Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2009, Vol. 96, No.

1, 155169

2009 American Psychological Association 0022-3514/09/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0012879

Efficacy

Endowment Efficiency: Revisiting Efficacy and Endowment Effects in a Public Goods Dilemma
Chi-ching Yu, Wing-tung Au, and Ka-shing Kevin Chan
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
This article reexamines the efficacy and endowment effects in public good (PG) dilemma by conceptualizing that efficacy endowment efficiency. Endowment is the resource that a person can contribute. Efficiency is the impact of a unit of endowment. Efficacy is the total impact of contribution. The authors used a group project scenario to simulate a continuous contribution PG dilemma. The 2 2 2 2 experimental design manipulated own efficiency and own endowment as within-subject variables and the other persons efficiency and endowment as between-subject variables. Results indicate that cooperation was mainly affected by ones endowment and others efficiency. The authors distinguished among 3 types of efficiency effects: (a) an own-absolute-efficiency effect that efficient people put in more effort regardless of others efficiency, (b) an other-absolute-inefficiency effect that people put in more effort when others are inefficient, and (c) a relative-inefficiency effect that inefficient people put in less effort in the presence of efficient people. Contrasting previous robust findings on efficiency, they identified a situation in which efficiency has no effectswhen one has more endowment than do others. Keywords: efficacy, endowment, efficiency, public goods

A public good (PG) is a commodity or service made available to all members of a group. It has the property of nonrivalry that multiple people can simultaneously consume the same unit of the good. For example, anyones enjoyment of a clean environment or a fine radio station will not affect (and is not affected by) others enjoyment. It also has the property of nonexcludability, which means that it is impossible (or very costly) to exclude people who do not pay for consuming the good (Davis & Holt, 1993). In particular, access to the PG is not conditional on ones contribution to its provision. This introduces a temptation to free ride (Olson, 1965), that is, to enjoy, and benefit from, the PG without contribution. An example is the viewers of public television who do not contribute funds to their favorite stations. In a typical PG experiment, each individual in a group of n persons starts with a certain positive endowment (which can be varied across individuals). Depending on the specific scenario, individuals have to decide whether to contribute all (a discrete contribution method, e.g., Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977) or some portion (a continuous contribution method, e.g., Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992) of their endowment to the PG. If the total amount contributed reaches a predetermined provision threshold, k, the PG will be provided. Typically, k is fixed and known to all, but in

some cases the threshold is not precisely known and is modeled as a random variable (e.g., Suleiman, 1997). The PG can be either a fixed amount (a step-level PG, e.g., van de Kragt, Orbell, & Dawes, 1982) or proportional to the amount of contribution (a continuous PG, e.g., Marwell & Ames, 1979). In a step-level PG, each individual receives a fixed, predetermined bonus. In a continuous PG game, the bonus is often some function of the total amount contributed (e.g., each player gets an equal share of twice the amount of the total contribution). This study focused on a continuous PG with a continuous contribution method and reexamined two key factors affecting cooperation behaviors: efficacy and endowment.

Efficacy
Efficacy is the belief that ones action can make a difference in the final outcome. Efficacy has a robust effect in enhancing cooperation (e.g., de Cremer & van Vugt, 1998; Kerr, 1983, 1989, 1992; Seijts & Latham, 2000; Sen, Gurhan-Canli, & Morwitz, 2001). A related concept is criticality. Rapoport (1987) proposed that a person is in a critical situation if and only if his or her contribution is required to provide the PG. However, a person may perceive varying degrees of criticality in the provision of PG. Therefore, perceived criticality is defined as the extent to which a person believes that his or her contribution affects the provision of the PG (Au, 2004; Au, Chen, & Komorita, 1998; Chen, Au, & Komorita, 1996). Perceived criticality has been shown to be effective in inducing cooperation by enhancing a sense of social responsibility (de Cremer & van Dijk, 2002). Although the term criticality has mainly been used in the study of step-level PG, research under the rubrics of efficacy and criticality all points to the same conclusion, that a person who perceives a larger impact on PG provision contributes more.
155

Chi-ching Yu, Wing-tung Au, and Ka-shing Kevin Chan, Department of Psychology, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong, China. The work described in this article was substantially supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. CUHK4655/06H). Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Wingtung (Winton) Au, Department of Psychology, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong SAR, China. E-mail: wintonau@cuhk.edu.hk

156

YU, AU, AND CHAN

Various factors influence cooperation rate through efficacy. For example, a large group size decreases cooperation drastically because it diminishes ones sense of efficacy (Seijts & Latham, 2000). Kerr (1989) also demonstrated that people in a small group reported higher self-efficacy and hence cooperated more than those in a large group, despite the fact that their impacts on the outcome were made objectively the same in both the small and the large groups. Efficacy also influences cooperation as a mediation variable. De Cremer (2001) reported that making salient the collective identity, rather than personal identity, increased cooperation. It is suggested that if players have a strong group identity, they may perceive their own choices and actions as representative of their group, and hence self-efficacy will be increased. Self-efficacy is such a salient psychological factor that people would justify their noncooperation through self-inefficacy. Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1997) showed that when a person faced strong incentives and chose not to cooperate in the public good dilemma (PGD), the person would justify his or her action by believing that his or her effort would have limited effect on the outcome.

Van Dijk and Wilke (1995) found that because players used different coordination rules, the effect of endowment depended on whether a social dilemma was framed as a PGD or a resource dilemma. In a resource dilemma, the main focus is on distributing outcomes, and people prefer an equal outcome rule to minimize differences in outcomes among members. Hence, people with asymmetric endowment (some can take more than others) took the same amount. In PGD, however, the main focus is on distributing contribution. Thus, people favor a proportionality rule by which higher endowed people are assumed to contribute more. This focus-coordination rule hypothesis was further supported by van Dijk and Wilke (2000).

Efficacy

Endowment

Efficiency

Endowment
Theoretically, endowment has an effect similar to that of efficacya persons potential impact on PG provision should increase if the person has a larger endowment. However, empirical findings on endowment in the PGD are mixed. In a continuous contribution paradigm, in which players are allowed to contribute any portion of their endowment, higher endowed players were found to contribute more (Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992; van Dijk & Wilke, 1994; Wit, Wilke, & Opewal, 1992). According to van Dijk and Wilke (1994), people with a larger endowment would, based on equity, redistribute wealth by contributing more to the PG. Moreover, as they have a larger endowment, they could have a greater impact on the final outcome and hence would contribute more. This effect can be attributed to efficacy. Other studies, however, have showed that a higher endowment actually led to less cooperation. Rapoport, Bornstein, and Erev (1989) found that in a discrete contribution paradigm in which participants had to make an all-or-none contribution decision, people with a larger endowment contributed less. This is because the relatively wealthy players, although having the greatest impact on the outcome, would gain the least from the outcome. Because the cost-to-benefit ratio is higher, they are less likely to contribute. These findings suggest that two conflicting motives are operating when a relatively wealthy player makes his or her decision. One motive is to keep ones endowment because a wealthy person has the least to gain from the outcome. Another motive is to give ones endowment because one has the greatest effect on the outcome. Which motive, then, is stronger? Rapoport (1988) found that the keep and give motives roughly canceled each other out, but the give motive was slightly stronger. In other words, people weigh more heavily the impact they have on the outcome. Jackson (2001), however, found that if the inequality of endowment was not justified, that is, if the players perceived the inequality was based on luck rather than on previous effort, higher endowed people would contribute more. In other words, justification of the asymmetry of endowment also plays a role.

The brief review of efficacy shows that it has a robust effect in enhancing cooperation. Although the effect of endowment on cooperation is complicated by different factors, experiments using a continuous contribution method point to the same conclusion, that higher endowed people contribute more. We see a parallel in the effects and theoretical rationales of efficacy and endowment from the experimental manipulations of these two variables. In efficacy studies, researchers have typically manipulated efficacy by varying group size (e.g., Kerr, 1989; Seijts & Latham, 2000), provision point (e.g., Kaufman & Kerr, 1993), or the impact (e.g., investment value) of the endowment on the PG (e.g., Kerr, 1992). No matter which manipulation is used, the fundamental idea is that everyone has the same endowment, but the impact of the endowment on the PG is different. In endowment studies (e.g., Rapoport, 1988), however, different people had different endowment, but the impact of each unit of endowment on the PG was the same. The link between efficacy and endowment is efficiency, which is the functional relation between endowment and its impact (efficacy) on the PG. Specifically, efficiency is the impact of each unit of endowment on PG provision such that Efficacy Endowment Efficiency. Consider the group project scenario that we used in the present study. Performance on the group project is determined by the joint efforts of the group members. Typically, the outcome (e.g., group project scores as in a student project) is equally shared among all group members, that is, all students in the same group will have the same group project score. A group project can be a PGD. At the individual level, a person will always benefit more by not contributing to the group project and relying on other members contribution (unilateral defection is better than unilateral cooperation). However, if no one contributes to the group project, the outcome will be worse than if everyone contributes to it (mutual cooperation is better than mutual defection). In our scenario, contribution to the group project (PG) is the number of pages of research materials that a person can read. A person with higher efficacy can potentially read more pages than others. The potential number of pages a person can read is determined by two factors: (a) endowmentthe amount of time that a person has for this group projectand (b) efficiencythe speed at which a person can read. A person who has 9 hr (endowment) and who can read 10 pages per hour (efficiency) can potentially read 90 pages altogether (efficacy). Another person having 6 hr but who is able to read 15 pages per hour can also potentially read 90 pages altogether. We consider these two persons as having the same level of efficacy although one person has a larger endowment but a smaller efficiency, whereas another person has a smaller endowment but

EFFICACY

ENDOWMENT

EFFICIENCY

157

higher efficiency. Table 1 presents the interaction of endowment and efficiency on efficacy. On the basis of the Efficacy Endowment Efficiency framework, we can see that previous efficacy studies and endowment studies manipulated only one variable but kept another variable constant. Efficacy studies like Kerrs (1989, 1992) kept endowment constant but varied efficiencyall participants had the same endowment, but the efficiency (i.e., investment values) of their endowment was different, which resulted in different impacts (i.e., efficacy) on the PG. Endowment studies like Rapoports (1988), however, kept efficiency constant such that each unit of endowment had the same impact (efficiency), yet different people were assigned different endowment, which also resulted in different impact (i.e., efficacy) on the PG. Therefore, the Efficacy Endowment Efficiency framework allows us to examine the effects of endowment and efficiency on efficacy (and also on cooperation) independently. In the present experiment, we manipulated not only ones endowment and efficiency, but also other members endowment and efficiency.

Effect of Efficiency
On the basis of previous findings on efficacy (which is conceptualized in this study as efficiency), we hypothesized that high efficiency in general will lead to more cooperation in a PGD. Note that efficiency in the present experimental design should be distinguished as absolute efficiency and relative efficiency. Absolute efficiency refers to how efficient a person is with respect to the task, for example, a person who can read 15 pages per hour (pph) is absolutely more efficient on the task than if he or she can read only 10 pph. Relative efficiency refers to how efficient a person is relative to another person. A counterexample is that a person who can read 15 pph is not relatively more efficient than another person who can also read 15 pph, although both of them are absolutely more efficient than a person reading at 10 pph. Previous studies have typically confounded the two types of efficiency because different players are assigned different impact values. A person who is relatively more efficient than others is therefore also absolutely more efficient. When we vary efficiency of the target person and his or her members independently, we can distinguish between the absolute effect and the relative efficiency effect. We make a prediction on the absolute efficiency effect on the basis of previous findings on the efficacy effect because past Table 1 An Example to Illustrate the Relation Between Efficacy, Endowment, and Efficiency
Efficiency Endowment Low (6 hr) High (9 hr) Low (10 pages per hour) 60 pages 90 pages High (15 pages per hour) 90 pages 135 pages

literature has usually interpreted efficacy as an absolute efficiency effect. This is evident from the corresponding perceived efficacy measure, which typically phrases the question as how much impact will a persons effort have on the public good? (i.e., relative to the task). On the basis of the efficacy effect, we thus hypothesize that a person who is (absolutely) more efficient will cooperate more. When we examine the effect of relative efficiency, we have to consider other members efficiency. We hypothesize that relatively efficient people will contribute more and offer two reasons to support this assertion. First, we expect that a player will contribute more if other members have lower efficiency. This is because of a sense of perceived (absolute) efficiency. Without a standard metric to measure efficiency, a person judges his or her efficiency on the task by making reference to other people. This is a classic notion of social comparison, that people gauge the objective environment by comparing themselves with others. Knowing that there are people with lower efficiency than their own will probably make them feel that they are absolutely more efficient on the task. This relative efficiency effect is because of a confounding absolute efficiency effect. It then follows from the first hypothesis that a relatively efficient player will contribute more. Second, although people expect that inefficient others will not contribute as much, they, being relatively efficient, will not reduce their effort to avoid being a sucker. Kerr and Brunn (1983) found that when other peoples (maximum) output was limited by their innate inability (e.g., women are stereotypically considered to be weaker than men on effort exertion tasks), participants would not mind being a sucker and to take up others reduced effort. Thus, we expect that a person will contribute more when he or she sees that other members are relatively inefficient.

Effect of Endowment
Although the effects of endowment are not consistent across different studies, there is an orderly pattern under the continuous contribution method showing that higher endowed people contribute more. In this study, we used a continuous contribution game, and thus we hypothesized that a person with more endowment would cooperate more. The effect of other members endowment has not been studied independently from own endowment. Without guidance from previous literature and because the effect of endowment has always been explained in terms of efficacy, we borrow from the other efficiency hypothesis to state that a person whose endowment is relatively larger than that of others will contribute more.

Interaction Effects
We offer no specific predictions regarding the various interaction effects among own and other efficiency and own and other endowment. A commonsense expectation is that they have multiplicative effects such that cooperation increases as absolute and relative efficiency increase and as own and relative endowment increase. However, our results show that the interactive effects are much more complicated. It behooves our theoretical prowess to specify precisely the patterns of the various interactions without hypothesizing after the results are known (Kerr, 1998).

Note. Efficacy is considered a product of endowment and efficiency. Endowment is operationalized as the number of hours a person has for the project. Efficiency is operationalized as the speed at which a person can read for the project. Efficacy is thus the number of pages a person can read for the project.

158 Method Design

YU, AU, AND CHAN

This experiment entailed a 2 2 2 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with group members time (MemTime) and speed (MemSpeed) as between-subject factors and participants time (OwnTime) and speed (OwnSpeed) as within-subject factors. MemTime and OwnTime had two levels: 6 versus 9 hr. MemSpeed and OwnSpeed also had two levels: 10 versus 15 pph. As a result, there were altogether four combinations of time and speed for both member and self: (a) 6 hr 10 pph, (b) 6 hr 15 pph, (c) 9 hr 10 pph, and (d) 9 hr 15 pph. Each participant completed one of the four combinations of members reading speed and members time. Under the same member combination scenario, each participant completed all four combinations of own reading speed and own time scenario in a random order.

HK$5 for 1 point on the total score, which was the sum of the individual test score and the group project score. Participants were told that 3 out of an expected 150 participants would be chosen to receive the individual bonus up to HK$500 (approximately US$64).

Questionnaire
The questionnaire consisted of two parts in a total of 12 pages. The cover page was an informed consent page that described the questionnaire as an individual and group decision-making experiment. Part 1, from pages 2 to 6, gave a detailed description of the scenario with three examples demonstrating score computation. The sample scenarios also illustrated the essence of a social dilemma in which the participant could get a higher total score if he or she invested more time in reading for the individual test than in doing the group report. The last page of the questionnaire, which contained two graphs illustrating the conversions between number of pages read and scores for the individual test and group project, could be detached for easy reference. The end of Part 1 (on p. 6) was a quiz that consisted of five questions. The first three questions tested participants understanding of score computations when members allocated different number of hours to the group project. These questions also illustrated that if the whole group put more time into the group report, the project score would be higher. This implication was also tested explicitly in Question 4 on which participants had to indicate whether their score would be higher or lower if the whole group put more time into the group report. In the last question, participants were required to indicate, using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (no effect at all) to 5 (a very large effect), the degree to which their time and speed might affect other members allocation of time on the report. This question was to enhance participants awareness that each members time and speed would have an effect on the others decisions. Part 2, pages 7 to 10, presented 4 of the 16 Own Member Endowment Efficiency scenarios. MemTime and MemSpeed were kept constant across all four scenarios. For example, across all four scenarios, all three other members might have 9 hr each and could read 10 pph. The four OwnTime Own Efficiency scenariosthat is, 6 hr 10 pph, 6 hr 15 pph, 9 hr 10 pph, and 9 hr 15 pph, were presented in a random order. Each participant had a different order. Participants answered five questions for each scenario. Questions 1 to 3 were manipulation checks and measures of perceived efficacy. Participants indicated the degree to which (a) their own time, (b) their own speed, and (c) the combination of their own time and own speed would affect the group report score. Responses were made on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very small effect) to 7 (very large effect). Question 4 asked the participants to estimate the total number of pages the other three members would read for the group report. Question 5 asked the participants to write down their own allocation of time between the individual test and the group project. On the second-to-last page, participants indicated their demographic information such as age and gender. Participants were asked to leave their contact information if they wanted to take part in the lucky draw and obtain a debriefing form.

Participants
One hundred thirty-four university students participated in this questionnaire study on individual and group decision making. Completion of the questionnaire entered them in a lucky draw for a bonus commensurate with their performance. Altogether 3 participants received a bonus of HK$85, HK$135, and HK$150, respectively (between US$11 and US$19).

Scenario
We used a student group project scenario to simulate a PGD. Participants role-played a student enrolling in a general education course in a university. The assessment of this course was composed of an individual test (30%) and a group project in a group of four students (70%). The PG was the group project. Cooperation was reflected by allocating time to do the group project, and defection was indicated by allocating time to study for the individual test. The score on the individual test was a linear function of the number of textbook pages read, which was determined by the amount of time a person allocated to read the textbook and his or her reading speed (number of pages read per hour). The score on the project was determined in a similar way, only it depended on the number of pages of research materials read by the whole group (the participant and the other 3 members). That is, it depended on each members amount of time allocated to read for the group project and each members reading speed. All the group members received the same score for the group project. Participants were told that their outcome (i.e., grade) in this course depended solely on their own score and that they did not need to get a higher score than other students to get a better grade. This instruction was used to clarify that there was no competition among participants. Participants major task was to decide how much time to allocate between the group project and the individual test. To motivate the participants to complete the questionnaire seriously, they were told that they would be entered in a lucky draw for a bonus commensurate with their performance in one of the four scenarios. Although participants did not form real groups when they answered the questionnaire, they were assigned randomly to groups of four after all participants returned their questionnaires to compute their group project scores. The bonus was

EFFICACY

ENDOWMENT

EFFICIENCY

159

Results Data Validity Check

Out of the 134 questionnaires collected, 24 were discarded because of (a) out-of-range responses, for example, allocating 12 hr in a scenario for which there was a maximum of only 9 hr (15 out of 24), (b) missing data (3 out of 24), (c) responses indicating that the participant failed to read the graphs correctly (3 out of 24), and (d) incorrect computation of number of pages from time allocation (3 out of 24). A total of 110 questionnaires were used in the data analyses.

her members; at the same time, the other attribute has to be at least as strong as his or her members. In other words, being relatively stronger on one attribute is not enough for one to feel efficacious; the other attribute has to be at least as strong as that of the other members. In summary, the manipulations of participants time and speed and of members time and speed were successful.

Estimation of Members Allocation

Number of pages read by other members. After participants indicated their perceived efficacy, they estimated the total number of pages that their group members would read for the group project. We found significant main effects of OwnTime, OwnSpeed, MemTime, and MemSpeed, Fs(1, 106) 7.26, 4.87, 62.53, and 38.63, respectively, ps .05, partial 2s .06, .04, .37, and .26, respectively. No interactions were statistically significant. Participants estimated that other members would read more pages when participants had less time (M6 hr 138.90 vs. M9 hr 130.79), when participants read at a slower speed (M10 pph 136.56 vs. M15 pph 132.31), when members had more time (M9 hr 160.76 vs. M6 hr 108.12), and when members read at a faster speed (M15 pph 155.13 vs. M10 pph 113.75). In summary, a person expects others to produce a larger output when (a) he or she has a small endowment and low efficiency and (b) when others have a large endowment and high efficiency. In other words, capable people (those with a larger endowment or higher efficiency) are expected to produce more, and they are also expected to produce more when one is incapable (i.e., has a smaller endowment or lower efficiency). Estimated amount of time (and proportion of time) contributed by other members. We computed the estimated amount of time contributed by other members by dividing estimated number of pages read by members by members reading speed (i.e., efficiency). We then analyzed estimated time by means of the same four-way mixed ANOVA as above. We found significant main effects of OwnTime, OwnSpeed, MemTime, and MemSpeed, Fs(1, 106) 8.34, 5.97, 63.37, and 3.82, respectively, ps .05, partial 2s .07, .05, .37, and .04, respectively. No interactions were statistically significant. Participants estimated that their members would contribute more time to the group project (a) when participants had less endowment (M6 hr 11.2 vs. M9 hr 10.5) and were less efficient (M10 pph 11.0 vs. M15 pph 10.7) and (b) when their members had more endowment (M6 hr 8.8 vs. M9 hr 13.0) and were less efficient (M10 pph 11.4 vs. M15 pph
The main effects of OwnTime, OwnSpeed, MemTime, and MemSpeed were all statistically significant, Fs(1, 106) 12.38, 5.89, 7.03, and 8.75, respectively, ps .05, partial 2s .10, .05, .06, and .08, respectively. Participants perceived higher efficacy when they had more time (i.e., a larger endowment; M9 hr 4.63 vs. M6 hr 4.25) and when they could read faster (i.e., higher efficiency; M15 pph 4.56 vs. M10 pph 4.32). Perceived efficacy was also greater when other members had less endowment (M6 hr 4.67 vs. M9 hr 4.21) and when other members were less efficient (M10 pph 4.69 vs. M15 pph 4.19). Moreover, the interactions of OwnTime MemTime, OwnSpeed MemSpeed, and OwnTime OwnSpeed MemTime MemSpeed on perceived efficacy were also statistically significant, Fs(1, 106) 20.09, 35.58, and 20.69, respectively, ps .05, partial 2s .16, .25, and .16, respectively. 2 Detailed descriptions of the analyses can be obtained from the corresponding author.
1

Manipulation Check
Before participants made their contribution decisions, they were first asked to indicate, relative to other group members, the extent to which (a) their own time, (b) their own speed, and (c) the combination of their time and speed could influence the group project score. These three items served as checks on the effect of participants and members time and speed manipulations. We analyzed each of these three variables by means of a 2 2 2 2 mixed ANOVA with MemTime and MemSpeed as betweensubject factors and OwnTime and OwnSpeed as within-subject factors. MemTime and OwnTime had two levels, 6 hr versus 9 hr. MemSpeed and OwnSpeed also had two levels, 10 pph versus 15 pph. Perceived influence of own time. On the measure of the perceived influence of own time, the main effect of OwnTime was statistically significant, F(1, 106) 9.84, p .05, partial 2 .09. Participants who had 9 hr felt that their total amount of time had a greater effect on the group project than did those who had 6 hr (M9 hr 4.33 vs. M6 hr 3.89). The MemTime main effect was also statistically significant, F(1, 106) 7.86, p .05, partial 2 .07. When other members had 9 hr, participants felt that their total amount of time had a smaller effect on the group project than when other members had 6 hr (M9 hr 3.86 vs. M6 hr 4.36). These results show that the manipulations of own time and members time were successful. Perceived influence of own speed. The manipulations of speed were also successful. The main effect of OwnSpeed on the perceived speed influence measure was statistically significant, F(1, 106) 5.53, p .05, partial 2 .05. Participants who had a faster reading speed of 15 pph perceived a greater effect on the group project than those who had a slower speed of 10 pph (M15 pph 4.34 vs. M10 pph 4.02). Besides, the main effect of MemSpeed was also statistically significant, F(1, 106) 6.77, p .05, partial 2 .06. When other members had a faster speed, participants perceived a smaller effect of their own speed on the group project than when other members had a slower speed (M15 pph 3.94 vs. M10 pph 4.42). Perceived influence of own time and own speed in aggregate. Participants also indicated the perceived aggregate impact of their time and speed on the group project. The combined effect of own time and own speed can be conceptualized as ones perceived efficacy. In addition to the main effects in the expected direction,1 we also found a significant four-way interaction.2 The basic principle that drives this four-way interaction on perceived efficacy is that a person feels efficacious about his or her endowment or efficiency only when this attribute is relatively stronger than his or

160

YU, AU, AND CHAN

10.3). Note that the effects of member speed on estimated pages and estimated time were in the opposite direction. Participants expected that efficient members would put in less time yet produce more output (reading more pages). Analyses of proportion of time revealed the same pattern of findings.3 Participants expected that efficient members would contribute proportionally less time but would still be able to read more pages than would inefficient members.

Time Allocated to Group Project

After participants estimated the output of other group members, they were asked to indicate how much time they would allocate to the group project. We analyzed time allocated to the group project similarly by using a 2 2 2 2 mixed ANOVA. The main effects of OwnTime and MemSpeed were statistically significant, Fs(1, 106) 167.24 and 4.59, respectively, ps .05, partial 2s .61 and .04, respectively. Participants allocated more time to the group project when they had more time (M9 hr 3.76 vs. M6 hr 2.49) and when their members read at a slower speed (M10 pph 3.36 vs. M15 pph 2.89). When we compare the results here with those for estimated amount of time contributed by other members, we see that participants behaved similarly to how they would expect other members to behave. Although participants expected more resourceful members to contribute more, participants who had more endowment themselves also contributed more. Similarly, although participants expected that other members would put in more time if participants themselves were inefficient, participants also contributed more time to compensate for other members inefficiency. These results support the hypotheses that resourceful people will contribute more and that people contribute more when others are less efficient. The effect of MemSpeed was qualified by an OwnSpeed MemSpeed interaction, F(1, 106) 5.98, p .05, partial 2 .05. In general, when members could read at a faster speed, participants allocated less time to the group project, that is, they put in less time when members were efficient. In particular, participants contributed even less time when they were inefficient (M10 pph 3.39 vs. M15 pph 2.74) than when they were efficient (M10 pph 3.33 vs. M15 pph 3.04). In essence, in the presence of efficient others, people put in less effort, and in particular people put in even less effort when they were inefficient. There was also a four-way interaction of OwnTime OwnSpeed MemTime MemSpeed, F(1, 106) 4.63, p .05, partial 2 .04. Figure 1 presents the pattern of the interaction. Consider first the situations in which everyone in the group had the same amount of time, that is, MemTime OwnTime (all had 6 hr [top left panel] or all had 9 hr [bottom right panel]). Simple-interaction analyses of the 2 2 (OwnSpeed MemSpeed) mixed ANOVA show that the OwnSpeed MemSpeed interactions were statistically significant when all group members had 6 hr, F(1, 49) 7.78, p .05, partial 2 .14, and when all group members had 9 hr, F(1, 49) 5.53, p .05, partial 2 .09. None of the simple main effects was statistically significant. In other words, when the amount of endowment that participants and other members had was the same (i.e., both had 6 hr or 9 hr), the amount of time contributed by efficient participants (i.e., 15 pph) was not affected by the efficiency of other members. However, inefficient participants (i.e., 10 pph) put in significantly less time

when other members were efficient than when others were inefficient. Consider the second situation in which participants had fewer hours than their group members, that is, the participant had 6 hr and other group members had 9 hr each (presented in the top right panel of Figure 1). Simple interaction analyses showed that both simple main effects of OwnSpeed and MemSpeed were statistically significant, but the simple interaction was not significant. Participants allocated more time to the group project when they were efficient (M15 pph 2.46 vs. M10 pph 2.22), F(1, 57) 4.38, p .05, partial 2 .07, and when their group members were inefficient (M10 pph 2.65 vs. M15 pph 2.03), F(1, 51) 5.27, p .05, partial 2 .09. Under the condition in which participants had less endowment than others, participants contributed more time when they were efficient and others were inefficient. Participants used their advantage on efficiency to compensate for their lack of endowment to produce an output equitable with those having more endowment. Consider last the situation in which participants had more hours than their group members, that is, the participant had 9 hr and other group members had 6 hr each (presented in the bottom left panel of Figure 1). Simple interaction analyses showed that neither the main effects nor their interaction were significant. That is, participants allocated the same amount of time to the group project when they had more time than their members, no matter how fast they or their members could read.

Proportion of Time Allocated to Group Project

Another measure of effort contributing to the group project was the proportion of time allocated. We computed the proportion of time relative to the total number of hours given. For example, a person given 6 hr and allocating 4 hr to the group project and another person given 9 hr and allocating 6 hr would have contributed the same proportion of time (i.e., 67%) to the group project. This measure captures effort contributed to the group while controlling for the endowment given. We also similarly analyzed the proportion of time allocated to the group project by using a 2 2 2 2 mixed ANOVA. The main effect of MemSpeed was statistically significant, F(1, 106) 5.23, p .05, partial 2 .05. Participants allocated proportionally less time to the group project when members were efficient (M15 pph .38 vs. M10 pph .45). Participants seemed to
3 We computed the estimated proportion of time contributed by other members by dividing the estimated amount of time contributed to the group project by the amount of time endowed. We then analyzed estimated proportion of time contributing to the group project by using the same four-way mixed ANOVA as above. We found significant main effects of OwnTime, OwnSpeed, and MemSpeed, Fs(1, 106) 7.14, 5.79, and 3.98, respectively, ps .05, partial 2s .06, .05, and .04, respectively. The main effect of MemTime was not statistically significant, F(1, 106) 1, ns, partial 2 .00, nor were all the interactions. Participants estimated that their members would contribute proportionally more time to the group project (a) when participants had less endowment (M6 hr .50 vs. M9 hr .47) and were less efficient (M10 pph .49 vs. M15 pph .48) and (b) when their members were less efficient (M10 pph .51 vs. M15 pph .46). Note that the effect of member speed on proportion of time was similar to that on amount of time, which was in an opposite direction to that on number of pages.

EFFICACY

ENDOWMENT

EFFICIENCY

161

Time allocated to group project (hour) 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5

Own Time = 6 hours Member's Time = 6 hours

Own speed = 10 pph. Own speed = 15 pph.

Time allocated to group project (hour) 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5

Own Time = 6 hours Member's Time = 9 hours

Own speed = 10 pph. Own speed = 15 pph.

10 pph. 15 pph. Member's Speed (pages per hour [pph.])

10 pph. 15 pph. Member's Speed (pages per hour [pph.])

Time allocated to group project (hour) 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5

Own Time = 9 hours Member's Time = 6 hours

Own speed = 10 pph. Own speed = 15 pph.

Time allocated to group project (hour) 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5

Own Time = 9 hours Member's Time = 9 hours

Own speed = 10 pph. Own speed = 15 pph.

10 pph. 15 pph. Member's Speed (pages per hour [pph.])

10 pph. 15 pph. Member's Speed (pages per hour [pph.])

Figure 1. A four-way interaction of own time, own speed, members time, and members speed on the amount of time allocated to the group project.

have relied on efficient others to contribute proportionally more to the group. The effect of MemSpeed was qualified by an OwnSpeed MemSpeed interaction, F(1, 106) 6.23, p .05, partial 2 .06. In general, participants put in proportionally less effort when others were efficient. In particular, however, participants took advantage of efficient members even more when participants were inefficient (M10 pph .45 vs. M15 pph .36) than when they were efficient (M10 pph .45 vs. M15 pph .41). Note that although this OwnSpeed MemSpeed interaction effect on proportion of time is exactly the same as that on amount of time, the effect on this measure is even more remarkable because participants not only put in less effort, they put in proportionally less effort. Besides, there was also a significant interaction effect of OwnTime OwnSpeed, F(1, 106) 4.37, p .05, partial 2 .04. When participants had less time (6 hr), they contributed proportionally less when they were inefficient than when they were

efficient (M10 pph .40 vs. M15 pph .42). However, when participants had more time (9 hr), their efficiency had a negligible effect (M15 pph .42 vs. M10 pph .43). In summary, people contribute proportionally less when they simultaneously have less endowment and low efficiency. There was also a four-way interaction of OwnTime OwnSpeed MemTime MemSpeed, F(1, 106) 5.12, p .05, partial 2 .05. Figure 2 presents the pattern of the interaction. The interaction patterns were the same as those for amount of time.

Pages Read for Group Project

The third measure of cooperation was the total number of pages read for the group project. This outcome measure takes into consideration the amount of time allocated and the persons effi-

162

YU, AU, AND CHAN

ciency. We similarly analyzed the total number of pages read for the group project by using a 2 2 2 2 mixed ANOVA. The main effects of OwnTime, OwnSpeed, and MemSpeed were statistically significant, Fs(1, 106) 171.61, 290.95, and 3.97, respectively, ps .05, partial 2s .62, .73, and .04, respectively. Participants read more pages for the group when they had more time (M9 hr 47.08 vs. M6 hr 31.34), when they had a faster speed (M15 pph 47.75 vs. M10 pph 30.67), and when other members had a slower speed (M10 pph 41.89 vs. M15 pph 36.53). These results support the hypotheses that resourceful and efficient people produce more and that people produce more when others are less efficient. There was also a significant interaction effect of OwnTime OwnSpeed, F(1, 106) 13.53, p .05, partial 2 .11. Generally, participants read more pages when they read faster, but the increase was greater when they had more time (M10 pph 38.79 vs. M15 pph 56.72) than when they had less time (M10 pph 23.89 vs. M15 pph 37.44). There was also a statistically significant four-way interaction of OwnTime OwnSpeed MemTime MemSpeed.4 Figure 3 presents the pattern of the interaction. Similar to the amount of time and proportion of time results, people generally produce a larger output when they have more endowment or when they have higher efficiency. In particular, when others have the lowest or the highest potential output, efficient people produce much more, especially when they have more endowment than when they have less endowment. In summary, people produce a larger output when they have more time. People generally also produce a larger output when they are more efficient. In particular, however, the increase in output is greater when people have more time than when they have less time. Also, when others efficiencies are low, people produce a larger output to the group to compensate for others inefficiencies. In conjunction with the findings on amount of time and proportion of time contributed, these findings so far suggest that efficient people do produce more, and they will produce more to compensate for others inefficiencies, despite the fact that they have not increased their effort more than have other people. Efficient people have not capitalized on their efficiency advantage and have not put in extra effort (beyond what others do in terms of time and proportion of time). By virtue of their higher efficiency, their same (or even lesser) level of effort is able to produce a larger output than others.

variable only, t(109) 9.44, p .05. The 9 hr 10 pph participants put in more time (M 3.73) than did the 6 hr 15 pph participants (M 2.58). In summary, when the potential outputs are the same, people put in more effort when they have more endowment (and lower efficiency), although the proportion of endowment given out and the final output contributed remain the same. In essence, people maintain equity by contributing more endowment to make up for their lack of efficiency. It can also be conceived that efficient people will contribute only as much as to match others output. Efficient people will not capitalize on their efficiency to provide more output than others. Equity is maintained at the output level but not at the endowment (input) level.

Experiment 2: A Replication
Because of the novel nature of using questionnaires in studying social dilemmas, we replicated the experiment using a more inter4 The four-way interaction of OwnTime OwnSpeed MemTime MemSpeed is statistically significant, F(1, 106) 4.02, p .05, partial 2 .04. Consider the situations in which members had the smallest potential output (i.e., time 6 hr and speed 10 pph, which is presented in the top left panel of Figure 3) and the largest potential output (i.e., time 9 hr and speed 15 pph, presented in the bottom right panel). The main effects of OwnTime and OwnSpeed were significant, with Fs(1, 106) 19.58 and 41.06, respectively, ps .05, partial 2s .42 and .60, respectively, for the former case and Fs(1, 106) 99.62 and 105.70, respectively, ps .05, partial 2 s .78 and .78, respectively, for the latter case. These effects again support the hypotheses that more resourceful and efficient people contribute more. When members had the smallest potential output, participants read more pages when they had more time (M9 hr 50.18 vs. M6 hr 30.49) and a higher speed (M15 pph 50.49 vs. M10 pph 35.18). The same effect appeared when members had the largest potential output (M9 hr 41.79 vs. M6 hr 25.79 and M15 pph 42.50 vs. M10 pph 25.08). The interaction of OwnTime OwnSpeed in these two situations was also significant, Fs(1, 106) 11.71 and 8.45, respectively, ps .05, partial 2s .30 and .23, respectively. In other words, participants generally read more pages when they were more efficient, but the increase was greater when they had more time than when they had less time. When members potential output was the lowest, the actual output increased because of a larger increase in efficiency when they had more time (M10 pph 40.89 vs. M15 pph 59.46) than when they had less time (M10 pph 29.46 vs. M15 pph 41.52). When members potential output was the highest, the actual output increased because of an increase in efficiency was also larger when they had more time (M10 pph 31.33 vs. M15 pph 52.25) than when they had less time (M10 pph 18.83 vs. M15 pph 32.75). In summary, the effect of increased efficiency on PG provision is more prominent when there is more endowment to benefit from the increased efficiency. Next, let us consider the situations in which the possible output of the other member was at a medium level. The situation for 6 hr 15 pph is presented in the top right panel of Figure 3, and the situation for 9 hr 10 pph is presented in the bottom left panel. We found that only the main effects of OwnTime and OwnSpeed were significant, with Fs(1, 106) 65.05 and 97.63, respectively, ps .05, partial 2s .75 and .82, respectively, for 6 hrs 15 pph and Fs(1, 106) 49.20 and 77.69, respectively, ps .05, partial 2s .64 and .74, respectively, for 9 hr 10 pph. These results again support the hypothesis that more resourceful and efficient people make a larger contribution. That is, participants produced more when they had more time and a higher speed under both situations in which members had less endowment but higher efficiency (M9 hr 47.78 vs. M6 hr 30.75 and M15 pph 48.75 vs. M10 pph 29.78) and when members had more endowment but lower efficiency (M9 hr 48.57 vs. M6 hr 33.31 and M15 pph 49.26 vs. M10 pph 36.62).

Proportion of Pages Read for the Group Project

We computed the proportion of pages read as (hours contributed speed) / (maximum hours speed). Because it is equal to (hours contributed) / (maximum hours), which is equivalent to the proportion of time allocated to the group, we performed no additional analyses for the proportion of pages read.

Comparison of Same Output From Different Attributes

In two situations, a person had the same maximum output: 6 hr 15 pph or 9 hr 10 pph. Comparisons of amount of time allocated, proportion of time allocated, and amount of pages read between these two situations were made using paired-sample t tests while collapsing over the 2 2 between-subjects factors of member endowment and member efficiency. There was a significant difference between these two situations in the amount of time

EFFICACY
Proportion of time allocated to group project

ENDOWMENT

EFFICIENCY
Own Time = 6 hours Member's Time = 9 hours Own speed = 10 pph. Own speed = 15 pph.

163

Own Time = 6 hours Member's Time = 6 hours Own speed = 10 pph. Own speed = 15 pph.

Proportion of time allocated to group project

50%

50%

45%

45%

40%

40%

35%

35%

30% 10 pph. 15 pph. Member's Speed (pages per hour [pph.])

30% 10 pph. 15 pph. Member's Speed (pages per hour [pph.])

Proportion of time allocated to group project

Own Time = 9 hours Member's Time = 9 hours Own speed = 10 pph. Own speed = 15 pph.

50% 45% 40% 35% 30%

10 pph. 15 pph. Member's Speed (pages per hour [pph.])

Figure 2. A four-way interaction of own time, own speed, members time, and members speed on the proportion of time allocated to the group project.

active and behavioral experimental approach. We retained the group project role-play scenario because in our experience participants can more easily grasp the individual and group conflicts when the task is presented in a real-life context. In this replication study, we had about 20 participants in each experimental session. We assigned participants to different groups of four people at the beginning of the experiment so that they felt they were making interactive decisions with other participants in real time. Like other typical social dilemma studies, communication was not allowed and participants did not know who their group members were. In this replication, we also included a fifth variable, possibility of future interaction, on top of the 2 2 2 2 mixed design. In half of the experimental sessions, participants were led to believe that they would play the game one more time with their same group members after we disclosed their results on the first game. In another half of the experimental sessions, participants thought that they would play the game again with all new members and that these new members would not know each others decisions on their first game. One hundred seventy students participated in this study and received HK$50 (approximately US$6.50) in exchange for participating. In each experimental session, we randomly selected a participant to receive a bonus determined by his or her performance in the game, which was a result of the interdependent

decisions among group members. The average bonus was HK$70 (approximately US$9.00). We found a significant five-way interaction on the amount of time allocated to the group project. Without going into details of the analyses that are beyond the scope of this article, we noted a similar pattern of the four-way interaction under the condition in which participants expected they would interact with each other again as the same group. As an illustration, the results of this four-way interaction are presented in Figure 4. These similar results provide strong support for the main findings reported in the first experiment.

General Discussion Endowment and Efficiency Effect

On the basis of the Efficacy Endowment Efficiency framework, the present study uncovered complex yet systematic cooperation behaviors under different combinations of own and others endowment and efficiency. First of all, we replicated findings on endowment and efficiency (referred to as efficacy in previous studies): (a) Higher efficacy leads to greater cooperation (e.g., de Cremer & van Vugt, 1998; Kerr, 1989) and (b) in a continuous contribution game people with a larger endowment cooperate more (e.g., Rapoport, 1988; van Dijk & Wilke, 1994). We also found

164
Member's time = 6 hours (hrs.) Pages read for group Member's speed = 10 pages per hour (pph.) project Own time = 6 hrs. 55 45 35 25 15 10 pph. Own Speed
Member's time = 9 hours (hrs.) Pages read for groupMember's speed = 10 pages per hour (pph.) project 55 45 35 25 15 Own Speed Own time = 6 hrs. Own time = 9 hrs.

YU, AU, AND CHAN

Member's time = 6 hours (hrs.) Pages read for group Member's speed = 15 pages per hour (pph.) project 55 45 35 25 15 Own time = 6 hrs. Own time = 9 hrs.

Own time = 9 hrs.

15 pph.

10 pph. Own Speed

15 pph.

Member's time = 9 hours (hrs.) Pages read for group Member's speed = 15 pages per hour (pph.) project Own time = 6 hrs. 55 45 35 25 15 Own Speed Own time = 9 hrs.

Figure 3. A four-way interaction of own time, own speed, members time, and members speed on the pages read for the group project.

four-way interactions of own and other endowment and efficiency on perceived efficacy, amount, and proportion of time contributed to PG provision. In summary, when everyone had the same amount of endowment, inefficient people put in less effort in the presence of efficient others, whereas efficient people would not undermine their effort. We should note that the inefficient people put in less time when efficient others were present; it was not that efficient people put in more time when others were inefficient. In other words, being relatively more efficient does not seem to induce people to contribute more time (or effort), but being relatively less efficient undermines peoples effort. In addition, when people have more endowment than others, their efforts (amount of time put into the group) are not affected by their own efficiency and others efficiency. The key point is that efficiency has no effect on effort when a person has more endowment than others. This null effect of efficiency has not been established in previous studies because endowment has not been manipulated in those studies of efficiency (conceptualized as efficacy). Efficiency affects effort only when people have the same endowment as do others: If people themselves are efficient, they put in more effort regardless of other members efficiency. Here we replicated the classic effect of efficacy (or in our conceptual-

ization, efficiency), that is, efficient (efficacious) people contribute more effort. We should note that this is an absolute efficiency effect, which demonstrated that efficient people put in more effort regardless of other peoples efficiency. There is also a relative effect: If people are not efficient, they contribute less when others are efficient (than when others are inefficient). We should perhaps even delineate this effect as the relative inefficiency effect. The key is that being inefficient does not undermine effort; it is being comparatively less efficient than others that drives down effort. Last, when people have less endowment than others, they put in more effort if they are efficient (an own absolute efficiency effect) or if others are inefficient (an other absolute inefficiency effect). A broad generalization of the effect of efficiency on effort is that 1. When a person has more endowment than others, efficiency has no effect. When a person has the same amount of endowment as others (a) there is an own absolute efficiency effect that efficient people put in more effort regardless of other peoples efficiency (a simple interaction of own efficiency and member efficiency) and (b) there is also a relative inefficiency effect that inefficient people put in

2.

EFFICACY

ENDOWMENT

EFFICIENCY

165

Figure 4. A four-way interaction of own time, own speed, members time, and members speed on the amount of time allocated to the group project in Experiment 2.

less effort in the presence of efficient people (a simple main effect of member efficiency). 3. When a person has less endowment than others, (a) there is again an own absolute efficiency effect that efficient people put in more effort (a simple main effect of own efficiency) and (b) there is an other absolute inefficiency effect that people put in more effort when others are inefficient (a simple main effect of member efficiency).

Despite these patterns of intricate findings, we propose a broad generalization that cooperation behaviors are primarily driven by (a) our own endowment and (b) other peoples efficiency.

Importance of Own Endowment

We reason that a persons own endowment is important in determining cooperation behaviors because we found significant main effects of own endowment on both measures of (a) time allocated to group project and (b) number of pages read for the group project. We also found that in the four-way interactions on amount of time and proportion of time, when participants had more endowment than others, effects of efficiency disappeared. The four-way interaction on number of pages also shows that the effect of own efficiency was more prominent when one had more endowment. The whole set of findings suggests that own endowment either drives cooperation behaviors independently or magnifies the effects of efficiency on cooperation behaviors collectively. It is not a trivial finding that people with more endowment contribute more; the fact is they indeed have a larger capability to do more. Note that the mean number of hours put in by the higher endowed

Efficiency promotes effort when a person perceives him- or herself as efficient or when a person perceives others as inefficient. Such an enhancement effect of efficiency does not require a comparison with others. It is a comparison with the task itself that determines this sense of absolute efficiencythe extent to which ones effort can have an impact on the task. However, inefficiency undermines effort when a person perceives him- or herself as relatively less efficient than others. Perceiving that oneself is not efficient on the task will not promote effort exertion, of course; what really undermines effort is when one also thinks that other people are more efficient than one is.

166

YU, AU, AND CHAN

participants (i.e., having a maximum of 9 hr) was about 3.76 hr. It did not exceed the number of hours assigned to the lower endowed participants (i.e., 6 hr). Under the parameters of this PG game, the lower endowed people could have matched or even exceeded the contribution of higher endowed people if they desired to. Lower endowed participants, however, chose to contribute less than did higher endowed participants.5 The main effects of own endowment on time allocation and pages read do show that higher endowed people contributed more than did lower endowed people. However, higher endowed people did not contribute proportionally more than lower endowed peoplethe main effect of own endowment was not significant in the proportion of time allocated. The higher endowed participants put in 41.8% of their available hours, whereas the lower endowed participants put in a comparable 41.5%. Participants had a common perception of what constituted a fair share of contribution. When everyone adheres to this equity principle, naturally higher endowed people will contribute more than do lower endowed people. We can attribute the own endowment effect to the equity norm. We reason that a persons own efficiency was not a primary factor affecting cooperation behaviors because there was a significant main effect of own efficiency on neither time allocated nor proportion of time allocated. Note that although own efficiency played a role in higher order interactions, its effect was not separate from own endowment. Although it is also true that own efficiency had a significant main effect on pages read, we regard this effect as an artifact because the number of pages read is a numerical product of the number of hours allocated and reading speed. Holding everything else constant, reading speed, which cannot be changed by the participant, necessarily has a significant effect on the number of pages read. In fact, the number of pages read for high-efficiency and low-efficiency participants were 47.8 and 30.7, respectively. Their ratio (47.8 / 30.7 1.56) is just about the same as that of the assigned reading speeds (15 / 10 1.50). Because the effect of own efficiency did not appear independently of other factors, we conclude that own efficiency is not a primary factor affecting cooperation behaviors.

Importance of Member Efficiency

The effect of other peoples efficiency on cooperation behavior is clear. There were significant main effects on amount of time, proportion of time, and pages read. It is also clear that other peoples endowment had no independent effects on cooperation, as indicated by the lack of main effects of member endowment on any of the three dependent measures. Hence, we conclude that member efficiency is another primary factor determining cooperation behaviors. When members efficiency increased from 10 to 15 pph (i.e., a 50% increase in efficiency), participants put in fewer hours (from 3.4 to 2.9 hr, a 14% decrease) and proportionally less time (from 45% to 38%, a 15% decrease) and read fewer pages (from 42 to 32 pages, a 13% decrease). Obviously, participants took advantage of the increasingly more efficient others by contributing less. However, people did not take full advantage of that. Because of the 50% increase in efficiency of the three other members, the participant can withhold all of his or her contribution in the extreme situation, but the total group output will still be larger than before.

This extreme outcome assumes, of course, that the three other members will not reduce their effort when their efficiency increases. In fact, participants did expect that other group members would not reduce their effort when members became more efficient. Recall that participants were asked to estimate the number of pages that the other three members would read. The statistically significant main effect of member efficiency indicated that participants expected the other three members to read more pages when their efficiency increased (a 36% increase from 114 to 155 pages). On the basis of the estimated number of pages read, we deduced the estimated number of hours contributed by other members. We found that participants did not expect their members to cut down on their hoursthere was a negligible change from 11.4 to 10.3 hr (the main effect of member efficiency was not statistically significant). It is reasonable for participants to expect that their group members would not reduce their effort. Recall that we had concluded earlier that a persons efficiency was not a primary factor determining his or her contribution. Therefore, if a persons own efficiency is not going to affect his or her contribution, by projecting his or her actions onto others that person can rightfully expect that others behavior will not be affected by their efficiency either. As participants expected others would not reduce their effort when their members efficiency increased by 50%, participants reduction of effort might not harm the whole group at all. In fact, despite a reduction of effort by the participant, participants expected that the total group output would increase from 114 42 156 pages to 155 32 187 pages as efficiency increased. In summary, members increased efficiency induced participants to put in less effort. However, participants restrained their effort reduction so as not to harm the group. This result parallels with Kerr and Bruuns (1983) finding. They found that when task success depended on the performance of the best member, participants with lower ability (i.e., efficiency) reported lower efficacy, and hence contributed less. A similar situation occurred in the present study, although this was an additive task. When other members had the highest efficiency and participants had the lowest, the group outcome depended greatly on the members (best member). Hence, the less efficient participant relied and counted on more efficient others to produce more.

Understanding the Differential Focus on Endowment Versus Efficiency

Ones own endowment seems to have a larger impact than ones own efficiency in affecting behaviors. In the other members case, however, their efficiency is more influential than their endowment. Thus, endowment and efficiency exert their effects differently: Ones endowment counts more than ones efficiency, but others efficiency weighs more than others endowment in determining ones contribution behavior. However, such a difference may rise from the response format of the questionnaire, in which particiOf course, in other games with a different k index when the outcome of cooperation becomes more attractive, lower endowed people, despite contributing their maximum effort, may not be able to match the natural level of cooperation of the higher endowed people.
5

EFFICACY

ENDOWMENT

EFFICIENCY

167

pants were asked to allocate time first and then to multiply the amount of time to compute the pages read for the group project. This order of questions may induce participants to focus on the amount of endowment (i.e., time) that they had. The difference between endowment and efficiency effect can also be interpreted in terms of the social context in the present study. We structured the PG game as a group project scenario. The construct of endowment was defined as the amount of time that one has, and efficiency was defined as reading speed. Within this social context, endowment and efficiency may be viewed differently. The amount of time (endowment) one has may be viewed as a situational factor, and ones reading speed (efficiency) may be seen as a dispositional factor. Participants may succumb to an actor observer effect when making their decisions. When evaluating ones own attribution (endowment and efficiency), the situational factor is more salient; hence, people tend to count their own endowment more than their own efficiency. When they evaluate others attribution, however, the dispositional factor counts more. Consequently, people tend to weigh others efficiency more heavily than others endowment.

produce more if we are inefficient. As Kerr (1983) found that people are not wary of contributing more (i.e., being suckers) if their members are incapable, it is thus acceptable and expected that relatively inefficient people can put in less effort. Thus, relative inefficiency is the culprit of diminishing effort.

Perceived Efficacy
Like efficiency, we can also distinguish whether perceived efficacy is an absolute concept in comparison with a task or a relative concept in comparison with other people. The distinction between absolute and relative perceived efficacy was moot in previous studies because a persons efficacy and other members efficacy have not been manipulated independently. Nevertheless, we reckon that perceived efficacy has typically been considered as an absolute concept as reflected by how it has usually been measuredas how much impact a person has on the task. In this study, the wording of our perceived efficacy measure was no different from those of other researchers. However, we found from a four-way interaction that participants judged their efficacy in comparison with other members, which suggested that perceived efficacy was a relative concept. Specifically, we found that perceived efficacy was determined by two principles: (a) A person feels efficacious about his or her endowment (or efficiency) only when this attribute is relatively stronger than his or her members endowment (or efficiency) and (b) at the same time, the other attribute has to be at least as strong as his or her members. The underlying theme of this interaction suggests that perceived efficacy is driven by a comparison with others in addition to a comparison with the task. Although there are limitations in the current experimental design that preclude us from making a strong conclusion, future research with a more elaborated design will be able to delineate more precisely the absolute versus relative determinants of perceived efficacy. Our tentative results here suggest that perceived efficacy is determined more by relative person factors than absolute task factors.

Effect of Efficiency
Although we emphasize the role of own endowment over the role of own efficiency in affecting cooperation behaviors, we are not neglecting the impact of efficiency at all. By considering the effects of own efficiency and member efficiency together, we have identified the different conditions under which efficiency promotes effort, whereas inefficiency would undermine effort. A crucial theoretical proposition is that we distinguish between efficiency as relative to the task and efficiency as relative to other people. A person is efficient on a task when a little effort can have a large impact on the task outcome; we label this type of efficiency absolute efficiency. A person can be efficient relative to another person (when two people are putting in the same effort, but one persons impact on the outcome is larger than that of the other person); we label this type of efficiency relative efficiency. The results on amount of time and proportion of time show that when a person is absolutely efficient, he or she will put in more effort regardless of other peoples efficiency. We further delineate this effect as the own absolute efficiency effect to distinguish it from the other absolute efficiency effectmore effort is exerted when other people are inefficient regardless of ones efficiency. Thus, absolute efficiency enhances effort when a person is efficient on the task or when other people are inefficient on the task. To be precise, we found an own absolute efficiency effect when a person does not have more endowment than others, and we found an other absolute efficiency effect when a person has less endowment than others. No less important is that we found no effect of efficiency when a person has more endowment than others. Although previous studies have always demonstrated the impact of efficiency, we seem to have identified the condition (i.e., having more endowment than others) under which efficiency has no effects. Although absolute efficiency promotes effort, relative inefficiency undermines it. We found that not being efficient on the task is not detrimental; it is being less efficient than others that discourages effort. This can be a combination of two effects. First, we expect that efficient others will produce more (although not necessarily put in more effort), and second, we expect that others will

Rules Used in Determining Cooperation

Equity rule. Results reveal that people tend to use an equity rule when considering the impact of their own endowment. Participants own endowment has a statistically significant effect on the amount of time contributed, but not on the proportion of time contributed. When considering the proportion of final output, people tend to produce the same proportion regardless of their endowment and efficiency. This shows that people tend to use the rule of equity to judge their own contribution to the group. When they have more endowment, they tend to give out more, but just to match the same proportion of endowment given. When they have more endowment and higher efficiency, they tend to produce more, but just enough to match the proportion of the final output. Hence, the equity rule strongly affects peoples cooperation behavior. Similar results occurred in estimating others contribution. When others had more endowment, participants expected them to give out a larger amount of endowment, but not a larger proportion of endowment. This result is consistent with previous findings (e.g., van Dijk & Wilke, 2000) that people tend to favor a proportionality rule in a low-outcome-focus PGD (i.e., asking players the amount of endowment they would give out). Complementary rule. When considering other members endowment and efficiency, the complementary rule, but not the equity

168

YU, AU, AND CHAN

rule, operates. If people had used an equity rule and had less endowment or lower efficiency, they should expect others to contribute less. In reality, however, participants expected others to contribute more. Clearly, they expected others to produce more to compensate for their own smaller output. The complementary rule also plays a role in determining ones own contribution. When others are less efficient, people generally put in a larger amount of endowment and a larger proportion of endowment and produce more to compensate for members inabilities. This result on the complementary rule parallels findings from previous studies. Kerr (1983) found that people would not decrease their effort if members of low ability (who were hence unable to succeed by themselves) benefited from their contribution, but they would not tolerate a free rider who had the ability to succeed but did not do so. The complementary rule may also reflect the operation of the social responsibility norm. De Cremer and van Dijk (2002) found that high perceived criticality triggered feelings of social responsibility, which in turn influenced contribution. In the present study, people may have felt a greater social responsibility to contribute to the group when other members were less efficient. Future studies should also measure this variable to verify this claim. In summary, the impact of ones own and others endowment and efficiency seems to be driven by equity and complementary rules. The equity rule is used when evaluating ones own endowment in making the contribution decision and estimating others allocation. The complementary rule is used when evaluating others efficiency and endowment.

Definition of Cooperation
By conceptualizing efficacy in terms of Endowment Efficiency, a question about the definition of cooperation emerges. In previous studies of endowment and efficacy (i.e., efficiency in the present study), cooperation was defined as the effort allocated to the group. As the amount of output is directly proportional to the amount of effort contributed, output and effort are in the same measure of cooperation, although they are in different metrics. However, when we consider output as Endowment Efficiency, defining cooperation in terms of effort contributed and output produced led to different results. This is because the same amount of output can be derived from different combinations of endowment and efficiency, for example, 90 pages of output can either be a combination of 6 hr 15 pph or 9 hr 10 pph. From our results in comparing two types of peoplethose who had an endowment of 6 hr and an efficiency of 10 pph and those who had an endowment of 9 hr and an efficiency of 15 pphwe found that people contributed more effort when they had more endowment, but the final outputs were not significantly different from each other. If we define cooperation as the amount of effort contributed, the 9 hr 15 pph people will be regarded as more cooperative; however, if we define cooperation as the final output produced, both types of people will be considered as equally cooperative. This is a debate that warrants more empirical and philosophical investigation.

For example, we consider efficiency a fixed attribute; people cannot control how efficiently they do the work. However, efficiency can also be considered as changeable or controllable. Efficiency defines the maximum efficiency a person has. Depending on motivational factors or situational demands that also consume a persons time or resources, a person can choose not to perform at his or her maximum level of efficiency. An experimental paradigm studying this concept can allow a decision maker to decide on the level of efficiency (subject to the maximum efficiency level given) he or she wants to exercise. Nevertheless, is this changing level of efficiency empirically, or even conceptually, the same as effort? In the present studies, differences in endowment and efficiency among group members were randomly assigned to participants under the pretext that different people may happen to have more or less time and be more or less efficient on the task. We were in fact imposing a philosophy stating that it is equal to everyone that people are unequal. However, in a real-life situation, people may make different attributions and social comparisons on these unequal distributions of attributes, for example, thinking that people with low efficiency or endowment are not motivated, wanting to outperform others, and so forth. Although we think that these attributions and social comparisons are unlikely to occur in the present studies because we have emphasized the random nature of these assignments, in future studies these attributions and motivations should also be considered as dependent variables or mediation variables. We commented on earlier studies confounding absolute and relative efficiency (and endowment) effects in their experimental design. This study is not immune to this criticism either. We manipulated own efficiency (and endowment) independent of other efficiency (and endowment), but we examined only two levels of each variable. Thus, a person who was relatively more efficient was also absolutely more efficient, and this was also true of the endowment variable. A more elaborate, although typically impractical, experimental design that considers more than two levels of each variable (e.g., having four levels of efficiency, such as very low, low, high, and very high) can minimize the confound substantially. An alternative is to measure participants perceived impact of their absolute and relative efficiency and endowment and to use these perceptions as predictor variables. However, it is unlikely that participants can clearly distinguish among these four types of perceptions, which will subsequently be highly correlated among each other. Some ingenious experimental design is required to examine properly the interactive effects of absolute and relative efficiency and endowment on perceived efficacy and cooperation behaviors.

References
Au, W. T. (2004). Criticality and environmental uncertainty in step-level public goods dilemmas. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 8, 40 61. Au, W. T., Chen, X. P., & Komorita, S. S. (1998). A probabilistic model of criticality in a sequential public good dilemma. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process, 75, 274 293. Chen, X. P., Au, W. T., & Komorita, S. S. (1996). Sequential choice in a step-level public goods dilemma: The effects of criticality and uncertainty. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 69, 179 193.

Further Research Directions

This study was based on the framework of Efficacy Endowment Efficiency, which requires a more in-depth exploration.

EFFICACY

ENDOWMENT

EFFICIENCY

169

Davis, D. D., & Holt, C. A. (1993). Experimental economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J., & Shaklee, H. (1977). Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other peoples behavior in a commons dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 111. de Cremer, D. (2001). Perceptions of group homogeneity as a function of social comparison: The mediating role of group identity. Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social, 20, 138 146. de Cremer, D., & van Dijk, E. (2002). Perceived criticality and contributions in public good dilemmas: A matter of feeling responsible to all? Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 5, 319 332. de Cremer, D., & van Vugt, M. (1998). Collective identity and cooperation in a public goods dilemma: A matter of trust or self-efficacy? Current Research in Social Psychology, 3(1), 111. Jackson, J. W. (2001). Effects of endowment amount and attributions on responses to a subgroup social dilemma. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 5, 67 80. Kaufman, C. M., & Kerr, N. L. (1993). Small wins: Perceptual focus, efficacy, and cooperation in a stage-conjunctive social dilemma. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23, 320. Kerr, N. L. (1983). Motivation losses in small groups: A social dilemma analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 819 828. Kerr, N. L. (1989). Illusions of efficacy: The effects of group size on perceived efficacy in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 287313. Kerr, N. L. (1992). Efficacy as a causal and moderating variable in social dilemmas. In W. B. Liebrand, D. M. Messick, & H. A. Wilke (Eds.), Social dilemmas: Theoretical issues and research findings (pp. 183 197). Oxford, England: Pergamon Press. Kerr, N. L. (1998). HARKing (hypothesizing after the results are known). Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 196 217. Kerr, N. L., & Bruun, S. E. (1983). Dispensability of member effort and group motivation losses: Free-rider effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 78 94. Kerr, N. L., & Kaufman-Gilliland, C. M. (1997). And besides, I probably couldnt have made a difference anyway: Justification of social dilemma defection via perceived self-inefficacy. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 211230. Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1979). Experiments on the provision of public goods I: Resources, interest, group size, and the free-rider problem. American Journal of Sociology, 84, 13351360.

Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rapoport, A. (1987). Research paradigms and expected utility models for the provision of step-level public goods. Psychological Review, 94, 74 83. Rapoport, A. (1988). Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of inequality in resources. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 432 440. Rapoport, A., Bornstein, G., & Erev, I. (1989). Intergroup competition for public goods: Effects of unequal resources and relative group size. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 748 756. Seijts, G. H., & Latham, G. P. (2000). The effects of goal setting and group size on performance in a social dilemma. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 32, 104 116. Sen, S., Gurhan-Canli, Z., & Morwitz, V. (2001). Withholding consumption: A social dilemma perspective on consumer boycotts. Journal of Consumer Research, 28, 399 417. Suleiman, R. (1997). Provision of step-level public goods under uncertainty: A theoretical analysis. Rationality and Society, 9, 163187. Suleiman, R., & Rapoport, A. (1992). Provision of step-level public goods with continuous contribution. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 5, 133153. van de Kragt, A. J. C., Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M. (1982). The minimal contributing set as a solution to public good problems. American Political Science Review, 77, 112122. van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (1994). Asymmetry of wealth and public good provision. Social Psychology Quarterly, 57, 352359. van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (1995). Coordination rules in asymmetric social dilemmas: A comparison between public good dilemmas and resource dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 31, 127. van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (2000). Decision-induced focusing in social dilemmas: Give-some, keep-some, take-some, and leave-some dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 92104. Wit, A., Wilke, H. A. M., & Opewal, H. (1992). Fairness in asymmetric social dilemmas. In W. B. Liebrand, D. M. Messick, & H. A. Wilke (Eds.), Social dilemmas: Theoretical issues and research findings (pp. 183197). Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.

Received February 2, 2006 Revision received May 19, 2008 Accepted May 19, 2008