The President's Party Author(s): James A. Davis and David L. Nixon Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.

24, No. 2, Eisenhower and Governance (Spring, 1994), pp. 363-373 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551246 . Accessed: 13/01/2011 21:51
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The President's

Party

JAMES A. DAVIS
Associate Professor, Political Science

DAVID
Assistant

L. NIXON
Professor, Political Science

Oklahoma State University

Abstract examines some of the mechanisms through which the American to the more decentralized governing environment which has confronted presidency may adapt recent In it we will argue that new, institutionalized means have emerged Chief Executives. in order to coordinate the electoral and various policy activity of presidentially affiliated groups. was to to this pattern. A We use the term present refer "president's party" president's party it declined. The final the early years of theReagan administration hut, during subsequently, section of the paper describes a set of conditions which will revive the president's party within This paper eight years. a coalition For purposes of this paper, the "president's party" refers to in its electoral, of interest groups developed and coordinated and adminis legislative, trative activities by a particular president. It differs from temporary or "per issue" of interests because the same general constellation coalitions of groups remains inte across numerous a issues arising within administration. grated particular presidential It differs from traditional parties in that it does not necessarily its architect outlive a traditional party coalition. and become part of seems in the foresee president's party across presidencies unlikely selection processes do not produce skilled Chief Lobbyists depend the president's it party is not the same as a traditional party although ably. Thus a per issue coalition. is the president's such parties. Neither The augments party coalition. party is a "per president" president's are The effects of a president's party on American democracy necessarily specula tive but nonetheless A president/group alliance could greatly redistribute important. Bequeathing able future because could match power. No counterforce itwas the power of a fragmented unless to dissipate presidential energy in a resources of the the potential party president's or a Congress protected, parochial bureaucracy ? or an angry tangle of delays and informal vetos a

public. The authors argue that an institutionalized White House capacity to manage a coalition was in pursuit of electoral of interest groups and governmental goals in the latter two years of the Carter administration. attained A clear working example

363

364

PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

in the first two years of the Reagan of a president's administration. party evolved It declined in the latter six years of the Reagan No president's party presidency. the Bush administration. emerged during of the president's party. This requires two things. predict the re-emergence must The climate of public expectations favor change and governmental activity must stress activism and the presidential skills in bargaining, along with personality We negotiation party will and lobbying. Thus, the final prediction of this paper is that a president's occur are met. We two conditions these re-emerge when predict this will in either one of the last two in this decade. administrations presidential The tenor of events surrounding the 1992 presidential indicate that elections of a climate The only remaining is an activist Chief Lobbyist. Political activism of expectations favoring for the re-emergence requirement and change has been of a president's party

the condition met.

Fragmentation

and

the Decline

of Political

Parties

The president's the structures, party pattern of political to a changing The creation of new of presidents environment. response political for the conduct of traditional party functions?especially interest aggre arrangements an to the changing American example of institutional gation?provides adaptation political dation are the consoli political parties and folio wings beliefs, issues, performance appraisals, candidacies, are into two large public alternatives. Voting and policy-making thereby simplified and made more workable. Parties thus guarantee the first requisite of democracy? of diverse They also help elected public have officials, such as presidents, situation ?particularly the classic functions Among its fragmentation. ascribed to American

is an evolving

plausible public alternatives. keep their promises.

a series of Recently, political developments States which undermine such traditional party attenuation of the instrument

functions.1

the United taken place within The first of these is the

majorities ?namely, governing the public and, consequently, across waned since these decisive times. This, Depression generations succeeding combined with the centrality of television and personal imagery in American politics, has resulted The fostered forces in the individualization the executive of election criteria is the case in both and legislative of subcommittees and the weakening reforms of the 1970s have the traditional and political agendas. branches of government.3 of the seniority

to build electoral and used by presidents historically the political in party. Party loyalty has weakened as the effects of the Great in their representatives2

This

proliferation by the congressional members

system

in Congress

and weakened of Congress

individualistic networks on much flourished

action committees (PACs) and their temporary ad hoc (i.e., "per issue") coalitions. The power of groups to influence policy outcomes numerous and powerful subcommittees has compounded the fragmentation through

it increasingly have made of their agenda.5 Under their political along with

party's inmore decentralized operating decision-making to use the party to insist difficult for presidents these conditions interest groups have organized

strengthened centrifugal function.4 More integrative

THEPRESIDENT'S PARTY | 365

of national the need same is true of the "electoral connection"6 which magnifies politics. The to suit home constituencies whatever the effect on a national agenda. the increasing preference of states for presidential primaries Simultaneously,

over the has emphasized skills needed to gather delegate image projection bargaining blocs in caucus/convention selection processes now test Public systems.7 Presidential than Chief Lobbyist skills better skills. This discounts those Presidency precisely activist presidents ?to skills in negotiation needed by presidents?particularly offset a the declining role of traditional parties8 in building majority. working are less able to in today's fragmented their promises Presidents keep political of American and plausibility setting. Public faith and thus the legitimacy democracy situation make a presi suffer consequently. Weak parties and the fractious political dent's ability to cobble together coalitions more difficult and more than important ever. Thus are to find additional means to aggregate today's presidents obliged interests and build electoral and governing majorities. The function of coalition building in a democracy is as fundamental and compel as ever at in American the moment the means in traditional when ling precisely history structures have declined. it has become Thus, likely that presidents will develop new structures to help traditional to build electoral and function parties governing a seems inevitable like in a democracy that majorities. party Something president's so much more has come to promise than it delivers. President's Party traditional Ameri just described undermine fragmenting can and aggregating institutions. What is often overlooked is that as mediating new or modified structures structures evolve to lose viability, the political perform same basic function a of building majority. The core criterion for a president's party is its capacity to stay largely intact across issues a to traditional administration. Adherents confronting particular parties are bound similar socialization and by the identifications, together by experiences and beliefs that result. It is through partisan eyes that a attitudes of the majority views and appraises their stake in how candidates address the demands general public The circumstances of the times. or interest group constituencies are degrees "organized publics" an bound together within traditional parties by exchange of group electoral, legisla for a favorable policy agenda. This is also the partic tive, and administrative support To varying ular glue the president's party together. groups Participant a for allying with than in "per issue" group greater policy payoff president individual group lobbying or traditional party capabilities. A Review There of the Literature that holds presume coalitions, a Mediation Possibilities: The

are two particular focal points in the literature on traditional parties. The first stresses party structures and the second party functions. The structural school centers on three discernable structures: a party organization, a party in the electorate, and a party in government. These first discussed elements, by V. O. Key,9 have

366

PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

to organize many texts on parties such as Paul Beck's and Frank Sorauf's official or includes all activists, Politics in America.10 The party organization Party or some other resource to the party. The party who contribute not, time, money, are either candidates for, or holders of, in government refers to partisans who public served at any level. The party in the electorate refers to citizens who do not meet a given the role criteria of the first two components, but nevertheless with identify alternative. party in the party literature centers on their functions. The second emphasis Joseph as ". . . groups A. Schlesinger, for instance, defines parties and party organizations to gain control of government in the name of the group by winning organized a party as ". . . any group, to public office."11 Leon Epstein election recognizes to elect governmental however officeholders under a given loosely organized, seeking label."12 Robert definition Huckshorn's describes a political party as J. "pragmatic" "an autonomous the purpose of making nominations and group of citizens having office in the hope of gaining control over governmental elections power through contesting the capture of offices and the organization of government."13 have similar bases. Both hold that These structural and functional abstractions term "party" somehow to an institutionalized the refers coalition electoral/governing over time and across issues. which this base point differences emerge. persists Beyond The functional view is more flexible. In order for an entity to be considered a some indeterminate sense, it need only demonstrate type "party" in the functional of organized activity. electoral/governing to have certain features The structural conceptualization requires institutions as "parties." Itmust be an before qualifying entity with distinct government organized and electoral components. The structures comprising the president's party have the to fulfill traditional party functions. However, the president's potential party should to a be seen as a structural adaptation It is roughly environment. fragmenting political analogous functions. cies to traditional parties and carries out similar electoral and governmental

In the president's party the leadership networks serve as the party The party "organization." and administrative with staff working supportive

interest constituen of organized in government is the campaign office holders. The base public

membership functional

in the party literature stresses the mobilization of to develop electoral The president's party functions support. its emphasis and governing is on governing. This is a response support although to the that increasingly characterizes theWashington political fragmentation political to reinforce a traditional party environment. the president's Thus, party functions the latter has attenuated. where we refer to as the What party was first predicted by Joseph Pika.14 president's come to a coalition of interest groups. Pika asserted that presidents would rely upon Presidents would be bound to groups by exchanging increasingly recogni presidential and administrative tion, access, and policy for group electoral, support. legislative, emphasis electoral and governing

structurally The functional

of cooperative interests is the organized (i.e., "organized publics") in the electorate. the president's of the party Thus, party is equivalent to traditional parties. analogous

THEPRESIDENT'S PARTY | 367

He come about as a consequence that this coalition would of weak parties, believed and the resulting need for a more dependable the fragmented situations, political House Office of the White of that an expansion political base. Pika also expected the president's electoral and governing Public Liaison help structure (OPL) would coalitions.15 provide expanded by other authors who structure and functions the developing of the empirical descriptions House institu party. Hugh Helco notes the existence of multiple White president's tions capable of building interest group support for the president that are reminiscent Pika's initial predictions have of been of those associated Baruch with a traditional and Michael communication
groups.17

bounded

Grossman

party headquarters.16 the 1970s evolution describe the political

Martha

system which

served to structure

Joynt Kumar an OPL of supported of key interest activity

are

Lester G. Seligman and Cary R. Covington have argued that presidents to substitute White structures ? House coalition building increasingly required structures of the less viable policy management and electoral such as the OPL ?for Finally,

go so far as to suggest political parties.18 Indeed, Seligman and Covington is determined their ability to create and of presidents that the overall effectiveness by the White electoral and governing coalitions House.19 manage convergent through in the evolution Thus the key structural development of the president's party traditional of diverse group interests. of presidential management as the Office House of This has been done primarily agencies such through White The OPL has served to integrate presidential coalition forma Public Liaison (OPL). tion across both time and issue domains. has been the institionalization The often dealt with Rise of the President's

Individual

Party such as Franklin D. Roosevelt presidents in order to marshal different groups support

on But Roosevelt of legislation. usually relied congressional no effort was made like Kennedy before him, was more direct although Johnson, to institutionalize Without the same institutionalization, activity. presidential/group do not last. In a president's the presidential/group ties must last coalitions party a are encountered across the issues which multiple during particular administration. as an OPL Interest group management first became conspicuous assignment Nixon the Nixon administration. faced an assertive Congress controlled during by a conservative to the opposite party. Furthermore, Nixon sought agenda propound on the heels of so needed the extra lobbying Lyndon Johnson's Great Society and power of a set of interest Charles Colson was an interest group to in developing coalition The intervention Nixon's the antiballistic missile efforts regarding support system.20 of Watergate ?and the president's need for mass public support ?pre subsequent vented the formalization of this activity in the OPL until the Ford administration. oversee "town to sponsor conferences, the OPL Ford employed and meetings," administer reelection efforts.21 groups. successful

or Lyndon Johnson for particular pieces or party intermediaries.

368

PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

into a nearly coalitions evolved system of OPL-coordinated In April of late in the subsequent Carter administration. party complete president's a to fuse to use the OPL Ann Wexler 1978 presidential assistant began together union of private sector groups, and congressional administration leaders.22 officers, The Nixon/Ford This association environmental officials was very broadly based. It included elements of business, labor, state and local government It also utilized and social action groups. of senior Executive officers.23 to be the most

active and effective proved On one policy the Carter administration. governing during implemented in a week.24 The House meetings eleven White alone Wexler convened proposal was exhorted as much to generate full range of coalition grassroots participants as Most major for the president efforts (such as SALT support possible. subsequent mechanism were II ratification) within the Carter conducted similar administration through ? were also made to use this system in an electioneering mode Efforts mechanisms. in the the results of such efforts were less pronounced than they were though domain.25 programmatic The Carter system was both clearer group Carter Even with was to elect a network of presidentially the functioning activity designed organized of a president's party was the central role assigned to presidential/ across issues. The it lacked continuity

interventions and the personal This system of political mobilization

and to govern. However, than its institutionalization. Despite in the Carter employed theWhite system

liaisons

administration, different constellations

House though well developed functions, not fully institutionalized.

issues. of groups to address different structure module formed a permanent institutional the contribution of the interest group component final, missing property would be developed in

This

administration. Reagan established of Public the first complete party. The Office Reagan president's Liaison was even more pivotal for programmatic under Reagan than it leadership across issues the essential feature of continuance had been under Carter. Moreover, on support of the in Reagan's materialized than "party." It centered more president on support for issues or programs. The Reagan efforts to sell AW ACS specific aircraft long himself to Saudi Arabia the OPL involved effort illustrate continued term commitment While led the OPL meetings methodical became of a coalition as the new the enlarged OPL role as well to a particular of groups president. to manage most the president coalition activity, both

the ensuing

to an degree. For instance, Reagan personally unprecedented to generate group and grassroots support through phone calls, to interest group and speeches These the efforts included delegations. recruitment of groups which electoral support to Reagan had provided sale. campaigns yet had virtually no direct stakes in the proposed an argument that goes to the very heart of a president's given are derived that policy payoffs from the party's continuing, per The

during his election Such groups were party?namely, president nature.

and therefore the long term president's long term credibility, were at stake. Few actors in the American of participant groups, political prospects an from such high levels. The resulting polity could resist such appeal transmitted concerns. over 200 business included coalition

PARTY | 369 THEPRESIDENT'S

in designing House and carrying The coalition, for its part, assisted theWhite on how best to negotiate with It provided its lobbying efforts.26 intelligence to potential opposition House from other business and it alerted theWhite Congress of Independent Busi Federation the Chamber of Commerce, National groups (e.g., out nesses, Farm Bureau Federation). and the American than the sheer scale of this governing Even more significant alliance was its

durability. In 1982 much of the coalition that helped Reagan with

sale was mobilized

the AW ACS

tax in support of Reagan's the long This illustrates proposals. was given term self interest in a president's since business party support despite the increase in tax levels among many of the elements of that very constituency.27 actual and enlight served an educative the continuing Thus, dialogue presidential/group assumed that long term and overall payoffs behavior function. ening Participant in per issue coalitions. short term sacrifices. That is not the assumption outweighed Such contributions and participant alliances vary in their constellation temporary to the nature and value of immediate to participate In choosing according payoffs. term the overriding in a president's such as business demonstrate party, groups long of allying with an effective came Chief Lobbyist within a favorable climate of

advantage

expectations. The Reagan Reagan's case,

OPL system the "conservative

to augment traditional political parties in both structural and functional coalition"

and, in terms.

traditional party leadership was Structurally largely replaced by the organizational in conjunction with staff and format of interest group leaders working presidential the rank office holders. The party rank and file were other executive replaced by and file membership of the diverse group memberships. or interest role of traditional the programmatic aggregating was fulfilled to the regime. It was expected that all loyal parties loyalty through no elements of the president's would mobilize when called upon?even when party was to accrue to them. It is precisely direct programmatic such advantage expected In functional terms, short term forbearance ture to forge and long term commitment an adequate and enduring governing which allows any political struc combination.

of the causes behind the formation Indeed, discussion Reagan. seem inevitable. This is not the case, of the president's party can make its emergence Even before the end of the first term of the Reagan however. the administration, conditions which the "party's" emergence were altered. promoted a A president's party is much more likely to emerge during period which demands This is because and governmental the politics of change activity. change in the way of mobilizing than the politics of power require much more governing to achieve In order for contemporary consolidation. presidents significant policy sufficient support to overcome the labyrinthian govern changes they must mobilize mental the legislative process. process?especially

perhaps ahead under President

to a President's Impediments Party The long term evolution of a president's traditional party functions replacement ?of

? party and its augmentation seemed to be moving decisively

370

PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

veto is replete with procedural hurdles, detours, Congress delays, and must overcome effect change, ameasure's hurdle. This every proponents resources. considerable "Veto politics" or stopping an initiative at political of a number points, low amounts of effort. One require relatively victory is sufficient to stop legislation. The maze of veto points measure's opponents To

points. requires any one of the within

vis ? vis many presidents. its greater conservatism It is far easier guarantees Congress to stop measures that change the status quo than to assert them successfully. or undermine an activist can compete with presses Congress president who for change. It can also serve a conservative intends to restrict president who or other initiatives. Thus, the president's party is needed more by an activist, than a more passive counterpoint. liberal, probably Democratic president The president's traditional spending probably

is a natural brake. Thus party is a gas pedal where Congress rather than president's attractive for presidents become parties parties are maintained less demanding with Traditional parties agendas. by actors with as governors and members such of Congress, rather than by competing agendas, are sufficient to restrict initiatives the president alone. While and participate they in veto politics, it takes the augmentation of traditional parties by presidential parties to overcome more likely the tangle to develop a of legislative procedures. Thus, party is much president's a in times favoring activism is an and with president who

active Chief Lobbyist.

The We tion within therefore party Party have already discussed the factors which undermine political mobiliza structures. traditional Presidents with party insurgent agendas must structures. he was president's commitments and increasing military favored these measures. Accord expectations its fullest things expression. to intervened Ronald Reagan needed a Decline of the President's

create their own mobilizing for the first two years when

taxes. At that time, public decreasing itwas during this time that the president's party achieved ingly, the third year of his first term however, Before three arrest any further The first was development. in the Senate. The president's party was without in the upper House. with The second reason was

the loss of the Republican majority a traditional party to majority ally

a climate the congruence of Reagan's conservatism with over of expectations favored consolidation which change. While Reagan sought his first two years, they were conservative changes during priorities and he otherwise was inclined toward passivity and "feel good" politics. the party was also congruent with president's times and presidential personality. Itwas the remarkable power of the Reagan "public at amoment in our nation's history when the public needed to feel better presidency" The of Reagan's about changes security themselves were than learn through presidential needed the active support needed. Reagan rather leadership that fundamental of the aerospace and national for his defense buildup. He needed the support of business (in for his tax cuts. He succeeded in altering the tenor of these policy Most of the balance of the Reagan agenda could third arrestor

networks

cluding aerospace) fields early in his administration.

THEPRESIDENT'S PARTY | 371

be achieved politics. party. within of governance, sufficient for the tasks at hand, were available House. the personally White Rather than continue demanding a the Reagan administration task of maintaining turned structure, party president's to direct media ?the for support from his mass public supporters public appeals Less arduous means the Reagan Since the consolidation demanding, less pro years was agenda of the latter Reagan to be more the public presidency than approach proved by stymying "big spending" Democratic It required a resilient public presidency. initiatives. It did not required veto require a president's This

presidency. grammatically
adequate.

Such a shift can only happen, however, when both the president's agenda and are congruent. In part, then, Reagan's structural shift was the public's expectations at and which of "throwing facilitated by a public mode weary money problems" that "America was, again, number one." yearned for assurances It has been widely character argued that the climate of public expectations which term. George into his successor's Bush was times continued ized Reagan's briefly to favor a consolidation agenda.28 Initial public expectations predisposed profoundly were The Bush presidency has been referred thwarted in the Bush administration. a a This perception has been maintaining guardian29 and presidency.30 acute in the area of domestic is precisely the area which This policy. particularly a to construct most requires the activist president with party. Consistent president's we have constructed Bush did not rebuild a president's the expectations which George to "veto politics" and devote his efforts to con party. Instead he was content play of the Reagan serving much legacy.31 a massive shift The climate of public expectation, however, was experiencing summer and fall of 1992 the battlecry of nearly all important presidential and by the a viable contenders ?including, and especially, Ross Perot?was change. Without or a sufficient traditional party base to its public presi supplement president's party, to as both was the Bush administration severely dency, domestic exacerbated agenda. This weakness, was controlled Congress, skillfully exploited Clinton status and Ross Perot were able to contrast domestic record a in its ability to galvanize hampered a of Democratically by the existence Both Bill challengers. by presidential change great to the success. his not

of public expectations House with of the Bush White quo, policy an effective President Bush, party, was unable to lacking president's foe of domestic agenda and could only rail against the amorphous "gridlock." With the electoral

invigorate governmental

of a president's public tration seem

defeat of President Bush the stage was set for the re-emergence party. The success of the Clinton candidacy was clearly keyed to for domestic policy activism and the early portions of his adminis expectations

domestic

party be formed coming,

a to in the role of government effort to modify portend significant to governance traditional affairs. Since most structural impediments through to operate it is quite likely that a institutions continue party will president's sometime it is unlikely If a president's party during his administration. that an activist agenda can be sustained. Should is not forth that happen,

372

STUDIES QUARTERLY I PRESIDENTIAL

the demand for change will be overwhelming by the 1996 electoral cycle. Thus this
paper predicts the re-emergence of a president's Notes
1. Norman Thomas, "The Presidency in the 1980s," in Dimensions of the Modern Presidency, ed.

party before

the turn of the century.

Edward N. Kerny (St. Louis: Forum Press, 1981), pp. 1-21; Paul C. Light, The President's Agenda (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1983), pp. 211-213; Morris Fiorina, "The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics," Daedalus 109 (Summer, 1980), 24-45. 2. David H. Everson, "The Decline of Political Parties," Proceedings of the Academy ofPolitical Science 34 (1982), pp. 49-60; Peter R. Moody, "The Erosion of the Function of Political Parties in the Post-Liberal State," Review ofPolitics 45 (April, 1983), pp. 254-279; Helmut Norpoth and Jerrold
G. Rusk, "Partisan Dealignment in the American Electorate: Itemizing the Deductions Since

1964," American Political Science Review 76 (September, 1982), pp. 522-537; Gerald Pomper, "The Decline of Party inAmerican Elections," Political ScienceQuarterly 92 (Spring, 1977), pp. 21
42; George Rabinowitz, Paul-Henri Gurian, and Stuart Elain MacDonald, "The Structure of

Presidential Elections and the Process of Realignment, 1944 to 1980," American Journal ofPolitical Science 28 (November, 1984), pp. 611-635; William Crotty, American Parties in Decline, 2nd ed. Little, Brown and Company, 1984); Ruth Scott and Ronald J. Hrebenar, Parties in (Boston: Crisis: Party Politics inAmerica, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984). Gary R. Orren, "The Changing Styles of American Party Politics," in The Future ofAmerican Political Parties, ed. J. L. Fleishman (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 31 notes the
nearly universal agreement among political scientists on the decline of the party. This observation

is referred to in Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The New American Political Party," American Political ScienceReview 75 (December, 1985), p. 1152. However, Schlesinger himself disagrees with the decline of the party thesis. He does this by redefining party organization as "all cooperative
activities insecure Schlesinger. definition aimed electoral The at capturing situation, present elective office in the name of the party" (p. party "organizations" with most paper concludes in analyzing the prospects are more sources vigorous that parties In a competitive, 1153). than ever according have declined. However, to

itwill refer to both the traditional or formal understandings of parties and to the "operational"
of Schlesinger for a "president's party."

3. Peter Tuckel and Felipe Tejera, "Changing Patterns inAmerican Voting Behavior. 1914-1980," Public Opinion Quarterly 47 (Summer, 1983), pp. 230-246; Thomas Marshall, "Evaluating Presiden tialNominees: Opinion Polls, Issues, and Personalities," Western Political Quarterly 36 (December, 1983), pp. 650-659; Crotty, pp. 210-214.
4. Christopher Deering, of "Subcommittee Government in the U.S. House: An Analysis of Bill Manage

ment," Legislative Studies Quarterly 7 (November, 1982), pp. 533-546; Steven Haeberle,
Institutionalization the Subcommittee in the United States House of Representatives,"

"The

Journal

of Politics 40 (November, 1978), pp. 1054-1065; Norman J. Ornstein

"Political Parties and Congressional and John Reforms," in Parties and Elections

and David W.
in An Anti-Party

Rohde,
Age, ed.

Jeff Fishel (Bloomington: University

5. Kay L. Schlozman Tierny,

of Indiana Press, 1978), pp. 291-292; Light, p. 211.

"More of the Same: Washington Pressure Group Activity

in aDecade of change," Journal ofPolitics 45 (May, 1983), pp. 351-377; David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Tuckel andTejera; Marshall; Light, pp. 211-213.
6. Matthew. 7. Tuckel D.C.: and Tejera; Doris and American 3rd ed. (Washington, Politics, Graber, Mass Media search The best discussion of the president's Inc., pp. 219-224. Quarterly Congressional 1989), is George C. Edwards and for effective for public HI, The Public Presidency: press coverage support

The Pursuit of Popular Support (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).
8. Eugene B. McGregor, Jr. "Uncertainty and National Nominating Conventions," Journal of Politics

40 (November, 1978): 1011-1043; Tuckel and Tejera; Marshall.

THEPRESIDENT'S PARTY | 373

9. V. O. Key, Jr. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Crowell,
163-65.

1964), pp.

America 7th ed. (New York: Harper Collins 10. Paul Allen Beck and Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics in Publishers, 1992).
11. Schlesinger.

12. Leon Epstein, Political Parties inWestern Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 1. America 2nd ed. (Monterey, Cal. : 13. Robert J. Huckshorn, Political Parties in Brooks/Cole Publishing 10-11. Company, 1984), pp.
14. Joseph to a by Pika, "The President and Interest Groups," in Dimensions of the Modern Presidency, held ed.

Edward N. Kerney (St. Louis: Forum Press, 1981), pp. 59-79. While
"president's an exchange the discussion of a continuing party," is his initiative. of resources primarily presidential/group

Pika does not refer literally

coalition together

15. Ibid. 16. IhiL 17. Hugh Heclo,

Governance, 161-183. pp. 18. Martha Joynt 92-101.

"The Changing Oval Office,"

ed. Arnold J. Meltsner and Michael

in Politics and theOval Office: Toward Presidential

Institute for Contemporary Communications Studies, from 1981),

(San Francisco: Baruch Grossman,

Kumar

"Political

theWhite

House: The Interest Group Connection,"

Presidential Studies Quarterly, 16 (Winter 1986), pp. The Coalitional Presidency (Chicago: The Dorsey
"Electoral Governing Coalitions in the Presidency:

19. Lester G. Seligman and Cary R. Covington,

Press, 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 1989), pp. 104-105. Lester G. Seligman,

A Theory and a Case Study," Congress and thePresidency 10 (Autumn 1983), p. 128.
Seligman. Pika, Pika, Kumar Kumar Pike, Kumar Kumar Charles p. p. 69. and Grossman, 1984, 1984, 1984. 1984, p. Low 303. Expectations: Strategy and Prospects of the Bush Presidency," pp. p. 302-304. 302. 1984, p. 301. Kumar pp. 69-70; and Grossman, and Grossman, 71. and Grossman, and Grossman, O. Jones,

"Meeting

The Bush Presidency:First Appraisals, ed. Colin Campbell, S.J. and Bert A. Rockman (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1991), pp. 37-68; George C. Edwards III, "The Public Presi dency: The Politics of Inclusion," The Bush Presidency:First Appraisals, ed. Colin Campbell, S.J. and Bert A. Rockman (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1991), pp. 129-154. 29. Richard Rose, The PostmodernPresidency:George BushMeets the World 2nd ed. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1991), pp. 305-338. 30. Bert A. Rockman, "The Leadership Style of George Bush," The Bush Presidency:First Appraisals,
ed. Colin Campbell, S.J. and Bert A. Rockman (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers,

1991), pp. 1-35. 31. Barbara Sinclair, "Governing Unheroically

Congress," The Bush Presidency: First

(and Sometimes Unappetizingly):

ed. Colin Campbell, S.J.

Bush and the 101st

A. Rockman

Appraisals,

and Bert

(Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1991), pp. 155-184.