A STUDY OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION IN U.S.

AIRLINE AIRWORTHINESS AND PUBLIC SAFETY

by

Daniel Curtis Whitford

A Graduate Capstone Project Submitted to ERAU Worldwide in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of Master of Aeronautical Science

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Worldwide Whidbey Island Center March 2011

A STUDY OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION IN U.S. AIRLINE AIRWORTHINESS AND PUBLIC SAFETY

by

Daniel Curtis Whitford

This Graduate Capstone Project was prepared under the direction of the candidates Project Review Committee Member, Mr. Alireza Tabanshomal, Adjunct Instructor, ERAU Worldwide Campus, and the candidates Project Review Committee Chair, Dr. Alan Bender, Professor, ERAU Worldwide Campus, and has been approved by the Capstone Review Committee. It was submitted to the ERAU Worldwide Campus in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Aeronautical Science

PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE: //SIGNED// ______________________________ Alireza Tabanshomal Committee Member //SIGNED// ______________________________ Alan Bender, Ph.D. Committee Chair

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to express special thanks to Lori Whitford, Ingrid Taylor, Kristeen McMoran, and university committee members Alan Bender and Alireza Tabanshomal whose insights, practical suggestions, and editing of this manuscript was critical to the successful outcome of the Graduate Capstone Project. Appreciation is due to Bryan Heartsfield, and the members of the survey instrument-reviewing group, for their assistance and participation into the development of a useful questionnaire as a key component in gathering essential data for this study.

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ABSTRACT Researcher: Title: Institution: Degree: Year: Daniel Curtis Whitford A study of public perception in U.S. airline airworthiness and public safety Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Master of Aeronautical Science 2011

Research conducted in December 2010 examined allegations made by the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) that the U.S. airline industry operated aircraft with documented maintenance airworthiness violations. Additionally, the FAA asserted some airlines placed the flying public at risk while operating ill-repaired or uninspected aircraft. Journal reports concluded airlines flew thousands of passengers millions of miles in an unairworthy maintenance condition. It was hypothesized the flying public was not aware airlines operated aircraft with known maintenance discrepancies which may have affected safety of their flight. A quantitative study was conducted utilizing data collected by means of a randomly distributed survey instrument. Analysis of the findings was accomplished by application of descriptive and inferential statistics. The conclusions of the study found the hypothesis to be supported.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ABSTRACT LIST OF TABLES LIST OF FIGURES Chapter I INTRODUCTION Background of the Problem Statement of the Problem Significance of the Problem Assumptions Limitations Definition of Terms Acronyms II REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH Summary Statement of the Hypothesis III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Research Model Survey Population The Data Collection Device 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 6 13 15 16 16 16 16 ii iii iv vii viii

Instrument Pretest Distribution Method Instrument Reliability Instrument Validity Treatment of Data IV RESULTS V DISCUSSION VI VII CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS

17 17 17 18 18 19 30 33 35 37

REFERENCES APPENDIX A SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

39

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LIST OF TABLES Table 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Survey Respondents Gender Probability that the Fifth survey question population mean is 6.00 or higher Probability that the Sixth survey question population mean is 6.00 or higher Probability that the Seventh survey question population mean is 6.00 or higher Probability that the Eighth survey question population mean is 6.00 or higher Probability that the Ninth survey question population mean is 6.00 or higher Probability that the Tenth survey question population mean is 6.00 or higher Page 19 21 21 22 22 23 23

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LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 2 3 4 5 6 Fifth survey question results Sixth survey question results Seventh survey question results Eighth survey question results Ninth survey question results Tenth survey question results Page 24 25 26 27 28 29

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1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Background of the Problem In the mid 1920s, the newly established airline industry was suffering from a financially stressed corporate image, and a tarnished accident and safety record. Public support for air travel was low, and the industry struggled with inconsistent, vastly differing and loosely administered internal maintenance safety measures. Noted by the United States (U.S.) Congress, airlines needed to be stabilized in order to promote public confidence back into air travel, and federally regulated to promote integrity throughout all safety facets of early aviation. Public pressure for enhanced air safety prompted the passage of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, which was legislation enacted to provide federal regulation in the monitoring of airline mechanics, inspection, and operation of aircraft. In the 1950s with the advent of the complex jet airliner and a marked increase in mid-air collisions, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was created by the U.S. Congress to oversee the maintenance and inspection policies of the airline industry. As an arm of the federal government, the FAA in 1964 recognized an amplified need for improving airline safety with more rigorous federal safety standards for commercial aircraft, and instituted Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). These governing instructions established mandates and responsibilities for the airline industry to follow in order to maintain aircraft in a safe and airworthy condition. A key component in FAA oversight of airline compliance with airworthiness is the Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI). The PMI is assigned by the FAA to oversee maintenance operations of each air carrier. The PMI among other duties ensures an airline is complying with manufacturers specifications in aircraft repair, monitors phases of the

2 carriers maintenance procedures, and ensures manuals related to the upkeep of an aircraft comply with FAR regulatory requirements. In recent years, FAA oversight has identified numerous cases of airlines failing to comply with mandatory maintenance and inspection requirements. For example, one particular airline was found delinquent in complying with structural inspections on their fleet, but continued to operate the aircraft, arguing the probability of a failure was not imminent. The most likely cause for these scenarios is a highly competitive environment of the airline industry and the economic hardships facing many air carriers. However, one would expect safety to be every carriers first concern. Nevertheless, despite requirements to assure safe air public transportation and the issuance of warnings and fines by the FAA due to substandard maintenance practices, it has been found some U.S. carriers continue to operate aircraft in spite of industry-wide maintenance airworthy violations. Statement of the Problem U.S. airlines continue to operate aircraft with known maintenance deficiencies despite federal regulations to maintain aircraft in a safe and airworthy condition. Significance of the Problem Operating unairworthy aircraft may place the flying public in danger of an accident. The typical airline traveler may not be aware the aircraft he or she is flying in may be operating with known maintenance or inspection tasks overdue or incomplete. If so, the safety of the public is being compromised without their knowledge. Assumptions The study assumed the American flying public perceived airline travel as safe, and had no positive or negative perceptions of aircraft maintenance. The lack of recent major accidents

3 related to aircraft maintenance is a basis to believe the flying public maintained the attitude the airline industry is safe. It is assumed an adequate sample of the flying public will be agreeable to participate in a study of this nature, and the data collected for analysis can be used to develop appropriate statistical inferences for purposes of assessing the study hypothesis. It is also assumed, the population of the American airline user contains a normal standard distribution of opinion concerning knowledge of the airworthiness of aircraft they may fly. Therefore, a sampling of public opinion, both male and female, was used as a representation of the true population. Limitations Primary limitations of this research project were time and budget constraints. The project timeline was controlled and was to be completed within 60 days, and there was no financial support provided. The researchers travel restrictions required the study to be completed from a remote Pacific Northwest location. This limited the scope of the survey opinions to a small number of airline travelers and a single regional airport. There was no existing information available that would have provided previous findings pertaining to the specific research planned. Therefore, the researcher developed all data required for this study.

4 Definition of Terms Airframe Pertains to the fuselage, booms, nacelles, cowlings, fairings, airfoil surfaces, rotors, and landing gear of an aircraft and their accessories and controls. This definition excludes propellers and rotating airfoils of engines.

Airworthiness - The ability of an aircraft to operate safely in all the flight conditions to which an aircraft of its type will be subjected. The FAA and other national authorities issue airworthiness regulations and specifications for aircraft.

Airworthiness Directive- Maintenance or modifications ordered by an aviation regulator, such as the FAA. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Is the regulatory element of the U.S. Department of Transportation responsible for the promotion, regulation, and safety of civil aviation. Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) - Pertains to rules prescribed by the FAA governing all aviation activities in the United States. The FARs are designed to promote safe aviation, and protect the public from unnecessary risk.

Maintenance- Pertains to inspection, overhaul, repair, preservation, and the replacement of parts, but excludes preventive maintenance.

Acronyms AD- Airworthiness Directive FAA- Federal Aviation Administration FAR- Federal Aviation Regulations

5 PIC Pilot in Command PMI- Principal Maintenance Inspector

6 CHAPTER II REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH The literature review supported in this research project included periodical data, library database searches, textbooks, and federal regulations. This chapter contains a synopsis of the most relevant documents reviewed. Regulatory Authority As specified by Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121, airline operators are responsible for repair, inspection, and airworthiness of the aircraft they operate. An aircraft cannot be operated if a known service condition exists, such as missed repair work on an essential component, or an elapsed preventive maintenance schedule; both instances could make the aircraft not airworthy. FAR Part 121 prescribes airline specific repair procedures to be followed in aircraft maintenance manuals as a regulatory responsibility in the maintainability of an aircraft in an airworthy condition. Included within this regulation are the aircraft engine, parts, and other essential accessories of the aircraft subjected to the airworthiness rules of the FAR. Concluded by FAR Part 121, an aircraft may not be operated after it has been repaired or inspected unless verified to be in a safe and airworthy condition by qualified personnel. Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 91further stipulated a person may not operate an aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition, and described the responsibilities of a Pilot in Command (PIC) regarding aircraft airworthiness. FAR Part 91stated the PIC of an aircraft is directly accountable for the operation of flight; additionally, the PIC of an aircraft is responsible to determine whether an aircraft is safe for flight prior to its operation. Other key points made by FAR Part 91 is the airline industry must prominently display a valid and current airworthiness certificate easily accessible, to be viewed by the flying public and crew of each aircraft. FAR

7 Part 91 also declared airline operators are legally responsible for maintaining aircraft in an airworthy condition. FAR Part 91, details the responsibilities of the pilot to ensure the aircraft is in a safe and airworthy condition, and the flying publics right to view an aircraft airworthiness certificate prior to boarding an aircraft. FAR Part 39 described FAA Airworthiness Directives (AD) as enforceable federal safety instructions applied to all facets of airline maintenance and inspections. FAR Part 39 asserted airlines are not allowed to operate aircraft if a known AD is deemed applicable, which shows the aircraft is in immediate need of airframe, component repair or replacement and examination. Further addressed by FAR Part 39, when an AD is issued and found not to be complied with in violation of the FAR, the airline is subjected to fines and grounding of the aircraft. As speculated by news reports (Michaels, 2010), airlines have disregarded FAA documented maintenance violations as well as critical to flight ADs, yet continued to operate aircraft with the flying public. Airline FAR Infractions Stoller (2010) asserted the U.S. airline industry had flown unsafe aircraft despite fines and warnings issued by the FAA. He believed airlines were aware their aircraft carried passengers in a risky repair condition during a 6-year period, while violating FARs. Stollers investigation, conducted from 2003 through 2009, revealed the airline industry flew millions of passengers over 65,000 flights defying airworthiness concerns. The report also showed airlines disregarded FAA airworthiness citations during the operation of aircraft, which were noted as flying in an unsafe condition for air travel. Stoller contended some airlines used improper maintenance and substandard oversights on their aircraft, and falsified maintenance logbook entries. Stoller assumed the airline industry had purposively disobeyed FAA warnings and fines

8 in order to keep aircraft operating. This information provided knowledge concerning the risk airline passengers have taken when they have unknowingly boarded an aircraft with known maintenance deficiencies. The Associated Press (Associated Press, 2009) also reported on the accusations of airline fines and violations. The Associated Press (2009) explained the FAA had fined the U.S. airline industry more than $9 million for violating ADs. As described by the Associated Press, from October 2008 through January 2009, eight airline aircraft that totaled 1,647 flights flew passengers while in violation of airworthiness directives and the airlines own maintenance procedures. Other asserted violations ranged from aircraft operating more than 200 flights with maintenance shop towels used as oil collection devices, rather than required protective caps in an aircraft engine. The Associated Press alleged a Boeing 757 was allowed to operate with passengers on 505 flights without required maintenance inspections. Associated Press also claimed an Airbus A320 flew the flying public a total of 855 times without meeting airlines airworthy maintenance program requirements for an engine repair. Moreover, stated by the Associated Press, a regional airline was found to be in violation of FAR rules when it operated an aircraft without complying with a mandated AD, which required the aircraft to be inspected to prevent cargo doors from opening in flight. The information provided by this article illustrated U.S. airlines had flown passengers in aircraft despite fines imposed by the FAA due to airworthiness related maintenance and inspection regulations. Explained by Ramstack (2004), a government watchdog group accused the FAA of falling short on its regulatory authority over the airline industry, and not protecting the safety of the airline flying public. He cited a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report of a study conducted from 1993 through 2003, which suggested 15% of all FAA violations levied against

9 the airline industry involved unacceptable maintenance repair on aircraft. Ramstack recounted that the FAA had imposed airline FAR violation fines totaling $162 million during the timeframe. He also noted the FAA database for tracking airlines, which violated FAR rules, was difficult to use and contained incomplete data. Ramstack contended the FAA did not properly evaluate its own enforcement actions, and had no way of knowing whether the FAAs supervision of FAR violations was effective. Allen (2004) described how the FAA fined the airline industry for continued operation of three unairworthy Boeing 737 aircraft. She reported the aircraft had not been properly inspected and tested for electrical or airframe damage from separate incidents involving lightning strikes while in flight. She contended between May 2001 and March 2003, aircraft were allowed to carry passengers on a combined 703 flights despite FAA claims of not being airworthy. Allens study also found the flying public was also allowed to fly on a McDonnell-Douglas MD-82 aircraft, despite previous passenger warnings to the PIC of a fuel leak on the right wing. Allen alleged the aircraft continued to operate in an unairworthy condition with the fuel leak for an additional 53 flights. The information contributed awareness on the flying publics possible risk of safety in flying with less than airworthy aircraft. Michaels (2010) discussed maintenance deficiencies have increased in U.S. airline operations, while FAA oversight of airline maintenance has decreased. He believed the federal agency had not properly inspected an air carriers increase in aircraft maintenance rescheduling, and deferrals, and aircraft had not complied with compulsory airworthiness inspections. Michaels claimed the FAA had not performed required oversight of an airlines system for identifying faulty wiring and failed responses to manufacturer service bulletins requirements, which were cited by Inspector General Examinations. He further contended airline technicians

10 performed maintenance on aircraft without valid credentials, and operational reliability of air service has decreased since 2004. Caterinicchia (2008) discussed the FAA audit of all domestic carriers maintenance programs in the wake of Southwest Airlines missed critical AD safety inspection for cracks in the skin of its aircraft. He alleged the FAAs investigation found four unnamed U.S. airlines had failed to comply with airworthy maintenance related FARs. He argued the airline industry had not completed airworthiness checks on hydraulic pumps and wiring specifications, and had missed aircraft inspection deadlines. He asserted during the FAA airline maintenance audits, dozens of Boeing 757s and 777s were suspended from service to test their cargo fire suppression systems, and for inspection on wing parts of the aircraft. Caterinicchia noted the Southwest issue was a two-way breakdown between the airline and the federal government, and most carriers have complied with federal regulations nearly 99% of the time. Airline Economic Challenges Wensveen (2009) concluded that the flying public valued low-ticket prices above all other air carrier factors, and the airline with the lowest costs had a powerful competitive advantage. He claimed in order for an airline to maintain operations, it had to cut labor and fuel expenses, which have accounted for 60% of an airlines operating expense. Wensveen argued expensive unionization in the airline maintenance industry reduced the ability for long-standing, established airlines to compete with startup airlines. Wensveen noted employees in a maintenance department accounted for 25% of an airlines total workforce, and labor consumed 20% of every revenue dollar. He asserted new airlines typically do not have maintenance unionization issues, and have outsourced their restoration functions to substandard repair stations with minimum pay scale requirements for mechanics. Wensveen also made the point that fuel

11 costs are heavily influenced by demand, political turmoil, acts of God, and a 1 per gallon increase in fuel had cost the airline industry about $160 million. Wensveen illustrated the competitive characteristics between legacy and start-up airline labor and maintenance costs, and the uncertainties of global fuel expenditures. Thorner (2008) asserted 3,000 airline flights were cancelled due to non-compliance with an FAA AD to inspect MD-80 aircraft. He claimed the airline industry had lost an estimated $30 million in revenue due to this incident. Thorner provided a detailed account in which an airline had to pay vouchers for stranded customers, and overtime for maintenance crews to bring the aircraft into an airworthiness standard. Thorner explained the aircraft were part of a safety AD inspection to verify if electrical wires were properly bundled. According to Thorner, the airline believed it had previously completed the mandated inspections; however, the examinations were not accomplished in accordance with the ADs, and aircraft had to be grounded and re-inspected. Thorner then concluded that if the airline industry had initially complied with the AD properly, the total cost to the airline would have been less than $1 million. The insights gained from this account showed a financial loss the airline faced when it had not complied with ADs, and the continued risk to the flying public in aircraft in an unairworthy condition. Schober (2009) argued that regardless of safety systems and safeguards in place, the airline industry had lost millions of dollars because of cancelled flights due to non-compliance with ADs. Airlines found not to be in compliance were forced to suspend operations and faced fines imposed by the FAA. Schober stressed that a careless repair attitude at several airlines had taken place. Schober claimed airlines ignored time sensitive, regulatory compliance of Airworthiness Directives and their method of completion. This article underscored the apparent

12 unawareness of the flying public to the possible dangers of boarding an aircraft not in full compliance with regulated FAA Airworthiness Directives. Wilber (2008) contended a poor quality of maintenance work and ethical issues on domestic airlines contributed to a safety risk to the flying public. He assumed that if these repair discrepancies had gone uncorrected, air carriers could have experienced serious incidents or fatal accidents. Wilber found 351 MD-80 aircraft were suspended from service for inspection; however, 207 did not comply with safety rules and continued transporting the flying public. He further explained due to these unexpected inspections, 3,000 flights were cancelled; aircraft were grounded 4 days; and, 350,000 passengers were stranded without airline service. Wilber clarified the airlines position stating the aircraft were never in a safety or hazardous situation, and accused the FAA of miscommunication. AirGuideOnline.com (AGB) (2008) reported an airline cancelled 4% of its scheduled flights and grounded 43 airplanes for a missed AD inspection of aircraft windows on Boeing 737s. AGB believed collusion between the airline and an FAA inspector played a role in the missed structural inspections. AGB alleged the airline was given permission by the FAA to operate the aircraft in a less than airworthy condition for a period of 9 days before complying with the AD; however, the carrier was ultimately assessed a civil penalty of $10.2 million for non-compliance with the AD. According to AGB, airline executives contended the missed AD requirement was a maintenance lapse perpetuated by lack of oversight and a gap in corporate documentation. Non-Airworthy Consequences Parker (1989) asserted an Aloha Airlines Boeing 737 suffered catastrophic structural damage due to poor airline maintenance practices during an inter-island flight in the State of

13 Hawaii. She reiterated Aloha Airlines maintenance personnel failed to detect ongoing metal fatigue on the 19-year-old aircraft, which created the in-flight emergency. Parker also noted that the FAA failed to inspect and uncover weaknesses in the airlines maintenance program. She also alleged the airline ignored crucial manufacturer Service Bulletins related to the inspection of key structural areas of the aircraft, which led to fatigue cracking on the incident aircraft. Parker specifically emphasized the airline had an unacceptable maintenance and inspection program for older aircraft. These alleged deficiencies were a catalyst in the events that led to an aircraft accident, and provided information related to the operation of aircraft with substandard airline maintenance. Benedict (1979) concluded the PIC who was in control of American Airlines Flight 191 was not at fault in the crash of the DC-10 aircraft that killed 273 people in May 1979. He believed the primary reason for the accident was improper engine removal procedures and negligent maintenance oversights from the FAA. Benedicts analysis showed mechanics at American Airlines used an unapproved device to remove an engine from the DC-10. According to Benedict, the subsequent removal of the engine caused a fracture in a key section in the aircraft engine attachment. Benedicts contributions to this study provided information, which pertained to the flying public who were unaware maintenance personnel used improper mechanical procedures; and were tragically affected by the outcome of substandard airline repair services. Summary The FARs clearly define airline operators are responsible for the airworthiness and maintenance of their aircraft. The regulations further specify no person may operate a U.S. airliner unless it is in an airworthy condition, and those passengers flying have the right to view

14 an airplanes airworthiness certificate prior to boarding an aircraft. The review of literature found the airline industry flew millions of passengers on thousands of flights, while defying FAA citations regarding the operation of aircraft. Reports claimed the airline industry operated numerous flights in an unairworthy condition, due to overdue maintenance actions and inspections on aircraft. Airlines were also found to be in violation of FAR rules by operating aircraft without complying with mandated ADs, which required immediate adherence in order to maintain airworthiness. Competition in the airline industry was also noted, and remained a key component as a cost saving dynamic for finding solutions to lowering the overall costs of doing business. High fuel costs and an expensive maintenance workforce are dominating factors that may influence an established airlines ongoing labor concerns and a startup airlines outsourcing of aircraft repair. Further examples of aircraft operating in an unairworthy maintenance condition which placed the flying public in a perilous situation included a Boeing 737 and a DC-10, which both experienced structural damage due to poor airline FAR abidance and maintenance practices, with catastrophic results. Statements allegedly made by airline executives contended missed AD requirements were a maintenance lapse perpetuated by lack of oversight and a gap in corporate documentation. This research examination contributed knowledge to the field of study concerning public awareness, and perceptions of airline operating with known airworthiness discrepancies.

15 Statement of the Hypotheses Based on the review of literature, the following hypothesis will be tested: Ho = The flying public is not aware airlines operated aircraft with known operational discrepancies which may affect safety of flight. HA = The flying public is aware of airlines operating aircraft with known operational discrepancies which may affect safety of flight.

16 CHAPTER III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Research Model The objective of this research was to determine American flying public perceptions, based on journal and periodical reports, that the U.S. airline industry flew passengers in an unsafe airworthiness condition. The research model was a quantitative, cross-sectional empirical design that utilized data collected by random convenience sampling. A survey questionnaire was used to collect respondents demographic information and opinion data relevant to the sampling of airworthiness safety in the air traveling population. Assessments and deductive reasoning to opinioned questions were made by application of a standard z-test probability model, and were applied to develop conclusions by appropriate descriptive data and inferential statistical tests to evaluate the hypothesis. Survey Population For the purposes of this study, the true population of the American flying public was not known. Therefore, a simple non-probability sampling was conducted by convenience sampling in the Bellingham, WA, area business districts and retail outlets. To be qualified to participate in the study, respondents had to be over the age of 21 and familiar with basic airline travel. A sample of 51 was queried during a 2-week period following approval of the research proposal. The Data Collection Device The data collection device used in this research was a two-part survey questionnaire. Part I collected the basic demographical information of the respondents; this included questions to obtain their age group, gender, and experience in airline travel for purposes of qualifications to participate in the survey. Part II consisted of opinioned data and measurements to test the

17 hypothesis. A Likert-type scale was used to obtain measureable empirical data. The scale utilized a range of 1-10. One indicated strongly disagree and 10 indicated strongly agree. Instrument Pretest An instrument pretest was conducted in an interview setting using an initial group of aviation academics and business professionals to assess the surveys completeness, and to ensure it met the needs of the study. Results and feedback obtained by the pre-test group was used to identify and clarify areas requiring further adjustments. Minor modifications to the survey instrument were incorporated before it was distributed for data collection. Distribution Method Distribution and collection of the survey instrument was completed by convenience sampling in the western Washington area. The primary method of accomplishing this was by random personal contact with individuals outside business districts and retail outlets who were available and willing to participate in the research. Instrument Reliability The cross-sectional design of this study and research time constraints limited this study to randomly selected respondents through convenience sampling, and did not permit the application of a continuous, inter-rater or inter-observer reliability testing. Additionally, there was no opportunity to test the same sample of respondents on two different occasions; therefore, a TestRetest reliability assessment was not completed. For these reasons, instrument reliability was assessed by utilizing the Internal Reliability Consistency Estimation Model. Selected survey pre-test opinion questions were used to make this assessment. Internal consistency was found to be satisfactory.

18 Instrument Validity A draft proposal of the survey instrument was reviewed for appropriateness and face validity by the researchers project committee. Survey content was reviewed and evaluated by university faculty who had sufficient knowledge of the subject matter, the capability to appraise the problem statement, and an objective understanding of the research to be conducted. Content validity was assessed following the instrument pretest. Feedback from the pretest group focused on the clarity and usefulness of the survey instrument. Members of the pretest group actively provided insights and opinion in adequately assessing the study hypothesis. Survey validity was found to be acceptable. Treatment of Data Following the collection of data by use of a survey questionnaire, sample mean and standard deviation statistical templates were utilized to calculate, compile and analyze the findings. These data were used to provide descriptive statistics and construct histogram graphic illustrations described and assisted in interpretation of the survey results that were included in Chapter IV, pp. 19-29. Further statistical analysis was conducted using z-test applications depending on volume and diversity of the data collected. Appropriate statistical applications provided inferences and the probability level of the samplings representative of the population, with a hypothetical population mean of 6.0 or higher on survey questions indicating agreement. Conclusions were developed and used as a basis for evaluating acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis. Recommendations are presented in Chapter VII pp. 35-36.

19 CHAPTER IV RESULTS Fifty-one completed surveys were utilized to support this study. Part I of the survey identified and collected basic demographic information of the respondents. The first survey question was used to verify if the respondents were at least 21 years of age, which all indicated they were age qualified to take the survey. For the purpose of this study, it was not deemed necessary to break down the age groups of the respondents. The second question was used to ensure that a standard gender percentage mix of 55-45 male to female ratio had been represented. This was considered a normal standard distribution of the flying public for the purpose of this study. A running tally of completed surveys by gender was used to ensure an equal as possible distribution of male to female respondents was achieved. Table 1 displays this distribution. The remaining demographic questions were used to ensure the respondents relevancy to the research topic by having flown on a U.S. commercial airline flight; it was found all respondents had basic business or pleasure U.S. airline travel experience. For the purpose of this study, it was not deemed necessary to break down the relevancy of respondents travel characteristics. Table 1 Survey Respondents Gender

Gender Respondents Percent

Male 28 55

Female 23 45

Total 51 100

20 A conventional z-test was applied to assess the probabilities of the opinion-based questions in Part II of the survey questionnaire. The z-tests provided a statistical probability between 0.00 and 1.00 obtained from the sample data that infers the flying population would provide similar results. The z value was converted to a probability equation using a standard z Table. For this study, a mean population value of 6.00 was utilized. The conventional expression of z = x/s was used (Shavelson, 1996) where: z = Probability x = Sample mean = Population mean s = Sample standard deviation Thus, for the fifth survey question: z = x/s = z = 9.37 6.00/1.29 = 2.61 z Table for 2.61 = .9955 or .99 The fifth question was used to determine whether the survey respondents agreed or disagreed that a U.S. airline should comply with all maintenance airworthiness and safety requirements. The survey results provided a sample mean response of 9.37 and a sample standard deviation of 1.29. This sample mean indicates there is strong agreement among the survey respondents, and a sample standard deviation of 1.29 does not indicate there is a wide disbursement of this opinion. Table 2 illustrates the results of the fifth survey question.

21 Table 2 Probability that the fifth survey question population mean is 6.00 or Higher (Agree)

Population Mean 6.00

Sample Mean 9.37

Standard Deviation 1.29

z Value 2.61

Probability .9955

The sixth question was used to determine whether the survey respondents would not fly on a U.S. airline aircraft if they knew maintenance airworthiness discrepancies existed. The survey results provided a sample mean response of 8.56, and a sample standard deviation of 1.82. This sample mean indicates there is strong agreement among the survey respondents, and a sample standard deviation of 1.82 does not indicate there is a wide disbursement of this opinion. Table 3 illustrates the results of the sixth survey question. Table 3 Probability that the sixth survey question population mean is 6.00 or Higher (Agree)

Population Mean 6.00

Sample Mean 8.56

Standard Deviation 1.82

z Value 1.40

Probability .9192

The seventh survey question was used to determine whether the survey respondents had knowledge of maintenance airworthiness discrepancies of a U.S. airline flight prior to take-off. The survey results provided a sample mean response of 2.23, and a sample standard deviation of 2.46. This sample mean indicates there is a general disagreement among the survey respondents,

22 and a standard deviation of 2.46 indicated there is a marginal disbursement of this opinion. Table 4 illustrates the results of the seventh survey question. Table 4 Probability that the seventh survey question population mean is 6.00 or Higher (Agree)

Population Mean 6.00

Sample Mean 2.23

Standard Deviation 2.46

z Value -1.53

Probability .0630

The eighth survey question was used to determine whether the survey respondents expected a flight to be cancelled if an aircraft does not meet federal maintenance standards for airworthiness. The survey results provided a sample mean response of 9.00, and a sample standard deviation of 1.75. This sample mean indicates there is a strong agreement among the survey respondents, and a sample standard deviation of 1.75 does not indicate there is a wide disbursement of this opinion. Table 5 illustrates the results of the eighth survey question. Table 5 Probability that the eighth survey question population mean is 6.00 or Higher (Agree)

Population Mean 6.00

Sample Mean 9.00

Standard Deviation 1.75

z Value 1.71

Probability .9564

The ninth survey question was used to determine whether the survey respondents would consider flying in an aircraft with publicized airworthiness discrepancies if assured by the airline the flight would be safe. The survey results provided a sample mean response of 5.00, and a

23 sample standard deviation of 2.95. This sample mean indicates there is marginal agreement among the survey respondents, and a standard deviation of 2.95 indicated there is a wide disbursement of this opinion. Table 6 illustrates the results of the ninth survey question. Table 6 Probability that the ninth survey question population mean is 6.00 or Higher (Agree)

Population Mean 6.00

Sample Mean 5.00

Standard Deviation 2.95

z Value -0.33

Probability .3707

The tenth survey question was used to determine whether the respondents believed it would be better as a passenger on a U.S. commercial flight to be unaware of airworthiness discrepancies associated with their flight. The survey results provided a sample mean response of 4.47, and a sample standard deviation of 3.36. This sample mean indicated there is nonagreement among the survey respondents, and a sample standard deviation of 3.36 indicated there is a marginal disbursement of this opinion. Table 7 illustrates the results of the tenth survey question. Table 7 Probability that the tenth survey question population mean is 6.00 or Higher (Agree)

Population Mean 6.00

Sample Mean 4.47

Standard Deviation 3.36

z Value -0.45

Probability .3264

24

. I expect a U.S. airline to comply with all maintenance airworthiness and safety requirements.

35 30 Respondents 25 20 15 10 5 5 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 0 0 0 1 11

33

10

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

Figure 1. Fifth survey question results. The fifth survey question was used to determine whether the respondents expected U.S. airlines to comply with all maintenance airworthiness and safety requirements. As shown in Figure 1, 50 (98%) of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that U.S. airlines are expected to comply with all maintenance airworthiness and safety requirements. A sample mean of 9.37 and a sample standard deviation of 1.29 were calculated for these data.

25

. I would not fly on a U.S. airline aircraft with maintenance airworthiness discrepancies if I knew they existed
30 25 Respondents 20 15 15 10 5 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 0 2 0 3 1 4 2 24

Figure 2. Sixth survey question results. The sixth survey question was used to determine whether the respondents would not fly on a U.S. airline aircraft with maintenance airworthiness discrepancies if they knew they existed. As shown in Figure 2, 46 (90%) of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that they would not fly on a U.S. airline aircraft with maintenance airworthiness discrepancies if they knew they existed. A sample mean of 8.56 and a sample standard deviation of 1.82 were calculated for these data.

26

I have knowledge of maintenance airworthiness discrepancies of an aircraft prior to boarding a U.S. airline flight
35 30 30 Respondents 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 2 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 13

Figure 3. Seventh survey question results. The seventh survey question was used to determine whether the respondents had knowledge of maintenance airworthiness discrepancies in U.S. airline flights prior to boarding a flight. As shown in Figure 3, 6 (11%) of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that they have had knowledge of maintenance airworthiness discrepancies in U.S. airline flights prior to boarding a flight. A sample mean of 2.23 and a sample standard deviation of 2.46 were calculated for these data.

27

I would expect a flight to be cancelled if an aircraft does not meet federal maintenance standards for airworthiness
35 30 30 Respondents 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 1 0 0 1 0 2 3 5 9

Figure 4. Eighth survey question results. The eighth survey question was used to determine whether the respondents would expect a flight to be cancelled if an aircraft does not meet federal maintenance standards for airworthiness. As shown in Figure 4, 49 (96%) of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that they would expect a flight to be cancelled if an aircraft does not meet federal maintenance standards for airworthiness. A sample mean of 9.00 and a sample standard deviation of 1.75 were calculated for these data.

28

I would consider flying in an aircraft with publicized maintenance discrepancies, if I were assured by the airline that the flight would be safe
12 10 10 8 Respondents 8 6 4 4 2 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 2 5 4 5 4 7

Figure 5. Ninth survey question results. The ninth survey question was used to determine whether the respondents would consider flying in an aircraft with publicized airworthiness discrepancies, if assured by the airline the flight would be safe. As shown in Figure 5, 23 (45%) of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that they would consider flying in an aircraft with publicized airworthiness discrepancies, if assured by the airline the flight would be safe. A sample mean of 5.00 and a sample standard deviation of 2.95 were calculated for these data.

29

It would be better as a passenger on a U.S. commercial flight to be unaware of maintenance discrepancies associated with my flight
20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 19

Respondents

6 3 3 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 3 4 4 4

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

Figure 6. Tenth survey question results. The tenth survey question was used to determine whether the respondents believed it would be better as a passenger on a U.S. commercial flight to be unaware of airworthiness discrepancies associated with their flight. As shown in Figure 6, 21 (41%) of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed it would be better as a passenger on a U.S. commercial flight to be unaware of airworthiness discrepancies associated with their flight. A sample mean of 4.47 and a sample standard deviation of 3.36 were calculated for these data.

30 CHAPTER V DISCUSSION Survey questions were used to collect basic demographic information, used as an element in determining qualifications to participate in the study, and opinioned values, used as a foundation in establishing quantitative and inferential analyses for the study. Based on the demographical information obtained in Part I of the survey questionnaire, it was found the respondents were qualified to participate in Part II of the survey questionnaire. A conventional z-test assessment was applied to the opinioned questions, with a standard statistical theory that a probability of .69 or less is weak, .70 - .79 is moderate, .80 - .89 is strong and .90 and above is very strong. A Likert type scale was used to measure the opinion variable of the respondents. The scale ranged from 1, which represented strongly disagree to 10, which represented strongly agree, where a response of 6 or higher was considered in agreement with each survey question. The information from the respondents in Chapter IV provided a sample cross section of the U.S. airline commercial flying public, as well as gender identification for the purposes of this study. There were no out of the ordinary factors found that could be responsible for skewed data, or other indications that there was not a normal standard distribution of opinion among the survey respondents. The descriptive statistical data displayed in Chapter IV were used to accomplish the following analyses of the respondents opinions. An initial z-test calculation established a .99 probability that the flying public believed the U.S. airline industry should comply with all maintenance and safety requirements. This probability inferred a strong expectation from the air traveling public that U.S. airlines should comply with all maintenance airworthiness and safety requirements associated with airline flight. Further z-test calculations established a .91 probability that the flying public would not fly on a

31 U.S. airline aircraft if they knew maintenance airworthiness discrepancies existed. This established a strong inference that the flying public would feel uncomfortable flying on a U.S. airline aircraft if maintenance airworthiness discrepancies were known. This data was used to determine relevancy regarding the flying publics level of assurance in flying in an aircraft with maintenance airworthiness discrepancies. Additional z-test calculations established a .63 probability that the flying public had knowledge of maintenance airworthiness discrepancies of a U.S. airline flight prior to take-off. By z-test conventional theory, this assessment showed a weak probability that the flying population would have the same opinion as the survey respondents; however, this inference is based on the studys premise of 6.00 or higher is an agreeable hypothetical population mean. This result was used as a deductive aid in either accepting or rejecting the studys null hypothesis. Further z-test calculations established a .95 probability that the flying public would expect a flight to be cancelled if an aircraft does not meet federal maintenance standards for airworthiness. This provided an inference for the safety of airline passengers, that the flying public would expect an airline to cancel a flight if the aircraft does not meet federal maintenance standards for airworthiness. Conventional z-test calculations established there is a .37 probability that the flying public would consider flying in an aircraft with publicized airworthiness discrepancies if assured by the airline the flight would be safe. By z-test conventional theory, this assessment showed a weak probability the flying population would have the same opinion as the survey respondents; however, this is based on the studys premise of a hypothetical population mean of 6.00. This provided little confidence and widespread opinion based on the null hypothesis. A concluding standard z-test assessment established there is a .32 probability that the flying public would believe it would be better as a passenger on a U.S. commercial flight to be unaware of airworthiness discrepancies associated

32 with their flight. By z-test conventional theory, this assessment shows a weak probability the flying population would have the same opinion as the survey respondents; however, this inference is based on the studys premise of 6.00 or higher is an agreeable hypothetical population mean. This provided little confidence the flying public would agree with the assumption that it would be better to be unaware of airworthiness maintenance discrepancies associated with flight.

33 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS This chapter presents the conclusions of the research project. These findings were developed by applying deductive and inferential reasoning from the sampled data collected in chapter V. Conclusion 1. There is a very strong probability the flying public believes the U.S. airline industry must comply with all maintenance and safety requirements. Conclusion 2. There is a very strong probability the flying public would not fly a U.S. airline aircraft with maintenance airworthiness discrepancies if they knew they existed. Conclusion 3. There is a strong probability the flying public would expect an airline to cancel a flight if an aircraft does not meet federal maintenance standards for airworthiness. Conclusion 4. There is a weak probability, based on the studys hypothetical 6.00 sample population mean, the flying public had knowledge of airworthiness discrepancies prior to takeoff. It is inferred the flying population would have drawn similar results as the sampled population. The null hypothesis of this study asserted the flying public is unaware airlines had operated aircraft with known operational discrepancies, which may have affected safety of flight. In summary, there was sufficient evidence found which suggested the flying public has little or no knowledge of aircraft maintenance related airworthiness issues within the airline industry, based on the studys 6.00 hypothetical population mean. Further inferred, although the flying public is generally unaware of airline airworthiness discrepancies, they would not fly on an airliner if they were aware of airworthiness discrepancies associated with their flight. Also

34 construed, the flying public would expect U.S. airlines to comply with all maintenance and safety requirements; however, they would also expect a flight to be cancelled if an aircraft does not meet federal maintenance standards for airworthiness. Results showing the flying public believed it would be better as a passenger on a U.S. commercial flight to be unaware of airworthiness discrepancies associated with their flight were inconclusive. The conclusions of the study found evidence the flying public, despite FAA reports on airlines operating aircraft in an unairworthy condition, had an indistinct perception on airline maintenance and airworthiness. This is considered strong evidence for acceptance of the null hypothesis. For these reasons, the null hypothesis is accepted.

35 CHAPTER VII RECOMMENDATIONS This chapter presents the researchers recommendations based on the conclusions of the study. It is recommended additional research should be conducted on a wider scope than was made possible by this study. This research may be considered a pilot study useful in preestablishing the American public perceptions of the safety implications associated airline maintenance airworthiness. However, this was determined under several limitations. Additional study should be conducted and designed to assess the opinion of a clearly defined sample population, which includes countrywide sampling and a representative distribution of the true population demographics and airline flying experience. This study accepted the presented null hypothesis that the flying public is unaware U.S. airlines had flown aircraft with FAA airworthiness maintenance discrepancies. The following recommendations are provided based on this finding. Recommendation One. The FAA should widely disseminate and publish on an independent Watchdog website, all airlines and their particular aircraft that are currently not operating within FAR standards of maintenance airworthiness. Recommendation Two. To provide transparency the U.S. airline industry should voluntarily include, as part of the standard emergency literature available to each seated passenger, a copy of the most recent airworthiness certificate for that aircraft. Recommendation Three. The FAA should considerably increase the size of fines levied against an airline operating aircraft while in an unairworthy condition, and aggressively ground all aircraft that have failed airworthiness (AD) inspections. Added to fines levied, any PIC who knowingly operates a commercial airliner outside of FAR airworthiness specifications.

36 Recommendation Four. The FAA should request legislation and funding authorizations from U.S. Congress for increased oversight, advertising, and public educational awareness campaigns of airline airworthiness discrepancies. Recommendation Five. The FAA should require and publicly institute an alphanumerical designation (A1, B1, C1, etc.) for each commercial aircraft, which would delineate the latest airworthiness condition the aircraft is currently in, based on the most recent PMI inspection, and other federal (FAR) safety criterion. Recommendation Six. The airline industry should ground aircraft that are known to be out of standards for maintenance airworthiness compliance. Recommendation Seven. The FAA should expedite the incorporation of Safety Management System (SMS) for air carrier operations. In summary, there is likely opposition from unionized associations, airport operators, and segments within the U.S. Congress to require the airline industry to divulge airworthiness issues on every flight inside the United States. However, a central medium needs to be brought forward which benefits the safety of a paying consumer and the revenues of an airline. The above recommendations are purposed to serve as a guideline in that central medium, and to effect change into the awareness and perceptions of safely operating airworthy aircraft as both an asset to the economy and the general flying public.

37 REFERENCES AirGuideOnline. (2008, March 17). Company watch-Southwest airlines. Retrieved September 6, 2010, from Airguide Online: https://www.airguideonline.com. Allen, M. (2004, November 26). Hefty FAA fines bring airlines down to earth. Retrieved September 3, 2010, from ProQuest: http://library.erau.edu. Associated Press. (2009, October 15). United, US Airways face millions in fines. Retrieved August 23, 2010, from NewsBank: http://www.docs.newsbank.com/infoweb. Benedict, H. (1979, December 20). Safety board finds flight crew blamless in DC10 disaster. Boston Globe. Caterinicchia, D. (2008, April 13). FAA says 4 U.S. airlines under investigation. Retrieved September 2, 2010, from Mobile Press Register: http://www.newsbank.com/infoweb. Federal Aviation Regulations Part 39, 91, 121. (nd). U.S. Government. Michaels, D. (2010, February 18). FAA takes heat for oversight. Retrieved August 23, 2010, from The Dallas Morning News: http://www.newsbank./infoweb. Parker, L. (1989, May 24). Board blames airline for fuselage tear fatal to flight attendant. Washington Post , p. A4. Ramstack, T. (2004, July 17). Agency accuses FAA of lax safety enforcement. Retrieved September 3, 2010, from The Washington Times: http://www.washingtontimes.com. Schrober, D. (2009, June 15). FAA oversight of aircraft maintenance. Retrieved August 22, 2010, from Aviation Maintenance : http://newsbank.com/aviation maintenance.

38 Shavelson, R. (1996). Statistical reasoning for the behavioral sciences (3rd ed.). Needham Heights, MA: Simon and Schuster. Stoller, G. (2010, February 1). Since 2003, 65,000 U.S. flights with maintenance problems have taken off anyway. Retrieved August 13, 2010, from USA Today: http://www.infoweb.newsbank.com. Thorner, J. (2008, April 12). American's toll grows. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from St. Petersburg Times: http://www.newsbank.com/infoweb. Wensveen, J. (2009). Air transportation a management perspective 6th ed. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing. Wilber, D. (2008, May 17). American accused of shoddy maintenance. Retrieved September 7, 2010, from The Washington Post: http://www.newsbank.com/infoweb.

39 APPENDIX A DATA COLLECTION DEVICE

40 PERCEPTIONS IN SAFETY AND AIRWORTHINESS OF THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY Survey Questionnaire My name is Daniel Whitford, a researcher with Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, a premier institute of higher learning in aviation sciences and aerospace engineering. I am conducting an in-depth study of public perception associated with maintenance airworthiness and safety facets within the U.S. airline industry. The attached survey is the research instrument I am using to gather data for this project. Your assistance in completing this survey will provide valuable, anonymous data pertinent to this research topic. The information from the survey will be used to develop a new body of knowledge and opinioned-based statistical analyses of airworthiness and safety awareness of the U.S. airline industry. I can be contacted by phone at (360) 296-2395. My email address is whitford@my.erau.edu I request you fill out this survey and return it within one week. Thank you for your time and assistance. If you would like an executive summary of my findings, please provide your name and address below (your personal information will not be used nor reflected in this report):

Name: _______________________________________________________________________ Address: _____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________

41 A study of U.S. Airline Airworthiness and Public Safety Part I PFor questions one through four, place a check mark in the space next to your demographic.

1. What age group do you belong to? 21-30 31-40 41-50 51 + _____ _____ _____ _____

2. Gender

M___ F___

3. How many times per year do you fly on U.S. Airlines? 0 1-5 6-10 11 or more _____ _____ _____ _____

4. Are the majority of your flights on U.S. airlines for business or pleasure? Business Pleasure _____ _____

42 Part II For questions 5 through 10, please place a circle around the number which best describes your opinion based on the following legend. Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 Strongly Agree 9 10

5. I expect a U.S. airline to comply with all maintenance airworthiness and safety requirements. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

6. I would not fly on a U.S. airline aircraft with maintenance airworthiness discrepancies if I knew they existed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

7. I have had knowledge of maintenance airworthiness discrepancies of a U.S. airline flight prior to its take-off. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

8. I would expect a flight to be cancelled if an aircraft does not meet federal maintenance standards for airworthiness. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

9. I would consider flying in an aircraft with publicized airworthiness discrepancies, if I were assured by the airline that the flight would be safe.

10

10. It would be better as a passenger on a U.S. commercial flight to be unaware of airworthiness discrepancies associated with my flight.

10