Russia Development Index 2011-2012 (Valdai Index), English Version

RUSSIA DEVELOPMENT
INDEX 2011/2012
Expert opinion poll of the Valdai
Discussion Club
Moscow, November 2012
valdaiclub.com
Russia Development Index 2011/2012
3
ExpErt opinion poll of thE
Valdai discussion club
The results of the survey of the Valdai Club
international experts have pointed to differ-
ent trends in the development of Russian
institutions and society. Positive changes
in certain spheres, such as the develop-
ment of innovative industries and the finan-
cial services market, the strengthening of the
defense potential and foreign policy activity,
are set off by negative estimates in
other areas, which means that the minor
recessive trend indicated in last years sur-
vey remains dominant.
Experts believe that changes lie in store
for Russia. And these changes are like-
ly to be caused by recalibration of the
system and a search for a new balance
as a result of Vladimir Putins return
to the Kremlin.
The Russian Political System module
demonstrates a slackened pace of
decline (to 0.3 in 2012 from 0.4 in 2011
and 0.5 in 2010).
The main downward factor is the assess-
ment of the efficiency of Russian institutions
and public's trust in them. According to the
2012 survey, the deteriorating efficiency of
the prime minister was mentioned by 72.6%
of respondents, of the government by 57.5%,
of the State Duma by 46.6% and of the
president by 45.2% of respondents. A total
of 80.8% said public trust in the president
has decreased, 79.5% said the same about
the prime minister, 69.8% about the gov-
ernment, 67.1% about the State Duma, and
58.9% about courts.
According to experts, the party with the par-
liamentary majority (the ruling party) was
even less efficient: 78.1% assessed its effi-
ciency as low and 84.9% believe that public
trust in the party has decreased (nearly 40%
of them pointed to substantial deteriora-
tion).
At the same time, the influence of parlia-
mentary and especially non-parliamentary
opposition has grown, which is a positive
sign for the awakening of society and the
political life of the country as a whole. The
growing influence of the extra-parliamen-
tary opposition was mentioned by 71.2% of
respondents, and 68.5% pointed to growing
public confidence in them. Public opin-
ion and civil society have new means and
platforms for channeling their messages,
a number of experts said in explaining the
4 Moscow, noveMber 2012
trend. Another factor is the development
of the new middle class. Until the non-reg-
istered opposition formulates its medium-
and long-term plans and systemic actions,
it will be the new urban residents who
will promote the systems growth, the com-
mentators said. Their growing influence will
attract the attention of the authorities and
serve as the reason for dialogue.
Meanwhile, 63% of respondents said that
the standards of civil rights and freedoms,
including freedom of the press, have declined
since September, 2011, and 57.6% said the
extent to which citizens interests are reflect-
ed during elections has decreased. Over
60% of respondents said that the extent to
which the rights and freedoms to elect and
be elected are observed and the freedom of
campaigning in Russia have declined.
Speaking about the role of NGOs in organizing
the protest movement and the reaction to the
July 2012 law regulating the work of NGOs,
experts were divided almost equally on the
role of NGOs in Russias political system.
The survey showed that the roles of the Fed-
eration Council, the Constitutional Court
and the Public Chamber in the Russian
political system have remained almost con-
stant at last years level. The regional execu-
tive branch appears to be more balanced
than the federal authorities, which experts
explain by a low level of involvement on the
part of regional governments in political
life, or insufficient information for the pub-
lic and the media on their operation.
After Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev
swapped places, the position of the presi-
dent has become more influential, which
experts note as a major tend. Over 60%
of them pointed to that trend, and over
half said that the position of the president
has grown considerably stronger. Experts
believe that this shift of the decision-making
center to the Kremlin will also increase the
presidents potential to enhance the effi-
ciency of the system.
Most economic performance indica-
tors have fully shown mixed trends
not in absolute terms, but relative to expec-
tations that the economy would respond to
the leadership's rhetoric about moderniza-
tion and innovation, one of the experts said.
Despite positive macroeconomic parameters
compared to European figures, the Valdai
Index has not remained in the black. After
growing to 0 in 2011 from 0.1 in 2010, the
indicator has slumped back to 0.1 in 2012.
The relative balance of macroeconom-
ic parameters has been confirmed by the
experts, 34,2 % of whom said they have
improved, while 41,1% pointed to a minor
decline.
A similar balance of opinions, though with
a slightly more pronounced stagnation
sentiment, was provided for trends in the
commodity and manufacturing industries.
As for innovative industries and financial
services, 35.7% and 41.1% of experts respec-
tively said they have improved over the past
year. This result was obviously due to the
consistent policy of modernization and the
development of an international financial
center in Moscow.
However, these achievements are not suf-
ficient to provide a positive assessment
of Russias economic diversification. Over
50% of experts do not see any change in this
area, and 41.1% said that the modernization
efforts could be more effective.
Almost 50% of respondents positively
assessed Russias efforts to integrate in
5
the global economy, and 38.3% positive-
ly assessed the openness of the Russian
economy. The key factor influencing their
opinion was of course Russias accession to
the WTO.
The experts praised the establishment of
the post of business ombudsman and the
appointment of Boris Titov to this post,
but they also said that Russias investment
attractiveness and business climate have
deteriorated. They explain this primarily by
investors increasing uncertainty due to pre-
and post-election protests.
The Valdai experts believe that Russia
should improve its competitiveness and
stimulate foreign investment. The Russian
economy is insufficiently diversified, which
could become a major problem in condi-
tions of low oil prices, global economic
stagnation and the ensuing decrease in
energy exports.
The respondents assessment of the
Russian human dimension reaffirmed
the negative trend: 0.3, as in 2011.
Most experts said that the situation in the
environment, public health, and poverty
and prosperity levels has not changed. But
they are divided almost equally on the feel-
ing of safety/security and general and pro-
fessional/vocational education standards:
some believe that the situation has deterio-
rated while others say it has not changed.
In the Ideology and Politics sector of the
Human Dimension module, 41.1% of experts
said the level of patriotism has not changed
as compared to last year. But the majority of
respondents pointed to deterioration in the
sense of freedom, the level of mutual trust
and the level of tolerance (74%, 65.7% and
67.1%, respectively). Approximately 50% of
experts said that the cultural level of popu-
lation has not changed.
On the other hand, the feeling of decline in
the past year was probably stronger than the
actual decline, another Valdai expert said.
Social media are building and extending
trust amongst people who have no direct
personal connection. These virtual com-
munities, which form on the basis of affin-
ity, interest and outlook, have considerable
mobilization potential.
However, the level of trust between strang-
ers in Russia is still considerably lower than
in Europe or North America. As a country
that is becoming increasingly more open
to external, global public opinion, Russia
seems to be living a paradox of a growing
level of freedom in terms of public opinion
and independent sources of information
and a growing sense of restriction and
lack of independence in media and public
life altogether. National pride and patrio-
tism are feeding nationalist feelings and a
poor level of tolerance, alongside a grow-
ing sense of a mutual distrust, one of the
experts said.
Compared to 2009/2010 and
2010/2011, the trend in science and
innovative development was slightly
negative (0.1).
Opinions regarding the competitiveness of
Russian higher education, post-graduate
and doctorate courses were divided between
deterioration and no change. The cre-
ative potential of academics/scientists and
engineers has not changed either.
According to 31.5% of respondents, the
infrastructure incentives for innovation
have improved, but the business commu-
nitys willingness to be involved in venture
investment and tax incentives for innova-
tion remained flat at last years level, indi-
cating a lack of progress in these spheres.
However, up to 20% of respondents had no
opinion on this issue.
A total of 52% of experts believe that the brain
drain has seriously accelerated over the past
year, although 39.7% point out that the level
of state financing for science has increased.
The number of competitive innovation
projects has grown, said 34.3% of experts,
whereas nearly half of respondents believe
that the extent to which R&D results are
applied in the economy has not grown.
One of the experts said that there have not
been any major changes despite the sharp
criticism of corruption in the system of
higher education. According to another Val-
dai Club expert: The attention and impor-
tance officially given to several categories
of innovative development does not find
a direct correspondence in political prac-
tice, in programs and everyday life of the
population. Although a number of innova-
tive higher education, post-graduate and
doctorate courses have been created, the
Russian post-graduate educational system
is not yet perceived as competitive on the
international level. A still big creative poten-
tial is threatened by a persisting brain drain,
especially in terms of young specialists.
Russias index in the system of nation-
al, regional and global security is the
highest compared to other develop-
ment aspects (0.1). After a pause last
year, it has resumed growth due to relatively
static threat conditions and government
measures to strengthen national defenses.
Over half of respondents said that the exter-
nal border security index remained quite
stable. Although some experts pointed to
stalled military reform, the majority believe
that the level to which the Russian Armed
Forces are equipped with modern weapons
and the level of advanced military R&D
projects have grown (over 50% and 40% of
experts, respectively). They also pointed to
improvements in the professional qualities
of officers, commanders and soldiers and
7
their ability to quickly respond to a threat
from abroad, to conduct operations in Rus-
sia and outside it, and to combat the terror
threat.
External border security is better because
the West has fallen into the economic cri-
sis, one Valdai expert said. Another expert
believes that in spite of rhetoric, after the
August 2008 war in the Caucasus Russia
has proved quite pragmatic in terms of
international security, including in the Lib-
yan conflict and to a great extent in Syria as
well. While defending its interests, though,
Moscow finds itself on the other side in
terms of international community percep-
tion, giving the idea of defending old and
tyrannical systems.
The index of the Russian diplomat-
ic activity on the international scene
plunged to 0.2 in 20112012 (from 0.2
in 2011 and 0.8 in 2010).
The experts are widely divided over Russias
stance on Syria. Some of them described
it as harmful and said that Russia's for-
eign policy appears to be more focused on
preventing U.S. leadership than on sup-
porting Kofi Annan's plan for a transition.
Others have a positive view of Russias role
as mediator: Russia has been highly active
on the diplomatic scene connected with
Syria and has made strenuous attempts
to help to find a political solution through
strong support for the Kofi Annan mission
and Moscow's own contacts with the Syrian
government as well as representatives of
opposition groups. Its role has been poorly
understood in the Western and much of the
Arab media and deliberately distorted by
spokespeople for Western and some Arab
governments. As a result, perceptions of
Russia's global diplomacy have, unfortu-
nately, become more negative.
Accordingly, over 75.4% of respondents said
that the perception of Russia abroad has
worsened, while 46.6% have a negative view
of Russias diplomatic initiatives.
Most Valdai experts have a neutral opin-
ion of Russias participation in interna-
tional organizations, which they say has
not changed since last year. At the same
time, Russias participation in the G20 and
the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) has improved,
according to 32.8% and 20.6% of experts,
respectively.
A total of 63% of experts have a positive
view of Russias chairmanship of APEC and
APEC Leaders Week in Vladivostok.
They have a more positive opinion of Rus-
sias participation in the SCO (39.6%), the
CIS (36.9%) and the CSTO (31.5%), than in
the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
Despite the general consensus about a lack
of major change in Russias participation in
these organizations compared to last year,
negative assessments prevail in the case
of the UN (34.2%) and the OSCE and the
Council of Europe (32.9%).
Experts point to a negative trend in
Russias openness to the world (0.1),
although 46.6% of them mentioned improve-
ment in the degree to which Russian citizens
are free to travel internationally and 39.7%
in the degree to which foreign citizens are
free to travel within Russia. Russians travel
more and more extensively, while foreign
tourists are still a minor presence in most
regions of the Russian Federation except
Moscow and St. Petersburg. Russia is still
perceived as a closed country. Easing visa
systems would certainly help to a great
extent, a number of experts said.
The Russian populations attitude toward
foreign citizens remained largely stable,
whereas foreign perception of Russian citi-
zens has deteriorated, said 37% of experts.
A total of 76.7% of experts believe that for-
eign perception of Russia as an open coun-
try has deteriorated. The level of accessi-
bility of information on Russia to foreign
citizens has not changed. Russia has long
ceased to be a daily news item. Only
a handful of correspondents and report-
ers are serious or knowledgeable. So the
impressions of most people are created by
stories: Berezovsky v Abramovich, Mag-
nitsky, and Pussy Riot, one of the experts
said.
The majority of experts said the level of
openness and accessibility of representa-
tives of federal and regional government
bodies to foreign citizens remained almost
flat at last years level, and that there was
only a minor negative trend. There have
been increasing image problems for Rus-
sia because of arrests and persecution of
opposition and dissident figures. Particu-
larly since President Putin took office in
May, the increasing repression of Russian
civic groups has significantly worsened
Russia's international reputation, experts
said.
The trend for Russias soft power index
remained slightly negative (0.2).
Almost half of respondents (46.6%) noted
a decrease in the attractiveness of Rus-
sias cultural and civilizational models. The
extent to which Russias political values
are reflected in its foreign policy and the
assessment of the national idea (values that
predominate nationwide) reflected a slight
negative trend.
The experts are divided in their assessment
of the global role of the Russian language
and the global popularity of Russian culture,
saying that they have not changed, or show
a minor deterioration in the case of the Rus-
sian language (28.7% v 23.2%) and an equal
balance of positive and negative in the case
of Russian culture (24.7% respectively).
Russian culture is highly respected world-
wide. But teaching and knowledge of the
Russian language are declining, at least in
the West, one of the experts said.
Some respondents doubt whether many
foreign countries look to Russia for a civiliza-
tional model. According to 56.1% of respon-
dents, Russias attractiveness as a place of
permanent residence has declined.
9
The analysis of the surveys over the past three years leads to the con-
clusion that international experts still view Russia as a strong and active global
power. Their opinions of its domestic policy and some aspects of Russian society
are mostly negative, but they do not dramatize the situation and only point to
a minor negative trend. It is important to note that they have a positive view of
the political priorities on which Russia has been consistently working, such as
support for innovative development. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the
current circumstances the choice of development trends depends on Russians,
and primarily on the Russian president who has greatly strengthened his stance
over the past year and who will have to address the issue of confrontation with
a class of new urban residents and to redouble efforts to diversify the Russian
economy and stimulate investment in human capital (education, culture and bet-
ter living conditions).
9.
30.1
41.1
9.
4.1
4.1
1.4
0.0
1.4
.8
19.2
12.3
13.7
35.
11.0
0.0
5.5
1.4
23.3
2.0
17.8
11.0
0.0
0.0
,QXHQFHZLWKLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
(IFLHQF\RISROLF\GHYHORSPHQW
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
3XEOLFWUXVW
Very substantIaI deterIoratIon
SubstantIaI deterIoratIon
SIIght deterIoratIon
No change
SIIght Improvement
SubstantIaI Improvement
Very substantIaI Improvement
Dont know / Cant assess
1.1. The President
3XEOLFWUXVW ,QXHQFHZLWKLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
15.1
49.3
19.2
9.
5.5
1.4
0.0
0.0
17.8
24.7
37.0
13.7
4.1
1.4
0.0
1.4
11.0
31.5
30.1
17.8
.8
1.4
0.0
1.4
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.2. The executive branch
1.2.1. The Prime Minister
1. The Russian political system
11
.8
21.9
41.1
23.3
4.1
2.7
0.0
0.0
3XEOLFWUXVW
4.1
21.9
32.9
30.1
5.5
4.1
0.0
1.4
2.7
1.4
38.4
32.9
2.7
4.1
0.0
2.7
,QXHQFHZLWKLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.2.2. The Russian Government
2.7
12.3
35.
28.8
9.
1.4
0.0
9.
,QXHQFHZLWKLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
3XEOLFWUXVW
1.4
5.5
24.7
39.7
1.4
2.7
0.0
9.
1.4
8.2
20.5
49.3
.8
2.7
0.0
11.0
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.2.3. The regional executive branch (Plenipotentiary Representatives,
Governors, Mayors)
11.0
20.5
35.
24.7
5.5
0.0
0.0
2.7
,QXHQFHZLWKLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
(IFLHQF\RIGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
3XEOLFWUXVW
4.1
12.3
28.8
4.
5.5
1.4
0.0
1.4
4.1
17.8
24.7
43.8
.8
0.0
0.0
2.7
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.3. The legislative branch
1.3.1. The State Duma
4.1
5.5
15.1
5.8
2.7
1.4
0.0
5.5
4.1
12.3
17.8
58.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
.8
4.1
5.5
13.7
7.1
2.7
0.0
0.0
.8
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.3.2. The Federation Council
5.5
5.5
2.0
4.
11.0
0.0
0.0
5.5
13.7
23.3
21.9
32.9
5.5
0.0
0.0
2.7
2.7
12.3
23.3
45.2
11.0
1.4
0.0
4.1
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.4. The judicial system
1.4.1. The courts of general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
3XEOLFWUXVW (IFLHQF\RIGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
,QXHQFHZLWKLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
0.0
4.1
9.
5.8
4.1
0.0
0.0
1.4
0.0
8.2
17.8
52.1
.8
0.0
0.0
15.1
0.0
4.1
8.2
7.1
5.5
0.0
0.0
15.1
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.4.2. The Constitutional Court
13
1.4
1.4
5.5
0.3
8.2
1.4
2.7
19.2
1.4
4.1
15.1
50.7
5.5
2.7
1.4
19.2
1.4
2.7
.8
58.9
9.
1.4
0.0
19.2
3XEOLFWUXVW (IFLHQF\RIGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
,QXHQFHZLWKLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.4.3. Arbitration tribunals, the Supreme Arbitration Court
3XEOLFWUXVW
11.0
19.2
39.7
15.1
8.2
5.5
0.0
1.4
23.3
39.7
21.9
.8
.8
1.4
0.0
0.0
,QXHQFHZLWKLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
12.3
24.7
41.1
12.3
.8
1.4
0.0
1.4
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.5. Political parties and the political system
1.5.1. The ruling party
5.5
.8
21.9
28.8
32.9
1.4
1.4
1.4
0.0
13.7
1.4
28.8
35.
2.7
1.4
1.4
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
1.4
15.1
13.7
47.9
17.8
1.4
0.0
2.7
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.5.2. Parliamentary opposition
,QXHQFHZLWKLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
3XEOLFWUXVW
1.4
1.4
.8
1.4
50.7
17.8
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7
11.0
13.7
42.5
21.9
4.1
1.4
2.7
2.7
9.
39.7
34.2
4.1
2.7
4.1
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.5.3. Extra-parliamentary opposition
11.0
21.9
24.7
19.2
1.4
.8
0.0
0.0
5.5
34.2
23.3
23.3
12.3
1.4
0.0
0.0
9.
23.3
30.1
19.2
15.1
2.7
0.0
0.0
7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFK
FLWL]HQVLQWHUHVWVDUHUHHFWHG
GXULQJHOHFWLRQV
7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHULJKWV
DQGIUHHGRPVRIFLWL]HQVDUHREVHUYHG
E\WKHJRYHUQPHQW
'HJUHHRIIUHHGRP
RISUHVVDQGH[SUHVVLRQ
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.6. The role of civil society
1.6.1. Civil society development level
7KHGHJUHHRISUHGLFWDELOLW\
RIWKHHOHFWRUDOSURFHVV
12.3
20.5
27.4
20.5
17.8
0.0
0.0
1.4
7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHULJKWV
DQGIUHHGRPVWRHOHFWDQGEHHOHFWHG
DUHREVHUYHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW
)UHHGRPRIFDPSDLJQLQJ
LQFOXGLQJDFFHVVWRWKHPHGLD
12.3
20.5
28.8
24.7
9.
1.4
0.0
2.7
5.5
13.7
21.9
38.4
13.7
2.7
2.7
1.4
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.6.2. The electoral process
15
3XEOLFWUXVW
0.0
5.5
11.0
30.1
41.1
9.
2.7
0.0
,QXHQFHZLWKLQ
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
1.4
8.2
24.7
24.7
34.2
5.5
1.4
0.0
1.4
12.3
11.0
41.1
2.0
2.7
1.4
4.1
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.6.3. The role of non-governmental organizations
WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
4.1
15.1
12.3
42.5
9.
1.4
0.0
15.1
DQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
1.4
12.3
11.0
50.7
11.0
0.0
1.4
12.3
2.7
13.7
9.
47.9
11.0
0.0
1.4
13.7
No change
SIIght Improvement
1.6.4. The role of the Russian Public Chamber

0.0
4.1
37.0
20.5
31.5
2.7
0.0
4.1
0DFURHFRQRPLF
SDUDPHWHUV
No change
SIIght Improvement
2.1. Macroeconomic parameters (GDP trends, external debts,
the trade balance and inflation)
0.0
1.4
19.2
31.5
37.0
4.1
0.0
.8
0.0
2.7
1.4
39.7
32.9
1.4
1.4
5.5
0.0
2.7
24.7
38.4
23.3
2.7
0.0
8.2
0.0
1.4
23.3
39.7
21.9
4.1
1.4
8.2
)LQDQFLDOVHUYLFHV ([WUDFWLRQLQGXVWULHV 3URGXFLQJDQG3URFHVVLQJ
LQGXVWULHV
,QQRYDWLRQLQGXVWULHV
2.2. Development of economic sectors
2. The Russian economy
17
0.0
5.5
19.2
52.1
15.1
1.4
0.0
.8
0.0
2.7
2.0
37.0
20.5
2.7
0.0
11.0
5XVVLDVEDODQFH
RISD\PHQWVIRUHFDVW
/HYHORIGLYHUVLFDWLRQ
RIWKHHFRQRP\
7KHHIFLHQF\RIPHDVXUHV
WDNHQWRPRGHUQL]H
WKHHFRQRP\
2.7
9.
28.8
30.1
20.5
1.4
0.0
.8
No change
SIIght Improvement
2.3. Economic modernization
,QYHVWPHQWDWWUDFWLYHQHVV
GLUHFWLQYHVWPHQW
1.4
12.3
27.4
32.9
20.5
0.0
1.4
4.1
/HYHORI5XVVLDVLQWHJUDWLRQ
LQWKHJOREDOHFRQRP\
7KH5XVVLDQ
PDUNHWVRSHQQHVV
1.4
2.7
1.4
2.0
39.7
8.2
1.4
4.1
0.0
.8
15.1
35.
34.2
4.1
0.0
4.1
No change
SIIght Improvement
2.4. The Russian investment climate
%XVLQHVVFOLPDWH ,QYHVWPHQWDWWUDFWLYHQHVV
SRUWIROLRLQYHVWPHQW
0.0
.8
13.7
41.1
23.3
1.4
0.0
13.7
2.7
5.5
37.0
35.
15.1
0.0
0.0
4.1
0.0
9.
37.0
27.4
19.2
1.4
1.4
4.1
7D[OHJLVODWLRQ
GHYHORSPHQWOHYHO
No change
SIIght Improvement
(QYLURQPHQW 3XEOLFKHDOWK )HHOLQJRIVDIHW\VHFXULW\
0.0
2.7
31.5
47.9
12.3
1.4
0.0
4.1
1.4
5.5
37.0
45.2
9.
1.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.7
21.9
42.5
27.4
0.0
0.0
5.5
No change
SIIght Improvement
3.1. Living standards
3RYHUW\OHYHO 3URVSHULW\OHYHO
0.0
2.7
27.4
39.7
2.0
0.0
0.0
4.1
0.0
1.4
20.5
42.5
31.5
1.4
0.0
2.7
No change
SIIght Improvement
3. The Russian human
dimension
19
1.4
11.0
2.0
42.5
12.3
1.4
0.0
5.5
*HQHUDOHGXFDWLRQVWDQGDUGV 3URIHVVLRQDOYRFDWLRQDO
HGXFDWLRQVWDQGDUGV
1.4
9.
2.0
39.7
15.1
0.0
0.0
8.2
No change
SIIght Improvement
3.2. Education standards
/HYHORIPXWXDOWUXVW
2.7
23.3
39.7
24.7
8.2
1.4
0.0
0.0
/HYHORIQDWLRQDO
SULGHSDWULRWLVP
6HQVHRIIUHHGRP
0.0
2.7
24.7
41.1
21.9
2.7
2.7
4.1
4.1
27.4
42.5
13.7
9.
2.7
0.0
0.0
No change
SIIght Improvement
3.3. Ideology and politics
&XOWXUDOOHYHO
RIWKHSRSXODWLRQ
1.4
4.1
2.0
47.9
1.4
1.4
0.0
2.7
/HYHORIJRRGZLOO
VXSSRUWWRFRPSDWULRWV
FRPSDVVLRQ
7ROHUDQFHOHYHO
1.4
4.1
37.0
38.4
1.4
0.0
1.4
1.4
1.4
21.9
43.8
23.3
.8
1.4
1.4
0.0
No change
SIIght Improvement
The creative petentia|
ef engineers
1.4
1.4
12.3
4.
13.7
1.4
0.0
23.3
1.4
.8
2.0
35.
15.1
1.4
0.0
13.7
Cempetitiveness ef kussian
higher educatien, pest-graduate
and decterate ceurses
The creative petentia|
ef academics / scientists
1.4
2.7
19.2
42.5
20.5
1.4
0.0
12.3
No change
SIIght Improvement
7KHEXVLQHVVFRPPXQLW\V
ZLOOLQJQHVVWREHLQYROYHG
LQYHQWXUHLQYHVWPHQW
1.4
4.1
19.2
34.2
23.3
2.7
0.0
15.1
1.4
1.4
12.3
37.0
2.0
0.0
0.0
21.9
,QIUDVWUXFWXUHLQFHQWLYHV
IRULQQRYDWLRQ
7D[LQFHQWLYHVIRULQQRYDWLRQ
1.4
4.1
20.5
27.4
31.5
0.0
0.0
15.1
No change
SIIght Improvement
4. Russian science and the
countrys innovative
development
21
7KHOHYHORIVWDWH
QDQFLQJIRUVFLHQFH
4.1
8.2
39.7
28.8
11.0
1.4
0.0
.8
0.0
4.1
15.1
2.0
37.0
2.7
0.0
15.1
1.4
1.4
17.8
35.
19.2
1.4
0.0
23.3
9HQWXUHLQYHVWPHQWLQ5'SURMHFWV 7KHEUDLQGUDLQ
No change
SIIght Improvement
7KHH[LVWHQFHRIFRPSHWLWLYH
LQQRYDWLRQSURMHFWV
1.4
2.7
1.4
27.4
32.9
1.4
0.0
17.8
0.0
4.1
1.4
4.
15.1
0.0
0.0
17.8
7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFK5'UHVXOWVDUHDSSOLHG
LQWKHHFRQRP\PHFKDQLVPVJRYHUQLQJ
WKHFRPPHUFLDOL]DWLRQRIVFLHQWLFLQQRYDWLRQV
No change
SIIght Improvement
/HYHORIDGYDQFHG
PLOLWDU\5'SURMHFWV
0.0
2.7
1.4
54.8
20.5
2.7
1.4
1.4
0.0
4.1
12.3
30.1
41.1
0.0
0.0
12.3
([WHUQDOERUGHUVHFXULW\ /HYHOWRZKLFKWKH5XVVLDQ
$UPHG)RUFHVLVHTXLSSHG
ZLWKPRGHUQZHDSRQV
0.0
4.1
13.7
24.7
53.4
0.0
0.0
4.1
No change
SIIght Improvement
$ELOLW\WRTXLFNO\UHVSRQG
WRDWKUHDWIURPDEURDG
0.0
4.1
8.2
52.1
23.3
0.0
0.0
12.3
0.0
2.7
13.7
41.1
30.1
2.7
0.0
9.
0.0
1.4
13.7
49.3
24.7
0.0
0.0
11.0
3URIHVVLRQDOTXDOLWLHV
RIRIFHUVDQGFRPPDQGHUV
3URIHVVLRQDOTXDOLWLHV
RI5XVVLDQVROGLHUV
No change
SIIght Improvement
5. Russia in the system
of national, regional
and global security
23
$ELOLW\WRFRPEDW
WKHWHUURUWKUHDW
0.0
2.7
8.2
54.8
27.4
1.4
0.0
5.5
0.0
5.5
1.4
47.9
21.9
2.7
0.0
5.5
0.0
0.0
9.
45.2
35.
1.4
0.0
8.2
$ELOLW\WRUHVSRQGWRDWKUHDW
ZKLFKDULVHVZLWKLQ5XVVLD
$ELOLW\WRFRQGXFW
RSHUDWLRQVRXWVLGH5XVVLD
No change
SIIght Improvement
0.0
.8
17.8
34.2
32.9
.8
0.0
1.4
4.1
2.7
19.2
4.
15.1
1.4
1.4
9.
0LOLWDU\FRRSHUDWLRQZLWK
IRUHLJQFRXQWULHVDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQV
$ELOLW\WRFRQGXFW
DJOREDOZDU
5XVVLDDVDSRWHQWLDO
WKUHDWWRSHDFH
5XVVLDDVDJXDUDQWRU
RILQWHUQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\
LQFOXGLQJSHDFHNHHSLQJPLVVLRQV
1.4
1.4
15.1
5.2
13.7
5.5
1.4
5.5
0.0
4.1
24.7
43.8
21.9
1.4
1.4
2.7
6. Russian diplomatic activity
on the international scene
,QYROYHPHQW
LQLQWHUQDWLRQDODLGHIIRUWV
0.0
9.
30.1
24.7
27.4
8.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.1
17.8
49.3
20.5
1.4
4.1
2.7
0.0
17.8
31.5
20.5
2.0
4.1
0.0
0.0
5XVVLDVLQWHUQDWLRQDO
LQXHQFH
0HGLDWLRQZRUNWRUHVROYH
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQLFWV
No change
SIIght Improvement
6.1. General assessment of the Russian foreign policy
5XVVLDVGLSORPDWLFLQLWLDWLYHV
1.4
24.7
49.3
15.1
5.5
4.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
11.0
35.
27.4
17.8
4.1
4.1
0.0
3HUFHSWLRQRI5XVVLDDEURDG
No change
SIIght Improvement
25
The 0rganizatien fer cenemic
Ceeperatien and Deve|epment (0CD)
0.0
0.0
5.5
0.3
19.2
1.4
0.0
13.7
1.4
8.2
21.9
5.2
8.2
1.4
0.0
2.7
Participatien in the C8 Participatien in the C20
0.0
1.4
11.0
53.4
30.1
2.7
0.0
1.4
No change
SIIght Improvement
6.2. Russia's participation in international organizations
0.0
4.1
13.7
37.0
30.1
.8
0.0
8.2
The Cemmenwea|th
ef Independent States (CIS)
The Shanghai Ceeperatien
0rganizatien (SC0)
The Asia-Pacic cenemic
Ceeperatien (APC)
0.0
0.0
1.4
39.7
34.2
2.7
2.7
4.1
0.0
0.0
2.7
28.8
50.7
9.
2.7
5.5
No change
SIIght Improvement
7KH&RXQFLORI(XURSH
0.0
11.0
21.9
58.9
4.1
1.4
0.0
2.7
3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQ81DFWLYLWLHV 3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQ2UJDQL]DWLRQ
IRU6HFXULW\DQG&RRSHUDWLRQ
LQ(XURSH26&(DFWLYLWLHV
7KH&ROOHFWLYH6HFXULW\
7UHDW\2UJDQL]DWLRQ&672
0.0
8.2
2.0
43.8
15.1
0.0
2.7
4.1
0.0
8.2
24.7
1.
2.7
0.0
0.0
2.7
0.0
1.4
8.2
49.3
2.0
4.1
1.4
9.
7. Russias openness
to the world
7KH5XVVLDQSRSXODWLRQVDWWLWXGH
WRZDUGIRUHLJQFLWL]HQV
0.0
2.7
27.4
41.1
2.0
1.4
1.4
0.0
'HJUHHWRZKLFK5XVVLDQ
FLWL]HQVDUHIUHH
WRWUDYHOLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\
'HJUHHWRZKLFKIRUHLJQ
FLWL]HQVDUHIUHH
WRWUDYHOZLWKLQ5XVVLD
0.0
0.0
4.1
49.3
32.9
11.0
2.7
0.0
1.4
1.4
11.0
45.2
34.2
4.1
1.4
1.4
No change
SIIght Improvement
$FFHVVLELOLW\RILQIRUPDWLRQ
RQ5XVVLDWRIRUHLJQFLWL]HQV
0.0
4.1
24.7
4.
21.9
1.4
1.4
0.0
)RUHLJQSHUFHSWLRQ
RI5XVVLDQFLWL]HQV
)RUHLJQSHUFHSWLRQ
RI5XVVLDDVDQRSHQFRXQWU\
0.0
4.1
32.9
43.8
15.1
2.7
0.0
1.4
2.7
35.
38.4
12.3
.8
2.7
0.0
1.4
No change
SIIght Improvement
27
2SHQQHVVDQGDFFHVVLELOLW\
RIUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIUHJLRQDO
JRYHUQPHQWERGLHVWRIRUHLJQFLWL]HQV
1.4
1.4
17.8
45.2
8.2
2.7
0.0
23.3
2SHQQHVVDQGDFFHVVLELOLW\
RIUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIIHGHUDO
JRYHUQPHQWERGLHVWRIRUHLJQFLWL]HQV
0.0
4.1
28.8
4.
5.5
4.1
0.0
11.0
No change
SIIght Improvement
8. Soft power
1.4
11.0
17.8
52.1
12.3
1.4
1.4
2.7
7KHQDWLRQDOLGHDYDOXHV
WKDWSUHGRPLQDWHQDWLRQZLGH
7KHDWWUDFWLYHQHVVRI5XVVLDV
FXOWXUDODQGFLYLOL]DWLRQDOPRGHOV
7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFK5XVVLDVSROLWLFDO
YDOXHVDUHUHHFWHGLQLWVIRUHLJQSROLF\
2.7
15.1
28.8
35.
1.4
0.0
1.4
0.0
1.4
5.5
15.1
50.7
19.2
8.2
0.0
0.0
No change
SIIght Improvement
)RUHLJQSHUFHSWLRQ
RI5XVVLDQHPLJUDQWV
0.0
4.1
1.4
0.3
1.4
0.0
0.0
2.7
0.0
8.2
20.5
4.
20.5
2.7
0.0
1.4
7KHJOREDOUROH
RIWKH5XVVLDQODQJXDJH
7KHJOREDOSRSXODULW\
RI5XVVLDQFXOWXUH
5XVVLDVDWWUDFWLYHQHVV
DVDSODFHRISHUPDQHQWUHVLGHQFH
0.0
0.0
24.7
49.3
21.9
1.4
1.4
1.4
.8
15.1
34.2
34.2
5.5
0.0
0.0
4.1
29
About the project:
The Russia Development Index (Valdai Index) reflects the combined opinion of
the world's leading experts on Russia as regards Russias political, economic,
social, cultural and international performance. The annual poll aims to study
changes in Russias development trends over a year. It is important that respon-
dents assess not the current situation, but changes.
The first Valdai Index survey was conducted at the seventh annual conference of the Valdai
International Discussion Club in 2010. A group of 25 leading experts on Russia from the
United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, China, Poland, Canada and Japan
were asked to answer nine questions and to provide their marks on a 7-point scale ranging
from 5 (significant deterioration) to +5 (significant improvement).
In 2011, the Valdai Index structure was changed significantly. The questionnaire mod-
ules were expanded, each containing a number of categories that specify and define more
accurately the changes that happened in Russia over the year. The participants were asked
to choose one mark on a seven-point scale for each category in eight modules that best
describes the current trend. The marks range from 3 (significant deterioration) to +3 (sig-
nificant improvement). The new format was approved as the basis for the project.
The focus group for the Russia Development Index 2011/2012 included 230 participants
of the Valdai Club conferences, and more than 30% of respondents from 17 countries par-
ticipated in the survey: Great Britain, Hungary, Germany, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Italy, Canada,
China, Russia, Singapore, the United States, Turkey, Ukraine, Finland, France and Japan.
Among them, 71% were foreign experts.
There might be a slight error in the diagrams that show the results of the poll due to rounding.

Russia Development Index 2011-2012 (Valdai Index), English Version

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Russia Development Index 2011-2012 (Valdai Index), English Version

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

RUSSIA DEVELOPMENT

You might also like