NATO

wobec wyzwa wspczesnego

wiata
NATO poziom ambicji a globalne wyzwania bezpieczestwa
d 18-19 padziernika 2012
dr in. Jerzy DERE derenj@wp.pl

AGENDA

RODOWISKO BEZPIECZENSTWA MIDZYNARODOWEGO

ZAGROENIA
KONCEPCJA STRATEGICZNA NATO POZIOM AMBICJI ZDOLNOCI = DPP (FPP) NSC + NFS OPERACJE WNIOSKI

rodowisko Bezpieczestwa Midzynarodowego (ewoluowanie)

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (wg NATO)

7.Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century. 8.However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. [..]

Defence and Deterrence

16.The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATOs resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.

19.We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will: [..].. maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;

PEACE
Strategic lift

CONFLICT
CJTF CJTF
Strategic lift

Art.5 HIC

WAR
Art.5 HIC

Art.5 HIC Art.5 HIC

Strategic lift

Art.5 HIC

SYSTEM OVERARCHING VALUES

NATO / National Level of Ambitions

Power
Capabilities

Strategy
Requirements

War Conflict - Cooperation

Threat

NATIONAL SECURIY SYSTEM INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

END OF THE COLD WAR (1945 1989)

SHIFTING OF THE PARADIGM OF THE WAR TOWARDS ASYMETRY

The evolution of Security Envronment

New Concepts Adopted

Industrial Era of Conventional Wars

In accordance with new vision and Concepts - new quality of capabilities, are required. For combat angagement : doctrines, tactics, technics and procedures.

POLITYKA

STRATEGIA

KONCEPCJE

DOKTRYNY

TTP

SOP/SOI

RMA Prekursor transformacji

The military concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a theory about the future of warfare, often connected to technological and organizational recommendations for change in the United States military and others. Especially tied to modern information, communications, and space technology, RMA is often linked to current discussions under the label of Transformation and total systems integration in the US military.

1993

1992

Zagroenia

The 21st Century Security Environment

Changing ALLIANCES: IMPACT OF THE EURO ECO-ASIA Virtual States Sub-National Groups: Russian Mafia, FARC, Al Qaida

FAILED STATES TERRORISM

POPULATION GROWTH + RESOURCE SCARCITY = Wars over Food, Water, Fish Global Warming +/ Ecological disaster + Creeping Deserts =

INFORMATION WARFARE
ETHNOReligious PAN-NATIONALISM IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY GLOBALIZATION

UNCERTAIN UNCERTAIN FUTURE FUTURE

ASYMMETRIC THREAT/WARFARE

Proliferation of WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS? More GNP = More Defense Spending GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

DISEASE (AIDS PANDEMIC MALARIA, EBOLA))

DRUGS TRAFFICINKG AND TRANSBORDER CRIME ILLEGAL MASS MIGRATION

Security vs. Threat

Asymmetric

Prof. P. Sienkiewicz, C4ISTAR Seminar, National Defense University, Warsaw 2007

Conventional
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Threat

Asymetic

Koncepcja Strategiczna NATO

(par 19. 02 NLoA)

Poziom ambicji NATO

koncepcja

GLOBAL ASSUMPTIONS IN NEW (OLD) AGENTS

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM (a new agents) USA A new Generation: ACTA , OWS, EU NATO China UN India Turkey + North Africa + M-E Russia (threaties) Dr. Henry Kissinger: "The

centre of gravity of world affairs has left the Atlantic and moved to the Pacific and Indian Oceans"

Evolution Of Strategic Concepts

NATO DM PROCESS KEY PRODUCTS

1991 Alliance Strategic Concept 2010 Alliance Strategic Concept

During the immediate post-Cold War period, NATO issued two unclassified Strategic Concepts that advocated a broader approach to security than before: The Alliances Strategic Concept, November 1991; The Alliances Strategic Concept, April 1999. Both of these were accompanied by a classified military document: respectively MC 400 and MC 400/2.
I.Force Standards (Vol. VII) CREVAL, TACEVAL, APs, STANAGs, MOU, TA, SOP, SOI, TTP

NATOs Command Structure has been reviewed, as part of a major reform process, to make it more efficient, flexible and responsive.

While the Alliances level of ambition remains the same,

the changes will make its Command Structure more affordable, reducing the overall number of staff from 13,00 to 8,800 posts. The review process took into account the Command Structures core functions such as planning of operations, conduct of operations, development and transformation, military cooperation, and support activities. It also considered a number of new tasks stemming from the 2010 Strategic Concept and key principles such as the ability to conduct Article 5 operations, deployability and sustainability, as well as Alliance cohesion. Greater interaction between NATO headquarters and national headquarters will also be developed as a result of this reform.

[..] The enduring core purposes of the command structure are two:

provide strategic and operational command for all NATO missions, both
Article 5 and non-Article 5; and prepare members and partner militaries for operational employment as

interoperable multinational forces.

Neither of these roles should be substantially shifted to the NATO Force Structure.
This risks weakening interoperability because only the command structure provides such crucial functions as: the link to higher Alliance authorities; integrating multinational commitments beyond any given NFS commands frame of reference; and guiding member militaries toward Alliance-wide transformation and interoperable networking.
W. Bruce Weinrod and Charles L. Barry., NATO Command Structure Considerations for the Future, National Defense University, September 2010

19. Zapewnimy, aby NATO dysponowao penym zakresem zdolnoci niezbdnych do odstraszania i obrony przed jakimkolwiek zagroeniem bezpieczestwa naszych spoeczestw.
Dlatego bdziemy:

Utrzymywa zdolno do jednoczesnego prowadzenia wikszych poczonych operacji oraz kilku mniejszych operacji obrony zbiorowej i reagowania kryzysowego, w tym operacji na odlegych obszarach strategicznych

[..] The level of ambition that relates to the size of the command structure will have to be confirmed or revised.
A fundamental of planning is to be ready to take on a second core challenge whenever called on to deal with a first, in order not to risk being taken advantage of if heavily committed, as in Afghanistan.

Thus the command structure should be capable of two simultaneous major operations. However, at least some small operations may be an area to share with nations or outside NATO itself, e.g., with the EU.
W. Bruce Weinrod and Charles L. Barry., NATO Command Structure Considerations for the Future, National Defense University, September 2010

Alliance Security Environment

Steven B. Snyder, NATO Relevance: Military Implications And Translation Of The 2010 Strategic Concept NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,, 2010

Alliance Requisite Capabilities for Cooperative Security

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Steven B. Snyder, NATO Relevance: Military Implications And Translation Of The 2010 Strategic Concept NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,, 2010

Alliance Requisite Capabilities for Crisis Management

Steven B. Snyder, NATO Relevance: Military Implications And Translation Of The 2010 Strategic Concept NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,, 2010

..modu dowodzenia ?

NATO and its future Have combat experience, will travel Mar 26th 2009 | from the print edition

For years after the cold war ended,

NATO's threat assessment, contained in a document known as MC 161,

saw no Russian threat; that is why there are few contingency plans to defend new allies.
For instance, SHAPE drew up plans to defend Poland (inadequate ones, say senior Poles), but none exists to protect small Baltic states that feel particularly vulnerable. This is changing slowly; NATO's outgoing commander, General John Craddock, started some informal prudent planning for territorial defence that could, in coming months, become official contingency plans, if friends of Russia, like Germany and Italy, can be made to agree. Russia, General Craddock has said, seeks to weaken Euro-Atlantic institutions and has shown readiness to use economic leverage and military force to achieve its aims.

Further Complications In The Acceptance Process: NATO As An Example

Within a NATO context, scenario approval implies the consensus of Alliance members. Thus, approving NATO planning scenarios requires a decision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). But an approval of the scenario set could be interpreted as a direct statement of the Alliances strategic intent. Typically, however, planning scenarios are only intended to capture uncertainty and allow prudent defence planning. Consequently, NATO approved scenarios at this level would be extremely unlikely, if not impossible to obtain. It should be noted that there is no political body within the Alliance beneath the NAC to whom political authority can be delegated. (This logic may be similar for national authorities as well.)

In theory, it might be possible to obtain NATO military approval at the senior level of military authority within the Alliance, the Military Committee (MC), but in practice this is not feasible due i.e. to the time constraints of that body. As military authority can be delegated within NATO, approval is feasible at the next highest military level, the Strategic Command (SC).

The SC could and should obtain the comments of the MC; and, hence, their implied approval.
Thus, while it is not possible to obtain NATO politically approved scenarios, militarily approved scenarios are achievable at the SC level with the implied consent of the MC.

When constructing scenarios, the SC should derive factors such as the type of mission and geographic area of interest from existent NATO agreed documents. These include the Treaty itself, the Alliances strategic concept, Ministerial Guidance for defence planning and NATO agreed intelligence (e.g. MC161, which is the basis for risks to the Alliance). Interpretation of these source documents will still be required. Normally, the Strategic Commander delegates this task to a specific staff body. However, ultimate responsibility for the interpretation resides with the commander. It is also the responsibility of that commander to ensure that interpretation is consistent within the command, to coordinate interpretation with other NATO commands and to consult with senior military bodies.

Zdolnoci = NCS + NFS (Capabilities)

STAA I MOBILNA INFRASTRUKTURA NATO

NATO INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE (NCS)

ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION
byo STRATEGIC COMMAND ATLANTIC Norfolk, US
STRIKFLTLANT* Przeksztacone w cz Si NATO
Norfolk, US

ALLIED COMMAND OPERATION

byo STRATEGIC COMMAND EUROPE Mons, Belgium

SZCZEBLE DOWODZENIA
STRATEGICZNY 1.

JSRC N
Zreorganizowane w

REGIONALNY
PODREGIONALNY

dowdztw poczonych
dowdztw komponentw

JWC
Podporzdkowane ACT Stavanger, NO

CZARNY: POPRZEDNIA STRUKTURA CZERWONY: NOWA STRUKTURA * Dowdztwa bezporednio podlege SC Nowe pastwa czonkowskie, Francja w zintegrowanej strukturze wojskowej

SUBACLANT* Zreorganizowane w

JSRC NE CC Nav
Zreorganizowane w Rozwizane Karup, DA
CAOC

ASC
Podporzdkowane ACO
Norfolk, US

MCC NORTH
Northwood, UK

RC NORTH
Zreorganizowane w

RC WESTLANT
Rozwizane Norfolk, US

RC EASTLANT
Rozwizane Northwood, UK

CAOC DCAOC

JFC NORTH
Brunssum, NL CC Air
Zreorganizowane w

ACC NORTH
Ramstein, GE

JSRC C

JSRC S RC SOUTHEAST
Zreorganizowane w JHQ Podporzdkowane ACO Rozwizane Verona, IT
CAOC DCAOC

Zreorganizowane w

LCC NORTH
Heidelberg, GE

ISAF CJTF

RC SOUTH
Zreorganizowane w

Lisbon, PO
CAOC

JFC SOUTH
Naples, IT

JSRC SW
Zreorganizowane w LCC SOUTH (1) Madrid, SP

CC Nav
Zreorganizowane w

CC Air
Zreorganizowane w ACC SOUTH (2)

JSRC SC
Rozwizane (3) Larissa, GR

JSRC SE
Zreorganizowane w ACC SOUTH (4) Izmir, TU

MCC SOUTH
Naples, IT

Headquarters (SC) Allied Command Operations (ACO)

ACO SHAPE Mons, Belgium
JFC HQ Brunssum JFC HQ Brunssum The Netherlands The Netherlands CC-Air HQ CC-Air HQ Ramstein Ramstein Germany Germany CAOC-1 CAOC-1 Uedem Uedem Germany Germany DCAOC DCAOC Uedem Uedem Germany Germany CAOC-2 CAOC-2 Finderup Finderup Denmark Denmark CC-Mar HQ CC-Mar HQ Northwood Northwood UK UK Joint HQ Lisbon Joint HQ Lisbon Portugal Portugal CC-Air HQ CC-Air HQ Izmir Izmir Turkey Turkey CAOC-3 CAOC-3 P.Renatico P.Renatico Italy Italy DCAOC DCAOC P.Renatico P.Renatico Italy Italy CAOC-4 CAOC-4 Larissa Larissa Greece Greece
Dualhatted

Commander USEUCOM

JFC HQ Naples JFC HQ Naples Italy Italy CC-Mar HQ CC-Mar HQ Naples Naples Italy Italy CC-Land HQ CC-Land HQ Madrid Madrid Spain Spain

CC-Land HQ CC-Land HQ Heidelberg Heidelberg Germany Germany

Headquarters (SC) Allied Command Transformation (ACT)

ACT Norfolk, USA
Strategic Concepts Policy & Requirements Identification Future Capabilities Research & Technology USJFCOM

Joint Concept Development

Education & Training

Multi/ National Centres of Excellence NATO Agencies/ Bodies

ACT Staff Element Mons, Belgium Capabilities Planning & Implementation

Joint Warfare Centre Stavanger, Norway Joint Force Training Centre Bydgoszcz, Poland Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre Monsanto, Portugal

Undersea Research Centre La Spezia, Italy

NATO Defense College Rome, Italy NATO School Oberammergau, Germany NATO Communications & Information System School Latina, Italy ---------------NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre Souda Bay, Greece

INTEROPERACYJNO
TE RM INO LO GIA

LO GIS TY KA

TR EN IN GI

U i SW

TA KT YK I
(TTP)

DO KT RY NY

Cele Operacyjne (standaryzowane)

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE

A CJTF is a multinational, (Combined) and multi-service (Joint) Task Force, task organised and formed for the full range of Alliance military missions that require multi-national and multi-service command and control by a CJTF Headquarters.
41

Source: MC 389/1 - Jun 2000

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NORFOLK
1. ACTIVATE NUCLEUS STAFF 2. COMMENCE PLANNING

6. SAIL 5. UPLIFT CIS

7. CONTINUE PARALLEL PLANNING

8. INTEGRATE MAIN AUGM. 9. OPEN UP THEATRE 10. CO-ORDINATE ENABLING OPS

4. INTEGRATE CRITICAL AUGM. 3. STAND UP CJTF HQ

11. ASSUME C2 OF FORCES

12. INTEGRATE FORCES 13. CONDUCT ENHANCEMENT TRAINING

JOA

14. COMMENCE OPERATION

HIGH READINESS CJTF HQ

42 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

The NRF at FOC

Total Force approx 25,000 Deployable Joint Task Force HQ

Maritime

Land

Special Operations

Air

Brigade Combat Team

Special Forces Task Groups

200 Combat Sorties/Day

Monday, 12 November 2012

43

With Strategic Enablers Lift Intelligence Force Protection Combat Support NATO RESTRICTED Combat Service Support
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NRF i NFS GRF HRF

HQ NRDC-GE/NL
HQ RRC-FR HQ ARRC HQ EUROCORPS HQ NRDC-IT HQ NRDC-SP HQ NRDC-TU HQ MNC NE-PL HQ MC IV 2003 GRF(L) FLR(L)

HQ GR C CORPS

Legenda: HRF (L)

11/12/2012

FLR (L)
COMBAT MODELS Session 3 44

Evolution from CD OPP to EBAO (N)NEC

Information Political Military Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
Links Social

Strengths Key Nodes Weaknesses Economic Relationships

SPACE CYBER-SPACE UNMANNED SENSORS & STRIKE

PRECISION STRIKE

PRECISION STRIKE
HUMINT AIR-GROUND ASYMMETRIC
INTEGRATED

INTEGRATED SOF-CONVENTIONAL IO/PSYOP

SOF

SOF WMD
Threat

Light
Systems Analysis Allies

SOF

SOF Heavy

SYMMETRIC

UNMANNED SYSTEMS

Nicht Zum Kernkrieg, As They Say By Armed Liberal at Jan 4, 2007: 06:46

Information Homeland

SATELITE
PREDATOR JSTARS U2R

GRCS QUICKFIX
300 km / AAG 900 km
AAG

GR 300 Km

Q-37

LRSU 150 Km

AAG

WRE SD K

SD D

C4 ISTAR

NNEC Feasibility Study: Method of Work

Design Reference Scenarios:
NRF Focused
#1 - Afghanistan-like Operations #2 - Urban Operations #3- Maritime-Littoral Operation

Input: Planning situations

STANDARDIZATION REQUIREMENTS

Human Interoperability Concepts Information NNEC CIS System Concepts

STANDARDIZATION REQUIREMENTS

Technology
Input: National Plans Commercial Trends
49

Technology Trends
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NNEC Development
Alliance Wide Perspective
Bi-SC Operational Transformational Objective Areas
(EE) Expeditionary Operations, (IL) Integrated Logistics, (EC) Enhanced CIMIC, (JM) Joint Maneuver, (EE) Effective Engagement and (IS) covering the Operational aspects of Information Superiority.

NII = National NIIs + NATO NII The Enabling Network of Networks

Operacje

Six Trends of Modern Ops

Hard to soft objectives, setting conditions Amongst the people Timeless, unending Fight to preserve the force New uses for weapons and organisations of industrial war Non-state, multinational groupings on our side against non-state party or parties

53

From a national perspective the strategic level concerns the application of the full range of national resources, across all instruments of power, to achieve policy objectives. It is the domain of the Head of Government and ministers. Within the Alliance the strategic level concerns the application of Alliance resources to achieve strategic objectives set out by the NAC.

Operations by Allied joint forces are directed at the militarystrategic level and planned and executed at the operational and tactical levels. Actions are defined as military strategic, operational or tactical, based on their intended effect or contribution to achieving the stated objectives.

The relationship between the three levels is illustrated in Figure ABOVE which also shows that they are not directly linked to a particular size of unit:

NATO CRO Operations

UNPF

UNCRO
B&H Croatia

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2003 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 EUROFOR

UNPROFOR

IFOR

SFOR

UNPROFOR - UN Protection Force IFOR - Implementation Force SFOR - Stabilisation Force

1998 KVM

1999

2000

2001

FYROM *
FRY

EF AC AFOR

EH

AF

2003 2004 2005 AH EU 2006

2002

Albania

Kosovo / AL / FYROM */ GR

KFOR ISAF
EH - Essential Harvest AF - Amber Fox AH Allied Harmony
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Afghanistan
KVM - Kosovo Verification Mission AFOR - Albania Force EF - Extraction Force AC - Air Campaign
57 *Turkey

recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

NATO Article 4/5 Operations

2001
USA 2002 2003 2004 2005 2005 NRF SE TURKEY DD 2004 NATO Training Mission - I

EAGLE ASSIST
ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR + STROG

EAST MED + STROG

2006

2007

2008

ISAF
2009

2010

2011

2009 NATO Training Mission - A

DD Display Deterrence STROG Straits of Gibraltar 58

2011 Operation Unified Protector Libya

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

WNIOSKI

Reforming
NATO Force Generation
Progress, Problems and Outstanding Challenges
RUSI

62

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

THANK YOU

W. Bruce Weinrod and Charles L. Barry., NATO Command Structure Considerations for the Future, National Defense University, September 2010

"Deep defense cuts can hamper growth" http://andersfogh.info/2010/06/02/deep-defense-cuts-can-hamper-growth/

During the press conference, Mr Rasmussen said that The need for a new strategic concept is clear. The current one dates from 1999, before September 11th, before the conflict in Afghanistan, before cyber attacks, before piracy, and when NATO only had 16 members. The world has changed, the threats have changed. So has NATO. We need and we will have a strategic concept that takes account of todays realities and tomorrows challenges as well. Dr Albright spoke of the necessity of looking at all the crucial issues of the 21st century as they affect the worlds greatest alliance,

4 listopada 2010