CASES - CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 1. Robles vs CA, GR no 123509 March 14, 2000 Robles v. Court of Appeals GR. No.

123509, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 97 Panganiban, J. To be entitled to the remedy of quieting of title, petitioners must show that they have title to the real property at issue, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy. Buyers of unregistered real property, especially banks, must exert due diligence in ascertaining the titles of mortgagors and sellers, lest some innocent parties be prejudiced. Failure to observe such diligence may amount to bad faith and may result in the nullity of the mortgage, as well as of the subsequent foreclosure and/or auction sale. Unless the co-ownership is clearly repudiated, a co-owner cannot, by prescription, acquire title to the shares of the other co-owners. FACTS: Leon Robles originally owned the land which was inherited by his son Silvino Robles. The latter then took possession of the land and declared it in his name for taxation purposes. Upon his death, the same was inherited by his widow Maria dela Cruz and his children. The plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles. For unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the name of Silvino Robles was cancelled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father of Andres Robles who is the wife of the defendant Hilario Robles. He secured a loan from the Cardona Rural Bank, Inc. which was foreclosed for failure to pay the mortgage debt wherein the defendant bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale. Defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Santos. An action for quieting of title was filed by respondent Santos. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been in possession of the land since 1942 and it was only in 1987 that they knew about the foreclosure of the mortgage. The Court of Appeals ruled that because of the plaintiffs inaction for more than 20 years, prescription had already set in. ISSUE: Whether or not the action has prescribed against Hilario Robles. First Issue: Quieting of Title; Second Issue: Validity of the Real Estate Mortgage; Third Issue: Efficacy of Free Patent Grant HELD: Yes. Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owner; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the coownership. As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his share, as he in fact did. Neither should his payment of land taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as owners. Article 476 of the Civil Code provides: "Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title. "An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein." Based on the above definition, an action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. That there is an instrument or a document which, on its face, is valid and efficacious is clear in the present case. Petitioners allege that their title as owners and possessors of the disputed property is clouded by the tax declaration and, subsequently, the free patent thereto granted to Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos. The more important question to be resolved, however, is whether the petitioners have the appropriate title that will entitle them to avail themselves of the remedy of quieting of title. The failure to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to the property in question is vital to the resolution of the present Petition. It was from him that Hilario had allegedly derived his title thereto as owner, an allegation which thereby enabled him to mortgage it to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The occupation and the possession thereof by the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest until 1962 was not disputed, and Exequiels acquisition of the said property by prescription was not alleged. Thus, the deed of conveyance purportedly evidencing the transfer of ownership and possession from the heirs of Silvino to Exequiel should have been presented as the best proof of that transfer. No such document was presented, however. Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners that Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of title to the property at the time of the institution of the Complaint for quieting of title.

Mortgage of Real Property

Considering that Hilario can be deemed to have mortgaged the disputed property not as absolute owner but only as a co-owner, he can be adjudged to have disposed to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., only his undivided share therein. The said bank, being the immediate predecessor of the Santos spouses, was a mortgagee in bad faith. Thus, justice and equity mandate the entitlement of the Santos spouses, who merely stepped into the shoes of the bank, only to what legally pertains to the latter -- Hilarios share in the disputed property. In sum, the real estate mortgage contract covering the disputed property a contract executed between Spouses Hilario and Andrea on the one hand and the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., on the other -- is hereby declared null and void insofar as it prejudiced the shares of Petitioners Lucio, Emerita, Aludia and Emilio Robles; it is valid as to Hilario Robles share therein. Consequently, the sale of the subject property to the Santos spouses is valid insofar as it pertained to his share only. Likewise declared null and void is Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 issued by the Bureau of Lands covering the subject property.

2. Deiparine vs CA 299 SCRA 668, G.R. No. 111257. December 4, 1998 (See separate whole case) 3. Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co vs Mun Council of Iloilo, 24 Phil 471 ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL- Nuisance City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination. FACTS: Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints regarding the smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and comfort. The defendant made investigations and later on passed a resolution which demands that the smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else the factory operations will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction. ISSUES: Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and abate the supposed nuisance in this case?

RULING: NO. There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The former may be abated even by private individuals however the latter is different; it needs a determination of the facts which is a judicial function. The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts of law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision. City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination. In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfort. The resolution is obviously not enough to abate the property of the plaintiff. 4. Monteverde vs Generoso, 52 Phil 123, September 29, 1928, G.R. No. 28491 Facts: Tomas Monteverde is the owner of a parcel of land bounded on the northwest by the Agdao River. The Tambongon Creek is a branch of the Agdao River and Runs through Monteverdes land. For fishpond purposes, Monteverde constructed two dams across the Agdao River and five dams across the Tambongon Creek. The two dams in the Agdao River were destroyed by order of the district engineer of Davao. The Provincial governor of Davao also threatened to destroy the other dams in the Tambongon Creek. The motive behind the destruction of the dams in the Agdao River and the proposed destruction of the dams in the Tambongon Creek was to safeguard the public health. To prevent the contemplated action with reference to the Tambongon Creek, Monteverde sought in the Court of First Instance of Davao to obtain an order of injunction in restraint of the provincial governor, the district engineer, and the district health officer, but in this attempt Monteverde was unsuccessful in the lower court. Issue: It was stated at the onset that the ultimate and decisive question is this: Is a provincial governor, a district engineer, or a district health officer authorized to destroy private property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any judicial proceedings whatever under the pretense that such private property constitutes a nuisance? Ruling: Under the circumstances in this case: The question at issue is answered in the negative. With reference to this varied assortment of law, the flat statement is advanced without fear of contradiction that with the possible exception of article 24 of the Law of Waters no law expressly empowers the provincial governor to order the removal of obstructions and the destruction of nuisances in a navigable stream. On the contrary, the law specifically grants to the municipal council the power by ordinance or resolution to declare, prevent, and abate nuisances. Of course, a dam or a fishpond may be found to be a nuisance where it endangers or impairs the health or depreciates property by causing water to become stagnant. The public health may be conserved but conserved only in a legal manner. Due process of law must be observed before the citizens property or personal rights or liberty can be interfered with. Conceding without deciding that article 24 of the Law of Waters is in force, we reiterate that it can only be made use of by conforming to the provisions of the organic law. It is not easy to draw the line between cases where the property illegally used may be destroyed summarily and where judicial proceedings are for its condemnation. If the property were of great value, as, for instance, if it were a vessel employed for smuggling or other illegal purposes, it would be putting a dangerous power in the hands of a custom officer to permit him to sell or destroy it as a public nuisance, and the owner would have good reason to complain of such act, as depriving him of his property without due process of law. But where the property is of trifling value, and its destruction is necessary to effect the object of a certain statue, we think it is within the power of the legislature to order its summary abatement. For instance, if the legislature should prohibit the killing of fish by explosive shells, and should order the cartridges so used to be destroyed, it would seem like belittling the dignity of the judiciary to require such destruction to be preceded by a solemn condemnation in a court of justice. The same remarks might be made of the cards, chips, and dice of a gambling room. (1) there is no law authorizing the summary abatement of nuisances by the provincial governor; and (2) the dams and fishponds are not of trifling value.

: July 6, 2012 Friday) 1. Valdez vs. Republic, GR 180863, Sept. 8, 2009 2. Co vs. Registrar of Manila, GR 138496, Feb 23, 2004 3. Republic vs. Benemerito, GR 146963, March 15, 2004 4. Geluz vs. CA, 2SCRA 801 5. Limjuco vs Intestate Estate of Pedro Fragrante, 80 Phil 776, G.R. No. L-770, 27 April 1948

1. Valdez vs. Republic, GR 180863, Sept. 8, 2009 - Presumptive Death FACTS: Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilios application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. HELD: The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid. 2. G.R. NO. 138496 February 23, 2004 CO VS CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA FACTS: HUBERT TAN CO was born March 23, 1974. His sister, ARLENE TAN CO, was born May 19, 1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents CO BOON PENG AND LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are CHINESE CITIZENS. CO BOON PENG filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under LETTER OF INSTRUCTION no. 270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under PD 1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization and consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen on February 15, 1977. On August 27, 1998, they filed with the RTC Manila a petition under Rules of Court for correction of entries in the certificate of birth which was denied on the ff. grounds: a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of the applicant; **Sec. 15: effects of naturalization on the wife and the children b) LOI 270: refers to qualified individuals only; c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270; d) Application of pari material rule of construction is misplaced. ISSUE: Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on account of the naturalization of their Father Co Boon Peng. HELD: It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the ff. material allegations in their petition: 1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng; 2) They were born in the Philippines; 3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen. In Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, the High Court reiterated the distinction between the phrases "to correct" and "to change." Said the High Court: To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may be. Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein. 3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, petitioners, vs. PETRONIO L. BENEMERITO, respondent. G.R. No. 146963. March 15, 2004 VITUG, J p: Facts: On 29 February 1998, respondent Petronio L. Benemerito, filed a verified petition before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija asking for the correction of certain entries in the record of birth of his son, Joven Lee Benemerito, on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The entries sought to be corrected included 1) the change of the father's name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to Petronio L. Benemerito; and 2) the date of marriage of Joven Lee's parents, Edna V. Sicat and Petronio L. Benemerito appearing therein from 01 September 1989 to 25 January 1998. The trial court rendered a decision granting the petition. The Republic appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the petition should not have been granted since indispensable parties themselves were not notified of the proceedings and that substantial changes, such as the date of marriage of parents, name of the father, or filiation of the child and whether legitimate or illegitimate, could only be threshed out in adversarial proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision stating that the present case, the opportunity to contest the petition was afforded to all concerned parties through the publication of the petition in 'Pulso ng Bayan, a newspaper of general circulation, that the correction of the spelling of petitioner's name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to Petronio Laurente Benemerito and the change of the date of marriage from September 1, 1989 to reflect he actual date of marriage as January 25, 1998 are both an innocuous alteration. The Republic asserts that the changes sought by respondent are substantial and not innocuous. Claiming that an adversarial proceeding is essential to fully ventilate the allegations of the petition. Issue: Whether or not the correction in the birth certificate of the Petitioner would tantamount to a substantial change in the entry of his birth and needs a further adversarial proceeding. Ruling: The Court reversed and set aside the appealed decision without prejudice on the part of respondent to initiate the appropriate adversarial proceedings such as may be minded. The Court citing Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 412 of the Civil Code, states the procedure by

which an entry in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding there contemplated may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. On the other hand, substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. The "corrections" sought to be made by respondent in the birth certificate of Joven Lee could hardly qualify as just clerical errors and the intended correction of the date of marriage of the parents of Joven Lee from 01 September 1989, appearing in his certificate of birth, to 25 January 1998, would, in effect, change the status of the child. The changes in the entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joven Lee S. Benemerito, which can possibly affect successional and other rights of persons related to either or both respondent and his wife, as well as that of Joven Lee himself, are simply too substantial to be dealt with in summary, instead of the regular adversarial proceedings, where all interested parties are impleaded, or at least notified, and allowed to be heard before the proposed changes in the birth certificate are effected. Apparently, the proceedings conducted by the trial court in the instant case fell much too short of the requirements. Nowhere in the records would it appear that all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings. The obvious effect of Republic Act 9048 is merely to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings. 4. Geluz vs CA CITATION: 2 SCRA 801 FACTS: Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion. ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same. HELD: The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated. Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated. HELD : No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment. NOTE BENE: In the Philippines, people who seek pecuniary damages for loss of relatives are seen in a negative light. It gives the impression that youre just after the money. But it should not be the case. 5. Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397 FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality. HELD: The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission. Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.