Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999 ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO, respondents. Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star, a daily newspaper. At the time the complaint was filed, petitioner Borjal was its President while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher and Chairman of its Editorial Board. Among the regular writers of The Philippine Star is Borjal who runs the column Jaywalker. Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil engineer, businessman, business consultant and journalist by profession. In 1988 he served as a technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman of the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy. During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private respondent, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such as government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or participants. 2 On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference. Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned. Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Press Club (NPC) against petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct. He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm, AA Borjal Associates. 6 In turn, petitioner Borjal published a

rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent not only to protect his name and honor but also to refute the claim that he was using his column for character assassination. On 31 October 1990 private respondent instituted against petitioners a civil action for damages based on libel subject of the instant case. 8 In their answer, petitioners interposed compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs. After due consideration, the trial court decided in favor of private respondent Wenceslao and ordered petitioners Borjal and Soliven to indemnify private respondent P1,000,000.00 for actual and compensatory damages, in addition to P200,000.00 for moral damages, P100,000.00 for exemplary damages, P200,000.00 for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo but reduced the amount of the monetary award to P110,000.00 actual damages, P200,000.00 moral damages and P75,000.00 attorney's fees plus costs. In a 20-page Decision promulgated 25 March 1996, the appellate court ruled inter alia that private respondent was sufficiently identifiable, although not named, in the questioned articles; that private respondent was in fact defamed by petitioner Borjal by describing him variously as a "self-proclaimed hero," "a conference organizer associated with shady deals who has a lot of trash tucked inside his closet," "thick face," and "a person with dubious ways;" that petitioner's claim of privilege communication was unavailing since the privileged character of the articles was lost by their publication in a newspaper of general circulation; that petitioner could have performed his officer as a newspaperman without necessarily transgressing the rights of Wenceslao by calling the attention of the government offices concerned to examine the authority by which Wenceslao acted, warning the public against contributing to a conference that, according to his perception, lacked the univocal indorsement of the responsible government officials, or simply informing the public of the letters Wenceslao wrote and the favors he requested or demanded; and, that when he imputed dishonesty, falsehood and misrepresentation, shamelessness and intellectual pretentions to Wenceslao, petitioner Borjal crossed the thin but clear line that separated fair comment from actionable defamation. The trial court ruled that petitioner Borjal cannot hide behind the proposition that his articles are privileged in character under the provisions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code which states: Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and, 2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. Respondent court explained that the writings in question did not fall under any of the exceptions described in the above-quoted article since these were neither "private communications" nor "fair and true report . . . without any comments or remarks." But this is incorrect.

A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks." On petitioners' counterclaim for damages, we find the evidence too meager to sustain any award. Indeed, private respondent cannot be said to have instituted the present suit in abuse of the legal processes and with hostility to the press; or that he acted maliciously, wantonly, oppressively, fraudulently and for the sole purpose of harassing petitioners, thereby entitling the latter to damages. On the contrary, private respondent acted within his rights to protect his honor from what he perceived to be malicious imputations against him. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victim to damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, nor should counsel's fees be awarded every time a party wins a suit. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 25 March 1996 and its Resolution of 12 September 1996 denying reconsideration are, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the complaint for damages against petitioners is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counterclaim for damages is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC December 3, 1948 In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations. Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent. Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the Philippine Lawyers' Association) as amici curiae.

Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline

in large letters "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation. Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State demands and this court requires that he reveal the source of sources of his information and of his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who are appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and correct the examinations questions and last but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions and is determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the identities of the persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data and evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be no basis from which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even involve imprisonment. When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause would kill the purposed of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless

the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of the state required that the names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one example a case of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by the phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved. In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state," was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public interest, "when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the State" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest, "Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases "public interest" and "interest of the estate," may account for the readiness or lack of objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state." hen the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were

unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before examinations day, and study and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the examinations. In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news items or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However, considering that case like the present are not common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 120715 March 29, 1996 FERNANDO SAZON y RAMOS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Petitioner Fernando Sazon and private complainant Abdon Reyes were both residents of the PML Homes in East Drive, Parang Marikina, Metro Manila. They were likewise members of the PML-Parang Bagong Lipunan Community Association, Inc. (PML-BLCA), an association of homeowners of PML Homes. The association had a monthly newsletter, the PML-Homemaker, of which the petitioner was the editor. On December 11, 1983, the PML-BLCA held an election for the members of its board of directors. Among those who ran in the election were the private complainant and the petitioner. The petitioner was elected as a director. He was likewise elected by the new board as president of the homeowners' association. The private complainant lost in said election. Unable to accept defeat, the private complainant, on January 16, 1984, wrote a letter to the Estate Management Office of the Home Financing Corporation (EMO-HFC) protesting the election of the petitioner as a director and president of the homeowners' association. He alleged that the election was a nullity because of: (1) the lack of authority of the petitioner to call for such an election; (2) the absence of a quorum; and (3) lack of the required notice to the homeowners. On January 18, 1984, the private complainant wrote his co-homeowners explaining to them his election protest and urging them not to recognize the petitioner and the other members who won in the election. Meanwhile, in response to the election protest, the EMO-HFC ordered-the PML-BLCA to conduct a referendum to be supervised by the EMO-HFC. The private complainant then notified his cohomeowners about this development and requested them to attend a general meeting with the representatives of the EMO-HFC which was to be held before the referendum. Soon after the general meeting, several copies of a leaflet called the "PML Scoop" were received by the homeowners. The leaflet was entitled "Supalpal si Sazon,"' obviously referring to the affirmative action taken by the EMO-HFC in connection with the private respondent's election protest. At about the same time, the phrase "Sazon, nasaan ang pondo ng simbahan?" was seen boldly written on the walls near the entrance gate of the subdivision. There was no proof, however, as to who was responsible for these writings. Aggrieved by the aforequoted article, the private complainant initiated the necessary complaint against the petitioner, and on May 25, 1984, an Information was filed before the trial court charging the petitioner with libel. On March 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision finding the petitioner guilty of the crime charged, and accordingly sentenced him, thus: WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of P200.00 in accordance with Art. 353, in relation to Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code. With costs against the accused. SO ORDERED. 2

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. NO. 142509 March 24, 2006

JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR., Petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ, Respondents. On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz wife put it on her husbands desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made out its content. Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent a communication by registered mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr. dispatched a second letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz. Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: "Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao," Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito." Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as a result of the filing of the instant case, Atty Pieraz frail health was likewise affected and aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant. The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to him, it was at the behest of the president of the organization "Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan" or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a comment to the letter of private-complainant in the second week of August 1995. Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had signed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutors Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he had sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.3 After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30, 19974 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL defined in Art. 353 and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as

minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of compensatory damages; the amount of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages, and another amount ofP10,000.00, for exemplary damages; to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs. The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or brought to the attention and notice of other persons other than the offended party, there was publication; and that the element of identity was also established since the letter was intended for respondent. It rejected petitioners stance that the libelous letter resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner boldly admitted that he had to reply to respondents letter to Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member of petitioners association. The RTC found respondent entitled to recover compensatory damages as the immediate tendency of the defamatory imputation was to impair respondents reputation although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. It also awarded moral damages as well as exemplary damages since the publication of the libelous letter was made with special ill will, bad faith or in a reckless disregard for the rights of respondent. Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTCs decision to the CA which, in a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial court. The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for and defamatory in character as they impeached the good reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It rejected petitioners claim that the letter is a privileged communication which would exculpate him from liability since he failed to come up with a valid explanation as to why he had to resort to name calling and downgrading a lawyer to the extent of ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so called "duty" in a more toned down fashion. It found also that there was publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be classified as privileged. Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous letter-reply would be fully scrutinized, there is justification for the use of those words, to wit: "lousy but inutile threatening letterusing carabao English" was due to the fact that the demand letter was indeed a threatening letter as it does not serve its purpose as respondents client has no legal right over the property and respondent did not file the ejectment suit; that respondent is just making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus he is stupid; that the words "Yours in Satan name" is only a complementary greeting used in an ordinary communication letter, which is reflected to the sender but not to the person being communicated and which is just the reverse of saying "Yours in Christ". Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.

Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a private communication made in the performance of his moral and social duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriguez estate where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus in the nature of a privileged communication and not libelous. Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication. In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice. Since the letter is not a privileged communication, malice is presumed under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as discussed above. Thus, CA did not commit any error in affirming the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of compensatory damages is DELETED. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-47880 April 30, 1979 WILSON AGBAYANI, CARMELO BAUTISTA, PABLO PASCUAL and RENATO ROMEO DUGAY, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch I, the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES And CONRADO B. MAHINAN, respondents. Conrado B. Mahinan, a lawyer, was the manager since September 24, 1973 of the Cagayan Valley Branch of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) stationed at Cauayan, Isabela. Among his subordinates in that branch office were Wilson Agbayani, chief of the investment unit; Carmelo N. Bautista, chief of the production and premium unit; Pablo R. Pascual, officer-in-charge of the legal and claims unit, and Renato Romeo P. Dugay, an employee of the claims unit. On March 8, 1976, Mahinan filed with the fiscal's office at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya a complaint for written defamation against Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay. Two days later, or on March 10, 1976, the Board of Trustees of the GSIS in its Resolution No. 373 considered Mahinan as resigned from the service as of the close of business hours on that date. Mahinan appealed to the Civil Service Commission which later directed the GSIS Board of Trustees to reinstate him "to his former position, or at the discretion of the proper official and in the interest of the service, he may be assigned to another station or branch without demotion in rank, salary and privileges". So, Mahinan is back in the service (pp. 2-3, Memorandum of Mahinan, pp. 200-1, Rollo). On July 23, 1976, the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya filed in the Court of First Instance of that province an information for libel charging Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay with having maliciously made defamatory imputations against Mahinan on or about February 17, 1976 in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya (Criminal Case No. 509). Quoted in the information were the affidavits of Pascual and Bautista signed at Cauayan, Isabela on October 6, 1975; Bautista's undated letter asking for Mahinan's dismissal, and Agbayani's "unusual incident report" of October 3, 1975 subscribed and sworn to before a Manila notary and enclosing documentary evidence to support his charges of malversation and falsification against Mahinan and praying for the latter's separation from the service. According to the information, all those documents allegedly depicated Mahinan "as an incorrigible managerial misfit, despoiler of public office, spendthrift of GSIS funds, inveterate gambler, chronic falsifier', and an unreformed ex-convict". The four accused filed a motion to quash. They contended that the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because Mahinan was a public officer holding office at Cauayan, Isabela when the alleged libel was committed and, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal

Code, the offense charged comes within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. They argued that the provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file the information. The trial court in its questioned order admits that if Mahinan was a public officer at the time the written defamation was committed, it would have no jurisdiction to try the case since the venue of the action should be Isabela where Mahinan held office at the time of the commission of the offense. In this memorandum, Mahinan has not questioned Ms status as a public officer and he admits that Cauayan, Isabela was his official station. WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of April 25, 1977, denying petitioners' motion to quash is set aside. It is directed to dismiss Criminal Case No. 509, the libel case against the petitioners, without prejudice to the filing of another criminal action for written defamation in the Court of First Instance of Isabela within the remainder of the prescriptive period, if warranted according to the result of a proper and duly conducted preliminary investigation. Costs against respondent Mahinan. SO ORDERED.