Public Relations Review 30 (2004) 161167

Message strategies of Saudi Arabias image restoration campaign after 9/11

Juyan Zhang a, , William L. Benoit b
a

Department of Communication, Monmouth University, 400 Cedar Avenue, West Long Branch, NJ 07764, USA b University of Missouri, CA, USA Received 13 October 2003; received in revised form 1 February 2004; accepted 20 February 2004

Abstract The research applies Image Restoration Discourse to Saudi Arabias attempt to repair its damaged reputation after 9/11. The country was accused of supporting terrorism and of failing to support a possible U.S. attack on Iraq. It was suggested that by relying heavily on denial and bolstering, the image repair effort was partially successful at dispelling the rst concern; it was notably less effective in responding to the second accusation. 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Message strategy; Image restoration campaign; Reputation

1. Introduction: events and accusations Nations have images, and relations between countries have always been shaped by images (Giffard & Rivenburgh, 2000; Kunczik, 1997). The United States has become the most important target of public relations efforts by countries seeking to improve their images (Bennett, 1988; Cutlip, 1997). Although image cultivation is practiced increasingly by nations, it is rare for a country to try to restore a tarnished national image through crisis management. The image restoration campaign by the Saudi government in the United States since September 11, 2001 is such a case. Saudi Arabias image in the United States was seriously damaged by its connections with terrorism. The country was home to 15 of the 19 hijackers, and over 100 Saudi citizens made up the bulk of the Afghanistan war prisoners detained at the U.S. Naval base in Guantanamo Bay (Most Guantanamo Bay detainees are Saudis, 2002). Osama Bin Laden was a Saudi national. The country was also accused of

Corresponding author. Fax: +1-732-571-3609. E-mail addresses: juyan z@yahoo.com (J. Zhang), benoitw@missouri.edu (W.L. Benoit).

0363-8111/$ see front matter 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2004.02.006

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aiding the Palestinian suicide bombers and failing to support U.S. plan to attack Iraq. A Rand Corporation analyst even accused the country as being the kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent in the Middle East (Pentagon blasts Saudi Arabia report, 2002). Two Gallup Polls quantify the damage to Saudi Arabias image in the United States. In February 2001, 47% of respondents reported a favorable attitude toward Saudi Arabia and 46% were unfavorable (Overall opinion of Saudi Arabia, 2001). However, a year later (after 9/11), only 27% reported favorable attitudes toward Saudi Arabia and the unfavorable group had increased to 64% (Overall opinion of Saudi Arabia, 2002). Although the poll did not attempt to ascertain the cause of this shift, surely the accusations sketched above contributed to Saudi Arabias image problem. Therefore, we argue that Saudi Arabias image suffered damage from two primary accusations. First, it failed to combat terrorism. Second, it did not support the U.S. plan to attack Iraq. 1.1. Image repair campaign Facing an image crisis, Saudi Arabia launched an extensive image repair campaign from mid-July 2002 through early September 2002. The Saudi government spent more than $5 million by the September 11 anniversary and hired prominent U.S. public relations rms, law rms, consultants and a media-buying rm. Adel al-Jubeir, an adviser to the Saudi government, said that his government was employing American political campaign techniques to restore its image: hiring a publicity team, being more accessible to the press, sending ofcials on speaking tours, cultivating research organizations and polling Americans on their opinions. The Saudi government ran hundreds of television and radio spots in America, placing ads in publications like People magazine and Stars & Stripes (Worried Saudis pay millions to improve image in the U.S, 2002). This study examines the message strategies that the Saudi government employed in restoring its image in the United States. First we identify which message strategies were employed in this public relations campaign. Then we evaluate the persuasiveness of this international image repair effort.

2. Literature review 2.1. Public diplomacy and message strategies Strategies to shape messages were scarcely attended in public diplomacy research. Manheim and Albritton (1984) briey mentioned that public relations rms hired by foreign governments might help shape message strategies for the client. Zaharna and Villalobos (2000) reported that the U.S. public relations rm hired by the Colombian government coached visiting Colombian ofcials on their presentations. The public relations rms hired by the Mexican government drafted the embassys press releases, facts sheets and all media pieces following embassy guidelines. 2.2. Image restoration theory Benoits (1995) image restoration theory is applied to analyze the campaigns message strategies. The theory argues that there are ve general options available for self-defense: denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortication (see Table 1).

J. Zhang, W.L. Benoit / Public Relations Review 30 (2004) 161167 Table 1 Typology of image restoration strategies Strategy Denial Simple denial Shift the blame Key characteristics Did not perform act Another performed act Example Tylenol: did not poison capsules Tylenol: a madman poisoned capsules Firm moved because of new taxes Executive not told meeting was moved Tree fell on tracks causing train wreck Sears wants to provide good auto repair service

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Evasion of responsibility Provocation Responded to act of another Defeasibility Lack of information/ability Accident Mishap Good intentions Meant well Reducing offensiveness of event Bolstering Stress good traits Minimization Act is not serious Differentiation Act is less offensive Transcendence More important values Attack accuser Reduce accusers credibility Compensation Reimburse victim Corrective action Mortication Plan to solve/prevent recurrence of problem Apologize

Exxons swift and competent cleanup of oil spill Exxon: few animals killed in oil spill Sears: unneeded repairs were preventive maintenance, not fraud Helping humans justies testing animals Coke: Pepsi owns restaurants, competes directly with you for Disabled movie-goers given free passes after denied admission to AT&T long-distance upgrades; promised to spend millions more to improve service AT&T apologized for service interruption

Source: Brinson and Benoit (1999).

3. Method 3.1. Rhetorical analysis This study employs the method of rhetorical criticism, which helps understand how people use symbols to inuence one another (Campbell & Burkholder, 1997). Rhetorical criticism is the systematic process of illuminating and evaluating persuasive messages (Andrews, Leff, & Terrill, 1998). Unlike content analysis, rhetorical criticism examines the relationship of context and message. The rhetorical critic also can make a judgment of the importance of the elements of the message as a gestalt that considers not only simple frequency but also prominence as indicated by placement, development, and relationship of ideas in the persuasive message(s). 3.2. Texts The texts were obtained from three sources. The Saudi Embassy website is the most important data source. All of the news releases, statements and speeches were downloaded from the News Room link. Four widely aired TV/Radio spots were also located. Stories about Saudi Arabia in the Washington Post and the New York Times were searched in Lexis-Nexis from September 11 through June 21, 2002, when the Arab ministers met in Cairo and decided to launch media campaign in the West (Arab states start media campaign, 2002). The news stories were screened and those that quoted Saudi news sources were used.

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4. Results The textual analysis is divided into sections for each accusation and the Saudi responses into strategies of the typology of Benoits image restoration theory. Accusation 1: Saudi Arabia supports terrorism, or at least did not actively combat terrorism. 4.1. Denial The Saudi Government relied heavily on denial to respond to this criticism. It denied any connection to terrorism (Crown Prince Abdullah condoles American people, 2001). It asserted that there is no proof that Saudi money went to the Taliban (Prince Nayef reiterates Kingdoms rejection of terrorism, 2001). The accusation that Saudi was hesitant to ght terrorism in Afghanistan is just not true (Fox News OReilly Factor interview with Al-Jubeir, 2001). Islam forbids terrorism (Saudi royal family continues to condole Americans, 2001) and the terrorists were not true Muslims (Crown Prince Abdullahs interview with Time magazine, 2002). Furthermore, Saudi did not fund (Palestinian) suicide bombers (Saudi Arabia does not pay suicide bombers, 2002). Next, the Saudi declared that it stands rm behind efforts to combat terrorism (Prince Bandar stresses Kingdoms stand against terrorism, 2002). Everything the U.S. has requested . . . Saudi Arabia has provided (Fox News OReilly Factor interview with Al-Jubeir, 2002). Saudi Arabia has taken many actions to ght global terrorism (Summary Report: Initiatives and actions in the ghting against terrorism, 2002). The Flags spot reported that Saudi donated more foreign aid per capita than any other nation. Of course, these statements could be dismissed as self-serving. Therefore, third-person endorsement was adopted. The Bush Quote spot pointed out that President Bush acknowledged that As far as the Saudi Arabians go . . . they have been nothing less than cooperative (Bush Quote, 2002). The spot Powell Quote uses Colin Powells words: Saudi Arabia has been prominent among the countries acting against the accounts of terrorist organizations (Powell Quote, 2002). These sources make Saudi Arabias denial of the charge more persuasive. 4.2. Attack accuser A smaller component of the defense enacted the strategy of attacking accusers. Saudi rhetoric asserted that western media tended to arbitrarily throw out accusations against Muslims (Imam of Makkah calls for wisdom and reason, 2001). Saudi Prince said that 90 percent of what the U.S. media says about my country is incorrect or misleading. (Nader, 2002) Such claims could reduce the persuasiveness of those accusations. The Rand analyst who attacked Saudi Arabia received most of the counter attacks: He is shallow, and not honest about the facts, and has barked about these things just to drive a wedge between our two countries (SaudiU.S. relations discussed with Adel Al-Jubeir, Foreign Policy Advisor to Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Meet the Press, NBC-TV, 2002). These statements, if accepted by the audience, would tend to reduce the credibility of the accusations against Saudi Arabia. 4.3. Differentiation Saudi Arabia could not deny that it had provided assistance to the Palestinian suicide bombers families. Instead, it employed differentiation to respond to this accusation. The defense protested that Saudi money

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for Palestine was not to support the bombings but to put food on their tables and medicine in their pharmacies. If some money had gone to the Palestinian suicide bombers families, its to help them in their need. So, while denying nancial support for Palestinian suicide bombings, the Saudi Government admitted that money had been sent to Palestine to provide food and medicine (Katz, 2002). 4.4. Good intentions When Saudi prince Alwaleed donated a $10 million check to New York after September 11, he stated that I believe the government of the United States of America should re-examine its policies in the Middle East. The comment led Mayor Giuliani to reject the check. Guiliani asserted that the Saudi prince was trying to justify the terrorist attack. Responding to the accusation, the Saudi prince claimed that I wanted to show the good face of the Arab world. We tried to tell America, Please try to look at this problem and resolve it so that we can remove Bin Ladens breeding ground. Thus, the Saudi prince argued that he meant well and his comments were well-intended (Nader, 2002). Accusation 2: Saudi Arabia failed to support the U.S. plan to attack Iraq. 4.5. Defeasibility Saudi Arabia suggested that it was inappropriate for it to support an attack on Iraq without the support of the United Nations: There is a UN mechanism that we go through. We should go through a process (Fox News OReilly Factor interview with Al-Jubeir, 2002). This suggests that Saudi Arabia did not have the legitimate authority to support such an attack without approval from the UN. Another argument is that the United States does not yet have a specic plan: Youll have to make the case. I dont believe that the decision has been made yet (Adel Al-Jubeir Foreign Policy Advisor to Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz on CNNs Crossre, 2002). Thus, these remarks suggest that Saudi Arabia has not yet bestowed or withheld its support because the United States has yet to provide a plan of attack. 4.6. Good intentions Saudi Arabia also reacted to the accusation by arguing that it did this in the interest of the United States. Our view is that . . . it [to attack Iraq] would not serve Americas interests, or the interests of the region. It is counterproductive and would have grave consequences for American interests in the region, as well as the interests of your friends and allies (Katz, 2002). These kinds of statements appear to function as evidence of Saudi Arabias good intentions. 4.7. Bolstering Bolstering often does not pertain to a particular accusation; it emphasizes the accusers positive qualities to counterbalance the accusations. Saudi Arabia bolstered its image in four ways. First, it expressed shock and concern over the 9/11 tragedy. Immediately after the attack, the Saudi royal family paid visits to U.S. diplomats to offer condolences. Saudi Foreign Minister went to the United States to offer in person the condolences. These kinds of actions could help bolster the countrys image. Second, the country offered aid and support to the victims of the terrorist attacks. Saudi Prince Alwaleed donated a check of $10

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million for the Twin Towers Fund, though it was rejected. The Saudi Mosaic Foundation gave donations to the DC schools and the fund that aids September 11 victims. A racehorse was given to the 9/11 victim families. Third, the country discussed humanitarian efforts in other countries. Saudi Television collected donations for Afghani refugees. Saudi Arabia claimed that it has long been committed to providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinians and is committed to the peace process for over 30 years (Al-Jubeir, 2002). These actions show that the Saudi government possesses general humanitarian qualities. Finally, the Saudi government reiterated its friendship with the United States: We have been staunch allies . . . and effective partners (Katz, 2002). The Allies spot features snapshots of Saudi leaders with eight U.S. presidents. The voiceover says, Weve been allies for more than 60 years. The voiceover of the spot Flags said that One country [Saudi Arabia] has been an ally for over 60 years. These messages employ bolstering because they serve to stress that Saudi Arabia is a valuable ally of the United States. Furthermore, the country quickly retreated from its initial opposition to attacking Iraq after Bush addressed the United Nations. It also indicated that it would make up any shortfall that might result from war if oil price is pushed high.

5. Implications This research applied Benoits Image Restoration Theory to analyze the message strategies of the Saudi image restoration campaign after September 11. Part of the message strategies appeared to be effective. The fact that Saudi Arabia had revoked Bin Ladens citizenship was consistent with denial of the rst accusation. The countrys denial was also supported with endorsement from President Bush and Secretary of State Powell. However, the response to the rest of this rst accusation was noticeably weaker: No evidence supported the claim that funding had not supported the Palestinian suicide bombers. Furthermore, there was no attempt to deny the second accusation. Instead, the country pled defeasibility and good intention. Bolstering probably helped but could be expected to help only a little. Thus, we judge the overall defense as only partially effective. This is supported by some external evidence. An Opinion Dynamics poll in April 30May 1, 2002 found that 22% considered Saudi Arabia U.S. Ally and 56% did not. A Washington Post poll conducted September 13 of 2002, near the end of the Saudi campaign, reported that 39% considered Saudi Arabia a friend and ally while 44% considered it to be unfriendly or an enemy. Thus, there was positive movement in attitudes, as favorable responses rose (2239%) and unfavorable ones dropped (5644%). Other evidence suggests that many people believed that Saudi Arabias advertising blitz was an attempt to capitalize on September 11 and promote their country (53%) than a sincere show of support for Americans during the difcult time (21%). (Fabrizio, 2002) This evidence is generally consistent with our evaluation that the strategies were partially effective.

6. Conclusion Saudi Arabia developed an extensive image repair effort to restore its reputation after 9/11. Denial, attacking accusers and bolstering were major components of the image repair effort. Defeasibility, good intentions and differentiation received scant emphasis in the defense. Thus, as a whole, this image repair effort was partially effective. This case study shows that countries can have modest success improving their reputation through the use of image repair discourse.

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