~FEAOQLIARTERS ~ OF THL ARMY ,"DEPARTMiNr } \\tik~ (Il'FICI!

Of: T1Im Plovos-r MArI(SHAL 4WNUINAL 4 " "I

, WASHINGT"14. D.C, 20315

PHGP-P
SUBJECT: A Model Police Force for Developing Nations

16 June 1967

S LO~

TO:

SEE DISTRIBUTION

I. The attached otudy, "A Model Police Force for Developing Naticns", is an effort to formalize what in the past has been a "beet guess" approach to advising police forces in developing nations. Although the Army's role in such operations is by no means new, this study provides a methodology heretofore unavailable to the military adviior in the Aield. The study represents sn initial effort to optimize an 2. As orpan::.zational configuration based or the best available data. To assist in improvement. such, it is subject to modification and thia effort, user comments are welcomed and should be forwarded to The Provost Marshal General, Attention: Police Overseas Internal , Defense Branch, Military Police Plans nd Operaticns Division.

1 Inel as

(/

C. fRRNER A Major General, USA The Provost Marshal General

JUL 3 01968

Best Available Copy

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The current "information explosion" makes it

possible to

support research projects by a wealth of previously developed material. While the author owes much to the authors of such five people stand out as contributing far For providing meaningful

background material, beyond what is

currently written.

critiques and technical expertise the author owes a debt of gratitude to Colonel D. R. Dingeman, Commanding Officer, USA

SCombat

Development Command, Military Police Agency; Mr. Martin S. Gordon, ABT Associates Inc; Professors W. H. Hewitt and C. Dana

Kuhn, State University of New York at Farmingdale; anid Mr. McLaren, International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Roy C.

Richard D. Miller Major, Military Police Corps

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Il I i I I I I
I

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"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present... Let us disenthrall ourselves." Abraham Lincoln

'I I I I I 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

1 I 1 1 I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 4

1 1 1 1 I I 1 1 I

Provost Marshal, MACV Provost Marshal, USARV Provost Marshal, USAREUR Provost Marshal, USARSOCOM Provost Marshal, HQ CONARC Provost Marshal, each US Army Headquarters Military Police Detachments, Special Actions Forces Military Police Representative, Special Warfare School US Army Military Police School US Army Combat Developments Command, HP Agency USACDC-CAG USACDC-CSSG (LTC Lundquist) USACDC HQS (LTC Gerecke) within DA Staff DCSPER DCSOPS DCSLOG ACSFOR of Defense Analysis/WSEG Institute Center for Research in Social Systems(CRESS) ABT Associates Inc. Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) H.R.B. Singer Inc. International Association of Chiefs of Police Assoc for International Research (ATRINC) SIMULMATICS Inc.

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I.

II II

_-

CONTENTS

PARAGRAPH
III.

I.

PURPOSE
IESIGN CRITERIA -1
GEERAL METHOWWGY 4III.

Page P

2 2
-

IV,

ASSUMPTIONS-INTROIUCTIDN A. General--------------

V.
r *

3
3 6 9 12 12 13 14

B. C.

Current Police Problems-------Police-Military Relationship

V1. MOJEL FORCE ORGANIZATION ------------A. B. General -------------------------------------

Organization - ------------

C. Methodology ------------D. E.

Basis for Police Model -]----------17 Organization of Model -.-.-.---------1. Administrative Services------a. b. 2. Plans - ----- ----------Training and Schools ....... --17 19 19 -20 21 21 21 2 22

Technical Services ------------a. b. Records -------------------

Communicatiorns -. - - ---------

3.

Inspectional Services--- ---------.. a. b. Inspections -- --------------Intelligence ------- - - ---

c.

Personnel Inspection -- --------..

24

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I
PARAGRAPH VI. MODEL FORCE ORGA14IZATION (Continued) E. Organization of Model (Continued) I 4. Line Division - ------- ------a. Patrol Division - --------Operaitional Support Section nn(cous -- -------------25 25 27 27 30 39 --39 40 41 41 41 43 43 43 44 54 54 54 54 Page

j
5. F. VII.

h.

Mlec(i scf-I

Model Ratios - ------- -----------

DERIVATION OF FORCE STRUCTURE ------A. Operational Factors -- -------B. Model Country -- -----------------1. Economy -- ---------------------2. Political Structure - ------- --3. 4. 5. 6. Ethnic Background -- ---------Population -- -----------------Area -- -----------------------Topography -- ------------------

C. Computation of Police Strengths ------

D.Operational

Employment -- ----------

1. Rural - ---------------------------

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I
VIII. IX.

2.

Urban --------------------------------------

3. General - ---------

E. Coordination - --- -------------------FOOTNOTES -- -------------------------BIBLIOGRAPHY -- ---------------------APP INDI'. 60 62

it

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1 2 3 Title Forms of Goverrment----------------------------Police Phasing------------------Pace 4 8 11 13 1" 23 - 28 29 31

33

Police Government Relationship - -----------------Basic Police Structure -------Survey Form -I----------------------

4
5

------------------------------

Model Poli('r;. Organization, National Level--.--.--.-78 9 10 11 12 13 Indicators - Police Operations ------------------

Functional Responsibilities of a Patrol DivisionOrganization - Patrol Division ------------------

Population per Police Employee (US Cities) -------Selected Police Ratios by Geographical Areas
-

Police-to-Population Ratios --------

-------------

34

Ratios of Functional Areas within US Urban Police Departments --------------------------------37

.18

II
15

Suhfun'tion-ll Activity Ration -.-.-.-.--------------rTmpornin - -------------------------------------a-

i6 17 18 19

Police SubdJstricts-

---------------------------------------

55 56 57 59

Typical Rural Police District -------Typical Urban Police Force - ------------National Govt/Police Relationship

'il

I.

PURPOSE:

To design an effective model for police forces of t.raining and

dh(v(.lopinA nations which Includes a basic organization, requirements,

effective but realistic supporting equipment,

operational methods of employment for the entire sphere of internal security operations.

11.

DESIGN CRITERIA:

Polioe

In a devel,.p12,; nation operate frou, a

Utnque position in rvtated roles, tactical.

that thevy function in four separate but closely political, administrative, and

that is; the social,

The social role of law enforcement involves the police institution; an agency of social control. that tLi,

function as a basic social

The political role involves the police. as a government institution; which ex*,rcises the government's legitimate right of control. Ilert

police stand as the center of power in governmental operations by virtue of their security mission. The administrative role bridg,,s the gap between the .iational government and the villages and people of the rural areas as well as the inhabitants of more sophisticated urban areas. The tactical role involves those offensive the Lorce

operations necessary to maintain the public peace. Thus,

design must include an internal intelligence capability to detect incipient insurgency and a capability to cope with small scale banditry or guerrilla activity in addition to the capability to perform the normal police functions endemic to the environment.

III.

GENERAL METHODOILOGY:

This study, through the technique

of comparative analysis, develops a model police force based on the socioeconomic and political aspects of varying world regions and subject to the instability projected in threat studies for the 1970-75 time-frame. To insure maximum validity of developmental

factors outlined, various police structures are examined to ascertain those organizational factors which are most prevalent in US and foreign police forces. A brief examination is made of the various conditionE under which police may be utilized in a low intensity warfare environment. The force structure and operational concepts are based on the following principles; unity of command, operational continuity,

jurisdictional authority, organic support resources, operational flexibility, and environmental flexibility. IV. ASSUMPTIONS:

A.

That developing nations will desire to place the greatest

emphasis on the preventive aspects of internal defense. B. That the greatest threat to world stability will be the

small, localized instability of nations whose impact on world stability is disportionate to their actual importance in the world hierarchy. C. Th , from the standpoint of effectiveness, economy, and police will continue to be the "first line of

national /cceptance, defense"

in matters pertaining to internal security.

'A
,i

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V. IfTRODUCTIDN. A. General. During the time frame under study the United

I
i
Sthat,

States Army will be irvol-G. in internal defense type operations to a degree hitherto unlaown. Current threat analyses postulate

as the threat c- general war lessans because more nations have becoe? members of tbiuclear weapons family, the Comminnst

tu].o: will increase their efforts to subvert nations through the medium of internal revolution. If this is the case, the US Army,

s, cifically the Military Police, must be prepared to assume a greater role in the creation, restoration, and maintenance of indigenous forces of law and order. To assume a larger role in the tangled and diverse international scene will requf'-2 a knuwledge of the areas of operations, the cultural

propensity towed law and order, and the form of government. This 0 form may r rige from the family system through the tribal, city, state, country, or nation system. from oligarchy to democracy. The specific form of govornment may range (See figure 1.) The economic form may

lie somewhere between sccialism and capitalism.

For the police to be able to do their job properly and effectively, they must be aware of the effect of religion, the economic status of the nation involved, and the difference in rural tribal systems and urban advanced political systems. While this study is primarily concerned with

police, both civilian and military, the role of the police cannot be isolated

t'Cron the realities of the world environment.

The police role touches very

I I
INDIVIDU&L FAMILY TRIBE CITY STATE COUNTRY NATION

OLI CARCIlY MONARCIHY DICTATORSHI P THEOCRACY PLURAL HEADSHIP

DEMOCRACY LIMITED LONARCHY REPUBLIC

SOCIALISTIC

CAPITALISTIC

Figure 1

I
closely on the political, economic, system. and social aspects of the world The part and place which the police play in Further, we must realize

an orderly society must be recognized.

that without law there is no order and without order men have m direction. Certainly, a system of orderly relationships is a Such a system is

prtmary condition of human life at every level. formalized in a code of laws.

Divergent interests are circumscribed

by these laws of the state that the courts interpret and apply. But, there is a vast number of mores, taboos, and understanding that really reguJate the innermost workings of the system or society. government makes these, no court applies them, and no political executive enforces them. ment must also operate. This is the margin within which enforceThus, it behooves those who work in the No

police field tc understand and appreciate these unwritten laws which in effect do more toward regulating a society than the enforcement element. We have seen that law and order is a basic prerequisite for the stability of all nations, but law (that is codified sterile thing. .wj is a

Without its counterpart, the enforcement element, The enforcement element is the force which Therefore, any

it is of little effect.

changes law from philosophical to pragmatic reality. study which touches on law and order mus forcus which assure the rule of law.

of necessity deal with the

These forces are, in their

basic form, the police.

The need for law and order has been exhibited throughout the centuries by each nation's development of taboos and mores. nociety is developed, As the

the law and order forces gradually evolved to The orderly environment

enforce adherence to these conventions.

created by these rorces has in turn made possible the development of more advanced economic and political systems, The success enjoyed

by some nations in achieving economic prosperity has stimulated other less fortunate societies into what has been described as a revolution of rising expectations. is, paradoxically, The first victim of this revolutionary tide

the force charged with creating an environment of

order. Destroying order is it. always a much easier task than maintaining

Hence this study points out some of the problems of maintaining the developing nations as well as promoting a greater awareAdditionally,

order in

ness of the police role in ensuring the rule of law.

It dovelops a model upon which the advisor can base the development of pollce forces in those areas in which he may be committed. B. Current Police Problems. The police of many developing nations

are poorly trained, are inadequately equipped, have inefficient organizational structures, are corrupt and venal, and have few, records. if any,

In many cases, police personnel are illiterate and when they too readily resort

standard police methods fail, or are unknown,

to brutality and other repressive measures to enforce obedience to the nation's laws. These latws may, in themselves, be outdated or

Inadequate to the nation's need.

This is particularly true of those

:ourntrie:; whooe Judicial systeomu were originally based on a colonial

power's legal system.

In many cases the laws required to control a

colony are in direct opposition to those required to regulate an

independent society. For instance, laws to enforce segregation in

colonial African countries are totally intolerable after independence. In general, many police forces are ill-prepared for the job which may well set the stage for the existence or even the survival of the government they support. most critical time, forces. Because the police cannot do their job at this

thsy are often decimated by the growing insurgency in the first days of the Dominican Republic

For example,

Insurgency, nearly one-third of the National Police were trapped and executed by the rebels. In other countries, police have so incurred they survive they can hope their battle to contain an

the hatred of the population that even if to receive little insurgency. Thus, or no popular support in

as the police effort fails and the situation continues

to deteriorate, major military forces must be committed to stabilise the nation. When It military force is US ordered into a country torn by

Instability, the commander may find that the police force has been decimated or is at least inoperative. If so, he must take steps to

establish new police forces or reestablish the authority of the existing force. This is a complex and highly specialized task. It

may require recruiting, organizing, equipping, and training police

personnel.
If the police structure has been totally decimated, US military

forces must provide law and order during the interim period in which a new police force is created.

A3DN3O9flSNI AO 13A31

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The creation of a structure for law and order must be based on the resources available, the cultural, political, and economic background of the country and the skill and knowledge of the organizing agency. While the local environmental factors cannot be controlled,

the knowledge and skill of the organizing agency can and must be. Paragraph VI provides a model structure for a police force being The

created or reorganized in a low intensity conflict environment. police model provides a general organizational structure for a

civilian police force which ccan be modified in accordance with factors applicable to each apecific country. C. Police - Military Relationship. Too frequently, an unhealthy generated. Both

competition between the police and military is

organizations have an important role to play and each must subordinate personal interests in order to successfully defeat insurgency. Figure 2 shows what should be the proper relationship between police and the military in an insurgency environment. This figure defines Police function

police activities in relation to the insurgent effort.

throughout all phases of insurgency but take precedence during some phases, Just as they give way to the military force in other phases. to identify the critical points

A major problem in this respect is wher-e responsibility shifts. Phase I.

Normally, civil police, paramilitary forces,

or military

forces will be responsible for carrying out the functions of discipline, law, and order in support of the established government. When insurgent

forces first

become active (Phase I) police forces have the responsi-

bility for countering the threat.

Since insurgents are classified as

criminals, police investigative and operational techniques are utilized. The success with which the civil police meet this challenge

dictates whether the insurgency escalates into Phase II or regresses to a situation of stability. act in a "preventive" role. Phase II. This time frame sees an intensification of the It is during this phase that the police

insurgency and a Vurthor attempt by police forces to control it. IDuring this phase, police operations take on an ever-increasing military characteristic. Military advisors may assist in training

police forces and some military units may be used. Phase III. Police operations continue but due to the increasingly

violent nature of the conflict, a requirement exists for military action and a centralized authority. This authority may ae police or It should be noted that

military, with competence being the key.

these first three phases correspond to the counterinsurgency Phases I through III outlined in FM 31-22. Because this study envisions

activities well beyond the combat phase, two additional phases are
added.

Phase

IV.

ThiB phase ia identified by the reestablishunent of Because the area may be contiguous

police authority over an area.

to uncleared areas, the police must have a capability of providing protection for themselves and the area. Reconstruction starts during

10

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this phase and a separate phase is

identified only because of the

existing threat of renewed insurgency.

Phase V.

This phase is similar to Phase I in that a minor

exists and the police must carry out an

insurgency threat still

antit-Inuurgent role an well ai the normal functions of discipline, law, and order. Succe iperations during this phase insure a

return to stability and allow emphasis to be placed on nation buildi ng.

phases.

Figure 3 relates th, police-government relationship in all

The major problem in a chart such as figure 2 is that no clear

boundaries of insurgency can be readily identified. identified from I through V concurrently. insurgency cycle is Phases may be

Another aspect of the

that successfully countering the insurgency in It should be

any phana can cause roeression through the cycle. pointr, out, howovr, insurgent.

that thLs regression is applicable only to the the police should

If' a successful program in carried out,

never return to the backward,

inefficient status which allowed the

insurgency to esca'atu In tho first and second phases. VT. MODEKL FORCE ORGANIZATION. A. Guneral. The question as to the composition of a police force

ha- been debated by law enforcement experts and laymen alike for many yu.urs. Soveral excellent. studles have been written which have attempted, to simplify the task of determining how many but. few, if any, have addressed the very real

tiu ui;h formularizat Lon, pollct, a country needs,

12

problem of how the force should be structured internally. studies have, by means of weighted variables,

Existing

attempted to relate the social, economic, and

police requirement to significanL environmental, population factors.

While these studies have provided an important they have frequently been the field. While

input to the study of the problem at hand,

so esoteric as to be unusable to the police advisor in

this study does not suggest a system which can function without decisions on the values of certain variables, it is hoped that the comparative

approach will provide the user a better comprehension of the problem involved and the background which is making process. B. Organization. 1. Basically a police structure consists of four divisions. . available to help him in the decision

IF

COMMAND]

L SERVICES
Records

ThUNICALLINEADMINISTRATIVE

L DIVISIONS
Patrol
Traffic

SERVICES
Budgeting, accounting, and purchas-

Communications

i'r-perty control Crine lahoratory jalL MaLntenance

Detective ViCoJuvenile

ing Personnel Public relations Planning and inspection Intelligence Personnel inspectorate

Figure 4

13

2.

In addition to these purely police functions,

the police of

many areas are responsible for additional nonpolice or quasi-police functions, e. g. a. b. Animal pounds. Vehicle licensing and inspection (taxis, private vehicles,

and commercial vehicles). c. d. C. f. g. h. i. 3. Maintenance of standards for weights and measures. Tax collection. Census. Customs. Border control. Presidential and VIP security. Licensing and inspection of amusement places. 6 encom-

The model shown above and as modified in figure

passes those functional areas of police effort which have been identified by analysis of police organizations throughout the United States.
2

0. W.

Wilson also identifies these areas as the primary functions of a modern police force. functions, While specific organizational forms may vary, appear in these

or closely related ones,

the majority of foreign

police forces analyzed during the course of research for this study. C. Methodology. 1. The basic methodology used in this study is the comparison

of cvxsting police forces throtighout the world in order to gain data on

14

str,ngthti,

orgaizatLins, responsibilities,

and functions.

The compari-

sons are made through the use of charts and graphs which estsblish operational means and which are translatable to usable ratios. data was taken from the Municipal Yearbook-1965;
3

The basic

The International Bibliog5

graphy of Police Literature; 4Uniform Crime Reports-1966; ducted for this study. 2. A questionnaire (figure

and a survey con-

5 ) was sent to 158 US cities in

order to determine the percentages encompassed by the various functional aireas inherent in a poLice structure. responses were received. Of 158 surveys dispatched, 106

Six of these were invalidated because of unSpecific data on responses are as follows: RATIO RESPONSES/ REQUESTS 85.8% 78.7 64.3 82.3 54.9 56.8

resolvable mechanical errors.

SIZE COMMUNITY 500,000 250,000-500,000 100,000-250,000 50,000-100,O00 25,000-50,000 10,000-25,000 TOTALS

NO REQUESTS 14 14 28 34 31 37 158

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE 8.9% 8.9 17.7 21.5 19.6 23.4 100.0% Table 1

NUMBER OF RESPONSES 12 11 18 28 17 21 107

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES 11.2% 10.2 16.8 26.2 15.9 19.7 100.0%

Thlu21 resiponses from cftles of 10,000 - 25,000 were Invalidated during finial computatitons because the forces involved were generally too small to allow an accurate breakdown of functional responsibilities. one or two detectives performed all vice, gations. Juvenile, For example,

and criminal investiThe specific and discussed

Traffic and patrol duties were likewise combined. 13 and 14

results of the survey are contained in figures in paragraph VI F. 15

TI
INSTRUCTIO' SHXKr i. Where a functional title varies from those used by your organization, feel free to change the form titles. It your organizationAl )reakout is not as detailed as is shown, please indicate the n%=Ler oi perscnnel who do carry oul related activities within your dpartme .
2. Includes chief of police and other operational staff comsaniers, of uniformed servicee. stenographers from all d&visions of

such as director/chief/commander

13.
thi

Includes clcrKs, force.

typists,

4. Includes maintenance of weapons, vehicles, ccinmunications, facilities. If maintenance is provided from outside sources; i.e., contract or by city emloyees, please so indicate.

and

5. Identify personnel listed as "other" on the back of the foim. This may include such personnel as internal security, inspection, public relations, and budget. 6. Where personnel can be clearly identified as having dual functions; i.e., cornmnications and records, spaces should be identified to nearest one-half.

I I I

POLICE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

POMCe

Department

F'ync,'.ionl Cmxund2

Number of Personnel

NOT

ILL IN

Ad-nini s ra tive 3

Nalntenance4 Supp'y Jail

Cri-ne L~b Others5

L Traffic
Detective
Juvenile Communications Records

Vicc
IIntelligcnce

Patrol (Harbor)

(Air) TOTAL

( -_

FIGURE 5

16

D.

Basis for Police Model. 1. Based on the questionnaires returned, the organizational and

.1
j

operational details of each department wereanalyzed to determine ratios of various functional areas. Figures 13 and 14 provide comparisons made

between various categories of cities to show what effect city and department sizes have on organizational ratios.

I
j

2.

The functional areas analyzci were:

Administration, These

Auxiliary Services,

Operational Support Activities, and Patrol.

functional areas were broken down as follows: a. personnel, Administration: Clerks, typists, stenographers, and training. property, budgeting,

public relations, b.

plans,

intelligence, Records,

Technical services: and maintenance. Operational support:

communications,

Scrime

lab, jail, c.

Traffic,

detective,

vice, and

juvenile. d. of traffic. Patrol: Includes all patrol activities excluding those

E. Organization f Model.

Irsed on ratios derived from an analysis interviews, and general research, This a

of data collected throagh the survey,

model organ~ization has been constructed as outlined in tigure 6.

model has been developed as a tool to aid the military polio- advisor in his deatings with civil police. It provides a gauge to determine require-

ments and provides a simplified system for developing an organization.

j17

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'The user must study the model,

study the area toward which he is

oriented

and then modify Lhe model to fit the specific needs of the country involved. The four major functional areas of the model, are as follows: The functional elements of this with their most

significant subfunctions, 1.

Administrative services.

division should be kept as basic as good organizational principles will allow. 'Two of the inLernal sections are particularly important and They

deserve special attention during organization or reorganization.

a re --

a.

Plans.

Efficient law enforcement in

a civilian environment depends as much on prior planning as does any military operation. Therefore, continuous plans must be on hand to insure that unplanned for.

no activity occurring in

the area of responsibility is

Plans and training must be dynamic,

changing as population shifts occur Examples of the

or as interests and activities of the population change. type plans which must be made are (L) disasters. (2) religious gatherings, (3) and activities in (2) Crowd control plans:
--

Civil disturbance plans:

Fire,

riots, and natural

Sports activities, parades,

and national holiday gatherings. Traffic control plans: above. Visiting dignitaries

19

I
(4)
murder,

Operational plans:

Robberies, t~rrorist attacks,

auto theft, and protection of critical facilities.

Many of the plans outlined above require greater manpower resources than would be readily available without degrading the enforcement effort in other area-. To preclude this happening, a reserve or "Special Force"

should be maintained at all operational levels of platoon and above. b. Training and schools. This section is responsible for A

all centralized training of units, cells, and individual personnel.

national police academy should be established to insure economy and uniformity of all police training. A minimum permanent staff should be

established to insure economy and uniformity of all police training. Active field or headquarters personnel should provide instruction in daily operating, organizational, and logistics problems. The training

curriculum should include, as a minimum, general investigative techniques, circulation control of individuals, traffic control, training, personnel identification systems,

leadership, supervisory procedures and tech-

"niques, search and apprehension, national and local law, criminal

investigation, crime prevention, weapons instruction, coammnications, A major prob-

vehicle operation,

and care and maintenance of equipment.

1
j

lcm which has frequently been identified by police engaged in control of civil disturbances traincd, is the inability of police, who are otherwise well To minimize this problem, riot

to function as a member of a unit.

unit training should be given in fire and maneuver techniques, 20

!
control tactics, ambush tactics, search and seizure, rural patrolling,

and general tactics for small unit operations. 2. Technical services. This division provides those services

which support the operational elements of the patrol and operational support divisions. a. Records. No current total system exists but due to

increased Federal interest and aid, the time frame under study should produce a standard manual model adaptable by developing countries and a low-cost automated system for more advanccd nations. b. Communications. Communications consist of both depart-

mental or internal communications and operational or external communications. Internal communications is that equipment linking the various

elements of the department.

This equipment is administrative in nature for the time involved. The two

and will depend on the state-of-the-art

major communications problems in a police force are control when elements must function as a unit and keeping in touch with individual patrolmen when a country's communications are otherwise minimal. Police must take

advantage of and acquire the latest developments in facsimile equipment, teletype, and radio-telephone equipment as early in the organizaticn stage as possible. The problem of control of police as units in riot

control operations or minor internal defense type offensive or defensive operations can best be solved by intensive training. In lieu of this,

individual "handy-talky" type radios can belp to increase control. 21

3.

Ins ectional services. a. Inspections. Inspection personnel should be avail-

able to insure continuous,

I
f

country-wide inspection# of all police elements

and activities. duct,

Inspections should insure high standards of moral conidentify equipment needs and defimake possible recommendations for

isolate training deficiencies,

ciencies,

identify personnel problems,

increasing or decreasing police strengths, and finally investigate matters having a public relations impact. b. Intelligence. The primary purpose of the intelligence element is to gather, evaluate, and disseminate information to the Direc-

tor of Police and others who should be informed on a need to know basis. Its broad objective, thus, is to gather information and translate it into

effective action through analyzation, evaluation, semination.

coordination, and dis-

Based on the analyzation of information the intelligence identify emeiIng leaders, describe the

element should define trends,

crime or insurge..,y potential/climate,

and in certain specific crimes To do so in the stability

supply motives and possible perpetrators.

environment the inL-lligence element must develop indicators which give a basis for diagnosing possible trends (see figure 7). Jectives are as follows: Specific ob-

1
j

"(1)

Establish the existence of organized crime (in illegal opposition to the legal government),

the insurgency enviroinrent, its strength, structure,

and principal income.

2
I2

INDICATORS

POLICE

OPERATIONS

FUNCTION

ACTIVITY

ELEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
0 O AOCTS 0O
TARGET

REMARKS
A"P1.SO AtAN169 REPEIC MlLISLRY 09 CIVIL- METROPOLITAN OR RURAL -------W ARS C04E VC - 00AL#ISIC SYNIOATIRI~ZR COeRCED AP*LI29 AGAINST LIKE POCO" ORtCIVIL LFADEIRS61INEAL POPULACE

SABOTAGE

I-TYPE SABOTEUR no or Amt

-.

---

-~~~A~bP~au

TERRORISM
PROECIO
.PURPOSE

TaeyMILITARY

44NPORCEMENT OP LOTALTIES VS FAILURE Oil PERSUAJI011 NO OF RAIDS TARGET1 1-LTIIOO APPILIED AGA tNsT LIKE PERIOD AND ARCA MILITARY OR GIVIL -FOOD OA WEAPONS -MEDICAL SUPPLY

HIT-AND-RUN VS ANNIHILA.TION ATTACKS

RAIOS

P11R015E

9TRENBYN
ACTIONS ATYITU02 Of P')PULAT-0ON NO 00 ROSaPPLIED
NOoPARTICIPANTS

DPSTRIJCTION

-REPRISAL

- I4ANASIJUNT

0 -MORALE

AXO ESPRI' - H4ANDLINSOf OWNDEAD.WOUNDEI)

YRS OC&IONATXTIOII

DESTINUCTION VS. CAPTUGEOF SUPPLIES KILL - KIDNAP -

9I[RSARD - PROPAGAND119 - fPLOIT

AGAINSTlI111 PERIOD

jIN

EACH ROTo
-..---1

LEADERSHIP RIOTS CAUSE

OURATION1 CONROLMEAS1DEBASE be Am$-C CONTROL

RELIGIOJS - ACADEMIC -POLITICAL - COMMUNIST POLITICAL OCIAL-ECONOMIC

OF FORCEREGUIRED0 SUPPRESS- CASUALTIES YO

.R MILITARY

0o :10STIKES
NO

APPLIED AGAtINT LOA. .0ERIOD

IN EACH STRIKE LABOR - ACADEMIC NEWS MEDIA - FARMERS CCOOIIIC - SOCIA L -POLITICAL

YO1STIKES

TYPE or1 STRIKE

TIESCAUSE
VIOLENT VS NONVIOLENT

CIVIL ORDER I--

I
CONtROL1 MIFANI DKGREE OF FORCE RE QUIRED0 CONTROL. PO&ICK OR UZILITAM To

LEADERSHIP NorO )

UNION -

RILIGIOUS - ACADEMIC - POLITICAL- COMMUNIST AGAINST LIKE PERIOD

--

DEMONSTRATIONS

APPLIED

NO0 OP PARTICIPANTS

IN EACH DEMONSTRATIONRELIGIOUS -ACADEMI'C -MILITARY - POLITICAL

TYPE MOVEMENT

RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

NE0TNETCHJGEIOMONSTRA
MEFANS

TO CONTROL

jc9

TION - YIMEN' - StO~dOWN

ITOOWN

GENSor FORCE REQ19UIR TO SUPPRI toPO'LOCIE OR MILITARY. tD

LEADERSHIP
allRATIONII.ASSIVE IC0

PELISIOUS -POLITICAL - ACADEMIC - MIL ITANT - CommuniSty

VS V/IOILENT APPLIED AGAINATPREVIOUS AND TOTAL

COMPLETI'D 0911ET101I3E1 MAGNITUDE POPULATION

CARDS ISSUED
CENSUS

'A FAMILY NO

INPORI.ATION *TIPS'

Of CIVILIAN1 SUPPORT

P~OPULATION RESOURCE S
CONTROL A

INIO NOLURPEW

NOU~ REDEPfecTomb OF
VIOLATIONS RIATIto- POLIC& POPULATION CN4CKPOINT VC TO AREA AE

BSDO
I

NPQIRM61

EUSMN

fT011111-9

EEMND5

RASRI ~iSRE

V'OLATIONS

CARCI -TRAVEL

PERMITS - CAPTUrED

WEAPONS REICV11RLO COOMPLCTiD

TURNED-IN

411) - 011TROTED

RIESOURCES

REGI1STRATIOII4

WEAPONS - CROPS - LIVESTOCK - VEHICLES

CHECK(POINT VIOLAYII)3N%

CARGO MANIFESTS

FIICIJRE1

23

(2)

Identify current and emerging criminal leaders

and their associates; prepare and maintain dossiers on them; and conduct investigations in depth thereof. (3) Identify areas or industries, legal or illegal,

which are most vulnerable to organized crime (or insurgency). (4) Maintain an informant program, an undercover unit,

a surveillance unit, and a technical unit. (5) (6) Utilization of o~ert sources of information. Maintain a depariment-wide program to stimulate

submission of information. (7) cross-references, Maintain accurate records and files with good

and a system of rapid and complete retrieval. (8) (9) Effectively disseminate information.

Cooperation with, and knowledge of, the activi6 agencies." ties of other law enforcement and regulatory enforcement (10) Cooperation with, and knowledge of,.the activi-

ties of military forces which are involved in related duties. c. Personnel inspection. Depending on the cultural backthis element may be Close coordi-

ground and state of advancement of the police force,

placed under direct supervision of the Director of Police. nation should be maintained with the Plans Section. This

section should investigate all suspected or actual cases of wrongdoing

24

by police personnel. this section hold, training.

Because of the position of power which personnel of

great care should be taken in their selection and

Maximum safeguards should be taken to preclude inspection

positions becoming political appointments. 4. Line division. The basic element of a police force is the

line division which provides services. port this basic element. is

All other elements exist to sup-

Por the purpose of the model, the line division

further broken down into two elements: a. Patrol division (see figure 6). It retains the This division is nucleus of manpower the

main element of the model force.

and provides for urban and rural patrols. cal in any environment, terrorist attacks,

While many duties are identi-

the additional requirement for protecting against and small unit hit-and-run attacks fall Patrolmen must be

sabotage,

primarily on the shoulders of the patrol division.

trained in more traditionally combat oriented roles and equipped with arms capable of repressing or repelling small unit guerrilla attacks. Ceneral police training tends to orient policemen to actions as individuals. They must also be trained to operate as units in addition to the An alternative to this is This alternative is infringes on what

traditional one- or two-man beat or post.

the organization of epecial combat police units. rejected in all but exceptional cases because it

shc~uld be purely military responsibilities and requires an excessive expenditure of manpower. This alternative may be appropriate in areas functioned in the dual role of

where police forces ha\c traditionally 25

internal

and external

de!ense forces; e.g.,

many South American national

guard type units. (1) Urban patrols. This unit provides normal patrol In small cities auxiliary

personnel for cities and metropolitan areas. and administrative special teams. If

support can be provided from central headquarters by the magnitude of work so dictates these teams can basis. Wi.thin either rural or urban patrols to provide for special patrol or border patrols (see figure

be assigned on a permanent (2)

Rural patrols.

a further structuring may he accomplished acLivities, 8). such as railway, waterway,

air,

When required,

these special patrol activities

may be augmented Because

by teams

from the operational support section discussed below.

of the isolated nature of the rural posts,

police assigned to this duty

must be prepared to carry out a greater range of duties than the urban patrolman. cases, In specific cases, i.e., murder or particularly difficult

central 11Q will provide (3)

investigative teams. of a patrol company (figure Q). The

Organization

standlard II NCO'%s,

patrol company consists ot a total of 78 personnel; 3 officers. anid 64 patrolmen. The Internal structuring of 2 platoons with provides for 24-hour opera-

4 sections consisting of 4 patrol tion of 2 geographical areas.

teams each,

For example,

a small city requiring a each being assigned

patrol company could be divided into two districts, a platoon.

The platoon leader with his four sections has three 8-hour

26

shifts with the fourth section providing a reserve force and personnel
for special details as well as replacements or normal leave. b. of traffic, Operational support section. and juvenile This section In is composed for personnel on sick leave

detective,

subsections.

the early

stages of development, detective section. workload increases

juvenile duties may be assigned to the

As the force becomes more sophisticated and the individual subsections may be formed to handle the

below listed subfunctions. (1) traffic statistics (2) persons, In arson, Traffic section, including traffic safety education,

and analyses, Detective forgery,

and signs and meters. section, which includes narcotics, and auto theft. missing

frauds,

burglary,

order to provide maximum countrywide support with a minimum of manpower, composed of cells which provide their functional service

this section is

on-call or as needed.

Personnel manning these activities should be

maiatained at the national or central headquarters where they can undergo sppcial ample,

training and r,.cycling as requried.

due to a heavy military traffic

For exForktown (figure 15),

load in

two-man traffic cells can be dispatched and upon completion of this assignment 5. be reassigned or recalled for further training. Miscellaneous. It is not the intent of this mnodel to a developed police force, to degrade but with

many functions which are important

27

ar

W
w

aa)
0 1.-a. w0 ZZlz >U z (a 0

0>

w ki

o0

ccw W 0: J
z
>

_j x
0 1

to0

0
IIL

Wr

o
-~44(aqW

140-M 49
0
-j z

C)4
) s

OLw
o

FIG~URE 8 28

ORGANIZATION--

PATROL DIVISION
OF POLICE COMMANIES *NUMBER BASED ON TOTAL STRENGTH
OF PATROL DIVISION.
I WATER, RAILWAY, AND BORDER PATROLS MAY BE COMPANIES PLATOONS,OR SECTIONS, AS REQUIRED. COMPANY ADMINISTRATIVE LOGISTIC, AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO BE P,.)VIDED

DEPUTY CHIEFRURAL OR URBAN

IO
I

PATROL

PATROL COMPANY
76 PERS., j I I- CAPT 3vSGTS

2-LTS

FROM NATIONAL POLICE

AS REQUIRED.

HOS FUNCTIONAL TEAMS

8-CPLS CA.-PATROLMEN

PATROL

PLATOON 38 PERS. I-LT I-SGT 4-CPLS 32-PATROLMEN

PATROL

SECTION

9 P CIS.
I- CPL
_____,-8-PATROLMEN

PATROL TEAM-A 2 PTLM

PATROL TEAM-B

PATROL TEAM-C 2T2_PTLM

FIGURE 9
29

PATROL TEAM-D

2 PTLM

the key element of simplicity,

the unit under design must limit itself to As the country in question gains

major functional responsibilities.

economic maturity and can afford to support a more sophisticated police force,
of
--

thought may be given to placing more police resources in support

a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. F.

Research and analysis. Public relations. Liaison. Juvenile activities. Labor relations. Women's bureau. Specialized disaster squads. Police information center.

Model Ratios. I. The primary purpose of the survey conducted for this study

was to determine to what degree the resources committed to each functional area of a police organization could be identified. was evident and the results are shown in figures A degree of consistency 13 and 14. The re-

sults are shown as averages since no extremes of enough significance to skew them were in evidence. police in the city proper. The ratios shown in figure 10 reflect those

They do not reflect the backup force which State police, ,nd the multitude of

exists in the form of County police,

specialized Federal police agencies available to handle special cases,

30

POPULATION PER POLICE EMPLOYEE RATIOS(U.S. CITIES--5965

S8

00

714

700

600-

5888

_______

z
0~
0

500
,

423jt

400..

30 0

.....

200
0 0

0 0 000
0--

0 0 00

010 0

0 000

0 0

0 0 000

0 0

0 0 000

000
--

0 0

OU) Nk

0 --

in

SIZE OF COMMUNITY
FIGURE 10

31

I
Si.e.,
FBI, Treasury and Secret Service, and Border Patrol police. All not

these agencies provide a reserve of expertise and manpower, available, would have to he provided by the city. these Thus, It

which if

when designing is estimated

a police structure that in

forces must be provided for.

the United States the police forces above the community level With community enforcement agencies numbering 150,000, to population ratio in the United States becomes

number 102,000.

the available police 1:242. 2. 12

The world police,

whose ratios are shown in

figures

11 and

do not consist of one well organized,

centrally directed police In many cases several different

force with well defined responsibilities.

forces have grown up with overlapping and conflicting responsibilities, or else differing organizations have been created to carry out varying police oriented functions. between the Communl Police, This multistructured For example, the police of Belgium are split and the Judicial Police. the older

the Gendarmarie,

enforcement element is while

more prevalent in

more developed countries, toward the centralized, of manpower. 3. [fgures

the newly developed nations seem to tend

single national police force aimed at more economy

One word of caution inust be given concerning the use of Information concerning

used in charts on foreign police forces.

a nation's police force is is is zealously guarded. difficult to obtain.

an indicator of national strength and as such accurate data in an unclassified state it is desired to keep this study in an

Therefore, Because

unclassifsied configuration,

the best available data was used with the 32

-" C. r4 ,! I
.

.0

o0

-.
0!

4s

a,4

c .y. -

... .

. . .

.+

... ,+ ... l

C t .i

4 -

*f.

-i.

Ofl ..

o
,

1 .*flfl

~i

N ,4

ii

,t.t

II
.. 0 0 N

.,

'

.4..W .4 . .

It4

.,.0

0 0,

0 O 4

,, ,

M.0 WI

on

'CI

&V

,-, V .13

,..oo,+-, '+ .N
*C

FGR

11 g,'+ '+<
0

S,

,.,j.

..

. .

4, ..,

fl .+

4 4l; " '

A' 44.

. 44,0

,l
44 .

.m
0.

. m
".41, .
. . .' .

..v
.C.4

. ..
. 1.0 o, 4. . ,. . 4. . .--.4 .. . 1r.++

15
.4

-.

..

.... .

o, .-

.0

,0

,+'- I

.d . . ..

. 11

:.

FIGURE
33

NONV831

-w

-~~

VNIH

d81

NVdVP V~8~ 8viivN.snv -

cc
l<39VAN3)$A

V1839IN
L

V13flZ3N3A

0114
-rso

VIA110B

244
0 i

S1U.LS C31lNn
VOVNVO fr~00NI)4 03J.INfl N 30 3MS NIVdS CNVI83Z.UMS

1*
Mon

AVM8ON
ANWb483E9 AM
)X1VVfrN30

0 to 0

0 0

0 0
OD

0 0

0 0

0 0
10,

0 0
P)

00 0
N~

(r

z
0

knowledge that certain variances do exist. years 1962-1965 has been combined.

In this respect,

data for the

For the purpose of developing a are not

methodology the variances created by combining several years data considered significant. Since the data depicted in

figures 11 and 12

are from unclassified sources, not absolutes. reso;urces.

they should only be considered as ranges,

The user must verify the actual ratios from classifed on(, of the problems which plagueF the

In this same respect,

researcher is

the diverse interpretations as to what constitutes a In some countries, purely military force.; art.

nation's police forces. responsilth

for functions carried out in other nations. by police forces.

This difficulty should be kept in mind as one attempts to determine a nation's total police strength. 4. 12 The mean ratios of police to population developed in figure

are established as guidelines for the geographic area within which They represent, for the most part, a state

the advisor may be working. of relative tranquility.

As such,

knowledge of a state o. less than

tranquility (most likely the gencral case) would dictate using a higher ratio as the start point. thi(. advit;or should opt start point. 5. Without extensive field work it is difficult to evaluate Factors of If a state of lawlessness or insurgency exists.

Ior the higher police to populat ion ratio .as his

the efficiency/effectiveness customs, topography,

of any given police force.

form of government,
35

propensity toward law and order,

density of population, on any such evaluation. J

and s'~ate of police training all weight heavily Therefore, this study must of necessity accept

a coefficient of efficiency of one (1) for the mean level of existing orces. Any other value of efficiency must be applied by the user

based on a knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the existing forces from which comparative data or ratios are derived. 6. In spite of the problems which have been enumerated, certain

frames of reference and mtio ranges may be derived from the data provided in this study. As the purpose of this study was to develop a system for not evaluate them, the relatively minor

developing a police organization,

deviations in data reliability are not considered significant. 7. Within the police structure a balance between the supported While the internal ratios shown in there

and supporter must be maintained. figures 13 and 14

vary slightly in each category of communities,

is no evidence to indicate that an environment of insurgency would give cause to drastically revise the basic only exception is schools. in ratios of support activities. The

in the subactivities of intelligence,

and training and

Figure 14

deviates from the actual results of the survey only

that these two elements have received that slice of personnel identiThis category encompassed

fied as "other": in the survey questionnaire. such diverse duties as research,

school crossing guards, and humane

personnel; all of whicih are generally unnecessary in a force being designed for an unsophisticated area.

36

0
toI

g
0-1
0

Il
000~~

IiIa_

3I
000 00

0 0

I
M9)

~3DN3911T131NI I NOI~llFlS3A~l 1VN8a.LNIj

~ (0 o

1L
1

-r

jSNVld
SlOOH:3S 9 oNdl
-

ISNrnJ.13ki
__ __

31-18nd
_

>d

ci:

'ST II

13NNOSON__
.TDQA

p
0 k

'ICI

- -,- -

--

3lA 3.1 N -A

A~

G. Z

~3 I13A1313 G

FIGU'RE 14

VII.

DERIVATION OF FORCE STRUCTURE. A. Operational Factors. Prior to making a decision on the number

and/or

location of police units a detailed survey of the area or country following:

should be made to determine the 1. Population density. a. b. c. 2. 3. 4.

By total country. By areas. By national, ethnic, religious, or tribal grouping.

Ethnic background of population. Religious beliefs, Terrain. a. b. c. Type. Road net. Waterways. practices, and taboos.

5.

Strategic val.,e of locale.

a. b.
c. d. 6.

Proximity to friendly or unfriendly borders. Agricultural value.

Mineral wealth. Accessibility. law and order.

Population's traditional propensity toward a. Existing local enforcement system. (1) (2) Tribal. Colonial.

39

(3) Fami ly. b. Population's association with, or acceptance of, national

government and the attendant rules and regulations. 7. insurgents. 8. Evaluation of existing police system. a. b. Crime statistics available, either formally or informally. Police strength. (1) (2) C. d. In-country
-

Strength and relative aggressiveness of actual or potential

available and proposed. countries.

In comparison with adjacent

Status of education and training. Equipment. (1) (2) Vehicles. Communications.

(3) Weapons. C. Relationship with other agencies; e.g., Army and/or other

enforcement agencies. 9. 3. General competence of existing governmental hierarchy. To preclude becoming involved in the time and an ac.tual country, a simple model, Temporania, There will be

Model CounLry.
1ItiizeA

sipace requiired to

wilt be utilized to demonstrate tlie-use of the model force. tio attempt

itoL

to

fully develop the background of Temporania, but this should degrading any aspect of i~ts social, economic, or

he contitrued as

40

political structure.

The abbreviated country model serves only to point Temporania (see figure It

out the more basic aspects of the police model. 15) is

i:

small coastal nation 100 north of the equatorial belt.

consists government

f three lotsely structured and Joined provinces.

The current The

is a limited democracy with a single political party.

president has recently voiced a desire to bring the country closer together and to get the outlying areas more involved in national affairs. To do this he has asked for assistance in developing a modern police force. 1. Economy. The economic base of Temporania rests primarily Of lesser importance is the embryonic

with the rice crop of province Chi.

rubber tree crop and the limited crop of a number of old banana plantations. Capital city is a seaport. It has a small merchant fleet and transshipment The port is nationally owned and

of goods provides limited capital input. operated. 2. Po)litical structure.

While the national government

is

ostensibly a limited democracy, little is

those areas outside the capital city have For the most part, tribal rule

or no voice in national policies.

in effect for the traditionally agrarian population. is backward and undeveloped.

A small national

army exists but it 3.

Ethnic background.

Temporania consists of several tribes The only exception is province Rho whose

which are generally compatible.

jungle dwelling tribes have never attempted social or economic intercourse with the other provinces. Governmental control has been limited to the

41

I1
1"

~~PROVINCE

4''

325MF1."NN, .

IN

PuPROVINCIAL CAPITAL

.~RICE

PADDIES

e JUNGLE
PLANTAT)ON.0

MOUNTAINS OR HILLS
[IUR

appointment of rather ineffectual province chiefs.

Their limited control

has been enforced by a small detachment of the national army. 4. Population:

a. b. Total -

1,000,000.

Province Psi - 400,000

(1) Capital city - 100,000. (2)

c.

One city of 10,000.

-

Province Chi (1) Forktown

500,000. 30,000.

(2)
d.

Two cities of 10,000.

100,000.

Province Rho -

The remainder of the population lives in small tribal enclosures ranging

from 500 - 5,000 population.

5.

Area: a. h. c. d. Total - 25,000 square miles. Province Psi - 8,500 square miles. Province Chi
-

12,000 square miles.

Province Rho - 4,500 square miles.

6.

Topography: a. Province Psi is rolling hill country with a fairly good all-

weather road net. b. Province Chi is low and flat with a number of swamps. The

Much of the area has been used to cultivate rice for many yearc. road net is passable only in good weather. 43

I
c. terrain. Provi:ice Rho is entirely covered by mountainous jungle by porter trails. One small The only access to this area is

airstrip is C.

available at the province chief's village. As stated previously, any

Comp atation of Police Strengths.

7
*

computations of police strengths must be tempered by known facts and problems of the area involved. The computations used here are simplified in order to develop the

and based on the model country, Temporania, methodology. 1. Figure

12 shows that the median ratio for police for the 1 policeman per 525

geographic region (for study purposes, Asia) is population. police force. 2. Thus, a 1,000,000 population

525 = a 1,905-man national

The police ratio for cities of 100,000 population as inis 1:627; for cities of 30,000, thus: 62/
=

terpolated from figure 10 for cities of 10,000,

1:667; and

1:714, 100,000 30,000 1.0,000

160 police 45 police 14 p, ,Ice

667 = 714 =

A req'uirement,

therclfore.,

exists for the following urban police:

I city of 100,000 - 160 police (capital city) I city of 30,000 45 police (Forktown)

3 cities of 10,000 - 42 police TOTAL Urban Police - 247

STOTAL

Police Required
Urban Police Required

1,905
-

2A7

TOTAL Remaining for Rural Police 44

1,658

l
3. Figure 13 indicates the percentages of strength encompassed Based on these percentages, by each functional element of the police force.

the support base for rural police can be computed as follows: Rural strength x functional area % = support base Lu58 1658 1658 1658 x 11.5 (admin) x 6.5 (insp svc) = 191 = 108
=

x 12.0 (tech svc)

199

x 24.0 (op spt) x 25%* = 100 TOTAL sot base 1658 -598 1060 man rural patrol = 598

*257Z is an arbitrary decrease in operational support activities brought about by decreased traffic and detective requirements in the rural areas. 4. Area comparison. A check of figure 15 indicates the fol-

lowing percentages of area for each province: Province Psi = 34'4 of area Province 3hi = 487% -f area Province Rho = 18'7 5. -f area

Based on the percentages above, a rough approximation of the

rural patrol force 3trength for each province can be computed: Psi Chi Rho

1060 x 34Z. = 360

1060 x 487 = 509 1060 x 187 = 191 TOTAL 1060 patrol 45

I
6. Based on the rural support strengths computed in 3 above and the area percentages shown in 5 above, the support slice for each province can be computed: Province - Area 7,x Rural spt slice - Province slice

JPsi

- 34'A Chi - 487. Rho - 18%

x 191 x 191 x 191

- 65 Admin spt - 92 Admin spt - 34 Admin spt

Psi -

340/

x 199

= 68 Tech svc

Chi - 48% Rho - 18%

x 199 n 199

= 95 Tech svc = 36 Tech svc

Psi - 34% Chi - 48% Rho - 18%

x 100 x 100 x 100

= 34 Operational spt = 48 Operational spt = 18 Operational spt

Psi - 34% Chi - 48"Z Rho - 18%

x 108 x 108 x 108 GRAND TOTAL

= 37 Insp svc = 52 Insp wvc = 19 Insp svc 598

7.
is

As computed in 6 above,

the support strength for each province

as follows:

Psi Province Administrative spt - 65 Technical svc Operational spt Inspectional svc
46

-68 - 34
-

37

244

Chi Province Administrative apt - 92 Technical svc Operational apt Inspectional svc - 95 - 48 - 52 287

Rho Province Administrative apt - 34 Technical svc Operational spt Inspectional svc 8. Figure 14 - 36 - 18 - 19 107

indicates the percentages of subfunctional areas Applying the ratios as follows for each

for each support activity.

province will produce the basic support organization. a. Psi Province % - Number x % of Total Force Province Slice

Subfunction - Rural Total x Technical svc Records Commo Jail - 1658 - 1658 - 1658 - 1658

x 3%

= 49.7

x x x x

34% 34% 34% 347

- 17 = 25
-

x 4.5% - 74.6 x 2.0% - 33.1 x 1.57

= 24.8

11 8 W1

Maint

Administrative Plans - 1658 x 2.57 - 41.4 x 347

-

14 14-

Inspectional svc Intol - 1658 x 3%

- 49.7

34%

17 TY 92

Assigned Slice 47

b. Technical svc Records Commo Jail Maint

Chi Province

- 1658 - 1658 - 1658 - 1658

x 3%

49.7

x x x x

487 48. 487 487

24

x 4.5%- 74.6 x 2.0% = 33.1 x 1.5% = 24.8

- 36
-

16 12 r88

Administrative Plans - 1658 x 2.5% = 41.4 x 487

=

20 TO

Inspectional svc Intcl - 1658 x 3T.

=

49.7

487

23 T3 131

Assigned Slice c. Technical svc Records Com.o Jail Maint - 1658 - 1658 - 1658 - 1658 x 3% = 49.7 x x x x 18% 187 187 187 =
-

Rho Province

9 13 6 4 T2-

x 4.5% = 74.6 x 2.07 = 33.1 x 1.57 = 24.8

= =

Administrative Plans - 1658 x 2.57 - 41.4 x 18. a 7 7

Inspectlonal svc Intel - 1658 x 3%

-

49.7

18%

9 9 48

Assigned Slice 48

9.

Based on the strengths thus far computed,

a recapitulation

is as follows:
Province Psi

Chi *73* Forktown (45) 2-10,000 (28)

Rho

Urban Police Capital City 1-10,000 City Rural Police (patrol and assigned support) Patrol (para 5) Support (assigned slice) (para 8) Support (authorized slice) (para 7) TOTAL TOTAL AUTHORIZED

*174* (160) (14)

*0* (0) (0)

*452 (360)*

*640 (509)*

*239 (191)*

(92)

(131)

(48)

(204)* *626 (738)*

(287)* *713 (869)*

(107)* *239 (298)*

Total force excluding national police headquarters - 1578 1905 - 1578 10. follows: Province Spt Slice - Attached or Assigned Spt Police - Headquarters Element
Psi 204 92 - 112
=

327 strength for national police headquarters The national police headquarters breakout is computed as

Chi

- 287

- 131
48

= 156
M 59

iho - 107

TOTAL

327

49

11.

As indicated in 2 above,

the total requirement for urban

police is 247. figure 13,

The percentages of each functional area, derived from

are computed as follows:

Capital City - 160 police No Police x % 160 160 160 160 160 = No in Functional Area

x 11.5% = 19 (Administrative apt) x 12% x 24% = 19 (Technical svc) = 38 (Operational apt)

x 6.5% = 10 (Inspectional svc) x 46% = 74 (Patrol)

Forktown - 45 police

45 45 45
45 45

x 11.5% = x 12% x 24%

5 (Administrative apt)

= 5 (Technical svc) = 11 (Operational apt)

3 (Inspectional svc)

x 6.5% = x 46%

= 21 (Patrol)

3-10,000 Cities - 42 42 42 42 x 11.5 x 12% 47 x 24% = 5 = 7 = 13

.

3 = 2 (Administrative apt)

3 = 2 (Technical svc)
3 = 3 'Operational apt) 3 = 1 (Inspectional svc) 3 = 6 (Patrol)

j42 j

x 6.5% = 42 x 46 %

= 19

4/City

50

I
12. Now that total strengths and proportions have been determined, it remains to design organizations and hupport elements cequired for dayto-day operations. For the purpose of this study, only the force structure

within Psi Province will be calculated in detail. a, Capital city. (1) Operational support section. ratio of 24.0%. Thus 24.0% of 160 - 38. Figure 13 shows a

Traffic, detective, and juvenile For study

sections must be apportioned based on local requirements. purposes, we will use the percentages shown in figure 14.
Traffic = 14.0% of 160 police = 22

Detective - 7.5% of 160 police = 12 Juvenile (2) = 2.5% of i60 police Technical services. 4 38

12% of 160 = 19 total Records

Communications

= 3.0% of 160 - 5
= 4.5% of 160 = .5% of 160 = 7

Property Control =

1 1

Crime Lab Jail Maintenance

.5% of 160 =

= 2.0% of 160 = 3 = 1.5% of 160 = TOTAL 2 19

r1

(3)

Administrative services.

11.5% of 160 = 18 total Budget i Personnel Public Relations Plans Tng & Schools 1% of 160 - 2 3.5% of 160
-

1% of 160 - 2 2.5% of 160 - 4

= 3.5% of 160 - 5

I
(4) 6.5% of 160 = 11 total

TOTAL Inspectional services.

18

Internal Investigation = Intelligence Inspection Vice

= = =

1% of 160 - 2 3% of 160 - 5 ,5% of 160 = 1 2% of 160 - 3 TOTAL 11

(5)

Patrol.

46% oT 160 = 74 total b. Rural police. (I) As indicated in paragraph 9, Psi Province is and 112

allocated 360 patrol personnel,

92 assigned support personnel,

j 1

support personnel assigned to national police headquarters. down of support personnel is specified in paragraph Oa, (2) follow

The break-

The number of patrol companies is computed as 9 patrol company)

-

360 78 (see figure

4.3 patrol companies.

.1
I

52

This may be equated to 4 companies, will be deployed as shown on figure Operational Employment. 13. structure,

1 platoon, 16,

2 sections.

These units

and as discussed in paragraph D,

As a verification of ratios involved with the current two checks remain to be made. a. Population ratio. Population Assigned Strength 400,000 500,000 .100,000 Population 400,000 500,000
.

Province Psi Chi R1c, Provinne Psi :hi

Ratio 1:639

626 713 239

-

1:701 1:418

Strength + Spt Backup = Ratio 738 870 = 1:542 1:575

-

Rho
Nationwide b. Province Psi Chi Rh'Province

100,000
1,000,000

298 1905

1:336 1:525

Area ratio. Area (sq mi 8,500 12,000 4,500 Area (sq mi) 8,500 7 Assigned Strength = Ratio 626 713 239 Strength + Backup 738 870 298
a -

- 1:13.6 - 1:16.8 1:18.8 Ratio 1:11.5 1:13.8 1:15.1

hi Rho

12,000 4,5(0

I
i

53

I
..

I
D. Operational Employment. 1. Thus, Rural. Each province Is regarded a# Psi Province. , '".e district. Psi District is To facilitaLe cominand and coo.'dLnation, each district is subdivided inLo numbered suu "stricts (see figu;re ChL-2 as e separate 3ubeistrict of Chi

16).

Forktown is,

therefore,

district, a. Command. The company located at each province capital Thus, the patrol company

assumes a role as district headquarters.

commander has a dual role of disttict coxriiander and subdistrict commander (see figure 17). b. Support. The d.atrict corowndeT may either attach

support elements to subdirrrfct u'nits c,: ratain them under centzal control at district headquArte-.

Tyvpi-,l oi decentralized elsm its are

communications teams and inteaiigence texis. 2. Urban. All cit;e, of 1O,O00 The popula..ion and ove- are designated Cepital

as separate subdistricts.

nly excptp.on to this division is

City which is a separate metropolitan dlistrcL.

CCntinuous reqgdrements

for .,pport eleme.Ls dicta.e tne direct attachment of Eupport teams to tle urban forces. In smaller cities lesser used support teams may be he3d on foi absignme-1t a3 needeu. Schew-tically, an urbau force

an on-call basio,

would be organized as shown in figure !'.

1
I
i54

3.General.

Facc city subd'qtrict police force vili be under is located.

thc conmand, of th,, di-;trict poJice chief within which it CapitLi City's police force will report dire.

ly to t'e Chief of the

PI -

1IT

1r-

001 00
-

-6

550

'II

tInJ~

UA. 0r

U-

L(

oF&

YOZ
IL9 0.

4c

5. IL0Lq
0
Jli

-oo
0 00

IL--

-Z

IF

4-J

urn

*Q.

D( &

I2

ILl

4 mw

0.

00w

z
4

-J

OX
0J m
00 02

co
M
00

W2
10 OI~

ILVw

2T

V)Ju

IX > 0I~ WIC>-

a 0

I
57

z* go~'R
U

1.4

I i I
Patrol Division at National Police Headquarters. The overall police to

government relationship is depicted in E. Coordination. I. surgencies,

figure 19.

Throughout each of the many historical studies done on inlack of coordination evolves as one of the prime contributers Coordination must be established with all elements to have any chance for

to police failure. of government if success. cal,

the internal defense plan is

Continuous lines of communication must be opened to the politieconomic, and military or paramilitary arms of government.

social,

The resultant exchange of information and benefits derived therefrom, are nowhere more aptly pointed out than in the successes of Malaya and the early failures experienced in 2. elementr Vietnam.

Coordination must not only be accomplished throughout all but also across all levels. This includes and the

of government,

coordination at the highest level, lowest level, off;:lals.

the Area Coordination Center,

the patrolman on the beat and his relations with local or how well

No matter how efficient a police organization, they cannot work in a vacuum. the social, economic,

organized they are, *

Without the support and political order,

of, and coordination with, the police program is

doomed to failure.

t5

NATIONWAL GOVT AND POLICE RELATIONSHIP

OHIF

r
LINE

OlNECTOR
OF

POL.-CE FOR OI1V.SIot4S

CHIE F

OF

PATRO ,OIVSIONrP

D/C.

RURAL
P.tLSPATROLS

/C URSAN

L__[

METROPOLTAN
A_ EAS R

PROVIN' CHI~

CP RURAL. PATROL

S IVALL
CITY PR~iAL

OFT
PATROL

I
VIII FOOTNOTES IWarren H. Metzner , LTC. Security Mission. O.W. Wilson. US Assistance in the Peruvian Police Internal Pa.) Illinois: Charles

(US War College,Carlisle barracks, Police Planning. (Springfield,

C. Thomans,

1952), p. 44.
The Municipal Year

3 International City Manager's Association. (Chicago, 1965). Book 1965. 4 International Police Association.

International Bibliography of

(London: Butterworth, 1962). Police Literature. 5 Uniform Crime Reports for the United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 1966).
6

(Washington, D. C.:

John F.

Snanley.

Address to the Law Enforcement Intelligence

(Chicago, Illinois, 1 November 1963). Unit Eastern Regional Conference. 7 Uniform Crime Reports for the United States. (Washington, D. C.: Federal Bureau of Investigatiod, July 1966), International Police Association. Police Literature. (LondouL. Table 43.

International Bibliography of 1962).

Butterworths,

9International Police Association. Police Literatu .

1

International Bibliography of

(London:

Butterworths,

1962).
The Municipal Year Book

0 International City Manager's Association. (Chicago, 1965).

1965.

"International City Manager's .,ssociation.

1965. (Chicago, 1965).

The Municipal Year Book

In2ernational City Manager's Association. 1965. (Chicago, 1965).

The Municipal Year Bfjok

60

I
1965.

~~~Inittnational City M~anager'8 As~oclatiofl

(Chicaga, 1965).

unc;IYerBo

61

I
J
1. BOOKS. Banton, Michael. Book, Inc., Bauer, Chicago: 1964, Peter and Basil Yamey. Ecopornes of Unc.de.,loped Countries. 19J7. Londov: Cassell, 1964. The Policeman in the Community. New York: Basic IX BIBLIOGRAPHY

University of Chicago, James.

Cramer,

The World's Poiice.

International City Manager's Association. 1965. Chicago, 1965.

The Municipal Year Book

International Police Academy. Washington, Washington, D. C.: D. C.

Th, Poli~e axid Internal SezuriLy. AID. Department of State,

Office of Public Satety. 20523, September 1965.

International Police Association. Police Literature. Leonard, Foundaticot V. A. London: Butterwerths,

_Inernptionl. ibltovrah, 1962. Brooklyn:

of

Police of the Twentieth Sentury. 1964. New Ycik:

The

Press,

Inc.,

SMacI,-r,

R. M.

Th2 Web of Government.

The MarMil1n

Company, Mei, Measures.

1947. Ko-Wang. Oriental Police Systems and Counter-Subveisive 1963.

Michigan State University,

62

I
Mil;spaugh, A. C. Menasha, Wisconsin: Reith, Ltd.1 1952. Reith, Charies. London: Police Principles and the Problems of War. 1940. New York: Charles. Crime Control by the National Government. 1937. London; Faber and Faber, George Banta Publishing Co., The Blind Eye of History.

Oxford Press,

Shils, Edward. HumanitiEs Press, Wilson, Thomas, 1952. 0. W.

Political Development of the New States.

Inc. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C.

Q. W. Police Planning.

Wilson, Service, II.

Police Reccrds.

Chicago:

Public Adminifetration

1942,

GOVERNrtVNT PUBLICATIONS AND ARTICLES. Adkins, E. H., Jr. The Police and Resources Control in Counter-

InsueBncy. To Vietri.-,

Public Safety Division, United States Operations Miss'-on January 1964. Frank E. A Concept for Military and Police-Security Harmon-on-Hudson, New York: Hudson

Armbruster,

Opera.ions in South Vietnam. Institute, Inc., 20 June 1966.

Gollsen,

J. M.

"Counterinsurgency" and Research in 1970.

Text of

Speech Given at Advanced Research Projects Agency Symposium, of Defense. Metz:.., Missi-en. Washington, D. C., 24 May 1965.

Department

Warren H. US Assistance In the Peruvian Internal Security 1965

US War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 63

Headquarters, Police of Europe. Malvin, Ohi.,

United States Army Europe. Africa and Aria.

Foreign Countries,

The

Pamphlet No. 550-1,

27 November 1963.

Eugene II. "Ideology and Organization in Counterinsurgency."

Volume 8, Spring 1.964.

"Miller, Richae'd D_, iaiu

Order.

US Army, Military Police Corps. Mitiary Police Journal.

"Law and 1966.

'foutthsto:c ol Stiihility." 7. Background Santa Barbara,

October,

Paymaany, America III.

for Counterinsurgency Studies in Latin California: Defense Research Corporation,

15 December 1964. President's Commission on Law Enforcement arl Administration of Justice. prevention and Control of Riots (Draft), May 1966. Vol. 1. Cambridge, New York:

Report on Urban Insurgency Studies, The Simuimatics Corporation, Rescarc'l Massachuse~ts: Sorenson, May 1966.

on Urbao D.seoil~lilrium Final Report, Associate John L.

Phase I.

Cambridge,

for International Research,Inc.,

31 May 1966. California:

Urban Insurgency Cases. February 1965.

Santa Barbara,

SDefense

Research Corporation,

Uniform Crime Reports for the United States.

Washington,

D. C.:

I
j
,f

Federal Bureau of Investigation,

July 1966. A New Approach to CounterResearch Analysis Corporation,

H. Williams, R. and McQuie, Robert. McLean, Virginia: insurgency Research.

October 1964.

64

APPENDIX SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

I.

GENIRNEAL.

As a rvtiiit of the research conducted

for this study,

vert'ii

derivative data wa, is

collected which,

although not critical to the

developnwmnt of the model, visor in the field. II.

helpful as background knowledge to the ad-

PAY AND OPERATING COST COMPARISONS. A. Figure 1 shows a gradual decline in salaries paid police emas the size of the community

ployees, while operationaA costs increase, decreases.

While the significance of the decreasing salary scale is care should be taken in evaluating increasing operational

understandable, costs.

While an efficiency factor may be evident to some small degree,

procurement costs would seem to impact heaviest in the small community. In a small comrnunity, probably every officer is mobile. Again, Thus, the ratio the

of vehicles to police is higher.

due to bloc procurement,

sedan that costs the city of New York $1,400.00 may well cost Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, ment, $2,200.00. The same is true of weapons, riot control equip-

and even basic forms and stationery. B. Salaries range between 82% and 937. of the police budget in all (See figure 2.) Thus, it may be well for the

categories of communities.

advisor of an underd,!veloped nation to give thought to using such a range for the greatest return in enforcement. This would make the department

i
I
AVERAG? COSTS-OPERATION OFW U.S. POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN COST PER EMPLOYEE

r
$8,000

TOTAL COST/POLICEMAN POLICEMAN SALARY OPERATIONAL COST

;;;

-r-

-0

14$6473

zt5, 0... O00 $6,000-

..

-5,

a, ooo i$08
i-,: o
........... .. .o oo

67
o.

o.

$14

aft.__

117

0o00o

o0000

000

SIZE

OF COMMUNITY
FI GURE 1

I
SALARIES VS OPERATIONAL COSTS

SALARIES t
100%

OPERATIONAL

~~COLTS

--

1
-""i

90% 80 %

60% 50% 40%

30% 20%

10%
0%
__

,__'
__ _ _ _ __ _

0
0
to

00

=
CJo-

oO

oo

o0.O
V) t

ogo

SIZE OF
3

COMMUNITY
2

SFIGURE

people-orLented

rather than gadget-oriented.

It

is

recognized that most

US communities have a base or physical police plant on hand that only requtres nInintenance, updating, ol many new cotintrics; more thain likely still C. Whlile it is still or occasional replacement. This is not true

, tther comparable Covernment agencies will peop!e-ortented. compare police salaries and Iigurvs

h1. prepqondedratntly impos:.Ible

tLis ncirately

costs with other servi ce-orieicited aLgencies on a worldwide basis, J and 4 show 'omparo;,Lti' ye,:t: Is Ior 1S poIice and fireman.

These differ-

ences may he roighly compared "'or developing nations to give tile advisor a heel I-or the adequacy of police pay it the country of interest.

COMPARATIVE COSIS OF POLICE' B FIRE SERVICES IN 1964

(SALARIES
"POLICE

VS. OPERATIONAL

COSTS)

OPNS
SALARIES -P-P-

FIRE
OPNSSALARIES-F-F-

100%
80 %

--..

q/-

60%

40%

20%

....-.

0%-

L!0.i.6- 6,1.
0 oo 0 0 o o 0 0 o, o
0 00

0c 0

SIZE OF [

COMMUNITY
3

F! GURE

I
I

POLICE1 COMPARATIVE COSTS OF 8 FIRE SERVICES IN 1964

(COSTS PER CAPITA)

I POLICE

IFIRE
I
_________25

I $ 20
-.-..

$15
10~

0o o tOOdo o o00 oC o o 00 OoO 0 0o

SIZE

OF
6

COMMUNITY

FIGURE 4