NASD

LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE, WAIVER AND CONSENT

NO. EAF- 0400060001
RE: Hantz Financial Services, Inc., Respondent (CRD No. 46047)
John Hantz, Respondent (CRD No. 1462066)
Pursuant to Rule 9216 of NASD'$ Code of Procedure, Respondents Hantz
Financial Services, Inc. ("HFS" or the "firm") and John Hantz ("Hantz") (collectively,
"Respondents") submit this Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (NAWe") for the
purpose of proposing a settlement of the alleged rule violations described in Part II
below. This AWe is submitted on the condition that, if accepted, NASD will not bring
any future actions against RespOndents alleging violations based on the same factual
findings.
Respondents understand that:
1. Submission of this AWe is voluntary and will not resolve this matter unless
and until it has been reviewed and accepted by NASD's Department of
Enforcement and National Adjudicatory Council f'NAC") Review
Subcommittee or Office of Disciplinary Affairs ("aDA"), pursuant to NASD
Rule 9216;
2. If this AWe is not accepted, its submission will not be used as evidence to
prove any of the allegations against them; and
3. If accepted:
a. this AWe will become part of Respondents' permanent disCiplinary
records and may be considered in any future actions brought by
NASD or any other regulator against them;
b. this AWe will be made available through NASO's public disclosure
program in response to public inquiries about Respondents'
disciplinary records;
c. NASD may make a public announcement concerning this
agreement and the subject matter thereof in accordance with NASD
Rule 8310 and IM-8310 .. 2: and
d. Respondents may not take any action or make or permit to be
made any public statement
t
including in regulatory filings or
otherwise t denying, directly or indirectly. any allegation in this AWe
or create the impression that the AWe is without factual basis.
Nothing in this provision affects Respondents' testimonial
obligations or right to take legal or factual pOSitions in litigation or
o 0 L ~ 0 5 b I 2 G 10Gb

other legal proceeding in which NASD is not a party.
Respondents also understand that their experience in the securities jndustry and
disciplinary histories may be factors that will be considered in deciding whether to
accept this AWC. This experience and history is as follows:
HFS has been an NASD member since 1999. Its principal offices are
(ocated in Southfield, Michigan. It has 16 branch offices in Michigan and
Ohio, and approximately 270 registered representatives. HFS has no
relevant formal disciplinary history.
John Hantz, age 43, has been registered as an associated person of an
NASD member since 1986. He is currently registered 8S a General
Securities Representative (Series 7) and a General Securities Principal
(Series 24). John Hantz founded HFS in 1998, and currently serves as its
President, CEO and Director. He owns 65% of HFS' parent company, the
Hantz Group ("HG'). He has no relevant formal disciplinary history.
I.
WAIVER OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
Respondents specifically and voluntarily waive the following rights granted under
NASD's Code of Procedure:
A. To have a Formal Complaint issued specifying the allegations against
them;
B. To be notified of the Formal Complaint and have the opportunity to answer
the allegations in writing;
C. To defend against the allegations in a disciplinary hearing before a
hearing panel, to have a written record of the hearing made, and to have a
written decision issued; and
D. To appeal any such decision to the NAC and then to the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and a U.S. Court of Appeals.
Further, Respondents specifically and voluntarily waive any right to claim bias or
prejudgment of the General Counsel, the NAC. or any member of the NAC, in
connection with such person's or body's participation in discussions regarding the terms
and conditions of this AWe, or other consideration of this AWe .. including acceptance or
rejection of this AWe.
Respondents further speciftc8l1y and voluntarily waive any right to claim that a
person violated the ex parte prohibitions of Rule 9143 or the separation of functions
Page 2 of 22

prohibitions of Rule 9144, in connection with such personts or body's participation in
discussions regarding the terms and conditions of this AWe, or other consideration of
this AWe. including its acceptance or rejection.
II ..
ACCEPTANCE AND CONSENT
HFS and John Hantz hereby accept and consent, without admitting or denying
the allegations or findings. and solely for the purposes of this proceeding and any other
proceeding brought by or on behalf of NASD. or to which NASD is a party. prior to a
hearing and without an adjudication of any issue of law or fact, to the entry of the
following findings by NASD:
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.. Summary
From January 1, 2002 to June 30, 2004 (the wrelevant period"), HFS engaged in
certain fraudulent activities described below by misrepresenting or failing to disclose
material conflicts of interest to customers, thereby violating NASD rules and Sections
17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933.
1
HFS sold financial plans to its customers that recommended the customer
purchase a variety of financial products, such as mutual funds, variable annuities and
insurance products. As described below
t
the firm misrepresented to its clients that it and
its employees were "independent" and "objective," HFS claimed that it offered its clients
the opportunity to choose products from a number of different suppliers and stated it was
not captive to one or a few product companies.
In fact, HFS had arrangements with a preferred supplier for each investment
product and received substantial payments from each preferred supplier. It acknowledged
to its preferred suppliers that it was not independent, it had a proprietary sales force, it
could determine what its FAs sokl, and it expected 90 percent of its sales of each
investment product to be the' preferred suppliers' products. In practice, HFS directed the
Section 17(a)(2} of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Acti provides, in relevant part. that
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any security ... directly or indirectJy to ... obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in tight of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.- SectJon 17(8)(3) provides that it is unlawful to lIengage in any transaction.
practice. or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser-.
The Supreme Court has held that establishing violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) does not
require a showing of seienter. The Court found that the language of 17(8)(2) does not include a scienter
requirement and the language of 17(a)(3) focuses on the effect of particular conduct on members of the
investing public. rather than upon the culpability of the person responsible. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680.
69697 (1980).
Page 3 of 22

vast majority of its sales of each product, up to 95%, to its preferred supplier in each
product category. .
HFS' revenue sharing arrangements differed from most other firms'. In some
instances, the firm collected marketing fees from its preferred suppliers that were
substantially higher than the fees received by most finns in the industry. HFS collected
almost $970,000 from the various preferred suppliers in 2002, almost $1.5 million in 2003,
and almost $1.8 million in 2004. By the end of 2004, the revenue sharing payments
gradually rose to account for 7% of HFS' total revenues, thereby becoming an increasingly
important component of the finn's business.
The payments HFS received from its preferred suppliers were a substantial factor
in the firm's decision to select, recommend and sen those suppliers' products. For
example, in 2002, HFS learned that one mutual fund company, which had been its
preferred supplier for several years, was no tonger willing to pay it. HFS loki the mutual
fund supplier it would stop selling that supplier's mutual funds and would switch the firm's
existing business to other mutual fund companies. HFS proceeded to negotiate a revenue
sharing arrangement with a new preferred supplier. Sales of the old preferred suppliers
product plummeted while the sales of the new suppliers funds soared. Moreover, HFS
transferred more than $20 million in assets from other mutual fund suppliers to the new
preferred supplier at NAV. To provide an incentive for the HFS FAs to effect these
switches, the new preferred supplier gave HFS and its F As special cash compensation in
the form of a payment of 50 basis points on each transfer. HFS customers were not told
about this special cash payment.
During portions of the relevant period, as part of its overall financial planning
process with its clients, HFS also recommended that thousands of its customers refinance
their homes through Tranex Financial Services, Inc. (nTranex"). Although the firm
disclosed a general relationship with Tranex, HFS failed to adequately disclose that HFS'
parent company owned and controlled Tranex, thereby making Tranex an affiliate of HFS.
Furthermore, HFS paid a fee that amounted to 25% of the net yield spread that Tranex
earned on the Joan to FAs who recommended the mortgage refinance loans and referred
mortgage customers to Tranex. HFS did not disclose the fact or amount of this
compensation to customers.
In addition. HFS sold limited partnership products to customers who did not meet
the minimum suitability requirements on net worth or income established by the issuer,
the State of Michigan, or HFS. HFS also distributed a sales brochure without obtaining
the required review from NASD's Advertising Regulation Department. Finally, HFS and
John Hantz failed to adequately supervise and the firm failed to maintain adequate
supervisory systems to ensure compliance with the federal securities laws and NASD
rules.
Page 4 of 22

2. Background
HFS is dually registered as a broker dealer and an investment advisor. Its 270
registered personnel work in sixteen branches in Michigan and three in Ohio. John Hantz,
its President, CEO, and principal owner. had been a top producer and Midwest Regional
Manager with a large, nationa" financial-planning finn before he founded HFS in 1998.
HFS charges its clients $300 to $2,500 to prepare a detailed financial plan. Based
upon the interviews with and information provided by the clients. HFS FA's recommend
that customers purchase various securities products (mutual funds, variable annuities, real
estate direct participation programs/limited partnerships, and variable universal life) and
other financial products (including mortgage loans, fixed annuities, life insurance, disability
insurance and long tenn care insurance). HFS sells both its plans and its financial
products through registered representatives, known internally as Financial Advisors
("FAs"). The FAs, who are employees of the finn, generally are hired with little or no
industry experience and learn to do business according to the Hantz model.
3. HFS Made Misrepresentations about its "Independence"
In speaking with potential customers. HFS' FAs generally portrayed themselves
as "independent" financial consultants. HFS' FAs generally began their initial client
interviews with potential clients by closely following a detailed script in HFS' First Year
Training Manual:
I would like to give you a little background on myself. First of a", as I may
or may not have mentioned to you I am an independent financial
consultant. Do you know what that means? To be an independent
financial consultant means a lot more freedom and flexibility to offer 8
number of different products and s9IVices without being captive to one or
a few product companies. It allows me to better service my clients to help
them reach their financial goals because there is more objectivity.
[Emphasis addedj.
In its primary sales brochure entitled "More Choices - More Results", which it
typicalty provided to customers, HFS stressed-its ability to offer "choices from a multitude
of services and products." In an advertisement published in Fall 2000, HFS claimed to sell
"the most comprehensive array of products available in the market today," and in a
February 2003 advertisement, it claimed to offer "individually designed financial plans and
a wide range of investment products. II
The firm's assertions in its sales brochure, these advertisements, and the FAs'
claims to customers, were misleading because HFS' product offerings were in essence
limited to the preferred suppliers' products for each type of investment.
Page 5 of 22

In confidential presentations sent to firms HFS was considering as potential
preferred partners, HFS conceded that it was not independent and that it did not behave
like ordinary "independent broker/dealer firms," (t wrote:
uThe [Hantz Group] Business Model is unique in the financial planning industry. In
many respects, it is almost the complete opposite of the traditional Independent
Broker/Dealer business model."
In several presentations to preferred suppliers, HFS boasted: "Because it knows its role as
a product distributor, HG is the best firm in the nation at selling proprietary product."
Elsewhere, it described its goal of being the "best controlled distribution company in the
worid at selling their partners products". HFS said that product manufacturers could utilize
. HFS' brokers as their own "proprietary sales force" and expect those brokers to sell the
"proprietary" products 90% of the time.
In fact, HFS selected one "Preferred Supplier" in each product category and then
delivered almost all of its sales to that supplier:
Product Cateaory
Mutual Funds
Variable Annuities
Fixed Annuities
WL Insurance
Term Life Insurance
Disability Insurance
REITs
long-Term Care Insur.
Preferred Supplier
Mutual Fund Company X
VA Company A
Fixed Annuity Company J
Insurance Company N
lnsurance Company N
Insurance Company M
Limited Partner Company C
Insurance Company C
% o'SII'I
84.54 %
96.45
%
92.83 %
99.45 %
81.97 %
80.71 %
94.95 %
84.63%
While claiming to be independent. objective, and freety able to offer the products of
a number of different suppliers, HFS was effectively acting as the proprietary sales arm for
specifIC product manufacturers. HFS did not disclose to its customers that it was, in
essence, recommending the products of only one preferred supplier in each product
category I although the average investor would have considered that information to be
material.
4. HFS' Revenue Sharing Arrangements Presented Undisclosed Conflicts of
Inte .... t
a. HFS Negotiatad Extraordinary Revenue Sharing Arrangements
With several of its preferred suppliers, HFS did not simply accept the marketing
fees that were being offered by those companies. It negotiated persistently with them to
2
The sales figures for Mutual Fund Company X cover the period July 1. 2003 (the quarter when
Mutual Fund Company X first became the mutual fund preferred supplier) to September 30,2004. Later,
approximately 95 percent of HFS' fund sales were of Company Xs fund.
Page 6 of 22

maximize the amount of marketing fees in return for the agreement to maximize sales of
those supptiers' products. As HFS directed inaeasing volumes of business to its preferred
suppliers, it sometimes re-opened negotiations and sought even higher levels of marketing
fees. Eventually. HFS secured several revenue sharing arrangements that \\I8re
significantly higher, for several important product categories, than the fees normally paid in
the industry, especially when compared to fees paid to firms of HFS' size and asset base:
Product Category Preferred Supplier Recent Revenue Sharing
Payments
Mutual Funds Mutual Fund Company X 45 bps on new sales
5 bps on aged assets
Variable Annuities VA Company S 25-35 bps on new sales
Fixed Annuities Fixed Company J
on the product)
bps on new sales
limited Partnerships limited Partner Company C 50 bps on new sales
Variable Universal Insurance Company N 9 % of target premiums
Life
Disability Insurance Insurance M 60 % of first year premiums
Long Term Care Insurance Company C Varying scale based on client age
Insurance
These agreements allowed HFS to collect a steadily increaSing amount of money
from marketing fees:
2002.. $ 968,772-
2003 - $ 1,487.772
2004 - $ 1.838.691
Total- $ 4,295,235
HFS' marketing fees accounted for a significant percentage of its overall revenues
- 5% in 2002, 6% in 2003, and 7% in 2004. The revenues were also important to the
firm's profitability. For example, without its marketing fees, HFS' net profits in 2002 would
have fallen from $1.026,374 to only $57,602. B"ecause of the magnitude of these fees,
revenue sharing arrangements became an increasingly critical component of the finn's
business concept.
b. HFS' Business Structure Maximized Its Revenue Sharing
Opportunities
HFS designed its structure and procedures to allow it to focus its sales effort on the
products of its preferred suppliers. In a confidential marketing presentation it made to its
preferred suppliers, HFS asserted:
Since HG's entire sales force are employees. not independent
contractors, HG can dictate how they do business .... Unlike
independent broker/dealer finns, almost all of HG's new hires come
Page 7 of 22

from outside the industry. so HG can train them to do business its
way.
An official who worked for a preferred supplier sent an internal e-mail describing HFS'
system as follows: "Hantz has strong control over the reps which can be manipulated
based upon the best deal and the best timing that can be derived."
On the rare occasions when HFS hired an experienced person, it required the new
FA to undergo a Mdetox" program to re-educate the FA on how to do business according to
the Hantz business model. HFS brought in representatives from the preferred suppliers to
train its FAs on all the positive features of that suppliers products. The FAs received little
or no training-regarding the products of non-preferred suppliers. and were discouraged
from speaking with the wholesalers who could have offered them educational information
about alternative products.
HFS subjected its new FAs to very close supervision, especially during their first
year of employment. Managers routinely tested the FAs on how well they had memorized
their sales scripts. The superVisors trained them on which products to recommend to their
customers, and helped them to become comfortable with the preferred suppliers' products,
but only those products. HFS' supervisors and employees also discouraged new FAs
from recommending the products of non-preferred suppliers during weekly "case study"
peer review meetings.
Many of HFS' 270 FAs conducted littia or no due diligence to determine which
financial products were most appropriate to recommend to their clients. Instead, they
relied almost entirely on two top managers who analyzed the many product choices and
selected what was deemed to be the best supplier in each product category. The FAs
then recommended the chosen products, based almost entirely upon the selections made
by a small group of management personnel. The F As and customers were encouraged to
focus on general concepts of financial planning and long term goals. They were not
encouraged to focus on other factors, such as the specific costs or features of a given
product. or the performance of that product in comparison to the products offered by other
product suppliers. Hantz Group's confidential Business Plan stated:
Product performance is de-emphasized .... Goal Orientation -
Identiftes long-term goals and de-emphasizes need for 'best
investment product.' [The HFS business m o d e ~ appeals to
consultants who believe that specific product choices are less
important than the planning process.
Etsewhere in its confidential Business Plan I HG described that its goal was to
develop "'ncreased Share of Wallet - Increased wallet-share initially and over time. More
accounts per client. Larger account size." Once HFS developed a client. it aggressively
sought new opportunities to eam income by offering a widening spectrum of financial
products - car insurance. home insurance. life insurance, mortgage refinancing, tax
planning, estate planning, and other financial products.
Page 8 of 22

c. HFS Selected Ita Preferred Suppliers Basad In Substantial Part Upon
the Suppliers' Willingness to Pay Marketing Fees, Presenting an
Undisclosed Conflict of Interest
During the relevant period. HFS switched from one preferred supplier to another in
only the mutual fund area. A substantial factor in HFS's decision to pick its new preferred
suppliers was the suppliers' willingness to pay marketing fees. When HFS dropped that
preferred supplier. sales of that supplier's products plummeted. When HFS seleded the
new preferred supplier and that firm began paying marketing fees. sates of that suppliers
products soared.
HFS sold the mutual funds of Mutual Fund Company 0 ("Company 0") from 1998
to 2002, when HFS discovered that that preferred supplier had stopped paying marketing
fees. HFS told Company 0 that unless it paid HFS the marketing fees supposedly owed,
HFS would stop sending Company 0 new business and move current assets out of
Company O's funds.
When Company 0 did not resume marketing fee payments. HFS stopped
recommending the sale of Company D's funds to new customers and sales of Company
O's funds decreased substantially. Later, after HFS had negotiated a new revenue
sharing agreement with Mutual Fund Company X ("Company X"), HFS named
Company X as its new preferred supplier. Once that new agreement was signed. sales
of Company X's funds skyrocketed t while sales of the old preferred supplier's funds fell,
until over 90 percent of HFS' mutual fund sales were of Company X's funds. HFS also
recommended that more than 2000 of its existing mutual fund customers transfer their
existing mutual fund holdings to Company X.
Page 9 of 22

In
C
o
=
u
as
IIJ
c
l!
t-
'0
...
.!
E
::s
Z
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
o
HFS 2003 Sales of Products of
Mutual Fund Company X
Month
Marketing support agreement between HFS and Mutual Fund Company X became effective July 21,
2003. There were 12 transactions before July 21 and 45 transactions on or after July 21.
By November 2003, based on HFS' impressive volume of saies
l
Company X granted
HFS an improved revenue sharing arrangement that allowed HFS to collect 45 basis
pOints on sales and 5 basis pOints on assets (instead of the 27 basis points that had
previously been paid by Company X). The terms of this deal were among the most
generous found anywhere in the industry.
5. HFS' FAa Received Compenaation For Directing Busine.s to an Affiliated
Mortgage Company. Creating a Conflict of Interest
Hantz Group, HFS' parent company, acquired Tranex in approximately 1999.
Tranex is a licensed Michigan mortgage broker that originates residential loans for its
customers. HG replaced most of the Tranex loan officers who had previously originated
its mortgage loans and began using the HFS FAs as Tranexs exclusive sales arm. After
receiving extensive training, the HFS FAs began handling many of the various duties of
the former loan officers, such as educating the homeowners about mortgage product
options, taking mortgage applications, disseminating the various mandatory HUD
Page 10 of 22

disclosure forms, and collecting the necessary documentation required at loan closings.
Tranex employees subsequently handled the underwriting, credit analysis, and loan
decision, and attended the actual closing.
In retum for recommending a mortgage loan to their clients, and then handling
many of the various mortgage-related tasks. HFS paid the FAs referral fees that equaled
25% of the net yield spread that Tranex eamed for originating and closing the mortgage
loans. In some instances this compensation accounted for as much as a quarter of the
FAs' annual income. These fees gave the FAs incentive to recommend mortgage
refinancing to their clients. It also provided them with a financial incentive to recommend a
mortgage loan from Tranex, instead of from competing mortgage brokers or lenders. This
financial incentive presentedHFS and its FAs with a conflict of interest.
6. HFS Misrepresented or Failed to Adequately Disclose Material Facta About
its RelationshIp with Ita Preferred Suppliers and With Tranex
a. HFS Did Not Disclose to Its FAa or Its Cnents Its Exclusive
Relationships With Its Preferred Suppliers or the Marketing Fee
Arrangements
Despite the actual conflicts of interest described above, HFS did not disclose: a)
that it had selected preferred suppliers; b) that it was directing substantially all of its
business to those suppliers; or c) that those preferred suppliers were paying Significant
marketing fees to HFS with the understanding that HFS would direct most of its business
to them. HFS actions gave rise to a conflict of interest. but the firm did not provide its
clients with disclosure that would enable the clients to make suffiCiently educated
decisions about how to handle the conflict.
HFS' clients could not learn from the FAs that HFS was coJtecting marketing fees
because the firms management did not tell the FAs that the finn was receiving the fees.
HFS management opted not to inform the FAs about the revenue sharing arrangements.
because management did not believe the information was relevant or necessary for FA's.
Only a handful of HFS' top managers knew anything about the revenue sharing program.
HFS also failed to mention any specific information about the marketing fee
arrangements in the written disclosure documents it routinely provided to its clients. The
finn presented each of its clients with a Financial Planning Agreement and a Form ADV-
Part 11.3 Although these documents contained numerous disclosures relating to
compensation, they notably failed to include specifics about the revenue sharing
arrangements. HFS did not disclose to its clients that it had preferred suppliers, or specify
the tenns andlor amounts of compensation the firm was collecting.
3
Form ADV is the Uniform Application for Investment Advisor Registration- that investment
advisory firms file with the SEC and/or state securities regulators to disclose details about their business
operations. HFS distributed Part II of this form to its clients at the time they first entered into a planning
agreement. and made it avaifable at other times as well.
Page 11 of 22

b. Neither HFS Nor its FA. Adequately Disclosed to Clients or Regulators
that the F As Were Working for a Cloaely Affiliated Company and
Receiving Fee. For Recommending and Referring CUents to Tranex
HFS either misrepresented or did not adequately disclose to customers its FAs'
relationship with Tranex. tn written disclosures to clients from 2002 to 2004, HFS stated
that "no referral fees of any kind were being paid by either' Tranex or HFS to the HFS FAs.
Beginning in April 2004, HFS stated: UNo referral fees of any kind will be paid by either
Tranex or the Hantz Group for said referrals. II This failed to disclose the fees paid to the
HFS FAs in connection with the Tranex mortgage referrals.
The 2004 disclosure document also mischaracterized the role that the HFS FAs
played in the mortgage (oan process: "Once an introduction [of the customer to Tranex] is
made, Tranex representatives then handle the application, mortgage approval and closing
process." In fact, the FAa remained a main point of contact with the customers from loan
application through loan closing. and played a critical role throughout the process.
. When Tranex sold mortgages to customers who were recommended by an
affiliated business, federal law required that the mortgage customers receive a written
document (an Affiliated Business Arrangement Disclosure Statement) disclosing the
affiliation between Tranex and the company providing the mortgage referral. The Affiliated
Business Arrangement Disclosure Statement was specifically designed to disclose the
nature of the relationship between the affiliates and to reveal the amount or percentage of
the referral fee that was being paid. Neither HFS nor Tranex provided this required
disclosure to customers until September 2003.
Michigan's mortgage regulators sent a letter to Tranex in October 2002 asking
whether HFS officials were conducting mortgage business. Tranex's reply letter stated
that the HFS employees were not engaged in mortgage brokerage activity. The letter also
suggested that Tranexs customers were receiving the Affiliated Business Arrangement
Disclosure Statement at a time when they were not. Finally, Tranex did not disclose to
Michigan mortgage regulators that HFS FAs were receiving compensation from HFS for
mortgage referrals.
Moreover, even though the HFS F As were conducting the face-to-face interviews
and taking the mortgage applications, they avoided signing as the "interviewer' and left the
Signature line blank pursuant to a firm policy:
ONLY TRANEX EMPLOYEES may sign a mortgage
application as interviewer. This means that if you are an advisor of
HFS, you are not to sign a mortgage application. It must be signed
by [a Tranex employee] .... THIS IS A SERIOUS COMPLIANCE
ISSUE. [Emphasis in original].
Page 12 of 22

Clients were not provided with sufficient disclosures to alert them about the close
affiliation between HFS and Tranex and the resulting conflicts of interest. If HFS' clients
had fully understood the financial incentives the F As were receiving for recommending a
Tranex mortgage. they would have considered the FAs' recommendations more
cautiously.
7. HFS and John Hantz Failed to Establish and Follow an AdequatD Supervisory
System to Monitor the Revenue Sharing Arrangements and the Related
Disclosures
HFS failed to adequately supervise its FAs who had a) suggested to investors
that they and their firm were Ilindependent"; b) failed to disclose that HFS was selling
almost exclusively the products of its preferred suppliers; and c) failed to disclose that
the preferred suppliers were paying significant marketing fees to HFS that created a
financial incentive to promote the products of its preferred suppliers. HFS also failed to
establish, maintain and enforce supervisory systems and procedures reasonably
designed to prevent the FAs and the firm from engaging in the activities discussed
above.
As examples, HFS' procedures contained no provisions requiring officials to
monitor what the firm and its FAs told customers- about revenue sharing arrangements,
HFS' "independence'" or HFS' freedom to offer products from a wide range of product
suppliers. Finally, the firm failed to establish adequate procedures designed to
detennine whether the product companies had made appropriate disclosures in their
product prospectuses and statements of additional information about the revenue
sharing arrangements that had been reached with HFS.
Because John Hantz owned more than 650/0 of HFS' parent company, Hantz
Group, he received the majority of the financial benefits that were generated by HFS'
undisclosed revenue sharing arrangements. Furthermore, as HFS' President, CEO.
and Director, John Hantz directly supervised the firm's revenue sharing program. He
failed to adequately monitor the firm's revenue sharing activities or its disclosures
regarding the conflicts of interest described herein. John Hantz did not adequately
. ensure that HFS maintained and enforced the supervisory procedures and systems
described herein. As a result, John Hantz failed to adequately supervise HFS' activities
with respect to its revenue sharing program.
8. HFS Received and Old Not Ensure Adequate Disclosure of Special Ca.h
Compensation
In approximately July 2003, HFS entered into an agreement with Mutual Fund
Company X that allowed HFS to transfer its clients from the funds of other mutual fund
families into Company X mutual funds at net asset value ("NAV"). Since there wourd be
no sales commissions paid to the HFS FAs for moving clients to Company X mutual
funds at NAVt HFS and Company X entered into an agreement that allowed the FAs to
receive 50 bps on gross sales for all money transferred into Company X mutual funds at
Page 13 of 22
I
NAV. The special deaJ lasted from July 21 t 2003 to January 21 t 2004. Company X did
not grant this same deal to other broker-dealers who sold its mutual funds.
Company XIS payment to HFS and its FAs constituted "special cash
compensation" under NASD Rule 2830(1). Company X's prospectuses and statements
of additional information ("SAts") did not adequately disclose the special cash
compensation paid to HFS in three respects: they never mentioned HFS by name;
they did not indicate that Company X was paying special cash compensation to the HFS
FAs for their NAV transfers, but not to other firms; and they did not disclose the
tldetails" of the special cash compensation arrangements, such as the specific basis
points or dollar amounts that were being paid to the HFS FAa.
HFS, Written Supervisory Procedures Manual ( .. the WSP Manual") stated that
HFS would not enter into special cash compensation arrangements unless such
arrangements were adequately disclosed in the fund's prospectuses and SAls.
Moreover, the WSPs required HFS to ensure such disclosure was made before HFS
would accept special cash compensation.
HFS failed to follow the provisions of its WSPs and failed to comply with NASD
Conduct Rule 2830(1). Accordingly t HFS' clients who received recommendations to
transfer assets from their existing mutual funds to the funds of Company X were not
alerted to a potentially significant conflict of interest. The clients had no way of knowing
that the FAs who recommended the NAV transfers had received special cash
compensation that amounted to an economic incentive to recommend the transfer.
9. HFS Sold Limited Partnerships to Customers Who Did Not Meet Certain
Minimum Suitability Requirements
During the relevant period
l
when HFS recommended limited partnerships to its
clients, it overwhelmingly recommended and sold a product offered by one preferred
supplier, Limited Partner Supplier C (ULP Supplier CII). These products could only be sold
to investors who satisfied the minimum suitability requirements in: a) LP Supplier C's own
prospectus; b) the State of Michigan's guidelines for limited partnerships; and c) HFS'
Registered Rep Manual dated April 18
1
2003 ('he RR Manual"), Because it failed to
follow these guidelines, however, HFS sold limited partnerships to customers who did not
have sufficient assets or income to meet these minmum suitability thresholds.
While HFS made 808 total sales of these limited partnership products, at least 19
(2.4%) of those sales were made to clients who failed to meet LP Supplier Cts minimum
suitability requirements that they have either a) a minimum annual income of $45,000 and
a minimum net worth of $45,000 (excluding home, furnishings and personal automobiles);
or b) a minimum net worth of $150,000 (excluding home. furnishings and personal
automobiles).
At least 51 of HFS' 808 clients (6.30/0) who purchased LP Supplier C limited
partnerships failed to meet Michigan's suitability requirements that they have a) an annual
Page 14 of 22

gross income of at least $60,000 and a net worth (not including home, furnishings and
personal automobiles) of at least $60,000: or b) a net worth (not including home,
fumishings and personal automobiles) of at least $225,000.
At least 537 of HFS' 808 clients (66.5%) who purchased LP Supplier C limited
partnerships failed to comply with the requirement in the HFS procedures that they have at
a minimum $1 ,000,000 net worth.
HFS calculated the net worth of its clients by including the value of a clienrs home,
furnishings and automobiles. Michigan and LP Supplier C calculated their minimum net
worth thresholds by excluding the value of these three items. Therefore. HFS was unable
to provide its supervisors with a means of properly detennining whether its FAs were
recommending the sale of limited partnerships to customers for whom they were not
suitable. HFS' failure to adopt and implement appropriate procedures for unifonnly
calculating net worth therefore led to the recommendations that did not meet the various
. suitability reqUirements, and management's inability to prevent the violations.
10. HFS Failed to Obtain NASD's Review of Its Discovery Interview Brochure
HFS routinely distributed a tri ... fold Discovery Interview Brochure to all its clients and
potential clients from 1998 through 2004. This brochure suggested that HFS offered
"More Choices" and a "full range of financial services and products." It also suggested that
HFS offered "choices from a multitude of services and products to meet every investment
need." Prior to November 2004 .. the finn failed to file this brochure with the NASD
. Advertising Regulation . Department. As a resurt, HFS never obtained the review required
under NASD Conduct Rule 2210(c)(2)(A).
B. VIOLATIONS
1. HFS Made Claims of 'Independence": Violations of Sections 17(8)(2)
and 17(a)(3)" oftha Securities Act of 1933 and NASD Conduct Rule 2110 I
.. Section 17(8)(2) of the securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Acr) provides. in relevant part, that
lilt shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale,of any security ... directly or indirectly to ... obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading. Section , 7(a)(3) provides that It is unlawful to -engage in any transaction.
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchase"-.
The Supreme Court has held that establishing violations of Sections 17(8)(2) and 17(a)(3) does not
require a showing of scienter. The Court found that the language of 17(a)(2) does not include a scienter
requirement and the language of 17(a)(3) focuses on the effect of particular conduct on members of the
investing public, rather than Lipon the culpability of the person responsible. Aaron v. SEC. 446 U.S. 680,
696-97 (1980).
NASD Conduct Rule 2110 provides: "A member, in the conduct of his business, shan observe
high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade. "
Page 15 of 22

As described above, HFS engaged in fraudulent activity when it encouraged its
FAs to suggest to clients that both they and the firm were "independent", anot captive to
one or a few product companies". and free to offer a number of different products.
These statements were misleading, and in violation of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of
the Securities Act and NASD Conduct Rule 2110.
2. HFS Entered into Revenue Sharing Arrangements that Created
Conflicts of Intereat, Without Disclosing the Arrangements to Its Cilents:
Vlolatlona of Sections 17(8)(2) and 17(8)(3)' of the Securities Act and NASD
Conduct Rule 2110
As described above, HFS engaged in fraudulent activity when it failed to inform
its clients that it sold almost exclusively the products of certain preferred suppliers and
that HFS selected those suppliers based in substantial part upon those firms'
willingness to pay significant marketing fees. HFS' clients were not informed that HFS
had a financial incentive to promote the products of its preferred suppliers or that HFS
was taking its own financial interest into account when deciding which products to
recommend to its customers. These omissions of material facts constituted a violation
of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act and NASD Conduct Rule 2110.
3. HFS and John Hantz Failed to Establish and Follow an Adequate
Supervisory System to Monitor Its Revenue Sharing Arrangements and Related
DI.clo.ures: Vlolationa of NASD Conduct Rule 3010' and 2110 .
As described above, HFS and John Hantz did not adequately supervise the firm's
employees with respect to HFS' revenue sharing activities. They also failed to adopt,
follow or enforce a supervisory system that adequately covered these activities. No
system was in place to prevent the firm and its FAs from a} suggesting to investors that
they and their firm were "independent"; b) famng to disclose that HFS sold almost
exclusively the products of its preferred suppliers; and c) failing to disclose that the
preferred suppliers were paying significant marketing fees to HFS that created a
financial incentive to promote the products of preferred suppliers.
I Section 11(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act-) provides. in relevant part. that
lilt shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any security ... directly or Indirectly to .. , obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made. in light of the circumstances under which they were
made. not misleading.- Section 17(a)(3) provides that it is unlawful to -engage in any transaction,
practice. or course of bUSiness which operates or would operate 8S a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser".
The Supreme Court has held that establishing violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(8)(3) does not
require a showing of scienter. The Court found that the language of 11(a){2) does not include a scienter
requirement and the language of 17(8)(3) focuses on the effect of particular conduct on members of the
investing public. rather than upon the culpability of the person responsible. Aaron v. SEC. 446 U.S. 680.
6 9 6 ~ 9 1 (1980). .
7 NASD Conduct Rule 3010 required members to assign responsibility for each aspect of its
business to an appropriately registered prinCipaL Assigned supervisors are required to reasonably
supervise activities under their purview. Rule 3010 also requires each member to establish both
supervisory systems and written supervisory procedures specifically tailored to the member's business
that address the activities of its registered and associate persons.
Page 16 of 22

John Hantz. by serving as HFS' President, CEO, Director, and primary owner.
had ultimate responsibility for the firms supervisory failures. As a result, HFS and John
Hantz violated NASD Conduct Rules 3010 and 2110.
4. HFS Received Undisclosed Special Cash Compensation for NA V
Transfers of Mutual Funds - Violations of NASD Conduct Rules 2830(1). 3010 and
2110
As described above. HFS arranged for Mutual Fund Company X to pay special
cash compensation to the FAs for NAV transfers. These payments were not disclosed
in Company X's prospectuses or related documents, as required by NASD Conduct
Rule 2830(1).8 HFS did not have supervisory procedures to confinn that the required
prospectus reviews were conducted, as required by NASD Conduct Rule 2830(1). As a
result, HFS violated NASD Conduct Rules 2830(1)" 3010 and 2110.
5. HFS' Buslneas Practices-in the Mortgage Are. Generated
Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest - Violations of NASD Conduct Rule 2110
HFS failed to adequately disclose the fact that the FAs received referral fees as
compensation for recommending their clients to the affiliated mortgage subsidiary. As a
result, HFS violated NASD Conduct Rule 2110.
6. HFS Sold Limited Partnerships to Clients Who Did Not Meet the
Suitability Requirements - Violations of NASD Conduct Rules 2310,' 3010 and
2110
As described above, HFS sold limited partnerships to customers who did not
meet the minimum suitability requirements (in terms of assets and/or income) as laid out
in the product supplier's prospectus, the State of Michigan regulations. and HFSt
Registered Representative Manual. As a result, HFS violated'NASD Condud Rules
2310 and 2110. Furthermore, HFS did not have adequate procedures in place to allow
supervisory personnel to know whether a client had sufficient net worth to purchase the
limited partnership product. As a result, HFS violated NASD Conduct Rule 3010.
8
NASD Conduct Rule 2830(1) provides: MNo member shall accept any cash compensation from an
offeror unless such compensation is described in the current prospectus of the investment company.
When special cash compensation arrangements are made available by an offeror to a member, which
arrangements are not made available on the same terms to all members who distribute the investment
company securities of the offeror, a member shall not enter into such arrangements unless the name of
the member and the details of the arrangements are disclosed in the prospectus."
"
NASD Conduct Rule 2310 - Recommendations to Customers (Suitability): (a) In
recommending to a customer the purchase. sale or exchange of any security. a member shall have
reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basiS of
... his financial situation and heeds. (b) Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended ... a
member shari make reasonable efforts to obtain information concerning .. , (1) the customers financial
status ... and (4) such other information used or considered to be reasonable by such member or
registered representative in making recommendations to the customer.
Page 17 of 22

7. HFS Failed to Obtain the Nece.sary Review of an Advertisement -
Violations of NASD Conduct Rules 2210 10 and 2110
HFS distributed its Discovery Interview Brochure for almost six years without
submitting it to the NASD Advertising Regulation Department for its review and
comment. As a result, HFS violated Conduct Rules 2210 and 2110.
c. SANCTIONS
Respondent John Hantz consents to the imposition. at a maximum. of the
following sanctions:
1. A censure;
2. A fine in the amount of $25,000; and
3. A suspension from acting in a supervisory capacity with any NASD
member for a period of thirty (30) days.
Respondent Hantz Financial Service., Inc. also consents to the imposition. at a
maximum. of the following sanctions:
1. a censure;
2. a fine in the amount of $675.000.
Respondent Hantz Financial Services Inc. further consents to undertake the
following:
a. HFS shan place and maintain on its public website within 15 days of the date of
Notice of Acceptance of this AWC disclosures regarding
(i) its preferred supplier relationships, including:
(a) the existence of the preferred suppliers;
(b) the names of the preferred supplier firms and the products for whom
they serve as the preferred supplier;
(c) the amount of revenue sharing payments that HFS receives from each
of the preferred suppliers based on a reasonable estimate from historical
experience, expressed in basis points or doUars;
(d) the total amount of revenue sharing payments (expressed in dollars)
that HFS receives annually. starting with the amount received in 2005 as
of the date of Notice of Acceptance of this AWe and updated each year
thereafter;
(e) that the equity owners of the Firm may benefit financially from the
revenue sharing payments HFS receives; and
(f) that HFS does not generally receive revenue sharing payments from
non-preferred suppliers; and
10
NASD Conduct Rule 2210(c)(2)(A) provides that advertising and sales literature conceming
registered investment companies (including mutual funds) must be filed with NASO"s advertising
department within 10 days of the date of first use.
Page 18 of 22

(ii) the details of the relationship between HFS and Tranex Financial
Services, Inc., including
(a) the common ownership and control;
(b) the specific tasks conducted by the HFS FAs in the mortgage loan
process;
(c) the fact that the F As receive 25% of the net yield spread that Tranex
earns on the mortgage loans referred by the FAs.
b. HFS shall send the information contained in paragraph a above:
(i) to its current customers within 90 days from the date of Notice of
Acceptance of this AWe: and
(ij) to new customers upon the opening of an account.
c. HFS shall devise and implement within 90 days of the date of Notice of
Acceptance of this AWC a policy and set of procedures to ensure that HFS is
complying with its obligations under this AWe, the federal securities laws, and
NASD rules.
d.' HFS shall devise and implement within 90 days of Notice of Acceptance of this
AWC a 'policy and set of procedures for training its FAs regarding
(i) disclosures of the financial incentives that
(a) HFS receives from its preferred suppliers; and
(b) the FAs receive for mortgage referrals toTranex; and
(ii) disclosures to customers regarding the lIindependence" of HFS and/or its
FAs.
e. HFS shall retain, within 60 days of the date of Notice of Acceptance of this AWC,
the services of an Independent Consultant not unacceptable to NASD Staff. The
Independent Consultant ("IC") shall, at HFS' expense, review and make
recommendations concerning the adequacy of HFS' policies, procedures and
disclosures as they relate to the matters described in this AWC.
f. Within 120 days of the Notice of Acceptance of this AWC, The IC shall prepare a
written report and present it to HFS and NASD staff. The report shall outline the
steps already taken by HFS to address the issues discussed in the AWe. If
necessary. the report should recommend further steps that need to be taken,
including any recommendations regarding changes that may be necessary to
HFS' supervisory and compliance procedures and systems or recommendations
for the adoption of revised disclosures relating to the matters discussed in this
AWC.
g. Within 30 days after delivery of the le's report, HFS shall either adopt all
recommendations made by the Ie or, if it determines that a recommendation is
unduly burdensome or impractical, propose an altemative procedure designed to
achieve the same objective. HFS shall submit such proposed alternatives in
Page 19 of 22

writing to the IC and the NASD staff. Within thirty days of receipt of any
proposed alternate procedure. the Ie shall: (i) reasonably evaluate the
alternative procedure and detennine whether it will achieve the same objective
as the IC's original recommendation; and (ii) provide HFS with a written decision
reflecting his or her determination. HFS will implement the Ie's ultimate
determination with respect to any proposed alternative procedure and must adopt
all recommendations deemed necessary and appropriate by the IC.
h. Within 45 days of receiving the ICs report or the IC's written decision reflecting
his or her determination as to proposed alternative procedures, HFS shan adopt
and implement all recommendations made by the IC. HFS shall also send a
written letter to NASD staff confirming the steps it has taken to (i) address the
various concerns described in this AWC; and (ii) fully implement the ICs
recommendations.
i. HFS shall cooperate fully with the Ie and shall provide him or her with access to
HFS' files, books, and records, as reasonably requested by the IC. HFS will also
provide the Ie with access to the employees, contractors and affiliates of HFS
and its affiliated companies.
j. To ensure the independence of the IC. HFS:
(i) shall not have the authority to terminate the Ie, without the prior written
approval of NASD Staff; ,
(ii) shall compensate the Ie, and persons engaged to assist the ICt for seNices
rendered pursuant to this AWe at their reasonable and customary rates;
(iii) shall not be in and shall not have an attorney-client relationship with the Ie
and shall not seek to invoke the attorney-client privilege or any other doctrine or
privilege to prevent the Ie from transmitting any information, reports, or
documents to NASD staff.
k. To further ensure the independence of the Ie. HFS shall require the Ie to enter
into an agreement that provides that. for the period of the engagement and for a
period of two years from completion of the engagement, the IC shall not enter
into any employment, consultant, attorney-cUent, auditing or other professional .
relationship with HFS, or any of its present or former affiliates. directors, officers,
employees, or agents acting in their capacity. Any firm with which the IC is
affiliated in performance of his or her duties under this AWC shall not, without
prior written consent of NASD Staff, enter into any employment, consultant,
attorney-client, auditing or other profeSSional relationship with HFS, or any of its
present or former affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents acting in
their capacity as such for the period of the engagement and for a period of two
years after the engagement.
J. For good cause shown, and upon receipt of a timely application from the Ie or
HFS, NASD staff may extend any of the procedural dates set forth above.
Page 20 of 22

III.
OTHER MATTERS
A. HFS and John Hantz understand that they may aHach a Corrective Action
Statement to this AWC that is a statement of demonstrable corrective steps
taken to prevent future misconduct. Respondents understand that they may not
deny the charges or make any statement that is inconsistent with the AWC in this
Statement. This Statement does not constitute factual or legal findings by NASD.
nor does it reflect the views of NASD or its staff.
B. John Hantz agrees to pay the monetary sanctions imposed on him within ten
days of the notice of acceptance of this AWC.
C. HFS agrees to pay the monetary sanctions imposed on it within the timeframes
outlined in the installment payment plan approved by NASO staff and the
National Adjudicatory Council.
D. HFS and John Hantz specifically and voluntarily waive any right to claim that they
are unable to paYt now or at any time hereafter, any monetary sanction imposed
in this matter.
The undersigned certify on behalf of HFS and John Hantz that they have read and
understand all of the provisions of this AWe and have beeh given a full opportunity to
ask questions about it, and that no offer, threat, inducement, or promise of any kind.
other than the terms set forth herein, has been made to induce them to submit it.
Hantz Financial SeNices, Inc.
Date ~ ,
By:
Name: ~ '*"'H:
Title: ec--C
z::,
l
Date John Hantz
Page 21 of 22

Reviewed by:


Hertz, Schram sa Saretsky, P.C.
1760 South Telegraph Road - Suite 300
Bloomfield Hills, MI '48302..()183
Counsel for Respondents Hantz Financial Services I Inc. and John Hantz
Accepted by NASD:
Date
Page 22 of 22

ATTACHMENT
CORRECTIVE ACDON STATEMENT
Hantz Financial Services, lnc.("HFS") is in the process of draflina a brochure for review
by NASD's Advertisina Regulation Department. The purpose of this brochure is to
infom our clients of some of the critical disclosure issues that financial services firms
face today and the potential conflicts of interest issues that may arise from certahl
relationships between HFS and its product providers. It is our desire for these issues aDd
relationships to be adequately disclosed and transparent to our cJients. This brochure will
detail the types of relationships that the Hantz Group, Inc. ("HOt') and HFS have with
various product providers. It will fully disclose that BPS receives compensation, in
differing forms and amounts, based upon various arrangements with each product
suppJier (including prefen-ed product suppliers). These disclosures will supplement the
agreed upon requirements contained in the AWe at pages 18 and 19 (Section C(aXi) and
(U.
HFS bas accepted, waived and consented in the A we at page 18 (Section 87) to a
finding that it failed to obtain the necessary review of an advertisement in violation of
Conduct Rules 2210 and 2110. On June 20, 2005, BPS received notice from NASD's
Advertising Regulation Department that the 1Ji .. fold brochure that was the subject of the
violation was reviewed. by the NASD with the following comment: "the material
submitted appears to be consistent with applicable standards."
This Corrective AdioD StatelDeDt .. ..bmltted by ReapoDdeat. It does Dot
eo titute f a ~ t a . l or leaat bdlD. by NASD
t
Bor does It reRett tile view 1 of tile
NASD or Itt staff.