VILLAMOR VS. COMELEC G.R. NO.

169865 FACTS: On May 13, 2004, petitioner Virginio Villamor was proclaimed as mayor of Carmen, Cebu, by MBC in the elections held on May 10, 2004 over his opponent, respondent Batao. On May 17, 2004, respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner alleging as grounds the illegal composition of the MBC and its proceedings. Subsequently, or on May 24, 2004, respondent filed an election protest with the RTC. However, it dismissed the election protest for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed one-day late. Under Section 3, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, an election protest should be filed within 10 days from the date of proclamation of the results of the election. Since petitioner was proclaimed on May 13, 2004, respondent had until May 23, 2004 to file an election protest. However, respondent filed the same only on May 24, 2004, thus, it was dismissed by the trial court in an Order dated June 24, 2004. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the respondent and was granted by the trial court in because it found that the election protest was actually filed on time. Since the last day to file the protest fell on May 23, 2004 which was a Sunday, thus, under Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, the time should not run until the next working day which was May 24, 2004. Petitioner appealed the Order granting respondent's motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC and was denied. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not a regular court, in an election protests, act on a motion for reconsideration from an order of dismissal of election protest. HELD: Under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), the trial court cannot entertain a motion for reconsideration of its decision in an election contest affecting municipal officers filed by the aggrieved party. However, the latter may appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now COMELEC) within five days after the receipt of a copy of the decision. Likewise, Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure implementing the abovementioned Section 256 provides: Sec. 19. Promulgation and Finality of Decision.The decision of the Court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after its promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

ELECTION LAW

COMELEC VS. ESPANOL G.R. NOS. 149164-73 FACTS: During the elections on May 11, 1998, Florentino A. Bautista was the official candidate of the Lakas for the position of Municipal Mayor of Kawit, Cavite. He executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the incumbent Municipal Mayor Atty. Federico "Hit" Poblete et. Al, of violation of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (vote buying) and filed the same with the Law Department of the COMELEC. The petitioner, through its Law Department, filed an information against the respondents with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. ISSUE: Whether or not Poblete is guilty of vote buying. HELD: Section 261(a)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code penalizes vote-buying and vote-selling and conspiracy to bribe voters. Not only principals but also accomplices and accessories are criminally liable for election offenses. Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648 governs the prosecution of the crimes of votebuying and vote selling. Under the last paragraph of the said provision, any person guilty of vote-buying and vote-selling who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on violations of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offense with reference to which their information and testimony were given, without prejudice to their liability for perjury and false testimony.

ELECTION LAW

HERRERA VS CA G.R. NO. 140651 FACTS: Bernardino Daquioag, Flordelita Daquioag and Estelita Herrera were found guilty of violating certain provisions of the Omnibus Election Code for transferring the ballot boxes from the polling place to their respective houses without authority from the COMELEC. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants. Accused-appellants' separate motions for reconsideration were denied. Only accused-appellant Herrera interposed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner alleged that the information did not sufficiently charge the offense of which they were convicted. ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera may be convicted of the crimes specified in the information filed against him. HELD: As a general rule, the complaint or information must charge only one (1) offense. Admittedly, the instant Information charges petitioner with several offenses, to wit: (a) failure to immediately deliver ballot box and other election paraphernalia to the municipal treasurer; (b) opening or destroying ballot box or removing or destroying its contents; (c) failure to properly account for ballot box, documents and forms; and (4) violating the integrity of any official ballot or election return. The remedy of petitioner would have been to move to quash the Information at any time before entering a plea on the ground that more than one offense was charged in the Information. The failure of petitioner to assert this ground in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the Information is deemed a waiver. Consequently, she may be validly convicted of as many offenses as are charged in the Information and may be proved by the People. Luckily for petitioner, the trial court found her guilty only of violating Sec. 217 of BP Blg. 881 and exonerated her of the other charges.

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KILOSBAYAN V COMELEC G.R. NO. 128054 FACTS: The PYHSDFI was registered with the SEC as a non-stock, non-profit foundation with private respondents herein as incorporators. In order to implement its various sports, health, and cultural activities, the PYHSDFI President entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the DILG-NCR Regional Director for the purpose of allocating an amount from the government's Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) to finance its various programs. The advice of allotment allocating the amount of P70 million was signed and released by the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management. The petitioner Kilosbayan wrote the Comelec to inform them of two election offenses committed in relation to the release of CDF funds. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC can conduct the preliminary investigation in case of election controversies. HELD: SEC. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted." Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the Comelec is the "public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the [Omnibus Election] Code before the competent court." This constitutional and statutory mandate for the Comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election laws translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued.

ELECTION LAW

BAYTAN VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 153945 FACTS: On June 15, 1997, petitioners were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio. Ignacio led petitioners to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18. Petitioners registered in this precinct. When petitioners returned home, they wondered why the registrants in this precinct looked unfamiliar to them. This prompted petitioners to return to the registration center to study the precinct map of Barangay 18. They then realized that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28. Petitioners assail Comelec En Banc's resolutions denying their motion to reconsider its order directing its Law Department to file the proper information against them for double registration. As defense, petitioners claimed honest mistake and good faith in registering twice. ISSUE: W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion upon recommending the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite clear and convincing evidence on record that they had no intention of committing said election offense. HELD: A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is only the means to discover who may be charged with a crime, its function being merely to determine probable cause. All that is required in the preliminary investigation is the determination of probable cause to justify the holding of petitioners for trial. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different precincts without canceling their previous registration. Aside from this, the COMELEC found certain circumstances prevailing in the case sufficient to warrant the finding of probable cause.

ELECTION LAW

COMELEC VS. ESPANOL G.R. NOS. 149164-73 FACTS:

During the elections on May 11, 1998, Florentino A. Bautista was the official candidate of the Lakas for the position of Municipal Mayor of Kawit, Cavite. He executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the incumbent Municipal Mayor Atty. Federico "Hit" Poblete et. Al, of violation of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (vote buying) and filed the same with the Law Department of the COMELEC. The petitioner, through its Law Department, filed an information against the respondents with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. ISSUE: W/N the trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion upon denial of the motion to dismiss filed by COMELEC. HELD: Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, COMELEC is empowered to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the Constitution to the petitioner of the express power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election. Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The petitioner may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government.

ELECTION LAW

BAYTAN VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 153945

FACTS: On June 15, 1997, petitioners were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio. Ignacio led petitioners to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18. Petitioners registered in this precinct. When petitioners returned home, they wondered why the registrants in this precinct looked unfamiliar to them. This prompted petitioners to return to the registration center to study the precinct map of Barangay 18. They then realized that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28. Petitioners assail Comelec En Banc's resolutions denying their motion to reconsider its order directing its Law Department to file the proper information against them for double registration. As defense, petitioners claimed honest mistake and good faith in registering twice. ISSUE: Whether or not the action has prescribed. HELD: Prescription of the crime or offense is the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time. Section 267 of the Election Code provides that "election offenses shall prescribe after five years from the date of their commission." In this case, the offense of double registration allegedly occurred on June 22, 1997 when petitioners registered for a second time in a different precinct without canceling their previous registration. At this point, the period of prescription for the alleged offense started to run. However, prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the offender. Specifically, the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation. The COMELEC initiated the complaint for double registration against petitioners motu proprio under Sections 3, 4 and 5, Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

ELECTION LAW

Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan v. Comelec G.R. No. 150946, 23 October 2003

FACTS: Mayoralty candidate Flora L. Benzonan instituted a pre-proclamation case relative to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections in the Municipality of Glan, Sarangani, before the Commission on Elections en banc. Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution declaring as null and void the proclamation of the winning candidates and ordered the re-canvass of the election returns. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC en banc may decide on cases even though it was not heard in COMELEC division. HELD: It is important to clarify, however, that not all cases relating to election laws filed before the COMELEC are required to be first heard by a division. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then, upon motion for reconsideration, en banc.

ELECTION LAW

De la Llana v. Comelec G.R. No. 152080, 28 November 2003 FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Pablo, Jr. were among the candidates for Provincial Board Member, First District of Zambales. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winning candidates which included petitioner, being the third duly elected member of the Provincial Board. Respondent ranked fourth. Contesting the election and proclamation of petitioner, respondent filed an election protest alleging that some votes were not credited to him such that if the missing votes were to be counted in his favor, the same would have been sufficient to have him proclaimed the third member of the Provincial Board. This appeared in the Statement of Votes by Precinct. The Commission on Elections First Division treated the case as one for correction of manifest errors committed in the Statement of Votes. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the First Division. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the resolution of its first division. HELD: The Constitution has vested to the COMELEC broad powers, involving not only the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but also the resolution and determination of election controversies. It also granted the COMELEC the power and authority to promulgate its rules of procedure, with the primary objective of ensuring the expeditious disposition of election cases. Concomitant to such powers is the authority of the COMELEC to determine the true nature of the cases filed before it. Thus, it examines the allegations of every pleading filed, obviously aware that in determining the nature of the complaint or petition, its averments, rather than its title/caption, are the proper gauges. This was what the COMELEC did when it treated respondent's questioned petition in EPC No. 2001-06 (captioned as an election protest) as a case for correction of manifest errors. The COMELEC found that the averments therein actually call for the rectification of apparent errors in the Statement of Votes in Precinct No. 29-A-I of Castillejos, Zambales.

ELECTION LAW

Aklat v. Comelec G.R. No. 162203, April 14, 2004 FACTS: On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as a party-list organization for purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its petition that it participated in the 2001 elections but was disqualified by the Comelec as it was found not to have complied with the guidelines set by the Court in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec (Bagong Bayani case) for party-list organizations to qualify and participate as such in the party-list elections. Accordingly, Aklat re-organized itself in order that it will comply with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court in the said case. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC properly disqualified AKLAT for not complying in the guidelines set in the Bagong Bayani case. HELD: Verily, the Comelec has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to enforce and administer election laws. This power includes the determination, within the parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the accomplishment of certain pre-election act like filing petitions for registration under the party-list system. This is exactly what the Comelec did when it issued its Resolution No. 6320 declaring September 30, 2003, as the deadline for filing petitions for registration under the party-list system. Considering these, as well as the multifarious pre-election activities that the Comelec is mandated t undertake, the issuance of its Resolution No. 6320 cannot be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

ELECTION LAW

Aradais v. Comelec G.R. No. 157863, 28 April 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Aradais and respondent Asmadun were mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Lugus, Sulu during the May 14, 2001 elections. As there was no pending pre-proclamation controversy, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (BOC) of Lugus proclaimed respondent as the mayor-elect. Petitioner, also on May 17, 2001, was proclaimed as mayor-elect of Lugus, Sulu by virtue of a second Certificate of Canvass bearing the same serial number as that of the first COC, signed and thumbmarked by all three members of the BOC. On May 19, 2001, respondent took his oath of office and assumed office on July 2, 2001. Petitioner, on the other hand, took his oath of office on June 23, 2001. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC \gravely abused its power and discretion when it delegated its constitutional duty to "hear and decide" pre-proclamation cases to a mere ad hoc committee. HELD: It bears emphasis that the COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it. In the case at bar, it was well within the COMELEC's discretion to avail of the means it deemed effective, such as requiring the parties to present their side through position papers and memoranda and conducting a clarificatory hearing wherein the members of the BOC were required to shed light on the two proclamations made. Besides, it is a settled rule that the COMELEC's judgment cannot be overturned by this Court unless it is clearly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

ELECTION LAW

CIPRIANO VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 158830, 10 AUGUST 2004

FACTS: On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002. 1 On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the recommendation of the Commission's Law Department to deny due course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections, including petitioners. The ruling was based on the findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all the other candidates affected by said resolution were not registered voters in the barangay where they intended to run. 2 Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK elections and her name was not deleted from the official list of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City. 3 She took her oath of office on August 14, 2002. 4 On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning of Resolution No. 5363, filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of said resolution. ISSUE: May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its power to enforce and administer election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law? HELD: Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus: Sec. 76.Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. The Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy. The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner's certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.

ELECTION LAW

CIPRIANO VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 158830, 10 AUGUST 2004 FACTS: On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002. 1 On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the recommendation of the Commission's Law Department to deny due course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections, including petitioners. The ruling was based on the findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all the other candidates affected by said resolution were not registered voters in the barangay where they intended to run. 2 Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK elections and her name was not deleted from the official list of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City. 3 She took her oath of office on August 14, 2002. 4 On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning of Resolution No. 5363, filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of said resolution. ISSUE: May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its power to enforce and administer election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law? HELD: Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the Commission also exercises other powers expressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the authority to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The exercise of such authority, however, must be in accordance with the conditions set by law. However, The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt.

ELECTION LAW

CAASI V. CA, G.R. NO. 88831, 8 NOVEMBER 1990

FACTS: These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel, for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao. G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13, 1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel, filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988. G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card holder. ISSUE: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988. HELD:

1. In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application
for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there, he entered the United States with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.

2. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate
who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act ELECTION LAW

or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code)

ELECTION LAW

NOLASCO V. COMELEC G.R. NOS. 122250 122258, 21 JULY 1997 FACTS: In the 1995 election for Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Florentino Blanco won over Eduardo Alarilla while Edgardo Nolasco was elected vice-mayor. Alarilla however, filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. The COMELEC (First Division), on the ground of vote-buying, disqualified Blanco who moved for reconsideration in the COMELEC en banc. Nolasco, as vice-mayor, intervened in the proceedings, moved for reconsideration, urging that as vice-mayor he should be declared Mayor in the event Blanco was finally disqualified, citing Section 44 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) and the Courts' decision in Labo v. COMELEC. The COMELEC en banc denied both motions for reconsideration. Hence, this two petitions for certiorari by Blanco and Nolasco. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction to disqualify Blanco. HELD: It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over proclamation and disqualification cases. Article IX-C, Section 2 of the Constitution endows the COMELEC the all encompassing power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election . . . " We have long ruled that this broad power includes the power to cancel proclamations. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646. Petitions for disqualification are subject to summary hearings. Blanco also urges that COMELEC erred in using summary proceedings to resolve his disqualification case. Again, the COMELEC action is safely anchored on Section 4 of its Rules of Procedure which expressly provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character.

ELECTION LAW

DOMINGO, JR. V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 136587, 30 AUGUST 1999 FACTS: The case under consideration is a special civil action for certiorari assailing the en banc resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated December 1, 1998 and the resolution of the Comelec First Division dated July 2, 1998 in SPA No. 98-361 which dismissed for lack of merit the petition for disqualification filed by petitioner against herein private respondent, the incumbent mayor of Mandaluyong City. Records show that the Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, the Comelec admonished petitioner and his counsel for attempting to mislead the Comelec for making false and untruthful statements in his petition. In the present case, petitioner assailed the resolution of public respondent for being violative of his right to due process, and thus, issued with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner likewise argued that the dismissal of his petition for disqualification on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was unfounded, considering that no hearing on the merits was conducted by public respondent on the matter. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC properly dismissed the petition for disqualification for lack of merit. HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion in the Comelec's decision to dismiss the petition for disqualification. The conclusion that petitioner's evidence is insufficient to support the charge of violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code was arrived at only after a careful scrutiny of the evidence at hand, especially of the videotapes of petitioner. This is evident from the discussion of the Comelec First Division, in the Resolution dated July 2, 1998, which quoted extensively from the pleadings and evidence of petitioners, and provided adequate explanation why it considered petitioner's evidence insufficient and unconvincing. Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned resolutions, the Court may not review the factual findings of the Comelec, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.

ELECTION LAW

MORENO VS COMELEC G.R. NO 168550

FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections. ISSUE: Whether or not Moreno re-acquired all his civil rights upon probation and may not be disqualified. HELD: It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in this case. They focused on the fact that Moreno's judgment of conviction attained finality upon his application for probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had been served.

ELECTION LAW

GREGO VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 125955 FACTS:

On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the January 18, 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office. After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national elections. Again, he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the six (6) City Councilors. However, his victory this time did not remain unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1,1992 due to its wrong wording? HELD: No. Petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992,Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Basco's dismissal from office which took place in 1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification there under to attach. Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to theeffectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies. We do not, however, subscribe to petitioner's view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of . There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case."

ELECTION LAW

ELEAZQAR QUINES VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 189698 FACTS:

Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the respondent Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the movants-intervenors' motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Court's December 1, 2009 Decision. The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.

ISSUE: Whether or not they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding elective positions. HELD: No. Sec. 4(a) of the COMELEC Resolution is null and void for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. Sec.13(par. 3) of R.A. 9369 & Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code were also declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881 & RA 8436 relating to the automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs was repealed by R.A.9006 (Fair Election Act). There was, thus, created a situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were not. Four (4) requisites of valid classification must be complied with in order that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. According to the Supreme Court, the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones isnot germane to the purposes of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. And discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. ELECTION LAW

ELECTION LAW

LUNA VS COMELEC GR NO. 165983 FACTS:

On 15 January 2004, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy on the same date. Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the name of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of Luna. On 20 April 2004, private respondents filed a petition for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy or disqualification of Luna. Private respondents alleged that Luna made a false material representation in her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra but a registered voter of Bangued, Abra. Private respondents also claimed that Luna's certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid. Private respondents alleged that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on election day and, therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be substituted by Luna. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger. HELD:

In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004,6 the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to give due course to Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy. On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The Election Code allows a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election by submitting a written declaration under oath. There is no provision of law which prevents a candidate from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the election. On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger. Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger.

ELECTION LAW

BAUTISTA VS COMELEC GR NO. 133840 FACTS:

Petitioner Cipriano "Efren" Bautista and private respondent were duly registered candidates for the position of Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the elections of May 11, 1998. Aside from said candidates, a certain Edwin "Efren" Bautista, hereinafter referred to as Edwin Bautista, also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position of mayor. His certificate of candidacy was filed at midnight on March 27, 1997, the last day for such filing. In fact, the filing was done at the very last minute. On April 1, 1998, petitioner filed a petition praying that Edwin Bautista be declared a nuisance candidate. The COMELEC saw merit in the petition and in a resolution dated April 30, 1998, declared Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate and consequently ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor. Accordingly, the name of Edwin Bautista was not included in the list of candidates for the position of mayor for Navotas. Copies of said list were distributed by the Office of the Election Officer of Navotas to the boards of election inspectors (BEI). On May 8, 1998, Edwin Bautista filed a motion for reconsideration. As a result, on May 10, 1998, the Election Officer of Navotas issued a directive to the BEI to include the name of Edwin Bautista in the certified list of candidates. Conversely, on the afternoon of the same day, the Election Officer issued another directive to the BEI recalling his earlier directive for the inclusion of Edwin Bautista pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Wheter or not COMELEC should include the Bautista stray votes as part of the valid votes of petitioner. HELD: YES. Extreme caution should be observed before anyballot is invalidated. In the appreciation of ballots,doubts are resolved in favor of their validity (Silverio vs.Castro, 19 SCRA 521 [1967]).The votes separately tallied are not really stray votes.Factual circumstances and logic dictate that the"Bautista stray votes" refer to only one candidate,Efren. Such votes could not have been intended for Edwin, who was declared a nuisance candidate, wasallegedly known as a mere tricycle driver and worse, adrug addict, and shown as a candidate with no politicalline-up, no personal funds that could have supportedthis own campaign, and no accomplishments whichmay be noted and considered by the public, as against a known former public officer who had served thepeople of Navotas as barangay official, councilor, andas vice-mayor. To rule other wise will definitely result inthe disenfranchisement of the will of the electorate.COMELEC is therefore directed to order the inclusion,as part of the valid votes of petitioner, the Bautistastray votes

ELECTION LAW