Mendoza v. Arrieta G.R. No. L-32599, June 29, 1979 Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts: A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a car owned and driven by petitioner Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar, and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the CFI of Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-ownerdriver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazars jeep and petitioners car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar. After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a civil case against respondents Salazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles. Issue: whether or not the lower court in dismissing petitioners complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against private respondents Held: Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent Judge wrongfully sustained Timbols allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in a criminal case filed against him, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against Salazar only. For petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that, When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Timbols submission that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, bars the institution of such separate civil action is untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31 (in relation to Articles 2176 and 2177) of the Civil Code creates a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation is required to be made in the criminal case. And so, to reiterate, the civil case filed against Timbol is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

But insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no. In as much as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended party. The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case. Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by petitioners car for considering that the collision between the jeep driven by him and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Montoya, it cannot be said that Salazar was at fault. Hence, the right of petitioner to claim damages from Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c) which provides that, Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil right arise did not exist

PSBA VS CA G. R. No. 84698February 4, 1992 FACTS: On August 30, 1985, Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce student of PSBA, was stabbed to death while on the second floor premises of the said school. His parents filed a suit for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. It was established that the assailants were not members of the schools academic community but were elements from outside the school. PSBA sought to have the suit dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article. http://missaldea.blogspot.comThe trial court denied the motion to dismiss. CA affirmed the trial courts decision based on the law of quasi-delicts holding that teachers and heads of the school are liable unless they prove thatthey observed all the diligence to prevent damage. http://missaldea.blogspot.com ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for the damages http://missaldea.blogspot.com RULING: Article 2180 plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. The assailants of Carlitos were NOT students of PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. http://missaldea.blogspot.comUpon enrolment, a contract between the academic institution and the students is established, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. The school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Amadora v. CA [1988] Cruz, J. Facts: April 13, 1972: Alfredo Amadora, a high school graduating student of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos went to school to finish a Physics experiment. However, while he was in the auditorium, his classmate Pablito Daffon fired a gun that hit him. He died at 17. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.

Amadoras parents filed a civil action for damages under CC Art. 2180 against the school, its rector, HS principal, dean of boys & Physics teacher,plus Daffon & 2 other students thru their parents. Complaint against students was later dropped. CFI Cebu: defendants were liable in the sum of P294,984.00 (deathcompensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,moral damages, exemplary damages & attorneys fees)

CA: reversed, all defendants absolved completely. o o o o 1.As per Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 45, CC Art. 2180 is not applicable since the school was an academic institution of learning & not a school of arts & trades. 2.Students were not in custody of the school at the time of the incident since the semester had already ended. 3.No clear identification of the fatal gun. 4.Defendants exercised necessary diligence in preventing injury.

Petitioners claim their son was still under schools custody because he went to school to comply w/a requirement for graduation.

Respondents: Amadora went to school to submit a Physics report & he was no longer in their custody since the semester was over. A gun was confiscated by Sergio Damaso, dean of boys, from Jose Gumban on April 7, 1972. It was an unlicensed pistol w/c was later on returned to Gumban w/o reporting such to the principal or

taking further action. Gumban was one Daffons companions when the incident happened. Petitioners claim it was this gun that killed their son w/c respondents rebutted by saying there was no proof that they were one and the same.

ISSUE & RATIO: WON respondents are liable. NO. HOLDING: Petition denied.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following conclusions: 1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities. 2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-incharge of Alfredo's killer. 3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline. 4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son. 5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have

been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody. In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.