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The fallacy of the affirmative is that they fail to realize that suffering and antagonism are inevitable parts

of human existence. Their focus on the elimination of instability and difference paradoxically codify a constant state of emergency into politics- Saurette 1996
(Paul, Prof of Political Studies @ UOttawa, I Mistrust All Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt, and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory Millenium 25.1) According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that to

understand the development of our modern conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence.6 However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. 'Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps from excess: the monstrum in animo was a universal danger'.7 No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this
context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians: he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an endAnd Socrates understood that the world had need of him his expedient, his cure and his personal art of selfpreservation.8 Socrates

realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[rationality was divined as a saviour.,,it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.,.,,9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World' of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World' of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something, is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, ascetic Christianity

exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote, '1 suffer: someone must be to blame for it' thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the
ascetic priest tells him: 'Quite so my sheep! someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,you alone are to blame for yourself 'This is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced

with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....'12 The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering".n According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goalthis goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goat; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.14 The very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.
Next, the 1ACs invocation of the good of humanity as the basis for action is not an ahistorical notion, it is rooted in a civilizational process of valuating different types of being. This logic internally necessitates the creation of an evil inhuman enemy- endless wars and genocides have been carried out under the banner of humanism Rasch 2003 (William, Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, Human Rights as Geopolitics: Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form
of American Supremacy, Cultured Critique, pg. 54)

"To preach and announce the Gospel in the lands of the barbarians," Vitoria admonishes us, is not just a right; it is also a Christian duty. "Brotherly correction is as much part of natural law as brotherly love; and since all those peoples are not merely in a state of sin, but presently in a state beyond salvation, it is the business of Christians to correct and direct them. Indeed, they are clearly obliged to do so" (1991, 284). Though it is wrong to convert the
barbarians forciblyhere, as almost everywhere, Vitoria follows Aquinasit is right and just to force them to listen, whether they accept the

truth or not. Accordingly, if

the barbarians obstruct or prevent the Spaniards in any way from exercising their Christian duty to spread the truth, then the Spaniards may "take up arms and declare war on them, insofar as this provides the safety and opportunity needed to preach the Gospel." They may even "lawfully conquer the territories of these people, deposing their old masters and setting up new ones and carrying out all the things which are lawfully permitted in other just wars by the law of war, so long as they always observe reasonable limits and do not go further than necessary" (285-86). It was Vitoria's sad and sincere belief that
Spaniards had not observed "reasonable limits" and had, in fact, "gone beyond the permissible bounds of justice and religion," but their excesses neither cancelled their rights to use force when necessary nor vitiated the legal and moral principles involved (286). Christians had the right and the duty to travel wherever they pleased, take the gold and other goods that they found to be unused and unclaimed, and preach their way of life, by force if necessary, in order to bring the barbarians of the New World out of their self-imposed immaturity and into civic adulthood as full members of the Christian community. Vitoria is careful to specify that the barbarians of the Americas had nearly all of the same rights as the Spaniards, for instance, the right to travel to Spain and receive the full protection of Spanish law. But, for all of Vitoria's concern with reciprocitygranting the Indians the same rights of travel and tradehe cannot grant them equal rights when it comes to religion. Here, as Schmitt is quick to point out, one finds Vitoria's, and Christendom's, central and inescapable asymmetry. The ultimate justification for the Spanish conquests lies in Christ's command to the apostles to "teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you ... even unto the end of the world" (Matthew 28:19-20). In more secular terms, the Church's evangelical mission becomes Spain's "civilizing" mission, a mission for which, perhaps because of his lingering Catholicism and his adamant Eurocentrism, Schmitt cannot help but have some sympathy. It is worth listening to what Schmitt has to say here at some length: However, that the result [of his investigations] still leads in the Wnal analysis to a justiWcation of the Spanish conquest lies in the fact that Vitoria's objectivity and neutrality do indeed have their limits and in no [End Page 134] way extend so far as to ignore or deny the distinction between believing Christians and non-Christians. On the contrary: the practical result is grounded completely in Vitoria's Christian conviction, which Wnds its real justiWcation in the Christian mission. That non-Christians could demand the same right of free propagation of and intervention for their idolatry as the Christian Spaniards for their Christian missionthat really does not occur to this Spanish monk. Here, then, is the limit both of his absolute neutrality and his general reciprocity and reversibility of concepts. Vitoria is perhaps an Erasmist, but he is not representative of absolute humanity in the style of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries; he is no Voltarian and no Rousseauist, no free thinker and no socialist.... For Vitoria, Christian Europe is still the center of the world, historically and concretely located in Jerusalem and Rome. (1988, Der Nomos der Erde, 83, 84) Yes, this passage attests to the antiliberal prejudices of an unregenerate Eurocentric conservative with a pronounced affect for the counterrevolutionary and Catholic South of Europe. It seems to resonate with the apologetic midtwentieth-century Spanish reception of Vitoria that wishes to justify the Spanish civilizing mission in the Americas. 8 But the contrast between Christianity and humanism is not just prejudice; it is also instructive, because with it ,

Schmitt tries to grasp something both disturbing and elusive about the modern worldnamely, the apparent fact that the liberal and humanitarian attempt to construct a world of universal friendship produces, as if by internal necessity, ever new enemies. For Schmitt, the
Christianity of Vitoria, of Salamanca, Spain, 1539, represents a concrete, spatially imaginable order, centered (still) in Rome and, ultimately, Jerusalem. This, with its divine revelations, its Greek philosophy, and its Roman language and institutions, is the polis. This is civilization, and outside its walls lie the barbarians. The humanism that Schmitt opposes is, in his words, a philosophy of absolute humanity. By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity, it has no localizable polis, no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside.

Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against whom or what does it wage its wars? We can understand Schmitt's concerns in the following way:
Christianity distinguishes between believers and nonbelievers. Since nonbelievers can become believers, they must be of the same category of being. To be human, [End Page 135] then, is the horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is made. That is, humanity per se is not part of the distinction, but is

that which makes the distinction possible. However, once the term used to describe the horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction's positive pole, it needs its negative opposite. If humanity is both the horizon and the positive pole of the distinction that that horizon enables, then the negative pole can only be something that lies beyond that horizon, can only be something completely antithetical to horizon and positive pole alikecan only, in other words, be inhuman. As Schmitt says: Only with the concept of the human in the sense of absolute humanity does there appear as the other side of this concept a specifically new enemy, the inhuman. In the history of the nineteenth century, setting
off the inhuman from the human is followed by an even deeper split, the one between the superhuman and the subhuman. In the same way that

the human creates the inhuman, so in the history of humanity the superhuman brings about with a dialectical necessity the subhuman as its enemy twin.9
And, their focus on reformations ignore that this is the only world weve got- their hatred against the apparent world turns the impacts of the 1ac because fantasizing about a world without suffering creates impotence- only an embrace of the world as is solves back this circular logic- Turanli
2003 (Aydan, Prof of Humanities and Soc Sciences @ Istanbul Technical Institute, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26)

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. [End Page 61] Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For
Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586).

The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI 309).
Alternative: Vote negative to affirm life- only accepting a love of fate can end the destructive cycle perpetuated in the 1ac- Owen 95
(David, Social ScienceUniversity of Southhampton, Nietzsche, Politics & Modernity, p. 113-5) This passage is characterized by a lyrical simplicity of expression which conceals the complexity of its character. Let us begin by noting that

this passage does not disclose a cosmological thesis but poses a hypothetical question: can you affirm (i.e., will) the eternal recurrence of your life? Nietzsches reference to a a tremendous moment when one could make such an affirmation directs us to the moments of amor fati already discussed because we experience such moments as a justification or redemption of our being what we are (with all that this entails). In this context, we can grasp the relation of eternal recurrence to amor fati in this passage in a twofold sense. Firstly, the thought of eternal recurrence embodies the conceptual structure of amor fati in drawing out attention to the fact that to affirm the fleeting moments of the experience of amor fati entails not only affirming all the moments of ones life prior to this experience and as such constitutive of its possibility but also affirming the necessity (eternal recurrence) of ones being what one is. Secondly, the thought of eternal recurrence acts as a test of our present capacity to love fate, to embrace necessity of our being what we are, by posting the question Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more? if we reflect on these
two aspects of the thought of eternal recurrence, we can note that insofar as it reproduces the conceptual structure of the experience of amor fati so too the experiential structure of the affirmation of eternal recurrence reveals itself as the experience of amor fati; it is this which makes the

In other words, our capacity to experience amor fati is tied to our capacity to affirm the thought of eternal recurrence; to affirm this thought truthfully
thought of eternal recurrence a test of ones capacity to love fate.

is to experience amor fati. Of course, to experience a moment in which one can affirm the thought of eternal recurrence is not to say that one can go on affirming this thought; such moments are all too fleeting. But insofar as we can both identify the affirmation of the thought of eternal recurrence with the experience of amor fati and recognize the telos of human existence in the ideal of a human being who is amor fati incarnate (the Overman), the thought of eternal recurrence acts as an ethical imperative: act always according to that maxim which you can at the same time will as eternally
recurring. We can give this alternate expression by referring to the thought of eternal recurrence as the rule of an eroticized asceticism: erotic because it does not abstract from the embodied and embedded character of human agency, and ascetic because it places a purely formal constraint on the expression of our erotic nature, it channels the activity of willing towards the formal architectonic goal of the Overman. In this sense, the thought of eternal recurrence acts both as a test of our present capacity to love fate and as an ethical for our future actionsbut what of our past actions? Does the thought of eternal recurrence have any significance here? Consider the following passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in which Zarathustra comments on the relationship between willing and the past: Will- that is what the liberator and bringer of joy is called: thus I have taught you, my friends! But now learn this as well: the will itself is still a prisoner. Willing liberates: but what it is that fastens in fetters even the liberator? it was : that is what the wills teeth-gnashing and most lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been done, the will is the angry spectator of things past. The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and times desirethat is the wills most lonely affliction. (Zs of redemption) It is worth noting that the image of the wills teeth gnashing in Zarathustras remarks recalls Nietzsches phrase Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? (GS 341, my italics) from the presentation of eternal recurrence discussed above. Whatever we make of this similarity of expression, it seems clear that Zarathustra is drawing our attention to the fact that past actions and events have the character of necessity; however much we feel ashamed of our past actions and, thus, regret them, we cannot change either these actions or the fact that they are partially constitutive of what we are. Thus we may imagine that, confronted by the thought of eternal recurrence, one might be overwhelmed by nausea and pity because we recognize that we cannot change them. In such an all too

But does the feeling of shame which attended our recognition of the ignoble character of certain of our actions have a necessary connection with the feeling of regrets? In a remark from his positivist period, Nietzsche comments: Remorse- never give
imaginable situation, it seems likely one would feel crushed by the thought of eternal recurrence. way to remorse, but immediately say to yourself: that would merely mean adding a second stupidity to the first. if you have done harm, see how

the thought of eternal recurrence is significant for past actions which one cannot in good conscience affirm, because in forcing us to confront the fact that our shameful past actions are constitutive of what we are, it reveals a way to redeem these actions by transforming them into motivational resources for overcoming our shame by becoming what we are, it reveals a way to redeem these actions by transforming them into motivational resources for overcoming our shame by the rule of eternal recurrence in its prospective role as ethical imperative. In other words, if the thought of eternal recurrence gains possession of us, we may experience this possession as feeling crushed (because we are ashamed of many of our past actions), yet precisely because this feeling crushed is a feeling of a decrease of power, we are motivated to overcome this feeling and we recognize that we can overcome it by using it as an affective resource for performing noble actions in the future. What is going on in this breaking of the connection between shame and regret? If we return to the example of my diet, which was deployed in our discussion of the necessity of a counter-ideal, we can see that the thought of eternal recurrence heightens my feeling of shame at failing to achieve my goal ( my lack of self mastery) by asking me to contemplate the eternal recurrence of this failure and the attendant feeling of shame. In the fact of this abysmal prospect, I am motivated to overcome (and thus redeem) my failure by
you can do good. using my shame as a resource to embark on a new diet and to success in achieving my goal of weight loss in the full recognition that my desire for sausage, bacon, egg and chips may overwhelm me once again. In this way, my feelings of nausea ( I regret failing. God, Im feeble) and

It is in this respect that I think that

pity (I wish I could change my past failurewhat I ambut I know that I cant) are transformed into the dispositions of heroism which attends my embarkation of a new diet (I am determined to succeed this time to redeem my past failure!) and ironic cheerfulness (or self parody) which attends my recognition that, being what I am, I may fail again (Once more unto the diet, dear friends)

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