Proceedings of the 2012 9th International Pipeline Conference IPC2012 September 24-28, 2012, Calgary, Alberta, Canada

IPC2012-90186

COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF PIPELINE FAILURE STATISTICS

Srgio B. Cunha Petrobras Transporte - TRANSPETRO Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil KEYWORDS Failure statistics. risk evaluation, size of hole. ABSTRACT Failure statistics for onshore pipelines transporting oil, refined products and natural gas from the USA, Canada and Europe are compared. Failure data from Brazilian pipelines are presented and included in the comparison. Failure rates for internal and external corrosion, human action and natural forces are analyzed and the expected failure rate for each failure mechanism is indicated. The effects of relevant construction and environmental factors on the failure rates are studied and mean trends are obtained. Furthermore, the sizes of the holes observed in each type of failure are also compared. Finally, the probability of ignition after a failure in gas and liquid pipelines is evaluated. This study may serve as basis for the estimation of failure frequency, hole size and probability of ignition for hazard liquids and gas pipelines. INTRODUCTION Pipelines are, undoubtedly, the safest and most economic way to transport natural gas, petroleum and refined products in the large volumes and long distances required nowadays. Although rare, losses of containment in pipelines do occur, sometimes taking very large tolls in terms of human life, environmental damages or only economic losses. Pipeline failure statistics enable the understanding on how and why pipelines fail, providing the means to enhance pipeline transport safety. In Western Europe, the industry voluntarily gathered in few independent organizations [1, 2, 3] in the middle 20th century to collect data and determine trends concerning pipeline failure. In the USA, the US Department of Transportation (DOT) [4] has collected and published pipeline failure data since the 1980s. These data have been analyzed by external organizations [5, 6]. More recently, the Canadian government National Energy Board [7] has started collecting and analyzing failure data from this countrys pipelines. In this paper, these different databases are jointly analyzed. Moreover, pipeline failure data from Transpetros pipelines are introduced. The focus is to obtain mean frequencies of failure from corrosion, third part action and natural causes. The effects of parameters such as wall thickness, population density and burial depth on the failure rate are studied. The distribution of sizes of hole for each failure mode is also evaluated. FREQUENCY OF FAILURE The frequency of failure presented in the different databases, regardless of the cause of the failure, is presented in Table 1 for gas pipelines and in Table 2 for cold liquid pipelines. The period of coverage indicated for each databasis is valid for the remainder of the paper. The five (or ten) year average refers to the most recent period of the particular databasis. The differences among the reporting criteria of the databases, summarized in Tables 1 and 2, should be taken into account when comparing the failure rates. The failure data indicate that liquid pipelines fail about twice as frequently as gas pipelines. It seems reasonable to consider failure rates between 0.1 and 0.25 failures/103 km year as good international practice for natural gas pipelines. In the case of liquid pipelines, the failure rate depends on the type of product and its corrosiveness. Pipelines that transport heated products present a much higher failure rate, mostly caused by external corrosion. Table 3 displays the causes of failure and their percentages in the different databases. Accidental or intentional human actions are the principal cause of pipeline failures, leading in 6 out of 8 databases. The exception is Canada, where this mode of failure is of less relevance, as it represents only 6% of the cases. Probably this is due to the fact that many Canadian pipelines cross remote, unpopulated regions. External corrosion seems to be another major problem, for all databases. Material and construction are also responsible for a significant number of pipeline failures. The data indicate that dry gas does not usually cause internal corrosion. In the USA statistics, the internal corrosion

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failures are probably caused by wet gas, since this databasis includes gathering lines. Cracking only seems to be a problem in particular cases. UKOPAs cracking is associated to the transport of wet manufactured gas. In Canada, about half of the cases are caused

by stress corrosion cracking, a failure mode related to specific soil conditions. Many of the remaining cases are related to external coating problems.

TABLE 1 FREQUENCY OF FAILURE - GAS PIPELINES Region Europe Canada UK USA Brazil Exposure Frequency of Failure (/103 km y) Period (km year) Historic 5 years avg. Source 0.35 0.16 EGIG [2] 1970 2010 3.55x106 2000 -2008 1.91x105 0.10 NA NEB [7] 1962 - 2010 7.73x105 0.23 0.093 UKOPA [3] 1985 - 1997 5.96x106 0.11 NA DOT - PRCI [5] 1978 - 2010 8.23x103 0.36 NA TRANSPETRO 0.23 0.13 Average(1) 0.20 0.15 Mean(2) (1) Arithmetic mean of the frequency of failures. (2) Total number of failures / total exposure. Reporting Criteria No lower limit. Pipelines at 15 bar or more. No lower limit. Death, injury, cost > US$ 50,000 No lower limit.

TABLE 2 FREQUENCY OF FAILURE - LIQUID PIPELINES Region Europe Canada Brazil Exposure Period (km year) 1971 - 2010 1.01 x106 2000 - 2008 2.41x105 1978 - 2010 6.13x104 Average Mean Frequency of Failure (/103 km y) Historic 5 years avg. Source 0.55 0.28 CONCAWE [1] 0.10 NA NEB [7] 0.70 0.23 TRANSPETRO 0.46 0.25 0.48 0.28 Reporting Criteria 1 m3 release. 1.5 m3 release. No lower limit.

TABLE 3 FAILURE CAUSE DISTRIBUTIONS 3rd Party EGIG UKOPA DOT PRCI TRANSPETRO NEB CONCAWE DOT API TRANSPETRO 48% 22% 43% 67% 6% 42% 41% 23% Internal Corrosion 0.5% 1% 16% 0%
25%

External Corrosion 13% 20% 14% 33% 12% 32% 49%

Material Construction 17% 28% 8% 0% 6% 29% 14% 10%

Cracking SCC 2.5% 16% 1% 9% 38% 2% 0% 0%

5% 10% 8%

Natural Causes, Geotechnical 8% 5% 10% 0% 6% 3% 3% 8%

3

Others Unknown 11% 8% 8% 0% 19% 7% 0% 2%

LIQUID

GAS

EXTERNAL CORROSION The frequencies of pipeline failure due to external corrosion are transcribed from the international databases in Table 4. Among the parameters that govern the external corrosion failure rate, the type of the external coating appears to be the most important. Some databases present the data classified by the coating type. Table 5 reproduces these data.

TABLE 4 FREQUENCY OF FAILURE (/10 km y), EXTERNAL CORROSION Historic 5 years 0.049 0.034 EGIG 0.048 0.017 CONCAWE 0.048 0.038 UKOPA 0.017 NA DOT-PRCI 0.31 0 TRANSPETRO 0.040 0.030 Average(1) 0.032 0.031 Mean (1) TRANSPETRO data excluded.

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TABLE 5 EXTERNAL CORROSION RATE OF 3 FAILURE (/10 km y), BY COATING TYPE Bitumen 0.095 0.103 0.099 0.095 Coal-Tar 0.067 0.044 0.056 0.063 Polyethylene 0.010 0.047 0.029 0.017 Epoxy 0.048 0 0.024 0.039

have caused a noticeable reduction in the failure rate. Table 6 presents historic and 10 year figures. TABLE 6 FREQUENCY OF FAILURE, EXTERNAL CORROSION HOT PIPELINES CONCAWE TRANSPETRO Historic 2.05 2.58 10 years 0.46 0.59

EGIG UKOPA Average Mean

Another important parameter for the external corrosion frequency of failure is the wall thickness. Table 6 presents data relating the rate of failure to the wall thickness. Figure 1 displays EGIGs and UKOPAs data and a least mean squares (LMS) fitted quadratic tendency line. TABLE 6 EXTERNAL CORROSION RATE OF 3 FAILURE (/10 km y), BY WALL THICKNESS t (mm) <5 5 -10 10 - 15 >15 EGIG 0.12 0.052 0.002 0 UKOPA 0.38 0.045 0 0 TRANSPETRO 7.88 0.33 0 0

The external corrosion rate of failure is affected by other factors, such as the efficiency of the cathodic protection system, integrity of the external coating and unmitigated stray currents. INTERNAL CORROSION Historic and five year failure rate of pipelines by internal corrosion are presented in Tables 7 and 8 for gas and liquid pipelines. TABLE 7 FREQUENCY OF FAILURE (/103 km y),, INTERNAL CORROSION GAS PIPELINES EGIG UKOPA DOT-PRCI TRANSPETRO Average Mean Historic 0.008 0.004 0.015 0 0.006 0.011 5 years 0.005 0 NA 0 0.0017 0.004
3

TABLE 8 FREQUENCY OF FAILURE (/10 km y), INTERNAL CORROSION LIQUID PIPELINES CONCAWE TRANSPETRO Average Mean Historic 0.023 0.040 0.032 0.024 5 years 0.017 0 0.009 0.016

FIGURE 1 EXTERNAL CORROSION EFFECT OF THE WALL THICKNESS Pipelines built to operate with heated products were constructed in the past with a type of external coating that caused very severe corrosion problems. This explains why heated pipelines present a much higher historic failure rate than cold pipelines. The operators efforts in dealing with this problem, by taking these lines out of operation, replacing the external coating or applying very frequent inspection intervals

Internal corrosion is a minor concern in pipelines transporting dry gas. The USA data includes gathering lines that are probably the responsible for the majority of the failures. Among liquid pipelines, the vast majority of the failures due to internal corrosion occurred in crude oil pipelines: 112 out of 130 registered by DOT [6] and 18/24 of CONCAWEs incidents. The exposures (km.y) for each fluid are not published, but it seems safe to assume that internal corrosion is not a significant threat for most refined products. All internal corrosion incidents at TRANSPETRO occurred in pipelines operating with crude oil. TRANSPETROs historic internal corrosion failure rate for liquid pipelines transporting crude oil is 0.17 failures/103 km.y, but no such case has been observed since 2004.

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THIRD PARTY ACTION Voluntary and involuntary human actions are significant threats to pipeline operation. Table 9 brings the failure frequency by human actions obtained from the different databases. Human-caused incidents are almost not observed in Canada, a vast and sparsely populated country. This observation re-enforces the straight-forward conclusion that the characteristics of the human occupancy along the pipeline route is determinant to the likelihood of this type of failure. Table 10 presents some data on 3rd party failure rate according to the population density, the HSE report presents failure data from BG Transco. CONCAWE [1] indicates 91% of the registered incidents occurred in residential, industrial or commercial areas, but it does not keep statistics on exposure for each type of land use. TABLE 9 RATE OF FAILURE (/103 km y), 3rd PARTY ACTION Historic 5 years 0.17 0.06 EGIG 0.17 0.06 CONCAWE 0.05 0.03 UKOPA 0.04 NA DOT-PRCI NA 0 NEB (1) 0.15 0.07 TRANSPETRO 0.12 0.05 Average 0.09 0.05 Mean (1) One case reported; historic exposure unknown. Not considered for averaging or mean. TABLE 10 3 PARTY RATE OF FAILURE (/10 km y) BY POPULATION DENSITY Urban, Suburban, Industrial 0.15 0.241 0.181 0.19 0.18 Remote, Rural 0.04 0.057 0.096 0.064 0.049
3 rd 3

data on failure rate by wall thickness class, and Figure 2 displays these data and an LMS quadratic regression trend line.

FIGURE 2 3 PARTY EFFECT OF THE WALL THICKNESS The statistics show that the failure rate due to human action depends strongly on the pipe diameter, with smaller diameters presenting a higher likelihood of failure. The statistical data is presented in Table 12 and Figure 3. An LMS adjusted linear trend polynomial is also shown in the figure. Since onshore pipelines are, in general, dimensioned according to the internal pressure, the effects of the diameter and of the thickness are not independent and should not be simply multiplied. TRANSPETROs third party failure data did not present the sensitivity to thickness or diameter observed in other databases. TABLE 12 3 PARTY RATE OF FAILURE (/10 km y) BY NOMINAL DIAMETER (in)
ND 4 5 - 10 12 - 16 18 - 22 24 - 28 30 - 34 36 - 48 EGIG 0.55 0.29 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.005 UKOPA 0.127 0.118 0.068 0.026 0.024 0.026 0 ND 4 - 10 10 20 20 28 > 28 DOT 0.063 0.043 0.038 0.008 ND 6 8 - 12 12 - 16 16 - 24 24 - 30 > 30 CONCA WE 0,25 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.1
rd 3

rd

UKOPA HSE [8] TRANSPETRO Average Mean

rd

TABLE 11 3 PARTY RATE OF FAILURE (/10 km y) BY WALL THICKNESS t (mm) <5 5 -10 10 - 15 >15 EGIG 0.46 0.12 0.002 0.00 UKOPA 0.228 0.063 0.013 0.00

The resistance of the pipeline to external action is clearly dependent on its wall thickness. Table 11 presents statistical

The depth of burial is recognized as an important factor in preventing damage by human action. Table 13 presents the observed frequency of failure for different burial depths, the HSE data is from BG-Transco databasis. Figure 4 displays the same data and a trend line obtained by means of a quadratic, LMS adjusted polynomial.

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TABLE 14 3 PARTY MITIGATION MEASURES REDUCTION IN FAILURE FREQUENCY Muhlbauer Concrete slab 90% Concrete slab + buried warning tape Steel plate + buried warning tape Buried warning tape 60% Additional Signage 40% Double ROW patrol frequency 30% HSE BSI [10] 84% 100% 95% 100% 60%

rd

Preventive measures can be employed when the risk of third party damage is deemed to high. Table 14 presents the reduction in failure rate for selected mitigation measures obtained in the literature. NATURAL CAUSES The rates of pipeline failures caused by natural forces are presented in Table 15. FIGURE 3 3 PARTY EFFECT OF THE DIAMETER TABLE 13 3 PARTY RATE OF FAILURE (/10 km y) BY BURIAL DEPTH (m) EGIG
depth < 0.8 0.8 -1 > 1.0 rate 0.65 0.175 0.125
rd 3 rd

TABLE 15 FREQUENCY OF FAILURE (/10 km y), NATURAL CAUSES Historic 5 years 0.026 0.015 EGIG 0.015 NA CONCAWE 0.009 0.009 UKOPA 0.014 NA DOT-PRCI NA 0 NEB (1) 0.073 0 TRANSPETRO 0.028 0.008 Average 0.018 0.014 Mean (1) 2 cases reported, exposure unknown. Not considered for average or mean The prevailing causes of failure by natural forces and their participations are shown in Table 16. TABLE 16 DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL CAUSES Earth movement, landslide, subsidence 55% 57% 89% 29% 100% 100% Flood, heavy rain 18% 21% 0 71% 0 0

Muhlbauer [9]
depth 0.9 1.5 2.0 3.0 rate 0.132 0.099 0.066 0.0013

Transpetro
depth rate

HSE
depth rate 0.178 0.055 0.038

1-1.5 > 1.5

< 0.9 0.239 0.9 -1.2 0.039 > 1.2

Lightning 4% NA 11% 0 0 0

EGIG CONCAWE UKOPA DOT-PRCI NEB TRANSPETRO

FIGURE 4 3 PARTY EFFECT OF THE BURIAL DEPTH

rd

The frequency of failure due to natural causes depends on the type of terrain, topographic and geological conditions, hydrological characteristics, level of rain and lightning, precipitation, possibility of earthquakes, etc. These conditions

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are not only very distinct among different countries and regions, but also, they are not usually constant along a pipeline route. For example, 10 of the 15 cases registered at CONCAWE occurred in a single country. Therefore, statistical based estimation of failure frequency should be used with extreme caution for this mode of failure. SIZE OF THE HOLE The different failure modes not only present different rates of failure, but they also have distinct failure size characteristics.

To evaluate failure consequences and operational risk properly, the distribution of hole size for each failure mode must be considered. Tables 17, 18 and 19 present the relative frequency of hole sizes for corrosion, third party action and earth movement observed in the failure databases. The hole size is represented by its equivalent diameter. EGIG data indicates that holes caused by lightning are very small in the vast majority of the cases.

TABLE 17 CORROSION HOLE SIZE (Equivalent Diameter - mm) RELATIVE FREQUENCY Size <= 20 20 ND Rupture EGIG Frequency 99.5% 0.5% 0% UKOPA Size Frequency <=6 80 % 6 20 18% 20 - 110 0% 110 - ND 2% Rupture 0% CONCAWE Size Frequency <=2 26% 2 - 13 14% 13 - 42 30% 42 - 178 22% Rupture 7% Size DOT-PRCI Frequency 58% 41%

Leak Rupture

TABLE 18 3rd PARTY HOLE SIZE (Equivalent Diameter - mm) RELATIVE FREQUENCY Size <= 20 20 ND Rupture EGIG Frequency 26% 54% 20% UKOPA Size Frequency <=6 10% 6 20 15% 20 - 40 42% 40-110 15% 110 - ND 3% Rupture 15% CONCAWE Size Frequency <=2 3% 2 - 13 11% 13 - 42 42 - 178 Rupture 41% 9% 34% DOT-PRCI Size Frequency Leak 9% Puncture 60% Tear Rupture 15% 16%

TABLE 19 NATURAL FORCES HOLE SIZE (Equivalent Diameter - mm) RELATIVE FREQUENCY Size <= 20 20 ND Rupture EGIG Frequency 27% 34% 38% Size <=6 6 20 20 - 40 110 - ND Rupture UKOPA Frequency 58% 14% 14% 0% 14% CONCAWE Size Frequency <=2 14% 2 - 13 13 - 42 42 - 178 Rupture 29% 0% 29% 29% Size DOT-PRCI Frequency 49% 51%

Leak Rupture

IGNITION PROBABILITY For a pipeline failure to develop into a fire, it is necessary that the combustible atmosphere created by the leak contacts an ignition source. The ignition source can be the pipeline damaging occurrence itself. A gas leak will generate a much wider combustible atmosphere and requires smaller activation energy than a liquid

leak. Therefore, the ignition of gas pipeline failures is more frequent and has been more studied. The physics of the gas ignition process are covered in [11]. Acton et al. [12] have studied the probability of ignition of gas transmission pipelines after ruptures. They found the diameter (D) and the pressure (p) to be the determining parameters and proposed a linear, data fitting equation, based in pD2.

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EGIG [2] and UKOPA [3] give some information on ignition following a gas pipeline failure, presented in Table 20. Figure 5 presents a LMS linear trend of the probability of ignition vs. the hole size based on EGIG and UKOPA data.

TABLE 21 LIQUID PIPELINE IGNITION FREQUENCY Total Crude Oil Raw data 2.38% 3.51% Adjusted (1) 1.85% 1.75% (1) Fires initiated during repair excluded. Ligth Refined 2.65% 2.65%

TABLE 20 GAS PIPELINE IGNITION FREQUENCY All EGIG UKOPA 4.5% 4.9 % 0 20 mm 4.0% 4.9% Leak Size 20 ND 2.0% 3.0% Rupture 13%
10% ND <16 33% ND16

14.3%

The probability of ignition probably varies with the leaked volume and the type of human occupancy at the event location, but the available data do not enable the observation of these effects. Leaks caused by lightning in liquid pipelines ignited in 79% of the cases on DOT regulated pipelines [6]. CONCLUSIONS Onshore pipeline failure statistics from several regions of the world were analyzed and compared. Emphasis was given to obtaining frequency or rates of failure. Failure data from TRANSPETROs pipeline network are presented and included in the comparison. The mean value of the frequency of failure is calculated, and it is suggested that it can be considered as a benchmark of good practice. Internal and external corrosion, human action and natural forces are evaluated in more detail; the effect of relevant construction and environmental conditions are studied and mean trends are obtained. The distributions of hole sizes for each mode of failure from different databases are also compared. Finally, the frequency of ignition subsequent to gas and liquid pipeline leaks is evaluated. Except for some exceptional, localized cases, the figures and trends are consistently similar for all the databases. This fact gives confidence in using these statistical data to estimate failure rates of operating pipelines. This study is intended to serve as basis for risk assessment and analysis of onshore pipelines operating with petroleum based liquids and gases. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author wishes to thank the technical and managerial staff at TRANSPETRO, for supporting and providing data to this study. REFERENCES [1] Davis, P. M., Dubois, J., Gambardella, F., Sanchez-Garcia, E., Uhlig F., (2011). Performance of European cross-country oil pipelines - Statistical summary of reported pillages in 2010 and since 1971. Report no. 8/11, CONCAWE, http://www.concawe.be. [2] EGIG - European Gas Pipeline Incident Report Group (2011). 8th Report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Group 1970-2010. Report 11.R.0402 (version 2). http://www.egig.nl. [3] McConnell R. A., Haswell J. V.., (2011). Pipeline product loss incidents (1962-2010). Report 11/076, United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators Association, Derbyshire. http://www.ukopa.co.uk.

FIGURE 5 GAS PIPELINES IGNITION FREQUENCY EFFECT OF THE HOLE SIZE The probability of ignition will actually depend on the size of the area with combustible atmosphere. The volume of the combustible atmosphere will depend not only on the leak flow but also on local dissipation conditions. Moreover, the type of human occupancy at the location possibly affects the probability of there being an ignition source. Unfortunately, the available data does not enable the quantification of these effects. For gas pipeline leaks caused by lightning, EGIG [2] indicates an ignition frequency of 57% and DOT-PRCI [5] of 50%. CONCAWE [13] recorded 378 leaks of liquid pipelines during 30 years of operation in Western Europe. Nine of those resulted in fire, 5 with light refined products (gasoline, naphtha), 4 with crude oil. No fire was observed in leaks with heavy refined products (fuel oil, lubricant). Two cases of fire with crude oil were caused by improper repair procedures. Table 21 introduces the observed ignition frequencies, including and excluding the fires caused by the repair crew.

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[4] US Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Pipeline incident and mileage reports. http:// www.phmsa.dot.gov. [5] Kiefner, J. K., Meslob, R. E., Kiefner, B. A. (2001). Analysis of DOT Reportable incidents for gas transmission and gathering system pipelines, 1985 through 1997. Pipeline Research Council International Report L51830, 2001. [6] Kiefner, J. K., Kiefner, B. A. , Vieth, P. H. (1999). Analysis of DOT reportable incidents for hazardous liquid Pipelines, 1986 through 1996. American Petroleum Institute Publication 1158. [7] National Energy Board of Canada (2010) Comparative analysis of pipeline performance 2000 - 2008. http://www.nebone.gc.ca. [8] Mather, J., Blackmore, C., Petrie, A., Treves, C., (2001). An assessment of measures in use for gas pipelines to mitigate against damage caused by third party activity. Health and Safety Executive Report CRR 372/2001. http:///www.hse.gov.uk. [9] Muhlbauer, W. K., (2004). Pipeline Risk Management Manual, 3rd Ed., Elsiever Ed. [10] BSI PD 8010-3:2009 (2009). Steel pipelines on land Guide to the application of pipeline risk assessment to proposed developments in the vicinity of major accident hazard pipelines containing flammables. British Standard Institution [11] Spencer, H., Rew, P. J., (1997). Ignition probability of flammable gases. Health and Safety Executive Report CRR 146/1997. http:///www.hse.gov.uk. [12] Acton, M. R., Baldwin, P. J., (2008). Ignition probability for high pressure gas transmission pipelines. 7th International Pipeline Conference 2008, paper IPC 2008-64173. [13] Lyons, D., (2002). Western European cross-country oil pipelines 30-year performance statistics. Report no. 1/02, CONCAWE, http://www.concawe.be.

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ANNEX A SUMMARY OF TRANSPETROS FAILURE STATISTICS SO PAULO REGION

EXPOSURE COLD LIQUID PIPELINE FAILURES Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Exposure Gas 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 239.7 285.9 285.9 285.9 285.9 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 354.1 8232.1 Length (km) Liquid cold 1101.6 1101.6 1101.6 1101.6 1101.6 1101.6 1106.6 1114.1 1275.4 1114.1 1275.4 1275.4 1406.0 1558.7 1558.7 1568.3 1568.3 1568.3 2539.8 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 2554.2 61297.5 Liquid-hot 279.2 279.2 326.8 326.8 326.8 329.8 329.8 329.8 329.8 329.8 329.8 329.8 329.8 329.8 329.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 333.8 10845.2 Year 1978 1978 1978 1979 1979 1979 1982 1982 1982 1982 1983 1983 1983 1984 1985 1986 1986 1987 1987 1987 1988 1988 1988 1989 1994 1995 1996 1996 1996 1998 1999 1999 2000 2001 2001 2001 2004 Failure rate Cause 3rd Party External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion Natural Forces Natural Forces Natural Forces 3rd Party 3rd Party External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion External Corrosion 3rd Party Int. Corrosion Material/Construction External Corrosion External Corrosion Material/Construction 3rd Party 3rd Party 3rd Party Other 3rd Party Int. Corrosion 3rd Party Int. Corrosion (1978-2010): 0.701 failures/103 km y (2001-2010): 0.228 failures/103 km y

GAS PIPELINE FAILURES Year 1989 1999 2001 Cause External Corrosion 3rd Party 3rd Party

Failure rate (1978-2010): 0.364 failures/103 km y

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HOT LIQUID PIPELINE FAILURES Year Cause 1978 External Corrosion 1979 External Corrosion 1980 External Corrosion 1980 External Corrosion 1981 3rd Party 1981 Other 1982 Natural Forces 1982 External Corrosion 1984 External Corrosion 1985 External Corrosion 1985 Other 1986 External Corrosion 1987 External Corrosion 1987 Other 1987 3rd Party 1988 External Corrosion 1990 3rd Party 1990 External Corrosion 1991 Other 1991 External Corrosion 1992 External Corrosion 1994 External Corrosion 1994 External Corrosion 1994 External Corrosion 1994 External Corrosion 1995 External Corrosion 1995 External Corrosion 1995 External Corrosion 1995 External Corrosion 1996 Other 1998 External Corrosion 1998 External Corrosion 1999 External Corrosion 1999 3rd Party 2000 External Corrosion 2000 Other 2000 External Corrosion 2000 External Corrosion 2001 External Corrosion 2001 External Corrosion 2007 Material/Construction External corrosion failure rate (1978-2010): 2.67 failures/103 km y (2001-2010): 0.599 failures/103 km y

10

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