THINKING AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS: A LECTURE Author(s): HANNAH ARENDT Reviewed work(s): Source: Social Research, Vol.

38, No. 3 (AUTUMN 1971), pp. 417-446 Published by: The New School Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970069 . Accessed: 15/08/2012 01:35
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THINKING AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS: A LECTURE

BY HANNAH ARENDT
For W. H. Auden

thatI feel seemsto me so presumptuous A o talkabout thinking I owe you a justification.Some yearsago, reporting the trial of Eichmannin Jerusalem, spokeof "thebanality evil" and meant I of with thisno theory doctrinebut something or quite factual,the of on phenomenon evil deeds, committed a giganticscale, which could not be tracedto any particularity wickedness, of pathology, or ideologicalconviction the doer,whoseonly personaldistincin tionwas a perhapsextraordinary shallowness.Howevermonstrous the deeds were,the doer was neithermonstrous demonic,and nor the onlyspecific characteristic could detectin his past as well one as in hisbehavior thetrialand thepreceding during police examination was something but entirelynegative: it was not stupidity a curious,quite authenticinabilityto think. He functioned in the role of prominent war criminalas well as he had under the Nazi regime; he had not the slightest in difficulty acceptingan set different of rules. He knew that what he had once entirely consideredhis dutywas now called a crime,and he acceptedthis new code of judgment as though it were nothing but another language rule. To his ratherlimitedsupply of stockphraseshe had added a fewnew ones,and he was utterly helplessonlywhen he was confronted witha situationto whichnone of themwould as in the mostgrotesqueinstancewhen he had to make a apply, speech under the gallows and was forcedto rely on clichs used in funeraloratory whichwere inapplicablein his case because he

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was not thesurvivor.1Considering whathis last wordsshould be whichhe had expectedall along, this in case of a death sentence, facthad not occurredto him, just as inconsistencies and simple in contradictions examination and cross-examinations durflagrant adhering the trialhad not botheredhim. Clichs,stockphrases, ence to conventional, and conduct standardized codesofexpression have the socially recognizedfunctionof protectingus against thatis, againstthe claim on our thinking attention which reality, all eventsand facts arouseby virtueof theirexistence. If we were to thisclaim all the time,we would soon be exhausted; responsive in the difference Eichmannwas only that he clearlyknew of no such claim at all. attracted This total absence of thinking my interest. Is evil* doing, not just the sins of omissionbut the sins of commission, possiblein the absence of not merely"base motives" (as the law calls it) but of any motivesat all, any particularprompting of howeverwe may defineit, interestor volition? Is wickedness, conthis being "determinedto prove a villain," not a necessary dition for evil-doing? Is our abilityto judge, to tell rightfrom wrong, beautiful from ugly, dependent upon our facultyof thought? Do the inabilityto thinkand a disastrousfailure of call consciencecoincide? The question that what we commonly imposed itselfwas: Could the activityof thinkingas such, the and reflecting habitof examining upon whatever happensto come of to pass, regardless specificcontentand quite independentof could thisactivity of such a naturethatit "conditions" be results, at men againstevil-doing? (The veryword con-science, any rate, as pointsin thisdirectioninsofar it means "to knowwithand by a kind of knowledgethatis actualizedin everythinking myself," of process.) Finally,is not the urgency thesequestionsenforced the well-knownand rather alarming fact that only good by people are ever botheredby a bad consciencewhereasit is a very rare phenomenon amongreal criminals? A good consciencedoes not existexceptas theabsenceof a bad one.
i See myEichmann Jerusalem, edition, 252. in 2nd p.

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Suchwerethequestions.To putit differently use Kantian and language,afterhaving been struckby a phenomenonthe - whichwilly-nilly me into the possession of quaestiofacti "put a concept"(the banality evil), I could not help raisingthe of did and whatright I possess "with quaestio jurisand askedmyself use it."2 I as "Whatis evil?" To raisesuchquestions "Whatis thinking?" has its difficulties. or They belongto philosophy metaphysics, that a terms designate field inquiry of as we all know, has which, fallenintodisrepute.If thisweremerely matter positivist a of and neo-positivist we not be concerned.8 assaults, need perhaps Our difficulty raising with suchquestions causedlessby those is to whomthey "meaningless" are thanby thosewho are anyhow underattack. Justas the crisisin religion reachedits climax
2 Quoted fromthe posthumously publishednotes to Kant's lectureson MetaAkademieAusgabe,Vol. XVIII, No. 5636. physics, that metaphysics no more "meaningful" is than poetry 3Carnap's statement runs counterto the claims made by metaphysicians; these,like but certainly Car of nap's own evaluation, maybe based on an underestimation poetry. Heidegger, whom Carnap singledout for attack,countered (thoughnot explicitly) by that thinking and poetry(denkenand dichten)were closelyrelated;they stating were not identicalbut sprangfromthe same root. And Aristotle, whom so far no one has accusedof writing "mere"poetry, of the same opinion:philosophy was and poetry somehow belongtogether; theyare of equal weight(Poetics,1451 b5). On the otherhand, thereis Wittgenstein's famousaphorism, "What we cannot last sentence). If takenseriously, speak of we mustbe silentabout" (Tractatus, it would applynot just to whatlies beyondsenseexperience but, on the contrary, mostof all to objectsof sensation. For nothingwe see, hear, or touch can be in adequatelydescribed words. When we say,"The wateris cold," neitherthe waternor the cold are spokenof as theyare givento the senses. And was it not the of betweenwords,the mediumin which precisely discovery this discrepancy and the worldof appearances, mediumin whichwe live, that led the we think, to philosophy metaphysics the first in and place? Except thatin the beginning withParmenides and Heraclitus it was thinking, it as nous or as logos,that be was supposedto reach trueBeing,whereasat the end the emphasisshifted from hence to sense perception and the implements with which speechto appearance, we can extendand sharpenour bodily senses. It seems only natural that an emphasison speech will discriminate against appearancesand the emphasison sensation againstthinking.

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as when theologians, distinguished fromthe old crowd of nonthe believers, began to talk about the "God is dead" propositions, crisisin philosophyand metaphysics into the open when came themselves to declare the end of philosophy began philosophers and metaphysics.Now, this could have its advantage; I trustit will once it has been understood what these"ends" actuallymean, - an obvious absurdity everyrespect not thatGod has "died" in but thatthe way God has been thought forthousandsof years of is no longerconvincing; and not thatthe old questionswhichare coeval withthe appearanceof men on earthhave become "meaningless,"but that the way theywere framedand answeredhas lost plausibility. What has come to an end is the basic distinction between the sensual and the supersensual, with the notion, at least together as old as Parmenides, thatwhateveris not given to the senses God or Being or the FirstPrinciplesand Causes (archai) or the Ideas- is more real, more truthful, more meaningful than what thatit is not just beyondsense perception but above the appears, world of the senses. What is "dead" is not only the localization of such "eternal truths"but the distinction itself. Meanwhile, in increasingly strident voices the few defenders metaphysics of have warned us of the danger of nihilism inherentin this deseldom invoke it, they velopment;and althoughtheythemselves in have an important argument theirfavor:it is indeed true that once the suprasensual realm is discarded,its opposite,the world of appearancesas understoodfor so many centuries, also anis nihilated. The sensual, as still understoodby the positivists, cannotsurvivethe death of the supersensual. No one knew this betterthan Nietzschewho, with his poetic and metaphoricdeof has scriptionof the assassination God in Zarathustra, caused so much confusionin these matters. In a significant passage in what the word God meant in The Twilightof Idols, he clarifies Zarathustra. It was merelya symbolfor the suprasensual realm as understoodby metaphysics; now uses instead of God the he word true world and says: "We have abolished the true world.

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Whathasremained?The apparent perhaps?Oh no! With one the trueworldwe have also abolished apparent one."4 the of of "deaths" God,ofmetaphysics, philosophy, These modern of positivism be eventsof greatimand, by implication, may all and are but they after thought events, though they portance, ourways thinking, do notconcern of most concern they intimately to the our ability think, sheerfactthatmanis a thinking being. thatmanhas an inclination I and, unlesspressed By this, mean moreurgent needsof living, even a need (Kant's"need of by to of reason")to thinkbeyondthe limitations knowledge, do morewithhis intellectual his brainpower, thanto use abilities, themas an instrument knowing for and doing. Our desireto whether out of practical theoretical know, necessities, arising or can its perplexities, sheercuriosity be fulfilled reaching by intended for goal; and whileour thirst knowledge maybe unbecauseof the immensity the unknown, that of so quenchable of horizons knowables, of region knowledge every opens further up theactivity itself leavesbehinda growing of treasure knowledge thatis retained and keptin storeby every civilization part as and parcelof its world. The activity knowing no less a of is than the buildingof houses. The inworld-building activity clination theneed to think, thecontrary, if aroused or on even none of the time-honored unanswerable by metaphysical, "ultimate leaves nothingso tangiblebehind,nor questions,"
* It seemsnoteworthy we findthe same insight its obvioussimplicity in that at in the beginning thisthinking terms two worlds, sensualand the superof of the sensual. Democritus us the presents witha neat littledialoguebetween mind,th are and he organforthesupersensual, the senses. Senseperceptions illusions, says; of theychange accordingto the conditions our body; sweet,bitter,color and such exist only nom,by convention among men, and not physei,accordingto true nature behind the appearances thus speaks the mind. Whereuponthe mind! Do you overthrow while you take fromus us sensesanswer:"Wretched Our overthrow will be your you can trust]? everything your evidence[pistis, balance downfall"(B125 and B9). In other words,once the always precarious whether "true world"abolishesthe the the between twoworldsis lost,no matter of in "apparentone" or vice versa,the whole framework references, which our breaksdown. In theseterms, was seems itself, nothing thinking used to orienting to make much senseanymore.

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of can it be stilledby allegedlydefinite insights "wise men." The and the need to think can be satisfied only throughthinking, will be satisfying need today which I had yesterday this thoughts only to the extentthat I can thinkthemanew. and knowing, betweenthinking We owe to Kant thedistinction and the between reason, the urge to think and to understand, knowlverifiable whichdesiresand is capable of certain, intellect, believed that the need to thinkbeyond the Kant himself edge. was arousedonlyby theold metaphysical of limitations knowledge and that he had questions of God, freedom,and immortality to "found it necessary deny knowledgeto make room forfaith"; of the "systematic by doingso he had thrown foundations a future 5 as a "bequest to posterity." But this shows only metaphysics" of never bethat Kant, still bound by the tradition metaphysics, of what he had done, and his "bequest to poscame fullyaware of turnedout to be thedestruction all possiblefoundations terity" of metaphysical systems. For the abilityand the need to think to are by no means restricted any specificsubject matter,such as the questionswhich reason raises and knows it will never be able to answer. Kant has not "denied knowledge"but separated and he has made room not for faith knowing fromthinking, but forthought. He has indeed,as he once suggested, "eliminated 6 the obstaclesby whichreason hindersitself." between In our contextand forour purposes,this distinction is and thinking crucial. If the abilityto tell rightfrom knowing wrong should have anythingto do with the ability to think, then we must be able to "demand" its exercise in everysane person no matterhow erudite or ignorant,how intelligentor stupid he may prove to be. Kant, in this respectalmost alone was much bothered by the common among the philosophers, that philosophyis only for the few precisely because of opinion thisopinion'smoralimplications. In thisvein,he once remarked,
s Critique PureReason,B XXX. of AkademieAusgabe,Vol. XVIII, No. 4849.

423 THINKING AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS 7 is whichin heart," a statement "Stupidity causedby a wicked thisform not true. Inability think not stupidity; can is to is it be foundin highly and wickedness hardly is intelligent people, itscause,if onlybecausethoughtlessnesswell as stupidity as are muchmorefrequent thanwickedness. The trouble phenomena is precisely no wicked that a relatively phenomenon, rare is heart, to evil. Hence,in Kantian one terms, would necessary causegreat needphilosophy, exercise reason thefaculty thought, the of as of to prevent evil. And thisis demanding greatdeal, even if we assumeand a welcome declineof thosedisciplines, the and philosophy metawhichforso manycenturies have monopolized facthis physics, Forthinking's characteristic chief is that interrupts doit all ulty. activities matter no whattheyhappento be. ing,all ordinary Whatever fallacies thetwo-world the of theories havebeen, might aroseoutofgenuine Forit is truethatthemothey experiences. ment start we on what issuewe stopeverything thinking no matter and this whatever mayhappen be, it else, to else, everything again the it we interrupts thinking process; is as though movedintoa different world. Doing and livingin the mostgeneralsense of inter homines esse,"beingamong fellow-men"theLatin my for being alive positively equivalent prevents thinking. As onceput it: "Tanttje suis,tantt pense" now I am, Valry je nowI think. connected withthissituation the factthatthinking is Closely deals withobjectsthatare absent, removed from direct always sense An object thought always re-presentation, of is a perception. that something somebody is actually or that is, absent present and to themindwhich, virtue imagination, makeit of can only by in the form an image.8 In otherwords, of whenI am present
7AkademieAusgabe,Vol. XVI, No. 6900. s In the eleventh book of On the Trinity, describes the transAugustine vividly an formation objectgivento the sensesmustundergo orderto be fitto be an in object of thought.Sense perception "the vision which was withoutwhen the sensewas formed a sensiblebody" is succeededby a "similarvisionwithin," by

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thinkingI move outside the world of appearances,even if my deals withordinary sense-given thought objectsand not withsuch invisiblesas conceptsor ideas, the old domain of metaphysical he thought. In orderto thinkabout somebody mustbe removed fromour senses; so long as we are together with him we don't thinkof him thoughwe may gatherimpressions that later become food forthought;to thinkabout somebodywho is present from his company implies removing ourselves surreptitiously and actingas thoughhe wereno longerthere. the These remarks may indicatewhythinking, quest formean- ratherthan the scientist's thirstfor knowledgefor its own ing sake can be feltto be "unnatural,"as thoughmen, when they to begin to think,engage in some activity contrary the human condition. Thinking as such, not only the thinkingabout exeventsor phenomenaor the old metaphysical traordinary questhat does not serveknowledgeand is tions,but everyreflection not guided by practicalpurposes in whichcases thinking the is of a handmaiden knowledge, mereinstrument ulterior for purposes - is, as Heidegger once remarked,"out of order."9 There is, to be sure,the curiousfactthattherehave alwaysbeen men who as chose the bios theoretikos theirway of life,which is no argumentagainsttheactivity being "out of order." The whole history whichtellsus so muchabout the objectsof thought of philosophy,
an image destinedto make presentthe "absent body" in representation. This of and becomes absent,is storedin memory image,the representation something as a thought remembered, object,a "vision in thought," soon as it is willfully in that is, the re-presenit whereby is decisivethat"what remains the memory," and thatsomething ariseswhenwe remember." else is tation, "one thing, (Chapter in is and what is im3) Hence,"whatis hiddenand retained memory one thing, of is thing." (Chapter8) pressed it in the thought theone remembering another by "in is well awarethatthinking factgoesevenfurther," beyondthe realm Augustine the "as of of all possibleimagination, whenour reasonproclaims infinity number of has or whichno visionin the thought corporeal things yetgrasped" whenreason bodiescan be dividedinfinitely." us "teaches thateventhetiniest (Chapter18) thatreasoncan reachout to the totally here seemsto suggest absent Augustine and its re-presentations, knows only because the mind,by virtueof imagination in whatis absentand how to handle theseabsences rememhow to makepresent brance,thatis, in thought. Introduction Metaphysics to (New York,1961),p. 11.

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and so little abouttheprocess thinking of is itself, shotthrough with intramural betweenman's commonsense, this warfare sixth sensethatfits five our senses intoa common world highest, and enablesus to orientourselves it, and man's faculty in of of he removes himself from it. thinking virtue which willfully by And not onlyis thisfaculty theordinary for courseof affairs while its results remainuncertain and un"good fornothing" but it also is somehow self-destructive. verifiable, Kant,in the of his posthumously wrote:"I do not notes, privacy published approveof the rule thatif the use of pure reasonhas proved this should later longer doubted though no be as something, result it werea solidaxiom";and "I do notsharetheopinion. . . that one shouldnot doubtonce one has convinced oneself someof this thing. In purephilosophy is impossible.Our mindhas a natural aversion it." it which seems against 10 (Myitalics.) From to follow thebusiness thinking liketheveilofPenelope: that of is itundoes what hadfinished night it the before. every morning Let me sumup mythree mainpropositions orderto restate in ourproblem, inner the connection between ability inability the or to think and theproblem evil. of existsat all, then the faculty First,if such a connection of as distinguished thethirst knowledge, from for must be thinking, ascribed everybody; cannot a privilege thefew. to it be of if and of Second, Kantisright thefaculty thought a "natural has aversion" itsownresults "solidaxioms," as then against accepting we cannotexpect or no anymoralpropositions commandments, finalcode of conductfrom thinking the leastof all a activity, newand nowallegedly final definition whatis goodand what of is evil. if dealswithinvisibles, follows Third, it is truethatthinking it thatit is out of orderbecausewe normally movein a worldof in which most the radical of appearances experience appearance is death. The gift dealing for withthings do notappearhas that
10Kant, Akademie Ausgabe, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 5019 and 5036.

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relevant Hence thequestionis unavoidable: How can anything we live in arise out of so resultless enterprise? an for the world An answer,if at all, can come only fromthe thinkingactivity, whichmeans thatwe have to traceexperithe performance itself, encesratherthan doctrines. And wheredo we turnfortheseexperiences? The "everybody"of whom we demand thinking writesno books; he has more urgentbusinessto attendto. And were the few,whomKant once called the "professional thinkers/' neverparticularly eager to writeabout the experienceitself, perbecause they knew that thinkingis resultlessby nature. haps For their books with their doctrineswere inevitablycomposed with an eye to the many,who wish to see resultsand don't care between knowing and thinking,between to draw distinctions truthand meaning. We do not know how many of the "professional"thinkerswhose doctrinesconstitutethe traditionof had doubts about the validityand philosophyand metaphysics of even the possiblemeaningfulness theirresults. We know only denial (in the SeventhLetter) of what others Plato's magnificent proclaimedas his doctrines: is me thatconcern nothing knownsince there On the subjects on in existsnothing writing themnor will thereeverexistanyknow in thing the future. People who writeabout such things For thereis no way don'tevenknowthemselves. they nothing; whichone can learn. it of putting in wordslike otherthings of the (nous) Hence,no one who possesses veryfaculty thinking will of the knows weakness words, everriskputting and therefore
11Phaedo 64, and DiogenesLaertius7. 21.

oftenbeen believed to exact a price the price of blinding the thinker thepoet to thevisibleworld. Think of Homer,whom or the gods gave the divine gift by strikinghim with blindness; thinkof Plato's Phaedo where those who do philosophyappear to those who don't, the many, like people who pursue death. who asked the Delphic Think of Zeno, the founderof Stoicism, Oracle whathe shoulddo to attainthe bestlifeand was answered, "Take on the color of the dead." u

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them so unflexinto in let down thoughts discourse, alonefixing iblea form written as letters.12 II ever is The trouble thatfewthinkers toldus whatmadethem and examine have caredto describe their think and evenfewer In thisdifficulty, to our unwilling trust thinking experience. becauseof the obviousdangerof arbitrariness, own experiences unlikethe to I propose look fora model,foran examplethat, ' ' could be representative our "everyfor thinkers, 'professional' a himself neither i.e.,to lookfor manwhocounted body/* among the manynor amongthe few a distinction least as old as at who or Pythagoras; did notaspireto beinga rulerofcities claim to know howto improve takecareof thecitizens' and souls;who did notbelieve that mencouldbe wiseand did notenvy gods the in their divine wisdom casethey should it; possess and whotherehad fore never eventried handat formulating his a doctrine that couldbe taught learned. In brief, propose use a manas and I to our modelwho did thinkwithout a a becoming philosopher, citizen in citizens, that, doingnothing, among nothing claiming hisview, shoulddo and had a right claim. You citizen to every will have guessed thatI intendto speakabout Socrates, I and no that choice historically is hopethat onewillseriously dispute my justifiable. But I must warn is deal ofcontroversy about you:there a great thehistorical abouthowand towhat extent can be an he Socrates, from to Plato,whatweight assignto Xenophon's distinguished Socrates, etc.,and thoughthis is one of the more fascinating of learnedcontention, shall ignoreit here altogether. I topics to to a historical Still, useor,rather, transform into figure a model and assign it a definite to function stands need in representative ofsome Etienne Gilson hisgreat in Danteand book, justification. shows how in theDivine Comedy character "a conPhilosophy,
12I paraphrase passages 341b-343a.

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funcservesas much of its historical realityas the representative 13 Such freedomin handling tion Dante assignsto it required/1 factualdata, it seems,can be grantedonlyto poets,and historical, ifnon-poets theirhand at it,thescholars will call it licenseand try this is precisely worse. And still,with or withoutjustification, what the broadly accepted custom of construing"ideal types" amountsto; forthe greatadvantageof the ideal typeis precisely that he is not a personified abstractionwith some allegorical meaningascribedto it, but thathe was chosen out of the crowd of living beings,in the past or the present, because he possessed a representative in realitywhich only needed some significance in purification order to reveal its full meaning. Gilson explains worksin his discussionof the part assigned how thispurification by Dante to Thomas Aquinas in the Divine Comedy. In the Tenth Canto of "Paradiso," Thomas glorifies Siger of Brabant who had been condemned for heresyand whom "the Thomas would never have undertakento eulogize in Aquinas of history the way in which Dante makes him eulogize him/' because he would have refused"to carrythe distinction betweenphilosophy and theology the point of holding . . . the radical separatism to thatDante had in mind/' For Dante, Thomas would thushave "forfeited the right to symbolizein the Divine Comedy the Dominican wisdom of faith,"a rightto which,on all other accounts,he could lay claim. It was, as Gilson brilliantly shows, that "part of his make-up, which [even Thomas] had to leave at the gate of the Paradiso beforehe could enter."14 There are a number of traitsin the Xenophonian Socrates,whose historical need not be doubted,which Socratesmighthave had credibility to leave at the gate of paradiseif Dante had used him. The first thing that strikesus in Plato's Socraticdialogues is that theyare all aporetic. The argumenteitherleads nowhere or it goes around in circles. In orderto knowwhatjustice is you
is Dante and Philosophy (New York,1949,1963),p. 267. of see ulbid., p. 273. For the wholediscussion the passage, pp. 27Off.

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mustknowwhatknowledge and in orderto knowknowing is, musthave a previous, notionof knowledge. unexamined you in Theaetetus and Charmides.)Hence, "A man cannot (Thus to discover either whathe knows whathe doesnotknow." or try If he knows, is if there no needofinquiry; he doesnotknow. . . he does notevenknowwhathe is to look for"{Meno 80). Or, in theEuthyphro: order be piousI must In know what to is. piety Piousare thethings thatpleasethegods;but are they bepious cause theyplease the gods or do theyplease the gods because are ever the they pious? None ofthelogoi, arguments, stays put; moveabout,becauseSocrates, to which he they asking questions doesnotknowtheanswers, themin motion. And once the sets statements comefullcircle, is usually have it Socrates whocheerto all fully proposes start overagainand inquirewhatjusticeor or knowledge happiness or are. piety of deal withverysimple, For the topics theseearlydialogues whenever such mouths everyday peopleopentheir concepts, as arise and beginto talk. The introduction runs as follows: usually there happypeople, are To be sure, men, courageous just deeds, to see and admire, beautiful aboutthem; knows things everybody the trouble starts withour usageof nouns,presumably derived from those whichwe applyto particular casesas they adjectives tous (weseea happy thecourageous deedor man, appear perceive thejustdecision), is,withsuchwords happiness, that as courage, which now call concepts whichSoloncalled we and etc., justice, the "non-appearing measure"(aphanesmetron) "mostdifficult forthemindto comprehend, nevertheless but the holding limits 15 ofall things"- andPlatosomewhat calledideasperceivable later of usedtogroup only theeyes themind. Thesewords, by together seenand manifest and occurrences nevertheless but requalities are unseen, partand parcelof our everyday latingto something and stillwe can giveno account them; of whenwe try to speech, define whenwe talkabouttheir them, getslippery; they meaning, tomove. So instead nothing putanymore, stays everything begins
i Diehl, frg.16.

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that Socrateswas of repeatingwhat we learned fromAristotle, we the man who discoveredthe "concept/* should ask ourselves what Socratesdid when he discovered it. For surely, thesewords were part of the Greek language before he tried to force the Atheniansand himselfto give an account of what theyand he meant when theyutteredthem,being convincedthat no speech would be possiblewithoutthem. This convictionhas become questionable. Our knowledgeof the so-calledprimitive languageshas taughtus thatthisgrouping of manyparticulars into a name commonto all of them together is by no means a matterof course, for these languages,whose vocabularyis often much richer than ours, lack such abstract nouns even if theyrelate to clearlyvisible objects. To simplify let matters, us take such a noun which to us no longer sounds abstractat all. We can use the word house fora greatnumber of objects forthemud-hut a tribe,forthe palace of a king,the of home of a citydweller,the cottagein the village or the country house in town but we can hardlyuse it forthe tents apartment auto kath'auto, that of somenomads. The house in and by itself, which makes us use the word for all these particularand very is different buildings, neverseen,neitherby the eyesof the body nor by the eyesof the mind; everyimaginedhouse, be it ever so abstract, having the bare minimumto make it recognizable,is house. This house as such,of whichwe must alreadya particular have a notionin orderto recognize buildingsas houses, particular has been explainedin different names waysand called by different in the history philosophy; of withthiswe are not concernedhere, it althoughwe mighthave perhapsless troubledefining thansuch wordsas happinessor justice. The point here is that it implies less perceived something considerably tangiblethan the structure and being "dweltin" by our eyes. It implies"housingsomebody" as no tentcould house or serveas a dwellingplace whichis put up today and taken down tomorrow. The word house, Solon's "unseen measure,""holds the limitsof all things"pertainingto dwelling;it is a word thatcould not existunlessone presupposes

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a aboutbeing housed, having home. Asa word, dwelling, thinking houseis shorthand all these for withthe things, kindofshorthand - "swift out which thinking and its characteristic as swiftness a thought" Homerused to say wouldnot be possible all. as at The wordhouseis something a frozen like which thinkthought must defrost itwere, as whenever wants find to it out unfreeze, ing itsoriginal this meaning.In medieval philosophy, kindofthinkwas called meditation, the word should be heard as and ing different evenopposed contemplation. anyevent, In this from, to, kindof pondering reflection not produce does definitions in and thissenseis entirely without it might however that be results; thosewho,forwhatever have pondered meaning the of reason, thewordhousewill maketheirapartments a bit better look notnecessarily andcertainly so without of though beingconscious so as is anything verifiable causeand effect.Meditation not the sameas deliberation, which indeedis supposed end in tangible to and does results; meditation not aim at deliberation it although no means sometimes, turns intoit. often, by very who is commonly to have believedin said Socrates, however, theteachability virtue, of seems indeedto haveheld thattalking and thinking aboutpiety, and wereliable justice, courage, therest tomake menmore more more even pious, just, courageous, though ' werenotgiveneither definitions * or Values' to direct their they further conduct. What Socrates believedin in such actually matters best illustrated thesimiles appliedtohimself. can be he by He calledhimself gadfly a midwife, according Plato, a and to and, wascalledbysomebody an "electric else a that ray," fish paralyzes and numbs contact, likeness a whose he by appropriateness recognizedunderthecondition it be understood "theelectric that that others itself. It isn't rayparalyzes onlythrough beingparalyzed the that, I perplex otherpeople. The knowing answers myself truth rather is thatI infect themalso withtheperplexity feel I 16 Which, course, of sumsup neatly onlywaythinkthe myself." as ing can be taughtexceptthatSocrates, he repeatedly said,
i Meno80.

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did not teachanything the simplereason thathe had nothing for to teach; he was "sterile"like the midwivesin Greece who were beyondthe age of childbearing. (Since he had nothingto teach, no truthto hand out, he was accused of neverrevealinghis own view [gnome] as we learn fromXenophon who defendedhim againstthis charge.)17 It seems that he, unlike the professional if felt philosophers, the urge to checkwithhis fellowmen his perwere shared by them and this urge is quite different plexities from the inclinationto find solutions for riddles and then to demonstrate themto others. Let us look brieflyat the three similes. First, Socrates is a gadfly:he knows how to arouse the citizenswho, withouthim, will "sleep on undisturbedfor the rest of their lives," unless somebodyelse comes along to wake them up again. And what an to does he arouse themto? To thinking, examiningmatters, withoutwhich life,accordingto him, was not only not activity worthmuch but was not fullyalive.18 Second, Socratesis a midwife: Here the implicationis threethe I fold the "sterility" mentionedbefore, expertknowledgeof that is, of the implications deliveringothersof their thoughts, of theiropinions,and the Greek midwife'sfunctionof deciding whetherthe child was fit to live or, to use Socratic language, was a mere "windegg," whichthe bearermustbe cleansed. In of matter. For thiscontext, only the last two of theseimplications lookingat the Socraticdialogues,thereis nobodyamong Socrates' thatwas no winda who everbroughtforth thought interlocutors egg. He ratherdid what Plato, certainlythinkingof Socrates, said of the sophists: purgedpeople of their"opinions,"thatis, he which preventthinkingby of those unexamined prejudgments that suggesting we knowwherewe not onlydon't knowbut cannot
17Memorabilia vi. 15 and IV. iv.9. IV. 18In thisas in otherrespects, Socrates saysin the Apologyverynearlythe opto what Plato made him say in the "improved apology"of the Phaedo. In posite he the first instance, explainedwhyhe should live and, incidentally, he was why not afraidto die althoughlife was "verydear" to him; in the second,the whole life is emphasis on how burdensome is and how happyhe was to die.

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as to them, Platoremarks, getridofwhatwasbad know, helping in them, their without however them making good,givopinions, them truth.19 ing that and stillunwilling Socrates, Third, knowing we don'tknow with steadfast hisownperplexities remains toletitgo at that, and, withthemwhomever comes like the electric he ray,paralyzes with. The electric at first intocontact seems be the to glance, ray, it ofthegadfly; paralyzes where gadfly the arouses. Yet, opposite whatcannotbut look like paralysis fromthe outsideand the courseof humanaffairs feltas the highest is stateof ordinary alive. There exist,despitethe scarcity documentary of being for evidence thethinking a of of experience, number utterances thethinkers thecenturies thiseffect. to Socrates himthroughout muchawarethatthinking deals withinvisibles is and self, very itselfinvisible, of lackingall the outsidemanifestation other seemsto have used the metaphor the wind forit: activities, of "The winds themselves invisible, whatthey is manifest are do yet 20 (The samemetato us and we somehow their feel approach/' is who also speaksof the phor,incidentally, used by Heidegger "storm thought/') of In thecontext whichXenophon, in anxiousto defend always the masteragainstvulgaraccusations with vulgararguments, mentions thismetaphor, does not make much sense. Still, it evenhe indicates themanifestationstheinvisible that of windof are thoseconcepts, virtues and "values,"with which thought Socrates dealtin hisexaminations. The trouble and thereason and whythesamemancan be understood understand himself as as wellas electric is thatthissamewind, it gadfly whenever rayis aroused, thepeculiarity doingaway has of with ownprevious its manifestations. is in itsnatureto undo,unfreeze it were, It as what the of has into language, medium thinking, frozen thought words(concepts, sentences, whose"weakdefinitions, doctrines), ness" and inflexibility Plato denouncesso splendidly the in
ie Sophist 258. so Xenophon, op, cit.,XV.iii. 14.

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is SeventhLetter. The consequenceof thispeculiarity thatthinkon has effect all estabing inevitably a destructive, undermining for lishedcriteria, measurements good and evil,in shorton values, those customsand rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics. These frozenthoughts, Socrates seems to say, come so can use themin yoursleep; but if thewind of thinking, handyyou which I shall now arouse in you, has rousedyou fromyour sleep and made you fullyawake and alive, then you will see that you have nothingin yourhand but perplexities, and the mostwe can do withthemis sharethemwitheach other. of is in Hence, theparalysis thought twofold: It is inherent the the of and it may stop and think, interruption all otheractivities, whenyou come out of it,no longersure of effect have a paralyzing what had seemed to you beyonddoubt while you were unthinkyou were doing. If your action coninglyengagedin whatever sistedin applyinggeneralrules of conduct to particularcases as life, then you will findyourself theyarise in ordinary paralyzed because no such rules can withstandthe wind of thought. To use once more the example of the frozen inherent the in thought word house,once you have thought about its implied meaning dwelling, havinga home,being housed you are no longerlikely to accept for your own home whateverthe fashionof the time may prescribe;but thisby no means guaranteesthatyou will be able to come up withan acceptablesolutionforyourown housing problems. You may be paralyzed. This leads to the last and, perhaps,even greatest dangerof this and resultless dangerous enterprise.In thecirclearound Socrates, therewere men like Alcibiades and Critias God knows,by no - and theyhad turned meansthe worstamonghis so-calledpupils out to be a veryreal threatto the polis, and this not by being by ray paralyzed the electric but, on the contrary, havingbeen by arousedby thegadfly. What theyhad been arousedto was license and cynicism. They had not been contentwith being taught how to thinkwithoutbeing taughta doctrine, and theychanged of the non-results the Socraticthinking examination into negative

435 results: If we cannotdefine whatpietyis, let us be impious which pretty is had muchtheopposite whatSocrates hopedto of achieve talking aboutpiety. by dissolvesand The quest for meaning,which relentlessly and rules,can at every anew all accepteddoctrines examines a of as it were,produce reversal the turnagainst moment itself, as these "newvalues." This,to an extent, old values, declare and that did is whatNietzsche whenhe reversed Platonism, forgetting Platois stillPlato,or whatMarxdid whenhe turned a reversed a of Hegel upside down, producing strictly Hegelian system in the process. Such negative results thinking of will history withthe same unthinking as thenbe used as sleepily, routine, the old values; the moment are applied to the realmof they it humanaffairs, is as though the theyhad nevergone through - and are call thinking process. What we commonly nihilism todatehistorically, politically, ascribe thinkand to tempted decry - is actually daredtothink erswhoallegedly "dangerous thoughts" in a danger inherent the thinking itself. There are no activity is itself dangerous, nihilism but is dangerous thinking thoughts; notitsproduct.Nihilism buttheother ofconventionalism; is side its creedconsists negations the current, of of so-called positive it valuestowhich remains bound. All critical examinations must a stageof at leasthypothetically go through negating accepted and out and tacit opinions "values"byfinding their implications and assumptions, in thissensenihilism maybe seen as an everof But doesnotariseout of danger thinking. thisdanger present the Socratic conviction thatan unexamined life is not worth out to results but,on thecontrary, ofthedesire find which living wouldmakefurther is thinking unnecessary. Thinking equally to all creedsand, by itself, does not bringforth dangerous any new creed. THINKING AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS which so a However, non-thinking, seems recommendablestate and also forpolitical moralaffairs, has itsdangers.By shielding the of it them hold to peopleagainst dangers examination, teaches

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the rules of conductmaybe at a given fastto whatever prescribed time in a given society. What people then get used to is not so much thecontent therules,a close examination whichwould of of as of alwayslead theminto perplexity, the possession rules under which to subsume particulars. In other words, they get used to nevermakingup theirminds. If somebodythen should show up who, for whateverreasons and purposes,wishes to abolish theold "values" or virtues, will findit easyenoughprovidedhe he a offers new code,and he will need no force and no persuasion no thatthenew values are betterthanthe old ones to enforce proof men held to the old code, the more eager will they it. The faster to be to assimilatethemselves the new one; the ease with which can such reversals take place under certaincircumstances suggests indeed that everybody asleep when theyoccur. This century is us has offered some experiencein such matters: How easywas it rulersto reversethe basic commandments for the totalitarian of - "Thou shalt not kill" in the case of Hitler's Westernmorality "Thou shaltnot bear falsetestimony Germany, againstthyneighbor" in the case of Stalin'sRussia. To come back to Socrates. The Athenians told him thatthinkthat the wind of thoughtwas a hurricane ing was subversive, whichsweepsaway all the established signsby whichmen orient in themselves the world; it bringsdisorderinto the cities and it confusesthe citizens,especially the young ones. And though Socratesdenied thatthinking he corrupts, did not pretendthatit and thoughhe declaredthat"no greater improves, good has ever befallen" the polis than what he was doing, he did not pretend that he startedhis career as a philosopherin order to become such a great benefactor. If "an unexamined life is not worth 21 living," then thinkingaccompanies living when it concerns itselfwith such conceptsas justice, happiness,temperance, pleasure,with words forinvisiblethingswhich language has offered
21Apology 30 and 38.

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us to expressthe meaningof whatever happensin life and occurs to us while we are alive. Socratescalls thisquest formeaningeros,a kind of love which is primarily need- it desireswhat it has not and which is the a only matterhe pretendsto be an expertin.22 Men are in love withwisdomand do philosophy(philosophein)because theyare not wise,just as theyare in love with beauty and "do beauty," as it were (philokalein,as Pericles called it23) because theyare not beautiful. Love, by desiringwhat is not there,establishes a with it. To bring this relationshipinto the open, relationship make it appear, men speak about it in the same way the lover wantsto speak about his beloved.24 Since the quest is a kind of love and desire, objectsof thought onlybe lovable things the can beauty,wisdom,justice,etc. Uglinessand evil are excluded by definition from thinking the concern, althoughtheymayoccasionturnup as deficiencies, lack of beauty,injustice,and evil as ally (kakia) as lack of good. This means that theyhave no roots of theirown,no essenceof whichthought could get hold. Evil, we are told, cannot be done voluntarily because of its "ontological as in status," we would say today;it consists an absence,in somedissolvesnormal,positiveconcepts thingthatis not. If thinking into theiroriginalmeaning,then the same processdissolvesthese into nonegative"concepts"into theiroriginalmeaninglessness, This incidentally by no means only Socrates'opinion; is thing. thatevil is a mereprivation, or negation, exceptionfromthe rule is the nearly unanimous opinion of all thinkers.25(The most
22Lysis 204b-c. 23 in the Funeral Oration, Thucydides II. 40. 24Symposium177. 25 I shall quote here only the view held by Democritus because he was a contemporaryof Socrates. He thought of logos, speech, as the "shadow" of action, whereby shadow is meant to distinguish real things from mere semblances; hence he said "one must avoid speaking of evil deeds," depriving them, as it were, of their shadow, their manifestation. (See fragments 145 and 190.) Ignoring evil will turn it into a mere semblance.

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as conspicuousand mostdangerousfallacyin the proposition, old as Plato, "Nobodydoes evil voluntarily/' theimpliedconclusion, is wants to do good." The sad truthof the matteris "Everybody thatmost evil is done by people who never made up theirmind to be eitherbad or good.) to Wheredoes thisleave us withrespect our problem inability of and thecapacity doingevil? We are leftwith or refusal think to the conclusionthatonly people filledwith thiseros,thisdesiring love of wisdom,beauty,and justice,are capable of thought that is, we are leftwith Plato's "noble nature" as a prerequisitefor what we were not looking for thinking. And this was precisely the when we raised the question whetherthe thinkingactivity, of fromand regardless itself as distinguished veryperformance - condiwhateverqualities a man's nature,his soul, may possess tionshim in such a way thathe is incapable of evil. Ill thatSocrates, thislover Amongtheveryfewpositivestatements ever made there are two propositions, of perplexities, closely connectedwith each other,which deal with our question. Both occur in the Gorgias, the dialogue about rhetoric,the art of the and addressing convincing many.The Gorgiasdoes not belong beforePlato to the earlySocraticdialogues; it was written shortly it became thehead of theAcademy. Moreover, seemsthatitsvery whichwould lose all of deals witha form discourse subjectmatter if it were aporetic.And yet,this dialogue is still aporetic; sense whichSocrateseitherdissaponlythe last Platonicdialoguesfrom or is no longer the centerof the discussionhave entirely pears lost thisquality. The Gorgias,like the Republic, concludeswith and punishwithrewards of one of the Platonicmyths a hereafter resolveall difficulties. that is ironically, mentswhich apparently, it consistsin their being Their seriousnessis purely political; non-Socratic, addressedto the multitude. These myths, certainly because theycontain,albeit in a non-philosophare of importance

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evil ical form, Plato'sadmission thatmen can and do commit and the voluntarily, even moreimportantly, impliedadmission thathe,no morethanSocrates, knewwhatto do philosophically withthisdisturbing Socrates fact. We maynot knowwhether thatignorance believed virtue be taught; can causeseviland that butwe do know that Platothought wiser rely threats. it to on The twopositive read Socratic propositions as follows. The thanto do wrong" to which "It is better be wronged to first: the in whatall Greece Callicles, interlocutor thedialogue, replies wouldhavereplied:"To suffer is wrong not the partof a man at all,butthat a slavefor of it whom is better be deadthan to alive, as it is foranyone whois unableto comeeither his ownassisto tancewhenhe is wronged to thatof anyone caresabout." or he for or (474) The second: "It wouldbe better me that lyre a my chorus directed I shouldbe out of tuneand loud withdiscord, and thatmultitudes menshoulddisagree of withme rather than thatI, beingone, shouldbe out of harmony withmyself and contradict me" WhichcausesCalliclesto tell Socrates thathe is "goingmad witheloquence/' and thatit wouldbe better for himand everybody ifhe wouldleavephilosophy else alone. (482) Andthere, we shallsee,he hasa point. It wasindeedphilosas or the of that to ophy, rather experience thinking, led Socrates - although, course,he did not start make thesestatements of his enterprise orderto arriveat them. For it would be a in serious 1 themas the results of mistake, believe,to understand some cogitation about morality; are insights, be sure, to they but insights experience, as far as the thinking of and process itself concerned is are at bestincidental they by-products. We have difficulties how paradoxical first the staterealizing mentmusthave sounded whenit was made; after thousands of it yearsof use and misuse, reads like cheap moralizing.And thebestdemonstrationhowdifficultis formodern of it minds to understand thrust thesecond thefact the of is thatitskeywords, for "Beingone" it wouldbe worse me to be at oddswithmyself than in disagreement withmultitudes men, are frequently of

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it leftout in translation.As to the first, is a subjectivestatement, wrong than to do wrong, meaning,it is betterfor me to suffer and it is counteredby the opposite,equally subjectivestatement which,of course,sounds much more plausible. If, however,we were to look at the propositions fromthe viewpointof the world, as distinguished fromthatof the two gentlemen, would have we to say: What counts is that a wrong has been committed;it is who is betteroff, wrong-doer the wrong-sufferer. the or irrelevant As citizens we must preventwrong-doing since the world we all share,wrong-doer, and is wrong-sufferer, spectator, at stake; the City has been wronged. (Thus our law codes distinguish is and transgresbetween crimes,where indictment mandatory, whereonlyprivateindividualsare being wrongedwho may sions, or may not want to sue. In the case of a crime,the subjective states of mind of those involved are irrelevant the one who suffered be willingto forgive, one who did maybe entirely the may to do it again because the community a whole has as unlikely been violated.) In otherwords,Socratesdoes not talk here as a citizenwho is supposed to be more concernedwith the world than with his own self. It is ratheras thoughhe said to Callicles: If you were like me, in love with wisdom and in need of examining,and if the world should be as you depict it- divided into the strong and the weak where "the strongdo what theycan and the weak sufferwhat they must" (Thucydides) so that no alternative existsbut to either do or suffer wrong,then you would agree than to do. The presupposition withme thatit is betterto suffer is: if you were thinking,if you were to agree that "an unexaminedlife is not worthliving." To myknowledgethereexistsonly one otherpassagein Greek literature that,in almostthe same words,sayswhat Socratessaid. than the wronged one "More unfortunate(kakodaimonesteros) of -fewfragments Democriis the wrongdoer," reads one of the of tus (B45), the great adversary Parmenideswho probably for

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thisreasonwas nevermentioned Plato. The coincidence by seemsnoteworthy becauseDemocritus, distinction in from Socwas not particularly in interested humanaffairs seems but rates, to have been quite interested the experience thinking. in of "The mind (logos),"he said, makes abstinence easy because "it is usedtogetting outofitself ex heautou)" (B146) joys (auton It looksas though whatwe are tempted understand a purely to as moralproposition arisesout of the thinking actually experience as such. And thisbrings to the secondstatement, us whichis the preofthefirst one. It, too,is highly requisite paradoxical.Socrates talks beingone and therefore beingable to risk of not out getting ofharmony himself. nothing is identical with But that with itself, and absolutely like A is A, can be either or out of one in truly with needat leasttwotones produce to harmony itself; always you a harmonious sound. To be sure, whenI appearand am seenby I I others, am one; otherwise wouldbe unrecognizable. And so as I am together withothers, conscious myself, of I long barely am as I appearto others. We call consciousness "to (literally, knowwithmyself") curious the fact thatin a senseI also am for I thatthe myself, though hardly appearto me, whichindicates Socratic is as "being-one" not so unproblematic it seems;I am not only forothersbut formyself, in this lattercase, I and am is into clearly notjustone. A differenceinserted myOneness. We knowof thisdifference other in that respects.Everything exists a plurality things not simply of is whatit is, in its among but from thisbeingdifferent identity, it is also different others; to its verynature. When we tryto get hold of it in belongs thought, wantingto defineit, we must take this otherness or into (alteritas) difference account. Whenwe saywhata thing also what isnot;every it is,wealways say as Spinoza determination, has it, is negation. Relatedto itself alone it is the same (auto heauttauton:"each foritself same"),26 the and [i.e. hekaston]
23Sophist 254d see MartinHeidegger, and Difference Identity (New York,1969), pp. 23-41.

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all we can sayabout it in its sheeridentity A rose is a rose is a is: rose. But thisis not at all thecase ifI in myidentity ("being one") relateto myself. This curiousthingthatI am needs no plurality within in order to establishdifference; carriesthe difference it it says: "I am I." So long as I am conscious,that is, itselfwhen conscious of myself, am identical with myself I only for others to whom I appear as one and the same. For myself, articulating two-in-one which this being-conscious-of-myself, inevitably I am is searchforidentity incidentally the reason whythe fashionable is futileand our modernidentity crisiscould be resolvedonly by losing consciousness. Human consciousness suggeststhat differwhich are such outstandingcharacteristics ence and otherness, of the world of appearancesas it is given to man as his habitat of are among a plurality things, the veryconditionsforthe existence of man's ego as well. For this ego, the I-am-I,experiences in when it is not relatedto the things difference identity precisely thatappear but only to itself. Withoutthisoriginalsplit,which Plato later used in his definitionof thinkingas the soundless the two-in-one, dialogue (erne ernauto)between me and myself, in whichSocratespresupposes his statement about harmony with is would not be possible.27 Consciousness not the same as myself, thinking;but withoutit thinkingwould be impossible. What given in conthinkingactualizesin its processis the difference sciousness. this two-in-one meant simplythat if you want to For Socrates, thinkyou must see to it that the two who carryon the thinking dialogue be in good shape, that the partnersbe friends. It is than to do wrongbecause you can remain betterforyou to suffer who of of the friend the sufferer; would want to be the friend and with a murderer? Not even a murderer. have to live together What kind of dialogue could you lead with him? Preciselythe dialogue which Shakespearelet Richard III lead with himself a after greatnumberof crimeshad been committed:
27 Theaetetus 189e ff., and Sophist 263e.

THINKING AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS Whatdo I fear? Myself? There'snoneelseby. Richard lovesRichard:thatis, I am I. Is there murderer a here? No. Yes,I am: Then fly. Whatfrom reason Great myself? why LestI revenge.What,myself upon myself? 0 noi Alas,I rather hatemyself Forhateful deedscommitted myself. by 1 am a villain. YetI lie,I am not. Fool,ofthyself speakwell. Fool,do notflatter.

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of A similar encounter the selfwithitself, undramatic, mild, in and almost harmless comparison, be foundin one of the can contested Socratic dialogues,the Hippias Major (which,even not evidence though written Plato,maystillgive authentic by At ofSocrates). itsend,Socrates Hippias, tells whohad proved to be an especially "howblissfully fortunate" empty-headed partner, he is compared himself to who,whenhe goeshome,is awaited fellow"who alwayscross-examines by a veryobnoxious [him], a close relative, in the same house." HearingSocrates living to he he giveutterance Hippias'opinions, willaskhim"whether is not ashamed himself of about a beautiful of life talking way whenquestioning makesit evident thathe does not evenknow themeaning theword'beauty'." of when (304) In otherwords, he does one; although certainly Hippiasgoeshomehe remains not lose consciousness, also will do nothing actualizethe he to withinhimself. With Socrates for that matter, difference or, RichardIII, it is a different story. They have not onlyintercourse withothers, have intercourse themselves. with The they hereis thatwhattheone calls "theotherfellow" and the point other"conscience" neverpresent is whenthey alone. are except Whenmidnight overand Richard joinedagainthecompany is has ofhisfriends, then is Conscience buta wordthat cowards use, Devisedat first keepthestrong awe. to in

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mustgo home And even Socrates, attracted the marketplace, so by wherehe will be alone, in solitude,to meet the otherfellow. I chose the passagein RichardHI, because Shakespeare, though does not use it herein theaccustomed he uses thewordconscience, way. It took language a long time until it separatedthe word consciousness for from and in somelanguages, instance conscience, in French,such a separation neverhappened. Conscience,as we use it in moral or legal matters,supposedlyis always present withinus, just like consciousness.And thisconscienceis also supposed to tell us whatto do and what to repentof; it was the voice of God beforeit became the lumen naturale or Kant's practical reason. Unlike this conscience,the fellow Socrates is talking in about has been leftat home; he fearshim, as the murderers - as somethingthat is absent. Richard HI fear their conscience that thoughtwhich is Conscience appears as an afterthought, aroused by eithera crime,as in the case of Richard himself, or or as the by unexamined opinions, as in the case of Socrates, as anticipated fear of such afterthoughts, in the case of the hired murderersin Richard HI. This conscience,unlike the voice of God withinus or the lumen naturale,givesno positive prescriptions even the Socraticdaimonion,his divinevoice,only tells him what not to do; in the words of Shakespeare,"it fills a man full of obstacles/1What makesa man fearthisconscience is the anticipationof the presenceof a witnesswho awaits him only if and when he goes home. Shakespeare'smurderersays: "Everyman thatmeans to live well endeavors... to live without it," and successin this endeavor comes easy because all he has the to do is neverto start soundlesssolitary dialogue we call thinkto go home and examine things. This is not a matter ing,never or as or of wickedness goodness, it is not a matterof intelligence betweenme and intercourse stupidity.He who does not knowthe myself whichwe examine what we say and what we do) will (in not mind contradicting himself,and this means he will never be eitherable or willingto give accountof what he saysor does;

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norwillhe mindcommitting crime, sincehe can be surethat any it willbe forgotten nextmoment. the sense in itsnon-cognitive, Thinking non-specialized as a natural of need of humanlife,the actualization the difference givenin of is consciousness,nota prerogative thefewbut an everpresent of everybody; the same token,inability thinkis to faculty by not the "prerogative" thosemanywho lack brainpowerbut of - scientists, the everpresent for scholars, possibility everybody and other in mental notexcluded to shun specialists enterprises thatintercourse withoneself and whosepossibility importance Socrates first discovered.We were here not concerned with with whichreligionand literature have tried to wickedness, cometo terms, withevil; notwithsin and thegreat but villains who becamethenegative heroesin literature usuallyacted and out of envyand resentment, with the non-wicked but everywhohasno specialmotives forthisreason capableof and is body evil; unlike the villain,he nevermeetshis midnight infinite disaster. that"fills conscience For thethinking and its experience, ego Anditremains marginal is a a manfull obstacles," a sideeffect. of in at For affair society largeexcept emergencies. thinking as for little for suchdoessociety good,muchlessthanthethirst knowin which is usedas an instrument other it for ledge purposes.It does not createvalues,it will not findout, once and forall, but what"thegood" is, and it does not confirm rather dissolves rulesof conduct. Its politicaland moralsignificance accepted in out in comes only those moments history rare when"Things fall thecentre cannot Mereanarchy loosedupon the is hold;/ apart; when"The bestlackall conviction, whiletheworst/Are world," fullof passionate intensity." At thesemoments, ceasesto be a marginal affair in thinking matters.When everybody sweptawayunthinkingly is political whateverybody doesand believes those else whothink are in, by drawn of hiding out becausetheir refusal join is conspicuous to

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and thereby becomesa kind of action. The purgingelementin of that Socrates'midwifery, bringsout the implications thinking, unexamined opinions and therebydestroysthem values, doctrines,theories,and even convictions is political by implication. For thisdestruction a liberating has human effect another on the faculty judgment,which one may call, with some of faculty, the justification, mostpoliticalof man's mentalabilities. It is the to judge particulars themunder those withoutsubsuming faculty general rules which can be taughtand learned until theygrow into habits that can be replaced by other habits and rules. of The faculty judging particulars Kant discoveredit), the (as abilityto say,"this is wrong,""this is beautiful/'etc., is not the of same as the faculty thinking. Thinking deals with invisibles, thatare absent;judgingalwaysconof withrepresentations things close at hand. But the two are interand things cernsparticulars and conscience related in a way similarto the way consciousness of the are interconnected.If thinking, two-in-one the soundless as withinour identity given in actualizesthe difference dialogue, resultsin conscienceas its by-product, and thereby consciousness of effect thinking, of thenjudging,the by-product the liberating in realizesthinking, makes it manifest the world of appearances, whereI am neveralone and alwaysmuch too busy to be able to is of think. The manifestation thewind ofthought no knowledge; beautifulfrom it is theabilityto tellrightfrom wrong, ugly. And in at this indeed may preventcatastrophes, least formyself, the whenthechipsare down. raremoments