Recent History of the Maghreb: A Sociological Approach

Ana Isabel Planet Contreras University of Alicante, Spain

In the Maghreb, the struggle for independence was the starting point for a new relationship between people and institutions. Three different ways of developing a new state in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are the result of a new social and political landscape that is being designed in the Mediterranean basin: from a monarchy in Morocco legitimised by religion, to a liberal republic in Tunisia and a socialist-populist regime in Algeria. During the 1970s and 1980s, both the internal and the international situation forced these countries to confront the difficulties of economical and political central control. The lack of liberties, the economic crisis, the fight for power among the political and social forces inside these countries, and the Western Saharan conflict limited the development of the area. Two decades after independence, in the 1990s, we witness a political, cultural, economic and social crisis considered by scholars to be the catalyst of social processes such as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or migration to Europe. The civil war in Algeria and the fight against Islamic terrorism are alibis for the authoritarian policies implemented by these regimes. Nowadays, limits on civil jobs, control of the Islamic presence in the political arena and new economic adjustment programmes related to European Union policy in the area, are all attempts to solve the critical situation.

En el Magreb, la lucha por la independencia fue el inicio de un nuevo modelo de relacion entre el pueblo y las instituciones. El panorama poltico de la region se articula en torno a tres regimenes distintos: desde una monarqua de legitimidad religiosa a una republica liberal en Tunez o un regimen populista-socialista en Argelia. Los anos 70 y 80 supusieron para estos pases tanto desde el punto de vista interno como internacional, un momento complejo, en los que debieron hacer frente a dificultades economicas y de ejercicio centralizado del control. La ausencia de libertades, la crisis economica, la lucha por el poder entre fuerzas polticas y sociales, as como el conflicto en el Sahara occidental, han limitado el desarrollo de la region. Veinte anos despues de la independencia, estamos ante una crisis poltica, cultural, economica y social considerada por los especialistas como la causa final de procesos como el auge del fundamentalismo islamico o la emigracion a Europa. La guerra civil argelina y la lucha contra el terrorismo han supuesto coartadas para las medidas coercitivas impuestas por los regmenes. Los lmites en el acceso a la funcion publica, el control del Islam en la esfera poltica y nuevos programas de ajuste estructural relacionados con la presencia de Europa en la region son cuestiones barajadas para controlar la situacion. doi: 10.2167/laic267.0

Keywords: sociopolitical, Maghreb, recent history of Maghreb The Maghreb is the western-most subregion of the Arab world. It shares both close geographical proximity as well as historical ties with Europe. Modern-day Central Maghreb comprises Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and the two peripheral countries, Libya and Mauritania, which link the region to
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sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the Arab world, known as the Machreq. Interesting works on the regional geography from a social and economic perspective may be found in many sources (e.g. Fabries-Verfaillie, 1998; Prenant & Semmoud, 1997; Troin, 1985, 1995). Only 14 km separate the Andalusian and Moroccan coastlines. The Maghreb is a region that increasingly requires global background knowledge in order to avoid conflicts, real or imagined. Among the issues that need to be taken into consideration are the geographical proximity between the Maghreb and Europe, the presence of the French, and to a lesser degree, Spanish and Italian colonial powers, and the constant flow of Maghrebi workers who have settled in Europe. Despite its idiosyncrasies, the Maghreb shares a certain number of cultural, linguistic and social features with the other Arab countries, of which the Arabic language and the Islamic religion are the most conspicuous. In addition to these characteristics, these societies are also plagued by a range of social divides and complexities, many of which are the direct result of mistakes made in the search for a nation-state in the post-independence period.

The Maghreb under European Control: Building a Colonial Relationship on the Basis of Migration
It is not an easy task to summarise the Maghrebi colonial era. Although a considerable amount has been published from a historiographical perspective in the relevant countries, there is still more work to be done in order to produce a contemporary analysis of the subject that is as objective as possible. The colonial relationship between certain European countries and those of central Maghreb was stormy and excessively long in some cases, for example, Algeria. During these relationships, certain changes began to emerge within the various colonised countries, both in the metropolises and also internationally. The three central Maghrebi countries (excluding Mauritania and Libya) implemented several different types of administrative models, resulting in different types of colonialism. Tunisia, for example, split its administration into one chamber for French public officials, and from 1907 onwards, an enlarged parliament accommodated a second chamber for indigenous representatives. Moroccos administrative model, however, was more complex because of a policy designed to protect indigenous institutions and practices used by traditional leaders. The purpose was to support local development so that progress would filter through, using the traditional social infrastructure (Laroui, 1994). It is patently clear that, apart from exceptions like the famous Uixan mines outside Melilla in North Morocco, agriculture became the main focus for development. The process of expropriating and buying land at low prices resulted in the erosion of tribal land. This policy would later create other problems, depending on what type of crop was being cultivated, for example, grape cultivation on the run-down vineyards. There would also be problems of a similar nature in Tunisia in 1930. In general, there was a move away from industry, which was barely able to function at subsistence level. Finally, from a financial perspective, Tunisia had a burden of foreign debt prior to becoming a French protectorate, following a period of intense rivalry between France,

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England and Italy. Tunisia had become a country where capital could be invested risk-free, and where the banks were authorised to charge huge commissions for bank loans, engendering a rentier-based capitalism. In Morocco, capital came from investors in the banking and industrial sectors with stakeholdings in the mineral industry. Foreign holdings, especially French and Spanish ones, loaned money to the sultan and also facilitated the liberalisation of communication channels, the development of mining projects and the procurement of arms. In Algeria, economic and financial business interests were interwoven in a complicated web. During the colonial era, a process of large-scale internal migration began, whereby people moved from the mountains to the plains and the cities. This would later lay the foundations for population movements to other countries. The domestic population shifts spawned a network of suburbs surrounding the big cities, which would later develop into cities of their own. It was at this time that emigration to France began, initially by members of the army. This trend was followed by population shifts within Algeria from south to north to occupy the properties left abandoned after decolonialisation. It was also during this period that displaced Algerians returned to the metropolises. At the time, migration within the Maghreb followed a classic pattern of rural exodus and a consequential increase in regional imbalance due to new production techniques, for example, the introduction of colonial agriculture, farming machinery, etc., which altered the design of the traditional economy. As the nation-state emerged, migration from the country to the city played a role in speeding up the process of urbanisation. The migrants headed for the capitals or the big economic hubs, rather than the medium-sized cities, like Marraquech, Fez, Constantine or Hama, which suffered an erosion of their traditional power base. The traditional elite also moved to the new centres of power. The arrival of huge numbers of former rural dwellers and farmers had a significant impact on urban sociology, leading to more temporary dwellings and a rural influence on some of the aspects of city life, engendering new sectors of the informal economy (Donte et al ., 2001; Salahdine, 1988) and producing new forms of political expression (Abu-Lughod, 1996). During this period, citizens acquired a key role in developing state policy (Chaline, 1996). From 1973 onwards, new migratory trends emerged, which were a consequence of modernisation, the new extended administration and the new regional balance. The big cities became transit zones to attract the people and later filter them into the city outskirts, the outer urban areas or mediumsized cities. These cities progressed thanks to improved facilities and services. The improvements were a direct result of a combination both of regional policy designed to improve regional balance and a policy relative to the international labour market. During this same period, large groups of Maghrebi immigrant communities established themselves in Europe. In the 1980s a population census quoted their numbers as being above 2 million. Alternatively, these immigrants headed for the oil-producing countries (countries of the Arab Peninsula, Libya and Iraq up until the Second Gulf War). Despite the fact that some cities like Kabala (Algeria) or Rif (Morocco) lacked production, they still experienced economic growth because of the remittances sent home by Maghrebi immigrants abroad (Berriane, 1993). It is important to stress the

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fact that immigration between Arab countries, in particular to the rentier micro-states of the Arab Peninsula, has had a huge impact on the social customs of the region (Fargues, 2000).

The Struggle for Independence and the Search for a New State: Political and Economic Choices
The relatively prolonged period of colonialism in the Maghreb varied, depending on the country in question, resulting in situations as varied as the Spanish protectorate in the North of Morocco, the international zone of Tangiers, and the modern-day territory of Algeria becoming a Department of France. By the 1960s, although these countries had different state and social systems, they had shared budgets. After independence, the search began for the right model on which to base a new state and to develop the corresponding administrative and organisational institutions. In all cases, these structures would continue to be deeply entrenched in the rationalist principles of the former metropolises. The process of creating a national identity using national budgets that had been developed during the struggle for independence was even more of a challenge. This aspect has been perhaps the most neglected by analysts, along with the language issue, the position of Islam in the new society and the philosophy advocating that the differential factors should be forgotten in order to facilitate the new state. During the colonial era, the practice of Islam was monitored attentively and used to meet the objectives of the colonial powers. The leaders supported a mainstream Islam, quite unlike the Islam promoted by the big religious centres, like the University al-Zeytuna in Tunisia or Qarawiyn in Fez. The aim of the colonial powers was to weaken the traditional elites legitimacy. Islam became a bone of contention for the rebels during the colonial era. It was seen as a crucial issue in the struggle to prevent the erosion of a culture. Moreover, Islam would continue to be a thorny issue during the postcolonial period (Laroui, 1994). As for the language issue, Arabic had been relegated to a secondary position by the colonial authorities and would rapidly become the object of Arabisation projects, leading to deep divides over educational policy. The differential factors refer to the exploitation of the Berber population at the hands of the colonial authorities in the interests of better controlling the territory. Instead of compensating them for damages, the postcolonialist leaders wasted no time in sacrificing the Berber cause in the name of national unity (Laroui, 1994). Algeria: Towards a socialist regime Algerias struggle for independence was a bloody one and could even be regarded as a civil war, given the parties involved. Afterwards, the Algerian state seems to have been haunted by its colonial era and by the struggle for independence it had undergone. In 1965, a constituent assembly was elected by universal suffrage and their first task was to prepare the initial draft of a

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constitution in which the preamble was to lay the foundations for the new state of Algeria. The only authorised party, The National Liberation Front (FLN), would remain the cornerstone of the new Algerian state. The elite of this omnipresent party controlled the government bodies and even the appointment of the President. The President of the Republic was supposed to be elected by universal suffrage and subsequently appointed by the party. Complete confusion reigned over the respective roles of the Executive and that of the President, given the fact that the President of the Republic was both Head of State and Head of Government. The army would also maintain an important political role and become an institutionalised presence in the framework of the party (Article 85). As mentioned previously, Islam and Arabic were viewed as important elements in the resistance movement against the colonial powers. Islam would be declared the state religion, despite the fact that Article 4 of the constitution made reference to freedom of belief. Nevertheless, this reference would disappear in subsequent versions. In 1965, Bumedien took power, bringing an end to speculation and heralding the advent of new reforms, including social modernisation and an open-door policy for new political parties. This move was inevitable, given the climate of modernisation at the time. There was also an attempt made to create a modern society using an industrial model based on three pillars. The first pillar was based on the administration, a legacy inherited from the French system, although the administrative model was enlarged after independence. The second pillar was based on a reorganised military, the National Liberation Army, which was transformed into a professional body. The third pillar was based on the economy, which was broken down into blue-collar workers, white-collar workers and agricultural workers, both from the new cooperatives born of the agricultural revolution as well as from the formerly selfadministered properties. From the 1976 Constitution onwards, Algeria witnessed the dawning of socialism. A National Charter, drafted prior to the Constitution, would enshrine socialist principles and later become the instrument which best embodied the regimens ideology. This charter, in addition to the subsequent charters, would take precedence over the Constitution, becoming its source of ideology and the driving force of Algerian state policy. The Republic of Tunisia Of all the Maghrebi states, Tunisia is the one that has achieved the best image for itself internationally. In contrast with the instability in Algeria, Tunisia is known as the Switzerland of the Maghreb, thanks to its successful economy. Nevertheless, the shiny image masks a return to authoritarianism, led by a president who is constantly targeted by human rights activists. Tunisian policy post-independence can be best divided into four periods. Firstly, 19561970 witnessed wide-ranging political and social reforms, which led to certain families amassing capital and a consequential economic deadlock. The second period, from 1970 to 1980, saw a shift from cooperative socialism, supported by Neodestur and president Habib Burguiba, to ultra

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liberalism, which would erode Neodesturs hegemony. The years from 1980 to 1987 proved to be a difficult and black period for President Bourguiba, who endeavoured to combine a policy of modernisation with respect for tradition. tat carried out by Ben Ali would lead to the Second The secret coup de Republic, characterised by a return to tradition, support for economic liberalism and a harder-line policy towards suppressing rebellion. After overthrowing Burguiba, the new president launched an initiative entitled national regeneration, which succeeded in raising levels of domestic and international consumer confidence. The project was accompanied by a new constitution, which abolished presidency-for-life, freed political prisoners and heralded a new era of European economic and political support for Ben Alis manifesto. Nevertheless, his government would suffer knock-on effects from events in neighbouring Algeria and the fight to stem the rise of Islam. Morocco: Seeking to legitimise tradition Throughout the 20th century, obvious tension reigned between the monarchy and the so-called opposition parties. Concurrently, the state was on a quest for legitimacy, producing an endless series of reforms, none of which made any significant changes to the political system which, since independence, had been characterised by centralised decision-making and a monarchy in search of legitimacy (Benmessaoud, 1996). In the years following independence and up to 1975, the political parties took a very hard line on certain issues in an attempt to seize, or at least share power. From 1975 onwards, the so-called Saharan issue came to the fore, involving the organisation of the Green March and the occupation of the territory which until then had been known as Spanish Sahara. This struggle would have a profound impact on the relationship between the monarchy and the political parties, mobilising the people to take a unanimous stance over the issue, which was being spearheaded by the monarchy. The same process can be observed over the Moroccan claims to the Spanish cities of Melilla and Ceuta. In Morocco, a number of reforms have been devised to increase the monarchys legitimacy. The current sources of legitimacy for the Moroccan monarch are varied in nature. Firstly, in addition to the monarch being the jalifa , the highest religious authority in Morocco, he is also the sultan, or holder of earthly power. The monarch is also the cherif , meaning he has been blessed with the divine baraka because he is a descendant of Muhammad. The Moroccan constitution also places the monarch at the apex of the political hierarchy. However, as is clear in the case of Western Sahara, Hasan II is still seeking new legitimacy, making this issue a key element of his foreign policy and a sideline issue in domestic policy, with the aim of achieving national unity (Planet Contreras, 2000, 2002).

The Maghreb Since 1990

The decade of the 1990s in Maghreb bore the knock-on effects of the neighbouring Algerian conflict, which burst onto the Algerian political scene,

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born of a politically driven Islam and represented by the Islamic Salvation Front. In 1991, the elections were stopped because it was feared that this group would take power. The direct consequence was an outbreak of armed violence throughout the country. Claiming that the situation might spread, neighbouring regimes used fear as their pretext to bring the ongoing processes of liberalisation and controlled democratisation to an abrupt halt. This resulted in an erosion of peoples freedoms and a whole new set of playing rules. Civil unrest in Algeria The situation in Algeria in 1988 was problematic. A drop in oil prices sparked an economic crisis, during which debt repayment interest rose to 70% of exports. The proposed solution was to cut imports, which in turn heralded a new period of austerity measures, a wave of dismissals and a surge in unemployment. President Benjedid endeavoured to implement agricultural reform and took a firm stance against the oligarchy wielded by the National Liberation Front. He also took a critical view of the people who did not provide for their own needs, which sparked huge protest marches in October. A referendum was considered necessary to resolve the issue and the people re-elected Benjedid. Constitutional reform followed, introducing a multiparty system and a change in the electoral law. The local elections in 1990 proved to be the acid test, revealing reduced support for the National Liberation Front, which had to compete with new political parties (32 of the 48 wilayas remained loyal to the Islamic Salvation Front). In addition to domestic problems, the ruling party was hit with the Gulf crisis, which provided the Islamic party with plenty of ammunition to use against the government because of the stance it had taken. This was the political climate in the run-up to legislative elections, in which the moderate wing of the Islamic Salvation Front, Djazara, which advocated respect for the law, decided to run for election even though the Islamic Salvation Front leaders were being held in prison. In the first round, the Islamic Salvation Front polled 43.7% of the vote and the National Liberation Front, 21.6%. Although Benjedid appeared prepared to share power, the army obliged him to step down and imposed military rule under the authority of the High Security Council. This heralded a very unstable political period, in which large-scale violence would be rife. According to Martnez (1998), the civil unrest in Algeria should be viewed from three angles. Firstly, it is a struggle for historical memory and a plea to interpret the countrys history differently. Whereas members of the Islamic resistance claim that their struggle began in 1954 during the national liberation war against France, the regime discredits this claim, saying they are children of collaborators who aspire to a position which is not theirs to claim. Secondly, there is an economic and social background to the civil unrest, because the social divide was responsible for a development crisis. Indeed, Benjedids presidency (19791991) is associated with the black decade, whereas that of President Bumedien (19651978) enjoyed strong levels of economic growth.

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The National Liberation Fronts model of the state was doomed to collapse sooner or later because it was incapable of developing the framework to support a modern state. Thirdly, the civil unrest can be viewed in terms of stakeholders competing with each other for control of the state. The new state benefited from the Islamic movement and, from a societal perspective, the Islamic guerrillas believe that violence is an instrument to raise themselves up the social hierarchy. Tunisia: A success story, relatively speaking? According to Larramendi (1999), in order to understand the Benal regime, one needs to consider both the high and low points. Some of the distinctive features of the first republic are still visible today, for example the confusion over the difference between the state and the party, a strong presidential system and a lack of real political competition. Electoral reform, which was implemented concurrently with constitutional reform, did not manage to block the trend of fronts and coalitions, designed to maximise representation in the maximum number of constituencies and thus reap the benefits of the majority system. However, the alliances that ultimately resulted from this trend ended up impeding the work of the government and, above all, discredited the political party in the eyes of the electorate. Despite the potential for democracy in Tunisia, in reality, the trend towards authoritarianism, excessively repressive policies and an absence of real opposition have cast a shadow over the Tunisian state, despite the economic and social achievements which have boosted investor confidence. However, it should be stressed that the current international context has contributed to authoritarianism in the case of Tunisia. Firstly, there was the free trade agreement with the EU. Any economic resistance was channelled into achieving the best prices for Europe, together with the industrial and business middle-class sector who supported the regime. Secondly, the USA supported the Presidents policies, such as the practice of controlling the public sphere to safeguard against a similar crisis to the one in Algeria. The combination of these two factors meant that it was easy for Tunisia to develop a hard-line regime, given that it had the support of its foreign allies. The problematic transition in Morocco The process of liberalisation which began in Morocco in 1995 required a whole series of reforms which would have a wide-ranging impact on the economy, the political landscape and thus, on society. Both the political reforms and the reforms relative to the states territorial delimitation were considered insufficient by some members of the parliamentary elite, who lobbied the regime. The reforms took place at a time when there was also international pressure calling for more liberalisation of the markets and widespread democratisation of the public sphere. New parties had been steadily emerging since 1992 in Morocco, most of which were factions which had split from already established parties. Nevertheless, the traditional political parties with the most parliamentary experience, both those within and outside the government, were suffering from a lack of political

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momentum. In addition to the fact that there were not enough new members to fill the ranks of ageing elite members, the other problem was that there was a general lack of initiative, resulting in many members losing hope and falling victim to a generalised phenomenon of political apathy. Some analysts believe that the politicians dwindling charisma and the general lack of support from the electorate were the primary causes of the rise of minority parties and associations. To a certain degree, some also believe that this could also explain why a certain sector of the population joined the ranks of movements considered to be Islamic. Some of these movements have converted themselves into official parties to participate in elections, like the Popular Constitutional Democratic Movement.1 The palace controlled a process of democratisation which upheld the traditional tension between the monarchy and the political parties. The political climate was also fraught with tension because of the upcoming elections, in which people rallied for new parties to the detriment of the traditional parties. The social fabric was also under pressure because living costs were high, job creation low and unemployment high among new graduates. Many of these graduates, along with other marginalised sectors of the population, resorted to emigration, although at the time emigration was severely impeded by European policy (Lopez Garca, 2000). The attacks in May 2003 in Casablanca, as well as the alleged Moroccan involvement in the attacks in Madrid in March 2004, have cast doubts on the effectiveness of Moroccan policy towards Islamic resistance movements because their links with international terrorist networks pose a threat to the global system.

The Future of the Region

There are several challenges facing the region. The 1990s made it abundantly clear that the political, economic and social systems developed after independence were not equipped to deal with the needs of the people. The dawn of the new century reveals societies that are weighed down with uncertainty. Economically speaking, it will not be easy to balance the production systems and rectify a depleted balance of payments, hit hard by debt repayment interest and a high level of imports, which has not been compensated with corresponding exports. The only solution is to rethink the nature of bilateral relations with the European Union and the northernmost Mediterranean countries. Compulsory structural adjustment policy, which is implemented on a regular basis in accordance with international financial organisations, continues to have an impact on the labour market, increasing the incidence of unemployment and short-term contracts. Given that the state is usually one of the best sources of employment, a crisis automatically means that public service jobs for young graduates become scarce and there are few opportunities on the private labour market. From a social point of view, the aforementioned unemployment has split families and has led to instability and massive exoduses from rural zones to outlying city suburbs. Many young people are attracted to the idea of leaving

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the country and see it as a way to support their families. In a survey carried out by a prestigious weekly newspaper in Morocco in the year 2002, 80% of the youth questioned said they saw emigration as the only solution. A new radical, Islam-based ideology attracts many young followers who see the philosophy as a social and political response to the crisis. These youth movements are neither official parties nor do they run for election. Rather, they lobby the institutions on everyday issues. Some analysts label these new youth lobbies as a breeding ground for Islamic movements whose sole aim is to destabilise the system and who employ violent methods to achieve their objectives. From a political perspective, the different systems in place need to be either maintained or changed. The ranks of the elite members of the parties are not being filled fast enough and people are becoming increasingly disenchanted with the prospect of elections, which are a forum for political expression but whose political institutions are not viewed by the people as being representative. The handover of political power to the new generation in Morocco has not yet incited its neighbours to do likewise. The fact that the young Moroccan king is continuing the previously established line of policy has dashed the hopes of optimists who saw an opportunity for a new leader to make changes, like those which have been made in Spain. The Tunisian and Algerian presidents are endeavouring to maintain their status in the hierarchy via elections and reforms, turning to allies to provide their respective countrys needs. International Islamic-based terrorism has sparked a global climate of uncertainty and has had a strong impact on the Maghreb region, raising allegations for which the Maghreb regimes do not have any answers. Correspondence Any correspondence should be directed to Ana Isabel Planet Contreras, Alicante University, C/Pelayo, 35, 28004 Madrid, Spain (ana.planet@mju.es). Note
1. Refers to a former party which followers of a moderate form of Islam joined in order to block the law allowing the creation of religious and non-religious parties which control the resources of the Moroccan people, as is the practice of Islam.

References
Abu-Lughod, L. (1996) Urbanization in the Arab world and the international system. In J. Gugler (ed.) The Urban Transformation of the Developing World (pp. 184208). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Benmessaoud Tredano, A. (1996) Democratie, culture politique et alternance au Maroc . Casablanca, Maroc: Les Editions Magrebines. Berriane, M. and Hopnger, H. (1993) Impact de la migration internationale du travail sur la croissance du cadre bati. Le cas du centre de Zeghanghane. Revue de Geographie du Maroc 15 (12), 143163. Chaline, C. (1996) Les villes du monde arabe . Armand Colin: Paris. Donte, P., Bhattacharya, R. and Yousef, T. (2001) La transition demographique au Moyen Orient: consequences pour la croissance et le logement. Monde Arabe Maghreb Machrek 171172, 1221.

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Fabries-Verfaillie, M. (1998) LAfrique du Nord et le Moyen-Orient dans le nouvel espace mondial . Paris: PUF. ne Fargues, P. (2000) Ge rations arabes. Lalchimie du nombre . Paris: Fayard. Hernando de Larramendi, M. (1999) Luces y sombras del modelo tunecino. Meridiano CERI 25, 2428. Laroui, A. (1994) Historia del Magreb. Desde los orgenes hasta el despertar magreb: un ensayo interpretativo . Madrid: Editorial Mapfre. gimen? Lopez Garca, B. (2000) Marruecos en trance. Nuevo Rey. Nuevo siglo. Nuevo re Madrid: Poltica Exterior-Biblioteca Nueva. rie Martnez, L. (1998) La guerre civile en Alge . Paris: Karthala. Planet Contreras, A.I. and Hernando de Larramendi, M. (2000) Marruecos en transicion nea 16, 119136. y el modelo espanol. Anales de Historia contempora Planet Contreras, A.I. (2002) El sistema poltico del Reino de Marruecos. In I. Delgado, n nea P. Chavarri and P. Onate (eds) Sistemas de organizacio poltica contempora (pp. 603627). Madrid: UNED. te Prenant, A. and Semmoud, B. (1997) Maghreb et Moyen-Orient. Espaces et socie s . Paris: Ellipses. tiers clandestins: le business populaire . Casablanca: Eddif. Salahdine, M. (1988) Les petits me Troin, J.F. (ed.) (1985) Le Maghreb, hommes et espaces. Paris: Armand Collin. Troin, J.F. (1995) Maghreb-Moyen Orient mutations . Paris: SEDES. United Nations (2002) Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and Algeria. Human Development Index .

Appendix: Information Provided by the United Nations (2002)

Table 1 Human Development Index Human Development Index Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia Spain 107 (medium level of human development) 72 (medium) 124 (medium) 147 (low) 101 (medium) 21 (Spain is included as a comparative reference)

Table 2 General data General data Life expectancy at birth Adult literacy rate GDP per capita Human development index Algeria 69.2 65.5 4792 0.683 Libya 70.2 78.1 6697 0.760 Morocco 67 47.1 3305 0.589 Mauritania 53.9 41.2 1563 0.451 Tunisia 69.8 68.7 5404 0.703 Spain 78.1 97.4 16212 0.899

120 Table 3 Demographic trends Demographic trends Total population (millions) Total population (2010) Mortality rate 0/00 Annual population growth rate (%) Population under 15 (%) Population over 65 (%)

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Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia Spain 29.9 37 6 1.9 37 4 5 6.4 7 2.1 38 3 28.6 34.4 7 1.4 33 4 2.6 3.6 13 2.6 43 3 9.5 11 6 1.3 30 6 40 40.1 9 -0.2 15 17

Table 4 Commitment to health Commitment to health Infant mortality rate (0/00) Infant mortality rate under 5 (0/00) Maternal mortality ratio (0/0000) People/physicians ratio Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia Spain 35 40 1062 20 24 957 57 70 230 2579 120 183 15772 25 32 70 1549 6 6 6 261

Table 5 Commitment to education Commitment to education Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia Spain Public expenses education (% GDP) Education. 1st, 2nd, 3rd (%) female Education. 1st, 2nd, 3rd (%) male 5.1 64 71 92 92 5.3 43 56 5.1 36 45 7.7 68 74 5 96 90

Table 6 Economy Economy GDP per capita ($) Real GDP per capita ($PPA) Average annual change in consumer prices Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia 1550 4792 -4.2 6697 1200 3305 0.7 380 1563 8.8 2100 5404 3.5 Spain 14,000 16,212 2.2

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Table 7 Employment Employment Workforce (% pop.) Female ratio (%) Agriculture (%) Industry (%) Services (%) Algeria 31 27 21 33 46 Libya 29 2 23 75 Morocco 39 35 37 28 35 Mauritania 46 44 44 13 43 Tunisia 37 31 22 34 44

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Spain 43 37 6 30 64

Table 8 The structure of trade The structure of trade Export. (mill. $) Import. (mill. $) Net foreign direct invest (mill. $) Official development assistance received (mill. $) Official development assistance donor (mill. $) Total debt service (% GDP) Algeria 13,133 10,000 5 388.8 Libya Morocco 9128 4880 7.1 7367 10,788 322 528.3 Mauritania Tunisia 514 600 5 171.1 6020 8486 650 148.3 Spain 109,964 144,436 11,392 0

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67.5

60.3

272.5

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