the West.) The 'provocation'
I
which Soviet official sources droned on about only arose
because they themselves commenced to harass and slander
the new group. Who are the 'hooligans' and provocateurs?
A young artist (who had just had eighty-eight of his peace
paintings seized by the KGB) and his friends? Or the security
agents who have been pushing them about?
These considerations were strengthened when we received
news of the programme of the group. But then an event of
great importance took place. Jean Stead, the Assistant
Editor of The Guardian-a newspaper distinguished in the
past two years by its well-informed treatment of the work of
the Western peace movement, and by the space it has afford
ed for discussion of accompanied the
Scandinavian Peacemarch on the full length of its course,
sending back a series of valuable reports. Also with the
March was Danielle Grunberg, a British marcher of part
Danish parentage-an active member of the Somerset peace
movement, whose sponsors on the march included END,
CND, and CND Western region.
Danlelle Grunberg and Jean Stead took the opportunity,
when the March passed through Moscow, to visit the group.
Their accounts are the heart of this pamphlet. Jean Stead's
account Is placed In the contex t of a retrospective view of
the success (but also the limitations) of the Peacemarch, and
also Includes an analysis of the composition and alms of
the official Soviet Peace Committee. It Is a revised text of
her article in The Guardian of August 13, 1982. Danlelle
Grunberg's account appears here for the first time.
END and CND have received many enquiries about this
new initiative. We have decided to present a selection of the
documents available to us now, In chronological sequence,
to enable readers to form their own judgments. The docu
ments drawn upon here come from very many
some which might be thought to be 'Cold War', some of an
Impartial stance, and some from the peace movemen t itself:
We thank all the Institutions, individuals, and newspapers
drawn upon: our particular thanks to The Guardian for
permission to republish Jean Stead's major article and to the
New Yorker for the excerpt from 'Talk of the Town'.
2
11 Russians Open Antinuclear Drive
B,. JOHNF. BURNS proposal! not prevtously UDCUooed by
$p..../O.n-_TwllTw. theKremhn.
MOSCOW June .. _ The SoYtet Although the members 01 the gnJUp
Union a backer of peace cam- are not dl5sidents, Mr. Batovrin said,
paign:; In Western oountrtes, found It- they belIeve that It Is Important that
self today with an embryonic peace "the f'oonnous creative potential" of
movement 01 its own thai 811m to be as ordinary people in the SOviet Un10Il be
lndepeJldent of Government control as bamessed in thequer;t for peace.
groups In the United States and Western Street cu.....laDDlld
Europe, Mr. Balovrin said the group intended
The 1I memben 01 the group Who an- to canvas9 for new memben amona
nounced its 'onnalion at a news conler- friends and by approaching people on
ence for Western reporters said their the 9treet, and to develop new Ideas to
goal was a lowenng of the dallger of ml.. complement the Kremlin's official
clear war without prejudice to the Inter- "peace program." member 01
ests of the Scrilet Union or the Umted the grouP. Vladimir Flelshgakker, an
States. They said that since this w.as engineer. acknowledged. that this wa9 a
also the professed object 01 the Soviet challenge or a kind to the aUlhontle8
authOrities they saw no reason why smce it was "the Soviet tratillion that
their initiative should bestined. nobody expresses his opinion until he II
But a spokesman for the fOllllden,
sergei Batovnn, a :z3..year-old artist, Nonethel..ss, Mr. Batovrln said the
made It plain that the impetus for the group hooed for tolerance. "We do not
group's establishment flowed lrom Iwant to be acounterweight to the au
thel.r perceptlun of the oUiclal Soviet thortlles, but to worll..alongside them,"
CornmiUee for the Defense of Peace as be sa;d. "If they understand us cor-
an mslrument of Soviet foreign polley, rectly they will not apply repressive
incapable o. adyancln& disarmament measures to us. Our PresII always sa)"
that everyone shollld lake part in the
peace movement, and we ICenoconlra
diction between thai and _baa we are
dOing,"
The lJ'OUP's arodety ttyt otrtdall

Reeled 111 the care that was taken to
summon R!portf'n1 by word 01 mouth,
avoWing use of lelepbonee. K.G.B. sur
veiliance that Is commonly evident
when forellJl repo,rters meet trith diuj.
dents or pnvate IfOUPS wu not
apparentClUtsldelhecramped suburtlan
apartment where the news conference
.-as held, but past experience duefI not
augur "ell forthe group. .
Generally, the Kremlin suppt'eSSe8
any pnyate group thai becomes actlw
in an.area of slate interest, and the
practice has been starkly evideat in
mlilteninYOlvmgdls.annament.
The unofficial group founded today
signaled its desire to remain politically
impartial by adopting a symbol that
o::omblnes a Western-style "ban the
bomb" emblem with a dove, thedmce
of the orflcial Soviet disarmlUJJelrt com.
miltee.
New York Times, 5 June 1982
Here are more details on the Independent Peace Group in
Moscow...
So far they have made available three documents:
I. An Appeal to the Moscow CityCouncil (Mossovet) suggest
ing to proclaim Moscow a Nuclear Free Zone.
2. An Appeal to the governments of the USA and USSR to
stop all the nuclear tests.
3. Programme of Actions aimed at improving trust between
the peoples of the USA and USSR, containing nine points:
I. Organisation of an exchange programme for school
children of the two countries.
2. Open TV discussions between representatives of the
two governments shown in full in both countries with
possibility for the people to question the speakers by
the 'phone.
3. A common programme of peace propaganda obligatory
in the Soviet and American schools and text-books.
4. Opening of a Soviet Culture Centre in Washington and
of American culture Centre in Moscow with a free
access for the people.
S. A creation of the Soviet-American mediatory bureau for
those seeking to re-unite their families or to help those
wishing to marry.
6. A creation of the Soviet-American Medical centre for
conducting joint research.
7. A creation of a mediating organisation for those wishing
to correspond (A Pen-Friends Bureau).
8. Regular joint Soviet-American space flights and general
cooperation in the field.
9. A creation of the Soviet-American Institute of Public
Opinion with authority to conduct public opinion polls
independently in both countries, on the questions
relating to peace and mutual trust.
Further on, the members of the Group publicised their tele
phone numbers inviting people to call them during weekends
if they have any other suggestions. This latter was a reason
why the Soviet authorities have cut their telephones so quickly.
(This information was provided by a Brussels-based organisa
tion 'USSR News Brief on Human Rights').
4
Please circulate
American Friends Service Committee
U.S.A.
Moscow, July 8 1982
Dear colleagues,
We, supporters of the trust creation between the Soviet
Union and the United States, have advanced on June 4 1982
our 'Appeal to the governments and the public of the USSR
and the USA', We have got many proposals from the SOViet
citizens after this call about starting grassroot initiatives for
the trust creation. People understand that it is important to
eradicate hatred as the feeding material of arm races.
Currently, we are trying to introduce our proposals into
the activities of the 'Peace-82' march (it starts in Sweden to
be in Moscow by the end of this July). There are handicaps
in our work such as house arrests to isolate us. It was the
,
case on June 27 1982, the day of our planned peace mam-
,
festation in Moscow. Please be vigilant regarding our fate
during the Moscow phase of the 'Peace-82 ' march.
In our specific conditions, with the lack of prior independ
ent public activism, it is literally a vital matter for our cause
to borrow from the experience of your peace efforts. Now
our supporters here are in a dynamic phase of self-education;
much depends on manifestations of solidarity.
We would welcome any forms of exploratory or working
contacts. Please arrange messages and personal visits, circulate
our documentation and comment it. Newsmen know how to
find us, it is easy in fact. But now it is really urgent for the
colleagues in the peace cause TO START KNOW EACH
OTHER.
Various strata of the Soviet society are represented among
our supporters: scientists and workers, artists and writers,
clergy and laity, Russians, Jews and other ethnic minorities,
etc.
Personal contacts from abroad seem to be the key element
of moral support in the present initial phase of our activities.
Obscurantists who are against us here can't suffocate us under
the umbrella of publicity and visits. International solidarity
as well as our own strict law-abiding conduct have already
S ..~
resulted in some victories. On the wave of mass protests
there are indications of the end of the house arrest for our
colleague Sergei Batovrin, an artist and a co-author of the
initial 'appeal' (the arrest is almost a month long).
There is a lot of important work ahead. We expect that
some of our peace proposals may be acceptable for r e ~ l i s a
tion by grassroot efforts, and not in too distant future.
Your help is critical in it. To begin with, we have fixed
August 6 1982 as THE DAY FOR OUR PUBLIC
MANIFESTATION PLUS FOR ROUND TABLE TALKS ON
THE TRUST ESTABLISHING. We invite you to join us:
by messages, by similar activities in your cities, or, perhaps,
by delegating participants who happen to be in Moscow on
that day.
We hope to hear from you.
With our friendly handshakes and our open hearts
The group for establishing trust between the USSR
and the USA.
[A list of sixteen names and addresses follows] :
P.S. The postal services are not always reliable and it is
imperative for us to send several copies of this letter in
various ways.
6
THE PEACEMARCH AND THE
MOSCOW INDEPENDENT GROUP
Jean Stead
It was the late Eugenie Constantinovitch Fyodorov, first
man across the North Pole, friend of President Brezhnev,
president of the Soviet Peace Committee and Hero of the
Soviet Union, who agreed last November to allow a group of
Norwegian women to march against nuclear weapons through
Soviet cities.
By the time five of the women arrived in Moscow in
February to complete the arrangements, they were no longer
so welcome. Fyodorov had died and the march, it seemed,
was no longer on. Then, just before they were about to leave
for home in defeat, the decision was reversed. Yurl Zhukov..
political commentator of Pravda and a deputy of the
Supreme Soviet, had won the battle to become the new
president-and had used the idea of the women's peace march
as one of his election programme attractions.
This illustration of the conflict within the Soviet Peace
Committee is typical of the dilemma it faces in trying to
relate to the Western European peace movement. The Peace
Committee has only 450 members and in the past has been
the final resting home for distinguished spacemen and women,
for Arctic and Antarctic explorers, actors, writers and
scientists, and for every distinguished name-including
Shostakovitch-needing a post with honour that is not too
onerous.
It is a sort of Russian version of the Royal Society, attach
ed to the Academy of Science, a recognition that since the
catastrophe of the Second World War nothing is more
important to the average citizen than not repeating it.
But in 1979, the year when the NATO countries decided
to modernise their theatre weapons and place cruise missiles
in Western Europe-which alone would be capable of
7
delivering 5,500 Hiroshimas into the Soviet Union-a decision
was made in the Soviet Union to bring the Peace Committee
into the front line of international politics-in fact, to update
it.
The praesidium of the Academy of Science decided with
the Peace Committee, to found a scientific council on
Research into the problems of Peace and Disarmament.
Research is also carried out through the Institute of World
Economy and International Relations, which has 200 mem
bers, one of them Fyodorov's son Yuri. The creation of a
non-nuclear Nordic and northern Russian zone, the examina
tion of United States and Canadian affairs through a special
institute, the problems of disposal of nuclear arms under a
disarmament programme are among the subjects of full-time
research and academic publications.
At the same time, it was decided that the World Peace
Council, founded in 1950 and later largely shrugged off by
CND and the Committee of 100 because of its overtly Soviet
bias, should be given a new image. It has a new secretary,
Professor Tair Tairov, a cosmopolitan international lawyer,
well informed on the West. Based in Helsinki, he was mainly
responsible for securing the visas for the Norwegian women's
march, and for smoothing out the arguments that the
Scandinavians got involved in, both among themselves and
with the Soviet Peace Committee.
When the five Norwegians returned home last February,
they invited delegations from Sweden, Denmark and Finland
to join them on the march that they were organising.
Most of the marchers-about 250-were liberal professional
women, mostly Labour-voting with a few Communists from
Finland. With them were about 20 men, mostly academics
and students. Many of them were abysmally ignorant about
the Soviet Union, but they were well boned-up on nuclear
defence strategy and were able to argue forcefully the case
for unilateral disarmament. Scandinavians have no nuclear
weapons.
It was felt to be something of a compliment that the
Soviets thought it worthwhile to put five of the leading
members of the Soviet Peace Committee with the march right
from its start in Stockholm, including the organising
8
,
secretary, Grigory Lokshyn, a man who would not look out
of place as a trade union negotiator in this country.
The Russians found it difficult at first to deal with the
women, who insisted on democratic participation and
lengthy meetings on every detail of the pre-planning and on
an inquest into every occasion when the Soviets appeared to
break the agreements they had made on how the march
should be conducted. The Danes even refused to have a
leader SO that there was no-one for Lokshyn to negotiate
with. 'But during the hot, thirsty marches, the long train
rides and the nights on the bare school floors in Finland,
an sort of trust began to form between the Russians
and the Scandinavians.
The Russians developed a respect for the women, who
were uncompromising in their arguments, and uncomplaining
about the physical hardship. But they also allowed them an
unusual degree of tolerance in their eccentricities. For there
is no doubt that the Soviets are pinning most of their hopes
for an end to the nuclear arms race on the effectiveness of
the Western European peace movement. Their domestic
resources are drained by weapons expenditure.
They feel surrounded and threatened by the American
bases. 'There are no Soviet military bases round the United
States, but there are 2,000 hostile bases round our country.
That is why we have to play with black figures', said Yakov
Lomko, the deputy chairman of the Soviet Union of Journal
ists, at a meeting with a marchers' delegation in Moscow.
The weeping on the streets at the sight of the peace
banners was testimony to the state of shock which much of
the older generation is still in, many decades after the
German occupation and 20 million deaths of the last war.
They seem barely able to grasp the idea of another war,
certainly not one with nuclear weapons. There are no
Panorama programmes or newspaper reports to present or
discuss the notion of unilateral nuclear disarmament. The
food shortages (particularly acute this year), the housing
difficulties, the deprivation of nolo being able to travel over
seas, are all more important preoccupations, the Scandinavians
discovered. One 20-year-old Norwegian student met an
architect standing on the pavement during the march in
9
~ -
Leningrad and followed up his invitation to phone him. She
went to his house for supper with his family-a fairly lavish
event, like all Russian hospitality. There they explained
that they were happy to join in demonstrations for peace,
which everyone wanted. But they explained that people
were far more concerned about getting more food and an
easier life than in getting rid of the SS20s.
One English teacher in Moscow, also a sympathetic
spectator, confessed, The truth is we are just too lazy to
think about things that are wrong here. It is easier to ignore
them because everyday life is so difficult.' A devotee of Iris
Murdoch, she exemplified that curious Russian blend of
extensive education and lack of curiosity about the world
outside.
In spite of their research and their meetings with the
Scandinavians, the Soviets still do not understand the
Western peace movement. They see it as a movement that
can be used to persuade NATO to call off the modernisation
programme. They are not able to grasp that it is essentially
a protest campaign that is joined in strength by the ecological
movement. The last thing that Russians could cope with is a
similar free-thinking ecological movement in their own
country-yet they now have their own sizeable pollution
problems.
So they are caught in a dilemma. They welcome a power
ful peace movement, but only if it is like the Soviet Peace
Committee which has an establishment voice and echoes
anti-American opinions. In the Soviet Union there are over
100 local committees in various regions, all of them led by
prominent public figures but, so far as is known, reflecting
only standard views. It is rather like a peace movement
which has its main sympathetic ties to the Ministry of
Defence and the Department of Energy. Yet it is a movement
of people whose feelings of fear of another war-feelings that
the Scandinavians began at last to understand-make them
glad that the Russians have nuclear weapons as a defence
against the Americans. It was the United States they
continually reminded the Scandinavian women who were
the first to arm themselves with atomic weapons and the
only people to actually drop atomic bombs.
10
The march, though it .sometimes resembled a cultural
delegation or a discussion group, can be considered a success
-if for no other reason than it held out a hand of friendship
with no strings attached. Its main failure lay in not securing
a meeting with the 16 leaders of the unofficial peace move
ment in Moscow. This included two distinguished professors
who were sent to a detention centre for 'alcoholics and
hooligans' for 15 days while the marchers were in town, and
two others who had been under intermittent house arrest.
Eva Nordland-an initiator of the march and a sociology
lecturer at Oslo University-suggested a meeting and was
told by members of the Soviet Peace Committee that it
might be possible. These, after all, were a group people
would be wanting to know about when they got home. Were
they genuine or were they 'plants' to bring discord to the
march? Grigory Lokshyn, the secretary of the Peace Com
mittee, told them that they were drunks, 'anti-socials',
provocateurs working for the CIA. At a stonny meeting
just before leaving Moscow, two members of the Soviet
Peace Committee gave different explanations for the arrests,
one of them being that one of the professors had hit a
conductor on a bus. The odds are that probably no one
knew the exact details.
In the end, and time being short, the women decided not
to seek a meeting with the unofficial group. They were under
pressure, they were tired-but it seemed like a mistake then,
and it still does. The Scandinavians put neutrality first in
all questions except the banning of nuclear weapons, and it
was this belief in the importance of neutrality that explained
all their actions, or lack of them.
In the end, only one member of the march went to see the
dissidents-Danielle Griinberg, half Danish, living in Britain
and sponsored on the march by END and CND. The ten KGB
men outside in cars were ob'Ciously on guard.
Mrs Olga Medvedkov is the wife of Professor Yuri
Medvedkov. He was chief of the laboratory of human ecology
at the Institute of Geography of the Academy of Science,
formerly at the Chief Ecology Unit of the World Health
Organisation in Geneva, and then subsequently in detention.
She was the spokesman for the five members of the group.
II
They were living together in a single flat for security. The
KGB men had told them to go no further than the end of
the road. They made three points-that they were not
dissidents, that they agreed with the Soviet policy on nuclear
disarmament, and that they had been surprised and shocked
by the KGB searches and seizure of documents which follow
ed their launch of a petition on June 4. Their proposals, sent
at the time to the Soviet Peace Committee, had received no
acknowledgement or reply.
They asked us for contacts in the West European peace
movement and seemed strangely naive about the varying
politics of the organisation they had been in touch with.
They said, for instance, that they had been most grateful
for the interest in them shown by the 'Voice of America'.
Their aim was to secure greater trust between the Soviet
Union and the United States, through the creation of an
international independent peace group; the establishing of
international groups of scientists for research and analysis
on disarmament proposals; the abstention from mutual
accusations from both sides; the guaranteeing of open
exchange of opinion between Soviet people in the spheres of
disarmament, the organisation of joint TV programmes,
and the creation of a non-governmental Soviet-American
commission to research public opinion. They also advocated
the notion that Moscow itself should be declared a nuclear
free zone.
A group of ten of the world's leading geographers, two of
them from Britain, met Dr Medvedkov when they were in
Moscow for a conference in June. He was highly distinguish
ed in his field, but they found him in severe trouble with
the authorities because, he said, he had applied for an exit
visa with his Wife, who is Jewish. He had lost his job, had his
professorship taken away from him, had been prevented
from attending the conference and told them he was about
to be stripped of his degrees. He was no longer allowed to
teach. Dr Derek Diamond, of the London School of
Economics, who went to see him at the flat of a friend, says
that because his special interest was social geography, which
would involve him comparing the quality of environment
in rich and poor areas, he would automatically be in
12
disfavour. 'We were very disturbed by the way he was being
treated. He just wanted out.'
Although the peace campaign had just been launched, he
did not talk of it to Dr Diamond. But he told him that he
thought the world was in terrible danger of nuclear war, that
the Soviet Union was re-arming too heavily, and that he and
some others were appealing to the Soviet Peace Committee
for action.
In Geneva, Dr Medvedkov did research in epidemiology,
now part of the communicable diseases division of the WHO.
Colleagues in London who have worked with him on and off
during the past ten years were surprised to hear he had been
campaigning for peace. One, Professor David Smith, of Queen
Mary College, University of London, said he had never
mentioned the subject during two evening-long discussions
in Moscow last June, during a conference of international
geographers. I told the Peace Committee that we had been
to see the group, and one of the Scandinavian leaders of the
march said subsequently that they thought the Soviet attitude
to the march changed completely from that day. It was the
last day in Moscow-the rest of the party had been on a
river boat trip. CertainlY, for the first time, men were obvious
lyon guard all over the Moscow hotel foyer. Women flying
in to join the march were held up for three hours while all
luggage was searched. Guards were obvious on the station
platforms, within the trains, and on the marches for the
remaining five days of the tour. The feeling of freedom and
open exchange had gone.
Why had this happened? Had the KGB decided that things
had gone too far and taken the matter out of the hands of
the Soviet Peace Committee and into their own? Or had the
Committee decided that for themselves? Had the women's
march wandered into the crossfire of a situation they did
not even know about? Why was this unofficial group of
academics not allowed to join the march as they wanted to,
when the Soviet Peace Committee had said repeatedly that
all citizens were free to crusade for peace?
There are, as yet, no answers. The unofficial group said
they had not timed their launching date to coincide with
the march, but had sent copies of their proposals to the
13

Women for Peace headquarters in Oslo. The Norwegians
said they had never received them. They returned home with
two suspicions in their minds. One was that the reason for
the importance of Professor Medvedkov was that, as an
ecologist, he was probably already in trouble for campaigning
on the dangers of nuclear pollution. The other was that even
though the unofficial group appeared sincere in wanting to
link up with other peace groups in the West, they might be
being used by anti-Soviet organisations without their know
ledge.
The leaders of the march said they had already had
experience of attempts to disrupt their peace march from
Copenhagen to Paris last year. The Russians may be anxious
to stop independent peace campaigners coming into the open
but the NATO countries also see their growing peace move
ments as a formidable threat to the stationing of cruise
missiles in Europe next year-and are likely to do whatever
they can to discredit them.
14
PEACE MARCH '82
Danielle R. Griinberg
'Why are you marching in the West? Go to Moscow!,' said the
critics of last year's Peace March from Copenhagen to Paris.
This was what started off the Nordic Peace March '82,
organised by Women for Peace from Scandinavia, a three-week
journey covering 3,000 miles by foot, boat and train, from
Stockholm (via Helsinki, Leningrad and Moscow) to Minsk.
The main slogans: 'No to Nuclear Weapons in Europe,
East and West!', 'No to Nuclear Weapons in the World!',
'Yes, to Disarmament and Peace!' had been easily agreed on
between the Scandinavian women and the Russians
More difficult to accommodate was the Scandinavian wornens'
wish to end the march in Moscow. This', the Russians said,
'would be seen as a direct threat to the Soviet Government',
and so the march ended in Minsk instead. At a later stage
in the negotiations the Russians insisted on linking Peace
March '82 with a march organised by them, from Moscow
to Vienna, but finally appeared to give in on this point.
And so a compromise was reached.
The Russians had laid on a special 'Peace Train' for the
long stretches between towns as there was no way 3,000
miles could be walked in three weeks.
The first meeting with Soviet people, in the small border
town of Vyborg, was rapturous, warm and full of music,
dancing and flowers. From then on the pattern was set.
On arrival in the towns, mass meetings were held, mostly
with 'invited people', followed by a march to the hotel
where participants were staying (at their own cost).
Leningrad, was for me a particularly memorable occasion.
A scorching hot Sunday in July, with many citizens obvious
ly away enjoying the weekend pleasures of the countryside
and yet as we began walkin/\ up the central Kirov Street
15
G
the 300 Scandinavians, forming the core of the march,
seemed suddenly to disappear into a sea of Russian people
thronging the width and breadth of the street. Some older
women, less inclined to participate, stood watching by the
side of the pavement-crying at the sight of the peace banners,
reviving the memory of their dead relatives. 'The people of
our country want peace', said a Russian woman, 'but they
feel surrounded and threatened by the United States. We
only have nuclear weapons to protect ourselves.' Conversa
tion rarely reached beyond this point.
In Moscow the spontaneity seemed to vanish and the
marching was shorter and much subdued. Western corres
pondents, who initially claimed the march would never
reach Moscow, now stated that Moscovites had not been
informed of the marchers' arrival. There were certainly
fewer people in evidence and more plain clothes police.
But whatever the immediate shortcomings, the march was
a breakthrough. It was the first time Soviet people had the
chance to see an independent Peace March in their country.
The main failure lay in the marchers' unwillingness to
make contact with the unofficial peace group. In Leningrad
we had heard of the arrest of two members of the group
and since no-one else seemed willing to go, I decided to
meet them in Moscow, and went to their flat accompanied
by Jean Stead of The Guardian and Cees van der Vel, a
Dutch journalist.
The flat, in a high rise block on the outskirts of Moscow,
was heavily guarded by KGB. We were greeted eagerly by
five members of the group (mostly scientists and intellect
uals).
Olga Medvedkov, doctor of Geographical Science, is the
wife of Professor Yuri Medvedkov. Olga outlined the aims
of the group. In their Appeal of June 4, which was sent to
the Governments of the USA and USSR they suggest: the
creation of private proposals to establish trust and dis
armament; the creation of international independent peace
groups; the establishing of international groups of scientists
to research and analyse disarmament proposals; the absten
tion from mutual accusations, on both sides, in the press;
the organising of open exchange of opinion between Soviet
16
people in the sphere of tr.ust and disarmament.
She said they had received scores of proposals from Soviet
people, some of which were: the creation of marriage agencies
between citizens of the US and the USSR; the creation of
ioint cultural and medical centres; the organising of ioint
TV programmes; the establishing of a non governmental
Soviet-American commission to research public opinion in
the sphere of disarmament; and the declaration of Moscow
as a nuclear-free zone. These proposals and their Appeal had
been sent to the Soviet Peace Committee but remained un
answered. They had collected hundreds of signatures on a
petition, mostly from students, but all their documents
and papers had been confiscated by the KGB as anti-Soviet
publications. This was followed by illegal house arrests,
disconnection of telephones, searches were made and mem
bers constantly followed.
Here are the notes which I took of our conversation:
Two well-known members of the group, both professors are in
prison now as hooligans. When I [Olga Medvedkov] went down to
buy some food I was followed by 8 men down to the shop. One
week after the group was created three members were under house
arrest, Vladimir Fleishgakker was under house arrest for three weeks
and his telephone was disconnected. Sergei Rosenoer was under
house arrest for two weeks.-Under Soviet law house arrest is illegal
but privately it is done. They don't tell you anything but just come
outside your door and stop you from going anywhere.-When I told
a solicitor about this he said he knew nothing about it.
On the 20 June Vladimir Fleishgakker went to vote at the Moscow
election of members of the local Soviet. He was kept in his car by
the KGB and could not vote.
On 27 June the group was going to organise a peace demonstration
near the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow under the slogans
'No More Hiroshima's' and 'Peace through Trust not Fear' and they
were kept in their flats.
On 16 July two members of the group, Yuri Medvedkov and Yuri
Hronopulo were arrested as hooligans in the street at midnight.
They had left the flat at 10 o'clock and disappeared. As they didn't
come back the others understood that they had been arrested. They
17
had wanted to join Peace March '82, in Leningrad. Diga Medvedkov
phoned the main police station but they did not know where they
were. She then went to the KGB but got nowhere. He had left the
flat in his shirtsleeves and had no jacket with him. She wanted to
make sure he had a jacket as he had just had pneumonia. She then
took a car with some of the others and they found them approx.
two kilometers outside Moscow in an alcoholic prison. They found
out that they had been arrested on charges of hooliganism coming
out of a station. Just before the arrest they had been on their way to
meet other members of the group to discuss Peace March '82.
Two other members, Victor Block and Gennady Krochik were
sent to Novosibirsk for the period 21-28 July. They are both
physicists and were told they had to go there. No reason was given.
The group did not join the Soviet Peace Committee as it was
organised by the government and is not independent. They had
asked for their help but were ignored from the beginning. Peace
and trust cannot only be on a political and government level. It must
be discussed amongst ordinary people.-The Peace Committees are
all controlled. It is not possible in the USSR for all people to come
and meet Peace March '82. People don't want war but they can't
discuss specific conditions of trust. The peace groups are fiction. All
their work is support for the Soviet government, they don't work.
At the Academy of Sciences in Moscow we have no meetings about
peace. We did have a meeting to express support for the Argentine
Junta during the Falkland war and to judge the UK as aggressors.
There was no discussion just an official point of view.-There is a
Soviet Peace Fund but what they do is not open in the press.
The group was asked how long they had been preparing
their programme and they said that they had been discussing
it through the winter.
They do not regard themselves as dissidents or against their
government. Peace is a matter for everybody. They were
surprised at the government's reaction and thought it fantas
tic. At first they thought they had been misunderstood. They
had sent their proposals to groups in the US and to the
Scandinavian Women. Nothing reaches them through the
post. Through the Voice of America they had heard of
support for their group at SSDII in a short mention by
18
Senator E. Kennedy.-T)ley had also sent their Appeal to
Geneva to the START negotiators.
Olga Medvedkov said that she had never experienced re
pression like this before. I asked her if they hadn't expected
trouble when they started and she replied. 'It is difficult to
live only the official way. The struggle for peace is so import
ant and not against the government. It has to be dealt with
despite repression.' - 'We cannot raise our voices for peace
quietly', she added.
They gave us the following 'Declaration to Peace March '82':
We declare, it is not enough to meet on the streets. We want to
discuss conditions of trust. We would like to work with peace
groups in other countries. We would like to meet the participants
of Peace March '82 and want to establish trust between peoples of
our country.-We expect to express your attitude to our group
and repression and hope you will raise your voices.
They added that they were disappointed that the peace
marchers did not come and see them but at the same time
they appreciated it was difficult.
The group had collected three hundred signatures, mostly
from students, on a petition but this had been confiscated
together with other papers and their typewriters.
They added that their peace work had nothing to do with
the fact that some of them had asked for exit visas.
They don't just want discussion but to build a monument
of trust for peace in different countries, first in the USA and
USSR.
They didn't know what would happen to them when the
peace marchers had left. But they hadn't done anything
bad.-'It's our underground. We only struggle', said Olga
Medvedkov.
19
Following our visit some of the Scandinavian women
said that they thought the Soviet attitude to the march
changed completely from then on. Certainly there seemed
to be more problems. In Minsk three young pacifists were
prevented from joining the march although a small group
later managed to communicate with them. The Soviet
organisers 'suddenly' decided to make official a visit to the
Khatyn war memorial outside Minsk, where 186 villages
were burned to the ground by the Nazis, easily confused in
many peoples minds with Katyn (outside Smolensk) where
4,000-6,000 Polish officers were killed in 1941, probably
by the Russians. The march nearly split at this stage but
was saved by a quiet, dignified sit-down protest by those
who refused to go. We also discovered that Peace March '82,
in breach of the original agreement, was being linked by the
Soviets with their own march from Moscow to Vienna (via
Budapest and Bratislava). Soviet Weekly and the Hungarian
party paper Nepszabadsag stated clearly that the Scandina
vian women's march was continuing to Vienna.
In conclusion, most participants felt that the march was
a success, a definite breakthrough in East-West relations.
Despite many difficulties it had been possible for two widely
different groups to work together for a common cause.
Through the initiative and hard work of a small group of
dedicated Scandinavian women, a major breakthrough in
East-West peoples relations had been achieved-and this
pleasing to the Russians-was done without bringing down
the walls of the Kremlin.
Sergei Batovrln 26 years, artist followed
Victor Blok 36 physics DPH is sent on a mission
Boris Kaluzhuy
37 physics DPH
Genmady Krochik
33
physics DPH is sent on a mission
Sergei Rosanoer 29 mathematician
Oleg Radsinsky 26 philologist serch; followed
Mark Reitman 50 mathematician DPH
Igor Sobkov
33 physician
~ Fleishgakker 29 engineer followed
Vladimir Fleishgakker 28 engineer followed
Yuri Hronopulo 47 physics Professor a-rest
Yuri Medvedkov
54
geographer Professor arest
~ Medvedkova 33 geographer DPH followed
Valery Godyak 41 physics DPH serch; followed
Vladimir Brodsky 38 physician :rollowed
""
N.B. This list of members of the group was written down
and given to Danielle when she visited them at Mrs Medved
kov's flat. DPH is Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.): for 'serch'
read 'searched'.
20 21
END London Group
227 Seven Sisters Road
London N4 2DA
29/6/82
Dear Mr Brezhnev,
We have been following closely the progress of the new
independent peace group in Moscow.
We were very pleased to learn of their formation and
agree with their reported aims of establishing nuclear-free
zones, stopping nuclear weapons testing, and working to
wards detente between the USA and the USSR.
As you may know, the aims of END go further than this.
We are campaigning to rid Britain and the rest of Europe of
nuclear weapons. By 'Europe' we mean both East and West:
one of our slogans is 'no cruise, no Pershing II, no SS20s'.
We very much appreciate the publicity given to our cam
paign in the USSR and we hope this letter will be positively
reported in the Soviet press, as have previous END initiatives.
We do believe that the USSR has made several moves recent
ly towards detente and disarmament. However, it would
detract from the credibility of these moves if the Soviet
government were to stille the activities of this new peace
group.
We therefore appeal to you to allow the registration of
this group with the Mos-Soviet, as requested, so that they
may continue their activities. We were very concerned to
read that the telephones of Sergei Batovrin and others have
been cut off and that Mr Oleg Radzinski has been threatened
with the termination of his studies unless he withdraws
his support.
This contravenes the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act and
also goes against Article 50 of the Soviet constitution,
adopted in 1977... 'citizens of the USSR are guaranteed
freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings,
street processions and demonstrations'. We note with con
sternation that the USSR is also violating the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which you have
ratified, in particular Article 19 which states that. ..
22
'everyone has the right !o hold opinions without interference'
and Article 25. . . 'every citizen shall have the right and
the opportunity... without unreasonable restrictions... to
take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.. .'
We share the convictions of this newly formed peace
group that the questions of war, peace, and disarmament are
too important to be left to governments, and that citizens
should have the right to participate in the search for peace.
We therefore call on you to allow their voices to be heard
throughout the Soviet Union and to listen to their requests.
Yours sincerely
Carol Freeman for
London END group
[We have received copies of a number of similar letters of
protest or enquiry, from individuals or organisations in the
peace movement. Some of them received replles Similar to
the one recorded by the London END group below. /
23
MR ROGER MANSER
LONDON END CONVENOR
CO 227 SEVEN SISTE RS ROAD
LONDON 4 ENGLAND
EYE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER STOP YOU HAVE BEEN MISLED BY FALSE
REPORTS OF WESTERN MASS MEDIA STOP NOT A SINGLE PERSON
REPRESENTANG PEACE MOVEMENT IN SOVIET UNION IS BEING REP
RESSED AND OF COURSE NOONE OF THEM HAS EVER BEEN ARRESTED
STOP DURING ONLY TWO MONTHS IN CURRENT YEAR MAY AND JUNE
SOVIET PEACE CHAMPIONS HELD ON OCCASION OF SECOND SPECIAL
SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH HAS TAKEN
PLACE IN NEWYORK USA OVER TWENTY THOUSAND RALLIES DEMON
STRATIONS MEETINGS MANIFESTATIONS WHICH WERE ATTENDED BY
OVER SIHTY MILLION PEOPLE STOP FURTHER WHEN IN JULY MEMBERS
OF 1982 PEACE MARCH FROM DANMARK NORWAY SWEDEN FINLAND
AND SOVIET UNION WERE MARCHING THROUGH TERRITORY OF USSR
FROM VYBORG UP TO MINSK VIA LENINGRAD KALININ MOSCOW AND
SMOLENSK THEY WERE JOINED ALONG THEIR ROUTE BY OVER TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND SOVIET PEOPLE STOP OUR MOVEMENT IS FULLY
INDEPENDENT AND IT DOES NOT NEED APPROVAL BY GOVERNMENT
OF ANY SUCH WCTlDN FOR BENEFIT OF PEACE STOP AS FOR TINY
GROUP OF ELEVEN PEOPLE PICTURED BY WESTERN PRESS AS INDE
PENDENT PEACE MOVEMENT NOBODY OF THESE PEOPLE HAS EVER
PARTICIPATED IN ABOVE LISTED ACTIONS OF PEACE ADVOCATES
AND EYE AM NOT ACQUAINTED WITH ANY OF THEM STOP EYE WAS
INFORMED THAT TWO OF THESE PEOPLE NAMELY YURI MEDVEDKOV
AND YURI KHRDPOPULO HAD BEATEN A WOMAN IN A BUS AND WERE
SENTENCED BY DISTRICT PEOPLES COURT TO FIFITEEN DAYS ON
CHARGE OF HOOLIGANISM STOP FURTHERMORE NOONE OF THEM
HAS EVER REQUESTED REGISTRATION WITH MOSSDVIET WHICH IS
ABSOLUTELY UNNECESSARY STOP THUS OUR SOVIET PEACE COM
MITTEE HAD BEEN ELECTED BY ALLUNIDN PEACE CONFERENCE AND
WE NEVER SOUGHT FOR ANY KIND OF OFFICIAL REGISTRATION
STOP EYE SHALL SEND YOU BY AIRMAIL PICTURES OF SOME OF MEN
TIONED MASS ACTIONS OF SOVIET PEACE ADVOCATES HELD IN MAY
AND JUNE THIS YEAR WHICH REFLECT BETTER THAN ANY WORDS
GENUINE MASS MOVEMENT OF SOVIET PEACE CHAMPIONS STOP
YOURS
YURI ZHUKOV CHAIRMANT SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE
24

END PRESS RELEASE
Extract from telegram of END to Leonid Brezhnev, 19 July,
1982.
, END is outraged by the jailing of Medvedkov and
Contact between all peace groups East and
West is essential. Enjoin you to allow peace marchers to
talk to everyone in peace work, release those In Jail and end
all harassment of independent group.. .'
(no reply as yet received).
25
CND PROTESTS OVER ARRESTS OF SOVIET PEACE
ACTIVISTS
CND. today endorsed in principle a letter of protest to
LeonId Brezhnev by END (European Nuclear Disarmament)
about reports that two members of an independent peace
organisation in the USSR have been arrested.
We regret that these arrests coincide with the Scandinavian
womens' peace march which is now crossing the USSR.
. This would have been an ideal opportunity for representa
tives from a Western peace movement to meet with members
of an independent peace movement in the USSR as well as
members of the Soviet Peace Committee.
CND welcomed the formation of the new peace group and
agreed with their reported aims of establishing nuclear-free
zones, stopping nuclear weapons testing and working towards
detente between the USA and the USSR.
With the threat of nuclear war facing us all, we believe
that people everywhere have the right to put pressure on
their governments to achieve nuclear disarmament.
CND's protest is in line with our previous protest to the
Turkish Government over the arrest of members of the
Turkish peace group.
CND will support initiatives either independent of govern
ments. or government initiatives-both east and west-to
achieve world peace through nuclear disarmament.
(eND Press Release. 20 July 1982)
26
AN APPEAL ON BEHALF OF
SOVIET PEACE ACTIVISTS FROM THE
AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT
To: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
As activists in the American peace movement dedicated to
the abolition of all nuclear weapons, we protest the actions
of the Soviet government in detaining independent Soviet
peace activists and seeking to prohibit their activities.
Such actions-taken even as the United Nations Special
Session on Disarmament was unfolding and after hundreds
of thousands rallied on June 12 for nuclear disarmament
are a violation of the Helsinki Accords guaranteeing freedom
of expression to which the Soviet Union is a signatory. We
welcome the recent Soviet renunciation of first-use of nuclear
weapons. However, it belies the Soviet claim to be 'peace
loving' when independent peace activists-our brothers and
sisters in the movement-are labelled 'provocative, illegal and
anti-social' .
Unity in the struggle for disarmament requires that all
citizens of the world have the right to form peace movements
independent of governmental or quasi-governmental controL
Such independent peace committees are essential to building
the broadest possible movement against nuclear arms and
calling all nuclear powers to account for their arsenals.
As activists opposed to actions by the Reagan Administra
tion that would escalate the arms race, we the undersigned
call upon you to release Sergei Batovrin, now interned in a
psychiatric hospital, and to cease harassment of the other
independent activists and allow their voices, too, to be
heard on this most vital of issues-the issue of survival in
the shadow of nuclear war.
ORGANISAnONS ENDORSING THIS APPEAL
(list in formation)
Fellowship of Reconciliation
WarResisters League,
Democratic Socialists of America
27
SANE (National)
Metropolitan SANE
Americans for Democratic Action
West!East Peace and Democracy Project
CoahtJon for a New Foreign and Military Policy
Greenpeace, USA
Humanitas
Mobilisation for Survival
Scientists and Engineers for Political Action
Socialist Party, USA
Council for a Liveable World
Sojourners
Pax Christi
28
..
. THE
NEW YORKER
THE TALK OF THE TOWN
For the last several weeks, Jeri Laber, over at the Helsinki
Watch Committee, has been forwarding us copies of tele
grams she's been receiving from disarmament groups all over
the country-or, rather, copies of copies of cables they've
been receiving from Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the official
Soviet Peace Committee, in answer to their protests on
behalf of the eleven Moscow citizens who formed an inde
pendent peace group early in June, only to be ruthlessly
suppressed during the next few weeks. ("YOU HAVE BEEN
MISLED BY FALSE REPORTS OF WESTERN MASS
MEDIA STOP ," Zhukov's form reply went. "NOT SINGLE
PERSON REPRESENTING PEACE MOVEMENT IN
SOVIET UNION IS BEING REPRESSED AND OF COURSE
NO ONE OF THEM HAS EVER BEEN ARRESTED STOP
MOSCOW IS NOT CHICAGO STOP," and so on, for several
pages, and then, "EYE HAD TO ENQUIRE ABOUT THE
ISSUE OF YOUR CONCERN AND FINALLY EYE WAS
INFORMED THAT TWO OF THESE PEOPLE... WERE
SENETENCED BY DISTRICT PEOPLE'S COURT ON
CHARGE OF HOLLIGANISM FOR BEATING A WOMAN
IN BUS STOP YOU QUALIFY THEIR BEHAVIOUR AS
EXAMPLE OF INDEPENDENT STRUGGLE FOR PEACE
STOP EYE WOULD CALL IT FLAGRANT BREACH OF
PEACE BUT OF COURSE EYE CANNOT INSIST THAT
YOUR VIEW OF WHAT IS GOOD AND WHAT IS EVIL
COINCIDE WITH MINE STOP"-which is about where we
did stop reading his endless cable.) Anyway, all this made
us all the more interested when Jeri Laber called early last
week to tell us that one of the eleven independent Moscow
peace activists, Mikhail Ostrovsky, along with his wife and
their two small children, had recently been expelled from the
Soviet Union and had just surfaced in New York City, in
her office, and to ask if we would like to meet him. We
WOUld, we assured her. Among more serious reasons, we
29
were curious to find out what a Soviet hooligan would
look like.
Ostrovsky looked young-young and earnest. Something
like a Donatello sculpture: tall, lanky body; large, triangular
head on a long, powerful neck. He was dressed in an orange
T-shirt and crinkly new bluejeans. His hair was dark and
wavy, and he had a neatly trimmed full beard. His eyes were
large and seemed to keep changing their colour-brown?
hazel? green? blue?-with the changing of his mood. He
told us-by way of a fine translator (Ostrovsky's voice was
deep and his English nonexistent)- that he was twenty-six
years old and had been a dental technician, like his father
before him. His mother, a doctor, was a loyal Party member,
and, he explained, he had undergone a typical Soviet up
bringing. Although Jewish, his family was not religious, and
he had grown up without any particularly negative feelings
about his lot or that of his countrymen. He had begun to be
disillusioned with the Soviet system, he said, only after
starting work as a dental technician in a state clinic. His
eagerness to research modern (Western) technology was
constantly undercut by his staid and reactionary supervisors;
his enthusiasm, he was warned, was "anti-Socialist". In 1978,
after several years of such frustrations, he and his young
wife decided to emigrate, filed their papers, and were refused
an exit visa. The authorities explained that they had failed to
procure the necessary permission from their parents-a
frequent excuse in such cases. "My own parents had granted
permission, and so had my wife's father, but her mother
had refused," Ostrovsky said. "We begged and begged her.
I don't know-she feared the public shame, perhaps. At any
rate, she refused. It wasn't a happy time. Soon she and we
stopped speaking to one another, though all of us lived in
the same apartment building. After a while, if we passed
her in the hall, we'd turn our faces aside, and she would do
the same-this despite the fact that in the meantime we'd
had our two children. They remained strangers to her."
Once a Soviet applicant is refused a visa, his life becomes
progressively more difficult. The Ostrovskys had become
refuseniks. "At my job, I found myself working three times
as hard for half the pay," Ostrovsky recalled. Increasingly
30
isolated from regular social intercourse, refuseniks often end
up seeking out each other's company. In this context, Sergei
Batovrin proved an important figure. Ostrovsky's eyes shone
a deep blue when he spoke of his friend Batovrin. "He is
actually a year younger than I am," Ostrovsky said, "but I
look up to him and see him as an ideal human being." Like
the Ostrovskys, Batovrin and his wife (and now their six
month-old baby) are refuseniks. Batovrin, the son of a high
level Soviet diplomat, grew up partly in New York City,
where his father was stationed at the Soviet Mission to the
United Nations. In Moscow, he was something of a hippie
during the early seventies. He let his hair grow long, and
became a Pop-style painter. His work never received official
sanction, and a few years ago he organised a show, in his
small apartment, of his own and other disapproved art-an
enterprise that did little to endear him to the authorities.
"Batovrin is tremendously generous," Ostrovsky explain
ed. "Tremendously outgoing. He knows everyone, and every
one is drawn to his home by the quality of the friendship
and the conversation. He knows physicists and mathe
maticians, artists, other former hippies, psychiatrists, other
refuseniks. We would all gather at his home at all hours to
talk about our own situation, our country's, the world's.
During the last several months, we spoke increasingly of the
perils of war, and this is how a group of us decided to form
our committee. The Soviet people truly want peace. This is
perhaps the fundamental fact of Soviet existence-the
memory of the war and the twenty million dead, and the
longing for peace. You can be standing in line and people
will be complaining about this or that, but then someone
will say, 'Still, the most important thing is that we never
have another war,' and everyone will agree. It has achieved
the level of a folk saying. People say it, but they don't do
anything. And here's a contradiction, because the other
lesson from the war was the horror of being invaded, so that
people support a big defense program. And they don't see
the contradiction. The entire Soviet system is built on
contradictions of this kind, and is designed to prevent people
from thinking about them. People live with their eyes closed,
and we were hoping to start the process of opening them."
31

We asked Ostrovsky to what extent the military budget
and, specifically, its nuclear component-was public know
ledge.
"Well, very little of it, of course," he replied. "But that's
why people have brains in their head, isn't it-to read bet
ween the lines?"
The Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and the
USA announced itself to the world on June 4 1982 from
Batovrin's apartment. According to Ostrovsk;, the
members (about half of them were refuseniks) felt that a
precondition of disarmament is trust and understanding
between peoples, and their initial proposals therefore includ
ed such. things as cultural and medical exchanges, regular
cooperation on space missions, and the establishment of
pen-pal networks. In addition, they proposed "open discuss
IOn between representatives of the two governments, to
be broadcast over television and shown in full with the
for people to phone in questions to speakers"
a Jomt program for peace education, compulsory
m SovIet and Amencan schools and textbooks." They also
proposed the formation of a four-sided committee with
representatives of the governments and the peoples ;f the
two. countries. "And another proposal," Ostrovsky recalled,
smIlmg, hIS eyes hazel, "was an exchange of chiIdren
especially the children of leaders. Perhaps leaders would
think twice before starting a war if their children were in
each other's capitals." In all, the group issued thirty pro
posals. The dissemination of these proposals became especial
ly dIfficult after June 12th, which was the day of the huge
anti-nuclear demonstration in Central Park and was also
the day when the Soviet authorities began cracking down on
the group. During the next several weeks, most of its work
was semi-underground. The members had to steer clear of
the police. They launched a peace petition and gathered
sIgnatures from at least five hundred courageous souls-this
despite the fact that copies were continually being seized by
the police. One by one, the members were nabbed hauled
in, warned, sometimes released, sometimes not. '
And then, in early July, Ostrovsky and his wife received
word that their visa had been granted, even though her
32
mother still refused to approve their emigration. "This
presented us with a dilemma," Ostrovsky said. "We had
decided, in joining the group, to give up our attempt to
emigrate. Instead, we would stay and fight for peace. Now
we-and we alone among them all- were being granted our
visa. I don't know why we were singled out. It was a kind of
psychological warfare, perhaps-to force a wedge between
us and the others. I did not want to leave my friends, and at
first I wasn't going to. They encouraged me, however. They
insisted that I would be of more service outside, spreading
our story and our proposals. So we decided to go, but it was
all in a tremendous hurry." The Ostrovskys travelled first
to Italy, and in mid-August they arrived in New York City..
We asked Ostrovsky about Zhukov and the official SovIet
Peace Committee.
"Well, you have to understand that official peace demon
strations in the Soviet Union are not at all like those here or
in Western Europe," he replied. "They are never spontaneous.
One isn't allowed to take part unless one is invited, and if
one is invited one isn't allowed not to take part. And, of
course, they're never critical of the official Soviet line."
We asked him what he and his friends had thought of the
June 12th rally here in New York City.
"We didn't hear about it at the time," he replied. "I heard
about it only after I got out. Occasionally, the Soviet press
will mention the peace marches in the West, but they show
only brief images on TV. The reason is simple: I remember
one day looking at such a TV image and being amazed at
the obviously handmade quality of the signs the demon
strators were carrying. Signs are never handmade in Soviet
peace marches. The Soviet media don't want to give Soviet
citizens any ideas."
We asked about the situation of his friends.
"I am concerned about all of them," he said. "All of
them are being harassed. But I am especially concerned for
Sergei Batovrin. On August 5th, Sergei staged another apart
ment show, this time of eighty-eight anti-war paintings. The
next day, he was arrested and placed, against his will, in a
psychiatric hospital. No doubt they are doing with him what
they have done with others-forcibly drugging him
33
alternately with stimulants and with tranquillizers. This
procedure has bad physical side effects, but they aren't so
much interested in causing one pain. They simply want to
destroy one's personality. After several months of this kind
of thing, one emerges lifeless, without anything of one's
former vitality and former nature. It's a terrible situation.
He's a great and vital man."
Ostrovsky was silent for a moment, his eyes almost brown.
He sighed. "The peril of war is extremely real today, and we
must find some way out of the disaster," he said. "But this
will corne only if citizens in the Soviet Union can demon
strate and put pressure on their leaders, just as yours do
here. We did not, when we got started, see ourselves as a
dissident movement or a human-rights movement. But these
two issues are inseparable in the Soviet Union today. If
there are human rights, people can and will struggle for
peace. If not, not. That is why the American peace move
ment must support people like Batovrin."
New Yorker, 13 September 1982.
(Reprinted by permission; 1982
The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.)
, p Guardian, 10 September 1982
eacenil{ '_free I
Soviet
paigner, Sergei Eeace. cam. j
been fr atovrm has
PSYChIatric ho 0ll? a Moscow
being held th sPItal after
than a monthere [or more
P.orted yesterda' fnends re
rm Was a' leadi Y. Mr Batov_
an unofficial ng member of
up to try to leace group Set
tween the So e.vetaop trust be
the US RVIe Union and
' . - euter.
25 August 1982
STATEMENT BY MIKHAIL OSTROVSKY IN
NEW YORK
My friends and I first began talking about forming a peace
group about eight months ago. We were concerned about the
impasse in efforts to bring about disarmament, and saw that
governments are too greatly burdened with their own interests
and political considerations to resolve disarmament conflicts.
We felt that there was a need for the Soviet public to become
involved and our first priority was to inform people about
these We also believed that increased contact with
Western citizens and exchange of information with them
would contribute greatly to the cause of peace, and that in
particular, mutual trust between the citizens of the US and
the USSR would be the best basis for disarmament.
. 35
- ... --.
$
We timed the announcement of our group's formation to
coincide with the June opening of the UN Special Session
on DIsarmament. At first we did not anticipate that we
would be harassed, but our group acted freely for only a
week before members began to be detained by the police.
and that is my chief concern now-the safety of my
colleagues. Members of the group, which include 15 scientists,
engmeers and other professionals have been repeatedly
held by the police, interrogated, and threatened with dis
missal from their jobs or expulsion from their academic
institutions because of their work for peace.
I am most concerned for Sergei Batovrin, the leader of
the group, who was interned in a psychiatric hospital on
August 6 and is being threatened with electric shock therapy
unless he continues to take depressant drugs. He is also
threatened with permission to emigrate, but he turned it
down, saying he wanted to stay in Moscow and keep work
ing with the peace group.
I think the Soviet authorities have made a serious mistake
in preventing our group from operating freely. By suppressing
our group, the Soviet Union undermines its image as peace
maker, and IS m danger of losing its credibility with the
American peace movement.
I call on organisations in the American peace movement
to press for the release of Sergei Batovrin, and appeal to
Soviet authorities to cease harassing our peace group.
36
These documents have been presented as information to the
British and European peace movements. and to assist them
in their discussions.
It is too early for us to draw conclusions. We are glad to
conclude our documents with the news of the release of
Sergei Batovrin from psychiatric hospital, perhaps in response
to representations to the Soviet authorities from European
and American peace organisations. We hope that the group
may now be free to continue with constructive work.
Here are some questions which thiS episode raises:
Do you think that Western peace movements should engage in
discussions only with 'official'. state-supported Peace Committees
or Councils in the Warsaw Pact countries? Or only with 'inde
pendent', unofficial groups, even when these are small, and isolated
as 'dissidents'? Or with anyone who wants to talk?
On this question, END has favoured the last course: talk
with anyone, provided it is on honest terms and that difficult
issues (like Afghanistan, Poland and the SS20s) are not swept
under the carpet. In the case of the Soviet Union, we do not
suppose that the members of this small Moscow group are
the only Soviet citizens who care about peace. Very import
ant exchanges have taken place recently between physicians
and churches. various forms of 'twinning' are going on, and
we have favoured contact-as direct and unbureaucratic as
possible.
In relation to the official Soviet Peace Committee, END
has had more reservations. We are directly opposed to the
manipulation of the European peace movement by Soviet
controlled agencies. such as the World Peace Council. But
several British peace delegations have visited the USSR in
the past two years, as guests of the Soviet Peace Committee.
sponsored by Quaker Peace Service, the Northern Friends
Peace Board, and (recently) by CND. Their reports have
suggested that at least some officials of the Soviet Peace
Committee are taking a more flexible attitude, and are
willing to listen to critieisms of Soviet military policies.
It is possible that behind-the-scenes debates are going on
in the offiCial committees, and that these may be influenced
37
..
by Western visitors.
But how are we to influence them? Should Western peace move
ments now boycott further discussion with the Soviet Peace Com
mittee until the right of unofficial groups (like the Moscow one) to
engage independent activity is guaranteed? Or would this be to play
the Cold War game?
This episode certainly played into the hands of the Cold
Warriors-and responsibility for this lies squarely on the
shoulders of the Soviet authorities who reacted with such
paranoia. The event could have been damaging if the
American and British peace movements had not at once come
to the support of the Moscow group and thereby demon
strated their non-aligned stance. But it should not pass with
out notice that much of the Western media (with honourable
exceptions) showed no interest at all in the programme and
proposals of the new group: indeed, these often went un
reported. Some newspapers-and also President Reagan
simply made use of the episode as Cold War propaganda
as an example of Soviet 'hypocrisy' and intolerance.
Were END and CND right to protest? Or was this an intervention
into Soviet affairs? Should the Scandinavian Peacemarchers have
acted differently?
The Scandinavian Women were in a difficult position. The
march from Helsinki to Minsk (when the true march ended)
had been negotiated with difficulty with the Soviet autho
rities, and they had entered into mutual agreements to
respect each others' wishes.
But END is grateful to Danielle Grunberg-our 'own'
marcher sponsored by the British peace movement-for
visiting the Moscow group and for bringing back the first
of their badges to reach the West.
END has from its origin taken up a principled stand on
exactly this issue. In the words of our initial Appeal, of
April 1980:
we must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East or
38
West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every
kind of exchange. .
We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and persuasion, to
consider urgently the ways in which we can work together for
these common objectives. We envisage a European-wide campaign,
in which every kind of exchange takes place; in which representa
tives of different nations and opinions confer and co-ordinate their
activities; and in which less formal exchanges, between universities,
churches, women's organisations, trade unions, youth organisations,
professional groups and individuals, take place with the object of
promoting a common object: to free all of Europe from nuclear
weapons.
We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe
already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West', but
to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limita
tions imposed by any national state.
In our view, this principle is critical to the future success
of the peace movement. If we are to break down the Cold
War, we must insist on open communications East/West,
and on full and free exchange.
The peace movements of the world must support each
other and we must come to the aid of our own fellow
workers for peace. The worst example of the repression of
peace workers at this moment is not in the Warsaw bloc
but within NATO (see our pamphlet on the current trial in
Ankara of members of the Turkish Peace Association).
As for the new Moscow group, we cannot know how the
episode will conclude. It is too early to guess whether this
is the first signal of a new kind of independent grass-roots
movement in the Soviet Union: or whether this group will
be isolated, its members encouraged or forced to emigrate,
so that little more will be heard of their courageous stand.
If further news of harassment should become known, here
are some addresses to which you can write.
39
Addresses of members of the group: please note that mail
Latest News
may not get t h r o u g h ~
Sergei Batovrin. spokesman
ulitsa Krupskoi No.5, kv. 96
Moscow 117331, USSR
Maria Fleishgakker
ulitsa Novoryazanskaya 36-28
Moscow, USSR
If there should be further
enquiries or protests to-
Soviet Ambassador
18 Kensington Palace Gardens
London W8
N.A. Shchelokov
Minister ofInternal Affairs
ul. Ogarleva 6
Moscow 103009, USSR
Moscow City Procurator:
SSSR
113184 Moskva
ul. Novokuznetskaya 27
Moskovaskaya Gorodskaya
Prokuratura
Prokuroru
Yury Medvedkov
Leninsky prospekt No. 123, kv 318
proyezd 5
Moscow, USSR
harassment of the group, send
Leonid I. Brezhnev, Chairman
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
The Kremlin
Moscow, USSR
Yury A. Zhukov, Chairman
Soviet Peace Committee
36 Prospekt Mira
Moscow, USSR
Chairman of the Moscow City
Soviet of Workers' Deputies:
SSSR
g. Moskva
ul. Gorkogo 13
Moskovskoy Gorodskoy Sovet
Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya
Predsedatelyu
40
While this Special Report was in the press, we have received
more news of the Moscow Peace Group.
We have learned from Dr Yuri Medvedkov that the work of
the group is continuing, despite harassment. An exhibition of
Sergei Batovrin's anti-war paintings was prepared for
Hiroshima Day (August 6th), but on August 5th 88 of these
paintings were confiscated. By the end of August the group
had experienced 90 man-days of house arrest, and 30 man
days of jail. Several members had been subjected to 24-hour
surveillance and continual harassment. Dr Medvedkov asks
for worldwide support for the group, and especially asks
for the support of fellow scientists. The group felt that the
Scandinavian Peacemarch was a disappointment. Dr Medved
kov adds that he and his wife, Olga, have entered a new and
important phase of their lives. The work of the group has
become more important to them than their previous applica
tions to emigrate.
We have also learned from a supporter of the British peace
movement who has had discussions with members of the
group that they have just issued new proposals for establish
ing trust between Soviet and United States citizens. This
call is also addressed to members of the European peace
movement. These new proposals include
* The setting up of libraries and cultural centres in all
towns of over one million people in the Soviet Union
and the USA.
* The use of films and audio-visual equipment to learn
each others' languages.
* The free exchange of newspapers.
* The easy availability of tourist visas.
* Extending telephone communications.
* Guarantees that no embargo be placed on trade relating
to agricultural products, medicines, and primary
resources.
Although Soviet authorities claim that the group is tiny
and mainly Moscow-based, a spokesperson from the group
says that by early October they had collected the signatures
41
of 900 supporters from different parts of the Soviet Union.
As the process of gathering signatures is not an easy one, it
may be assumed that many more have not reached Moscow.
There are also further details of the harassment to which
members of the group have been subjected. The charges of
'hooliganism' against Dr Medvedkov and Dr Yury Khrono
pulo (a distinguished physicist) arose in this way. The two
men were on the way to a station when they found that
they were being followed by a woman and a group of loud
youths. As they waited for the train, the woman came up to
Dr Khronopulo, pushed him, and began shouting at him to
take his hands off her. Khronopulo turned to people on the
platform to witness that he was not molesting her. At length
the two men went to the police-station to complain of the
harassment. The police officer offered to drive them home in
a police car. But officers from the KGB then brought them
back and compelled the police to charge them with
hooliganism.
The two were sent to a special prison for IS-day offenders.
They slept on boards, without pillows or blankets. They were
fed three times a day with different types of gruel. Only once
were they allowed to stretch their legs in the prison-yard.
Their wives were given no information and found them only
after four days of searching.
Another member of the group, Viktor Blok, narrowly
escaped being run down by a truck while cycling home with
his son. Yuri Medvedkov was driving a car, which was in good
condition, when a wheel flew off. Although Sergei Batovrin
was released from the psychiatric institution early in Septem
ber, he is still being treated as an 'outpatient'. His treatment
was illegal, since he was confined on the orders of the
Military Commissariat, which has no power over him since he
had been exempted from the draft. He was compelled to take
21 pills a day of the strong drug, chlorproteksin. He was also
given an electroencephalagram while under drugs, and
threatened, if he misbehaved, with the stronger drug,
sulphazin.
The Soviet peace group denies that they are 'dissidents'.
The members say that they are reinforcing the official policy
of peace and disarmament which is given almost daily coverage
42
in the newspapers. Their offence is that they are an independ
ent group, seeking direct communication with Western peace
movements. (They have sought, but have been denied, official
status and recognition.)
The group wishes to emphasise its unity with the peace
movements of the world, and it welcomes correspondence
and visits from Western peace activists. Here are two
addresses:
Yury Khronopulo Viktor Blok
Likhocheveskoe shosse, Likhocheveskoe schosse,
dom 20, k.3, Kv 77, dom.20,k.l,kv.159,
141700 Moskovskaya oblast, 141700 Moskovskaya oblast,
g. Dolgoprudnyy, g. Dolgoprudnyy,
USSR. USSR.
STOP PRESS
According to a Reuter newsflash (Guardian, 29 October)
another member of the group, Oleg Radzinsky, has been
arrested. He is charged under article 70 of the criminal code,
covering 'anti-Soviet propaganda'. The maximum sentence
under this article is seven years imprisonment plus five years
of exile. Mr Radzinsky, aged 26, is described in our informa
tion as a 'philologist' and as a 'teacher': we believe he is also
a writer. He is the son of a well-known playwright.
As we go to press we have no more information on this
case. We suggest that readers address their enquiries to the
Soviet authorities.
We have just learned that new branches of the Peace Group
have been formed in Odessa, Movosibirsk and Leningrad.
There is also an 'Independent Initiative' of young people,
already several hundreds strong. Here is the text of the
latest Appeal
43
ADDRESS TO PEACE SUPPORTERS
Today, when 25 million people are wearing military uniforms,
and when stocks of nuclear arms can turn the world into
radioactive ruins, no one can hope that the world will survive
by itself, or through someone else's efforts. Nuclear arms
have made every living being into a hostage of the relations
between the East and West. The two opposing camps have a
lot of suspicions and incomprehension towards each other
and it leads to a very ominous character of the inter
dependence of the two sides.
Everyone shares responsibility. Neither geographical
borders, nor political contradictions can be a handicap in
realising this responsibility.
0,: the first of January 1983 at 15:00 GMT we propose
holdmg TEN MINUTES of silence, prayer and universal
reflections on peace, disarmament and removal of mistrust
among nations.
We call for:
- everyone to break routine daily activities for ten
minutes, to devote these minutes to reflection on peace
- all the sides in all military clashes and conflicts to stop
their military actIOns by announcing de-facto cease
fire for at least ten minutes
~ everyone who is taking part in violence to give up at
least ten minutes.
Ten minutes is little. But ten minutes of universal reflect
ion on peace is ten minutes of solid peace which can turn
into a destructive handful of sand thrown into the machinery
of war.
We appeal for ten minutes of stable peace.
Moscow, USSR
The Group to Establish Trust
October 16, 1982
Between the USA and the USSR
Signed: Sergei Batovrin, Maria Fleishgakker, Viadimir Fleishgakker,
Igor Sobkov, Gennady Krochik, Viktor Blok, Yury Khronopuio, Sergei
Rosenoer, Boris Kalyuzhny, Yury Medvedkov, Olga Medvedkova,
Valery Godyak, Vladimir Brodsky, Oleg Radzinsky, Mark Reitman
Biographical Notes
Jean Stead was born in Yorkshire and started life as a reporter
on the Yorkshire Post. From there she joined the news team
of The Guardian, where she has now been working for
nearly 20 years. In 1969 she became the first woman News
Editor on Fleet Street. After nine years she was appointed
Assistant Editor responsible for News and Special Features
and it was then that she became particularly interested in
writing about the renaissance of the peace movement.
Danielle Rose Grunberg was born 1940 in the UK, of an
Austrian father and Danish mother and was educated in
France/Scandinavia. She worked in television in Copen
hagen before studying to become a theatre director. She
has worked for six years with the Emerging Dragon theatre
group in Somerset and has for the past year been national
coordinator of the Women's Peace Alliance in the UK.
Women's Peace Alliance
Box 240,
8, Elm Avenue,
Nottingham.
44
I
I
I
I
Sergle Batovnn \Il Moscow Psych, Ilospltal t'jo 14. August 1982.
Photo by courtesy Aid to Russian Chnstians- Peter Reddaway.
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Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
Young Christians Propose a Social Peace Service as an Alternative to Military Service
(December 7, 1982)


Taking the peace propaganda of the SED at face value, young Christians proposed a social
peace service as an alternative to compulsory military service. They wanted to express
opposition to the arms race and the militarization of East German society while trying to initiate
a political dialogue with the ruling party on a local level.




A World without the Military that Would Be an Alternative


In the spring of 1981, when three church workers from Dresden drafted a text demanding the
introduction of civilian service as an alternative to military service in the GDR, they were
probably unaware that they had provided the impetus to the most significant peace initiative in
the GDR (both in terms of numbers and political impact) since the debate on military instruction
in schools. Their demands were actually nothing new; time and again, young conscripts had
written letters and petitions that criticized the options for unarmed military service in the National
Peoples Army as insufficient.

It was only in March [of this year] that the leadership of the [Protestant] state church of the
province of Saxony considered a letter by students in Naumburg that mentioned the possibility
of a civilian alternative to military service in the context of the larger question of concrete steps
toward promoting peace. This letter was forwarded to the Church Leadership Conference.

The Dresden initiative differed from similar attempts in the 1960s and 1970s, however, in that it
aimed from the outset at a broader public within the church. Up to that point, petitions by
individuals or small groups had always ended up with the state authorities or the church
leadership, without having had any tangible effect. The Social Peace Service [Sozialer
Friedensdienst] Initiative, which quickly became known by its abbreviation SoFd, was set up
differently, so that many people could lend their support to the initiative through signatures
without it becoming the type of signature collection subject to authorization in the GDR. Also, it
was not addressed to the church leadership or state agencies but was supposed to be sent to
the synods that convene in the fall. They were supposed to take up the matter and forward it to
the government.

Reproduced from the German History
in Documents and Images Collection
by permission of the German Historical
Institute, Washington, D.C.
(www.ghi-dc.org)
-Thanks to GHDI Project Manager
K. McCullough and her staff for
ensuring the quality of the translations.
--Contributed by Holger Nehring.
2
The Dresden text spread quickly throughout the entire GDR. It was read aloud, discussed, and
signed at events and community evenings organized by Protestant youth groups [Junge
Gemeinde] and student groups. Most copies of the appeal were duplicated by typewriter. In
June 1981, the proposal circulated at public church congresses in Grlitz, Stralsund, and
Dessau. At a question and answer session with church personalities, young people asked
church representatives to take a stance on the issue. Although it was primarily younger people
who participated in the initiative, the proposal met with general acceptance in all church circles.
The strongly Protestant, almost pietistic basic understanding of the appeal, which probably
could have emerged in this form only in the Saxon part of the GDR, virtually ruled out any
possible Christian argument for rejecting the proposal.

A basic characteristic of the concept is that its focus is not on protecting the conscience of the
individual but on fulfilling a societal duty. Peace should not only be demanded but also
practiced, starting today, through emblematic personal sacrifice, and help should be given to
those who, according to Christian understanding, need it the most. Regarding the present
proposal, wrote the church leadership of the province of Saxony in November 1981, two things
should be emphasized as particularly important:

a) the connection between an expressed commitment to peace and peace service
b) the connection between disarmament and responsibility for the socially weak.

Because the paper was limited to proposals that appeared feasible and were not deemed futile
from the outset, it found broad resonance among the church public, and the church leadership
even made it the subject of negotiations between the church and the state. But this realism
brought the authors criticism from other supporters of the cause.

One member of an East Berlin peace group said: I didnt sign, because I simply see some
things differently. For example, living in barracks I spent a year and a half living in one of
those structures, and I know what that means. This is exactly how they break people down; they
tear you away from your social ties and prohibit all contact with the outside world. That wears
you down; it is an essential part of the structural violence. Now, whether I stoke up the stove in
the barracks or care for patients, there isnt really much of a difference for me. And a
conscientious objector to all forms of mandated service explained: I refuse to accept this
heteronomy. Social action cannot be prescribed. I have to practice it all the time.

During the summer of 1981, supporters of the initiative made numerous attempts to introduce
their demands into discussions with state representatives. There were opportunities to do so at
the voter gatherings in June of that year, since those gatherings were always held in the lead-up
to the Volkskammer elections. Such meetings have no direct influence on decisions, and they
generally inspire just as little interest as the rest of this hollow political ritual, but sometimes
critical questions did manage to shake them up. One person involved reported on such a
meeting:

3
Of the twenty-five young people, only three showed up aside from me. Even the Volkskammer
candidate who was supposed to introduce herself failed to come, so we could only speak with
one representative from the municipal district, the party secretary of the residential district, and
the residential district chairman, who was a career officer. After we had spent an hour debating
the poor quality of the streets and the sidewalk lighting, and the terrible rolls and miserable
sausage in the market, I started discussing my problems:

1. Legal regulations for young people under eighteen who want to become construction soldiers
[Bausoldaten] but who still have to participate in pre-military training in school and vocational
instruction.
2. The labor shortage in health and social service professions, including care for the elderly, and
the proposal to introduce a social peace service, that is, a civilian alternative to military service.
3. How can I nominate candidates for election who represent my own interests?

[ . . . ]



Source: Eine Welt ohne Militr das wre eine Alternative [A World without the Military that
Would Be an Alternative], Frankfurter Rundschau, December 7, 1982, p. 14.

Translation: Allison Brown
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Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
An Expelled East German Dissident Explains the Peace Movement (July 21, 1983)


In an interview published in the Tageszeitung, a leftist West Berlin newspaper, the expelled
Jena dissident Roland Jahn describes the East German peace movement: its motivations,
activities, and hopes for the future. The movement aimed to end the nuclear arms race and to
create space for political alternatives within the GDR.




Personally, I am not a Pacifist


Why is the GDR bureaucracy so allergic to the autonomous peace movement that, as we
saw in your case, it doesnt even stop short of forced expulsion? The Peace Community
[Friedensgemeinschaft] in Jena also supports the official government proposals. So
wheres the problem for the GDR?

Jahn: The problem is that we dont hold back, that we put our ideas into practice, delve into
what takes place in daily life. And there we see the contradiction between the militarism in social
life and the officially pronounced desire for peace. The state authorities think that this movement
could produce something that calls the entire social structure into question. The system is set up
in a way that disciplines people and takes away their right to make decisions, just like in the
military: orders obedience. Theres no democracy but rather a despotic militarism. And were
turning against militarism, militarism all over the world, and so of course we start here at home,
where we feel it every day, and we point it out. In doing so, we debunk the official peace
pronouncements and thus become dangerous. Threats and restrictions are felt everywhere, but
they dont always express themselves outwardly. The movement itself is everywhere inside the
people. But when someone breaks ranks publicly, more and more people find courage and
suddenly realize how restricted they are, how little say they have, and they start to express
themselves and resist things. This generates movement and the authorities want to counteract
that. But its not that were protesting just for the sake of opposition. We simply want peaceful
coexistence with respect for the individual and for human dignity, the kind of conditions under
which an individual can develop fully.




Reproduced from the German History
in Documents and Images Collection
by permission of the German
Historical Institute,
Washington, D.C. (www.ghi-dc.org)
-Thanks to GHDI Project Manager
K. McCullough and her staff for
ensuring the quality of the
translations.
--Contributed by Holger Nehring.

2

What role does the church play for [all of] you?

The Protestant church in the GDR contributes significantly in that it gives autonomous peace
work a chance to develop at all. Of course, there are lots of problems that go beyond the scope
of the present conversation. But just a short remark: the conflicts we had in Jena led to our
going public as a peace community, independent of state and church, for the first time.


Im thinking of the Pentecost meeting of the FDJ [Free German Youth], of the striking
television images. What is this thing that presents itself as the official peace
movement? Is it only bureaucratically decreed mobilizations?

Yes, on the one hand, thats what it is. But I dont deny that the people who attend those
gatherings have genuine emotions. Its a very natural thing to oppose the NATO Dual-Track
Decision.

The forms in which protests happens are prescribed. But other things come into play as well. Its
a Pentecost youth meeting and theres everything that accompanies that, having a good time
and so on. . . . You could certainly say that some people are manipulated, but most of them are
just speaking out for the cause of peace. The problem is that no one is allowed to go beyond the
officially prescribed slogans. Western depictions sometimes make it look as though everything
here were decreed, for example: Maybe they arent even against it. Thats nonsense. I dont
know anyone in the GDR who supports the NATO Dual-Track Decision. Because when a
weapon is aimed at you, you dont support that weapon being aimed at you. And the Pershing II
weapons are aimed at us in the GDR.

[ . . . ]


To what extent are the autonomous peace circles an isolated group in the GDR? Do they
radiate outward into the rest of society, into organizations like the FDJ, for example?

That which is understood as autonomous peace work is supported predominantly by the
Protestant church. And from there it radiates outward into the general population; there are,
after all, many Christians.

With respect to those of us in Jena and we also worked outside of the church the reaction
was quite varied. First of all, it was noticed. Id like to mention three public actions: the moment
of silence on Christmas, the rally on the anniversary of the bombing of Jena, and the FDJ peace
demonstration on Pentecost Day. (For us, the content aspect of our work is also important, but
Ill explain that in a minute.) During public actions, theres definitely a radiation outward into the
population. The term population is actually too broad, since its mostly the cheering types [die
Jubler] who go to the official rallies; the broad masses dont really come out, except for the FDJ,

3

since its mandatory for them. But many of the 15- to 16-year-olds in the FDJ are looking for
something new, and theyre open to engaging with all kinds of ideas.

At the moment of silence on Christmas the population noticed that something was going on
because of the large number of security forces. Some people say, Oh, theyre crazy; others
participate in slandering us: they say that were anti-social. But a large segment knows what its
all about and what were protesting. They know, but they still say theres no point in protesting
because thats the attitude of the opposition in the GDR, to say theres no point. And another
group of people say: that should be supported, what theyre doing is good.


Do people talk about it, say, at work?

Yes, of course, whenever it becomes public, whenever the security forces strike down hard.
Heres one very clear example. In November a moment of silence was held. Afterwards,
passersby spoke with the participants; there were small group discussions. And then it was
over. Then another moment of silence was supposed to be held on December 24, but a large
number of security forces and combat groups, etc, were on hand. Although the moment of
silence didnt take place, because it was prevented, it immediately became the talk of the town
in Jena. And then there was our rally on March 18. We came in with posters and were beaten
up. News of it spread everywhere immediately.

So on Pentecost Day we were tolerated in some places; people thus engaged with us. In a very
cautious way, of course, but at least they made an attempt. Then our posters were torn down
again and a few discussions started, there was a large group of very young FDJ youths
standing around and some of them said: Yeah, were on your side. And in Schwerin some FDJ
youths picked up posters of ours that had been torn down. At these moments, you can feel the
movement, you can feel whats going on inside people and that its mostly a matter of getting
the word out. For us it was the same thing. We didnt stop with the demand for disarmament;
rather, we also saw the contradictions in everyday life. This becomes the main issue the
moment you delve deeper, the moment you dont just say, yes, there are missiles that theyre
aiming at us, but when you precisely analyze everything that threatens us. You see that the
things happening in our army dont advance education toward peace. The same is true for
whats being taught in school in military training, and this also extends to war toys; thats where
you have to start. But of course its the missiles that are most visible. But then you come far
enough to realize that this militarization characterizes certain life patterns: subordination, not
having a say, and then you develop yourself further. Youre no longer concerned just with
disarmament, but also with democratic freedoms, with human rights.






4

What role does the call for unilateral disarmament play for [all of] you in the GDR?

There are different opinions. I personally think that disarmament has to occur on both sides, but
you have to set an example at each step along the way; you have to take measures that make
the other side follow suit.


Would you make this demand in the GDR? Even though you have a very clear position
on NATOs attempt to catch up in the arms race?

Yes, you have to take steps that set an example. All the calculations about weapons potential is
nonsense; thats why I dont pay too much attention to balancing one side against the other. I
dont regard the talks in Geneva as senseless but rather as fruitless. For that reason,
disarmament that cuts across blocs and proceeds from the bottom up is becoming more and
more important, and ways to achieve this need to be found. Thats where the exchange of ideas
is important, as is the willingness of individuals to adopt a stance of resistance. Those in power
in the East and West have no interest in disarmament. The one earns his profits in the
armaments industry; the other needs militarism and armaments to maintain the power
structures. Not only power for powers sake in a psychological sense, but also in a concrete,
material sense, since everyone here is anchored in this military system. The officers or those
who have good positions in the arms industry are earning well. Theyre making profits in a
different way than in capitalism, namely, through their position in the hierarchy of the system.
The officer, the general who carries the sword, golden and gleaming, and who has a good life
hes not eager to pull a ploughshare and sweat. Thats why he wont support the slogan: swords
to ploughshares.

This is why the peace movement always has to be driven forward from the grass roots. People
have to refuse to go along with the system. Put in a totally nave way: there wont be any
missiles if no missiles are produced. And who produces them? Workers. Thats where we have
to start, and there I think the question of unilateral disarmament is good. To start unilaterally
with yourself: dont go to the army, dont produce armaments or [war] toys, contribute to
teaching peace, starting with very simple things. Wars cannot be prevented by preparing for
them, but rather by teaching peace.

[ . . . ]


What effect did the events in Poland have on the GDR?

That was very complex. It generated a lot of hope, especially among the younger generation. A
large segment of the peace movement sees itself as an alternative movement with respect to all
aspects of society. The people are prepared to forego the normal path, careers, etc., simply
because of the threat. Then that develops further into a drive to develop ones own personality,

5

which is only possible under democratic conditions. And any change in this direction is of course
welcomed. Poland was like the GDR: elections results of 99 percent [for the Communist party].
And then suddenly the people learn to express themselves. That made a lot of people here
optimistic and made it possible for people to feel hopeful for the GDR. On the other hand, of
course, people saw that the GDR is not Poland. They are still doing well, in material terms, that
is.


What will happen now in Jena? The Peace Community has lost a lot of its members.

There are enough people to continue the work. Although it is a community, and not an
organization with a president, etc., there is still a structure there. We gave ourselves a concept.
For us, peace is not the absence of war; rather, it is action that can be lived all the time in
concrete situations. That also means trying to deal with the issues, having an effect on society.
Its not that were a bunch of people who just want to do spectacular things.

We began working in groups. Initially, the issue was the problem of militarism. Then came
questions about its cause, where it started: in how we are raised and educated. So an education
group formed. Then we asked ourselves: what else do we feel threatened by? Of course, the
relationship between humanity and nature/the environment, so an ecology group formed. Then:
many wound up in jail, were subjected to the arbitrariness of the state. They dont know the
laws, so a group formed and concerned itself with legal problems. Or we asked ourselves, are
we alone in the GDR? There are groups like this all over, we have to build up contacts and
exchange information. Everyone contributed whatever they could to our work. That included
artistic work. For example, we worked a lot with different photo-techniques; we made postcards
about peace and then sent them throughout the GDR.

All of that exists as before. Some people left, including some very significant individuals, but
everything continues to exist. Even if we cannot determine quantitatively how many people
belong to the peace movement, we know that there is something inside people, that the
increasing arms build-up and militarization, the increasing violence by the state, and very
concrete things like my expulsion make a difference. So people are looking for ways to work
together to do something to oppose the threat. Thats how these communities will form, and new
people will continue to find their way to them.




Source: Traude Ratsch, Interview with Roland Jahn: Ich persnlich bin kein Pazifist
[Personally, I am not a Pacifist], tageszeitung, July 21, 1983, p. 9.

Translation: Allison Brown
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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 247.

Saturday, June 9 [1984]
Another briefing breakfast 8:30 A.M. Then back to Lancaster
house. The morning meeting went long more protests by Pierre &
Francois. We didnt get to lunch until 2 P.M. There was blood on the
floor but not ours. As usual, Margaret, Helmut, Yasu & I stayed
together & for the most part prevailed. It was a good summit & we did
make progress on trade matters, East-West, plans if the Iran-Iraq war
creates an oil crisis & agreements on 3
rd
world matters & handling the
tremendous international debt.
We were further delayed in getting to Guild Hall for the finale
the presentation of statements to the press, by 40,000 anti-nuke
demonstrators who fouled up traffic. Before leaving we displayed a
model of our proposed space station & I extended an invitation to all
of them to join us.
Into black tie & on to Buckingham for the dinner give by the
Queen. It was a very nice affair & an experience to be in that historic
palace dining with the Royal family & others. I was between the
Queen & the Queen Mother who is a delightful person. Across the
table was Nancy between Prince Phillip & Prince Charles.
And so the Summit ends.

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Volume 9. Two Germanies, 1961-1989
Peace and Human Rights (1986)



In November 1985, after a human rights seminar planned by various East Berlin peace groups
was canceled at the last minute under pressure from the Ministry for State Security [the Stasi],
preparation committee members Wolfgang Templin, Ralph Hirsch, and Peter Grimm decided to
issue a call for a general discussion of human rights. In doing so, they took a decisive step away
from a narrowly focused peace movement toward a more general opposition to the GDR
dictatorship. Templin, Hirsch, and Grimm were active in the Peace and Human Rights
Initiative, which, in the following years, became one of the most important opposition groups in
the GDR. Within the peace movement, however, there were differences, most of which, as the
second text shows, concerned the manner in which the movement was to be organized and
represented.




I. Speaker of the Peace and Human Rights Initiative (Human Rights Seminar)


Dear Friends!

Within the peace movement there is a growing consciousness of the close connection between
peace and human rights. Many experiences in recent years prove that the goals of peace
initiatives depend upon the implementation of basic democratic rights and freedoms. There is a
tense continuation of the arms build-up in both political blocs, negotiations are being held
behind closed doors, and peace movement activists are being prosecuted and sometimes
criminalized, without any regard for those affected. As far as these practices are concerned, the
Western democracies are right up there with our governing leaders. Thats the state of our
experience we didnt know how to deal with it. We have yet to do any real work in the area of
human rights, aside from reacting to isolated cases and spontaneously expressing concern.
Last summer, people in various Berlin peace groups proposed the organization of a human
rights seminar. At the first meeting, common experiences were to be discussed, ways of
working on human rights issues reviewed, and contacts made. The proposed subjects and focal
points were regarded as an impetus to discussion and were to aid in the later results of our
work. Our statement regarding the postponement of the human rights seminar of November 16,
1985, and our letter to the synods of the Berlin-Brandenburg state church document the debates
on the prohibition of the seminar.

This situation did not relieve us of our responsibility to organize a human rights seminar and to
do further work in this area. In the preparation committee, additional agenda points were
discussed and devised; working groups were formed to address them. In these groups,
members of different church and autonomous peace groups worked together. We would like to
Reproduced from the German History
in Documents and Images
Collection by permission of the
German Historical Institute in
Washington, D.C. (www.ghi-dc.org)
-Thanks to GHDI Project Manager
K. McCullough and her staff for
ensuring the quality of the
translations.
--Contributed by Holger Nehring.

2

inform you of the current state of our work.

Main subject areas and working groups:

Peace and human rights
The right to employment as a basic human right
Human rights and society (historical development)
Human rights and the justice system
Church and human rights
Human rights and education/childrearing youth
Prospects for human rights work in the GDR
Environment, health, and human rights
Human rights in the military sphere

In all these subject areas, we want to concentrate on the situation and on development in our
own country; this does not rule out a discussion of human rights problems and cooperation and
solidarity with human rights initiatives in other countries.

We aspire for our work to spread throughout the GDR. Presently, representatives of all the
above-mentioned subject areas and working groups are active in a preparatory committee that
meets in Berlin and coordinates the content-related and organizational work on a regular basis.

The Peace and Human Rights preparation committee will be represented publicly by three
spokespersons who will rotate annually. We wish and hope for your ideas, criticisms, materials,
and participation. The current spokespersons are Wolfgang Templin, Ralph Hirsch, and Peter
Grimm.



II. Expression of Protest by the Opposing Faction: Statement Regarding the Preparations
for the Peace and Human Rights Seminar


[ . . . ]

There was agreement to continue work on a seminar, to form working groups on various
subjects, to have an editorial committee draft a new petition whose contents are more specific
than the present one and to submit this to the synods of the Protestant state churches, and to
appoint a group of three spokespersons. The spokespersons sole function will be to inform the
church leadership and the hosts of the parochial church council of the status of our work and to
represent the opinions of the preparation committee. Content-related and organizational work in
the preparation phase should finally be better coordinated. March 1986 was fixed as the target
date for a new seminar. Also, the working groups were nominally constituted, and it was agreed
that the entire group of people organizing the seminar should be convened for all important
decisions and in special situations.

At a later meeting in December 1985, the preparation committee sent the aforementioned
petition to the synods.

At the next meeting on January 9, 1986, several interested people were told that their presence

3

had not been intended, since a coordinating group comprising the three speakers and the
conveners of the working groups had already been formed on November 23, 1985, and they
were not part of that group. But since such a decision obviously contradicts grassroots
democratic principles also in the view of the coordinating group those people were allowed
to stay. At this meeting, the decision was made to draft an informational letter to peace groups
and friends [here] in the GDR who are interested in the seminar. The text was to have an
exclusively informal character and to provide information on the status of preparations for the
seminar.

On February 3, RIAS and SFB
1
announced that representatives of various peace groups had
met in East Berlin and decided to make human rights the focus of GDR-wide peace work. The
basis of this was a so-called Document III of a Peace and Human Rights Initiative. This was
how most people involved in organizing the seminar found out that such a document existed,
since it was not delivered to the Berlin peace groups. This omission constitutes a violation of the
instructions given on January 9, 1986. Attempts were made later to shift responsibility for this
onto others.

The lone authors of this letter are the three speakers, who showed the letter mind you, already
in duplicated form to only five members of the coordinating group prior to its dissemination.

The high-handed, autocratic actions of the speakers group in composing the so-called
Document III constitute a major breach of trust. The portions of the text that had not been
agreed upon pertain to:

1. political assessments that anticipate the possible results of the seminar, which has yet to be
held;
2. the announcement of intentions for GDR-wide human rights work,
3. the labeling of the statement of November 16, 1985, the petition of December 1985, and the
information of January 24, 1986, as Documents I to III;
4. the pretension of an annually rotating group of speakers to represent the group publicly;
5. the transformation of the preparation committee involved in organizing the seminar into a
Peace and Human Rights Initiative.

With this, the reservations of the Treptow parochial church council and the representatives of
the church leadership, which had led to the postponement of the seminar, were indirectly
confirmed. In the text, the seminars role as the aim of the undertaking retreats into the
background.

The contents of the so-called Document III represent a political threat to the preparations for the
seminar, create a sectarian separation between human rights and peace work, and harm the
peace movement.

When the speakers were first confronted about this so-called Document III, they either made
light of the criticism or did not respond at all. Their comments included: this is the agreed upon
informational letter; there was no reason to convene the preparation committee; the passages to
which there is objection include approved terms; the interpretations feared by those who
intervened represent nothing but panic-mongering; the critics are actually obstructionists who

1
RIAS [Radio in the American Sector] and SFB [Sender Freies Berlin] were two radio stations in West
Berlin trans.

4

waste time by constantly raising provocative discussions of fundamental issues and hamper the
work being done.

When contrary to the expectations of the speakers group reservations were voiced more
loudly and pressure to convene a meeting of the entire preparation committee grew, massive
efforts were made up front to exclude critics from this meeting and to prevent their attendance.
Some members of the preparation committee were given false information about the time and
date of the meeting; some claimed that everyone had already been invited to it though this
can be proven untrue and, up to the last minute, attempts were made to keep critics of the so-
called Document III away from the meeting on February 24, 1986. One of the speakers even
said at the meeting itself that the presence of some of the people there was contrary to what
had been agreed upon, though invitations were extended to friends who belonged neither to the
coordinating group nor to the critics.

Consequently, the meeting was very emotionally charged from the outset. The spokespersons
tried to shift the blame to the people who attended the meeting of January 9, 1986, by once
again claiming that the contents of Document III corresponded with what had been agreed upon
at that meeting, and that whoever was unaware of that must have been sleeping. The charge of
sabotage and pressure for a discussion of fundamental principles was reiterated. But since a
majority, even among those friends who had initially remained impartial, had expressed
criticism, and since no convincing arguments for the so-called Document III were presented, a
vague disclaimer representing the minimum consensus on defusing the criticized text was
drafted after four hours of discussion. This result was immediately undermined by assurances
that the conditions in the preparation committee would repeatedly lead to the same old conflicts.
On the very same evening, some participants reported that they did not feel bound by the
minimum consensus.

This makes it clear to us that any hope of working toward a joint seminar in the present group is
illusory. Therefore we have come to the following conclusions:

We declare:

that the preparation of a human rights seminar, in particular, requires democratic conduct
and organizational structures. The moral integrity of those involved is a prerequisite for
working together in a trusting relationship. Dirty tricks cannot be tolerated.
that, for us, this subject is an integral part of peace work, and we want to continue to work
toward this end;
that our political responsibility forces us to stop participating in this preparation committee as
of the present meeting.
that we intend to organize a seminar in Berlin and we invite anyone interested to help
organize it. One possible theme is: Human rights the individual and society.

The following subjects could be addressed as part of this:

different ideas of democracy and other forms of rule (e.g., grassroots, commissar republic,
pre-bourgeois, bourgeois, and socialist democracies);
development and differentiation of legal terms
experience with socialist law and social practice in the GDR
questions of concrete solidarity


5

This is not a firm program, but instead is open for any subject-related modifications.
This paper is intended for use in the GDR.


Signed: Vera and Knud Wollenberger, Silvia Mller, Thomas Klein, Reinhard Schult, and
Wolfgang Wolf



Source: Sprecher der Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte (Menschenrechtsseminar)
[Spokespersons of the Peace and Human Rights Initiative (Human Rights Seminar)] and
Erklrung zur Vorbereitung eines Seminars Frieden und Menschenrechte [Explanation of
Preparations for the Peace and Human Rights Seminar]; reprinted in Wolfgang Rddenklau,
ed., Strenfried. DDR-Opposition in Texten 1986-1989 [Troublemaker. The GDR Opposition in
Texts 1986-1989]. Berlin, 1992, pp. 56-57.

Translation: Allison Brown
Inscription reads: Dear Bernard! I want to thank you for your enormous
contribution to preventing nuclear war. Without it and other powerful anti-
nuclear initiatives it is unlikely that this Treaty would have come about. I wish
you all the best. Mikhail Gorbachev.

THE EUROMISSILES
CRISIS AND
THE END OF THE
COLD WAR,
1977-1987
DOCUMENT READER
PART II
Embassy of the
United States in Rome
10-12 DECEMBER 2009
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ROME, ITALY
Convened by t he Machi avel l i Cent er for Col d War St udi es ( CI MA) ; t he Woodrow
Wi l son Cent er s Col d War I nt er nat i onal Hi st or y Proj ect ( CWI HP) ; Fondazi one Craxi ; t he
George Washi ngt on Uni versi t ys Nat i onal Secur i t y Archi ve; t he Uni versi t y of Par i s I I I -
Sor bonne Nouvel l e; and t he Uni versi t y of Par i s I - Pant heon Sor bonne; i n cooperat i on wi t h
Bundeskanzl er Wi l l y Brandt St i f t ung; and under t he sponsorshi p of t he I t al i an Mi ni st r y of
Forei gn Af f ai rs and t he Embassy of t he Uni t ed St at es i n Rome.


The Euromissiles Crisis and
the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

Dear Conference Participants,

We are pleased to present to you this document reader, intended to facilitate discussion at the
upcoming conference on the Euromissiles Crisis, to be held in Rome on 10-12 December 2009.

This collection was compiled by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the
Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) with indispensable support from conference participants,
outside contributors, and institutional sponsors. It is by no means comprehensive. In selecting the
documents, we sought to include some of the most important materials available and to provide a broad
overview of the Euromissiles Crisis from a variety of perspectives.

This reader is divided into four parts: The Peace Movement highlights the perspective of the grass-
roots activists from both sides of the Iron Curtain who opposed the Euromissiles deployment and the arms
race generally, and the three chronological sections on International Diplomacy focus upon the actions and
views of the policy-makers and world leaders who were at the very center of the Euromissiles Crisis.

We are extremely grateful to everyone who contributed documentary evidence to this reader,
including Gianni Battimelli, William Burr, Malcolm Byrne, Elizabeth Charles, Lodovica Clavarino, Helge
Danielsen, Ruud van Dijk, Matthew Evangelista, Nathan Jones, Holger Nehring, Leopoldo Nuti, Giordana
Pulcini, Bernd Rother, Giles Scott-Smith and James Graham Wilson. Piero Craveri, Laura Pizei and Serena
Baldari played a key role in making documents from the Craxi Foundation available in this reader.

Once the documents were in hand, a number of people worked to ensure that this collection was
ready for dissemination, including Christian Ostermann, Bernd Schaefer, Mircea Munteanu and Kristina
Terzieva at CWIHP, the German Historical Institutes German History in Documents and Images Project
Manager Kelly McCullough, Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein from the London School of Economics, as well as
an extraordinarily capable team of CWIHP Research Assistants, including Pieter Biersteker, Amy Freeman,
Ekaterina Radaeva, Elizabeth Schumaecker, and Katarzyna Stempniak.

This reader and the larger conference to which it is connected benefited immensely from the
support of Fondazione Craxi, the National Security Archive at the George Washington University, the
University of Paris III-Sorbone Nouvelle, the University of Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne, Bundeskanzler Willy
Brandt Stiftung, the London School of Economics Cold War Studies Centre, and BCC Roma. The Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States in Rome deserve special thanks for their
central roles in sponsoring and hosting this conference.

Finally, we would also like to recognize the efforts of those whose hard work has made this
conference possible, including Matteo Gerlini for his pioneering research at the Fondazione Craxi, and of
course Leopoldo Nuti, and his outstanding staff, Giordana Pulcini, Lodovica Clavarino and Flavia Gasbarri,
as well as the Wilson Centers Diana Micheli, who designed the conference poster and program.


Tim McDonnell
Washington, D.C.
November 2009
The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

TABLE OF CONTENTS:


Part Two: International Diplomacy, 1975-1979

1975

1) 11 September, Action Memorandum, Hartman and Stern to Kissinger, The DOD Modernization
Program for Tactical Nuclear Forces in Europe, NARA, Contributed by William Burr.

2) 24 September, Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Mason Plenary
Discussion, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Contributed by William Burr.

3) 29 September, Cable, Hillebrand to Hartman, Schlesinger Discussions with Leber, State
Department FOIA Release, Contributed by William Burr.

1978

4) 16-17 February, Minutes of NPG HLG Meeting, Los Alamos, Norwegian Ministry of Defense,
Translated by Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein, Contributed by Helge Danielsen.

5) 18 August, Memorandum to Vice President Walter Mondale, Response to PRM-38: Long-Range
Theater Nuclear Forces, State Department FOIA Release, Contributed by William Burr.

6) 11 October, Cable, U.S. Mission to NATO to Cyrus Vance, TNF Bilateral with the UK, State
Department FOIA Release, available at the National Security Archive.

7) 16 October, Cable, U.S. Mission to NATO to Cyrus Vance, Bilateral with the FRG on TNF Issues,
State Department FOIA Release, available at the National Security Archive.

8) 16-17 October, Minutes of NPG HLG Meeting, Brussels, Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Translated
by Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein, Contributed by Helge Danielsen.

9) 24 November, Cable, U.S. Mission to NATO to Cyrus Vance, Nov 20 NAC on Arms Control Issues,
State Department FOIA Release, Contributed by William Burr.

10) 30 November-1 December, Minutes of NPG HLG Meeting, Brussels, Norwegian Ministry of Defense,
Translated by Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein, Contributed by Helge Danielsen.

1979

11) 12 January, Memorandum of Conversation between Brzezinski and Italian Ambassador Pansa,
Carter Library, Contributed by Leopoldo Nuti.

12) 20 March, Information Memorandum. Report on Consultations with Belgian, Dutch, and Italian
Governments, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs David Aaron to the
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, The Digital National Security Archive, Contributed by
William Burr.

13) 3 April, Minutes of NPG HLG Meeting, Brussels, Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Translated by Lars
Unar Stordal Vegstein, Contributed by Helge Danielsen.

14) 12 April, Briefing Book, SCC Meeting, 12 April 1979, White House Situation Room, CREST
Release, Contributed by William Burr.

15) 21-22 April, Speaking Notes for Dutch Prime Minister Van Agt for Meeting with Walter Mondale,
Dutch National Archive, Contributed by Ruud Van Dijk.

16) 23 April 1979, Memorandum of Conversation between Dutch Prime Minister van Agt and Walter
Mondale, Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands, Contributed by Ruud van Dijk.

17) 2 July, Cable from U.S. Embassy in Rome to Cyrus Vance, Senator Byrds Visit to Italy, State
Department FOIA Release, Contributed by Leopoldo Nuti.

18) 12 July, Letter from Carter to Dutch Prime Minister van Agt, Archive A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed by
Ruud Van Dijk.

19) c. 10 August, State Department INR Publication, Theater Nuclear Force Negotiations: The Initial
Soviet Approach, The Digital National Security Archive.

20) 10-11 September, Minutes of NPG HLG Meeting, Brussels, Norwegian Ministry of Defense,
Contributed by Helge Danielsen.

21) 21 September, State Department Cable to All NATO Capitals, HLG: U.S. Draft Report, State
Department FOIA Release, available at the National Security Archive.

22) 26 September, Minutes of NPG HLG Meeting, Brussels, Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Translated
by Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein, Contributed by Helge Danielsen.

23) 28 September, Minutes of NPG HLG and SG Joint Meeting, Brussels, Norwegian Ministry of
Defense, Translated by Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein, Contributed by Helge Danielsen.

24) 29 September, Cable, U.S. Mission to NATO to Cyrus Vance, NAC Briefing by Chairmen of High
Level Group and Special Group, State Department FOIA Release, Contributed by William Burr.

25) 2 October, Summary of Dutch Position on TNF Modernization for Meeting between Dutch Defense
Minister Scholten and US Secretary of Defense Brown, Archive A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed by Ruud
van Dijk.

26) 4 October, Stenographic Minutes of Meeting, Erich Honecker and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, The Digital
National Security Archive.

27) 13 October, Memorandum of conversation between Dutch Prime-Minister Van Agt and Italian Prime-
Minister Francesco Cossiga, Archive A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed by Ruud van Dijk.

28) 16 October, Cable, Cyrus Vance to U.S. Embassies, TNF Integrated Decision Document, State
Department FOIA Release, Contributed by William Burr.

29) 22 October, Memorandum of conversation between Dutch Defense Minister Willem Scholten and US
Deputy National Security Advisor David Aaron, Archive A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed by Ruud van
Dijk.

30) 25 October, Minutes of the meeting of the national directorate of the Italian Socialist Party, Craxi
Foundation Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

31) 26 October, Information Memorandum on NSC Weekly Report #114, Zbigniew Brzezinski to
President Jimmy Carter, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Contributed by William Burr.

32) 31 October, Letter from Carter to Dutch Prime Minister van Agt, Archive A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed
by Ruud van Dijk.

33) 7 November, Cable, U.S. Mission to NATO to Cyrus Vance, TNF: Permreps 6 November Discussion
of Integrated Decision Document Detailed Report, State Department FOIA Release, available at
the National Security Archive.

34) 14 November, Letter from Brandt to Brezhnev, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

35) 26 November, Letter from van Agt to Carter, Archive A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed by Ruud van Dijk.

36) 28 November, Cable, U.S Mission to NATO to Cyrus Vance, TNF Modernization Detailed Report
of Discussions on IDD at 28 November Session of Reinforced Permreps, State Department FOIA
Release, available at the National Security Archive.

37) November-December, Correspondence between Dutch Defense Minister Willem Scholten and
British Defense Minister Francis Pym on LRTNF Modernization, Archive A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed
by Ruud van Dijk.

38) 4 December, Memorandum of Conversation between Dutch Prime-Minister Van Agt and Belgian
Prime-Minister Wilfried Martens, Archive A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed by Ruud van Dijk.

39) 6 December, Memorandum of Conversation between Italian President Cossiga and Dutch Prime
Minister van Agt, Archive of A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed by Ruud van Dijk.

40) 6 December, Memorandum of Conversation between Margaret Thatcher and Dutch Prime Minister
van Agt, Archive of A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed by Ruud van Dijk.

41) 7 December, Memorandum of Conversation between Carter and Dutch Prime Minister van Agt,
Archive of A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed by Ruud van Dijk.

42) 7 December, Memorandum of Conversation between Vance and Brzezinski and Dutch Prime
Minister van Agt, Archive of A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed by Ruud van Dijk.

43) 7 December, Draft conclusions from the discussions in Washington, Archive A.A.M. van Agt,
Contributed by Ruud van Dijk.

44) 4-10 December, Major Points from the Discussions in Brussels, Rome, London, Washington, Bonn,
Archive of A.A.M. van Agt, Contributed by Ruud van Dijk.

45) 11 December, Result of Deliberations of Belgian Core-Cabinet, Archive of A.A.M. van Agt,
Contributed by Ruud van Dijk.

46) 12 December, Results of Special Meeting of [NATO] Foreign and Defence Ministers (The Double-
Track Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces).

47) 19 December, Letter from Brandt to Ceausescu, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.
THE EUROMISSILES
CRISIS AND
THE END OF THE
COLD WAR,
1977-1987
DOCUMENT READER
PART III
Embassy of the
United States in Rome
10-12 DECEMBER 2009
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ROME, ITALY
Convened by t he Machi avel l i Cent er for Col d War St udi es ( CI MA) ; t he Woodrow
Wi l son Cent er s Col d War I nt er nat i onal Hi st or y Proj ect ( CWI HP) ; Fondazi one Craxi ; t he
George Washi ngt on Uni versi t ys Nat i onal Secur i t y Archi ve; t he Uni versi t y of Par i s I I I -
Sor bonne Nouvel l e; and t he Uni versi t y of Par i s I - Pant heon Sor bonne; i n cooperat i on wi t h
Bundeskanzl er Wi l l y Brandt St i f t ung; and under t he sponsorshi p of t he I t al i an Mi ni st r y of
Forei gn Af f ai rs and t he Embassy of t he Uni t ed St at es i n Rome.


The Euromissiles Crisis and
the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

Dear Conference Participants,

We are pleased to present to you this document reader, intended to facilitate discussion at the
upcoming conference on the Euromissiles Crisis, to be held in Rome on 10-12 December 2009.

This collection was compiled by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the
Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) with indispensable support from conference participants,
outside contributors, and institutional sponsors. It is by no means comprehensive. In selecting the
documents, we sought to include some of the most important materials available and to provide a broad
overview of the Euromissiles Crisis from a variety of perspectives.

This reader is divided into four parts: The Peace Movement highlights the perspective of the grass-
roots activists from both sides of the Iron Curtain who opposed the Euromissiles deployment and the arms
race generally, and the three chronological sections on International Diplomacy focus upon the actions and
views of the policy-makers and world leaders who were at the very center of the Euromissiles Crisis.

We are extremely grateful to everyone who contributed documentary evidence to this reader,
including Gianni Battimelli, William Burr, Malcolm Byrne, Elizabeth Charles, Lodovica Clavarino, Helge
Danielsen, Ruud van Dijk, Matthew Evangelista, Nathan Jones, Holger Nehring, Leopoldo Nuti, Giordana
Pulcini, Bernd Rother, Giles Scott-Smith and James Graham Wilson. Piero Craveri, Laura Pizei and Serena
Baldari played a key role in making documents from the Craxi Foundation available in this reader.

Once the documents were in hand, a number of people worked to ensure that this collection was
ready for dissemination, including Christian Ostermann, Bernd Schaefer, Mircea Munteanu and Kristina
Terzieva at CWIHP, the German Historical Institutes German History in Documents and Images Project
Manager Kelly McCullough, Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein from the London School of Economics, as well as
an extraordinarily capable team of CWIHP Research Assistants, including Pieter Biersteker, Amy Freeman,
Ekaterina Radaeva, Elizabeth Schumaecker, and Katarzyna Stempniak.

This reader and the larger conference to which it is connected benefited immensely from the
support of Fondazione Craxi, the National Security Archive at the George Washington University, the
University of Paris III-Sorbone Nouvelle, the University of Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne, Bundeskanzler Willy
Brandt Stiftung, the London School of Economics Cold War Studies Centre, and BCC Roma. The Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States in Rome deserve special thanks for their
central roles in sponsoring and hosting this conference.

Finally, we would also like to recognize the efforts of those whose hard work has made this
conference possible, including Matteo Gerlini for his pioneering research at the Fondazione Craxi, and of
course Leopoldo Nuti, and his outstanding staff, Giordana Pulcini, Lodovica Clavarino and Flavia Gasbarri,
as well as the Wilson Centers Diana Micheli, who designed the conference poster and program.


Tim McDonnell
Washington, D.C.
November 2009
The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

TABLE OF CONTENTS:


Part Three: International Diplomacy, 1980-1983

1980


1) 14-17 January, Presentation by Craxi to a meeting of the Central Committee of the Italian Socialist
Party, Craxi Foundation Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

2) 11 March, Letter from Brezhnev to Brandt, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

3) 9 April, CIA Estimative Product, Soviet Attitudes toward Confidence-Building Measures in European
Arms Control, CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Contributed by Nathan Jones.

4) 28 August, Letter from Brezhnev to Brandt, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

5) 17 September, Letter from Brandt to Brezhnev, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

6) 12 December, Memorandum of Conversation between Brandt and V. Semyonov, Willy Brandt
Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

1981

7) January, Report, The Successor Generation: Its Challenges and Responsibilities, The Atlantic
Council, Contributed by Giles Scott-Smith.

8) 6 July, Memorandum of Conversation, Willy Brandt and Leonid Brezhnev on 30 June 1981, Willy
Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

9) 18 August, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Assessments and Research,
Western Europe: Neutralism and Anti-TNF Sentiment, The Digital National Security Archive,
Contributed by William Burr.

10) 28 September, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Current Analysis, Gromyko
on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, The Digital National Security Archive.

11) 28 September, Memorandum of Conversation between Brandt and Mitterand, Willy Brandt Archive,
Contributed by Bernd Rother.

12) 5 October, Memorandum of Conversation between Brandt and Haig, Willy Brandt Archive,
Contributed by Bernd Rother.

13) 13 October, Minutes of Meeting, U.S. National Security Council Meeting on Theater Nuclear Forces
and Egypt, The Reagan Files, (www.thereaganfiles.com), Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed
by James Graham Wilson.

14) 16 November, National Security Decision Directive 15: Theater Nuclear Forces (Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces), The Digital National Security Archive.

15) 20 November, Information Memorandum, Hugh Montgomery to Secretary of State Alexander Haig,
INF: The Soviet Approach, The Digital National Security Archive.

1982

16) 22 February, Letter from Brezhnev to Brandt, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

17) 17 March, Letter from Brandt to Brezhnev, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

18) 21 April, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

19) 8 June, NSC Fact Sheets on START, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.

20) 15 September, National Security Decision Directive 56: Private INF Exchange, The Digital National
Security Archive.

21) 1 November, Directorate of Intelligence Research Paper, Peace Groups and Leaders in INF Basing
Countries, CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Contributed by William Burr

22) c. 20 November, State Department INR Publication, INF Negotiations: The Likely Soviet Approach,
The Digital National Security Archive.

1983

23) 1 February, Cable from Ambassador Rome to Secretary of State. Dual Key for Italy. State
Department FOIA Release, Contributed by William Burr.

24) 28 March, National Security Decision Directive 86: U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations, The Digital
National Security Archive.

25) 1 April, Memorandum, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield to Secretary of State Shultz, INF
Consultations with Japan, The Digital National Security Archive.

26) 27-31 May, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

27) 31 May, Session of Politburo of CC CPSU, TsKhSD, Translated and published in CWIHP Bulletin No.
4, Fall 1994.

28) 2 June, Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting between CPSU General Secretary Yuri Andropov
and Averell Harriman, W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, Contributed by Nathan Jones.

29) 11 July, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

30) 21 September, National Security Decision Directive 104: U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations II, the
Digital National Security Archive.

31) 22 September, Letter from Brandt to Andropov, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

32) October, Memo on the Italian-Soviet Relations, Craxi Foundation Archive, Contributed by Giordana
Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

33) October, Memo on the Deployment of Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces, 1977-1983, Craxi
Foundation Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

34) October, Memo Comparing Soviet/Anglo-French Intermediate Nuclear Forces, Craxi Foundation
Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

35) 20 October, Protocol of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Defense from the
Warsaw Treaty Member States, Federal Archives of Germany, Military Branch, Contributed by Bernd
Schaefer.

36) 20 October, Speech by Ustinov to Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers, Federal Archives of Germany,
Military Branch, Contributed by Bernd Schaefer.

37) 24 October, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

38) 28 October, Memo on NATO NPG Meeting in Ottawa, Craxi Foundation Archive, Contributed by
Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

39) October 1983-March 1984, Report, History of the Headquarters, 7th Air Division, FOIA Release,
Contributed by Nathan Jones.

40) November, Letter from Ceausescu to Kohl, Craxi Foundation Archive, Contributed by Giordana
Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

41) 12 November, Memo to Craxi on Finnish Proposal to Merge INF and START Talks, Craxi Foundation
Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

42) 16 November, Memo from Badini to Craxi on Soviet missile deployment proposals, Craxi Foundation
Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

43) 8 December, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

44) 13 December, NSC Memorandum, Jack Matlock to Robert C. McFarlane, American Academic on
Soviet Policy, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by Nathan Jones.


THE EUROMISSILES
CRISIS AND
THE END OF THE
COLD WAR,
1977-1987
DOCUMENT READER
PART IV
Embassy of the
United States in Rome
10-12 DECEMBER 2009
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ROME, ITALY
Convened by t he Machi avel l i Cent er for Col d War St udi es ( CI MA) ; t he Woodrow
Wi l son Cent er s Col d War I nt er nat i onal Hi st or y Proj ect ( CWI HP) ; Fondazi one Craxi ; t he
George Washi ngt on Uni versi t ys Nat i onal Secur i t y Archi ve; t he Uni versi t y of Par i s I I I -
Sor bonne Nouvel l e; and t he Uni versi t y of Par i s I - Pant heon Sor bonne; i n cooperat i on wi t h
Bundeskanzl er Wi l l y Brandt St i f t ung; and under t he sponsorshi p of t he I t al i an Mi ni st r y of
Forei gn Af f ai rs and t he Embassy of t he Uni t ed St at es i n Rome.


The Euromissiles Crisis and
the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

Dear Conference Participants,

We are pleased to present to you this document reader, intended to facilitate discussion at the
upcoming conference on the Euromissiles Crisis, to be held in Rome on 10-12 December 2009.

This collection was compiled by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the
Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) with indispensable support from conference participants,
outside contributors, and institutional sponsors. It is by no means comprehensive. In selecting the
documents, we sought to include some of the most important materials available and to provide a broad
overview of the Euromissiles Crisis from a variety of perspectives.

This reader is divided into four parts: The Peace Movement highlights the perspective of the grass-
roots activists from both sides of the Iron Curtain who opposed the Euromissiles deployment and the arms
race generally, and the three chronological sections on International Diplomacy focus upon the actions and
views of the policy-makers and world leaders who were at the very center of the Euromissiles Crisis.

We are extremely grateful to everyone who contributed documentary evidence to this reader,
including Gianni Battimelli, William Burr, Malcolm Byrne, Elizabeth Charles, Lodovica Clavarino, Helge
Danielsen, Ruud van Dijk, Matthew Evangelista, Nathan Jones, Holger Nehring, Leopoldo Nuti, Giordana
Pulcini, Bernd Rother, Giles Scott-Smith and James Graham Wilson. Piero Craveri, Laura Pizei and Serena
Baldari played a key role in making documents from the Craxi Foundation available in this reader.

Once the documents were in hand, a number of people worked to ensure that this collection was
ready for dissemination, including Christian Ostermann, Bernd Schaefer, Mircea Munteanu and Kristina
Terzieva at CWIHP, the German Historical Institutes German History in Documents and Images Project
Manager Kelly McCullough, Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein from the London School of Economics, as well as
an extraordinarily capable team of CWIHP Research Assistants, including Pieter Biersteker, Amy Freeman,
Ekaterina Radaeva, Elizabeth Schumaecker, and Katarzyna Stempniak.

This reader and the larger conference to which it is connected benefited immensely from the
support of Fondazione Craxi, the National Security Archive at the George Washington University, the
University of Paris III-Sorbone Nouvelle, the University of Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne, Bundeskanzler Willy
Brandt Stiftung, the London School of Economics Cold War Studies Centre, and BCC Roma. The Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States in Rome deserve special thanks for their
central roles in sponsoring and hosting this conference.

Finally, we would also like to recognize the efforts of those whose hard work has made this
conference possible, including Matteo Gerlini for his pioneering research at the Fondazione Craxi, and of
course Leopoldo Nuti, and his outstanding staff, Giordana Pulcini, Lodovica Clavarino and Flavia Gasbarri,
as well as the Wilson Centers Diana Micheli, who designed the conference poster and program.


Tim McDonnell
Washington, D.C.
November 2009
The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

TABLE OF CONTENTS:


Part Four: International Diplomacy, 1984-1987

1984

1) 18 January, Information Memorandum, John H. Kelly to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Gromykos
Speech at Stockholm, Princeton University, Mudd Manuscript Library, Contributed by Nathan Jones.

2) 18 January, Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

3) 23 January, Memorandum, Press Themes on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting and U.S.-Soviet Relations,
Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.

4) 6 February, Memorandum, Jack Matlock to Robert C. McFarlane, U.S.-Soviet Relations: Toward
Defining a Strategy, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

5) 10 February, Memorandum, John Lenczowski to Robert C. McFarlane, Andropovs Funeral and
U.S.-Soviet Relations, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

6) 5 March, Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal
Republic of Germany, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

7) 5 March, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

8) 14 March, Memorandum of Conversation, Stanislav Menshikov and Jack Matlock, Reagan
Presidential Library, Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.

9) 14 March, Memorandum for the President [Reagan] from George P. Shultz regarding Amb.
Hartmans Meeting with Gromyko March 11, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

10) March-April, Memorandum on INF and MBFR Negotiations, Craxi Foundation Archive, Contributed
by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

11) 3 April, Action Memorandum, Richard Burt to Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Memorandum to
the President on your Meeting with Dobrynin, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by Elizabeth
Charles.

12) 4 April, Memo from Badini to Craxi on Domestic Constraints on Dutch Foreign Policy, Craxi
Foundation Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

13) 12 June, Letter from Kohl to Zhivkov, Central State Archive, Sofia, available in CWIHP Virtual
Archive.

14) July-August, Biographic Information, Gordon Brown, International Visitor Program trip to the U.S.,
Archive of Meridian International, Washington DC, Contributed by Giles Scott-Smith.

15) 28 September, Memorandum of Conversation, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, The Presidents [Reagans] Meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei A.
Gromyko of the Soviet Union, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

16) 10 November, Special National Intelligence Estimate, Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political
Activities, CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Contributed by Nathan Jones.

17) 22-23 December, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.


1985

18) 7 January, Memorandum of Conversation, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, First Shultz-Gromyko Meeting, Geneva, January 1985,
Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

19) 7 January, Memorandum of Conversation, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, Second Shultz-Gromyko Meeting, Geneva, January 1985,
Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

20) 8 January, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

21) 8 January, Memorandum of Conversation, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, Third Shultz-Gromyko Meeting, Geneva, January 1985,
Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

22) 8 January, Memorandum of Conversation, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, Fourth Shultz-Gromyko Meeting, Geneva, January 1985,
Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

23) 4 March, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

24) 24 April, Speech, Willy Brandt before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, Willy Brandt
Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

25) 4 September, Letter from Brandt to Gorbachev, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

26) 27 September, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

27) 29 September, Speech, Willy Brandt before the U.S. Congress, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by
Bernd Rother.

28) 18 October, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

29) 2-3 November, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

30) 5 November, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

31) 6 November, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

1986

32) 29 January, Letter from Brandt to Gorbachev, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

33) 3 February, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

34) 11 June, Letter from Brandt to Gorbachev, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

35) August, Biographic Information, Tony Blair, International Visitor Program trip to the U.S., Archive of
Meridian International, Washington DC, Contributed by Giles Scott-Smith.

36) 11 October, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

37) 12 October, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

38) 12 October, Transcript of Gorbachev-Reagan Reykjavik Talks: Part 4 [Russian Version], The
National Security Archive.

39) 18 October, Briefing Book, Ambassador Matlocks European Trip, Oct. 18-15, 1986, Reagan
Presidential Library, Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.

40) 27 October, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

41) 3 November, National Security Decision Directive 150: Post-Reykjavik Follow-up, Reagan
Presidential Library, Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.

42) 15 November, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

43) 25 November, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

1987

44) 4 February, Record of Conversation, Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Marshal of
the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeev and H. Brown, C. Vance, H. Kissinger, and D. Jones, obtained by
Svetlana Savranskaya, translated for the National Security Archive by Anna Melyakova, Contributed
by Elizabeth Charles.

45) 25 February, Memorandum, Alexander Yakovlev to Gorbachev, Toward an Analysis of the Fact of
the Visit of Prominent American Political Leaders to the USSR (Kissinger, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Brown,
and others), State Archive of the Russian Federation, obtained and translated for the National
Security Archive by Svetlana Savranskaya, Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.

46) 26 February, Notes of Politburo Meeting, On Soviet-American Relations and Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Armaments, Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Available at the National Security
Archive.

47) 9 April, Draft letter from Reagan to Gorbachev, Reagan Presidential Library, available at the National
Security Archive.

48) 10 April, Letter from Reagan to Gorbachev, Reagan Presidential Library, available at the National
Security Archive.


49) 14 April, Memorandum of Conversation between Gorbachev and Shultz, Archive of the Gorbachev
Foundation, available at the National Security Archive.

50) 16 April, Politburo meeting About the Conversation with Shultz, Archive of the Gorbachev
Foundation, available at the National Security Archive.

51) 6 May, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

52) 7 May, National Security Decision Directive 271: Instructions for the Eighth NST Negotiating Round,
NSC release, available at the National Security Archive.

53) 12 May, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

54) 8 June, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

55) 13 June, National Security Decision Directive 278, Establishing a U.S. Negotiating Position on SRINF
Missiles, NSC release, available at the National Security Archive.

56) 9 July, Politburo meeting About negotiations with Americans on middle-range missiles [excerpt],
Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, available at the National Security Archive.

57) 7 August, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

58) 8 September, Memorandum on Meeting with the National Security Planning Group, NARA,
available at the National Security Archive.

59) 10 September, Letter from Gorbachev to Reagan, Reagan Presidential Library, available at the
National Security Archive.

60) 23 October, Memorandum of conversation between Gorbachev and Shultz, [excerpt], Archive of the
Gorbachev Foundation, available at the National Security Archive.

61) 28 October, Letter from Gorbachev to Reagan, Reagan Presidential Library, available at the National
Security Archive.

62) 30 October, Memorandum from Shultz to Reagan on letter from Gorbachev, Reagan Presidential
Library, available at the National Security Archive.

63) 10 November, National Security Decision Directive 288, My Objectives at the Summit, NSC release,
available at the National Security Archive.

64) 7 December, National Security Decision Directive 290, Arms Control Positions for the US-USSR
Summit, NSC release, available at the National Security Archive.

65) 8 December, Background Book, Meeting Between President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev, Washington, D.C., December 8-10, 1987, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by
Elizabeth Charles.

66) 8 December, Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan and Gorbachev Morning Meeting, NARA,
available at the National Security Archive.

67) 8 December, Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan and Gorbachev Afternoon Meeting, NARA,
available at the National Security Archive.

68) 9 December, Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev one-on-one meeting, NARA,
available at the National Security Archive.

69) 9 December, Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev, NARA, available at the National
Security Archive.

70) 9 December, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

71) 10 December, Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev, NARA, available at the National
Security Archive.

72) 10 December, Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev Working Lunch, NARA, available
at the National Security Archive.

73) 17 December, Politburo Session On the Outcomes of the Visit to Washington, Archive of the
Gorbachev Foundation, translated by Anna Melyakova, reproduced in National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book The INF Treaty and the Washington Summit: 20 Years Later.

74) 29 December, National Security Decision Directive 292: Organizing for the INF Ratification Effort,
The Digital National Security Archive.




82) 22 September, Letter from Brandt to Andropov, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

83) October, Memo on the Italian-Soviet Relations, Craxi Foundation Archive, Contributed by Giordana
Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

84) October, Memo on the Deployment of Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces, 1977-1983, Craxi
Foundation Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

85) October, Memo Comparing Soviet/Anglo-French Intermediate Nuclear Forces, Craxi Foundation
Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

86) 20 October, Protocol of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Defense from the
Warsaw Treaty Member States, Federal Archives of Germany, Military Branch, Contributed by Bernd
Schaefer.

87) 20 October, Speech by Ustinov to Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers, Federal Archives of Germany,
Military Branch, Contributed by Bernd Schaefer.

88) 24 October, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

89) 28 October, Memo on NATO NPG Meeting in Ottawa, Craxi Foundation Archive, Contributed by
Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

90) October 1983-March 1984, Report, History of the Headquarters, 7th Air Division, FOIA Release,
Contributed by Nathan Jones.

91) November, Letter from Ceausescu to Kohl, Craxi Foundation Archive, Contributed by Giordana
Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

92) 12 November, Memo to Craxi on Finnish Proposal to Merge INF and START Talks, Craxi Foundation
Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

93) 16 November, Memo from Badini to Craxi on Soviet missile deployment proposals, Craxi Foundation
Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

94) 8 December, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

95) 13 December, NSC Memorandum, Jack Matlock to Robert C. McFarlane, American Academic on
Soviet Policy, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by Nathan Jones.

1984

96) 18 January, Information Memorandum, John H. Kelly to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Gromykos
Speech at Stockholm, Princeton University, Mudd Manuscript Library, Contributed by Nathan Jones.

97) 18 January, Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

98) 23 January, Memorandum, Press Themes on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting and U.S.-Soviet Relations,
Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.

99) 6 February, Memorandum, Jack Matlock to Robert C. McFarlane, U.S.-Soviet Relations: Toward
Defining a Strategy, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

100) 10 February, Memorandum, John Lenczowski to Robert C. McFarlane, Andropovs Funeral and
U.S.-Soviet Relations, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

101) 5 March, Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal
Republic of Germany, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

102) 5 March, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

103) 14 March, Memorandum of Conversation, Stanislav Menshikov and Jack Matlock, Reagan
Presidential Library, Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.

104) 14 March, Memorandum for the President [Reagan] from George P. Shultz regarding Amb.
Hartmans Meeting with Gromyko March 11, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

105) March-April, Memorandum on INF and MBFR Negotiations, Craxi Foundation Archive, Contributed
by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

106) 3 April, Action Memorandum, Richard Burt to Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Memorandum to
the President on your Meeting with Dobrynin, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by Elizabeth
Charles.

107) 4 April, Memo from Badini to Craxi on Domestic Constraints on Dutch Foreign Policy, Craxi
Foundation Archive, Contributed by Giordana Pulcini and Leopoldo Nuti.

108) 12 June, Letter from Kohl to Zhivkov, Central State Archive, Sofia, available in CWIHP Virtual
Archive.

109) July-August, Biographic Information, Gordon Brown, International Visitor Program trip to the U.S.,
Archive of Meridian International, Washington DC, Contributed by Giles Scott-Smith.

110) 28 September, Memorandum of Conversation, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, The Presidents [Reagans] Meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei A.
Gromyko of the Soviet Union, Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

111) 10 November, Special National Intelligence Estimate, Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political
Activities, CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Contributed by Nathan Jones.

112) 22-23 December, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.


1985

113) 7 January, Memorandum of Conversation, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, First Shultz-Gromyko Meeting, Geneva, January 1985,
Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

114) 7 January, Memorandum of Conversation, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, Second Shultz-Gromyko Meeting, Geneva, January 1985,
Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

115) 8 January, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

116) 8 January, Memorandum of Conversation, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, Third Shultz-Gromyko Meeting, Geneva, January 1985,
Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

117) 8 January, Memorandum of Conversation, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, Fourth Shultz-Gromyko Meeting, Geneva, January 1985,
Reagan Presidential Library, Contributed by James Graham Wilson.

118) 4 March, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

119) 24 April, Speech, Willy Brandt before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, Willy Brandt
Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

120) 4 September, Letter from Brandt to Gorbachev, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

121) 27 September, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

122) 29 September, Speech, Willy Brandt before the U.S. Congress, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by
Bernd Rother.

123) 18 October, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

124) 2-3 November, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

125) 5 November, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

126) 6 November, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

1986

127) 29 January, Letter from Brandt to Gorbachev, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

128) 3 February, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

129) 11 June, Letter from Brandt to Gorbachev, Willy Brandt Archive, Contributed by Bernd Rother.

130) August, Biographic Information, Tony Blair, International Visitor Program trip to the U.S., Archive of
Meridian International, Washington DC, Contributed by Giles Scott-Smith.

131) 11 October, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

132) 12 October, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.

133) 12 October, Transcript of Gorbachev-Reagan Reykjavik Talks: Part 4 [Russian Version], The
National Security Archive.

134) 18 October, Briefing Book, Ambassador Matlocks European Trip, Oct. 18-15, 1986, Reagan
Presidential Library, Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.

135) 27 October, Excerpt from The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brinkley.
The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987















Part Four
International Diplomacy,
1984-1987



























Rome, Italy, 10-12 December 2009
The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987












Part Four:
International Diplomacy


1984
























Rome, Italy, 10-12 December 2009
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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 223.

Monday, March 5 [1984]
A typical Mon. no breathing room & a stack of memos plus
things to sign which I didnt get to until later afternoon. Helmut Kohl
arrived (W. Ger. Chancellor). We had a good meeting thru lunch. He
confirmed my belief that Soviets are motivated, as least in part by
insecurity & suspicion that we & our allies mean them harm. They still
preserve the tank traps & barbed wire that show how close the
Germans got to Moscow before they were stopped. He too thinks I
should meet Chernenko.

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8. Promemoria Dialogo Est-Ovest [1984]

ABSTRACT This memo expresses the regrets of the Italian government
for the failure of the INF negotiation. According to the memo, Italy
committed itself to the normalization of the East West dialogue and
proposed a resume of MBFR talks.

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Sezione II: Attivit istituzionale
Serie 2: Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri
Sottoserie 3: Relazioni internazionali

Sottosottoserie 1: Incontri e visite ufficiali


UA 27: "Incontro del presidente del Consiglio con il primo ministro del Regno dei
Paesi Bassi, Ruud Lubbers (Roma, 4 aprile 1984)"

1. Promemoria Linee di politica estera dei Paesi Bassi [04/1984]


ABSTRACT An interesting memo from Badini to Craxi about the domestic
constraints on Dutch foreign policy



[Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 378-B, File 996, available in the Cold War
International History Projects Virtual Archive, www.cwihp.org. Translated for
CWIHP by Kristina N. Terzieva.]


BON, 12 June 1984


TO

HIS EXCELLENCY
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL
OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CC OF
THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Mr. TODOR ZHIVKOV




DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN,


I read with great interest and attention your letter of the 9
th
of May 1984,
delivered to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peoples Republic of Bulgaria,
Petur Mladenov.

I share your opinion that the Federal Republic of Germany and Bulgaria have
developed good and fruitful relations following the establishment of diplomatic relations
in 1973.

We see possibilities for strengthening and furthering these relations, which, in the
interest of the populations of our countries, we should not leave unrealized. The recent
talks between the foreign ministers of our countries revealed new prospects in that
direction. Even now, dear Mr. Chairman, I am glad that I will be able to continue this
dialog with you in Bon on the 20
th
of September 1984.

-2-

The international situation continues to be worrisome; the peace in Europe and in
the world continues to be exposed to great dangers. The differences in understanding the
reasons that have led to the current situation, in my view, should not prevent the
responsible and impartial search for solutions to the pressing issues. In the past, there
have been situations in the relations between the East and the West, when, despite the
different assessment of the relevant conditions, solutions have been reached through
negotiations a way to which there is no other alternative. Our countries can contribute
to the creation of a climate, which will enable the resolution of even central political
issues, by means of a broad bi-lateral political dialogue that we wish to continue by
mutual consent.

The Federal Government has always stood for an active policy of disarmament
and control over armament and has mainstreamed its efforts in offering assistance in that
direction through concrete proposals in the current negotiations. Recently Western
countries have made constructive propositions. In connection to that, I will shift your
attention to the packet of proposals, presented in Stockholm in January of this year, for
complementary, concrete measures for the strengthening of trust and security. Further, I
would like to point you[r attention] to President Reagans readiness - expressed in his
speech in front of the Parliament in Dublin on the 5
th
of June 1984 - to lead negotiations
in Stockholm for asserting the principle of the non-use of force.

-3-

This initiative aligns with the views of the Federal Government and has its full
support. Another example is the new proposal made by Western countries at the
negotiations in Vienna on the 19
th
of April of this year, in which the West points to new
ways of solving some of the key issues subject of these negotiations and emphasizes its
readiness to contribute to making headway by maintaining a flexible approach during the
negotiations. I very much hope that the Warsaw Pact member countries will study
carefully these proposals and will move towards a constructive dialogue with us on these
issues.

The Federal Government, led by me, is of the opinion that despite the great
significance, which we attribute to the political discussion on the control over armament,
the East-West dialogue should not be confined to the missile issue. The Final Act of the
conference on security and cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki, and the Final
Agreement of the conference in Madrid contain the broader basis of the program for
building East-West relations.

The process that began in Helsinki, based on which it was possible to reach
important agreements, despite the existing tensions, turned out to be a firm support for
continuing the multilateral East-West dialogue at a difficult stage.

-4-

We attribute to the Helsinki process the main significance for the further peaceful
and constructive development of East-West relations.

Please allow me, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion to touch upon some particular
issues addressed by you.

The Federal Government, along with its allies, has carefully examined the
Warsaw Pact member countries proposal of January 10
th
1984 for creation of a free of
chemical weapons zone in Europe. The Federal Government places a priority on the
negotiations, led at the Geneva Convention on disarmament, for a universal and reliably
enforced ban on all types of chemical weapons throughout the world. At present, these
negotiations have reached an advanced stage. It is important not to question again what
has been achieved so far and not to prolong the negotiations. We see such a danger in
starting parallel negotiations concerning the region of Europe. These discussions would
not only stumble across the same problems encountered in the negotiations at the Geneva
Convention, but would even be burdened by the necessity to [create measures of] control
[over] the non-storage of chemical weapons outside the zones free of chemical weapons.
By the way, the Third World countries represented at the Geneva Convention on
disarmament would hardly show understanding, should this important topic slip away
from their hands by means of special regional negotiations. The Federal Government
supports the proposal for a universal agreement on banning chemical weapons, set forth
by the U.S. on the 15
th
of April 1984.

-5-

The [Federal] Government sees in this initiative one important political step and
associates it with the expectation that the U.S. proposal will contribute to the
considerable progress of the Geneva negotiations. The U.S. clearly made it known that
this proposal is a contribution that lays the foundation for negotiations, and offered to
conduct consultations on it with all delegations in Geneva and, first and foremost, with
the Soviet one. Until now there has been no response to this offer on the part of the
Soviet Union. The Federal Government appeals to the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria to
defend, at the Geneva Convention on disarmament, the prompt and permanent removal of
the category chemical weapons on a world scale.

As far as the mid-range missiles are concerned, we welcome and support the
readiness of the U.S. to renew negotiations at any time without preconditions and to
examine every serious Soviet proposal. The Federal Government is very sorry that the
Soviet Union still persistently declines to continue the negotiations. How could the Soviet
Union consider the start of positioning of U.S. mid-range missiles a reason to halt the
negotiations, given that it had continuously positioned [Soviet] SS-20 missiles during the
negotiations and is still positioning them?

Regarding your remark, Mr. Chairman, that the U.S. is developing Programs for
the Militarization of Space, I would like to point out that the U.S. is ready to hold talks
at the government level on this matter.

-6-

As much as it is within my ability, I will stand for measured and reasonable solutions in
that sphere.

The Federal Government took a stand, regarding the renewed Warsaw Pact
countries proposal on freezing and reducing military expenditures, in front of the
Romanian Government, which made the proposal on behalf of the Warsaw Pact; and
brought attention to two aspects: the Federal Government, as well as the governments of
our Western allies, shares the concern with the size of the military expenditures world
wide.
1
The Federal Government also hopes that [military] defense expenditures can be
reduced as a result of balanced agreements on the control over armament and
disarmament. With this goal in mind, the Federal Government supports the efforts of the
United Nations for making public military expenditures based on a standardized
accounting system, and releases the respective numbers for its country. A system that
makes military expenditures of various countries comparable and subject to control is a
prerequisite for fruitful negotiations on the issue. We would welcome participation on the
part of Warsaw Pact countries in these efforts within the framework of the United
Nations. Such a move would be appropriate to underline the importance of the proposals
of the Warsaw Pact on matters of military expenditures.

-7-

Mr. Chairman, you also address the proposal for a treaty on the mutual restraint from the
use of force. With regard to that, I would like to emphasize one more time that the
observance of the ban on the use of force, underlying the United Nations Charter and the
Helsinki Final Act, has always been a constitutive ingredient of the foreign policy of the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance. In and of itself, a renewed
confirmation of the good will not to use force, when not proven by concrete, tangible
actions, would not lead to progress.

During my visit to Moscow in July of 1983, I paid attention to the fact that a new
binding confirmation of the ban on the use of force may contribute to the improvement of
the international situation, if it could, in reality, alleviate the threat of the use of force and
if the use of force can be stopped where it is ongoing.


Yours respectfully,

HELMUT KOHL

CHANCELLOR OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY




1
The translation suffers due to the cumbersome sentence structure in both Bulgarian and German. The
FRG has responded to the Romanian Government regarding a renewed proposal by the Warsaw Pact for
freezing and reduction of military expenditures.
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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 289.

Saturday December 22-Sunday, December 23 [1984]
Sat. dawned clear & bright which was fine because P.M.
Margaret Thatcher was coming in for a visit. I met her in a golf cart &
took her to Aspen where she & I had a brief visit in which I got a
report on her visit with Gorbachev of the Soviet U. In an amazing
coincidence I learned she had said virtually the same things to him I
had said to Gromyko. In addition, she had made it clear there was no
way the Soviet U. could split Eng. away from the U.S.
Then we joined the others Ambassadors, Shultz, MacFarlane,
Bush, et al at Laurel for a plenary meeting & working lunch. Main
topic was our Strategic Defense Research (Starwars) I believe was
eased some concerns she had. Then she was on her way to Eng.
Sunday was also a bright, beautiful day like Spring & we
returned to the W.H.

The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987












Part Four:
International Diplomacy


1985
























Rome, Italy, 10-12 December 2009
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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 292.

Tuesday, January 8 [1985]
Word from Geneva continues to be good. George B. & I were
presented with the new Inaugural medals. This morning I went to the
Press Room with Don Regan & Jim Baker & announced they were
exchanging jobs. The press was really astounded. They thought I
was coming in to talk about Geneva or something of the kind. This
was one story that didnt leak.
I was in the family theatre briefing for tomorrow nites press
conf. when I was called upstairs to take a call from George S. on the
secure phone. The meetings in Geneva are over & the Soviets have
agreed to enter negotiations on nuclear weapons, etc. Within the
month a time & place will be agreed upon. Did a brief interview with 2
men from Dallas Morning News a friendly paper. Then a reception
in the East room celebrating Human Events 40
th
anniversary.
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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 304-305.

Monday, March 4 [1985]
Our 33
rd
Anniversary. Other than that it was another Monday
morning. Why to they always seem different than other days?
Met with the new Sec. Gen. of OECD Jean-Claude Paye. It
was a brief but pleasant meeting. He is all for urging European
members of OECD to take steps to free up their economics, etc. so
as to catch up with our ec. recovery.
We had an N.S.C. meeting with our Arms Talks Leaders
looking at various options for how we wanted to deal with the Soviets.
Its a very complicated business. I urged one decision on them that
we open talks with a concession surprise! Since they have publicly
stated they want to see nuclear weapons eliminated entirely, I told
our people to open by saying we would accept their goal.
Nancy came to the oval office for lunch & we cut anniversary
cake & had a few of the immediate staff share in it. That was the
extent of our celebration except that at dinner we opened a bottle of
Chateau Margeaux 1911.
Right after lunch I addressed the N.A.C.O. Nat. Assn. of
County Officials. I wasnt sure how Id be received since theyve taken
positions opposing some of our budget cuts & that was what I talked
to them about. But they were very cordial.
Fred Fielding, Don Regan & Mike D. came in to see me about
the Arabian Horses that Kind Fahd wanted to give me. I had stated I
couldnt accept them as a gift due to our stupid regulations. As it
stands they are now in Prince Bandars (Ambas.) name & he has
asked Bill Clark to take care of them for him. Now what happens 4 yrs.
from now is anyones guess.
Had Sens. Dave Boren & Sam Nunn over for cocktails & to talk
about the MX. I believe well have their support. In fact they talked of
how wrong it was for Congress to interfere with a President in Foreign
affairs & how both parties must come together at the waters edge.

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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 356.

Friday, September 27 [1985]
Woke up to a surprise the twin doors that open into the living
room from the bedroom were wide open (and they open in).
Apparently when Gloria blew through Wash. before dawn it did that.
A brief meeting with P.M. Gonzalez of Spain then into a jam
session on upcoming Shevardnadze meeting. He arrived at 10 A.M.
a 2 hr. meeting, then I had 10 mins alone with him & then lunch (St.
Dining Room) until 1:30. Hes a personable fellow but we had our
differences. My goal was to send him back to Gorbachev with a
message that I really meant arms reductions & I wasnt interested in
any dtente nonsense. For the 1
st
time they talked of real verification
procedures.
After lunch George S., Bud & I met preparing now for King
Husseins visit Monday.
Afternoon, hurricane Gloria blew away, the sky is blue, the sun
is shining & Nancy will be home at 6:40. Thats the answer to a
prayer & I mean it. Gloria shifted course a little & the threatened
disaster melted away. There was some coastal damage but no
deaths, few if any injuries & alls well with the world.

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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 360-361.

Friday, October 18 [1985]
A huddle on the speech to the U.N. next week. Some wanted it
more harsh toward the Soviets than I think it should be. I won. NSC
meeting wide disagreement on whether to make a new presentation
on the M.B.F.R. talks in Vienna. Theyve been going on for 10 yrs.
Kohl &Thatcher want a new proposal D.O.D. opposes. Im inclined
to go with K & T. For one thing they hang their proposal on a strict,
intrusive verification procedure. If the USSR doesnt agree no
reduction in forces. If they do agree it will be the 1
st
time ever.
The Egyptian Amabs. came by with a lengthy letter from
Mubarak. Pres. M. is pleading for understanding but still charging us
with humiliating him, etc. The Ambas. almost in a whisper said put
yourself in our place. I said that should be mutual.






Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 365.

Saturday, November 2-Sunday, November 3 [1985]
A good ride under gray & threatening skies. Nancy didnt go,
her cold is still hanging on. Our defector in Kabul cant make up his
mind. Hes 19 yrs. old. The Soviet Ambas. visited him in our embassy
& gave him a fatherly pitch as to how he could go back to Russia no
punishment etc. Now the lad wants to see him again. That will take
place about 11 P.M. Sunday our time. We in turn have offered him
asylum here in the U.S. (on my orders).
Over the weekend I called Nixon & Ford to get any suggestions
they might have on the Summit. Dick had a h--l of a good idea on the
arms negotiations. We probably wont have them settled by the time
the Summit ends. His suggestion is that we state what we have
agreed on, that we will continue negotiating on the other points & as a
token of our resolve to achieve results we each take 1000 missiles
out of the silos & store them for a set time. If we cant come to a
reduction agreement we put them back in the silos. Back to the W.H.





Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 365-366.

Tuesday, November 5 [1985]
N.S.C. meeting was a movie. We saw a demonstration of our
new Bomber, one of the greatest advances in aircraft in years &
years. It is of course most hush hush I should call it what it is a
fighter bomber.
Geo. S. called from Moscow on scramble phone 7 more
hours of talks 4 of them with Gorbachev. Apparently not much
progress. Gorbachev is adamant we must cave in our S.D.I. well
this will be a case of an irresistible force meeting an unmovable
object. Met with Edmund Morris who is going to do my official
biography. Im pleased his book on Teddy Roosevelt was wonderful.
Of course I cant charge up San Juan Hill. Had an Ec. briefing our
recovery is continuing or by now I should say our expansion &
growth is progressing at a slow but steady rate & on employment
were doing extremely well. A higher percentage of the potential work
force (all between 16 &65) is employed than ever in our history.








Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 366.

Wednesday, November 6 [1985]
Briefing not the way to start the day what with news of the
games Cong. is playing with regard to the debt ceiling, deficit & tax
reform. And yes that goes for Repubs. as well as Dems.
Then George S. & Bud came upstairs with Don R. & George B.
to report on their Gorbachev meeting. It seems Mr. G. is filled with a
lot of false info about the U.S. and believes it all. For example,
Americans hate the Russians because our arms manufacturers stir
them up with propaganda so they can keep selling us weapons.
Nancy & Maureen arrived.

The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987












Part Four:
International Diplomacy


1986
























Rome, Italy, 10-12 December 2009
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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 387-388.

Monday, February 3 [1986]
Staff meeting & NSC as usual. This time I had an issue I
wanted looked into. Last nite on 60 mins. they had a segment on
homeless welfare recipients in N.Y. being put up in hotels. In one
case a women & three children in a 10 x 12 room for which the govt.
was paying $2000 a month. They were blaming it on the Federal govt.
I thought I knew the answer but wanted it checked out. I was right
that was a practice of N.Y. City not us. Another question had to do
with Scharansky. We have a deal to get him out of Russia. Last nite &
this morning it was all over the news. I feared the publicity might
queer the deal. Turns out the leak was from Moscow.
Then it was N.S.P.G. time in the situation room re Gorbachevs
proposal to eliminate nuclear arms. Some wanted to tag it a publicity
stunt. I said no. Lets say we share their overall goals & now want to
work out the details. If it is a publicity stunt this will be revealed by
them. I also propose that we announce we are going forward with SDI
but if research reveals a defense against missiles is possible well
work out how it can be used to protect the whole world not just us.

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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 444.

Saturday, October 11 [1986]
A.M. a briefing session then a 5 minute drive to the meeting
place a waterfront home. I was host for the 1
st
session. Gorbachev
& I met 1
st
with interpreters & note takers. Then he proposed we bring
in Geo. S. & Shevardnadze. Thats the way it went for all the
meetings. We got into Human Rts, Regional things & bipartisan
agreements on our exchange programs etc. I told him I couldnt go
home if I didnt bring up why they reneged on their commitment to
buy 6 million tons of grain. He claimed lower oil prices they didnt
have the money.
Then it was plain they wanted to get to arms control so we did.
In the afternoon we had at it looked like some progress as he
went along with willingness to reduce nuc. weapons.
At the end of a long day Geo. S. suggested we take all the
notes & give them to our teams to put together so we could see what
had been agreed & where were sticking points. They worked until 2
A.M.








Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 444.

Sunday, October 12 [1986]
Final day & it turned into an all day one even though wed been
scheduled to fly out in early afternoon. Our team had given us an
agreement to eliminate entirely all nuc. devices over a 10 yr. period.
We would research & develop DSI during 10 yrs. then deploy & I
offered to share with Soviets the system. Then began the showdown.
He wanted language that would have killed SDI. They price was high
but I wouldnt sell & thats how the day ended. All our people though
Id done exactly right. Id pledged I wouldnt give away SDI & I didnt
but that meant no deal on any of the arms reductions. I was mad he
tried to act jovial but I acted mad & it showed. Well the ball is in his
court and Im convinced hell come around when he sees how the
world is reacting. On way out I addressed our mil. forces & families at
Air Base. They were enthused & cheered my decision.

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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 447.

Monday, October 27 [1986]
An NSPG meeting on the Iceland arms proposals. The Join
Chiefs wanted reassurances that were aware of the imbalance with
Soviets in conventional arms & how threat would be aggravated by
reduction in nuclear weapons. We were able to assure them we were
very much aware & that this matter would have to be negotiated with
the Soviets in any nuclear arms reduction negotiations. Signed a bill
for freshman Colorado Congressmen Mike Strang having to do with
water conveyance in National Forests. Then over to the East Room
for a big signing of the Drug Bill. Some Olympic athletes were on
hand & some kids members of the Just Say No Club. Charles
Price Carol & their son & daughter came by theyre also coming
to dinner tonite for Angus & Princess Alexandra. Just a small, private
dinner. Cap W. & John Poindexter for more talk re the arms
negotiations. We have a problem with Cong. & its cuts in the defense
budget. Conventional arms are more expensive then missiles. If we
have to rev up that part of the mil. the Cong. is going to have to
recognize it & raise the ante. I feel however the Soviets if faced with
an arms race would have to negotiate they cant squeeze their
people any more to try & stay even with us. A long taping session &
then upstairs for dinner.
Ill host it alone for a while Nancys hairdresser was late.

Source:RRPL Exec.
Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs
Records, 1981-87, Box
91293 (010R-NSDDs)
NSDD 250-Post Reykjavik
Follow up (Folders 1-9)
-Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.









Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 451.

Saturday, November 15 [1986]
Margaret Thatcher arrived. I met the helicopter in a golf cart &
brought her back to Aspen were we had a good one-on-one re our
Iceland meetings & what we ware trying to achieve in arms
reductions. She had some legitimate concerns. I was able to reassure
her. Then we went down to Laurel where I did the radio cast then
lunch a working lunch with her sec. & Ambas. in attendance plus
Don. R., Geo. S., John P., & some W. H. staff. We covered the Iran
setup etc. She & the others left. Later in Wash. she did a press conf.
& went to bat for us. Most helpful.






Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 453-454.

Tuesday, November 25 [1986]
John P. came in this morning & announced he was leaving the
NSC & returning to the Navy. I told him I wouldnt refuse his
resignation but regretted it. I explained that I know the press would
crucify him if he stayed & he didnt deserve that. What it was all about
was that Ed Meese learned several months ago the Israelis delivered
some of our arms to Iran but expected a higher price than we had
asked. They sent us our price then past the balance in a Swiss bank
account belonging to the Contras their way of helping the Contras
at a time when Congress was refusing aid to the Contras. John
resigned because he had gotten wind of this game but didnt look into
it or tell me. In the old Navy tradition he accepted the responsibility as
Captain of the ship. We broke the story I told the press what wed
learned. This headed them off from finding out about it & accusing us
of a cover up. Ive asked Ed Meese to continue digging in case there
is anything we missed & Im appointing a commission to review the
whole matter of how NSC Staff works. Ed Meese stayed with the
press & took their Qs. They were like a circle of sharks.
Lunch was at the W. H. with returning Justices of the Supreme
Court. It was a fun time. Then an NSC meeting to see how wed
handle the rollout of the 131
st
B2 bomber equipped for nuclear cruise
missiles. It puts us 1 plane above the restraints of SALT II which the
Soviets & us had agreed to observe even though the treaty had never
been ratified. The Soviets have regularly violated the agreement. My
decision is to h--l with them we roll out the plane. Upstairs to the
lonely W.H. Mommie left for the West today. I join her tomorrow.

The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987












Part Four:
International Diplomacy


1987
























Rome, Italy, 10-12 December 2009
Record of Conversation
of Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union
S.F. Akhromeev and H. Brown, C. Vance, H. Kissinger, and D. Jones.
February 4, 1987

Akhromeev. Allow me to welcome you to Moscow. We welcome you, prominent
statesmen of the United States, who have made a great contribution to the development of
Soviet-American relations and to reaching agreements on arms limitations in the 1970s.
Regrettably, since then, during the 1980s, we have made almost no progress.
Perhaps your visit to Moscow will to some extent help us to sort through the heaps that
we have piled up around us in the 1980s, especially the U.S. administration. But since
negotiations are a bilateral process it seems we have also played a part in stacking up
these heaps. We are prepared to talk with you.

Brown. Mr. Marshal, I want to specify right away that we are not expressing the
views of the current U.S. administration here and therefore we cannot hope to resolve the
problems that have been stacking up because of our government. We do not intend to
resolve questions of arms limitations for the U.S. administration. We are here as private
persons. But whatever interests we represent, I must say that we are deeply interested in
issues of mutual security.
I think that it is in the interest of the U.S. and the Soviet Union right now to
participate in an intensive dialogue with the aim of reaching mutually acceptable, fair
agreements and providing strategic stability. It is clear to all of us that the issues of
strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons are closely related. We also
know that the USSR included medium-range weapons in the single package of its
proposals in Reykjavik. Without question, the negotiations going on in Geneva aimed at
significantly reducing nuclear weapons in every category are useful. However, I cannot
say whether these negotiations will be successful in the last two years of Reagans
administration. Hopefully, the achievements in Geneva over the next couple of years will
positively influence the next U.S. administrations work in the sphere of arms control.

Vance. I fully agree with Mr. Browns observations. I would also like to draw
your attention to the objective necessity of conducting the negotiations in Geneva during
the remaining two years of Reagans term. We have already been asked numerous times
in Moscow whether we believe in the possibility of success for the negotiations in the
near future. And although the short-term outlook for the negotiations is uncertain, I think
it would be a mistake to expect no progress from the Geneva negotiations and to take
them less seriously as a result of this pessimistic viewpoint. I do not know whether
anything can be achieved in Geneva during the next couple of years, but I am absolutely
convinced that the failure or cessation of the negotiations would be a grave mistake.
Regardless of who will be president of the United States in 1988, the situation would be
most unfavorable if the progress of the negotiations were stopped at some period during
these two years.

Kissinger. I agree with my colleagues. Progress in the next two years is possible.
The disagreements between our delegations are not so significant. Should the
negotiations fail over the next two years it would mean stagnation on the question of the
limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons for at least three or four years.
I would like to use this opportunity to state my personal position on the issue of
the negotiations. As you know, I was against the U.S. position stated by President Reagan
in Reykjavik on strategic weapons. I was opposed because as I thought then and think
now, the goal of our negotiations should be not only the reduction or liquidation of
strategic weapons, but the search for an agreement that would provide strategic stability
for both sides. The negotiations taking place in Geneva right now stipulate the
preservation of existing trends in weapons development. I think it is necessary to work
out a different approach to the negotiations.
But whatever the case may be, the negotiations in Geneva are taking place and I
would not want them to fail. As for my publications on this matter, I doubt that they will
be translated into Russian. But I repeat that I am not against the negotiations.

Akhromeev. We read a great deal on these issues, including your publications, so
we have the appropriate information.

Jones. I am glad to have the opportunity to meet with you once again Mr.
Marshal. With great satisfaction I recall our meeting last year. I was impressed then by
your deep interest in questions of arms control.
When I represented the U.S. armed forces, I spoke in favor of the SALT I and
SALT II agreements. I, myself, and my colleagues from the Heads of State Committee
currently speak in favor of arms control. We are in favor of reducing not only strategic
but also conventional weapons.
I also agree with Dr. Kissinger and I think that in Reykjavik our sides approach
to the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons was too narrow. In my opinion, the
total liquidation of strategic ballistic missiles will not promote the establishment of
strategic stability between our countries. Major reductions of strategic weapons will
without question yield positive results. But for real stability it is necessary to foresee the
reduction of conventional forces and arms. I would like to hear your opinion on this
question, Mr. Marshal.

Vance. In addition to what has been stated by General Jones, I would like to
express my concern in relation to the liquidation of strategic nuclear weapons and mid-
range nuclear weapons. Even if such an agreement were developed between our two
sides, it would have little chance of being approved by the U.S. Congress. But the U.S.
Congress would approve an agreement on major reductions in strategic weapons. If we
speak realistically, nuclear missiles will be in our arsenals for many years to come.

Akhromeev. Allow me to state my point of view.
Firstly, concerning the desire to continue negotiations and understanding the fact
that the Soviet Union will have to work with any U.S. administration that comes to
power. We understand quite clearly that whoever has power in the United States, the
USSR will have to work and negotiate with that administration. We cannot influence who
comes to power in the U.S., just as the United States cannot influence who comes to
power in the Soviet Union. Since this is the case, we understand very well that we have to
work with the Reagan administration while he is in power for two more years.
We view the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons with full responsibility
and would like to reach an agreement. You should have no doubts about this.
In my opinion there is one fundamental question that right now is the primary one
which hinders us from reaching an agreement. This is the question Mr. Brown
mentionedabout the relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive
weapons. At one time the American side also did not deny this relationship and with your
active participation, Mr. Kissinger, we signed agreements in which this relationship was
emphasized in many ways. That was in 1972. Now the Reagan administration is telling
us: Let us reduce strategic offensive weapons. It was proposed to reduce them by 50%,
and in Reykjavik President Reagan even proposed to reduce land- and sea-based ballistic
missiles by 100%. But the relationship mentioned earlier is denied by the American
administrationthey talk about reducing strategic offensive weapons and at the same
time of the possibility of developing a national anti-missile defense system, including the
development of an ABM space combat echelon. I think I do not have to explain this to
you at great length: it is impossible to radically reduce strategic offensive weapons and at
the same time develop a countrys anti-missile defense system.
For example, C[aspar] Weinberger is saying that the countrys first echelon of its
anti-missile defense system should be developed as soon as possible. My opinion is that
as soon as the first combat space systems capable of striking satellites and warheads of
ballistic missiles appear in space every hope for any reductions or even limitations of
strategic offensive weapons will be made null and void. Then a real arms race will start,
the likes of which none of us has ever seen before.
Is it possible to reach any agreement during the last two years of Reagans term?
It is. We have similar positions on limiting strategic offensive weapons and mid-range
missiles, but they are tied up by the question of space, and by the question of creating an
anti-missile defense system with a space echelon. If we could agree on not creating
combat systems in space, I think we could agree on the rest of the questions as well.
On the question of arms control, which General Jones spoke aboutI think the
time has come when this question is becoming irrelevant because the Soviet Union is
prepared to enforce every kind of verification. This concerns all types of weapons and it
seems that everybody can see this progress from our side.
And now on the question of the total liquidation of strategic offensive weapons.
You say that the U.S. Congress will not ratify such an agreement. This proposal did not
initiate with the Soviet Union but with President Reagan. You know the packet that we
came to Reykjavik with, and we presented it to your delegation. More precisely, this was
during the talks between the U.S. President and the CC CPSU General Secretary. At the
conclusion of talks on the second day President Reagan proposed that we completely
liquidate intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based ballistic missiles over
the next 10 years.
The Soviet delegation considered this proposal during a short recess. The question
arose of accepting these proposals emanating from the American side, but of accepting
them fairly, which would mean not excluding bomberswe would need to liquidate all
three components of the triad. The CC CPSU General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev
presented this proposal to the President.
The President took a break, collected his delegation and discussed this proposal
with his advisers for an hour and fifteen minutes. Afterwards he announced that he
agreed with the CC CPSU General Secretarys proposal. This is what happened. I have
not added anything.
If we proceed consecutively and gradually, then we could settle on 50%
reductions as the space question is being resolved.
Now on conventional weapons. We agree with reducing armed forces and
conventional weapons. The West maintains that the Warsaw Treaty and the USSR have
surpassed NATO and the U.S. in conventional weapons. I think that all four of you have
comprehensive information on this issue. You all were in positions in which you had all
the data right in front of you.
The armed forces of NATO and the WTO are about the same in numbers; we
could argue forever about the differences in amounts and quality of weapons. Once,
chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said that when a correspondent asked him
whether he would like to exchange his armed forces for the armed forces of the Soviet
Union he answered flatly: no, he would not like to do that. We also would not like to do
that. I am saying that a balance in the military is an objective reality. It exists not only in
the strategic sphere, but also in the general forces and conventional weapons.
Conventional armed forces have one serious feature. This feature is that we do not
allow a global approach in evaluating them. We speak of reducing the armed forces and
armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Here a military balance exists. We
are ready to start negotiations and we have concrete proposalsto reduce the armed
forces of the two alliances in Europe by 25%. This proposal was offered in June of last
year in Budapest. Regrettably, we have not even started an exchange of opinions on this
question, although it is no fault of ours. But the WTO Budapest proposal remains valid
and we are prepared to work persistently to realize it in negotiations.
An issue arises in resolving the problem of conventional weaponsand here I
would like to mention that this is not an official proposal but my personal opinionthe
time is coming when a global approach is necessary for conventional armed forces. We
consider strategic weapons globally; following the suggestion of the U.S. we consider
medium-range missiles globally. Right now the U.S. is working on making missiles with
less than a 1000-km range a global issue also. Your delegation produced this proposal at
the negotiations in Geneva. The question arises: why are conventional armed forces not a
global issue? But I repeat that this is only my personal opinion. The heads of the Warsaw
Treaty states presented an official proposal in Budapestto reduce the armed forces and
conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals by 25 percent. This
proposal is ready for discussion.

Jones. I would like to comment on the correlation of conventional weapons. Such
factors as population and industrial capacity influence this correlation. In this sense, the
Western countries surpass the Warsaw Treaty countries. But we are worried by your
40,000 tanks in the countries of Eastern Europe.
The time has come when we have to discuss questions related to conventional
weapons, which could be a prelude to serious negotiations on the reduction of
conventional troops and weapons.

Brown. I also think that reducing conventional forces and weapons is a very
important issue. The opinion in the West is that the current correlation of conventional
troops and weapons is not favorable to the West in case of a short-term war. Although in
a 3-year war, for example, the outcome might not be in favor of the Warsaw Treaty. But
very differing opinions on this issue exist.
Your idea of a global approach to reducing conventional troops and weapons is
undoubtedly very interesting, Mr. Marshal. But certain questions would inevitably come
up: how to take into account the armed forces of Iran, the PRC, India?

Akhromeev. I would like to mention once again that the conversation about a
global approach during the consideration of conventional weapons is my personal
opinion. In my opinion this issue is truly serious. I think General Jones understands very
well that there are peacetime armies with a certain quantity of weapons and there are
wartime armies. There is such a concept as troop mobilization in case of war. There is
nothing you can do: life is such that we have to take into consideration the possibility of
war. The Soviet Unions mobilization resources are in Europe and they are included
within the scope of weapons and forces that need to be reduced, while the U.S. territory
with all of its mobilization resources is outside the scope of reductions. This means that
such a question exists for the Soviet Union.

Kissinger. I agree with you, Mr. Marshal. But is it possible to engage third
countries in the process of reducing armed forces?

Akhromeev. Right now, probably not. That is why we propose to start
negotiations on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. But the
global issue does not disappear; we will have to deal with it.
Incidentally, when I mentioned this for the first time last September in Stockholm,
the U.S. representative even took offense at me. He said that I had stepped outside the
limits of the Stockholm requirements in my statement. But for my part this question was
presented as a problem for the future.

Vance. If we reach an agreement on full liquidation of strategic nuclear weapons,
the issue of reducing conventional armed forces for the provision of strategic stability
will arise. In this situation the military force of the PRC would cause more worry to you
than it would to us.

Akhromeev. If we achieve a sharp reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and
begin reducing conventional weapons, then all countries will have to reduce their military
forces. There was a reason why some of your allies were up in arms against President
Reagan for what he proposed in Reykjavik. It is nice to reduce somebody elses weapons,
much less pleasant to reduce your own. Global-scale reductions of conventional weapons
and military forces are only possible with the participation of all countries, including
China.
But I only raise this question to show you that the very process of reductions in
Europe has, for the Soviet Union, problematic links with the fact that U.S. territory is not
encompassed by these negotiations. It works out that the U.S. does not mind reducing
Soviet weapons while the weapons on their territory remain inviolable. Such a question
exists for us. There is also this question: we are always dealing with ground forces and
tactical aviation. Meanwhile, the fleet remains on the sidelines, as if 15 American aircraft
carriers are nothing, weapons that do not mean anything. This is also a question for the
future if we wish for greater security, as Mr. Brown said.

Kissinger. Let us move on to the question of SDI. Allow me to start with a
question. When at the start of our conversation you spoke of SDI you used the term
combat space means. What is your interpretation of this term?

Akhromeev. The SDI program includes a land part, a space part, and a combat
control system. As far as I know, the combat space system (I hesitate to give it a
precise designation; this is done at negotiations) is at the same time a carrier with
weapons, whether it is kinetic or laser.

Vance. What do you consider space noncombat means, for example surveillance
and intelligence, navigation, research, etc?

Akhromeev. We and you both have such means deployed right now. These are
systems of intelligence, navigation, communications, meteorology, topography, and
geodesy.
To speak frankly, we still do not understand the American sides position on
space. It is not stated during negotiations. There is a clear position on START and
medium-range missiles. There is a very clear position on nuclear testingto continue
nuclear explosions, which the U.S. does. But it is not clear to us what the U.S. wants in
relation to space.

Chervov. The American side does not have a position on this in negotiations. Mr.
Kampelman, who heads this group, cannot state the Americans position on space to us.
And negotiations on this issue have been going on for three years.

Brown. The problem is that our position on space is still being discussed in the
U.S. We are not in a position of sufficient confidence with either Mr. Kampelman or
President Reagan for them to trust us with thorough information on the official position
on space defense. We are aware that the U.S. position on space presented in the press is
unacceptable for the USSR. Our position is that the ABM Treaty should be complied
with by both sides for the next 10 years and that during this period the sides would have
the right to make developments and conduct experiments in space of space-based
elements using the principally new achievements of science and technology.

Akhromeev. But the ABM Treaty prohibits this.

Brown. Even in the U.S. we are dealing with different interpretations of the ABM
Treaty. The official interpretation of the ABM Treaty in the U.S. assumes that if there is
no agreement on the deployment of space-based means of strategic defense within the
next 10 years, each side has the right to withdraw from the Treaty and to begin deploying
space-based elements upon the expiration of this 10-year period.

Akhromeev. Our position is different.

Brown. I know that. You interpret the ABM Treaty in the narrow sense. Such
an interpretation excludes any testing of space-based elements outside of laboratories.
As you can see, the differences between these two interpretations of the Treaty are
vast. On the one hand, these differences can be understood as the absence of any kind of
foundation for an agreement on the space question. On the other hand, we can set a goal
of immediately bringing together the two sides positions on the question of space means.
Personally I am in favor of the second path toward solving this problem, in favor of the
effort to bring the positions of the USSR and the U.S. closer together.
Our lack of trust in each other on issues of space can be explained by the fact that
some U.S. experts believe that the current scientific-technological and industrial potential
of the USSR could allow it to get ahead and achieve a kind of supremacy over the U.S. It
seems the USSR has similar concerns about the possibilities and intentions of the U.S. As
a result, each side interprets the Treaty to its benefit.

Vance. I adhere to a narrow understanding of the ABM Treaty. Both sides must
discuss in detail what is allowed according to the Treaty and what is not; what type of
developments and tests can be allowed under what conditions, and which cannot be.

Akhromeev. In our opinion, space combat systems or their components cannot be
tested in space, the ABM Treaty prohibits it. And not only the Treaty. As soon as space
combat apparatus appear in space, capable of destroying satellites and another countrys
warheads, it will become impossible to reduce strategic offensive weapons in any way.
The arms race process will escape any possible kind of control by the governments, any
possibility of agreeing on limitations and reductions of strategic offensive weapons will
disappear.
As the question stands, according to SDI work is permitted only on the ground, in
laboratories. The sides have not yet clearly established what this means. It seems this
concept of what the sides are allowed should be clarified and mutually acceptable
resolutions and agreements should be found along these lines. There can be no agreement
on testing these systems in space.

Kissinger. From talks with our scientists I found out that they are preparing an
experiment in space with the use of laser technology in order to study Mars. Under your
interpretation of the Treaty, would such an experiment be possible? If the laser
installation is used to study Mars, then it can be supposed that it can also be aimed at a
satellite of a potential enemy.

Akhromeev. I think that such an experiment can be conducted. After all, laser-
technology is already being used for intelligence gathering, in communications systems,
in other satellites. The main issue is that it should not be used as a military means, as a
means for destruction, as a weapon mounted on a special apparatus (a satellite).

Kissinger. Mr. Marshal, is it possible to draw a distinction between laser
installations used for scientific purposes, or even intelligence, and military installations?

Akhromeev. We need to seek such distinctions.

Kissinger. Could such questions of a technical nature become the subject of
negotiations?

Akhromeev. I think that they can.

Brown. You believe that testing any element of a space-based combat device
should be prohibited. But what should be done about space-based means of surveillance
and intelligence, which use laser or in-beam technology? Where do we draw the line
between a combat and noncombat designation for these devices? How do we tell them
apart in space?

Akhromeev. We could agree on the power level of these systems and on other
technical factors that determine the designation of this or that system.

Brown. In the U.S. even the experts who do not view the SDI program as
stabilizing have doubts whether it would be possible to resolve technical problems in the
process of negotiations with the USSR. These questions are already arising now, when it
is still a long while before real space combat devices appear.

Akhromeev. It is true that right now the question is not specifically being
discussed at the negotiations on space-based devices. But if it comes to that then of
course the technical specialists from both sides will discuss all these technical details. We
are urging that these negotiations be started, [that we] begin discussing the problem of a
space combat echelon. But because of the American side we are not discussing these
issues right now.
Did we not have difficult issues to deal with in the 1970s? Dr. Kissinger must still
remember the problem of how to count a missile with a MIRVed warhead. We argued for
three years over this question and found a solution. The fact of the matter was that at that
time both sides wanted to find a solution. Now we are under the impression that the U.S.
administration does not want to find a solution to this problem. But we will continue to
negotiate, even though we are getting the impression that the American administration
does not take the negotiations seriously.

Brown. Speaking of the technological aspects of these questions, we could use the
positive experience we obtained during the development of the ABM Treaty. I remember
my work together with P[aul] Nitze. He thinks of you very positively and sends you his
best regards.

Akhromeev. Thank you.

Brown. As I understand it, you are not against discussing technical questions
related to space systems such as the characteristics of aircraft sensors, data processing
systems, surveillance and intelligence systems, power units on satellites. All of these
would be topics for negotiation?

Akhromeev. That is correct, Mr. Brown. Still, first we have to discuss the
positions of the [two] sides, and then we can discuss the details. Right now, regrettably,
the American side does not have a position on the questions of space. For our part, we
will be ready to discuss all questions in detail.

Chervov. Mr. Brown, the American side does not want to discuss the details you
mentioned at the negotiations.

Brown. I can understand why those details are not being discussed right now.
First and foremost it is because the U.S. administration does not have a position on space.
Therefore, my question was hypothetical in nature.

Akhromeev. Nevertheless, practical work is being conducted on SDI, while the
negotiations are at a standstill and treading water. There is movement in creating systems
for SDI. This is where the danger is right now.
I am afraid that I might leave you without lunch. As far as I know you will be
meeting with the CC CPSU General Secretary Comrade M.S. Gorbachev shortly. I do not
mean to be impolite, I am just thinking of your situation. Thank you.

Brown, Vance, Kissinger, and Jones thank Akhromeev for the conversation.

Present from the Soviet side were: Colonel-General Chervov N.F., Major-General
Lebedev Yu. V. The conversation was translated by Colonel Popov, F.F. (General Staff
of the GRU).

[Source: Obtained from a participant by the author in 1996
Translated by Anna Melyakova for the National Security Archive.]

Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.
1
Alexander Yakovlev, Memorandum for Gorbachev
Toward an Analysis of the Fact of the Visit of Prominent American Political
Leaders to the USSR (Kissinger, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Brown, and others), February
25, 1987

To Comrade Gorbachev M. S.


I. What does the fact of the visit signify?
The main purpose of this groups visit is, to a minor degree, to analyze the state of
current relations in the sphere of Soviet-American relations. The strategic basis rationale
is to form an assessment of the prospects of our countrys future development on the
basis of original sources in the light of the probable election in the United States in
1988 of a president who would represent the next generation of the U.S. governing elite.
From here [the next step] is to study the possibility of [establishing] new substance and
forms of relations with the Soviet Union.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the grave miscalculation of American Sovietology, in all
its divisions, became obvious. Two dominant scenarios of the future development of
the USSR existed before the start of the current decade.

According to the first one, the Soviet economy was approaching the brink of an
avalanche-like crisis, which would lead to an open expression of social discontent
(approximately following the Polish version). Open phases of such a crisis were
predicted by the proponents of that concept for 1983-1984. It is precisely on the basis of
these assessments that the Reagan policy in particular was built immediately after his
coming to power in January 1981.

According to the second one, the crisis in Soviet society would not assume open forms, at
least in the current decade, due to a very high level of patience among the population,
[the occurrence of] historical tragedies, and a powerful control apparatus. However, the
Soviet economys development would slow down, and most importantly, the USSRs
economic, scientific-technological, and social backwardness (lagging behind)not only
in comparison to the West but also to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and in the
future even to Chinawould grow. As a result, some time after 1993-1995, the Soviet
Union would lose material prospects for development as a world power and its moral and
political authority, and it would cease to represent a military, political and social threat to
the West.

In essence, beginning from 1975 after the signing of the Helsinki Act, all versions of U.S.
long-term strategyboth those that constituted the basis of the administrations official
course and those proposed as alternatives to that coursestarted from the assumption of
the USSRs downward socio-economic development in the long-term perspective.

In this case, such an approach is not simply a class-based denial that communism has a
future. Such perceptions are not just routine exercises in propaganda. The actual
2
assessments were based on data from the CIA, the Department of Commerce, and
academic, financial and industrial research centers, supported by information from
migrs arriving from the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe.

The latter source deserves special consideration.

When a substantial wave of emigration started arriving from our country in the beginning
of the 1970s, and when the migrs attributed quite negative characteristics to the internal
processes in the USSR, such information was initially received in the United States with
considerable qualification, even with mistrust. In essence, nothing but negative opinions
about all things Soviet was expected from the migrs.

However, when by the end of the last decade and at the turn of the 1980s Soviet official
statistics and our own public assessments started, in the American view, to confirm the
information provided by the migrs, the latter were given special credence. In a way, a
certain mutual strengthening of the traditional negative perception of our country and the
current intelligence took place. That resulted in [certain] evaluations of our countrys
development prospects for the future up to the XXI century.

That is why the shift in the development of Soviet society after the April (1985) Plenum
of the Central Committee had a shocking effect on the American political elite.

Events in the USSR shed bright light on the strategic mistakes of American Sovietology
and policy, because the theoretical recommendations of the last decade did not even
consider the abstract possibility of change in the USSRnot even as a hypothesis.

It is precisely in this context that one should consider the intelligence-gathering
political mission of the above-mentioned group, which consists of representatives of the
highest echelon of the political elite. In the discussions, which they held after their
conversations in Moscow, the following main directions could be identified.

1. Do developments in the USSR represent an explosion of idealism or are they a
thought-out and conscious policy?

Members of the group devoted special attention to trying to discover to what extent
people in the USSR see the interconnectedness between economic, social and other
aspects of the current course, and how they assess the essence of the problems and the
prospects for development at the intersections of the social and economic, and social
and political, and economic and military spheres.

What they heard in Moscow led them to conclude that the policy of perestroika was
based on a thought-out conception. They see the conflict between the demands for
economic efficiency and the demands of the social sphere as the main contradiction in
the development of Soviet society. Members of the group noted that judging by the
discussions that had taken place, people in the USSR see and understand this
contradiction (Peterson, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Jones, Kissinger). Diminishing the
3
sharpness of this contradiction would change the face of the country, and would raise its
social prestige.

2. How realistic are the plans of the Soviet leadership?
Only one member of the groupHylandcalled these plans unrealistic. At the same
time, one could clearly see in the reaction of this professional Sovietologist (a liberal one
by American standards) deep irritation with the fact that the prognoses of Sovietology
turned out to be completely overturned. He took part in developing those prognoses
himself.

The rest of the [participants] described the plans for socio-economic development in the
USSR with varying degrees of optimism. Not one of them allowed for the possibility of
fully realizing those plans. But at the same time, in their general assessments, there has
been a shift toward greater optimism and a greater willingness to believe in the success of
our initiatives. Such a reaction was especially noticeable in Vance and Peterson.

3. Is it good or bad for the USA if the USSR experiences upward development? Only
Hyland expressed himself to the effect that strengthening the Soviet Union could be
accompanied with problems for the USA, mainly from the perspective of foreign policy
and relations with Western Europe. The rest of them think that a developing USSR
would be more beneficial for U.S. interests than a possible [source] of any sort of shock
in their country. (Jones said directlywe wish [them] luck.)

Some members of the group expressed concern that both countries focus on competition
with each other would lead to a mutual weakening, and thus simultaneously to a relative
strengthening of third countries, above all Japan. In this connection, Kirkpatrick and
certain others spoke in favor of reducing military expenditures in the light of domestic
interest in the USSR and the USA.

4. To what extent has the new political thinking become a part of the Soviet Unions
foreign policy? The spectrum of judgments played out as follows. Kirkpatrick, who
believes that it was only a matter of Gorbachevs personal style, was at one pole. In her
assessment, she did not expect that the Soviet Union could have such an open and
democratically inclined leader. As far the content of USSR foreign policy, in her words,
there were only limited new expressions with the old background.

Vance represented the opposite pole within the group. In his opinion, a lot of new things
had already been introduced as part of the content of USSR foreign policy, and it was
especially important that the principal elements of that new [content] be confirmed in the
decisions of the XXVII Congress, such as for example the concept of an interdependent
world. One cannot fail to see, he noted, that the actions of the Soviet leadership are
coordinated with those general principles; we are not just talking about propaganda.

The subject of Afghanistan was in the very center of the discussion about new thinking
among the groups members.

4
Proponents of the point of view that the new thinking is nothing but words shared the
position that there is no reason for the United States to help the Soviet Union get out of
Afghanistan. At most, U.S. neutrality toward a political settlement in Afghanistan
would be possible in exchange for cutting all USSR assistance to Nicaragua, including
economic [assistance] (Hyland).

Vance, Tarnoff, and Swing spoke to the effect that now the USA does not gain any real
benefit from the war in Afghanistan, but more and more they are risking the likely
collapse of Pakistan and the possibility of an American-Indian confrontation. Taking that
into account, in their view, the USA should not interfere with a political settlement in
Afghanistan, if the USSR finds a formula of such a settlement.

5. About joint venture enterprises. This concept drew a lot of interest both from the
practical (Peterson) and the ideological (Kissinger) points of view. The main issue,
which is still unresolved, in the opinion of the Americans, and which constrains the
practical implementation of such projects, is how the contradiction between western
companies focus on extracting profit, on purely business criteria, and the need to abide
by the requirements of Soviet law would be resolved. All the practical issues, first of all
those having to do with the share of joint venture enterprises in the USSRs domestic
market, and those regarding procedures for repatriating the profitrequire more
explanations.

6. What does the sphere of common Soviet and U.S. interests consist of today? All
members of the group were united in the opinion that the principal sphere of common
interests lies in preventing nuclear war, and creating and strengthening guarantees against
its outbreak.

Members of the group also considered the two countries reduction of military
expenditures as a sphere of growing common interest. Peterson emphasized that in the
last two or three years in U.S. business circles a serious concern has arisen about the
consequences of the growth of military spending and the corresponding U.S. national
budget deficit. He mentioned that fears of a deficit were very strong in business circles,
especially because its impact could affect literally everythingU.S. internal life,
relations with allies and with the third world, and so on.

As a result of conversations in Moscow, the belief in the idea of exhausting the USSR
with the arms race was undermined. Members of the group noted that in the face of the
USSR, the way it is imaginable in the future, the USA would not be able to allow itself
excessive military spending (Peterson, Tarnoff, Jones, Vance); otherwise, they would
exhaust themselves.

At the same time, members of the group essentially do not see any other spheres of
common interest between the USSR and the USA. The idea of complete elimination of
nuclear armaments is being received with alarm. There are three groups of arguments
against this idea.
5
the belief that nuclear weapons alone have preserved the peace for the last forty years,
and would be capable of preserving it in the future.
the concern that if nuclear weapons were eliminated, the USSR would attain great
superiority in conventional weapons.
that whereas thinking within the nuclear framework is sufficiently well developed,
the liquidation of nuclear weapons would return foreign policy thinking in the U.S. to the
level and concepts of the 1940s-1950s.

Concerns about the prospect of eliminating nuclear weapons are so strong that according
to the statements of some members of the group (Kissinger, Brown), the proponents of
arms control in the U.S. have quieted down; they are frightened of both Soviet
superiority in conventional armaments and of the possibility of an unprecedented arms
race in this sphere on the basis of new technologies.

The conclusion of the groups members: nuclear armaments should be considerably
reduced on the basis of strategic stability, but not eliminated completely.

7. The prospects for Soviet-American relations, especially for the immediate future.
This is the main [subject] that was analyzed and discussed. On this, members of the
group expressed two opinions, which, strictly speaking, did not contradict each other.

First: in principle, there exists an opportunity to achieve agreement on disarmament
during this period, but only if we untie the Reykjavik package. In this case, an
agreement on INF could be the easiest to achieve. An agreement on SDI/ABM is not
impossible either, but it would require great effort.

Second: even if Reagan wakes up in the remaining two years and wants to achieve
agreement on something, nothing would come out of it due to the balance of forces in the
administration and the power of the extreme right to counter such agreements with
allegations to the effect that they would contradict the provisions officially accepted
previously by the administration.

It is telling that both the first and the second assessments were expressed by the same
people (Kissinger, Vance, Brown, Tarnoff). However, they all emphasized the need in
any case not to stop conducting an intensive policy toward the U.S., which would by
virtue of its existence neutralize the threat of the extreme right. And this threat, according
to the general assessment of the group, is real, and its scope is increasing along with the
growing difficulties of the administration and with national elections in 1988 drawing
closer.

II. Conclusions and Suggestions.

The trip to Moscow, of course, did not lead the members of the group to change their
general viewsnobody would have expected that anyway. The principal concepts of
goals remained the same as well. One thing has changed noticeably, howeverthe
opinion was confirmed that the USSR has started and will continue in the future the kinds
6
of domestic reforms that might require deep corrections in American prognoses of the
future development of Soviet societycorrections of a political, economic and
international nature.

Perestroika is not seen as threatening to the U.S. interests, apparently mainly because
they are waiting to see how things progress here. U.S. Sovietologists obviously need
more time for a deeper analysis of the interconnections between the USSRs domestic
and foreign policies in the future. Judging by everything, members of the group have in
mind to work out some kind of alternative to the Reagan course, but at this point they are
still unable to present it convincingly to public opinion and to the political elite of the
United States. There remains a certain lack of clarity after the mistakes [that have been
made] in their theoretical blueprints and practical actions.

Therefore, [we are facing] the task of [applying] incessant and effective political pressure
on the United States with the objective of countering Reagans course and of providing
support for those forces within the U.S. ruling class who stand against this course.

It appears that the most effective step here in the present circumstances could be to untie
the package that was proposed at the summit in Reykjavik, and to redefine the
relationships between its constituent parts. Tactically, such untying could be either a
one-time event, presented in some dramatic form, or more extended in time; either
instantly and fully open and public, or containing both public and diplomatic forms. It
would be most preferable to do it as a transformation of the package into a concept for
a framework agreement on the 1974 Vladivostok model.

A) The presentation of the package in Reykjavik was precise, right, and necessary. We
needed a powerful initiative, which would have captured public opinion, conducted an
assertive reconnaissance by fighting of the administrations positions, would have
illuminated those positions, and would become a means of putting pressure on them.
And a powerful initiative should have had reliable insurance. Our initiatives have
fulfilled all those functions with distinction:

a) Reagans positions as a proponent of a military-force approach were exposed
to the maximum extent;
b) In terms of domestic support, the SDI is now weaker in the U.S. than it was
before Reykjavikit is not an accident that Weinberger and the far right are
rushing with the decision to deploy [SDI]; in the Congress, the mood is
predominantly against a full-scale SDI, because of financial considerations as
well;
c) The administration is weaker in terms of foreign policy: Irangate became
possible only after and due to Reykjavik, it is a form of retribution against
Reagan for Reykjavik (simultaneously from several sides);
d) A deep split has occurred in public opinion in the West as a whole, which now
is using multiple channels of access to all aspects of relations between East
and West, as well as within NATO. This split is even more effective due to
the fact that it came as a complete surprise to the West;
7
e) The ideas expressed in the package are still at work now, almost half a year
after Reykjavik, as a factor in mobilizing the elements of new political
thinking worldwide, and in counteracting the line of the Reagan
administration. But it is precisely the ideas [themselves], not the package as
such.
In short, we have created an extremely important and effective beachhead for our
offensive against Reagan. Today, without losing any time, we should expand it,
turn it into a beachhead for an offensive against the positions of the forces of the
far right, and of the active proponents of the arms race in general, while at the
same time ensuring opportunities for cooperation in this sphere with moderately
conservative and liberal groups in the U.S. and Western Europe.

Objective opportunities for this do exist. The Reagan administration stumbled backwards
after Reykjavik. Having [now] taken positions on SDI that are even more aggressive
than [those presented] during the summit itself, Washington, judging by everything, is
now trying to exclude any possibility of a positive shift on any of the issues of our
package beforehand, even as they state just the opposite publicly. It turns the
package into a dead end.
The White House, it seems, is deeply convinced that the package represents our
final position. The responses to your latest statements show that they were waiting for
new proposals or concessions from us. Not having received them, they must be thinking
now in Washington that any serious progress on the Soviet position is unlikely. In these
conditions, untying the package would become one more action that finally unmasks
the genuine essence of the U.S. position on the issues of limitation and reduction of
armaments.

B) We should not let the next U.S. trick go unanswered. For us, the package as
such is not a goal, but a means. The Soviet side should not allow Washington to sow
doubts about our intentions, shift responsibility for the lack of progress in the
negotiations to the USSR, [or] capture the political initiative by painting a prospect for
fully realistic 50% cuts for public opinion, and so on.

There is no guarantee that if we untie the package, the U.S. side would assent to
balanced agreements with us. The facts suggest a completely different tendency in the
development of Reagans position. But another point is equally truein the atmosphere
of stagnation, one notices a dilution of borders in Western European public opinion, and
partially even in American [public opinion]: both superpowers are being perceived as
incapable of responding positively to the aspirations of the masses.

In politics, maximum freedom of maneuver is always valuable. The package in
its present form only ties our hands. We dont have likely grounds to expect that
everything will work out on its own, that Reagan will have an epiphanyin Reykjavik,
he missed his best change to go down in history not as a clown (litsedei), but as a
statesman. For that, Reagan is not intelligent enough, and too limited in his freedom of
choice.

8
In [our] analysis of the situation, we should take one more aspect into account.
Under the current correlation of forces, the USSR is confronting the USA not only in the
international arena, but also inside the U.S. itself. Of course, we cannot elect a good
President for ourselves, we cannot persuade him to make good policy for us. However,
we can protect ourselves from the worst. Today this would mean: increasing pressure on
Reagan and the circles standing behind him. Adding more flexibility and dynamism to
the Soviet approach would strengthen such pressure.

C) Are agreements on separate issues in our interest? I think yes. We never
formulated the issue as all or nothing. We are not presenting it in such a form now
either: we are not linking the package with nuclear testing, [or] chemical weapons.
What kind of agreements are possible in principle?

1. INF, with a simultaneous discussion about tactical missiles. For us this would
be tantamount to removal of a very serious threat. [It] would boost our reputation in
Europe. In the end, [it] would make our relations with China easier.

In any case, it is unlikely that we would have to penetrate SDI, if it is ever built,
with intermediate-range missiles. Untying the package makes this agreement
attainable; preserving the package blocks it. Here the benefit of untying is obvious.

2. A 50% reduction in strategic weapons, with a simultaneous emphasis on our
readiness to proceed to full nuclear disarmament. If it were possible, the benefit of such a
reduction would be unquestionable in all respects: political, economic, moral, and
military. Building up strategic offensive weapons would make sense only in order to
penetrate SDI, but we still have to undertake a comprehensive analysis of this issue.

3. The following model of a settlement also deserves considerationa 50%
reduction in strategic weapons (the number of delivery vehicles and the number of
warheads would be decreased by half in real terms, while each side would have the right
to decide the relative proportion of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers); a simultaneous
decrease by 50% in U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in the European zone;
and a reduction in U.S. forward-based systems by 50%. If the U.S. agrees to adequately
reduce its forward-based systems in Japan and South Korea, [we should agree] to bring
the number of [our] intermediate-range missiles in Asia (and respectively in the U.S.
territory) down to 100 (warheads).

At the same time, we take into account that the United States links the
implementation of measures on INF in Europe with strict verification. Consequently,
U.S. territory as such would be left outside of the verification regime, while inspections
in England, the FRG, and other countries would require complicated coordinating
procedures with the national governments.

Will the U.S. go for such decisions? It is already clearnot under Reagan!
Under these conditions, our readiness for an agreement outside the package would have
the following pluses for us:
9
[it would] uncover the true positions of the U.S., and become a powerful and long-term
instrument of pressure on the Americans and their course;
[it would] play the role of a stimulus to limit appropriations for SDI in the American
Congress; the stimulus [would be] even more effective if we could preserve existing
limits and cut at least some armaments, at least the INF. The political and psychological
effect of such a step would be very significant, especially taking into account U.S.
growing financial difficulties.

4. SDI proper. At this point, the Soviet Union stands by its position of a
complete rejection of all military technologies that constitute the basis of this American
program. If we want to be logical and persuasive in our struggle with SDI on this
platform, we have to be ready to put forth the idea of not just limitation but full
renunciation of ABM systems, i.e. of a toughening of the requirements of the 1972 ABM
treaty. Any limitation is always misleading, it leaves loopholes for circumvention and
misunderstandings.

A ban on ABM [systems] would mean very little real change for us, because
during the last decade systems have emerged against which there exist no effective
counter-systems so far; and the quantitative limitations under the treaty are very poorly
linked with the actual scale of possible massive strikes. Consequently, the Moscow
ABM district has significance only as a research and testing ground for the contingency
in the event the question arises about deploying a system of defense for the national
territory.

It appears that the U.S.at least up to the point of actual testing of the developing
technologies on real targetsis not going to engage in negotiations with us on the subject
of turning the ABM treaty into a treaty banning ABM [systems]. The latter would
become possible only in case testing within the framework of SDI returns disappointing
results, or if the systems themselves turn out to be so complicated and expensive that
Washington would prefer to cut back the system. However, testing outside the
framework of the existing treaty would mean the end of its existence, unless,
understandably, the sides agree to something else before such testing.

The issue of making a concession to the Americans in terms of a broad
interpretation of the ABM Treaty could be raised in practical terms only if there was
appropriate compensation on Washingtons partfor example, finding an agreed upon
modus on the legal status of space; [or,] further, developing regulations on certain kinds
of activities in space, or even betterin relation to objects in space; and finally,
formulating objective criteria to distinguish between the defensive and non-defensive
character of systems allowed to be deployed in space, and the methodology for verifying
implementation of the agreed-upon obligations.

What is the point of putting forth this kind of consideration? First of all, it would
not be expedient retrospectively to give our opponents a pretext for alleging that the
USSR made success in Reykjavik impossible by linking nuclear disarmament to SDI.
Secondly, by providing details of our approach (explaining terms, such as laboratory
10
research, and so on.) we would demonstrate that a development of this kind was already
possible at Reykjavik, had the United States wanted to bring our positions closer
together. Thirdly, raising a number of questions for discussion would allow us to weaken
the link between the ABM and SDI without any damage to our reputation, and to accept
the principle of parallel negotiations.

In general, partial agreementson SDI and on all other issuesare in our interest in
terms of their potential content and by virtue of the fact that their existence as such would
expand and strengthen the political and legal basis of Soviet-American relations. We
need to clear the way for such agreements as much as possible.

D. The initiative is in our hands now. We put forward far-reaching proposals, and took
steps to make their implementation a reality. The U.S. and the West responded with all
kinds of buts and ifs, [both] artificial and genuine doubts. The task now is to remove
artificial obstacles and to present for the judgment of world public opinion the genuine,
deep motives of American policy. For this we need a new breakthroughwith the
understanding, however, that the reaction to such a breakthrough in the United States
would follow the familiar pattern (which is more than plausible), and that some time later
we might need to further develop our proposals in the interests of maintaining constant
pressure on the U.S. (the matryoshka principle in formulating our initiatives).

From the perspective of the USSRs national security, the untying of the package does
not present any real minuses: the content of the proposals essentially remains the same.
The fact of untying in itself does not in any way signify the automatic conclusion of
agreements on conditions that are unfavorable to us. We also preserve the possibility of
proposing other linkages and packages should such a need arise.

There could be a difficulty of a propaganda nature on the issue of why in Reykjavik we
thought it necessary specifically to present a package and not a set of proposals. It seems
to me that this difficulty could be overcome by suggesting that we abandoned the
package principle in response to the initiatives of the West European states, and that
this represents a concession [on our part]. Such a step would also expose the positions of
West European conservatives, and would show how much their desire to achieve
agreements with the USSR is really worth.

Would the untying of the package be interpreted as an expression of our excessive
interest in [reaching] agreements? Of course it would. But this is how everything is
interpreted now anyway. The Reagan administration cannot raise the level of their
demands to usit has already been raised to the limit, and the general political
atmosphere and the positions of the administration are not at all what they were in 1981-
1982. At the same time, it is still a long while before a new administration comes to
power.

However, taking into account [the possibility] that with a new administration coming to
power more favorable conditions could develop for achieving agreements, including on
SDI, it appears most expedient to prepare [our] positions in advance. Untying the
11
package would now be seen as precisely that kind of preparation, beyond everything
else. To the contrary, taking this [step] closer to the time of achieving future agreements
would give the U.S. further grounds to draw conclusions about our excessive interest in
agreements.

A public speech announcing the untying of the package, if it were to take place in the
immediate future, could compensate, in the eyes of the world public, for the fact of our
reciprocal resumption of nuclear testing. This consideration is not decisive here, but it
also needs to be taken into account.

E. It is extremely important now not to lose the tempo we have developed, and not to
lose time. If we want to untie the package, we need to do it right now, because later the
effect of it will be much weaker:
at present, nobody expects a step like this from us; on the contrary, it looks as though
in the West and in the United States the impression is growing that we have written off
the Reagan administration;
the U.S. elections are still a long way away. Closer to the start of the electoral
campaign many people would inevitably interpret such a step as an effort to influence the
outcome of the elections;
objectively, we still have several months to complete the agreements before the
electoral campaign starts, and under these conditions our approach would be perceived as
a natural one;
for these and many other reasons, we should not create the impression that we are
providing any kind of advance to a future U.S. administration;
Irangate will conclude in some way. Depending on its resolution, our approach
could be interpreted either as dealing the final blow to Reagan or, on the contrary, as a
concession to the President, who has emerged from the crisis in a strengthened
position;
finally, informed people will see this as our positive response to what many prominent
foreigners have said in Moscow.

Therefore, if we undertake the untying of the package in the immediate future, it will
look objectively as one more expression of our good will and common sense, and a
practical expression of our new thinking, the unity of words and deeds.

And one more consideration. This experience demonstrates that the U.S. concludes
significant agreements when they sense the strength of our position. The advent of this
moment will be connected, beyond everything else, to the demonstration of our
unquestionable achievements in the material sphere. Such a time will come, obviously,
in several years. It will be at that point that a breakthrough of some kind in Soviet-
American relations will become possible. Therefore, it is expedient to view the actions
we undertake now as an accumulation of authority and positions in anticipation of that
sort of moment in the future, and as a long-term political investment.

F. Of course, untying the package would present us with new tasks.

12
We need a profound study of the full spectrum of positions and arguments for
contingencies involving both a U.S. refusal to reach agreement with us (in general or on
separate issues), and an expression, now or in the future, of readiness for agreement on
their part.

In particular, we need to study the entire set of issues regarding the possibility of carrying
out joint programs in space (including verifying that certain kinds of military activities do
not take place there), as well as cooperative programs in the arena of high technology.

In effect, we did not even touch on the possibility of [developing] programs in the
military sphere, starting with direct contacts between defense agencies up to, possibly,
certain unified systems of command and control.

The legal aspects of overflights of national territories by space weapon systems if and
when such systems start to be deployed (whether or not they should be shot down in
peacetime) should be studied too.

Another big theme for analysis is the possibility of using international procedures and the
services of third countries on matters of verification, arbitration, etc., on a mutual basis.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that the issues listed above as well as other
problems demand careful analysis on our part in any case, regardless of the package,
the untying of which might only necessitate a certain acceleration of such work.
However, again, an acceleration of that kind would be desirable in any case.

[Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond 10063, Opis 1 Delo 388
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.]





Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.
Politburo February 26, 1987
On Soviet-American Relations and Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Armaments

Gorbachev. Geneva is coming to a dead end. And we need to move to a new
level of conversation. We should invite Shultz to come here. First of all, to cut off the
broad interpretation of the ABM [treaty]. By continuing the Geneva negotiations in their
present form, we are pretending that nothing has happened and that we are willing to
tolerate all the American insolence. This borders on a betrayal of principles. And if they
keep dragging it out, [we should] shut down rounds 7 and 8 and begin new negotiations
on [the basis of] our proposals.
Gromyko. Maybe we should tear the SS-20s from the package? Of course, it
would be a step backwards but it [will be undertaken] under new conditions. And to
achieve a partial agreement. It would take a lot of brains for America to agree to a
comprehensive settlement.
Dobrynin. We werent counting on that either.
Ligachev. What if we employ our reserves at oncethe medium-range missiles?
Dobrynin. The main aspect here is political, but also [matters for] propaganda.
Gorbachev. Reagans political game is very clear to usto give political sanction
to SDI after he leaves office, and at the same time to preserve some impression that they
are searching for something, for some resolution. We could respond with two actions at
oncegive them a sharp rebuke, and negotiations. But that would satisfy them. They
will tangle our reins and at the same time pretend that they are in favor of an agreement
but we are the ones undermining it. Meanwhile, they will win time for developing their
SDI.
The biggest step that would make an impression on the outside world, on public
opinion, would be if we untie the package and agree to cut 1,000 of our most powerful
missiles.
Ligachev. If we agree to cut medium-range missiles right now, we will win right
now. And our defense will not be weaker as a result. We would win a lot in public
opinion.
Gorbachev. Yes, we need to smooth out the negative consequences of
withdrawing from the moratorium. I support Yegor Kuzmichs proposal plus a 1,000-
unit cut. Without that, Western Europe will not agree to remove the American
intermediate-range missiles (the Pershings). In the arena of public opinion, we will put
pressure on the United States by showing that we are in favor of mutual trust. And do it
after the 7
th
round, go straight to the administration, above the heads of the negotiators.
Or invite Shultz to Moscow.
Ligachev. What losses do we incur if we take the SS-20s out of the package?
Gorbachev. We need SS-20s to delay the deployment of SDI.
Ligachev defends his position.
Marshal Sokolov reminds about the French and British missiles.
Gorbachev. Here you are losing the political perspective? There will be no war
with Britain or France. It is not possible. And the mid-range missiles, if we remove
them, would change absolutely nothing here.
Shevardnadze. I am also in favor of making a decision on the mid-range missiles
because after the French test explosion and our [explosion] we have to compensate with
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should not delay this decision.
Ryzhkov. But the Europeans supported it (the renewal of testing).
Shevardnadze. Franceyes And one more thing: we still do not have a final
position on weapons in space: what is permitted and what is not.
Gorbachev. Could we sell the medium-range missiles for an agreement on
Afghanistan?
Dobrynin. No, this will not work. The Americans do not want either one.
Shevardnadze. We should continue the course respectfully, patiently. When
Armacost comes, we will talk to him.
Gorbachev (concludes). This was a useful discussion. We start from the
assumption that as difficult as it is to conduct business with the United States, we are
doomed to it. We have no choice. Our main problem is to remove the confrontation.
This is the central issue of our entire foreign policy. But we should not build our policy
on illusions. We should not count on capitalism suffering an economic crisis. It will find
a way out, as it has done before. We should not think that we would have a militarily
weaker opponent if arms reductions succeed because the sole interest of that state (USA)
is power. Thus, competition will continue in any case. And it is a very serious
[competition]. However, modifications will be taking place in all directions in the world
arena, and we should not feel doomed. The process is underway in the United States as
well. But we should not work only in the direction of America. We need to carefully
select other main directions besides the American one.
The renewal of tests is working against us. There will be major [negative] impact
Therefore, lets untie the package. Let the comrades prepare [materials]when and
at what level this should be done. But we have to do it before the 8
th
round of
negotiations begins and before Shultz comes to Moscow.
Maybe a statement by me? Before the whole world? It was difficult to go
for the test
Lets make the statement regarding untying the package some time in mid-March.
This will be our response to public opinion. And this would ameliorate the negative
reaction to the renewal of nuclear tests to some degree. But we had no other options.
We should respond to all the hints from those who want to work with us. Such
hints are coming, directly or implicitly, from Thatcher, Kohl, and Mitterrand. We should
be more assertive in pulling them all out of their American complex and pulling them
toward us.
We should give answers as well on the issues of cutting 1,000 heavy missiles, on
the imbalance in conventional arms, on offensive weapons in Europe, on the nuclear-free
corridor, on reconsideration of our doctrine, on the principle of reasonable sufficiency
i.e. on all the issues that are now being discussed at the negotiations and by the general
public. We have to work on the Chinese direction. [We should] try to entice Deng
Xiaoping to come to Moscow. Shevardnadze should go to Austria. We should remove
Rajiv Gandhis concerns about Pakistan. We should request from our institutesfrom
Primakov and Arbatovthat they provide us with an objective scholarly analysis once
per quarter, every 100 days. Lets entrust Arbatov to convene it.

[Source: the Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive]


srI":"EM
'0)64
THE WHITe Houec
WAGFll TO",
April I, I'"
" , ttDlOIWf'DOM rctt Til I01fODILI GIOIGB P. IllULTZ
lecretary of Itate
YRI IOtfOIWlLl CASPAR W. WElnERGER
The Secretary of Deren
St1B.1EC'T J tetter to General secretary Gorbachev
Attached ia the draft text of propod letter frOB the
'rident Gorbeehev. Coald I have
view 800ft polbl. on text and Oft the tiain,
of 1it. nlea...
Colia L. 'owell
. Attac"'J..,
Draft CI.
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t, 1911
De. r III'. 0-.1'8t i4H:ntary ,
linea it you and I I.at anleated
I would 11k. to ,i you thou9ht. Oft bow .1;ht
.' a.l'ln9 to fulftl1aant what J It...... prca1a1n9 ae:-ant in our
relations. ,ecl'etflli-y of 'tato 11nalta vl11. of COUI'M, ready
to di.eua, BOtter, In a_tall durint hi' Ylalt to Moscow.
Firat l.t me .ay that, 1n r 18Vin9 tho relatlon8hlp betwn our
two eountrl , t aa pIed that there ha. 10-0 proqr on
the aqen4& that you and I haTe t oat 1n our ...tinqa. .enlor
offieial. of our have bequR new cycle :of 41.euI
.lona on re,lonal .ffalra, tho eonvere0t1ona between Onder
Secretary ArD4COlt and sonior Soviet I.at sonth 1n
MoICOV demonstrate that this pect of our dialoque ia becomin9
.are c.ndid and w1de-ranq1nq. OUr two 90vernment8 8eeD cloa. to
aqrment on eBt&bliMhaent of alak Reduction Centers. An
a9reement on upace cooperation b4Qn concluded. and work 1.
proed1nq to expand other bilateral bctvoen our vovem
ana peOpl... I a. vltchlnq vith 9rt inter.at a number ot
aevelopaente 1nyour eountry Which touch on the coneerna t
d1.cud with you reqar41n9 hazan riqht5 and huaan!tar1an
i u... Ttlere haB been lt01l1e t proqro 1n axpaDdlft9ftOn
otrateqie our two countriee.
t'"l',::.!",
I ....,-
l::m.s. If Oft I OADR
welcOM UeN atepG aro, ttt.J ere on1, .. M,lMIDf. COftereto
pr09I'.'. - th 1.1'''' 1"'8 t r...1D our OYerTtdl..
_jectiftl"
'.- . t not to rou 8lY vrrylt COlleen and eontinulnq oppoe:
aitlon 'to the loYlet occupation of'Af9hanlltan, which a
ulnqularly heavy burden on laat-t rolet1on.. Ttle .t.t....nt.
which Under Secretary Araaco,t'hr4 1n Moecov about loviet
to withdraw ita force. frOD Af9han1atan are vel
co... I not. tbat .ome -ev...nt ha. tekan place at the C8neva
proxlmlty talk' and that the O.IR Ray be atudyln9 aer10uDly the
poibl11ty of proc \.of nationAl reconciliatIon. IGadlnq to
If-determination. However, t vant you to undergtand clrly BY
view, .hared fully by the GoYernment of Pak1ltan. the allt.nce
Alliance. end other 90v.rnDent., that. lenqthy timetable
for the withdrawal of your troop., far lonqer than dictated by
l091atlc requ1r9uenta, and aft approach to national reconciliation
.erely d t9ne4 to pre.erve cosmunlmt-40B1natod reql.. 1n labul
vill only prolonq tho w.r. Yhey vill Dot lead to l tin,.
politlcal ttlcgont which would benefit both oar and
e
e
of tho roqlon.

::

c::s
ll)
etate88nt. by Sovi.t 1 nd to be back.a up by

::s

actual SovIet atepa to Soviet forcel. unfortunately,


ll)
oS
such etep. have not been taken. On tbe contrary, tho SOViet
-
c::s

Unlon and the Kabul ceq1 have atepped up bc::t:iftbInq ra14,'.,alnat
ll)
Col
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,.
It! 'i

"r..;...

.RCl4n
)
.111., 1. "'telae th.t , re.ult.a 1n naaecoa. civilian
ea.u.ltl... lacb action. eerv. only U&9ft1fy the ..tferin" to
prolon<J the '4I',.to Incr.... Ute danqer ot tarver ...t ....t
confrontation, aad to call Into tl0ft tbe .tacerlty of IoYlet
.- *tat...ate tbe as wiShes to vltbdrav ita forc... Such
actlGfts will eet eau tho.. who oppoa. 8ovi.t OCCQP4tloft of
Af9haftl.tan to,re4ueo or to relent 1n tbQlr oppoeltlon.
The Onlt.4 't_t.a aupport. ,enGine effort. to achieve. political
MttlelMnt to tl't. conflict: that 1- acceptable to the people of
Afghani.tan. we .e.k no .trate,lc advanta,_ in Af9haniltan .nd
rec09nlze the Soviet Inter_lit In a cure lJouth.rn bQrder. ..
bave aad. cl.ar in the pt. and I to you, 'that. t.he Oftlted
Stat vll1 lena Its political ,apport to an .9r....nt.. conala
tent with United Ratione reaolutlona. vbleh brin98 about the
apeedy and cOIl'Plete withdrawal of Soviet. troop
aut the critical atopa tb.t viII allow the Afqhan peopl. to 11
in peace mU8t be taken by the O'SR. What is n-.ded, Mr. G4neral
Secretary. 18 clean polit1e.1 4ecl.1on by your vovernaent to
to
e
withdraw Soviet forceD realize thll will

I:::
not be ,. lut you have Ghovn uruau&l boldne and eourage.ln

c:s
'l)
l:'<
44dre ln9 the internal problem. of your country.0 .1091e .ct


Q by the USSR would 40 acre to conY ce the world tbat YOQ intend
l:'<
'l)
oS to apply qenulnely new think1n9 Soviet foroiqu polley. or ,.1n
-c:s
"c:s
.are International r peet, han to withdraw quiett, trom 'l) you
l

:::s
'.
&
l:lr::
'It i
..... r.

o. ....
..
Wlth ,.Gt to ' ...n rlfhte en4 concern have
..en -- .... eftaowlec19d -- poultl....tepa 1n Ma, of al' '
JOtI an4 I _ .. ,yea.l.d. . I hope that the et8p1l are nl)' a
"'lnnln,. 10\1 bay. 1'.'01"84 one-h.1f of all OQI: dlwldecl , ..lly
"t.tloa liet. eae.,. 8041 tvo-tlllJrd. of 0'.11' Hper.te4 l,ou..
e..... 1. It fiOt po.albl. to relolye the al1 nuab4r of re..ln
1n9 eae? Yoo have nov rele.8e4 over 100 political prilonerl'
1. it not po8.1bl.to 1'.1 tho utlllln prlaon for 8Jrpr:
.1n9 their .tev.? ,.wc.iCJr.tlon h be9Un to ril. .,. hope
for _ .ubet.ntlal, .Ultalne4 Iftcr..... Ther. 1. 81eo
partlcul.r ur,_ney to th. 1181ted number of c of ..rloualy
111 per.ona ktnq to traYGl for IiMdical tr.at_nt ebroad.
t,
Finally, I hope you find lODe ...nB.to re.olve veral c of
epeelal 1fttert to ... ineludtft9 p1anlat Vl.dialr relt..-ft.
refue.nik Id. Rudel, p.ratGd spou Golt&m&n, and dual
national Abe Stolar and b1. reatly. Contlnuinq proqre51 1ft
are vill In lmprOYtn9 our rclat1ono. Gnd
viII be v.lcOMOa by tbw world.
MA CA.. H,. Sk.u\\-) W\-\,\

. of our bl1at.ri{ relationa, 1. 1n
proa1.1n9 'il'eetlone. It t. tWit \.
rat yoe the aatter of your ot cubIY in \
Mo.cow which we bay. lataly d1acovored. me q_t directly to /
.
the point. Tour 90vernment ruthl ly exploita the
it .njoye a .ocioty pU%5uin;
a,aln.t a very open one, it dOG. 80
BSRfCP
f
. I
l:
. ! ,
. I j;
our tlploaatle ana the da.a,. t'1. toe. to
nl." .....,. If this teek of o. tM pan .f t"
oan COIl,IMaM,' Ulla ehould ellpGct to wifer tw .....ltl..
..... political ee.t eqollll, with t.he 08itMi,ltat.
",ardint GrDa control. Df pointe of deperture are our r ....nt
1n Geneva to ,round 8n6 the adyanc.. we Bade 1ft
.eetlnq8 In Geneva and Reykj tk. Both -.etlnqa were
.ton to tho 9011. vo have sutually .et. From your 0Vft
.t.t...nt .nd In vlaw of the work ftOV
the Wucl r en4' Space Talku 1n Geneva, I baIley. we cre In
on the urgency of &ovlnq forward fram Reyk1avik. OUr t k 1.
\,
find vay. to brld98 1" 1n1n9 alff.l".nc
OUr two lid have filled out aany of the detail. of potent1.1
on deep and atab111z1nq rGductlona 1n nucl.ar fore
Other laportant a_peets attll await l"Qlolutlon. lolvlft9 th
que.tSona.is lfreductlon: ere to r l1
the 90a1 of trtor 8llitery etabll1ty.
The onite4 place. the biqbeet priority on .chl.Yln,
8ubetant181 reductions in off.nlive nUClear arm.. Ybu t
beartened that we ere qett1nq cloa@( to 8qra...nt on de.p and
equ1table reduction. in lonq_r-ranqe IN? 51iD11 , we
toward their total To thl. end. our DefOtlatora
have begun .44,1n9 tho lpeclflc detail. of

6ECIt1'

.. mP.:!
blpl..."t tM (onu1. that.,. &9!'a on 1ft 'ley"_.!1l. lMl. vhl10
we N f.' to .... Ute bllncflt of detail"
wea are tn pod\Jon with fRtl .ffor1t to b-Iq1n to _k. prOlr
GB the 81.-.ntl ....ntia1 to enaure .ffeet1vQ Yerltlcat1on.
Ae ...a. cl.ar .incG t"t, an rwr a9rment BUst have
concurrent conatr.lnt8 on .horter-rang_ rwr .y.t....
Your .9r....nt to tbl. pr1nciple at OQr meeting in vas
a a19nlfleant advance lthouqh work remaine to be done on the
.pecific naturR of thoae constraint.. In particular, .Qch
conatralnte auat be ba.ed on equalIty of r1qhta
hope that we can wort t'?gethCir to r.eolvo our dift.renc about
the n.ture of tho con.tralntl.
Reqardinq atrateqic often.lv. force., tb. for-uta tor 50 pere.nt
reductions thAt ,you And I 4evelopvd end aqrae4 upon in Geneva and
Reykjavik provides us with an hi.toric opportunity to move
a bettor, fer world now. LiMlt1nq both eidee to 6000
on 1600 deployed ICBM deployed SLBMu. and h.avy bomber. -- with
appropriate verbd subllm1ta. countinq rules. and verificat10n
mea.are. -- wou14 be & draaatlc Ind .ffective 8tQP that
9081. we chould atrive toward rapid and uncompl1cated
aehieve..nt of" such an agr....nt without lwpo.1n9 unneee ry
condition. on it. re.lizatlon.
I
1@!!J
, .

.,
1 recall rowf s.,reed conc.rn. re9ar61n9 you
percei to be lOCi.teet with our IJ)I pl"Q9rUl. 1ft lOQr r.bNary
JI IJpeeeb, ...n"d concern that th18 prOCir- a1tbt lead to
the dep1or--nt of in apece. In direct r pon to rour
'CODe_rna that ..... predictability 1n the Dtrate,lc ret
1
.. of
the next . and, In an eftort to'DOve the o.9Qtlatlon. on
reduction. S. atratetle oftenalve forward, I am to
.19ft a tr.aty ftOw that would the United Stat and th.
Soviet Union throu9h 1'94 not to withdraw from the A8M Trty tor
the purpo of aeployln9 operational deten.lve .yet... who
cSeploY1Mnt Ie not by treaty. Attor 1'94. 'Nt voula
both be abl. to deploy etrate91c defen unl & we -91' 4
t.
oU.erwi ...
It qoe8 without oQylnq that t .tand by my pr.v1ou. ofterQ to
find appropriate thode to share the bener1ta of any .uch
deren.eD 1n thG of en 8qreed tranlitlon pera1ttln9 th.
1ner lnq eontributioft of 4etoneee end ROv1nq u. toward the
eli.in.tIon of ballistic .lell1... I b. prepared to add
th18 to any new Defense and Space .9r....nt, .a vell
to other which eould 91ve us both sore
pre41ctabl11ty about ch other'. effort. in the are. of
4ef.n
At the aaac tL... you t vout& 81qn treaty ...ntift9 th4
agreed-upon SO pare-nt off.nalYe era.,



- .... ' -

I
-B-Et:REr

appropclate .arh.aa .ubl1_1te. On the .1tal i.auo of
balll.tie 8i il. werh.ad .oblt_it., both our .idea ..de

id.ntical. Aaorlcan propo.al for e 8ubl1ait of CIOO
'belliatie 81tl. varhe.d. t Ientially the ...... Soviet
propo."l for an 10 percent .obI1_1t. OUr propoaed aublu.lt ot
3300 teaM warhead. drav. upon your .0 percent 'U99 Your
,propol to redUce heavy by half .ddr Ie.. of the
coneern. 41t with by oar propoeed third eubl181t on poet.tly
danteroa. JeaM
In recO<Jnlt1.on of your COhee1'1'l8 t1l.t Duch .ubllaitl force.'
rapid r of your fore , I Guqqt that wu &9r to
extend the period to complete the 50 percent reduction to von
year. frc. th. aate a tre.ty tak With thi. add1t1anal
time, it should be po.siblo tor both aid to lmplosent auch
sublLalta without undu. burdoft.
My proposal, thereforG, t. that ve In.tract our ne90t1atorl to
foculJ tllN41atQly on draft1n<j treat1 to lJii)i....nt the pr1netpl..
of SO percent reduction. in ven yoarc wlth .qrd,
auh1181t., end a mutual cOBDlt..nt throuqh 1". not to vlthdraw
free the ARM fr.aty for the purPo of dotenalve
aylitGiu vJ')olle deplO)"IHnt ill not. by the tr'1Uty. Gtu"
ked 'ecrotery Ihultz explain thl. approach la ereater 4et.11
hi. blpeQ411l9 ."i.it]

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1 hOp. roa -tIl COftlldsr t'- {&e.i ..rieuely. My effort 18
'rid.. eNl' Gtf'.n"cea an4 E'etIlOVe obatael Oft tM _y toward our
etr'" ana 'or.l9ft Mlni.ter l'GYerfftad
ebeNld ."lore tIM1I8 14 futher wheft ...t 1. rlGGeow ...
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fore t to strol. the IDPOrtanc. of ad4rln9 oth.r
pot.ntlal .cure of milltlry In.tabillty. particularly
labal.nc conventional fore and chemical ..aponD.
A. you know, r.pre of the mosbGr Itat of the North
Atlantic Orqanlzatlon are 41ucu8min9 with repr.,.ntatlv
ot the .araaw Pact ..naato for to Achieve
atable bal_nce on conventiOnAl tore 1n at lower lovela.
The U.S. and Soviet Union are 4i.cua.inV bilaterally aDd
multilatGrelly the illUGe rolete4 te & ,Iobal bon on
eh..lcal ,",oponG.
In all th netotlatlon., It vill be vital to develop effective
.meana of YeriflcatioR to o"aure confidence in the a9r.ementl
reached. loth the DD1ted Stat aft4 tho 'oviet Union haY8
.xprd concernA about .tf.ctlvG verificatioD in the pelt.
our ..tiOGD

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10
Mr. GeMl'al Ibcretary, oUi"tw' cowntrl ha.,. VOl'te4 hereS to
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The dlaeulona Ihults and Por.l9ft Klnlatlr
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SYSTEM II
90364
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 10, 1987
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
It has been a long time since you and I last
commupicated directly. I am pleased that the
visit of Secretary Shultz to Moscow offers us an
opportuni ty to resume our direct dialogue.
I can recall at Geneva sitting before a fireplace
and commenting that and I were in a unique
position. Together we can make the difference in
the future course of world events. Let us pray
that you and I can continue our dialogue so that
the future will be one of peace and prosperity for
both our nations and for the world.
I can also recall commenting to you that the very
we are in arms reductions
negotiations is because of military competition
that stems from the fundamental mistrust between
our governments. If we are able to eliminate that
arms reductions negotiations wiil be
much easier.
There has been a recent incident that has caused
problems between our two countries,' and I feel
. strongly about this issue. At the same time,
however, I am encouraged by many of the steps you
are taking to modernize your own country and by
the improved dialogue between us on arms
reductions. There has also been some progress on
human rights, although much more needs to be done.
But the dialogue on regional issues has been quite
fruitless so far, and I hope that we can make
strenuous efforts in this area, especially on
Afghanistan ..
. . ,
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-2
Secretary Shultz will come to M o ~ c o w prepared to
deal with a broad range of issues. He will carry
with "him positions that I have reviewed carefully
and that are designed to improve the" climate
between our two countries and to build on the
progress we have already made in the arms
reductions area.
I look forward to positive discussions during
Secretary Shultz' visit, and to a personal report
from him immediately upon his return. Nancy joins
me in sending very best regards to you and Raisa.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Commitrtee
of the Cornmunipt Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow
1
Memorandum of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of
State George Shultz
April 14, 1987

(In the beginning of the conversation G. Shultz handed M. S. Gorbachev a personal letter
from President of the United States Ronald Reagan)

Gorbachev. I had a brief look at the contents of the letter. I welcome it. As I
understand it, this letter, so to speak , is in the nature of an invitation.

Shultz. Yes, and in addition, it represents the personal contact which, the
President believes, has been established between him and you.

Gorbachev. I see it as a certain stimulus for us. I want to say that
notwithstanding all the difficulties and all the upheavals, we are continuing to strive for
cooperation with the Reagan administration. We have already accumulated a certain
experience in communication, and we have some results. And most importantlythe
United States will remain the United States, regardless of which party and which
administration is in power. The United States remains a country with its national
interests. And we start from that assumption.

Shultz. This is a reasonable approach.

Gorbachev. It is part of the new thinking, which we are developing right now.
And we are calling on you to join the campaign to spread this new thinking.

Shultz. This morning I had one of the most interesting conversations of all my
meetings with Soviet leaders. I have in mind my meeting with Mr. Ryzhkov about issues
of the economy.

[.]

Shultz. Yes. And besides, in Reykjavik, you and the President emphasized the
importance of verification. I repeatedly quoted your statements from Reykjavik to that
effect, and I noted your Friday speech in Prague as well. We presented a draft of the
treaty, which contains detailed proposals on verification. You, for your part, informed us
that you agree with all the principles of verification proposed by us, and maybe even wish
to go further. The key here, of course, is to agree on concrete details, therefore we are
waiting for a detailed response to our proposals. We believe that the INF treaty should
become a model for the future in terms of verification.
We hope that subsequently it will lead to agreements on strategic weapons, which,
as you said in your speech on Friday, represent the core problem. By the way, from the
perspective of verification, there are very strong arguments in favor of a complete zero
version on INF. It would be substantially better, from the point of view of trust, to have
the ability to verify the end result. We hope that you will still consider arguments in
favor of global zero.
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2
But I repeat, on the two central issues of the treaty, we are clearly on the way to
an agreement. What emerges here is the question about shorter-range missiles. We have
studied your proposal, which your Minister explained to me in detail yesterday. I would
like to focus on the principles, which, in our view, must determine our decision on this
issue. Generally speaking, they do not contradict the concrete stipulations of your new
proposal, although I have to say that we have not yet analyzed all of these concrete
proposals fully. The first of these principles is that we need to start from an
understanding regarding a ceiling on these missiles.

[.]

Shultz. [] additional work will be required only for coordinating the
quantitative parameters of this agreement. Here are the principles: first of all, to establish
the ceiling at your present level minus the missiles being withdrawn from the GDR and
Czechoslovakia. But the ceiling is necessary. Secondly, this ceiling or zero [missiles]
(depending on what we agree on) will be applied on a global basis.

Gorbachev. What do you mean by a global basis?

Shultz. That we would not have such missiles at all, or we would have some
number of them on a global basis.

Gorbachev. Deployed in the USA, in Asia, or on bases?

Shultz. Zero on a global basis, or some number regardless of where they are
deployed.
The third principle is a principle which we consider important in our relations in
generalthe principle of equality. Today we do not have such missiles. Therefore, we
need to have the right to a level equal to you, regardless of whether we would use this
right or not.

Gorbachev. But we want to eliminate these missiles.

Shultz. However, that will not happen overnight and would require a certain
amount of time while the negotiations take place.

Gorbachev. If in this agreement the Soviet Union undertakes an obligation to
eliminate tactical missiles within some defined period of time, for example within a year,
then why would you want to increase your armaments?

Shultz. We want to have the right to have an equal level.

Gorbachev. I think we should search for some formula here.



3

[.]

Gorbachev. [] There should not be any obstacles for verification. There should
be guaranteed access for inspections of industrial enterprises, whether private or state-
owned, of bases, including those in third countries, places of storage, plants, depots and
so on, regardless of whether any particular company has contracts with the Pentagon or
not. Concrete proposals on this issue should become the subject of negotiations.
Regarding the related issue of the shorter-range missiles. We are willing to start
and hold negotiations on such missiles simultaneously with negotiations on the INF. If
you think that an agreement on the INF would be achieved before an agreement on
operational-tactical missiles, then it could include the principles governing shorter-range
missiles. In that case, we would withdraw and eliminate a part of those missiles in the
context of the INF agreement. Simultaneously, we would conduct negotiations on the
remaining missiles. And besides, we are in favor of their elimination, and such a decision
would remove all our questions about equality, global basis and ceilings, i.e. it would
satisfy your principles. We could resolve the question of Asia in the same way we
resolved the INF question.

Shultz. What do you have in mind?

Gorbachev. We would have an equal level for both the USSR and the USA
outside of Europe, or a zero level. In other words, we are in favor of a global decision.

Shultz. We think that it does not make any sense to discuss geographical location
in connection with these missiles at all because they are highly mobile.

Gorbachev. In any case, we are in favor of a global zero level.

[.]

Shultz. I think we have a basis for a possible agreement. First of all, the issue of
the shorter-range weapons would be represented in the treaty on intermediate-range
missiles. I think it is clear to us which weapons we are talking about.

Gorbachev. As we understand it, about the SS-23 missiles and other missiles of
this class.

Shultz. The issue of the shorter-range missiles will be resolved on the basis of a
global ceiling. The initial ceiling will be determined by subtracting from your current
level the number of missiles now deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Then
additional negotiations will be conducted about the remaining missiles. During that
period, the United States will have the right to have an equal level with the Soviet level
on these missiles. At the same time, the Soviet Union would announce in advance
(although it is up to you to decide), that its position at the forthcoming negotiations would
presuppose elimination of the remaining missiles. We have not decided yet what our
4
position would be at these negotiations. But we will be talking about some quantity; I
cannot say precisely how many right now. Therefore, the question of what the final equal
level would bezero, or some other [level]would be decided at the negotiations.

Gorbachev. You obviously are defending the position you came here with and
which you formulated before we proposed elimination of all shorter-range missiles, not
only those deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, but all the rest of them. You did
not know when you were formulating your position that we would agree not just to freeze
but to conduct negotiations and eliminate the shorter-range missiles within a short time-
period. Why then would you need to increase your armamentsI simply do not
understand. There is no logic in that at all, with the exception maybe of a purely
legalistic interpretation of the right to equality. But this, it seems to me, is just casuistry.

[.]

Gorbachev. [] we should look at the issues in their entirety. And naturally, we
should also consult with our allies.

Shultz. I still think that the complex of issues relating to the INF and shorter-
range missiles is one thing, and other issues constitute another complex.

Gorbachev. I would not link tactical missiles with the INF and the shorter-range
missiles. We will still get to them.
And now I propose to take a break, after which we could discuss the issue we first
considered in Reykjavik: strategic offensive weapons.

(After the break)

Gorbachev. As I understand it, yesterday you and E. A. Shevardnadze had an
exchange about strategic weapons. Maybe we could now briefly summarize the positions
of each side?

Shultz. I will say honestly that I was somewhat disappointed. It seemed to me
that we made good progress in Reykjavik. However, we have not moved any further.
We agree now, as we agreed in Reykjavik, to have the ceiling on the number of
warheads on strategic offensive weapons at 6,000 units, and of strategic delivery vehicles
at 1,600 units. We also agreed in Reykjavik that the reductions would affect all the main
elements of the nuclear potential of both sides, the entire triad. I remember your gesture
during the meeting at Hofdi, so to speak, to cut all currently existing quantities by half.

Gorbachev. We came to a good agreement thento reduce all components by
half. Mr. Nitze, it seems, does not agree with me, because that agreement was reached
without him.

[.]

5
Shultz. [] from the point of view of our Air Force, it is quite a firm limit. In
particular, on the number of planes with air-launched cruise missiles. The quantity of
these cruise missiles is definitely limited at a level of 1,200 units, or, if that limit is
exceeded, it would be necessary to reduce the number of ballistic missiles, and our Air
Force has quite far-reaching plans. They believe that they have good Stealth
technology, cruise missiles and so on. The proposed version also limits the allowed
number of SLBMs, of which we now have a considerable quantity. Besides that, if we
keep our ICBMs in the modernized version, the number of SLBMs would be even more
strictly limited. Therefore, it was not easy for us to squeeze into all these limits, but we
believe that it could be done. We thought that it would be acceptable in principle for you,
too. That is why we, in particular, consider the sub-level of 4,800 within the overall level
of 6,000 warheads important.

Gorbachev. But in Reykjavik, we specifically walked away from all these sub-
levels. There, as you remember, we talked about the fact that the structure of strategic
offensive weapons on each side has its own historically developed special features. The
relative weight of each of the three elements of the triad is different for you and us. And
then, as I see it, we came to the understanding that the problem hides precisely in those
sub-levels, that they are the reason for the dead end to which the negotiations came
because in the discussion of those sub-levels each side tries to ensure its own security
interests and insists on certain things that are unacceptable for the other side. This is how
the dead end emerges. That is why we proposed to take the triad as it exists now, and to
cut it all in half in five years. The triad would remain, but at a different levelreduced
by half. The formula is simple and clear. But now I am starting to suspect that you dont
want to stand by what you personally, Mr. Secretary of State, called acceptable in
Reykjavik. Maybe Mr. Nitze does not like this formula, but it is a simple and realistic
one.

Shultz. In our view, it is ineffective because it is does not ensure stability and
does not ensure the necessary equality. In principle, we agree with the idea that in the
process of reductions we need to respect the existing structure of strategic forces. But at
the same time, our goal is to achieve equal levels and stability. This is the main idea that
was passed to the Nitze-Akhromeev group for consideration, so that they would be able
to translate it into concrete parameters. A purely mechanical reduction by half will not,
in our view, produce a reasonable, appropriate result. I repeatthe general idea is to
subject all elements of the triad to reductions and at the same time to take some of the
concerns of the other side into account.

Gorbachev. Mr. Secretary of State, do you think that it would be fair to say that
strategic parity exists between our countries today?

Shultz. You have more ballistic missiles than we do. We have a different
structure of forces, and I have to say that in the framework of your structure you have
colossal ICBM forces, far exceeding ours. Also you undertook quite impressive steps in
other spheres. In general, in our view, you have a very impressive arsenal.

6
Gorbachev. So what do you meanwe do not have strategic parity?

Shultz. Of course I would very much like to feel confident in this respect and to
believe that everything is in order. However, we witnessed a powerful process of
modernization in the development of your forces, and an increase in the number of
missiles and warheads, and that caused great anxiety among us. This is precisely why
under President Reagan you saw such a stepping up of U.S. efforts in this sphere.

Gorbachev. And yet the fact remains that we have an approximate equality
between us, a parity in the quantitative sphere, in the sense of power and potential of our
strategic forces. And even though it exists at a very high level [of armaments], and
disarmament is needed, we do have stability today. You are saying that you feel
especially threatened by our ICBMs. We feel even more threatened by your sides
SLBMs because they are less vulnerable, equipped with MIRVs, and very accurate. And
even though you have undermined the last mechanism limiting the strategic arms race
the SALT II Treatywe abide by its limits. As is known, we reduced the number of our
missiles before. I still think that we do have a common understanding that strategic
parity exists between us. Therefore, if today strategic parity is ensured within the
framework of the existing structure and quantity of offensive strategic weapons, then we
will preserve the balance when we reduce them by 50 percent, but at a level twice as low.
Isnt that so? And that way we would avoid all of these calculations, confusion, mutual
suspicions and accusations of bad intentions, which emerge when we start talking about
sub-levels. It seems to me that we found a simple and clear mechanism for resolving this
issue in Reykjavik, and I thought that you agreed with it, you personally, Mr. Secretary of
State. That is why I am so surprised today.

[.]

Gorbachev. [] I think here the Administration got caught in a trap of its own
making. Large contracts have already been placed, entire sectors of industry were
engaged, you are placing your bets on a breakthrough in information technology systems.
Do you really think that, as President Johnson used to say, whoever controls space
controls the entire world? If this is your policy, then it is based on a misconception, on a
serious misconception. And that is bad for you, and for us, and for the entire world.

In Reykjavik I said that if the U.S. Administration was so attached to SDI, then
we could give our agreement to the continuation of laboratory research, and then you
could say that SDI was preserved as a research program. We thought through this issue
once again. We thought about what could be done to untie this knot that had been tied by
the administration. We can talk about it with you. We thought through the issue of what
would constitute laboratory research that would not contradict the ABM Treaty, what
would laboratory mean in that context. We are explaining to you now for the first time
what laboratory research would mean. We believe that it should mean research in
laboratories on the ground, in research institutes, at production plants, at testing grounds
and fields. Maybe we could look for compromise on the basis of such an approach. We
7
could discuss during negotiations precisely which components would be barred from
deployment in space.
This is what we can propose. Frankly speaking, we are making our final efforts
because the position of the U.S. administration is one of very real extortion from its
partner, it is a position of treating its partner disrespectfully. One cannot do business like
this. And think about how our descendants will remember us. [....]


[Source: the Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.]


Politburo April 16, 1987
About the Conversation with Shultz

Gorbachev: It was a serious conversation. Shevardnadze did some serious work with
him. They worked at night. He brought two planes of experts with him. It was a visit to
find out what could be extracted from the USSR. It is hard to make any real policy
with such people. They are too closely connected to the military-industrial complex. But
we made a correct assessmentthe administration needed to have something [to show] in
relations with the USSR. They understand that if eight years end negatively in this sense,
it would be a big minus for the Republicans. And we have not seen any greater interest
in relations with us on their part.

Shultz is a special figure. He understands where policy beginsfrom dirt. I tried
to get him to engage in a realistic conversation. I spoke about the broad interests of our
two countries, about the fact that other states are interested in the improvement of
relations also. I tried to persuade him that nothing would work out in terms of the
improvement of international relations if we only consider your interests and our
interests. We have to have a common balance. And if we admit that, then we should
abandon the temptation to command others.

The world is interconnected, interdependent. Lets all think. Today there are
Republicans, tomorrow Democrats. But there are also the national interests of the United
States. We will maintain relations with the present administration to the very end. But
the question is: can we decide anything with you, can we achieve anything? Not a single
administration in the past had such chances to achieve something in relations with the
USSR. And whats happening? Nothing. Are you capable of anything or not? Your
behavior is politically inexplicable. You insist that you are observing important changes
in the USSR, but you do not make any corrections to your policies.

I lashed out at him, too, on the issue of spymania. I told him that he, Shultz, is
himself the main spy, as well as our Shevardnadzethe main spy, and all ambassadors
are spies. You know everything about us, and we know everything about you. And that
is good.

We had a long and detailed conversation about the missiles. He tried to convince
me that he personally and the President were in favor of the agreement. And I told him, I
have an impression listening to you that you are walking around hot porridge and cannot
make a decision to do anything.

I told him: show us what you came with. Because as soon as the time comes to
decide something serious, you throw us something ugly, or something like that in
international situation.

What are you going to doincrease your armaments? Why are you so obsessed
with tactical missiles, that we have more of them and so on? We are going to destroy
them, so why do you have to increase your armaments with your Lances.
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Overall, the conversation was good, but essentially emptywe did not move
anywhere.

Shevardnadze. Shultz ensured me that both he and the President are in favor of
the agreement.
I told him, we are sick and tired of cajoling you. We might get tired of listening
to you too. Our people have their own pride. And besides, we are not planning to pull
you out of your Irangate.
He started to threaten me with their Congress. He did not reject the key
stipulations of the treaty, but did not accept them either.
Their general tendency is hardening in all directions after Reykjavik, including
the INFthey want to keep 100 units and are against the global zero [idea].
The question ariseswhere do we conduct negotiations on operational-tactical
missiles? The Americans insist on Genevai.e. together with the INF negotiations, but
in a separate group.
On the medium-range missiles we have [good] prospects and we should look for
solutions. He was counting every dollarhow much the elimination of medium-range
missiles would cost, how much the elimination of chemical weapons would cost, where
to direct those freed resources if they would really be freed.

Gorbachev. We treat it simply here: Zaikov, for example, proposes to
immediately direct those resources to build other missiles. (Laughter)

Shevardnadze. They are unleashing targeted propaganda: we, the United States,
are in favor of creating a defensive system, and the Soviets are in favor of offensive arms.
We have to recapture the initiative here.

Gorbachev. In other words, I made Shultz understand that there would be no
summit without results on the missiles and on arms control in general. The explosion
of resentment will be worse than a nuclear one, especially in the third worldand there
are billions of people there.

Ryzhkov. Eduard Amvrosievich hinted that in three or four years there will be
something bright in our economic sphere and other spheres of relations between us.

Gorbachev. I am personally in favor of removing all the residue from our
relations, of doing it persistently. Judging by everything, Shultz is inclined to move in
this direction. We too need to develop a conception of economic relations with the
United States.
We are holding to the correct line. They will not get away from us, we will
persist like this.
We will inform Thatcher. We will tell her that we are hoping for a rational
approach (to Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear weapons) and that we took your
comments into account.

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow[
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.]









Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 493-494.

Wednesday, May 6 [1987]
Short staff meeting to make time for George S. to come in. NSC
postponed also. George came in to tie up loose ends about arms deal
with Soviets. I approved trying to persuade Helmut Kohl to join in
offering zero zero on short range missiles.
Then Ross Perot came in on our dealings with Vietnam. I have
named General Vassey as my rep. to seek info. on our POWs. Ross
is convinced some 350 or so are being held in Laos. Im trying to
persuade Ross to step back & not indicate we should try normalizing
relations trade, etc. until we get the truth on our POWs.
A quick lunch and then to Marine 1 & off to York, PA the
Harley-Davidson motorcycle plant. They have done a remarkable job
climbing out of a slump. Japanese competition was destroying them.
We invoked a 201 a temp. use of tariffs to allow them to reform to
meet that competition. A year early they told us to cancel the
protection. It was thrilling experience. They havent just improved
production, they have a team from the workers on the line to top
management & they can out compete any one. It isnt a factory, its a
religion.

May
SYSTEM II

90418
NATIONAL SECURITY OE
VIRECTIVE NUM8ER
IGBTH NST NE INSTRUCTIONS Fa ING ROuND (8)
The attached instructions provide guidance for tHe eighth round
of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which began on May 5, 1987,
in Geneva. They build on proposals made during my meeting
with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik
v
Iceland. (8)
Attachments
1. OVerall Instructions (8)
2. START Instructions (8)
3. INF Instructions (5)
4. Defense and'Space Instructions (S)
OADR
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- :-=- ..
{
.
. ',.
SUBJECT: INSTROC OVIET NUCLEAR AND
SPACE ARMS TALKS (S)
REF: (A) STATE 01312 PRESIDENTI R TO OS NEGOTIATORS
FOR DECEMBER 2-5 MBB TIl SOVIB'l' CO ARTS J (e) STATE
336325, (D) STATE 330 E) STATE 291 P) STATE 077781
1. SECRET
2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCEPOR US DELEGATION FOR THE EIGHTH ROUND
OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. GUIDANCE FROM PREVIOUS
ROUNDS AND SPECIAL DECEMBER MEETING REMAIN, IN EFFECT EXCEPT AS
MODIFIED BELOW. THE THREE
NEGOTIATING GROUPS
3.
THE US
PROPOSALS IN THE TH
PROPOSAL IN DEFENSE IN START AND INF.
-- TO INTENSIFY THE OF NEGOTIA SEEK PROMPT
ENTIRE TEXT.
NEGO'1'IATION OF AND AGREEMENT TO. AN INF TREATY BASED ON THE US INF
DRAFT TREATY TABLED IN ROUND VII.
- ''l'O TABLE IN ROOHD VIII A DRAFT START TREATY WHEN IT IS

AND SBU..: liBGOf
BASED ON us D
- '.00 CONTINUE
HOSTAGE' '1'0 PROGRESS
OF NEGOTIATIONS,
AND DEFENSE AND
START NEGOTIATIONS
ING THAT ACHIEVING

. . .
ALONG
4.
:'l'EXTS,
AGRBBMBH'l' QI A TRBATY
EFFECTIVELY VBRlrI
WITH AN I
PRIORITY.
DBLEGATION SHO
CONfORMING TO THE THRBB PRINCIPLES AGREED AT
REYKJAVIK, ARE ADDRESSED AND AGREBD CONCURRENTLy'WITH PROVISIONS
ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.
S. AS PER PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS, IF THE SOVIETS RAISE NON-NST
ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, DE
SHOULD BE PURSUED
SPECIFICALLY RAIS
REVIEW, DELEGATIO
THE TIME AND VENUE/FO
DELEGATION SHOULD STA;
TION SHOULD
DIPLOMATIC C
WHILE THE
THAT THESE
IF S()VIETS
F ABM TREATY
20 OF
IF
ATE CAN
OUT IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, THE US POSITION IS THAT THE REVIEW
CAN OCCUR ANYTIMB IN THE YEAR FOLLOWING THE DA.TE OF THE FIVE-YEAR
. ANNIVERSARY OF TIIB TREATY. IF SOVIETS RAISE THEIR MOSCOW
PROPOSAL
..

LEVEL, DELEGA'1'ION.
PROPOSAL UNDER
CHANNELS.
..DiIAL WITH AD
LD
ABLE AND
OFFENSIVE ARMS,
HEST ARMS CONTROL
TING DRAFT TREATY
SIONS FOR EFFECTIVS
ISSUES
REFTEL P,
PRESSED,
BE WOBKED
UDING PERMITTED AND
SE MINISTERS'
ON HAS THE SOVIET
APPROPRIATE
..
6.
FOR
TS, NOTING
REDUCTIONS
MATTER
CORE
E THE NEED

ONTlNUB TO EM 'THE saa
COMPLIAH<:r1fI1J.'B IX
PLACED
SALT LIMITS
POLICY DECISIONS ON T
II IN
LARGE FROM NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THESE
AGREEMENTS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD STRESS THAT THESE AGREEMENTS
ARE BEHIND OS, .BOTH AS A MATTER .OF LEGAL OBLIGATION AND AS A
MATTER OF POLICY COMMITMENT. THE US HAS ESTABLISHED A POLICY OF
INTERIM RESTRAINT IN ONS PROGRAMS AND
OBSTACLES
BY
OF US
EXCEEDING
THAT OS
ING REDUCTIONS IN
TED STATES AND THE
CALLED UPON THE USSR STRAINT IN ITS
PROGRAMS. OUR
TBEOFFENSlVE NUCLEAR
SOVIET UNION. 1. J
z .

" .
".
,
SUBJECT:
REFERENCES: (A) S
330273, (D) 86 STATE 2
54773, (G) 86 STATE 12
162424, (J) 85 STATE 7
1. SECRET - ENTIRE T'
(e) 86 STATE
ROUP-ROUND VIII
16, (F) 86 STATE
-(1) 85 STATE
2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U. S. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE-ARMS FOR ROUND VIII. -EXCEPT AS MODIFIED
BELbW, PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN .
3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE. THE _NEGOTIATING GROUP'S OBJECTIVE REMAINS
AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE, MID STABILIZING AGREEMENT REDUCING
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY 50 PERCENT. THE NEGOTIATING GROUPIS
- IS COMPLETED AND
OF THE WORK OF THE
OUTSTANDING ISSUES
ICULAR, NUMERICAL
ART TREATY WH
IT THE MAIN
lATIONS.
CHIEF OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND III ARE:
-- TO TABLE A DRAFT U.
APPROVED AND TO -SEEK
TWO SIDES IN THE ST
-- TO CONTINUE
NECESSARY FOR A ST
SUBLIMITS ON BALLIST C
-- TO INTENSIFY THE S
OPTIONS TO CONCLUDE A
IN ORDER TO PROTECT
EXT YEAR.
4 JOINT WORKIlfG -DOC THE U. S. D TY, HOT THE JOINT
WORKING DOCUMENT (JWD), SHOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF NEGOTIA
TIONS IN ROUND VIII. INSOFAR AS THE SOVIETS HAVE DESCRIBED THE
JWD AS A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, WE DO NOT WISH TO PURSUE SUCH
-A DRAFTING EXERCISE AND INSTEAD WISH TO PURSUE A TREATY ALONG THE
LINES OF TJiE NEW U. S. PROPOSAL. IF THE SOVIETS SUGGEST CONTINUING
WORK ON THE JWD, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD TELL THE SOVIETS
THAT THE JWD HAS SERVED ITS PURPOSE BY HIGHLIGHTING THE DIFFER
ENCBSBB'l'IfEIH SIDES AND, NCE THE FOREIGN M S MEETING HAS
ALREADY '1'UD PLACE IN OW, THE UNITED ES SEES LITTLE
FURTBBR VAWB Df -A. Jim lNG WASHINGT A
STAR'!' TREAft, HOWBVE IN PREPARATI ITS tntING, THE
NEGOTIATING GROUP ACTI CALLY 1'E, CONTINUE WORK
ON THE JWD AS A -IlY AND INING SUBSTAN
TIVE ISSUES. T SHOULD THAT THE UNITED
STATES DOES NOT S E AGRE AS AN ESSENTIAL
. STEP TOWARD REACHING NT ON A STAR n. INSTEAD THE
SIDES SHOULD TRANSITI TLY FROM T TO THE DRAFT TEXT
As _SOON AS IT IS AVAI AND USE THIS THE NEGOTIATING
DOCUMENT FOR RESOLVIN INING SOBST SSVES.
.. ;',
..c, : .' .
,
'.

s , SUBLIMITS AND RE SUES. THE GOTIATING GROUP'
SaOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE ANTIVE SOVIET
MOVEMEN'!' ON BALL E WARH S. THE GROUP
SHOULD MAKE CLEAR INGFUL S ESSENTIAL AND
THAT THE U.S. WILL A POSITI ONSTRATE FLEXI
BILITY ON RELATED ST ES AS LONG A SOVIETS REMAIN
UNWILLING TO ACCEPT T IMITS ALONG NES PROPOSED BY THE
U.S. AND AS PREVIOUSL . BY 'I'D SOV ION. NEGOTIATOR
SHOULD STATE THAT 'l'BB S MADB SPEC UBLIMIT PROPOSALS
ANDTBAT IT IS UP TO. 1ft SIDE 'l'O '. THE GROUP
SHOULD CATEGORICALLY ANY c SUGGESTI T THE U. S. AGREED
AT REYKJAVIK TO DROP StJBLIMITS AND SHOULD ALSO REJECT ANY ATTEMPT
TO WALR BACK THE BOMBER COUNTING RULE AGREED. AT REYKJAVIK AND .
RECORDED IN THE JWD. .
. . 6. REDUCTION SCHEDULE. IN ORDER TO EASE SOVIET CONCERNS
PERTAINING TO RESTRUCTURING OF SOVIET FORCES, NEGOTIATOR SHOULD
STATE THAT THE U.S. PROPOSES A REDUCTION SCHEDULE OF SEVEN YEARS
. AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF E TREATY INSTEAD REDUCTIONS BEING
COMPLETED BY' THE END OF , AS PREVIOUSLY OPOSED.
ICBMS (AS STATED
IN REF B) REMAINS
7. MOBILE ICBMS.
THAT VERIFICATION
PROV1SIONS REMAIN S. START PROPOSAL.
8. VERIFICATION.
S 9. REDU TO SEEK A 50
PERCENT REDUCTION OF THROW-WEIGHT. THE
NEGOTIATOR SHOULD STA: THAT THERE BE A
TREATY REQUIREMENT FO ueTION IN SOVIET
BALLISTIC MISSILE TBR BTTO A FlED IN THE MOU OF
A START TREATY. IN ADDITION, THE. START TREATY WOULD CONTAIN A
COMMITMENT THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD EXCEED THAT LEVEl,. DURING THE
LIFE OF THE TREATY. IF TACTICALLY NECESSARY, 'mE NEGOTIATOR MAY
INDICATE THAT THE U. S. PREFERS SUCH DIRECT LIMITS, BU'!' DOES NOT
.RULE OUT INDIRECT LIMITS IF THEY CAN REDUCE SOVIET BALLISTIC
MISSILE BY 50 PERCENT AND MAINTAIN IT AT (OR BELOW)
THA'l' LEVEL.

,
.-'" ... , .
<PREC> IMMSDIATE<CLAS>
STATE 5
(D) NS
ENTIRE TEXT
WAsaDC .,.K., . '''''.;<
I
INSTRUCTI0
STATE
(D
SECRBT D '. 2304271. usa,..""7
".
<ORIG>rM SSCSTATB "
<TO>TO USMISSION GBNEVA
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: KG GROUP,
ROUND VIII
REFERENCES: (A) NST GENEVA
3616
<TEXT>S E CitE 'I'
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS UP,
ROUND VIII
REFERENCES: (A) NST GENEVA
3616
1. ..-SECRET
2'. GUIDANCE t.OLLOWS rOR THB INF NBGOTIATING GROUP rOR
ROUND VIII. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ON IN' REMAINS UNCHANGED
EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY THESE INSTRUCTIONS.
3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE FOR THIS ROUND ,IS TO SEEK SOVIET
AGREEMENT TO BEGIN SUBSTANTIVE JOINT DRAFTING or AN INF
TREATY. THE U. S. TREATY TEXT RSFS A AND B CONTAIN THE
SUBSTANCE OF
DRAFTING. VIBT TABLING or
TEXT I ING VERIrICAT
OR THEIR READ 0 ENGAGE ON
TEXTW IDENCE or
TABLE
OF
OBSTRUCTION,
SEPTEL
THE.DELE
INSPECTION WI
A
THE ,U.S. POSITIO AND SHOULD BE US AS THB
u.s. PROPOSAL FQR
DETAILED INF TREATY
SPECIFICS, STANCE
OF THE US DRAFT
SERIOUSNESS THIS aOUN
4. IN ORDER TO HAVE TION
POSITION ON THE SSIBLE,
THE DRAFT MEMORANDUM THE
PROTOCOL ON SION
'WILL BE PROVIDED BE
TABLED AT A TIME THE
PROTOCOL ON TO
DELEGATION FOR TABLING
5. WHEN PRESS THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE or
u.s. POSITION AS CONTAINED IN DRAFT TREATY TEXT,
DELEGATION SHOULD INFORM THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR
WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO AREAS or CONVERGENCE, raOM
walCH THEY PREVIOUSLY DEPARTED, WILL NOT BaSULT.IN u.s.
CONCESSIONS.
6. IN MOSCOW,.THE
SRINF
AND THE
THEY APPeAR TO
OBLIGATION CONTAINED
NEGOTIATE SRINF LIM
THAT THESE NEGOTIATI
SS-23S, WOULD COVIR
,RM', AND WOULD 8E
CURRENTLY EXAMINING THB EGATION
SHOULD CONFIRM THE ABOVE rlR
AND SEEK FURTHER DETAILS TIOH.
THB DELBGATION SHOULD NO ,aopos NOT
ADEQUATELY MEET THE CRITERION SST rORTH BY THE US WITH
SOVIETS
TO alA
or
HAVE AC
TH
ON A GL S
OADR
....... .
. .
. . '.. ':
RBGARD TO THE US CONClq OR
..
'SIUNr BE PART or AN INIlft ' ,. ElUlOU,
ON THE BASIS or CURRBNT INl TION, It: '18 UN BOW
THE PROPOSAL MIIT$ SOMI 0 OTH!a ClITia!' r PRISSID
rOR ACCEPTANCI, THI DEL SHOULD NOTI ASHINGTON
IS EXAMINING SRINr IN DBVELOPMEN SCOW
IN CONSULTATION
CE IN
CEDURES
DO
REQUESTS
D TO STATE
0
BS SPECIFIED
IS A
TEcaNI
TREATY
S. WITH
7 .. IN RESPONSE TO
REF C, DELEGATION
FOR PERMITTED CONVERSION AND
C PROTOCOL.
8. GUIDANCE ON IN
REr D IN DRAFT
SUBJECT:
REFERENCES:
1. SECRET
2 The foJ,lowinq ,

S te 013191, ,
S te 082514,
Space Negotiating
tate 036410;
tate 312028
ance for th Defense and Space
NegotiatingdGroup to the Wegotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
for Round ft1:I, beginning May 5, 1981. Except as modified
below, guidance for Defense and Space Negotiating Group for the
previous rounds remain in effect. '
'3. OVerall Objectives and Approach: The principal u.s. goal
in the Defense and Space area remains' the preservation of the
option to deploy, if we hoose to do so, a anced strategic
defenses which 'meet au
manner as soon as po
tion to greater re .
should continue t
of the U.S. app
purposes of re,
ing Soviet gOfJ.
Space Negotiating
To present fii'
Space as presented
April 13-16 and out
below. ,Negotiating
riteria in a saf
e,
on defenses.
with the S
efense an
objec
u.s. oB
n ,Round VI
the .new o. S.
retary Shultz'
in paragraph
should emph
nd stabilizing
cooperative transi
egotiating, group
he basic elements
sues, with the
nying any conflict-
or the Defense and
al in Di'fense and
s meeting in Moscow
through seven
as appropriate,
that this new proposal represents a continued U.S. effort to
respond to Soviet and to identify practical near-term
steps to achieving agreements compatible with our longer-term
goals. Negotiating Group should nQte that previous u.s.
package proposals remain on
rejected tbea.
priori'tles:
defen...
ment to taken, to
1y verifiable re
constraints
and to revers
discuss how to.
managed transition
combination with r
To continue to fo
To faci
a"
maintai he principal
U.s. agenda
as they to the wor
of the negotiations
on the U.s, propos espond to Soviet
proposals, e Defense and Space
the table but that the Soviets have
-
on the highest u.s.
fective strategic
ion for such dep1oy
table and effective
sive ,arms, to avoid
ABM Treaty, to stop
eaty regime; to
possible jointly
trategic defenses in
11istic missiles.
2 '
....... ---.
-,::
NeCJ0t,latin9 Group. and i'
e, question and
. "low.anc! prey!
the u.s. PI'
inq the SOY.
intel'l'elationshl with other areas,
by continuing to'crit
be them in accor
dance with guic!a
nstrtietions, by
pointinq to ways 1 respond to $oviet
concerns, and by simplify their
approach and to stead an hat would only
entail limitatthe co U.S. has proposed,
on deployment ra addition ions on research,
and tes
4. The new U.S. p 1, not a JWP, d be the
focus of the'Defens Space Negotia in Round VIII.
Insofar as the Sovi ve described as a "Statement
....,
of Principles, we wish to pur h a drifting
,. "
ew proposal,
Neqotiating
reductions in strat
Gro
-c:
.8Jercise and instead wish to pursue a treaty along the lines of
new u.s. proposal. If the Soviets suggest continuing work
db the JWP, the Negotiating Group should tell the Soviets that
the has served its' purpose by highlighting the differences
between the sides and that since the Foreign' Ministers I meeting
had already' taken place in Moscow, the United States sees
little further value in a JWP. However, at the Negotiatorls
discretion, the Negotia nq Group may enga in preparing a
JWP, as a means of e ting proqress to d a -Treaty, re
flecting the new u.s posal
In present!
point out
roposal
f 1996,t
Space pro s

ffensive arms
force. This
following' pr
as outli elow.
s. New O.S. Pro
ause the Soviet
Union rejected e offensive ballis
tic missiles by States has 01'
mulated anew Defen his new proposal is
associated with our lish 50-percent
ven years after the
START Treaty enters fense and Space
proposal incorporat ns:
a. Non-Withdrawal. Both parties would commit through
1994 not to withdraw from the ABMTreaty in order to
deploy operational defensive systems. whose unilateral
deployment presently is not permitted under the ABM
Treaty, provided certain other conditions are met (START
reductions to so percent as-scheduled in accor
dance wit.h the START Treaty).
I' side exercises its
agreement to .
nq, any remaining
d with the ABM
unless mutually
ther side can deploy
r the tems of this
e e to the ABM Treaty,
After 1994,
its chooainCJ
t further r
ed otherwi
c. ASM
iiqhts un e
deploy defens
restrictions
Treaty will
aqreed o'therw
UICUSstflEO
>.

rejects a bianket
ve alters the
tomary internation
were a side to
d to the subject.
ts supreme inter
ts to terminate {in
aw (in case a side
ardized).
Any failure to meet
the START Treaty
to terminate this
ssociated with the
f. Entry into Force. This agreement will be documented
in the form of a treaty which will not enter into force
before the associated treaty covering 50 percent re
ductionsin strategic offensive forces enters into force.
oposal, the Negot' 'ting Group should
make
In presenting this
(1) s clear that a commitment wo not alter our
ability to withdraw the treaty in nse to a material
breach or because eme national' st, and (2) we will'
continue to insis Soviets their violation of
the ABM Tre.aty.
6.
70 In addition, stated rns with being abie
to predict the cour future rese r e Defense and Space
Negotiating Grog2_s propose a pr ility package.
In addition to.our us Open Labor s proposal and our
proposal for Recipr bservation of ng, this package
might include a fo ual exchange ogrammatic data.
It is intended that a predictabi ckage not entail
any additional restrictions on United States programs beyond
those indicated above. FYI: Negotiating Group should emphasize
the Open Laboratories Initiative pending receipt of interagency
papers on the qther two portions of the predictability package.
End FYI.' .
-
8. If the Soviets the sides develop a "Statement 'of
Principles- for the ST and Defense and pace fora, the
Defen.. and Space He ting Group sho respond that the
U.S. le:DOt interes pursuing- a nt of. Principles
or
Other
lks (NST)
e Standing C
uctions for
ose that the
es banned fr
. Negotiating
is defined i
ive worki
If the Soviet
list of systems' an
agre the should work toward
treaties in the
9. NST Relat relationship between
the Nuclear and ST Defense and Space
Negotiating Group ative Commission
(SCC) IX (Reftel D)
':
10. agree on a specific
III
nching into space
should say that
,uiClJSIjthe ASM Trea
4 '-' '"
, ,
..
8uch:an approach is not cessary because e ABM Treaty
specifies the sides' 0 ations in this ard.
-






Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 495-496.

Tuesday, May 12 [1987]
At 9 A.M. a phone call (secure) to Helmut Kohl (W.G.
Chancellor). This was a session on our intermediate range nuclear
missiles. I wanted him to know we werent going to pressure him on
the short range missiles. They have real concerns about being left
with nuclear weapons that would explode on Germany & being left
with Soviet superiority in conventional weapons. But I think hell be
cooperative.
Then it was a good meeting with Repub. Cong. Leadership.
Main problem is getting an extension on debt ceiling before May 28
when if we dont have an extension well be in default. Talk is of
getting a 60 day extension so something can be worked out. I asked
them to consider a ceiling based on Gramm, Rudman, Hollings
(G.R.H.) to carry us until budget was balanced with the ceiling each
year based on G.R.H. deficit allowed each year.
Then back to NSC meeting subjects Nicaragua, Contra
leaders are planning a Democratic government system. Then the
Philippines election. It looks like Acquino will win big. On Malta there
has been an election & for 1
st
time in years a pro U.S. Prime Minister
has been elected.







Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 504-505.

Monday, June 8 [1987]
Get away day breakfast at 7:45 then up & going. I left at 10
A.M. for the Cipriani Hotel on one of the small islands of Venice our
home for the next 5 days. Nancy left at 10:15 for Stockholm another
program in the anti-drug crusade. Shell rejoin me on Wed. This was
a busy day. We helicoptered to an Italian Naval station then took a
boat to the hotel many official greeters along the way. Arriving at
the hotel a little before 11 A.M. then to a room for briefing on bi-lateral
with P.M. Fanfani & his team.
I had a phone call from P.M. Mulroney Canada about taking
some action on S. Africa. I urged him to hold off until after Margaret
Thatchers election Thursday.
Finally, my meeting with old friend Yasu Nakasone, P.M. of
Japan. I was able to tell him of partial lifting of the sanctions imposed
because of the transistor dumping by some of their companies.
Theyve made some improvements so we lifted $51 million of $300
million in tariffs. This was made public at 4 P.M.
Then dinner lasted til midnight mainly because Margaret &
Helmut did battle over whether to go zero on the very short range &
tactical nuc. weapons. She says no & I had to differ with her although
I explained it shouldnt happen until after we had negotiated on end to
chemical weapons & reduced conventionals.
For a while it looked as if they were going to try to settle the
whole summit in this one evening. Bet at last.

U' i;.:;;.:
.'
numotl .' ,....... :'.' THE 'WHITE HOUSE " ,.... '0-: ..
WASHINGTON

--,
1987
NATIONAL SECURITY VECrSION
VIRECTIVE NUMBER 278
ESTABLISHING A U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION ON SRINF MISSILES
The United States' consistent position in the Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in Geneva has been that any INF
Treaty must include concurrent ,constraints on Shorter-Range !NF
systems (SRINF), constraints which are global, result in equality
between the United $tates and Soviet Union, apply to only O.S.
and Soviet systems, and enhance the security of the NATO
Alliance. .
Following indications during Secretary Shultz' meetings in Moscow
that the Soviets were now prepared to negotiate seriously on
these systems, I directed an intensive process of consultation
within the NATO Alliance to determine which specific SRINF
constraints would best serve NATO interests. Based on a NATO
consensus, and the unanimous advice of my senior advisors,
including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ! have decided to formally
propose the global elimination of U.s. and Soviet Shorter-Range
INF missiles as an integral part of the INF treaty now being
negotiated in Geneva. In doing so, I am also reaffirming our
long-standing position that cooperative systems, in-particular
the Pershing Ia missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of
Germany, are not and cannot become the subject of U.S.-Soviet INF
negotiations.
The remaining portions of our INF position are unchanged. In
particular, it will continue to be u.S. policy aggressively to
seek the total elimination of Longer-Range INF systems, although,
on an interim basis, we are prepared if necessary to accept a
treaty based on the formula.! agreed to with General Secretary
Gorbachev in Reykjavik of an equal global limit of one hundred
warheads on each side, with none in Europe.
The United States is committed to NATO's strategy of flexible
response, and will not permit the defense of NATO to be decoupled
from the American nuclear arsenal. It is a manifestation of this
commitment that I directed that the United States take no
position on specific SRINF constraints until we had heard the
views of our Allies and were confident that they -- like we -
recognize that such an agreement would make NATO safer and more
secure.
"'
DedasslfJe(JPaased GlJ s=-rz...,-'lI
'!
uncer ::roviSiOrts '::f E.!): 12356
'SECRET ... .,. ..,: :
S. irilev. CWt:nt:t
on:' OADR
-
... ---
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Politburo July 9, 1987 [Excerpt]

About negotiations with Americans on middle-range missiles.

Gorbachev: We are moving toward two global zeros on INF and operative-tactical
missiles. I.e. we are removing the question of 100 INF missiles in the East. This will
make a strong impression in China, Japan, and in their entire Asia. We will get a huge
political victory.

As far as operative and tactical missiles are concerned, by removing them, we are
delivering blow at the seventy-two Pershing-IBs (i.e. at the American intention to
modernize the Pershings that were already stationed in Europe) We will put the
Americans in a difficult situation by our initiative. And we will sell it at high price. Let
them choose how and where they can make a reciprocal step.

About the third zerothe tactical nuclear weapons. Today we have a balance with the
USA both in the delivery vehicles and in the number of warheads.

If one takes kinds of systems, however, but in artillery the picture is more or less the
same, but in missiles, we have 1,500, and they have 150. But then they have 1,200
planes more than we do.

Since we are prepared to clear Europe from nuclear weapons, we will cut them, but on an
equal basis, taking the dual-purpose weapons into account. Here we need a general
conception.

[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive]
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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 524.

Friday, August 7 [1987]
Howard had reached Bill Verity. Hes coming in Monday
sounds as if hell take the Sec. of Commerce job. Brad Holms has
been confirmed as head of FCC. Im getting a call from Dick Cheney
tomorrow at 1:30.
NSC Frank C. is back from Europe had good meeting with
Helmut & Margaret. We have some reason to believe the Soviets will
back down on the German Pershing 1A missiles. In the P. Gulf well
probably move 3 more tankers on the 9
th
. Ive written letters to Sen.s
Boren & Cohen Chairman & Vice Chrmn. of the Intelligence
Committee on policy regarding covert actions. We still protect my
right to defer notification of such actions if secrecy is necessary to
protect human life etc. Frank C. is a little on edge about Geo. S. &
Cap W. being a part of morning NSC meetings. Ill let them work this
one out.

..... ,-, I ..' .... I ,-'-
St'STEMI'I
90,919'
THE WHITE HQOS!
WASHINGt'ON
WI"r:H. GROUP
19B7
LOCA-.fIOlh Situation Room
'1'XME: lf15p..m. -- 2:15 p.m..
.,ROM: FRANKC..CA'R1tUCCI
I. PURPOSE
!r() rsvieow, tion$ i.n SrART a'ndDe fense in
upcomLng meet.ings. witib Soviet
'tQ,aete-rmine (1) if
UtlZL:o-ed alte:r pOl'd:.ionin "aflva'l)cea:nd (2)
whai; Secretary $p-'U!tz sh.ould b.ave tQr$ppnd to
Soviet .
Fot:s'lgn a ofn'teetings
Qn 15-17 Sep'be.e;.. These wi!.l deal
with as,;pects erf' 'Obe U.,S.. '!'" StJv:iet. rela.t;.ioJl$b!:p:
buman teg.io,nal i.ssues:,an,<:l bi1.ateral is:saQ$ as weJ.l
as a,rms The fpc'Us. of t.hisNSPG, however,
is a,:r;:.ms d$D;t'it'ol since
i11 1j?hisNSPQ youJ:Qnly opportlitdty to
theo:utst;andi.ng arins xedliction$ issues
with yQ\l1;:' advi8.ors be:for.e' prQvidinq guidanoe: -to
I who will cc>nduQt th.e bulk of the mee'tings
with
Tbe most important arms reductions issues facing us are
whe't;ber 1.f so how) t01lJodify our START and De,fense and
Space pps.itj.Oll in order. to :move closer to an
I propose NSPG focus on this ;issue..
Disc\1ssiGfiWill be ba$ed on 1:116 options in i,1:Je two oompart
mented papers I provided you previously...
On STAR!!', disussian will focus en whether to mo"dify our
pO$itiolland all.ow mobile ICBMs, whether to modify our
positiqn on ballistio sUbiimits, and bow to
with sea-launched cruise ll1iss).4<e$.. The :mps,t coni;:enti,otts
is,sue c.oncerns mo.bile ICBMs.,. '. ,.... , .
'.
Copy to: The Vice' President
The Chief of Staff
S'iX'RFL
Declassify on; OADR
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2
- ........----RE!JACl1::D------ ...........:--"""'-__--,.... _
D,rn Ar-rT"T
In Defense and Space, sevElral Qptions have been pro.p.osed
which eire listed in the paper I p'rovided you ann wbiehI
will at the op.ening Of dis.cuScsioIh I anticipate
th.at S:ecre'tary fi.e:inberg,e:r will !lusgue a,gainst any change ttl
our of ilb'n-wi'thdrawaI" from theASM !I':reaty
thrbug'b i:n ret.uxn for ri:9'ht to deploy
Secretary S;nultz fav,Qrmodifyi;.ng
our '
Althpug:htbe l:?ackqround,
"
paper I forwaz'ded you
suppozt; fO'.t' :e',c,tending the ho.n-w:i:t:'hdt'awal th1:'Quqh
1997; I doubt t.hiswill be .Ln the meeting- ..
Most there is no: 'r;eaSb'h to alter our :posiJdon
viv-a-vis' the, no",.. .$,OlD.e 'be:lieve, however r that we
must review our pelicy because -Qf .c,oncern:s by the Joint
, Chiefs of$t,aff oVer what theyper,ce'i-ve to be the aut-omatic
end to the ABM. Trea.ty ,under Qur Cl1rrent pr9posal. Mo.s:t :o'f
Y(.lUr other disagree witnthis interpretatitm -0 our
poli.cy ana. thus see no ne'edto positioD.
Participa,nts at Tap B.
IV. PRESS PLAN
White House phot0grapher eI'l-ly.
11 SEQUENCE OF
The agenda is at Tab A. I will open by asking for youz
comments; talking are at Tab C,. I :will
then ask George Shultz to pfovidea .brie'f overview of the
meeting.. We wi,11 then spend zo minutes ddscussLnq opt.Lons
for change' in our START positic,o, fo,llowed by a: simi lar
period QD Defense and space, Nb deeisions are required at
the meeting; decision documents to modify or reaffirm our
positions will be forwarded to you later in the week.
Attashments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B List of Participants Prepared by:
Tab C Suggested Talking Points Linton Brooks
Will Tobey

II
I
90919
NA1'IONAL . PumqINc;, GROll}' ,Ul'rING
,September 8', 1987
Situation ROom
1:15 p. m, -- 2:15
,For yeats we've had c.onsistent arms reduct.ion goa,ls:,
to qet verifi.aQ.:Le deepreductioil,s aIlqtQ pre,serve Qur
ability to to a safer world thrbugfl SOl.
It appea,rs \'i.e are near agreement in 1NF. Now we ,must finisp
the task in Qtber areas
... - I doni t sq,gge:stions of it is too
for us to get .a START agre'ementbef.ore. I leave crf fice.
\tlant a START agreement, but Qnly i.E it is a good one, one we
cap verify 'and w,tlich enhances
-,- At the same time, I believe fully Ln Q.ur policy of seeking a
stable transiti@l'l to strategic def:e,hs,e,s.
We must set tfle stage for one day deploying effective
aefense$, antl" to do so in a mannee that will strenqthep
strategic stability.
Georqets meetih9 next week is a chance to move toward these
two g.oals.. I want your thought.s today on how we can best
use that meeting. Are we be'tt.e r served by. movement in our
positiOD,or are our current posd,tionstbe be,st way to gain
our obj:ectives?
I'm looking forward to your views so we can help p,repare
George for his discussions.
SCBET
Declassify on: OADR
I
Unofficial translation
Dear Mr. President,
I think you and I were right when last 9ctober we arrived
at what was virtually a concurring view that our meeting in
Reykjavik had been an ,important landmark along the path
towards specific and urgently needed measures to genuinely
reduce nuclear arms. Over the past several months the Soviet
Union and the United States have made substantial headway in
that direction. Today, our two countries stand on the threshold
of an important 'agreement which would bring about--for the
first time in actual reduction in nuclear arsenals.
Nuclear disarmament being the exceptionally complex matter
that it is, the important thing is to'take a first step, to
clear the p aychoLog.i.c aL barrier which stands 'between the
deeply rooted idea that security hinges on nuclear weapons
and an objective perception of the realities of the nuclear'
world. Then the conclusion is inevitable that ,genuine security
can only be achieved through real disarmament.
We have come very close to that point, and the question
now is whether we will take that first step which the peoples

of the world are so eagerly awaiting. This is,precisely what


l:< I would like to discuss at greater length in this letter,


c;)
being fully aware that not too much time remains for the
l:<
'5
'Il
preparation of the agreement between us. The Reykjavik
l;S
-
]
understandings give us a chance'to reach agreement. We are
1
::s
HIS EXCELLENCY
llC: RONALD W. REAGAN
PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,/'.' ..
Washington, D.C.
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2.
facing the dilemma of either rapidly completing an agreement
\ .
on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles or missing the
chance to reach an accord which, as a result of joint efforts,.
has almost entirely taken shape.
It would probably be superfluous to say that the Soviet
Union prefers the first option. In addition to our basic
commitment to the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons, .
which is the point of departure for our policy, we also proceed
from the belief that at this juncture'of time there appears to
be 'a convergence of the lines of interests of the United States,
the Soviet Union, Europe, 'and the rest of the world. If we fail
..' .'
to take advantage of such a;;favorable confluence of' circwnstances,
those line will diverge, and who knows when they might converge
again. we would 'risk losing time and momentum, with the
inevitable consequences of the further militarization of the
Earth and the extension of the arms race into space. In this
context I, agree with the thought you expressed that lithe
opportunity before us is too great to let pass by. II
To use an American phrase, the Soviet Union has gone its mile
towards a fair agreement, and even more than a mile. Of course,
I am far from asserting that the U.S. side has done nothing
to advance the work on shorter-range missiles.
We could not have come to the point when the treaty is within
reach had the United States not made steps in our direction.
fAnd yet, there is still no answer to the question why Washington
has hardened its stance in upholding a number of positions which
are clearly one-sided and, I would say, contrived. I would ask
you once again to weigh carefully all the factors involved and
convey to me your final decision on whether the agreement is to
be concluded now or postponed, or even set aside. It is time you
and T took a firm stand on this matter.
I further request that you give careful thought to the
recent important: evolution in our positions on intermediate-
and shorter-range missiles, which in effect assures accord. We
are ready to conclude an agreement under which neither the
United States nor the Soviet Union would have any, missiles in
those categories.
The implementation of such a decision would be subject to
strict reciprocal verific,ation, including, 01: course', on-site
inspections of,boththe process of the missiles' destruction
and the cessation of their
I have to say that we are proposing to you a solution which
in important aspects is virtually identical with the proposals
that were, at various points, put forward by the U.S. side.
For that reason in particular, therashould be no barriers to
reaching an agreement, and the artificial obstacles erected by
the U.S. delegation should naturally disappear, which, as I
understand, will be facilitated by the decision of the F.R.G.
government not to rnodernizethe West German Pershing 1A missiles
and to eliminate ,them. Of course, we have no intention to
interfere in U.'S. alliance relations, including those with the
F.R.G. However, the question of what to the U.S. war

heads intended for the West German missiles needs to be clarified. "
4.
We are proposing fair and terms for an agreement.
Let me say very candidly and without diplomatic niceties: we
have in ef'f'ec t opened up the r'e ser-ves , of our positions in order
to facilitate an agreement. Our position is 'clear and honest:
we call for the total elimination of the entire class of missiles
with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. and 'of all' warheads
for those missiles. The fate of an agreement on intermediate-
and shorter-range missiles now depends entirely on the U.S.
leadership and on your personal willingness, Mr. President, to
conclude a deal. As for our approach, it will be constructive,
you can count on that.
If we assume that the u.S. side, proceeding from conside
rations of equivalent security, will go ahead with the conclusion
of the treaty--and this is what we hope is going to happen--then
there'is no doubt that this impart a strong impetus to
bringing our positions closer together in a very real way on other
questions in the nuclear and space area, which are even more
important for the security of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and
with which you and I have come to grips after Reykjavik.
What I have in mind specifically are the issues of strategic
offensive arms and Those are the key issues of security,
and our stake in reaching agreement on them is certainly not at all
diminished by the fact that we have made headway on intermediate
and shorter-range missiles. What is more, it is' this area that
is pivotal to the U.S.-Soviet.strategic relationship, and hence
to the entire course of military-strategic developments in the
world.
" .... ... :. -v,. .
At the negotiations in Geneva on those questions the
delegations, as you know, have started drafting an agreed text
of a treaty on strategic 'offensive arms. The Soviet side is
seeking to speed up, to the maximum progress
in this work and shows its readiness to accomodate the other
side andto seek compromise To reach agreement,
however, a reciprocal readiness for compromise is, of course,
required on the part of the United States.
Things are not as good with regard to working out
agreement on the ABM Treaty regime, on preventing the extension
of the arms race into- space. Whereas we have submitted a
constructive draft that takes into account the U.S.
attitude to the question of research on strategic defense, the
u.s. side continues to take a rigid stand. However, without
finding a mutually acceptable solution to the space problem
it will be impossible to reach final agreement on radically
reducing strategic offensive arms, which is what you and I spoke
about in both Geneva and Reykjavik.
( If we are to be guided by a desire to find a fair solution
to both these organically interrelated problems, issues relating
t-
e
to space can be resolved. The Soviet Union is ready to make



c:s
additional efforts to that end. But it is clear that this
Cl)
I:(
::s cannot be done our efforts alone, if attempts to secure

Q
I:(
unilateral advantages are not abandoned.
Cl)
':5
-
I propose, Mr. President, that necessary steps be taken,

Cl)
1

::s in Geneva and through other channels, particularly at a high

Cl) i
level, in order to speed up the pace of negotiations so that
l:lr: i
,
rill i
'0 I
fUll-scale agreements could be reached within the next few

!
..
6.
months both on the radical reduction of strategic offensive arms
and on ensuring strict observance of the ABM Treaty.
If all those efforts were crowned with success we would be
able to provide a firm basis for a stable and forward-moving
.' -development not just of the Soviet-V.S. relationship but of
international relations as a whole for many years' ahead. We
would leave behind what was, frankly, a complicated stretch in
world politics, and you and I would crown in a befitting manner
the process of interaction on the central issues of security
which began in Geneva.
I think that both of us should not lose sight of other
'"
important security issues, where fairly good prospects have now
emerged of cooperating for the sake of reaching agreement.
I would like to single out in particular the question of
the real opportunities that have appeared for solving at last
the problem of the complete elimination of chemical weapons
globally. Granted that the preparation of a convention banning
chemical weapons depends not only on the efforts of our two
countries, still it is the degree of agreement between our
positions that in effect predetermines progress in this matter.
It is our common duty to bring this extremely important process
to fruition.
If the venee+' of polemics is removed from the problem of
reducing conventional arms, a common interest will be evident
in this area t00. This is the interest of 'stability at a lower
f
level of arms, which can be achieved through substantial
reductions in armed forces and armaments, through removing
7.
.,
the existing asymmetries and imbalances. Accordingly,'we have
fairly good prospects of working together to draw up a mutually
acceptable mandate for negotiations on conventional arms. The , '
.....
Vienna meeting would thus become a major stage in terms of a
.- military dimension, in addition to the economic, human and
other dimensions.
One more consideration: we believe that the time has come
/ .
to remove the cloak of dangerous secrecy from the military
doctrines of the two alliances, of the U.S.S.R. and the U.B.A.
In this process of giving greater transparency to our military
guidelines, meetings of military officials at the highest level
>
could also playa useful role.
Does it not seem paradoxical to you, tir. President, that
//
/
we have been able to bring our positions substantially closer
together in an area where knots of our security are
located and yet we have been unable so far to find a common
language on another important aspect, namely, regional conflicts?
Not only do they exacerbate ,the international s{tuation, they
often bring our r-eLat i.ons to a pitch of high tension.. In the
meantime,_ in the regions concerned--whether in Asia, which is
increasingly moving to the forefront of international
:the.. Near; East or Central 'changes are now... ,.. '
under way, refle(}'ting a' for' .a ipeacefuL settlement.I have in
mind, in growing desire ,for reconciliation.
This should be given careful attention and, I believe,
f
encouragement and support.
8.
As you can see, the Soviet leadership once again reaffirms
..
.'
its strong' intention to build Soviet-U.S.relations in a constructive'
and busine s's Li.ke' SP.;L?7i t. Time flow particularly fast for
those relations, and we should treat it as something extremely
.' .precious. We are in favor of making full use of Eduar-d
Shevardnadze's visit to Washington-to find practical solutions
to key problems. In the current situation this visit assumes
increased importance. Our foreign minister is ready' for,. detailed
. " ..
wi th leaders on all questions, including' ways of
r,eaching agreement on problems. under discussion in Geneva and the
prospects and possible options for developing contiact.s at the
summit level. He has all necessary authority with regard to
I want to emphasize that, as before, I am personally in favor
of actively pursuing a businesslike and constructive dialogue
with you.
Sincerely,
M. GORBACH:B."V
1
Memorandum of conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State
G. Shultz. Excerpt.
October 23, 1987

Gorbachev: First of all, I would like to extend a warm welcome to you, Mr. Secretary of
State. Taking into account the fact that you came here soon after your meeting with E. A.
Shevardnadze in Washington, maybe we can say that our relations are becoming more
dynamic. We welcome this. The main thing now is the substance. And here, as it
appears to us, something is emerging.

Shultz: We always want to concentrate our attention on the substance. At the same time,
it is true that more and more active contacts at the upper levels help move the work on the
substance of important issues further. Therefore, a certain interconnectedness exists
between the process of our interaction and progress on the concrete issues. I think we can
make note of considerable progress on the substantive issues. In my toast at breakfast
yesterday, I said that in ten years history will register the fact that in Reykjavik we
achieved more than at any other summit in the past.

Gorbachev: I agree with you. I would say that an intellectual breakthrough took place in
Reykjavik, and that it was very powerful, that it had a shocking effect, resembling a
reaction at a stock exchange. Later, when many things calmed down, and when people
figured things out, it became generally accepted that Reykjavik opened a new, very
important stage in the political dialogue between our countries, especially on the most
important issues of security.

I would like to welcome Mr, Carlucci, who arrived with you. We are hoping that he will
make a positive contribution to our search for resolutions on the issues under discussion.

Shevardnadze: Mr. Carlucci made a constructive contribution to our work in
Washington.

Gorbachev: Why dont we do the same here?

Shultz: I have worked with Mr. Carlucci since the 1970s, when he was with the
governments Office of Economic Opportunitythe organization, which works on
helping to solve such problems as poverty, assistance to the poor, and so on. Then he
worked with me at the Office of Management and Budget. That is the organization whose
members constantly reject requests for resources from other government bureaus.
Overall, Mr. Carlucci has more extensive experience in various government bureaus than
perhaps anybody else. He has worked in the departments of Defense and State, in
intelligence, and on issues of domestic policy. He has rich experiences and we always
work well together.

Gorbachev: Then he should know well that there cannot be any agreement if the
interests of the partner in a negotiation are not taken into account. I say this because S. F.
Akhromeev and P. Nitze, who are present here, act differently: they want to bargain for
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better conditions for their side, to achieve superiority for the Soviet Union and for the
USA, respectively.

Shultz: I am sure this does not characterize Akhromeev. It does characterize Nitze.

Akhromeev: We were able to agree with him on many issues.

Gorbachev: I think that the fact that the military takes part in our meetings is also very
important. It shows that our relations have reached a new stage. If we dont intend to
fight each other and, more than that, if we are going to disarm, then our militaries
should also know each other and work together.

Shultz: I completely agree with that. If one looks at the history of Soviet-American
relations, then one sees that in one sphere [our] cooperation was able to survive all the
highs and lows of our relations, and to preserve its constructive character. I have in mind
the interaction of our navies within the framework of the agreement on preventing
accidents on the high seas. Therefore, we would consider it important that meetings be
held between our defense ministers and other military representatives, meetings between
Marshal Akhromeev and the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe.

Gorbachev: Good. Let us now discuss how we are going to conduct our meeting. We
are in a process of democratization in our country now. And that means that this issue
should also be resolved in a democratic fashion taking into account both your and our
considerations. Maybe you could tell us what you discussed with E. A. Shevardnadze.
And then it will be clear what we should discuss with you today.

Shultz: Good. I would like to summarize briefly the discussions that took place. We
have developed a certain process, which allows us to consider all the issues that are of
interest to both sides. Within the framework of this process, the work is conducted on the
basis of combining meetings in a comparatively narrow circle with the work of the
working groups, which discuss more concrete issues. We believe that this is a good
process.

Gorbachev: Yes, this organization of [our] work has proven itself.

Shultz: We have assembled a good group to conduct the main negotiations: from the
Soviet side it is E. A. Shevardnadze together with A. F. Dobrynin and A. A.
Bessmertnykh; and from our side, myself, F. Carlucci, and R. Ridgeway. We created
working groups, which did some good work on such issues as bilateral relations, human
rights and humanitarian issues, arms control. We also created, I would say
spontaneously, a group on conventional weapons. Nonetheless, the most productive part
of the discussion on regional issues took place within the small group.

We discussed a number of arms control issues. The working group on conventional
weapons tried as much as possible to help the discussions, which are now conducted in
Vienna, about the mandate for future negotiations on conventional weapons. Another
3
group held a useful discussion, in our view, on chemical weapons. As far as negotiations
on nuclear and space weapons are concerned, we had a separate working group on INF
and SRINF, as well as a working group, which discussed strategic weapons and space
the ABM. In addition, these latter issues were discussed in a detailed way at the
ministerial level.

We came here with a task and instructions from the President to complete the bulk of our
work on the treaty on intermediate and medium-range missiles, i.e. if not to literally dot
the last i, then to reach a stage where it would be sufficiently clear that this task is
solvable. The President also starts from the assumption that the key issue is strategic
weapons. We have also noted your statement to the effect that this is the cardinal
problem, as well as another statement in which you said that the work on the strategic
offensive weapons could be completed before the spring of next year. We agree with this
task and we would like to have a sufficient degree of progress to allow us to talk not
about the INF but mainly about strategic weapons during your visit to the USA, which we
hope will take place, and to establish a foundation for completing our work in this area.
This is our goal.

We clarified a number of issues on INF and SRINF. It relates in particular to the so-
called problem of Pershing 1A [missiles] in the FRG, as well as to some other issues. We
have to say that we resolved most of those issues at the ministerial level. There remain a
number of issues, which the working group was working on last evening and night. I
must say that I was disappointed with the report of that working group. I think that we
should make them do some serious work. We hear too many statements that such-and-
such issue should be left for consideration in Geneva, to which I say: no, this issue should
be resolved here because the people working in Geneva receive their instructions from
Moscow and Washington. Today, the people who can make the appropriate decisions are
gathered here, and it is necessary to resolve those issues.

In short, I was hoping to inform you that the main issues on INF and SRINF weapons
have been resolved. Unfortunately, I cannot do that. However, I can say that all of these
issues seem to be quite resolvable.

As far as the ABM and space are concerned, those discussions between us and within the
working group were, I believe, not useless. I think that we were at least able to identify
those key issues, on which we will need major political decisions. It also became clear
which issues will require a more comprehensive, detailed working through. I believe that
now, when we, while maximizing our efforts, are taking the final steps toward the treaty
on INF and SRINF, it has become especially clear how complex the issues of verification
are in all their detail and specifics. And when we start talking about the treaty on
strategic weapons, where even after the cuts there will remain a large quantity of
armaments subject to verification, the complexity and difficulty of control will be even
greater.

That is why we agreed that it is necessary right now to step up our efforts seriously in this
sphere. This is especially relevant to one big problem, which we admit. I have in mind
4
our differences on ground-based mobile missiles. As I explained, the problem is not that
we have objections in principle to mobile missiles. To the contrary, these weapons in
principle have some advantages. The problem is that everything on which we agree
should be subject to reliable verification. That is why we agreed that this issue will be
given priority attention, so that by the time of your visit, which we hope will take place,
substantial work will have been conducted that will help you and the President to discuss
that issue.

Shevardnadze: In principle, I agree with the assessments presented by the Secretary of
State.

Gorbachev: I see, you have agreed on everything? What is left for me and the
President?

Shevardnadze: I saidin principle.

Shultz: If not for the work accomplished by you, Mr. General Secretary, and the
President, in particular in Reykjavik, we would now be so mired in a bog that we would
not be able to move a step.

Shevardnadze: Of course, the agreement achieved in Washington on the liquidation of
two classes of missiles was made possible only on the basis of Reykjavik. One has to say
that even after Washington, the positive tendency has continued, thanks to which we have
been able to achieve agreement on a number of issues that seemed very difficult.
Yesterday we were able to agree on a formula regarding warheads for the Pershing-1A.
That is a complex and sensitive matter. On that issue, we were able to find a solution that
will be acceptable to the USA, the FRG, taking their alliance obligation into account, and
to us as well.

The issue of the overall timetable for eliminating intermediate and shorter-range missiles
turned out to be rather difficult. Yesterday we agreed in principle that for medium-range
missiles it would be a three-year period, and for shorter-range missiles a year and a half,
with consideration for technological capabilities in this sphere.

Discussion of a number of issues will be continued. We had a good discussion on the
issue of non-circumvention, not allowing transfers of relevant technolgies to third
countries. I think a mutually acceptable compromise is emerging in this sphere.

There are still quite a few difficult problems in the area of verification and inspections.
These problems can be solved on the basis of an objective approach with the
understanding that there are a number of sensitive problems and difficult aspects touching
upon the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev: I think Mr. Shultz put it right when he said that the most important issue
now is no longer intermediate and shorter-range missiles, but the prospects for resolving
the problem of strategic offensive weapons, and the shifting of negotiations to the plane
5
of practical decisions. As far as the remaining issues of the INF treaty are concerned,
they should be resolved in such a way that both of us have complete confidence and there
will be no anxiety regarding treaty implementation.

Shevardnadze: Yes, this is precisely the basis on which we should continue the
discussions. At the same time we emphasize that the United States has its own system of
missile production and deployment, which differs from our system. We have our own
system. And today we stated that in order to work out a realistic agreement, it is
necessary to take these differences into account.

Shultz: I agree with that. We do not argue with that.

Shevardnadze: I think that on some fundamental issues it is necessary to make a decision
now, today. We have to be clear. In the opposite case, if we leave these issues open, if
we transfer them to Geneva, they could persist for a long time.

Gorbachev: Yes, the main issues should be decided here, and leave only technical issues
for Geneva. We have the appropriate experience.

Shevardnadze: The second group of issues is disarmament. This, as was correctly noted
here, consists of the cardinal problem of radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons
and the ABM treaty. In this sphere, results have been more modest. I would say that it is
hard to speak of any results whatsoever. Yesterday I openly told the Secretary of State
that after Reykjavik the Soviet side made substantial changes, which took into account
the interests of the United States, and made significant steps toward the U.S. position.
However, precisely after Reykjavik, the U.S. administration added a number of
complicating factors to its position, which are causing problems in the negotiations and
retarding progress on the main issue.

Gorbachev: If we recall our Reykjavik marathon, then it was precisely the issue of the
ABM in space, which became the main obstacle that we were not able to overcome in the
end. Obviously, you drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the fact that space
remains the biggest obstacle. One also has to note that while we introduced positive
elements, elements of flexibility, into our position, the American side continued to stand
on its position of reinforced concrete. And it is precisely that position which impedes
progress toward an agreement on this issue, which is not only central to Soviet-American
relations, but is the most important issue for the entire world. How are we going to move
ahead?

Shevardnadze: Yes, it was precisely after Reykjavik that the new elements that are
making negotiations more difficult, such as the demand to eliminate all Soviet heavy
missiles, appeared in the American position.

Gorbachev: And by the way, we were ready to eliminate them, but in tandem with you,
in tandem with the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

6
Shevardnadze: Absolutely true. And the American side is presenting demands to resolve
this issue on a purely unilateral basis. They are also raising the issue of banning mobile
ICBMs, and proposing to count middle-range bombers as strategic weapons when that
question was already decided in 1979 when the SALT II treaty was negotiated. Also, the
American side does not agree to resolve the issue of limiting the number of sea-based
cruise missiles. As you know, in Reykjavik we agreed to resolve this issue separately,
outside the framework of the main strategic triad. However, it is clear that if sea-based
cruise missiles are not limited, it could open a new channel in the arms race, and create
an opportunity to circumvent the treaty.

The American side raised the issue of stepping up discussions of verification. We believe
that if the main fundamental issues of the future agreement are resolved, we would be
able to find a solution to the issues of verification.

As far as the ABM treaty is concerned, yesterday I presented our position in detail. The
essence of it is that if there is any retreat from the mutual understanding achieved in
Reykjavik about the need for a 10-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty,
along with strict compliance with its provisions, it would make it impossible to achieve
agreement on strategic offensive weapons. The American side is aware of the fact that
we developed and clarified our position on such issues as laboratory research, research
conducted at plants, testing grounds, etc. The USA is also aware of our new proposals
regarding development of a list of devices that would be banned from space, and our
proposals regarding the specific parameters and characteristics of such devices.

It so happened that we did not have time for a sufficiently comprehensive discussion of
this group of questions. But yesterday we reminded the American side that in order for
the summit to be fruitful and full-scale, it would be very important to coordinate our key
positions on these issues.

As far as chemical and conventional weapons are concerned, they were discussed within
the working groups. Today we will listen to their reports on those issues. We also
discussed such regional issues as the situation in the Persian Gulf in particular.
Yesterday, while discussing those themes, we stayed up almost until midnight. The
discussion was serious, and at times sharp.

Gorbachev: On this last issue I would like to say the following. It might seem to you
that sometimes we present demands against the position of the American side that are too
great. But here are two instances of principal importance. First of all, we are not sure
that you have calculated everything well, that you really understand where this policy
might lead for you, for us, and for the entire world.

Secondlyalthough in terms of importance it might be the main instancewe believe
that our interaction in the Persian Gulf is the freshest example that proves the possibility
of constructive cooperation between the USSR and USA in resolving a most acute
international problem. It was precisely this cooperation that led to the adoption of well-
known documents by the [U.N.] Security Council. We believe, and we have told you that
7
and stated it publicly, that we still have substantial potential there. And we need to use
our coordinated positions on Resolution 598
1
to the fullest extent, [in order] not to allow
that situation to escalate to a new level.

However, the United States is apparently offended by the fact that we did not support its
demand for sanctions, for a second resolution, and [you] decided to act alone, like the
good old days. We believe that the cooperation that has developed there is a positive
new factor, and is important for our overall relations. However, the United States has
preferred to throw away this interaction and to act alone. I will not talk about the reasons
for why it happened, but I want to say that your withdrawal from cooperation with us
creates disappointment. This political line is wrong. In addition, I repeat, we believe that
it could have very serious consequences, which, you, apparently, did not analyze. We are
watching America's actions. For our part, we are searching for ways to improve relations
with the U.S., ways to lead them to a new stage.

Shevardnadze: Mikhail Sergeevich, I presented our position during yesterdays
discussions in that exact same spirit. We believe that it is very important to preserve the
unity of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Soviet Union proceeds
from the assumption that resolution of the conflict in the Persian Gulf is possible. But for
this it is imperative to use the capabilities of the UN Security Council, in particular an
organ such as the Military Staff Committee, to the fullest extent.

I would like to summarize. The agreement on INF and SRINF does not look like a
distant possibility any longer. Given mutual desires, I believe it is possible to complete
all work on this treaty in, lets say, three weeks time. As far as the key principles of
strategic offensive weapons and the ABM are concerned, here some serious work is
required. But now, regrettably, we do not have a serious basis for resolving the issue of a
50% reduction in strategic offensive weapons under conditions of preserving the ABM
Treaty. I think that our task is to prepare a serious, solid basis for resolving this problem
for the summit.

Shultz: Speaking broadly, we have approximately the same impression. Nothing to
argue about here. As far as INF are concerned, I think that we should try to resolve the
majority of issues on the list prepared by the [working] group today. All that should be
left for Geneva would be editing work, dotting the last is. We would prefer not to
leave the resolution of serious issues for Geneva, where participants in the negotiations
would have to wait for instructions from Washington and Moscow.

Gorbachev: We would welcome such approach.

Shultz: As far as strategic weapons are concerned, this is a very important sphere where
we want to achieve some progress. E. A. Shevardnadze told me that you personally have
devoted a lot of time and attention to these issues, and that you probably would have
some thoughts, which you will present today personally. We would like to hear them.


1
A key Security Council resolution calling for an end to the Iran-Iraq War.
8
Several words about the Persian Gulf. As you noted, one very good opportunity has
emergedthe cooperation between us within the framework of U.N. diplomatic efforts.
We want this cooperation to produce results. We believe that it could help resolve this
military conflict, which is poisoning the entire international situation. We think that there
could be nothing better to strengthen the prestige of the U.N. than to achieve success in
resolving a difficult problem. A success of that kind would be miraculous medicine for
the United Nations. Success would show people that if we undertake something, we are
capable of achieving our goals.

I would like to assure you that we do not strive to act alone. We want the process to
function, to work within the U.N. framework. As far as our ships in the Gulf are
concerned, there are now more ships from European states and from the Gulf states there.
American ships constitute only a third, or maybe a fourth, of the overall number of ships
there. Why do we and others find ourselves there? Because Iran and the war in this
regions represent a threata threat to our friends in the Gulf and to the flow of oil, the
main source of energy for the countries of the West. We have to provide support for our
friends in the Gulf. We have to ensure the safety of supplies of such an important source
of energy. Because now and in the future this region will remain one of the main
suppliers of oil for the entire world.

I told your Minister that our forces deployed in the Gulf would be reduced if the
acuteness of the problem is reduced. They are deployed there precisely in connection
with this problem, not to create a permanent presence there. []

[] We cannot discount that. At the same time we are not looking for confrontation.
However, we cannot allow the Iranians to have a blank check.

Yesterday we discussed this issue in detail. We discussed it from the perspective of the
situation in the Security Council. In the immediate future the U.N. General Secretary
will present a new version of a package solution on implementing the Security Council
Resolution for consideration by all sides. Iraq will accept this proposal. We discussed the
issue of what we would do if by the end of the month it becomes clear that Iran is
continuing to play games. How should we act in the Security Council in that case? We
believe that we should take this to the end. We cannot allow Iran to make a laughing
stock out of the U.N. Security Council. The Council has defined its position and it is
necessary that it take this to the end.

Gorbachev: I dont want to get into detailed discussion of this issue right now. But it is
a serious, important issue. This problem could bury many things, including,
unfortunately, things in our relationship. I only want to say: we hope that you will weigh
all this, that you will not be overpowered by certain forces and emotions. This is very
serious business. It might lead to very serious consequences. Let us continue the line
that we have worked out together. Its potential has not yet been exhausted.

Shultz: I can agree with that. Indeed, we need to work within the U.N. framework
because something really important has happened at the U.N.
9

Gorbachev: I would like to return to what we were discussing earlier. Indeed, we can
see that it is not just that the tempo of our progress that is accelerating. There is also a
certain amount of progress on the concrete issues under consideration. I would say that if
one takes a look at the progress from Geneva through Reykjavik to today, we have
succeeded in clarifying many issues.

[.]

In their search for solutions the sides undertook concrete steps to meet each other
halfway. I must say sincerely: in our view, we undertook more of those steps. And in
you we still detect a tendency to squeeze as much as possible out of us. What can one do,
somebody has to do more, take this additional step, and we decided to do it. But this
movement that started gave birth to great expectations among our peoples, and in the
entire world. Therefore the anticipation that the next stage of our relations should
produce concrete results is completely natural. They have been waiting for them for a
long time now. If that does not happen, it would be a big loss both for the American
administration and for us. You cannot discount that.

It is from this perspective that I react to reports about the work conducted by you and E.
A. Shevardnadze. I have the impression that in the immediate future we could finalize
our work on the agreements on INF and SRINF. I agree that the principal issues should
be resolved here, in Moscow, while leaving our delegations in Geneva only technical,
editing issues.

I would even say: if we complete our work like this, that would be very important in and
of itself. It would be a very important event in the eyes of the peoples of the world. But
then people will rightfully ask: if we understand the importance of that agreement and if
we conclude that agreement in the immediate future, why would we then continue any
kind of activity in the sphere of production, testing and deployment of mid-range
missiles? Therefore, the right thing to do would be to announce a joint moratorium on
such activities. It could be introduced beginning November 1. I repeat, if we have an
agreement in principle that we will sign the treaty, then a joint moratorium on
deployment and any activities in the sphere of INF would be an important step that would
strengthen this political decision. It would show that the agreement would start working
de facto even before we actually sign it. I think that this important step would determine
the degree of our accord on this issue.

Now I move to the central issuethe issue of strategic offensive weapons and space.
You recalled my words in this connection. I confirm those words. We believe that
resolution of the issues of strategic offensive weapons and space would indeed be
extremely important for the security of the USA and the USSR because it is precisely
these matters that define the strategic situation. Therefore, finding mutually acceptable
solutions to nuclear and space questions becomes especially important and pressing.

10
In Reykjavik we had a serious exchange of opinions on those issues. After Reykjavik we
tried to do something to reaffirm our readiness to reach resolutions on the complex of
those problems. What is the essence of the mutual understanding reached in Reykjavik?
The essence is the 50% reductions in offensive strategic weapons and the 10-year non-
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. And what is happening in Geneva? Essentially,
bargaining is taking place there. Therefore we have been thinking a lot about what else
we could do to move ahead with a resolution to this problem in Geneva. Many issues are
being discussed there, a lot is being said. However, if you put it all aside, there are two
genuinely big issues. The first is ensuring strict compliance with the ABM Treaty, and
the second is the optimal correlation between the elements [that constitute] strategic
forces, the strategic triad.

As far as the first issue is concerned, we proposed to the United States not to use the right
of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for ten years. We also proposed a second version,
which is also connected with the idea of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Trying
to meet the U.S. halfway, we proposed to discuss which devices could be deployed in
space, and which could not. We are waiting for your reaction.

As far as the second issue is concernedthe issue of optimal correlation between the
different elements [comprising] strategic forces, we considered this matter carefully once
more. We are proposing a new formula, on the basis of which we could determine the
limits on concentrations of warheads for each element of the triad. Besides, each side
would have an opportunity to compensate for the lower number of delivery vehicles on
one kind by increasing the number of delivery vehicles of a different kind within the
overall limit.

Therefore, we propose [the following]: the United States agrees to legally undertake an
obligation not to use its right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for ten years under
strict compliance with all of its provisions. The Soviet Union agrees to establish limits
on concentrations of warheads on different kinds of U.S. and Soviet strategic armaments.
Within the [overall] limit of 6,000 warheads, we propose to have not more than 3,000-
3,300 warheads on ICBMs, no more than 1,800-2,000 warheads on SLBMs, and not more
than 800-900 warheads on air-launched cruise missiles.

We believe that this kind of movement toward each others positions would lead us in the
nearest term to work out key positions on these issues. This would prepare the ground
for the next stepthe move toward concluding the agreement. In that case, as I
understand it, when I arrive in the U.S., we would create the agenda, which we discussed
during your visit in April of this year. First of all, we would sign the treaty on the
elimination of INF and SRINF. Secondly, we would agree on the key provisions
regarding strategic offensive weapons based on the new compromise proposals. And
finally, we would incorporate the agreement about initiating negotiations on the problem
of nuclear testing that was reached between you and E. A. Shevardnadze. I think that
would be a solid agenda.

11
We see that not everybody in the United States is in favor of such agreements. There are
those who wish to undermine this process. They use all kinds of arguments for this
purpose, in particular the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar station. I have to say that we
also have complaints about American radar stations. We could remove these complaints
on a reciprocal basis. Now I would like to inform you about our unilateral step. The
Soviet Union announces a 12-month moratorium on all work on the Krasnoyarsk radar
station. We are expecting a similar step from the U.S. in regard to the American radar
station in Scotland.

I think that we can take on the issues of strategic offensive weapons and space as they are
connected in a substantive, fundamental way.

Shultz: Thank you. I would like to respond to the proposals you have outlined. Of
course, every time you introduce proposals on important issues, we study and analyze
them carefully. Now I can provide you some considerations based on our analysis.

First of all, I welcome what you said on the INF, and your words about your readiness to
give additional stimulus to this work. We are also instructing our representatives so that
the main issues will already be resolved in Moscow.

As far as the ABM and related issues are concerned, among other things we have been
trying to clarify what your proposals consisted of. We believe that there is a certain
amount of progress here. I would like to have total clarity as to whether I understand the
proposals that you presented. This does not presuppose that the President agrees with
them. As you know, for him this is a very delicate, sensitive issue. I would like to have
an opportunity to present the factual substance of your position to him as precisely as
possible. Thus, as I understand it, you are proposing that we define a ten-year period of
non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty with strong compliance with the Treaty in the
form in which it was developed.

Gorbachev: As it was before 1983. Then we did not have any differences. And besides,
that was not just our point of view. That is the point of view of the U.S. Congress. And
the Congress is, I am convinced, a very serious, very important body, which receives
reports, including reports from departments in which Mr. Carlucci has worked, from the
National Security Council, in which Mr. Matlock worked then, and other detailed
information. At that time we shared the same position.

Shultz: I would like to clarifydo you have in mind compliance with the Treaty in the
form in which it was presented, for example, in the report of our Defense Department
from March 1985? I mention this report because it was mentioned by your
representatives at the negotiations.

Gorbachev: In the form as this Treaty was understood and adhered to by both sides
before 1983.

12
Shultz: I would not want to enter into any secondary arguments right now, because
different opinions exist about what was adhered to and how, and what they had in mind.
In our country, some people believe, for example, that the Soviet Union insists on an
even more narrow interpretation of the Treaty than the narrow interpretation itself. I
named one document for a reference, which your representatives cited, in order to
understand your point of view better.

Gorbachev: I repeat: we are talking not only about that, but also about the fact that
before 1983 the Treaty was interpreted and effectively enforced by both sides in the same
way. If now this creates some difficulties for you, I told the President in Reykjavik that I
am ready to help him out of the situation that was created as a result of the launching of
the SDI program. Our proposalto agree on what can and cannot be deployed in space
under conditions of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treatyallows [you] to conduct
research within the SDI framework. In particular, the second version proposed by us
presupposes defining concrete parameters for devices that are allowed to be deployed in
space. With that, naturally, it is understood that there should be no weapons in space.
But as far as the orders you have already placed with companies and research
organizations, they can be carried out within the limits of these agreed-upon parameters.
This proposal represents a compromise.

Besides that, we are moving in the direction of your requests regarding limits. For
example, when I say that there would be a limit of 3,000-3,300 ICBM warheads within
the total limit of 6,000 warheads, this represents 50%. This is what I promised the
President. As you can see, we are true to our word.

Shultz: I would like to clarify certain aspects. You should not interpret the fact that I am
clarifying certain issues related to space and ABM as indicating that I was accepting your
positions. I am not able to do that. I can only report on them to the President. Do I
understand correctly that within the ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty, activities which correspond to the Treaty in its traditional interpretation would be
allowed, along with activities in space within the limits of the ceilings proposed by you?
At the same time, such activities could not include deployments prohibited by the ABM
Treaty.

Gorbachev: As well as weapons tests in space. As far as permitted activities are
concerned, we could discuss and define that together.

Shultz: I think that enough has been said on this issue within the bounds of what can be
said at the present stage. I repeat, I was only asking clarifying questions, which do not
signify agreement with your proposals on behalf of the President. I believe that we
should conduct our conversation directly and openly.

Now another side of the questionhow to implement the 50% reductions of strategic
armaments in practice? We believe that significant progress has been achieved on this
issue. I would like to present an alternative proposal for your consideration. Realizing
that the idea of sub-limits, at least of certain kinds of sub-limits has repeatedly caused
13
problems, in particular during our discussions in April during my visit, we undertook an
analysis of the situation. Now we have a joint draft text of the treaty, at this point with
many brackets. We agreed on a total limit on warheads6,000. We agreed that the
number of delivery vehicles and bombers will be 1,600. We agreed on the limit of
warheads on heavy missiles1,540. We agreed on the rule of counting the bombers.
We have an agreement that the throwweight would be reduced by 50%, and now we
would like to achieve a legal affirmation of that in the text of the treaty, as well as a
confirmation that after such a reduction in throwweight there would be no future
increases. In principle, I think we have an agreement on this; however, we would like to
confirm that in the formulations of the Treaty. One of the limitations, which we have
proposed, and which was reflected today in your response, is the limitation on the number
of warheads on ICBMs3,300. In Washington you proposed a sub-limit of 3,600 units,
but that was proposed as a maximum level for any of the elements of the triad.

We believe that the most serious difference between the elements of the triad is the
difference between ballistic missiles and warheads that are delivered by air and jet-
propelled systems. Of course, land-based missiles are more precise than SLBMs.
However, the main distinction is between ballistic missiles and non-ballistic means.
Therefore, we would like an agreement to have as a minimum a certain number of
warheads on the air-based part of the triad. For this purpose, we proposed a limit of
4,800 for ICBM warheads. In the interests of moving forward, we would be ready to
remove our proposal about establishing separate sub-limits for ICBM and SLBM
warheads in return for your accepting the proposal on a summary sub-limit of 4,800 units
for ICBM and SLBM warheads. Within this ceiling, each side would be free to
determine the constituent parts.

As I said before, when we start talking about mobile missiles, it becomes very important
to be confident that the limits stipulated by the treaty could be verified. We are ready to
engage in work on this issue in Geneva. Frankly speaking, we do not see a satisfactory
answer to the problem of verification of mobile missiles. But maybe you can show us
how that can be done. Maybe we will be able to work on this issue before your visit to
the U.S. At the same time, I have to admit, I do not see how to solve this problem.
However, we are ready to work on it.

So here is the structure that we propose. Yes, and there remains the sub-limit of 1,650
units that we proposed. However, as you can see, in general we are making the problem
of sub-limits easier, on the condition that there would be a general limit on warheads on
ballistic missiles.

Gorbachev: I think that if we find an approach that would allow us to begin movement
on all the complex of issues of strategic offensive weapons and space in their
interconnectedness, then we should be able to resolve the issue of mobile missiles. By
the way, you too are planning to build mobile missiles. You are already building
railway-based MX missiles. Therefore it is a problem both for you and for us.

14
Shultz: Yes, indeed, we are working on this. However, I would like to assure you that
we would prefer to introduce a ban on mobile missiles; we are ready to abandon this
program.

Gorbachev: But mobile strategic missiles already exist. Besides, as I said in Reykjavik,
they have a very short flight time. And what do you do with such a mobile system as a
submarine? They come very close to our territory. Besides, while it is known where
ICBMs start their flight, it is unknown with SLBMs.

Shultz: Both missiles have a short flight time. Beside that, once ballistic missiles are
launched, it is impossible to recall them. In short, ballistic missiles represent the greatest
threat, and that is why we consider it necessary to establish a limit on ballistic missile
warheads in view of their differences with air-based means.

Gorbachev: You have your own concerns, and we have ours regarding your strategic
armaments. I think that these issues should be discussed at the negotiations.

Shultz: I agree.

Gorbachev: I want to reiterate again what I have said many times before. We do not
want the United States, after the reductions, to find itself in a situation that would be
unfavorable for you, that would weaken your security, weaken your confidence in your
security. That would be bad for us as well. Because if one of the sides finds itself in
such a situation, it would try to find a way out of it, to seek the possibility of
compensation. Experience shows that both of us have found [such] answers. But it is
clear that this would not correspond to our interests.

Shultz: You expressed that idea in Geneva. I believe that it is a strong, important idea. I
agree with it. You also emphasized the differences in the structure of our strategic forces
then, the fact that neither of the sides could force the other to imitate an alien structure.
Precisely for this reason, having analyzed the situation, we decided to propose a joint
limit on the number of warheads on ballistic missiles, within which the sides would have
freedomat least at the present stageto determine the combination of warheads. We
cannot achieve everything at once. But it seems that it is possible to move considerably
ahead on this basis.

Gorbachev: I think now we have a basis on which to work on the key elements of
strategic offensive weapons. This could become the central element of the Washington
summit because as far as the agreement on INF and SRINF is concerned, all that remains
is to sign it. Signing key positions [on strategic weapons] could become the most
important outcome of the summit. We could give our delegations concrete instructions
on the basis of these key positions to work out a draft text of the treaty, which the
President and myself could sign during the Presidents visit to Moscow.

Recently some of your representatives, Mr. Kampelman, for example, said that we need
to start seriously developing a treaty on strategic offensive weapons. They said if we
15
could do that, then it would be easier to resolve the space issues. I want to say at the
outset, this is an unrealistic position, an unrealistic approach. Lets not waste time on
such approaches. Issues of strategic offensive weapons and space need to be resolved
together because they are interconnected. On this basis, we are ready to move forward,
taking into account as much as possible each others security interests.

Shultz: I think that in terms of numbers and parameters, we have said all that we can for
now. I think that we sense a certain flexibility, a readiness for collective work. I have
the impression that it is unlikely that our representatives in Geneva will be able to
produce much in this sense. These are questions for you and for the President. However,
our delegations could create a good foundation for a fruitful meeting between you and the
President. I have several thoughts about this.

First of all, we could say to our delegations in Geneva that they should tackle the
problems of verification energetically and as their priority, especially the verification of
mobile missiles. Now we see how difficult the problems of verification are. We should
not leave them for February or March. We should focus on them seriously now.

As far as concrete positions are concerned, I think that our delegations in Geneva should
not so much bargain about numbers as place an emphasis on clarifying each sides
principal approaches. We should talk about why you consider certain provisions
important, and why we consider other provisions important. I think that that would help
you and the President find resolution to those problems during your meeting.

Finally, I would propose that in addition to continuing our work on removing the brackets
in the joint text, which is useful, we should focus on the goal of having your meeting with
the President result in joint instructions for our delegations in Geneva regarding
parameters for the future treaty. I think that would be a good result of the meeting, which
would complement the work that will already have been done on coordination of the
treaty.

Gorbachev: From the very start I see weak spots in your proposals. First of all, you did
not even mention the problem of space. But if we leave this issue outside the boat, then
moving ahead on strategic offensive weapons will not make any sense. We have to
consider them as interrelated. Why does the American delegation in Geneva avoid
discussing the space issues, especially discussing the latest Soviet proposals?

Overall, I have an impression that with your three considerations, it is as if you are
throwing away the idea of developing key positions on strategic offensive weapons and
space. Instead, you propose to limit ourselves to some foggy formulas, talk about the
need to clarify positions, etc. Of course, resolution of the verification problem,
clarification of positions, removal of bracketsall this is necessary. However, our goal
should be the preparation of key positions, which we could consider and sign, so that by
the time of the Presidents visit to Moscow, we would have an agreement on the entire set
of these issues.

16
Your approach strikes me as undefined and foggy. In essence, it rejects everything that
we said for the purpose of clarifying [our positions] and signaling flexibility on concrete
problems.

I would like to repeat: we propose that our delegations in Geneva concentrate on
developing key positions for their adoption during the visit. Then it would make sense.
Otherwise, everything is moving beyond the term of the present administration. And that
would be too bad. Because we wanted to resolve [these issues] precisely with the present
administration. And this is possible. A lot has been already done. And we, as we see it,
are capable of concluding a good treaty with the current administration. Precisely a good
treaty: neither one of us needs a bad one.

Shultz: I would not object to defining coordinated positions. I do not want to offer you
anything foggy, not at all. I want to look ahead. Some things are already agreed upon,
mainly as a result of the agreements achieved by you and the President in Reykjavik.
The question iswhat should be done in order to prepare these key positions, these
instructions for our negotiators. With all respect for our representatives in Geneva, the
main, key positions should be adopted by you and the President. Our representatives in
Geneva do not have political mandate for that. But they can prepare the grounds, and we
can work to prepare the grounds for your decisions. That is why I emphasize the need for
more precision, for working on the issues of verification, especially regarding the mobile
missiles.

Gorbachev: Lets still prepare a draft of key positions before we, as you propose, start
discussing the issues, so to say, in a scattered way.

Shultz: Of course, the more we could move ahead before the summit, the better. The
main decision will have to be taken by you and the President. We, as well as you, want
the achieved breakthrough to be be written in the treaty, to receive a practical
implementation. It would be very good for you and for us, and would be a present to the
entire world.

Gorbachev: Yes, Reykjavik already has a place in history. But a second Reykjavik will
not happen. We should not meet with the President and engage in improvisation. I think
it is very good that we stood for Reykjavik. There were many people who wanted to bury
it. But if everything is limited to a second Reykjavik, it might lead to big political losses
both for you and for us. And to the contrary, if we find right political decisions, it would
bring both of us great political benefits. You need to decide what you want.

I have an impression that you still cannot decide what it is you want. Maybe it is
Ambassador Matlock who informs you in such a manner that you still cannot figure it
out? Do you want the Soviet Union to develop successfully, or you dont want that? [Do
you want] the Soviet Union to develop in the direction of greater democracy or in the
opposite [direction]? [Do you want] us to have stagnation or to move forward?

17
Shultz: It is your business. It is all up to you to decide, but I can give you my opinion:
what is happening in your country is very interesting, and I follow all these changes very
closely.


[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow,
Published in Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, nos. 10, pp. 69-81
and 11, pp. 73-84, 1993
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive]



Gorbachev Letter to Reagan, October 28, 1987

Dear Mr. President,

I am sure that you have already received information about the negotiations that took
place in Moscow between our foreign ministers, and also about my rather long
conversation with Secretary of State G. Shultz and your National Security Adviser, F.
Carlucci.

I will tell you frankly, we have here a unanimous opinionthese discussions were
business-like, constructive, and most importantly, productive. I think you would agree
that both the Washington and the Moscow stages of the dialogue that is developing
between us, have genuinely moved us closer to the final stage of preparation for the
Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. We derive
satisfaction from the fact that we, together with your envoys, have succeeded in
overcoming perhaps the most important obstacles and in achieving compromise formulas
and understandings, which will allow our delegations in Geneva to work out the text of
the treaty in the next two or three weeks if the political will on both sides can be
preserved.

You, I believe, noticed that on the final day of negotiations the Soviet side undertook
additional efforts, including in the areas of inspection and control. We hope that the
American side will respond with adequate reciprocal efforts.

The Moscow negotiations, in my view, presented new evidence that our relations have
entered a dynamic period, the origins of which were our meetings in Geneva and
Reykjavik. I have in mind not only the growing tempo of contacts between our countries
but also the fact that we undertook the practical resolution of the issue that we see as the
key to stopping the nuclear arms race, and to stabilizing Soviet-American relations. The
task of a deep reductions of strategic offensive forcesby halfhas moved to the center
of our conversations in Moscow.

And that is not by accidentbecause you and I are in the same frame of mind[we
want] to shift the negotiations on strategic offensive weapons to the plane of practical
decisions. As I have already written to you, we should speed up the tempo of the
negotiations, in order to make it possible as early as next month to reach full-scale
agreements in this sphere.

With that in mind, on the eve of U.S. Secretary of States visit, we in the Soviet
leadership have once again seriously weighed the possibility of giving additional impetus
to the negotiations on strategic offensive weapons. I presented in detail to Mr. Shultz the
concrete results we arrived at.

In particular, we took into account that the American sidewhich announced this to us
repeatedly, including at the political levelattaches special importance to establishing
concrete limits on the concentration of warheads in each separate element of the strategic
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triad. We undertook a thorough calculation of the different scenarios for the development
of the situation along with the prevailing tendencies of a technological and military-
strategic order, and came to the conclusion that we could move in the direction of your
position. It is not difficult to observe that individual combinations of proposed numerical
limits present a picture close to the one that was outlined to us recently by American
representatives at different levels.

I would add that the new formula we have proposed contains internal flexibility: each
side would have an opportunity to compensate for the lower number of delivery vehicles
of one kind by increasing the number of delivery vehicles of another kind within the
overall limit.

I hope that these proposals will be considered carefully by your experts and that both
sides will now have a wider basis for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

Of course the work on the agreement to reduce strategic offensive weapons should be
accompanied by efforts directed at further compliance with the ABM Treaty. Besides, we
are not asking here for anything more than what we spoke about in Washington, namely
that the right we enjoy to withdraw from this treaty should not be exercised for ten years.

The words you wrote in one of your letters to me are deeply imprinted in my memory
that our representatives at the negotiations should concentrate on measures to prevent
the erosion of the ABM treaty and on strengthening the role this Treaty might play in
preserving stability as we progress toward a world where there are no nuclear weapons.
In the same letter you added that if we act in this manner, we could avoid fruitless
discussions of a general nature, and open the way toward finding concrete, practical
solutions that take into account the concerns of both sides.

In this sense, we were encouraged by the exchange of opinions in Washington in
September of this year, where your side confirmed that our positions coincided on the
point that in the context of an agreement on 50% reductions in strategic offensive
weapons there arises a period during which we should renounce certain rights, in
particular the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and strictly carry out our
obligations under that treaty.

Therefore, we share a common ground on this issue as well. What is left, in essence, is to
agree on the period during which there is to be no withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Is
that an impossible goal? This is what the conversation comes down to now. We have to
seek a resolution here. We are ready for it.

I repeat, I am talking about compliance with the ABM Treaty, and we have explained to
you the way we see itincluding very recently in Washington.

In order to keep the discussion on this set of problems within the framework of such
reasonable notions, and not to let it slip into either a thicket of overly complex
technological argumentation or on the contrary into more generalized concepts, I propose
that along with the Geneva negotiations we open up a channel through which we would
continually be able to check the progress of negotiations as well as more freely express
concerns and alternative proposals. This channel could employ contacts specially
designated for this topic: the USSR Foreign Minister, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow
and the U.S. Secretary of State, and the USSR Ambassador in Washington. However, we
could consider some other alternative.

Here it is important to act with an awareness of the limited amount of time available to us
for working out an agreement on strategic offensive weapons, which it would be
desirable to finalize in the first half of next year, and to sign during your return visit to
Moscow.

Obviously, we need to clear the road to this treaty of natural complications, among which
are issues of verificationand here I agree with the suggestion expressed by Shultz on
your behalf, to concentrate in this direction right nowas well as complications
artificially introduced into the treaty (such as the inclusion of our mid-range Backfire
bomber in the treaty, the demand for a complete ban on mobile ICBMs, and the
unwillingness to resolve the issue of limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles).

I am convinced that it is realistic to achieve an agreement on strategic offensive weapons
under conditions of compliance with the ABM Treaty. Besides, the experience that we
accumulated at the negotiations on intermediate and medium-range missiles could be
useful for us here to a large degree.

After all, we were able to agree to start full-scale negotiations on nuclear testing, even
though just several months ago it looked like an impossible endeavor.

I think we should show the necessary mutual persistence in resolving the problem of
banning chemical weapons (even though I must say that I am deeply disappointed with
your position on binary weapons), and on the issue of reducing conventional weapons,
which is of interest not only to us but also to our allies and to other European countries.

Back in April, in my conversation with Mr. Shultz, I outlined my understanding of our
next meeting. I am still convinced that besides signing the INF Treaty we should
seriously discuss the issue of strategic offensive weapons and the ABM Treaty. I want
our ministers and our delegations in Geneva not to stand aside but to do everything
possible in order to make your work and mine as easy as possible.

If we want to crown your visit to the Soviet Union by concluding an agreement on
strategic offensive weapons, then we cannot avoid at least an agreement in principle on it
at this coming meeting. What form that agreement assumes in the end is not so
important. It could [take the form of] some key elements of a future agreement, if we
follow the idea you expressed personally in spring 1985. Or it could be, let us say,
instructions and directives, which we could give to [our] delegations for the speedy
preparation of the aforementioned document.

As I understand it, the Secretary of State, when he was in Moscow, spoke about
developing instructions for the delegations. The main thing is to achieve a common
understanding at the highest level of the goals to which we aspire, and of the means of
realizing them in the shortest possible time.

If we have sufficiently coordinated our intentions on this issue, then we will be able to
enrich our upcoming conversations in Washington with a substantive agenda.

I am passing this letter to you through E. A. Shevardnadze, who is fully informed about
my thoughts regarding the future paths of development of Soviet-American relations, and
the concrete plans for their potential fulfillment. He possesses all the necessary authority
to coordinate with you all the main aspects of the forthcoming summit, including the
agenda, the length of my stay in the U.S., and the exact dates of my visit. I would like
you to take into account that if it suits your availability, then according to my schedule of
events before the end of the year, the first 10 days of December would be the most
preferable period for my trip to Washington.

I hope you take advantage of the visit of our Minister to discuss and decide all the
necessary issues, as they say, on site.

Respectfully,
[signature]
M. Gorbachev.

28 October 1987

[Source: Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley,
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive]
SUPER SENSITIVE
8731388
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'. ,... ,.I . -.r-....H .....
THE SECRETARY OF STATE"
i
WASHINGTON
SYSTiEM II
91196
October 3D, 1987

.' MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: Gorbachev's letter
As expected, FM Shevardnadze provided us an advance copy of
General Secretary Gorbachev's letter to you upon his arrival in
Washington early this morning. It is a long letter, but fairly
positive, and offers a December window for a summit. He has
asked that we keep a tight lid on the contents until he hands
the letter to you at one today.
In the letter, Gorbachev has proposed a summit meeting in
the first ten days of December. Shevardnadze is empowered to
work out all details today. At the summit the INF Treaty would
be signed and START and Defense and Space would be discussed.
Additionally, the letter notes that if the President's visit to
the Soviet Union next year is to be "crowned" with a treaty on
strategic arms, it will be necessary to reach "agreement in
principle" on this score at the summit. Thus, a Moscow Summit
is not explicitly conditioned to agreements in principle on,
STARTjD&S at the Washington Sununit. What form this "agreement
in principle" would take is "not too important." Key elements
of a future treaty is cited as one possible way to go, but
instructions 'to delegations would also be acceptable.
The letter also sees an INF Treaty finalized-within 2-3
weeks, citing progress made in last week's Ministerial, and on
START refers to Gorbachev's Moscow proposal on sublimits,
hinting at a slight freedom to mix. On D&S, Gorbachev appears
to be backing away from previous Soviet insistence that the ABM
Treaty be "strengthened," insisting only that it be
"observed." As to linkage with START, the letter asserts they
want "nothing more" than a ten-year commitment not to withdraw
from the ABM Treaty. Gorbachev proposes establishment of a
channel to support and facilitate the negotiations, suggesting
Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors "could be" used for this
purpose.
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2
We are working 'with the Soviets this morning on a Joint
Statement, which. will be ready for possible release at the
White House immediately following your meeting with
Shevardnadzethis afternoon. He also visualizes a second
statement to the press at the end of the day's events.
Shevardnadze is aware of your plans to after
his meeting with you and shares our desire to make this a one
day affair. He seems confident we can work through matters by
'this evening.
I will brief you on this morning's sessions at 12:30, just
prior to one o'clock meeting with you. We can
go over the Joint Statement then if you like, and make any last
minute changes.
ATTACHMENTS: Letter From General Secretary Gorbachev
:BeRET/SENSITIVE
')NCLASSIFIED -.
THE WHITE HOUSE
SYSTEM II
.: WASHINGTON
91220
NATIONAL SECURITY OECISION
VIRECTIVE NUMBER 288
November 10, 1987
MY OBJECTIVES AT THE SUMMIT
General Secretary Gorbachev.has accepted my invitation to attend
a Washington summit, beginning December 7, that should witness
the signing of an.INF agreement and a thorough review of all
elements on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. The signing of the INF
treaty represents a triumph and vindication for the policy that
this Administration has followed toward the Soviet Union from the
start. It demonstrates that realism, strength, unity with
our allies are the prerequisites for effective tiegotiation with
Moscow. We must keep this principle in mind as we address all
issues related to the Summit. We must also bear in mind that the
nature of the Soviet regime, while it may be changing slowly,
sets limits to what we can achieve with Moscow by negotiation and
'diplomacy.
Objectives
I have a carefully calibrated mix of objectives for the Summit.
All are important. They include:
the completion and signing of an INF agreement in a form and
manner that maximizes Alliance solidarity and the prospects
for ratification;
making real progress toward a START agreement and moving
toward a treaty on Defense and Space that furthers the
promise the Strategic. Defense Initiative holds for a safer
world through deterrence based increasingly on defenses;
taking diplomatic and public affairs actions which at a
minimum assure that the Sununit is seen .as an event
addressing thoroughly our whole agenda. Prior to and at the
Summit, we should. create political pressure for the Soviets
to take positive steps on our human rights, regional, and
bilateral concerns. For example:
o On human rights, we should make the point that while
there has been some progress on the Soviet side, it has
been marked by tokenism; it has not
institutionalized nor made irreversible, and is
therefore far from adequate. We should seek Soviet
adherence to all human rights conventions signed by the
U.S.S.R., and vast improvement in emigration,
repatriation, and resolving divided family cases. If
-.._,""" OIl Cf:l
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byS. rutey. Nallonal Security Cceuntil
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UNCLASSIFIED
UHeiASSIFIED
2
the Soviets raise the issue, we should clearly say.that
they have a long to go before we can give support
to the idea of a human rights conference in Moscow.
o We should make clear that the absence of any progress
on regional issues is a fundamental impediment to a
general improvement of our relations . We should be
firm on the need for a prompt withdrawal of Soviet
troops from urge agre.ment right away to a
transitional regime free from Communist domination, and
repeat our willingness to facilitate their withdrawal
and to guarantee a genuinely independent, non-aligned
and neutral Afghanistan. We should make clear our
grave concern about the turn for the worse in Soviet
policy in the Persian Gulf -- Iran from a
second UNSC Resolution as Iran's behavior towards us
and the Gulf Arabs becomes more belligerent, and
allowing their Bloc partners and clients to ship arms
to Iran that could be used against us. We should put
the Soviets on notice that they are at a crossroads:
cooperation now on a second resolution .would mean real
progress on the regional agenda, but persistence
their current policy could damage U.S.-Soviet relations
and put us on a potentially very dangerous collision
course.
In conducting this Sununit we must strike a sensible balance.
While seeking concrete agreements in arms reductions which serve
our national .interests, we must not foster false illusioris about
the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Such illusions would only
undermine our ability to continue conducting the realistic
policies which brought us an INF agreement and have enabled us to
meet the Soviet challenge worldwide. r.t( .
Our conduct at the Summit and the framing of its results must in
no way complicate our efforts to maintain a strong defense budget
and key programs like 501; they must help us maintain support for
the Contras, Mujahidin, UNITA, and the democratic resistance in
Cambodia; and they must reinforce Alliance unity. In brief, the
Summit should seek simultaneously to codify progress in the
U.S.-Soviet relationship, prepare the way for futureprogress,
yet make clear where fundamental differences remain which block
progress.
JNCLASSIFIED
UNOtASSIFIEC

.
I
.
.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE 1m DENT
THE SEC OF STATE
SYSTEM II
..
91353
7
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIBMAN, JOIN'r CHIEFS' OF STAFF
TB.E DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CON'l'ROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
SUBJECT: National Sec\lX'ity Decision Directive (NSDD- 29(j on
Arm$ Control Positions for OS-USSR Summit (S)
The President ha$ approv during the
~ u m m i t as incorporated rity Decision
Directive (NSDD- 290)
Due to the sensiti 's document
should be made. I of all
those to whom this d ined by the
office of each addresse
~ O R THE PRESIDENT:
' ......"' ..
C!c/2)J
Colin L. Powell .
Actinq Assistant to the President
for N curity Affairs
. Attachment
NSDD- 290
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'!'Ol? SJ:;CRE'l'

START. The U.S.
portion of any agreed
ftThe Preside
negotiations on
They noted the cons!
conclusion of a
reductions.
to work toward the COlD
Treaty and all integra
preferably in time for
half of 1988. lecognizinq areas of agreement and
disagreement recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty
text, they, agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate
resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty'Text including'
early agreement on prOVisions for effective verification.
In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the
agreements on 50% achieved ik as subse
quently developed and no lected rtions of the
Joint Draft START Treat worke including
,agreement ceilings re tb ffensive
delivery systems, 60 ds" 1 4 heavy
missiJ.es; the agre ounti reement that
the reductions wi a 50 iet ballistic
missile throwweight 1 the reased. As
priority tasks, ocus rucial
issues:
. (a)
The additiona
reductions,e
include a ;cef
ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total, and a
further sub-ceiling of 3300 on the number of ICBM

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range
"!,((y
:'
air-laancbed erui
to each 'type o,f '
..
sucb
d
h.
n
(i.e. witb a range over 1500 kilometers), nuclear-armed
'missiles '( to be attributed
bomber ect to B-I,
8-52, BEAll-H CKJACK ed for
long-rangel. -armed' ez shall be
six Per be are not
equippedf ruise 9 BACKFIRE,
shall be accor er counting
rule agr javik. greed rules
ALOMs d to future
heavy bombers ped 0 ear-armed
ALCMs.
TOP SECRET
e'the START
lines:
team
re
treaty
They agre
ute of tti
documents during the meeting of Bea s
that the
These are to
egate number of f 4800 on t
..
6. nspections at
covert
pair of START
7. cealment or
ation by
sions would
n and would
tric infor
ight.
Rule Issue. Ballistic Missile War
The Sov1et Union has indo
sublimit on
acceptabl
(
be.includedln th
ch
O.
edthat
ad Sublimi
"
tin
Y's limi
ared to
consider a
stic mi' However,' it
'has further indicated ather on ballistic.
missile warheads of we fer to raise
that sublimit to 5 Be er accepting
such a proposal, tial t r
agreement with the e con
an ition air-launched
cruise missiles . in ST ly nuclear
armed ALCMs with in ex ometers would
the countirig rules applied to such ALCMs; and
the counting rules that will be applied to the warheads
on existing types of ballistic missiles covered by 'the START
Treaty. (S)
Should the Soviet
to be
..
au
iles
ad 'ti
1
(1)
a
s
ach
Unio a
definition of ALCMs nuclear-armed
of a range greater counting
such ALCMs
ied in item
(b) abOve, 'and (3) th' on existing
types of ballistic . above, I am
prepared to consid' ect to the
U.S. position on (TS)
With respect to th d, and in
the context of reaching roach
outlined in (b) above, number of
ALCMs attributed to eac agreement
on this critical point.
8. Measures to. enhance observation of START
related activities by national technical
These would include open displays of treaty
limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and
submarine ports at locations and times chosen by
the inspecting party.- (8)
- TOP SECRET

DEFENSE & SPACE. The U
the Defense & Space p
following lines
"The Presiden
status of negotiation
They agreed to instruct
work on a Joint Draft T
could enter into force
Strategic Offensive Arm
k to :frame
along the
iscussed the
issues.
to expedite
which
y on
ruct their
agreement and
-(5)
Further Elements. Should the Soviet side press for the
inclusion of additional "instructions" in the Defense & Space
area,- the U.S. side should pursue the inclusion of the following
language in the agreed statement:
"In pursuing a
should build upon the fo
(a) there will
would
prohibit
(b) after that' to
deploy defens

without furth
Joint
comma
giving
h both sides
s currently
be free
,the Treaty
to deploy and
(c) during the nQ ides have the
right to purs ir strategi se programs,
conducting research, development and testing, including
testing in space, as required; and
(d) to enhance strategic stability, prOVide
and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments are
not being undertaken during the non-deployment period,
the sides meet re larly:
1.
2. rategic
defense
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Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, p. 555-556.

Wednesday, December 9 [1987]
Had a half hour to review points for todays meeting. Then
briefing for meeting. At 10:30 went out to the drive to meet Gorby (I
should say Mikhail). We held still in the Oval O. for 5 waves of press
& photos. Then I took him into my study. We had a brief talk then
joined our teams in the Oval O. for a 2 hr. meeting. I led off on the
50% cut in ICBMs George S. & Frank C. added some remarks.
Then the Gen. Sec. responded. We seem to be doing well on the
50% deal but then he brought up SDI and while he didnt link it to the
treaty he still made an issue of it and suggested a 10 year abiding by
ABM Treaty & then we should negotiate on whether we could deploy.
Things got a little heated. We switched to regional problems
Afghanistan. I asked for a date certain for their leaving Afghanistan.
He said hed leave when we stopped helping the Mujahdeen. I
pointed out that we couldnt do that unless the puppet government
laid down their weapons. Well we agreed to put our teams to work on
50% deal & time was up. I took him over to the Dip. Room to meet
Raisa who was with Nancy. They took off for lunch at State. Dept. I
went back to Office for lunch.
After lunch a briefing for interview with 4 columnists. Interview
went pretty well. Some desk time then meeting with several Repub.
Sens re the Budget plan & INF. I let them know if some of the games
re the plan went through Id veto. We want the plan we agreed to. Phil
Gramm was bright spot he came out for the 1
st
time in support of
INF.
Then it was home to clean up & go to Soviet Embassy for
dinner. A very pleasant evening but dinner was pretty much the entire
evening. I lost count of how many courses but they just kept coming.
Brief entertainment after dessert a Soprano from the Bolshoi
Opera Moscow, then home.

- ,
RAFT
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Gorbachev,
December 10 Noon
TIME & PLACE: December la, 1987, 12:00 m. - 12:15 p.m.,
The Oval Office, The White House
PARTICIPANTS: U.S. USSR
Ronald-W. Reagan, President Mikhail S. Gotbachev, General
of the United States Secretary, CPSU CC
George Bush, President Eduard A. Shevardnadze,
Howard H. Chief of Minister for Foreign Affairs
Staff .
Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, CPSU
George P. Shultz, Secretary CC Secretary
of State _ Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, CPSU
Frank Carlucci, Secretary CC Secretary
of Defense Sergei Tarasenko, Special
Fritz Ermarth, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze
Assistant to the President, (notetaker)
-NBC Staff (notetaker) P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Others
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State (EUR)(notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)
Others

After initial pleasantries, the President opened by saying
that held had a chance to review the joint statement. He
understood that working delegations were now focused on the
START and Defense and Space portions of the statement, and
suggested that we get a report.
Gorbachev said that meetings were now in progress between
Marchal Akhromeyev and Mr. Nitze. While they were working, he
proposed that he and the President could have some further


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discussions of regional issues, and the President agreed.
Gorbachev asked to say a few words because he had the
impression that the U.S. side had not appreciated fully what he
had said on regional conflicts the day before. He had sought
to emphasize two or three important concepts. First, that
regional conlicts are very worrisome in that they inject
tension into U.S.-Soviet relations. It was necessary to find
some method or arrangement, some means of acting to permit an
interaction between the two countries in the int-erest of
themselves and the parties to conflict. The two sides had to
discuss an approach to cooperation.
Gorbachev continued that this caused tension in our
relations. We had to find a method of action that would make
it possible to take into account the interests of the parties .
to regional conflicts, as well, of course, as our own interests.
Second, Gorbachev went on, we needed to take account of the
trends that have .emerged, toward reconciliation among
'conflicting sides: 'towsrd a political settlement of problems.
Regional organizations were involved too. A situation had
emerged that presents a chance, if we move in a businesslike
spirit, for us to playa constructive role.
Take Central America, for instance, Gorbachevsaid. The
Guatemala agreement had been adopted. We could express a
positive response to it. For example we could say both sides
would not supply arms there except for small arms. This was
just an idea. What was important was a positive
On Cambodia, Gorbachev went on, contacts had begun' between
Sihanouk and the people in power. They had talked. Other
forces should of course be brought in. Vietnam had given the
Soviets assurances that they will withdraw. The principle of
U.S. and Soviet support for a political settlement there was
important. In Angola too there were good opportunities to move
forward to resolve the conflict politically.
The Middle East was of course a grave conflict, Gorbachev
said. It had deep roots. But the whole world believed that an
international conference to solve it was necessary. He
understand there were doubts about this in the U.S. But what
the Soviet Union supported was not inconsistent with what the
U.S. supported.- There could be bilateral contacts in that
framework. Israel could meet with the Arabs, with whomever it
wanted. But mention of a positive response would be good for
the world. The world was looking for the U.S. and the Soviet
<,


-,

7- 3
Union to cooperate in a businesslike way.
The day before, Gorbachev went on, they had concentrated on
Afghanistan'and the Iran-Iraq war, because these were
particularly acute conflicts. But with regard to Afghanistan
he had felt there was no interest on the President's part. But
if, without any publicity, there was an interest in resolving
the problem
I
the Soviets could withdraw their troops and the
U.S. side could stop its assistance to certain forces. If
there were agreement to that, the two sides could say that as
of a date certain the U.S. would stop its' assistance, and the
Soviet side could say that its troops would not participate in
any military operations. They should let Afghanistan be
neutral.
There was a basis for cooperation on Afghanistan, Gorbachev
went Qn. But the U.S. side's attitude seemed to be: you're
there, you should extricate yourselves, it's your problem.
Naturally, if that were the American attitude, it would be
harder for the Soviet Union to extricate itself. The two sides
should do better :than that.
. Gorbachev noted that he accepted the language on' regional
'issues in the joint statement. But what he wanted was
practical solutions to the issues.
On the Iran-Iraq war, Gorbachev went on, he could say
honestly, with no hidden intent at all, looking the President
in the eyes, that the Soviet Union did not want to create
problems for America. It wanted neither economic problems nor
solutions which created. (tragic) . drama for the Administration.
American forces were' involved. He felt, Gorbachev said, that
there was a basis for regional cooperation between the two
sides in this area.
He had had a short one-on-one discussion with the Vice
President on this, Gorbachev continued. The Vice President had
expressed doubt that Gorbachev or the President could entrust
their security interests to UN forces. He could say, Gorbachev
went on, that the two sides should make those forces deserve
trust. This was inherent in the first resolution. Movement
could be made. But if the question arose as to a real need to
cease the supply of arms, the Soviet Union wouid support this.
Gorbachev urged the U.S. side to think about these things.
It had experienced what kind of people the Iranians were. A
precise calculus of what would happen was needed. If they were
pushed too hard, there would be an explosion, and then the only
SEC /SENSITIVE
- 4
thing left to do would be for the U.S. to use the forces it had
there. This would push the Iranians further, and doing it
could be dangerous not only in the region itself .. The Soviet
side knew these people. It was not saying it did not want to
cooperate with the U.S., with other forces involved. Iran was
close to! the Sovie.t Union; it was important to them. $.,;& ..... c::::
vel e.' z o ?:;: ( t!::!' '$M
The President said he thought his reply should come when
they resumed (for lunch) at the White House. He just wanted to
say one thing. It concerned Nicaragua; i.t also 'concerned
Afghanistan. The Afghanistan government had its own military
forces. If the Soviet Union departed that would be fine. But
there were the the mujahadin, who wanted a voice in their own
government .. If it were denied them, if they were disarmed,
they would be at the mercy of the Afghan That
would not permit equal participation in forming a new .
government. If both sides were to come together to form one,
both would have to armed. Or one would have to disband the
Afghan military for them to be equal. .
Similarly in :Nicaragua, the President went on, the U.S.
side was for a peaceful settlement. We simply wanted the
Nicaraguan government to recognize other citizens who did not II
agree with it. But it was never willing to do that, even
though the Contras were prepared to lay down their arms. The
Sandinista government just wanted to Soviet .
supplies made it the most powerful militarYfforce in, the area,
not only against the fighters, but ore than .
Costa Rica, Guatema:a put togeth r.

Gorbachev suggested they continue at t\e White House.
.
Drafted:EUR:TWSimons, Jr.
12/10/87 x71126 (0133A)
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1
Politburo Session
December 17, 1987

Gorbachev. On the outcomes of the visit to Washington. This is bigger than Geneva or
Reykjavik, with full understanding of their importance and the fact that without them
Washington would not have happened. It is an even more significant sign that the course we
have set is being realized. We are once again convinced that the best line is the principled and
constructive one. And the main lesson we learned from this is a lesson for the future.

Much less apparent in Washington was the manner Reagan used with us in the beginning
making accusations, putting forth claims, blaming us for the crises of the modern world, and
presenting himself as all good and right, in a word: [Reagan appeared] in the role of either a
prosecutor or a teacher. But by the first conversation we had already agreed on this matter, even
though there was a moment of a certain sharpness. I told him: You are not a prosecutor and I am
not a defendant. You are not a teacher and I am not a pupil. And vice versa. Otherwise we will
not be able to do anything.

This was an important moment in establishing mutual understanding with the American
leadership. It was probably even a key moment in finding a common language: speaking as
equals and seriously, each keeping his ideology to himself. Of course this time we also had a
response to the usual human rights claims that by now set our teeth on edge. But we did not
succumb to that temptation. This approach justified itself when the talks entered the level of
concrete discussion of specific problems: the discussion was realistic without any kind of
euphoria, without illusions, with a readiness for reasonable compromises and mutual
constructiveness.

The central moment of the visit was the INF Treaty. We had total understandingand we
arrived with this, having the full support of the Politburothat everything would depend on the
outcome of this question: the entire development of Soviet-American relations and the
normalization of the international situation in general.

Therefore it was very important not to give up in the face of military-technical difficulties, which
were by no means minor. The fact that we overcame them was in large part due to our strong
policy determination to cross this barrier, to achieve the Treaty. As for untying the truly difficult
military-technical knots, I must say our colleagues were at their best, and I want to acknowledge
the experienced work of Marshal Akhromeev and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Bessmertnykh.

The experience of the last two years, as we began to act in the spirit of new thinking, showed that
we need practical results, we need a real-life test for the ideas we proposed and that we wanted to
introduce into international political practice. The world was waiting for it and demanding it. The
peoples trust in our new foreign policy depended on it. we wanted and strove to test these ideas
in real life. And the problem of the INF Treaty was just the deciding factor in this.

It was a trial for us. But it was also a trial of our partners, the Americans; a trial of the
earnestness of their approach to the key issue of todays world. It was a practical test of the
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2
statements they have made at the highest-level conferences, saying that nuclear war is
unacceptable, that the U.S. is striving for disarmament, and that they want normal international
relations.

Progress in this direction also opened the way for other areas of disarmament, namely nuclear,
chemical and conventional weapons. It created the background for similar businesslike
approaches to regional problems and bilateral relations.

The meeting in Washington was also an important test of another fundamental idea of new
thinkingthat its success and effectiveness depend on the state of affairs at home, and on
perestroika.

This is not only a question of objectively tying the two processes together, and not only our
sincere binding of the two, without any ulterior motives, in our conception, in our policies, and in
the development of our theories. It is also a question of the worlds perception and understanding
of this connection. And even though it would seem that this is the moral side of the issue, it has
also had enormous practical meaning.

In Washington we saw for the first time with our own eyes what great interest exists in
everything that is happening here, in our perestroika. And the goodwill, even enthusiasm to a
degree, with which prim Washington received us, was an indicator of the changes that have
started taking place in the West. These changes evidence the beginning of the crumbling image
of the enemy, and the beginning of the destruction of the Soviet military threat myth. That
was momentous to us. And it was noticed throughout the world.

A visit is an official action. We went there for talks with the President and representatives of his
administration. But we also met with America, with all kinds of Americathe youth,
intellectuals, artists, the press, business circles and even the official elite, the ones who serve the
administration.

And another very important aspect of the visit was truly getting to know a world which is in
essence different. You mutually recognize this world through common logic, which is dictated
by the growing degree of integration and interdependency of the world.

Major American figures wanted to meet with us. There was even some bias in the newspapers,
saying that Gorbachev did not come here only to talk with the President, he came to influence all
of America, including the people who ultimately determine its economy and politics.

We also noted that our partners did not want to give anything specific to the press on the
progress of the one-on-one talks with the President and the delegations. We were prepared to do
this. Thus, we were clearly winning in the question of glasnost. This emphasized the sincerity
and honesty of our position and the fact that we came to really get things done, to deal with
political policy, not play the games of the past.

3
In our contacts with the different kinds of America we saw that our perestroika has even reached
American society, which has been driven to the limit with anti-Sovietism. People were not
troubled by the fact that we might be behind in some aspects, such as the economy.
They were interested in the fact that our society has moved forward, that it is finding a new
movement and is inspired to change democratically. As a matter of fact, this interested
everybody, most of all during our contacts with the people.

We felt, perhaps for the first time, in Washington that the human factor is also [important] in
world politics. Until then we had gone by a rather hackneyed formula: foreign policy is about
personal contacts between leaders of countries, leaders of governments and in general exchanges
at the level of those who make politics.

This is understood. But even with this idea we meant that even the personal contacts still took
place between representatives of radically different and irreconcilable systems, and the people
were only representatives. We saw Reagan only as the embodiment of the most conservative
part of American capitalism and the masters of the military-industrial complex. But it turned out
that at the same time the politicians, including the leading heads of state, if they are truly
responsible people, also represent the purely human qualities, interests, and hopes of the
common peopleparticularly of those people who vote for them in elections and who associate
the countrys dignity and their patriotism with the politicians name and personal qualities. At
the same time, they can be guided by the most normal human motives and feelings. And it turns
out that in our day all of this has enormous significance for making political decisions.

We were prepared and ourselves even strove to understand this aspect of relations with the
American leadership, and with the leadership of other countries as well. In other words, we
wanted to include the purely human factor into international political policy. This is an important
aspect of the new thinking. And it has produced results. It seems in Washington we felt it
distinctly for the first time.

The visit to Washington had another aspect as wellthe European aspect. Undoubtedly,
everybody expected results; undoubtedly, all serious politicians understood that all further
development of world events would depend on the progress of Soviet-American relations.

At the same time there was another level of thinkingthe bloc and national-ego thinking, which
was superimposed with the ingrained ideas of a bipolar world and the idea that the decisive role
belongs to the superpowers and they can do a great deal behind the backs of other states, against
the interests of other states and at the expense of international politics. This came through
especially, if you remember, in Reykjavik. There was a similar suspicion in the international
atmosphere during our visit to Washington.

However, we were certain that the logic of disarmament would dispel these fears and suspicions.
This would be especially relevant for Europe, since we were primarily dealing with European
nuclear weapons.

Also, I wanted to let the American know that we will not pull back from the path to
democratization. Of course, we also have to carefully mind its socialist nature. The people will
4
protect this aspect of the matter. Sometimes this protection is even reminiscent of conservatism,
as if to say: we live modestly, but securely. The people value this.

But I have to say that some of our people are afraid of democracy. This fear is caused by the fact
that working personnel do not want to change their work methods. Here is a story: in Yaroslavl
the workers of one factory27,000 peoplespoke against managements independent decision.
The comrades in the administration and in the party committee called headquarters, saying: be
prepared, there might be a riot. That is what we do instead of talking with people. As it is, when
they spoke with the people everything was settled and the arguments were understood, and the
people agreed with managements decision. We are used to calling the firing squad as soon as
anything happens!

We invite the people to participate in leading the government, we encourage them to act, to
practice self-management, but the bosses wont let them. Thats their democracy for you! In
general we are developing this kind of a situation: some people are renovationists, ardent
followers of perestroika who are trying to get something done, who bruise themselves with
mistakes but learn from them. Then there are the others, who are always right, who sit and wait
for the others to break their necks. In the Politburo we need to see all of this.

The Party is awakening to the new work. But this is happening slowly. We even see such things
as engineers and specialists joining the apparatus of the Ministries and building a wall against the
demands of the working class, against its striving for something new.

Comrades, we are in the middle of a real revolution! We should not be afraid of a revolutionary
frenzy. Otherwise we will not achieve anything. There will be losses and retreats, but we will
only be victorious on the tracks of revolution. Yet we still have not tuned ourselves over to
revolutionary work methods. We are still quite the revolutionaries! We are all afraid of
something.

We should not be afraid. And it suits us to appear to the whole world as people who are ready to
go to the very limit in our revolutionary perestroika.

Some people speak of a convergence (Galbraith, for example), others speak of Gorbachevs
unpredictability. They write about his surprises. The Washington Post published an article titled
The Two Gorbachevs. It is difficult for them to unite our striving for peace, collaboration, and
good-neighborly relations with the socialist nature of perestroika. We ourselves have not quite
mastered these dialectics.

So we should not be surprised that they cannot make ends meet and keep searching for some
kind of dirty trick from Gorbachev, some kind of change in the Kremlin, which, it turns out,
planned perestroika in its entirety only to trick the West and lull them out of their vigilance.


[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow
Translated by Anna Melyakova for the National Security Archive.]

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