G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant, vs.

JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:p This case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private coporation or associaiton may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed on ethousand hectares in area". * That prohibition is not found in the 1935 Constitution. The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, in its application filed on December 1, 1976 in the Makati branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prayed for the confirmation of its title to two lots with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square meters, located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270 (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC No. N-50801). The Republic of the Philippines opposed theh application on the grounds that the applicant, as a private corporation,is disqualified to hold alienable public lands and that the applicant and its prredecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application (pp. 65-66, Rollo). After the trial had commenced, the Province of rizal and the Municipality of Tanay filed a joint opposition to the application on the ground that one of the lots, Lot No. 1165 of the Tanay cadastre, would be needed for the widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos and E.Quirino Streetsin the town of Tanay. The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos before the Pacific war which broke out in 1941. On July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing and MInerva Inocencio (Exh. K). The Piguing sapouses constructed a house therereon. Because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel post on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the Meralco on August 13, 1976. The said land was included in the1968 cadastral survey made in Tanacy by the Bureau of Lands, Plan AP-04-000902 (Exh. F and H) and was divided into two lots, Lots Nos. 1164 and 1165, so as to segregate Lot No. 1165 which would be used to widen the two street serving as the land's eastern and southern boundaries. The land was declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and taxes had been paid thereon up to 1977. It is residential in character as distinguished from a strictly agricultural land. It is not included in any military reservation. Since 1927, it has formed part of the alienable portion of the public domain. After trial, the lowre court rendered a decision dismissing the application because in its opinion the Meralco is not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for judicial confirmationof their imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco is a juridical person. The trial court assumed that the land which it seeks to register is public land. From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. In contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years, had become private land in the hands of the latter, and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land, is not applicable to the said land. The Meralco further contends that it has invoke section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land.

In reply to these contentions, the Solicitor General counters that the said land is not private land because the Meralco and its predecessors-in-interest have no composition title from the Spanish government nor possessory information title or any other means for the acquisition of public lands such as grants or patents (Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De Jesus, L-40912, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146, 157; Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, and Alinsunurin vs. Director of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975; 68 SCRA 177; 195; Lee Hong Hok vs. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372, 378-9; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals and Raymundo, L29575, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 634, 639; Padilla vs. Reyes and Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, 969; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil. 600, 603). The Public Land Law provides: CHAPTER VIII. Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. xxx xxx xxx SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.) xxx xxx xxx SEC. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the public domain not in possession of the qualifications specified in the last preceding section may apply for the benefits of this chapter. We hold that, as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed. This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892, which rule is a compendious or quintessential precis of a pervasive principle of public land law and land registration law, that"all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest." (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132). The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, that "an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain from time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public" and becomes private property. That ruling is based on the Cario case which is about the possession of land by an Igorot and his ancestors since time immemorial or even before the Spanish conquest. The land involved in the Susi case was possessed before 1880 or since a period of time "beyond the reach of memory". That is not the situation in this case. The Meralco does

not pretend that the Piguing spouses and their predecessor had been in possession of the land since time immemorial. In the Susi case, this Court applied section 45(b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title. On the other hand, in Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, 510-11, it was held that while occupants of public land, who have applied for the confirmation of their title, "teian asimismo a su favor la presuncion juris et de jure de que habian cumplido con todas las condiciones necesarias para la concesion del titulo; pero hasta que el titulo se expida no tenian el concepto juridico de ser los verdaderos dueos del terreno in este dejo de pertenecer a los terrenos publico del Estado susceptibles de enajenacion." That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a pice of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains public land. For that reason in the Uy Un case, it was held that if that land was attached by a judgment creditor of the applicant, while his application for confirmation of his imperfect title was pending in the Bureau of Lands, the levy and execution sald of the land were void. For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed are governed by the Public Land Law. Such lands would not be covered by the Public Land Law if they were already private lands. The occupants' right to the said lands is characterized in the Uy Un case, not as ownership in fee simple, but asderecho dominical incoativo. The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that if the Piguing spouses could ask for the confirmation of their imperfect title to the said lands, then why should the Meralco, as their transferee, be denied the same right to register the said land in its name, there being no legal prohibition for the Piguing spouses from selling the land to the Meralco? This Court is disposing of that same contention in the Oh Cho case said: The benefits provided in the Public Land Act (meaning the confirmation of an imperfect title under section 48[b]) for applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and before they could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest (meaning the Piguing spouses in the instant case) failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors-in-interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified. (75 Phil. 890, 893.) Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644). The lower court;s judgment dismissing Meralco's application is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner-appellant. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57461 September 11, 1987 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and HON. RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch XXIII, respondents.

CORTES, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari of a decision of the respondent Judge in Land Registration Case No. N-10317 LRC Record No. N-54803 entitled "In Re: Application for Registration of Title, Manila Electric Company, applicant," dated May 29, 1981. The facts are not disputed. Manila Electric Company filed an amended application for registration of a parcel of land located in Taguig, Metro Manila on December 4, 1979. On August 17, 1976, applicant acquired the land applied for registration by purchase from Ricardo Natividad (Exhibit E) who in turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad as evidenced by a Deed of Original Absolute Sale executed on December 28, 1970 (Exhibit E). Applicant's predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property under the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The property was declared for taxation purposes under the name of the applicant (Exhibit 1) and the taxes due thereon have been paid (Exhibits J and J-1). On May 29, 1981 respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the registration of the property in the name of the private respondent. The Director of Lands interposed this petition raising the issue of whether or not a corporation may apply for registration of title to land. After comments were filed by the respondents, the Court gave the petition due course. The legal issue raised by the petitioner Director of Lands has been squarely dealt with in two recent cases (The Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., etc., No. L73002 (December 29, 1986), 146 SCRA 509. The Director of Lands v. Hon. Bengzon and Dynamarine Corporation, etc., No. 54045 (July 28, 1987)], and resolved in the affirmative. There can be no different answer in the case at bar. In the Acme decision, this Court upheld the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. As the Court said in that case: Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected (sic) from the moment the required period of possession became complete. Coming to the case at bar, if the land was already private at the time Meralco bought it from Natividad, then the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease (1973 Const., Art. XIV, See. 11) does not apply. Petitioner, however, contends that a corporation is not among those that may apply for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Public Land Act.

As ruled in the Acme case, the fact that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental circumstance, "productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings." Considering that it is not disputed that the Natividads could have had their title confirmed, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny private respondent the right to register its property which was validly acquired. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the respondent Judge is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85322 April 30, 1991 ALFREDO M. ALMEDA, LEONARDO M. ALMEDA and ERNESTO M. ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, representative represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, respondents. Leonardo M. Almeda for petitioners.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p This petition for review assails the Court of Appeals' decision dated May 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. No. 09309-CV reversing the judgment dated January 6, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case No. N-10771 entitled, "Alfredo M. Almeda, Leonardo M. Almeda and Ernesto M. Almeda, Applicants versus Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, Oppositor." The case involves a parcel of land with an area of 1,208 square meters located in Barrio Pampangin Pateros, Rizal, and described in Survey Plan Psu-128539. It was originally owned and possessed by Emiliano Almeda, father of the petitioners, by virtue of an "Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" (Exh. G) executed on June 15, 1935, between him and his brother Adriano wherein they attested the fact that the land in question was inherited from their parents, Vedasto Almeda and Josefa C. Concepcion, who had inherited the same from their own parents (great-grandparents of herein petitioners). After Emiliano's death on May 1, 1948 at the age of 67, his wife, Ana Menguito and their children received the produce of the land and rented out to third persons portions of the property where Emiliano had three houses built. Upon Ana's death on April 3, 1950, her children with Emiliano inherited the property and the lessees moved out. On June 9, 1980, the brothers Alfredo, Leonardo and Ernesto executed an extrajudicial partition adjudicating the land to themselves (Exh. J). On September 12, 1984, the Almeda brothers applied for the registration of the land in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch CLVI, where the case was docketed as LRC Case No. N-10771, LRC Record No. N-58761 entitled, "Alfredo M. Almeda, Leonardo M. Almeda and Ernesto M. Almeda, Applicants." Their application was set for hearing on December 20, 1984. The notice of hearing dated October 10, 1984 was duly published in the Official Gazette and posted by the deputy sheriff. On the date of the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the application except the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, who had earlier filed a formal opposition. An order of general default was issued against the whole world, except the aforementioned oppositor, and the case was set for hearing. The report of the Bureau of Lands stated that the land is not included in any military area or naval reservation nor is it covered by any land patent or public land application. The Land Registration Commission Report also stated that Plan Psu-128539, when plotted in the Municipal Index map, does not overlap with any previously plotted titled properties under Act 496 as amended by PD 1525, and that the survey books do not show that the subject lot had been applied for except in this case. The Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General, presented Corazon Calamno senior forester of the Bureau of Forest Development, who stated that she prepared the inspection report on November 26, 1984; that the land fags within the alienable and disposable land under Project No. 29 of Pateros, Metro Manila, as per BFD Map LC 2623, certified and declared as such on January 23, 1968. The Court found that the applicants' possession of the parcel of land sought to be registered, together with that of their predecessors-in-interest, has been public, peaceful, continuous, adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner for a period of more than thirty (30) years, and, that the land is not located within any forest reservation nor mortgaged or encumbered in favor of any person or lending institution.

In a decision dated January 18, 1986, the trial court affirmed the order of general default and confirmed the title of the applicants to the parcel of land covered by the plan, Psu-128539, and ordered its registration in the names of Alfredo, Leonardo and Ernesto Almeda pro-indiviso (pp. 42-45, Rollo). From that decision, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09309, alleging that the applicants-appellees have not met the statutory requirements on possession under Section 48(b) of CA 141, mainly because the land applied for was inalienable forest land before its release as alienable and disposable land on January 3, 1968. The applicants' possession thereof prior to January 3, 1968 was invalid for purposes of a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated May 9, 1988, reversed the lower court and denied the application for registration. It held that private respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141 which requires public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession by the applicants in the concept of an owner, for a period of at least 30 years. They have to their credit only seventeen (17) years possession and occupation of the land, counted from January 23, 1968, when it was declared alienable and disposable, up to September 12, 1984, when their application for registration was filed. After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals, the applicants filed this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred: 1. in not holding that the land, classification made by the Director of Forestry (Bureau of Forest Development) could not affect the vested rights of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest who had continuously occupied and profited from the land since 1918 or very much earlier, as in this case; and 2. in denying the motion for reconsideration despite the ruling in "The Director of Lands vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Iglesia ni Cristo," 158 SCRA 568 promulgated on March 14, 1988, which allowed registration even when the land applied for was within the proposed alienable or disposable block of a proposed LC project. There is no merit in the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs.Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar et al., 178 SCRA 708, that: Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply Amunategai vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679). Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vamo vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [19831; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]). The petitioners have erroneously cited our decisions in Director of Forestry vs. Villareal, 170 SCRA 598 andRepublic vs. Court of Appeals, Miguel Marcelo, et al., 168 SCRA 77, in support of their position in this case. In those cases, the applicants' possession of the land antedated its classification as forest land. We held that such lands could not be retroactively legislated or classified as forest lands because it would violate previously acquired property lights protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

The situation of the land in this case is the reverse of the Villareal and Marcelo cases. The land here was already forest land when occupied by the petitioners but it was later released on January 23, 1968 from its forest classification. In other words, the petitioners here occupied forest land before it was released as alienable and disposable, while the applicants in the Villareal and Marcelo cases possessed parcels of land long before they were reserved as forest land. The subsequent reservation did not prejudice their vested rights therein. Petitioner's recourse to the decision of this Court in Director of Lands vs. Court of appeals and Iglesia Ni Cristo,158 SCRA 568, is inappropriate. That case did not involve forest land, but agricultural land of the public domain within the proposed alienable or disposable block. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149145

March 31, 2006

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN, represented by BISHOP JUAN N. NILMAR, Petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF BURUANGA, AKLAN, represented by the HON. PROTACIO S. OBRIQUE, Respondent. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan, seeking 2 the partial review of the Decision dated January 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52626. Likewise sought to be reviewed is the Resolution dated July 18, 2001 of the appellate court denying the petitioners motion for partial reconsideration. Factual and Procedural Antecedents Some time in 1990, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) thereof a complaint for declaration of ownership and quieting of title to land with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4164 and raffled to Branch 1 of the said RTC. The complaint alleged, among others, that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo is the lawful owner and possessor of a parcel of residential and commercial land (Cadastral Lot No. 138) located at the poblacion of the Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan. The said lot, with an area of 9,545 square meters, is a block bounded by four streets on all sides. It is more particularly described as follows: A parcel of commercial and residential land known as Cadastral Lot No. 138, GSS-06-00012, located at Poblacion, Buruanga, Aklan, containing an area of NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY- FIVE (9,545) SQUARE METERS, more or less. Bounded on the North by Viven Ostan Street; on the East by the Provincial Road; on the South by Nitoy Sualog Street; and on the West by Emilio Ostan Street, and declared for taxation purposes in the name of the Roman Catholic Church, Buruanga, Aklan, under Tax Declaration No. 6339 (1985) and assessed at 3 P23,850.00, including the improvements thereon. In 1894, the Roman Catholic Church was built in the middle portion of the said lot and has been in existence since then up to the present. The complaint further alleged that some time in 1978, the Municipality of Buruanga constructed its municipal building on the northeastern portion of the subject lot after it obtained the permission of Fr. Jesus Patio, then parish priest of Buruanga. The municipality promised to remove all the improvements it constructed thereon if and when the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo needed the said land. In October 1989, the said municipal building was razed by fire allegedly perpetrated by members of the New Peoples Army. On November 25, 1989, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, through its counsel, wrote to the Municipal Mayor of Buruanga requesting the officials of the said municipality to refrain from constructing its new building on the same site because it is the property of the church. Further, it needed the said land for its social action projects. The letter reads in part: I am writing you on behalf of my client THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN, a corporation sole and represented by Bishop Juan N. Nilmar requesting you and the Honorable Members of the Municipal Council (Sangguniang Bayan) to refrain from constructing your new Municipal Building on the same site where your old Municipal Building was burned down because it is constructed on the property of the Church.
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Please be informed that the land of the Church is needed for its social action projects and additional building, hence, kindly relocate your New Municipal Building in your own land located along Emilio Ostan Street, known as Cadastral Lot No. 87. With respect to your other public buildings such as the Rural Hospital, Buruanga Community Medicare Hospital, the Basketball Court and the Grandstand which are all occupying the Church property, you can continue using the same land subject to your recognition of the true ownership of the property of the Church The Roman Catholic Church of Buruanga, Aklan, under the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan, the lawful administrator of all church 5 properties in the Province of Aklan. On March 12, 1990, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo wrote the Department of Public Works and Highways of the said province requesting the said office not to issue any building permit to the Municipal Mayor and/or the Municipality of Buruanga in connection with the construction of its municipal building on the land owned by the Roman Catholic 6 Bishop of Kalibo. These letters went unheeded as the construction of the new municipal building on the same site proceeded. Consequently, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo filed the complaint a quo and prayed that it be declared the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138. It likewise prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued to enjoin the said municipality and its authorized representatives from constructing the new municipal building thereon and that the latter be directed to pay damages to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo. In its Answer, the Municipality of Buruanga, represented by Mayor Protacio Obrique, denied that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo ever acquired ownership and possession over the land subject of the complaint. It raised as affirmative defenses that the said lot was surveyed as property of the municipality on February 3, 1909 in accordance 8 with Section 58 of Act 926 by A.W. Bushell and approved by the Bureau of Lands on May 15, 1909. Thereafter, a decree was issued on March 14, 1919 in favor of the Municipality of Buruanga under Case No. 12871 of then Court of Land Registration, Bureau of Lands. It was further alleged that the said land was again surveyed in the name of the Municipality of Buruanga under Act No. 2259 and denominated as Lot No. 138 GSS-06-00012 from the approved cadastral map and that the said municipality alone had possessed the said land under the claim of title exclusively for over fifty (50) years, exclusive of all other rights and adverse to all other claimants. The Municipality of Buruanga urged the court a quo to dismiss the complaint and, instead, declare it the absolute and exclusive owner of the disputed lot. On November 29, 1990, the court a quo issued the Order appointing Geodetic Engineer Rodrigo Santiago of the Bureau of Lands as Commissioner and directing him to identify and delineate the lot in question. In compliance therewith, Engr. Santiago submitted the Commissioners Report and Sketch stating in part: That as per order of the court dated November 29, 1990 to delineate the land[in] question, the undersigned court commissioner notified both parties and the schedule of survey was January 12, 1991 but it was postponed and moved to January 15 as requested by the representative from the Municipality of Buruanga. That the land in question involved was pointed to me by the Honorable Mayor of the Municipality of Buruanga, identified on the plan as [L]ot 138 located at Poblacion Buruanga with survey no. GSS-06-00012 approved by the Director Lands last February 19, 1985, listed as Public Plaza on file in the CENR Office Land Management Sector, Kalibo, Aklan. That the Honorable Mayor of the Municipality of Buruanga pointed also the boundary between the Public Plaza and the Roman Catholic Church. The Technical Descriptions are as follows:
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Lot 138-A (Public Plaza) corner 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-1 S86 - 03E S03 - 17E N88 - 54W N06 - 33E 65.54 m. 32.36 m. 71.31 m 35.68 m.

containing an area of 2,319 square meters Lot 138-B (Roman Catholic Church) 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-1 S86 - 03E S03 - 17E N88 - 54W N06 - 33E 65.54 m. 32.36 m. 71.31 m. 35.68 m.

containing an area of 3,836 square meters Lot 138-C (Public Plaza) 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-1 N81 - 19W N06 - 33E S83 - 17E S03 - 17E
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87.70 m. 38.90 m. 80.35 m. 42.57 m.

containing an area of 3,389 square meters

Consistent with the above technical description, the sketch submitted by Engr. Santiago showed the delineation of Lot 138 into three parts: Lots 138-A, 138-B and 138-C. The municipal building stood on Lot 138-A; the Roman Catholic Church stood on Lot 138-B and the municipal health center and the Buruanga Community Medicare building stood on Lot 138-C. It also showed that portions of Lots 138-A and 138-C were being used as public plaza. At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following facts: 1. The identity of the lot in question which is Lot 138 consisting of Lots 138-A, 138-B and 138-C as reflected in the commissioners sketch with an area of 9,544 square meters and subdivided as follows: Lot 138-A 2,319 square meters Lot 138-B 3,836 square meters Lot 138-C 3,389 square meters 2. Lot 138-B is the present site of the Roman Catholic Church of Buruanga.
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The parties also agreed that the sole issue for resolution is who between the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo and the Municipality of Buruanga is the owner of Lot 138. After due trial, the court a quo rendered its Decision dated October 30, 1995 declaring the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo as the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-B and the Municipality of Buruanga as the lawful owner and possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C, the said lots being public plaza for public use.

The court a quo found that of the various tax declarations presented by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo to 13 support its claim, only one referred to a portion of Lot 138. Said tax declaration covered the church site and the 14 parish house situated within Lot 138-B. The other pieces of evidence could not be relied upon because they contained hearsay information relating to the disputed lot that occurred before the affiants were born. The affidavit 15 executed by Fr. Jesus Patio stating that he was the one who gave verbal permission to then Municipal Mayor Pedro Omugtong to construct the municipal building on the vacant lot owned by the church was not accorded any evidentiary value because he (Fr. Patio) did not testify during the trial. On the other hand, the court a quo did not give credence to the Municipality of Buruangas Exhibit "1," a microfilm enlargement of a plan showing that the land consisting of 12,615 square meters was subject of Land Registration Case No. 12871. The plan showed that the survey was approved on May 15, 1909 and the notations therein indicated that a decree was issued on March 14, 1919. But no such decree was shown. It was further found by the court a quo that the plan was requested from the Bureau of Lands Survey Division on December 22, 1976. However, the same was not duly certified by the issuing government agency. Even assuming that the disputed lot was indeed subject of a land registration proceeding and a decree had been issued therefor in March 1919, the Municipality of Buruanga, despite lapse of decades, failed to take the necessary judicial steps for the issuance of a title in its name based on the decree. Neither did it take any other course of action that would render its title thereto indefeasible. The court a quo, however, gave probative weight to the testimony of Manuel Sualog, Chief of the Lands Management Section of the Department of Environment and National Resources, who was presented by the Municipality of Buruanga. Sualog testified that the disputed lot was the public plaza of the said municipality. Standing thereon are the Roman Catholic Church and its parish house, the new municipal hall, the rural health center, the barangay community hospital and a basketball court. During the court a quos ocular inspection conducted on May 7, 1992, the town was celebrating its town fiesta. It observed that the public was using the whole plaza (in Lots 138-A and 138-C) for the festivities. Also, the existence of the health centers, basketball court and the municipal hall showed that portions of the disputed lot were being used by the public. Upon inspection of the church, the court a quo further observed that it was indeed an old stone structure and probably built in 1894, the year carved on its left side entrance. It described the church as "vintage turn-of-the century colonial Filipino church architecture. Moss and ficus grow out of its wall crevices. The age of the church shows that it has been occupying that particular space for almost one hundred (100) years long enough for the plaintiff to have 16 possessed it in the concept of owner continuously, adversely and publicly against the whole world." The court a quo held that the facts of the present case were similar to those in Harty v. Municipality of 17 Victoria, where the Court ruled that: For the above reasons, x x x it should be held, as we do hereby hold, that the whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a public plaza of said town, of public use and that in consequence thereof, the defendant is absolved of the complaint without any special ruling as to the costs of both 18 instances. The dispositive portion of the court a quos decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan, is declared the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-B with an area of 3,836 square meters in the Commissioners Report as against the defendant; 2. Defendant Municipality of Buruanga is declared the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-A with an area of 2,319 square meters and Lot 138-C with an area of 3,389 square meters in the Commissioners Report, 19 said lots being public plaza destined for public use. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo seasonably filed its appeal with the Court of Appeals. It sought the reversal of that portion of the court a quos judgment adjudicating the ownership of Lots 138-A and 138-C to the Municipality of Buruanga.

12

During the pendency of the case in the appellate court, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo moved to submit additional evidence to support its claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138. The additional evidence consisted of affidavits of old residents of Buruanga stating that the municipal building was constructed on the disputed lot only in the late 1950s. Prior thereto, the municipal building stood at a place called Sunset Park, a block totally different from the disputed lot. The said motion was denied by the appellate court on the ground that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo had already been accorded full opportunity to present its evidence in the court a quo. The Municipality of Buruanga did not file its appellees brief with the CA. On January 31, 2001, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision affirming with modification the decision of the court a quo. The CA affirmed the ownership of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo over Lot 138-B but reversed the court a quos ruling relative to the ownership of Lots 138-A and 138-C. The appellate court declared the said lots property of public dominion, hence, not owned by either of the parties. The CA stated that the court a quo correctly relied on the ruling in Harty, which was reiterated in Bishop of Calbayog 20 v. Director of Lands, where the Court held that the public plaza and public thoroughfare were not subject to registration by the church. In the latter case, it was ruled that since neither the Church nor the municipality presented positive proof of ownership or exclusive possession for an appreciable period of time, and the only indubitable fact was the free and continuous use of the lot in question by the residents of the town, which had no other public plaza to speak of other than the disputed lot, there was a strong presumption that the same had been segregated as a public plaza upon the founding of the municipality therein. As mentioned earlier, the appellate court reversed that portion of the court a quos judgment declaring the Municipality of Buruanga as the owner of Lots 138-A and 138-C which form part of the public plaza. Citing Articles 21 22 419 and 420 of the Civil Code, the appellate court classified these lots as property of public dominion; hence, not susceptible to private ownership by the Municipality of Buruanga. The said lots are merely under its jurisdiction and administration. Being intended for the common and public welfare, they could not be appropriated either by the State or by private persons. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads: WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Lots 138-A 23 and 138-C are declared property of public dominion not owned by either of the parties. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo moved for a partial reconsideration of the appellate courts ruling that Lots 138A and 138-C, being the public plaza, are property of public dominion. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo averred that the appellate court erred in affirming the finding of the court a quo that these lots comprise the public plaza. It maintained that it owned the entire Lot 138. The appellate court denied the motion for partial reconsideration, hence, the recourse to this Court by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo (the petitioner). The Petitioners Arguments The present petition for review on certiorari alleges that: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RELYING UPON THE CASES OF HARTY V. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA, TARLAC (13 Phil. 152 [1909]) and BISHOP OF CALBAYOG V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS (45 SCRA 418 [1972]) TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE PETITIONER IS NOT THE OWNER OF LOTS 138-A AND 138-C. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT LOTS 138-A AND 138-C [WHICH ARE WITHIN THE ORIGINAL LOT 138] ARE PROPERTIES OF THE PUBLIC [DOMAIN] AND NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP BY THE PETITIONER. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONERS OWNERSHIP OF THE ENTIRE LOT 138 WAS GRANTED AND RECOGNIZED UNDER 24 SPANISH LAW, AND AFFIRMED IN THE TREATY OF PARIS.

The petitioner clarifies that it is seeking a partial review of the appellate courts Decision dated January 31, 2001 classifying Lots 138-A and 138-C as property of public dominion and not susceptible to private ownership and that the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership thereof. It is not contesting the portion of the CA decision upholding its ownership over Lot 138-B. The petitioner opines that the case of Harty, relied upon by the court a quo and the CA to hold that Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza, are inapplicable because the facts therein are not similar to those of the present case. The petitioner points out that the public plaza referred to in Harty was the lot across the street from the church lot. It was not referring to the land surrounding the Catholic church and the convent of the town of Victoria, which was bounded by streets on each of its four sides. Thus, when the Court in Harty limited the ownership of the church to the land "occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house," it was not confining the ownership to a portion of the lot on which the church and parish house were situated. Rather, the Court in Harty referred to the entire lot or block (bounded by a street on each of the four sides) on which the church and its parish house were erected. The petitioner asserts that the following facts that have been established support its claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138 as against the claim of the Municipality of Buruanga (respondent municipality): [a] The church is built in the middle of Lot 138 (which is now Lot 138-B). It was built therein in 1894. The church was almost 100 years old (at the time the case was instituted with the trial court in 1990). x x x [b] The Municipality of Buruanga is an old municipality constituted or created during the colonial period, when the Philippine Islands was under the Spanish sovereignty. x x x [c] No building was built on Lot 138 earlier than or at about the same time as the church. No municipal building was built around the church for many decades after 1894. x x x [d] The municipal hall of Buruanga was built on what is now Lot 138-A only in the late 1950s. x x x [e] It was not controverted by the private respondent that then Mayor Omugtong of Buruanga sought and obtained the permission of the then parish priest, Fr. Jesus Patino, to allow the municipal government to build its municipal hall on Lot 138-A in the late 1950s only. x x x [f] No evidence was adduced by private respondent that it had obtained title of Lot 138-A or 138-C from the church (the owner of these lots) or that its possession of any portion of Lot 138 was adverse to that of the church. x x x [g] When the municipal hall was burned down by the NPA rebels in 1989 the church asked the municipal government to relocate the municipal hall elsewhere since it (church) needed the lot for itself. [h] Because the municipal government resisted and for the first time exhibited a possession adverse to the church, the petitioner promptly filed the instant suit before the lower court for quieting of title to the subject lot (the entire Lot 138) and to be declared the owner of such property. [i] The church has been in continuous, open, adverse, notorious possession of the entire Lot 138 in the concept of owner since at least 1894 until the late 1950s. x x x [j] No evidence has been shown that Lots 138-A and 138-C were devoted for public use or for use as a public plaza before 1894 or even at about the time the church was built on Lot 138. x x x {k] The only evidence as to the supposed character of Lot 138-C as a public plaza is a survey plan allegedly approved on 15 May 1909 denominated as [GSS]-06-00012, Buruanga Settlement Project, approved only in 1984. Petitioner was not notified of this survey. x x x [l] The real property tax declaration presented by private respondent to establish its supposed possession (Exhs. 4, 4-a, and 4-b, Record, pages 45-47) covered the year 1992 only.

[m] Witness Jaime S. Prado, Sr. (who was born on 17 December 1905 and coming to the age of reason when he was about 10 years old) testified that as far as he can remember (since he was grade 1) he was brought to mass by his elders at the church of Buruanga, which was the very same church as of the time he testified in 1992, and was active in church activities in that church (e.g., tsn, 9 January 1992, pages 5, 16); that the property of the church was bounded on all four sides by the very same streets that bounded it at the time he testified (ibid., at page 6-8). [n] Private respondent indirectly judicially admitted that it has no title (Torrens or otherwise) to the subject properties when its star witness (the incumbent Mayor Protacio Obrique of Buruanga) testified that the 25 properties in the poblacion of Buruanga are not covered by any title (tsn, 27 July 1992, page 5). The petitioner contends that the pronouncement in Bishop of Calbayog, cited by the appellate court, does not support its decision. Instead, it actually supports the petitioners claim of ownership over Lot 138, including Lots 138-A and 138-C. In the said case, the lot (Lot 2) that was declared by the Court as plaza was a separate and distinct lot separated from the church lot (Lot 1) by a provincial road. Lot 1, held to be owned by the church in the said case, included not only the space occupied by the church, belfry, convent, parish school and nuns residence, but also the empty space which only had concrete benches as improvements thereon and which was used as a public playground. The petitioner also cites Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v. Director of Lands, where the Court recognized that under the Laws of the Indies (Leyes de las Indias), the law in force in the Philippine Islands during the Spanish regime, the property of the church in the pueblos consisted of one parcel of land which meant "not only the two buildings but also the land adjacent and contiguous to said buildings, that is, the parcel which by itself constitutes one whole piece of 27 land bounded on its four sides by streets, and within which said buildings, the church and the convent, are situated." According to the petitioner, the appellate court erred in affirming the finding of the court a quo that Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza. Unlike in Harty, no evidence was allegedly adduced to show that from the time respondent municipality was created these two lots had been set aside for the public. Harty is not applicable, the petitioner expounds, because it was indubitably established therein that the "plaza was used without let or hindrance by the public and the residents of Victoria ever since its creation." In contrast, in the present case, there was allegedly no evidence to show that Lots 138-A and 138-C were set aside as the public plaza, or for any public purpose, when the Municipality of Buruanga was created during the Spanish period. The evidence, in fact, show that the entire Lot 138, bounded on all its four sides by streets, belonged to the church and it had continuous use and occupation thereof since 1894 when it constructed its church in the middle of Lot 138. No such use of Lot 138-A and 138-C as the public plaza for the same length of time or from 1894 had been shown. The petitioner assails the reliance by the appellate court on the court a quos statement during its ocular inspection on Lot 138 in 1992 that it observed that the property was occupied by the Roman Catholic Church, a parish house, the municipal hall and three of its municipal edifices, and a basketball court. Based on this observation, the court a quo concluded, and the appellate court affirmed, that Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza. The petitioner objects to this conclusion stating that the same cannot overcome the evidence in favor of the church as to its ownership over these lots traced back to 1894 when it constructed the church in the middle of Lot 138 or what is now Lot 138-B. It reiterates that under the Laws of the Indies, when a municipality was created, the church was assigned a property consisting of a parcel of land bounded on all its four sides by streets, and that the public plaza was situated not on the same parcel of land assigned to the church but on a distinct lot separated by a street from that assigned to the church. The petitioner likewise argues that even if it, as the owner of the entire Lot 138, allowed respondent municipality to build its municipal hall on what is now Lot 138-A in the late 1950s by mere tolerance of the parish priest, it does not necessarily follow that Lot 138-A had become property of public dominion. It does not allegedly lose its possession or ownership over the property if the possession or use by another of the same is by mere tolerance. Respondent municipality, through its Mayor Protacio Obrique during his testimony, allegedly admitted that respondent municipalitys lot was located in a portion designated as Lot 2 in its Exhibit "1." The said lot was along the beach and separated from Lot 138 by Emilio Ostan Street. The alleged import of this admission is that the entire Lot 138 (designated as Lot 1 in Exhibit "1") was assigned solely to the church since a different lot was assigned to respondent municipality.
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The petitioner avers that Buruanga is an ancient Spanish town and that when it was created the Spanish authorities assigned a distinct and separate lot for its municipal government or pueblo where it could build its municipal hall or casa real. It could thus be assumed that the casa real of respondent municipality would be built at about the same time as the church or around 1894. The petitioner contends that nothing in the evidence suggests that the casa real was built on Lot 138 during the said period. It was only in the late 1950s that the municipal hall was built thereon upon the permission granted by the parish priest. Refuting respondent municipalitys view that it is unthinkable that the church would be given a bigger property than the municipal government, the petitioner submits that such notion is not far fetched considering that the primary aim of the Spaniards at the time was to spread the Catholic faith to the colonies. That the entire Lot 138 belonged to the petitioner is allegedly supported by the practice during the Spanish period, as shown by the layout of the church convent and church plaza in practically all the old towns in the Philippines and the 28 early cases decided by the Court, to invariably provide the church with spacious grounds bounded by the four principal streets of the town. Even without any document or certificate of title thereto, the petitioner bases its claim of ownership over Lot 138 under the Spanish Law as recognized and affirmed under the Treaty of Paris. It cites Roman Catholic Apostolic 29 Church v. Municipality of Placer where the Court recognized that the church is entitled not only to possession of its properties but to ownership thereof. Bishop of Jaro was again invoked by the petitioner as the Court explained therein that it did not find it strange that the church was unable to exhibit a written title to its property since the Laws of the Indies in force during the Spanish regime dictated the layout of the towns and assigned the locations of the church, square and government administration buildings. The provisions of the Laws of the Indies pertaining thereto were held to be sufficient to secure the registration in the name of the church of its land. The petitioner asserts that even granting arguendo that Lot 138 was not assigned to it during the Spanish regime or is not owned by it pursuant to the Laws of the Indies, still, it had acquired ipso jure or by operation of law a government grant, a vested title, to the disputed lot by virtue of its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof since 1894. In support of this contention, the petitioner cites Subsection 6 of Section 54 of Act No. 926, which became effective on July 26, 1904, and which provided that: 6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter. It is allegedly clear that as early as July 26, 1904, when Act No. 926 took effect, the petitioner had already acquired a government grant, a vested title, to Lot 138. Subsection b of Section 45 of Act No. 2874, approved on November 9, 1919, which amended Act No. 926, is similarly cited by the petitioner. It provided that: (b) Those who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. On the basis of the foregoing provisions, a land registration proceeding instituted would, according to the petitioner, "in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time, and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested."

In addition to its arguments on the merits of the case, the petitioner assails the appellate courts denial of its motion to submit additional evidence which would have showed that the casa real of respondent municipality, together with its plaza (Sunset Park Plaza), was located on a distinct lot (Lot 2) separated from Lot 138 by Emilio Ostan Street. The petitioner urges the Court to reverse and set aside the portion of the appellate courts decision declaring Lots 138-A and 138-C as property of public dominion and to declare the petitioner the absolute owner of the entire Lot 138. In the alternative, the petitioner prays that it be allowed to submit additional evidence of its ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C. Respondent Municipalitys Counter-arguments For its part, respondent municipality contends that, except for the figures 1894 etched on the left wall of the church, the petitioner has not presented any evidence to show that it had continuous possession of the entire Lot 138 since the turn of the twentieth century. The petitioner is allegedly of the mistaken belief that because it possessed Lot 138B, it must have likewise possessed Lots 138-A and 138-C. Respondent municipality claims that it is the one that has been exercising acts of exclusive ownership over the disputed lot. The petitioner has allegedly misread Harty and Bishop of Calbayog in claiming that in cases involving the church, the lot adjudicated to it invariably consisted of the entire block, bounded by a street on each of the four sides, and the public plazas were situated in separate blocks. While it may true that many church properties occupy an entire block in certain municipalities, it is allegedly equally true that other church properties occupy only portions thereof depending on the exigencies of the locality at the time when the church was being established. In those instances that the Court allegedly adjudicated an open space in favor of the church, the local government was not shown to have exercised dominion over the property and the church has consistently established some control over it, like the putting up of a religious monument thereon. On the other hand, in the present case, respondent municipality insists that it has laid adverse claim over Lot 138 as early as 1909 when it applied for title over it and was even issued a decree over the said lot. Respondent municipality places its actual, public and adverse possession of Lot 138 at the latest in 1958 when it built its old municipal hall on the said site. Its occupation prior thereto could also be allegedly presumed from its actual possession thereof. The petitioner has allegedly failed to establish that the construction of the old municipal building in 1958 was by mere tolerance on its part. Respondent municipality harps on the failure of the petitioner to present as its witness Fr. Patio, the parish priest who supposedly gave respondent municipality permission to construct its municipal building on the disputed lot. Respondent municipality denies ever seeking such permission. Further, the tax declaration (Exhibit "B") of the petitioner only pertained to Lot 138-B proving that its ownership was limited to the said lot and did not extend to Lots 138-A and 138-C. Respondent municipality avers that it is already contented with the decision of the appellate court although the latter allegedly erred in concluding that Lots 138-A and 138-C are property of public dominion without taking into consideration that respondent municipality applied for the issuance of title covering the disputed lot and was issued a decree thereto in 1919. The admission of Mayor Obrique, during his testimony, that respondent municipality owned the lot along the beach (Lot 2) and situated across the street from Lot 138 could not be allegedly taken to mean that the Mayor was disclaiming ownership over Lot 138. Respondent municipality theorizes that in those cases that the Court upheld the ownership of the church over a subject property, the same have ever since remained the property of the church and have been in its peaceful possession. Further, there were no adverse claimants and the primary issue being resolved was whether, despite non-compliance with procedural requirements, title may be granted in favor of the church. Respondent municipality distinguishes the present case from those cases in that there is an open contest over the ownership and possession of Lots 138-A and 138-C and respondent municipality has in its favor actual and adverse possession thereof. It emphasizes that there is nothing in fact and in law that would support the petitioners bare claim of ownership and possession over Lots 138-A and 138-C. On the contrary, there is allegedly strong evidence showing respondent municipalitys exercise of proprietary and governmental rights over the said lots where it has constructed permanent structures, e.g., municipal building, community hospital, health center, social hall/basketball court, and where public functions are openly conducted.
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Respondent municipality urges the Court to dismiss the petition and, instead, to affirm the decision of the court a quo declaring it the lawful owner and possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C. Issue The substantive issue to be resolved is whether the appellate court correctly declared Lots 138-A and 138-C as property of public dominion, hence, not susceptible to ownership by either the petitioner and respondent municipality. Since respondent municipality no longer sought the review of the assailed decision of the appellate court, the Court shall mainly resolve the merits of the petitioners claim of ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C vis--vis the appellate courts holding that they are of public dominion, hence, not susceptible to private ownership. The Courts Ruling The petition is denied. The Laws of the Indies and the cases cited by the petitioner do not support its claim of ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C The petitioner anchors its claim of ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C on its theory that the entire Lot 138, bounded on all its four sides by streets, was assigned to it as far back as 1894 when the church was built in the middle of the said lot. The cases it cited allegedly stand for the proposition that "under the Laws of the Indies, when a municipality was created, the church was assigned a property consisting of a parcel of land bounded on all its (four) sides by streets, and that the public plaza was situated not on the same parcel of land assigned to the church but on 31 a distinct parcel of land separated from the parcel of land assigned to the church by a street." This allegation fails to persuade. The pertinent provision of the Laws of the Indies relating to the designation of a parcel of land for the church upon the establishment of a town or pueblo during the Spanish regime reads: Ley viij. Que se fabriquen el Templo principal en el sitio, y disposicion, que se ordena, y otras Iglesias, y Monasterios. En lugares Mediterrneos no se fabrique el Templo en la plaza, sino algo distante de ella, donde est separado de otro qualquier edificio, que no pertenezca su comodidad y ordenato, y porque de todas partes sea visto, y mejor venerado, est algo levantado de suelo, de forma que se haya de entrar por gradas, y entre la plaza mayor, y Templo se edifiquen las Casas Reales, Cabildo, Concejo, Aduana, y Atarazana, en tal distancia, que autoricen al Templo, y no le embaracen, y en caso de necesidad se puedan socorrer, y si la poblacion fuere en Costa, dispngase de forma que en saliendo de Mar sea visto, y su fbrica como defensa del Puerto, sealando solares cerca de l, y no su continuacion, en que se fabriquen Casas Reales, y tiendas en la plaza para propios, imponiendo algun moderado tributo en las mercaderas: y asmismo sitios en otras plazas menores para Iglesias Parroquiales, y 32 Monasterios donde sean convenientes. The above provision prescribed that the church be built at some distance from the square, separate from other buildings in order that it may be better seen and venerated, and raised from the ground with steps leading to it. It decreed that government administration buildings, including casas reales, be built between the main square and the church and at such distance as not to shut the church from view. In cases of coastal towns, the church was to be constructed in such location as to be seen by those coming from the sea and serve for the defense of the port. The other provisions of the Laws of the Indies on the establishment of new towns or pueblos in the archipelago, including the designation of lands for the church, casa reales (municipal buildings) and public squares, had been discussed by the Court in this wise:

xxx The executive authorities and other officials who then represented the Spanish Government in these Islands were obliged to adjust their procedure, in the fulfillment of their duties with regard to the establishment and laying out of new towns, to the Laws of the Indies, which determined the course that they were to pursue for such purposes, as may be seen by the following: Law 6, title 5, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, provides, among other things: "That within the boundaries which may be assigned to it, there must be at least thirty residents, and each one of them must have a house," etc. Law 7 of the same title and book contains this provision: "Whoever wishes to undertake to establish a new town in the manner provided for, of not more than thirty nor less than ten residents, shall be granted the time and territory necessary for the purpose and under the same conditions." It may be affirmed that years afterwards all the modern pueblos of the Archipelago were formed by taking as a basis for their establishment the barrios already populated by a large number of residents who, under the agreement to build the church of the new pueblo, the court-house and afterwards the schoolhouse, obtained from the General Government the administrative separation of their barrio from the pueblo on which it depended and in whose territory it was previously comprised. In such cases procedure analogous to that prescribed by the Laws of the Indies was observed. For the establishment, then, of new pueblos, the administrative authority of the province, in representation of the Governor-General, designated the territory for their location and extension and the metes and bounds of the same; and before the allotting the lands among the new settlers, a special demarcation was made of the places which were to serve as the public square of the pueblo, for the erection of the church, and as sites for the public buildings, among others, the municipal building or the casa real, as well as of the lands which were to constitute the commons, pastures, and propios of the municipality and the streets and roads which were to intersect the new town were laid out, as may be seen by the following laws: Law 7, title 7, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, provides: "The district or territory to be given for settlement by composition shall be allotted in the following manner: There shall first be set apart the portion required for the lots of the pueblo, the exido or public lands, and pastures amply sufficient for the stock which the residents may have, and as much more as propios del lugar or common lands of the locality; the rest of the territory and district shall be divided into four parts one of them, of his choice, shall be for him who takes upon himself the obligation to found the pueblo, and the other three shall be apportioned equally among the settlers." Law 8, of the same title and book, prescribes, among other things: "That, between the main square and the church, there shall be constructed the casas reales or municipal buildings, the cabildo, concejo, customs buildings," etc. Law 14 of the said title and book, also directs among other things: "That the viceroys shall have set aside such lands as to them appear suitable as the common lands (propios) of the pueblos that have none, therewith to assist in the payment of the salaries of the corregidores, and sufficient public lands (exidos) and pasture lands as provided for and prescribed by law." Law 1, title 13 of the aforesaid book, provides the following: "Such viceroys and governors as have due authority shall designate to each villa and lugar newly founded and settled the lands and lots which they may need and may be given to them, without detriment to a third party, as propios, and

a statement shall be sent to us of what was designated and given to each, in order that we may have such action 33 approved." Nowhere in the above provisions was it stated that the parcel of land designated for the church of the town or pueblo was, in all cases, to be an entire block or bounded on all its four sides by streets. The petitioner thus erroneously asseverates that the said ancient laws sustain its claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138. Neither can it find support in the cases that it cited. A careful review of these cases reveal that, in those instances where the Court upheld the claim of the church over a parcel of land vis--vis that of the municipality or national government, the ownership and possession by the church of the same had been indubitably established by its exclusive exercise thereon of proprietary acts or acts of dominion. For example, in Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands, which according to the petitioner supports its case, the Court adjudicated in favor of the church the ownership of Lot 1 (except the portion thereof occupied by a public thoroughfare) including not only the space occupied by the church, belfry, convent, parish school and nuns residence, but also the empty space which only had concrete benches as improvements thereon. With respect to the empty space (eastern portion of Lot 1), the Court noted the following: x x x The eastern portion of Lot 1, the area in contention, is an empty space except for concrete benches along the perimeter. A partly cemented path runs across this lot from east to west leading up to the front or entrance of the church and appears to be an extension of Anunciacion St., which runs from the bank of the Catarman river up to Mendiola St. In the middle of this path, half-way between Mendiola St. and the church, is a statue of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. xxx x x x The Roman Catholic Church had made no improvements on this eastern portion of Lot 1, which at present is being used as a public playground, although a bandstand stood there for about three years after it was constructed in 1926 by the members of an orchestra which was organized by a Fr. Ranera and which used to give musical performances on the bandstand. On the feast of Corpus Christi the parishioners would construct an altar on this lot 35 and hold the procession there. It is apparent that the Court adjudicated to the church the ownership of Lot 1 (except a portion thereof which was a public thoroughfare) because the latter was able to establish that it had exercised acts of possession or ownership over the same including over its empty space. In particular, the empty space was used for religious functions, such as the Feast of Corpus Christi and the procession held on the occasion and the church did not ask for any permit from the local authorities whenever it used the said space for such activities. In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that, at one time after the church was built in 1894 in the middle of Lot 138 (now Lot 138-B), it exercised acts of ownership or possession over Lots 138-A and 138-C as well. It must be emphasized that the petitioners allegation that it merely tolerated the construction of not only the municipal building but also the other improvements thereon, e.g., the rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand, has remained unsubstantiated. The affidavit of Fr. Patio was correctly not given any credence since he was not presented on the witness stand; thus, considered hearsay. Hearsay evidence is generally excluded because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of his right and 36 opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statement or writing is attributed. The testimony of Mr. Jaime S. Prado, Sr., an octogenarian and resident of Buruanga, cannot likewise be given any credence because it consisted only of a bare assertion that the church building and the land on which it was built, 37 bounded by streets on all its four sides, were the petitioners property. He based this statement on the fact that as a child he heard masses at the church with his parents. This assertion, without more or without any corroborative evidence, is not sufficient to establish the petitioners ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C especially in light of the fact that Mr. Prado is not competent to testify on the matter because he had no actual personal knowledge with respect to any transactions involving Lot 138: FISCAL DEL ROSARIO:
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Q Now, when you were President of the Parish Council, have you access of any documents relating to church properties in Buruanga, Aklan? A Never. Q Now, you have stated that the boundaries of the property of the[R]oman [C]atholic [C]hurch in Buruanga, Aklan has previous names thus, the present name of Viven Ostan, Nitoy Sualog and Emilio Ostan is at present now. My question is, what was the previous names of these roads? A Of Nitoy Sualog, that was Malilipayon Street. The Provincial road street, before that was Kaaganhon street, West, Emilio Ostan, before that was Kahaponanon Street and instead of Viven Ostan, that was Kabulakan Street. Q So, you will agree with me Mr. Witness so, that previous names is not in any way related to the names of former parish priest[s] of Buruanga, Aklan or saints, am I right? A No, sir. Q You know very well Rev. Jesus Patinio and Mayor Pedro Omugtong? A Yes, sir. Q Now, do you remember if there was any transaction of them during your lifetime? A This Padre Patinio and I were close friends. Mr. Omugtong met Patinio [,] talked together about the land they agreed [,] and I dont know what is there (sic) agreement but the building was constructed then. Q Were you present during the talked (sic) of Rev. Jesus Patinio and Mayor Pedro Omugtong? A No, sir. Q You identified in this Exhibit "F" as Municipal Hall, Rural Health Unit Hospital, the Buruanga Community Hospital, Basketball Court and the Grandstand. Now, my question is, are these buildings constructed by the [R]oman [C]atholic [C]hurch? A Not one.
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Even the affidavits of the other residents of Buruanga, which were also properly considered hearsay, made no mention of any instance where the petitioner exercised acts of dominion over Lots 138-A and 138-C. These affidavits uniformly stated: That we have been residing in this Municipality since birth and that we have full knowledge of the site where the church now stands; That during the Pre-Spanish time, the site of the town proper was swampy, fishermen used to fish in the swamp, trees of different kinds grows (sic) along the beach; That when the Spaniards arrived in our town, they introduced education and religion; That because there was no site for the church, the Spaniards forced the inhabitants to work for the filling up of the swamp, men are hauling stones[,] and women [,] sand and gravel; That after so many years of hard labor the swamp was filled up and then the friars build a church in the center of the town;

That as far as we are concerned the site where the church now stand and the surrounding area and the site where the present Municipal building now stands is even the part of the property of the church and not the property of the municipality as allege (sic) by the Mayor; That we execute this affidavit with our own free act and voluntary deed.
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The information proffered by these affidavits could not have been based on the personal knowledge of the affiants 40 because they obviously were not yet born when the events they narrated took place. Like in Bishop of Calbayog, the Court in Hacbang v. Director of Lands adjudicated to the church the ownership of two parcels of land, designated as Lots 1 and 2 despite the opposition of the Director of Lands who claimed that a portion on the eastern part of Lot 1 and the entire Lot 2 were public plazas. The Court affirmed the ownership of the church over these lots upon the following findings: It is inferred from the foregoing facts which are held to have been indisputably established by the evidence, that the disputed portion of lot No. 1 as well as the entire lot No. 2 belongs to the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church of the Diocese of Samar and Leyte. It cannot be denied that said church, for more than half a century, was in the possession of said lands together with the church, belfry and convent which existed first on lot No. 1 and later provisionally on lot No. 2. The fact that the catholic cemetery was located on lot No. 2 and that the stone posts and pillars were later erected thereon, thereby converting it into a place for the celebration of the Way of the Cross, conclusively proves that the property belonged to the church and that the latter's possession has constantly been under claim of ownership. x x x [I]t must be presumed upon these facts that said portion formed part of the parcels of land assigned and adjudicated by the authorities to the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in said town for the erection of the church, belfry, convent and cemetery, all of which, as everybody knows, are necessary for the practice and celebration of the 42 cults of said religion. The proprietary acts exercised by the church over the disputed lots consisted of the construction thereon of the church, belfry, convent and cemetery. Moreover, it conducted thereon the Way of the Cross and other religious celebrations. Unlike in the Bishop of Calbayog and Hacbang, in the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it exercised proprietary acts or acts of dominion over Lots 138-A and 138-C, to the exclusion of others, to buttress its claim of ownership over these lots. Neither can the petitioner rely on Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v. Director of Lands where the Court categorically made the finding that the lot in question (Lot 3) had been in the possession of the church, as owner, for a time 44 sufficiently long for purposes of prescription. In a prior case involving the said lot, the Court adjudged that the church was "entitled to the possession of the following property situated in the Municipality of Sibalom: The Church of Sibalom, the convent, contiguous to the same, and the land occupied by these two buildings." The Court interpreted the phrase "land occupied by the church and its convent" to mean "not only the two buildings, but also the land adjacent and contiguous to said buildings, that is, the parcel which by itself constitutes one whole piece of land bounded on its four sides by streets, and within which said buildings, the church and the convent, are 45 situated." Significantly, the parcel of land that was adjudicated in favor of the church was the "land adjacent and contiguous to said buildings," i.e., church and convent. The word "adjacent" has been defined as follows: The word "adjacent" is of Latin derivation. An examination of its original use clearly indicates that in order that things shall be adjacent they shall be thrown near together. Webster in his International Dictionary defines "adjacent" as "lying near, close or contiguous; neighboring; bordering upon;" and gives as synonyms the words "adjoining, contiguous, near."
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Roque Barcia in his "Diccionario General Etimolgico de la Lengua Espaola," in defining the word "adjacent," uses as synonyms "inmediato, junto, prximo." Things cannot be "inmediatas, juntas, prximas" where other objects intervene. Vicente Salva in his "Nuevo Diccionario Francs-Espaol" defines the word "adjacent as "qui est situ aupres, aux environs." Black in his Law Dictionary defines "adjacent" as "lying near or close to; contiguous. The difference between adjacent and adjoining seems to be that the former implies that two objects are not widely separated, though they may not actually touch." Harpers Latin Dictionary as revised by Lewis and Short, in defining the word "ad-jaceo," which is equivalent to the English word "adjacent," says it means "to lie at or near, to be contiguous to, to border upon." The Universal Encyclopedia defines an adjacent angle as "an angle contiguous to another, so that one side is common to both angles." In the case of Miller v. Cabell (81 Ky., 184) it was held that where a change of venue was taken to an adjacent county it must be taken to an adjoining county. In the case of Camp Hill Borough (142 Penn. State, 517), it was held that the word "adjacent" meant adjoining or contiguous. In the case of In re Municipality, etc. (7 La. Ann., 76), the court said: "We think the word adjacent, applied to lots, is synonymous with the word "contiguous." In the case of the People v. Schemerhorne (19 Barber [N.Y.], 576), the court said: "The interpretations given to the 46 adjacent by Walker are lying close, bordering upon something." Blacks Law Dictionary defines "contiguous" as "in close proximity; neighboring; adjoining; near in succession; in 47 actual close contact; touching in at a point or along a boundary; bounded or traversed by." Applying the foregoing definitions, the "land adjacent and contiguous" to the church and the parish house in the present case is the land comprising Lot 138-B. On the other hand, Lots 138-A and 138-C are the lands adjacent and contiguous to the municipal building, rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand thereon. Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro therefore is not squarely applicable to the present case because of significant factual differences. Specifically, in the former, the buildings or structures on the disputed land all belonged to the church; hence, this fact was construed by the Court in favor of the church as constituting its exercise of acts of dominion over the land adjacent and contiguous to these buildings. On the other hand, the municipal building, rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand, all standing on Lots 138A and 138-C, are not owned by the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner has not shown that it had, at any time, exercised acts of dominion over these lots. Consequently, given its tenuous claim of ownership, Lots 138-A and 138C, the lands adjacent and contiguous to the buildings and improvements which admittedly do not belong to the petitioner, cannot be adjudicated to the latter under the circumstances. Seminary of San Carlos v. Municipality of Cebu, cited in Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro, is also unavailing to the petitioner because the Court, among others, simply explained therein that the word "church" refers to the land upon which the church stands, and not to the church building itself. In the present case, the petitioners ownership has not been limited by the court a quo and the appellate court to the church structure itself but also as including Lot 138-B, on which it stands. In Roman Catholic Apostolic Church v. Municipality of Placer, the Court definitively recognized the juridical 50 personality and proprietary rights of the church citing the Treaty of Paris and other pertinent Spanish laws. It held
49 48

therein that the church not only was entitled to the possession of the church, convent and cemetery of Placer but was also the lawful owner thereof. It bears stressing that the crux in the foregoing cases, particularly Bishop of Calbayog, Hacbang and Jaro, is that the church had indubitably established its exercise of exclusive proprietary acts on the lots that were subject of the controversy. The same cannot be said with respect to the petitioner in relation to Lots 138-A and 138-C. In fact, not one of the enumeration ([a] to ([n]) made by the petitioner in its Petition for Review as allegedly showing its ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C categorically establishes that it exercised thereon exclusive proprietary acts or acts of dominion. The ruling in Harty v. Municipality of Victoria is applicable to the present case Contrary to the stance taken by the petitioner, the ruling in Harty v. Municipality of Victoria is applicable to the present case. The said case involved the dispute between the church and the Municipality of Victoria over the parcel of land that surrounded the parish church of the said town, and which was called the public plaza of the same. The Court therein held that "the whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a public plaza of the said town, of public use." It justified its conclusion, thus: xxx From the evidence presented by both parties it appears that the town of Victoria, which was formerly only a barrio of the town of Tarlac and known as Canarum, was converted into a town in 1855, and named Victoria; to this end they must have laid out the streets and the plaza of the town, in the center of which were situated the church and parish house from the commencement, and at the expiration of about twelve years the parish of said town was constituted and the priest, who was to perform the office of curate, was appointed; that from the very beginning, the large tract of land that surrounds the church and the parish house was known as a public plaza, destined to the use of all the residents of the recently founded town; public performances and religious processions were held thereon without hindrance either on the part of the local authorities or of the curate of said town. It must be assumed that the principal residents of the old barrio, being interested in the conversion of the barrio into a civil town, arranged in such a way that the barrio, as the center of the future town which was subsequently called Victoria, should have streets and a public plaza with its church and parish house, and also a tribunal or building destined for the use of the municipality and the local official at the time called the gobernadorcillo and later on capitan municipal, as has occurred in the foundation of all the towns in these Islands, under the old administrative laws. It may be true that the father of the witness Casimiro Taedo, who owned the space of land where the church and parish house were erected, had voluntarily donated it to the Catholic Church, the only one known at the time, but proper proof is lacking that the donation affirmed by the said Taedo comprehended the whole of the large tract which at the present time constitutes the plaza of the town. It was a custom observed by all the towns established administratively in these Islands under the old Laws of the Indies, that on their creation, a certain amount of land was always reserved for plazas, commons, and special and communal property, and as it is unquestionable that the said large space of land was left vacant in the center of the town of Victoria when it was constituted as a civil town, more than twelve years prior to the appointment of a permanent curate therein, there are good grounds to suppose that the late Vicente Taedo donated the land now occupied by the church and parish house in said municipality for religious purposes, or to the church, but not to the parish curate, because at the time there was no curate at the new town of Victoria. Even though all the remaining space of land which now forms the great plaza of the town of Victoria had been owned by the said Taedo, it must be presumed that he waived his right thereto for the benefit of the townspeople, since from the creation or establishment of the town, down to the present day, all the residents, including the curate of said town, have enjoyed the free use of said plaza; it has not been satisfactorily shown that the municipality or the principales of the town of Victoria had donated the whole of said land to the curate of Victoria or to the Catholic Church, as alleged, nor could it have been so donated, it being a public plaza destined to public use and was not private ownership, or patrimony of the town of Victoria, or of the Province of Tarlac.
51

It should be noted that, among other things, plazas destined to the public use are not subject to prescription. (Art. 1936, Civil Code.) That both the curates and the gobernadorcillos of the said town procured fruit trees and plants to be set out in the plaza, does not constitute an act of private ownership, but evidences the public use thereof, or perhaps the intention to improve and embellish the said plaza for the benefit of the townspeople. Certain it is that the plaintiff has not proven that the Catholic Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner or proprietor of the said extensive piece of land which now forms the public plaza of said town, nor that it was in possession thereof under the form and conditions required by law, inasmuch as it has been fully proven that said plaza has been used without let or hindrance by the public and the residents of the town of Victoria ever since its creation. For the above reasons, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and that it should be held, as we do hereby hold, that the whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a public plaza of the said town, of public use, and that in consequence thereof, the defendant 52 is absolved of the complaint without any special ruling as to the costs of both instances. The petitioner argues against the applicability of Harty as it makes much of the fact that the disputed lot therein was situated across the street from the church lot. When the Court therein limited the ownership of the church to the land "occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house," it did not allegedly confine its ownership to a portion of the lot on which the church and parish house were situated but to the block occupied by these structures. To the Courts mind, however, whether the disputed lot was on the same block as the church or separated therefrom by a street was not the crucial factor which constrained the Court in Harty to rule against the churchs claim of ownership over the said property. Rather, it was the fact that the church was not able to prove its ownership or possession thereof. The ruling on this point is reiterated below: Certain it is that the plaintiff has not proven that the Catholic Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner or proprietor of the said extensive piece of land which now forms the public plaza of said town, nor that it was in 53 possession thereof under the form and conditions required by law, x x x As applied to the present case, that Lots 138-A and 138-C are on the same block as the lot on which the church and its parish house stand do not necessarily make them (Lots 138-A and 138-C) also the property of the petitioner absent any evidence that its ownership or possession extended to these lots and under the conditions required by law. Contrary to its submission, the petitioner had not acquired ipso jure or by operation of law a government grant or title to the entire Lot 138 The petitioner submits that even granting arguendo that the entire Lot 138 was not assigned to it during the Spanish regime or it is not the owner thereof pursuant to the Laws of the Indies, its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138 since 1894 and for many decades thereafter vests ipso jure or by operation of law upon the petitioner a government grant, a vested title, to the subject property. It cites Subsection 6 of Section 54 54 55 of Act No. 926 and Subsection b of Section 45 of Act No. 2874. This contention is likewise not persuasive. One of the important requisites for the application of the pertinent provisions of Act No. 926 and Act No. 2874 is the "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" of the land by the applicant. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally 56 exercise over his own property. The phrase "possession and occupation" was explained as follows: It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the order [sic]. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam v. The Director of Lands: x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos v. Director of Lands. But it should be observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these qualifications is "one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant." While, therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession," possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. x x x xxx Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.
57

Indisputably, the petitioner has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by the church structure built thereon. However, the record is bereft of any evidence that would tend to show that such possession and occupation extended to Lots 138-A and 138-C beginning the same period. No single instance of the exercise by the petitioner of proprietary acts or acts of dominion over these lots was established. Its unsubstantiated claim that the construction of the municipal building as well as the subsequent improvements thereon, e.g., the rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand, was by its tolerance does not constitute proof of possession and occupation on its (the petitioners) part. Absent the important requisite of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereon since 1894, no government grant or title to Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested upon the petitioner ipso jure or by operation of law. Possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act 58 No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza and are property of public dominion; hence, not susceptible to private ownership by the petitioner or respondent municipality The appellate court correctly declared that Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza and are property of public dominion; hence, may not be the object of appropriation either by the petitioner or respondent municipality. In support thereof, it cited Bishop of Calbayog ratiocinating: This ruling [referring to Harty] was, in fact, reiterated in Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands (45 SCRA 418) involving the same question of ownership of the land which surrounded the parish church of the town. The Supreme Court therein declared that the public plaza and public thoroughfare are not subject to registration by the church; that since neither the Church nor the municipality presented positive proof of ownership or exclusive possession for an appreciable period of time, and the only indubitable fact is the free and continuous use of Lot 2 by residents of Catarman, and the town had no public plaza to speak of other than the disputed parcel of land, there was a strong presumption that the same had been segregated as a public plaza upon the founding of the municipality of Catarman. 59 xxx

As can be gleaned, the above discussion principally pertained to Lot 2, a public plaza the ownership of which was disputed by the Bishop of Calbayog and the Municipality of Catarman. The appellate court correctly cited Bishop of Calabayog. However, the ruling therein pertaining to a portion of Lot 1 occupied by a public thoroughfare is more apropos to the present case. To recall, in the said case, the application of the Bishop of Calabayog as to the eastern portion of Lot 1 was also being opposed by the Municipality of Catarman on the ground that it was part of the public plaza. As mentioned earlier, the Court upheld the ownership of the church over Lot 1 including not only the space occupied by the church, belfry, convent, parish school and nuns residence, but also the empty space which only had some benches as improvements thereon. Significantly, the portion of Lot 1 occupied by a public thoroughfare (Nalazon Street) was ordered excluded from the application for registration filed by the church. The Court therein made the following findings with respect to the public thoroughfare: Admittedly Nalazon St. was originally merely a trail used by the parishioners in going to and from the church. But since 1910, when it was opened and improved as a public thoroughfare by the municipality, it had been continuously used as such by the townspeople of Catarman without objection from the Church authorities. The acacia trees along both sides of the street were planted by the municipality in 1920, although these trees were cut down recently upon order of the priest. There is no proof that the Church merely tolerated and limited the use of this street for the benefit of its parishioners, considering that the street traverses the entire length of the poblacion from south to north and that Lot 1, on which the church stands, is located almost at the center of the poblacion. The street does not stop on Lot 1 but extends north toward the sea, passing along the lot occupied by the Central Elementary School and the Northern Samar General Hospital. Thus, it is clear that Nalazon St. inside Lot 1 is 60 used by the residents not only in going to the church but to the public school and the general hospital north of Lot 1. In the present case, the following improvements now stand on Lots 138-A and 138-C: the municipal building, rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand. Except for the construction of the municipal building, the other improvements were made on Lots 138-A and 138-C, and continuously used by the public without the petitioners objection. Further, there is no proof that the petitioner merely tolerated the construction of these improvements. On the other hand, the free and continuous use by the public of Lots 138-A and 138-C, as found by the court a quo and affirmed by the appellate court, incontrovertibly establishes that they are property for public use. On this point, Articles 420, quoted anew below, and 424 of the Civil Code are applicable: Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities. Property for public use of provinces and towns are governed by the same principles as property of public dominion of 61 the same character. The ownership of such property, which has the special characteristics of a collective ownership for the general use and enjoyment, by virtue of their application to the satisfaction of the collective needs, is in the 62 social group, whether national, provincial, or municipal. Their purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; they are intended for the common and public welfare, and so they cannot be the object of 63 appropriation, either by the State or by private persons. The appellate court committed no reversible error in denying the petitioners motion for reception of evidence

In denying the petitioners motion for reception evidence, the appellate court reasoned that based on the records, the petitioner was already accorded the full opportunity to present its evidence in the court a quo and that the evidence to 64 be introduced in the desired hearing would not directly establish its ownership of the disputed lots. The petitioners motion for reception of evidence filed with the appellate court stated that the additional evidence that it sought to submit consisted of affidavits of old residents of Buruanga attesting to the fact that "the old municipal 65 building was in fact at a place called Sunset Park prior to its transfer to the present site." These affidavits would allegedly establish that respondent municipality could not be the owner of Lots 138-A and 138-C which it had neither 66 possessed nor occupied. The appellate court did not err in denying the petitioners motion for reception of evidence. Indeed, the petitioner was already given full opportunity during the trial in the court a quo to adduce any and all relevant evidence to substantiate its claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138. In no sense, therefore, may it be argued that it was denied 67 due process of law. With the reality that those documents were never presented and formally offered during the trial in the court a quo, their belated admission for purposes of having them duly considered in the resolution of the case on appeal would certainly collide with Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which reads: SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The 68 purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. In any case, as correctly stated by the appellate court, these affidavits would not directly establish the petitioners ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated July 18, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52626 are AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167707

October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775

October 8, 2008

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands. There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the 1 2 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land. The Antecedents G.R. No. 167707 Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, 4 is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants who live in the 5 bone-shaped islands three barangays. On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.
6 7

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reservesunder the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA 9 Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan. In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid 10 realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree 11 (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for 12 tax purposes. The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to 13 submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda. The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. 15 Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. The titles were issued on August 7, 1933.
16 14

RTC and CA Dispositions On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land. SO ORDERED.
17

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be 18 19 the subject of disposition. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. The trial court cited Sections

87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only 22 those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve. The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.
23

20

21

The Republic then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in 24 this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court. The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.
25

Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775 On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 26 No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, Wilfredo Gelito, and other landowners in Boracay 30 filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of 31 pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 32 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition. On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the same 33 issues on the land classification of Boracay Island. Issues G.R. No. 167707 The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle 34 for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island. G.R. No. 173775 Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely: I.
27 28 29

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705? II. HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE? III. IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM? IV. IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657. V. CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN 35 BORACAY? (Underscoring supplied) In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitionersclaimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws. Our Ruling Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, 36 namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and 37 38 39 CA No. 141; (b) Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts. But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, 41 timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, giving the government great 42 leeway for classification. Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one 43 44 addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
40

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of 45 any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has 46 been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part 48 of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise 49 would be ordinary acts of ownership. Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, 50 ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the 51 public domain." The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage 52 Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under 54 certain conditions which were set forth in said decree. Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion 55 posesoria or possessory information title, when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and 56 57 adverse, from the date of its inscription. However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after 58 the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory 59 information title. > The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the 60 Philippine Bill of 1902. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) 61 grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. The act provided for, among others, the 62 disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). It also 63 provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands." Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" 64 under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government: x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands 65 acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x (Emphasis Ours) On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and 66 imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system. Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of 67 persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain. Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years 68 preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and 69 occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.
53 47

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of 70 71 the public domain other than timber and mineral lands, and privately owned lands which reverted to the State. Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by 72 Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of 73 imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073, which now provides for possession and 74 occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The issuance of PD No. 892 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land 76 registration proceedings. Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, 77 the recording of all unregistered lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344. On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration 78 Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. It governs registration of lands 79 under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as 80 an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other 81 purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been 82 "officially delimited and classified." The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is 83 alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land 84 subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; 85 and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land 86 claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification 87 cannot be assumed. They call for proof. Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the 88 89 Philippine Islands (1919) and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909). These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the 90 absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of
75

the evidence. This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. 92 De Palanca v. Republic, in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.: x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands. xxxx Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, 93 depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the 94 absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands. If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine. The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State. In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated: In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land.

91

The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. 95 Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra) (Emphasis ours) Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except 96 those that have already became private lands. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or 96-a reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, 97 whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain. Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933, did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926. We note that the RTC decision in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public 101 domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government, De Aldecoa v. The Insular 102 103 Government, and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands. Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue inKrivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 104 Constitution from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural. Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the 105 enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa. As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral. Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the 106 requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name. A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals. Collado, citing the separate 107-a opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, ruled: "Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands." Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are 108 alienable and disposable. (Emphasis Ours)
107 99 100 98

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The 109 110 DENR and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain. PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land. Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island; that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest. Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded 113 land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. 114 Director of Forestry is particularly instructive: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable 115 agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. (Emphasis supplied) There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the 116 other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine thelegal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land. Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership. Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3117 118 82 to "private lands" and "areas declared as alienable and disposable" does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides: No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular
112 111

recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides: Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development. Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801. The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the 119 areas alienability. More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation. It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the 120 same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into 121 alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to 122 123 do so. Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition. Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights. Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus: SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program: (a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act

until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain. That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705. In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, unclassified lands are public forests.
124

the Court stated that

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral 125 or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We 126 agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice on this point: Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a). Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry 127 Code. Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as 128 alienable and disposable land of the public domain. As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and 129 applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself. Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory 130 rights. Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945. We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945. Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064. The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island. One Last Note The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a byword in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess. For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration 131 132 of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law. More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to 133 exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide. In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress. To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. 134 Munoz: The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the 135 foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: 1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. 2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva Vizcaya, HEIRS OF CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND FARM PRODUCTS, INC., respondents. Celso D. Gangan respondent Heirs of Liberato Bayaua. Acosta & Associates fox Phil. Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. Jose Reyes & Associates for Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, et al.

NARVASA, J.: Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action of certiorari is the decision of respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land Registration Case No. N-109, LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a compromise agreement, the title of the private respondents over a tract of land. The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17, 1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The land was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. 236. Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some 1 others, including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua. In due course, an order of general default was thereafter entered on December 11, 1961 against the whole world except the oppositors. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded 1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares; 2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares; 3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and 4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares. The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In consideration of the areas respectively allocated to them, all the parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General contends that

1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration; 2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise agreement; 3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein; 4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment. The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General's arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot 7454 is public land, but it is not. According to them, as pointed out in the application for registration, the private character of the land is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit: 1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest; 2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings; 3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of Archives, the property in question was registered under the 'Spanish system of land registration as private property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-interest; 4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title to be confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings under the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the land involved belongs to the State. Under the Regalian Doctrine all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming 3 the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other 4 means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain . The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general 5 statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title. In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above mentioned) to the effect that according to the Government's (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896, the property in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua. But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary 6 evidence of ownership. It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question. And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for registration of land under the Torrens Act is proof that the land is of private ownership, not pertaining to the public domain, is to beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as private which the applicant has the obligation of establishing. For there can be no doubt of the intendment of the Land Registration Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper title for registration; indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim, the applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the Land Registration Court, if he fails to establish a proper title for official recognition. It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. But that compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of
2

their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land. The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents. As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should be pointed out that under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, the informacion posesoria cannot be considered as anything more thanprima facie evidence of 7 possession. Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor 8 General." It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 65663 October 16, 1992 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LINO ANIT, respondents.

NOCON, J.: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated September 28, 1983 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 66095 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, granting the application of Lino Anit for the registration of land title, but ordering that the title be issued in the name of Lino Anit's heirs, assigns or successors-in-interest. The facts of this case are as follows: On October 20, 1975, respondent Lino Anit, a Filipino who became an American citizen by virtue of his service with the U.S. Navy, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cavite an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 42,567 square meters situated at Ternate, Cavite, which case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. TM-101, LRC Record No. N-47776. After the required notices were published, the court heard the application on March 29, 1976, during which time only one Florante Malimban, through his counsel Vicente Forteza, informally registered his opposition to the application. However, Malimban did not file any formal pleading with the court. Respondent claims that the subject parcel of land was originally owned by Felix Garay, who sold the same to Jose Andra in 1943. In 1961, Andra sold the land to his parents, the spouses Servando Anit and Natalia Benitez. Respondent allegedly entered into possession of the land sometime in 1966, planting thereon bamboo, mango, and banana trees, and camote. His parents died in 1967. Thereafter, the heirs, which include respondent's brothers and sisters Teodoro, Librada, Domingo, Pascuala, and Victoria, allegedly executed a deed of partition wherein, among others, the subject property was given to respondent. The deed of partition was never presented in evidence before the trial court. To identify the subject land, respondent presented a blue-print copy of Plan Psu-04-003805. Respondent failed to show the exact date when he became an American citizen. On March 3, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision granting respondent's application, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows: WHEREFORE, considering the complete records under our present lights, judgment is hereby rendered and the application is hereby granted in favor of the applicant LINO ANIT married to Pelagia Lupisan of Ternate, Cavite, with postal address at 486 Higante Drive, Daly City, State of California, United States of America, his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest, who are hereby declared possessors and owners in fee simple of one parcel of land containing forty-two thousand five hundred sixty seven (42,567) square meters found at Sitio Batalay, Barrio Sapang, Municipality of Ternate, Province of Cavite, and bearing the technical descriptions (Exhibit CC-4) under Psu-04003805 as set forth by Geodetic Engineer Leonardo C. Santos and approved by the Regional Director Narciso V. Villapando on September 12, 1972 for the Director of Lands; Once this decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree be therefore produced completely and absolutely subject to Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 (dated November 28, 1975) for the tourism areas of concern of the Republic of the Philippines and its future expropriation causes of actions for such filed of governmental endeavor and program areas. Provided further that the parcel of land described herein shall however, be fully registered in the name (not of the applicant LINO ANIT) but in the names of his wife Pelagia Lupisan of Ternate, Cavite and his other heirs, assignees and successors-in-interest who are Filipino citizens, should there be any and if they are not American but Filipino Citizens.
3 2 1

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. After his motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition. Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the trial court on the grounds that (1) it acted contrary to law when it confirmed respondent's title on the basis of a mere blue print copy of the survey plan; (2) it misapprehended the facts when it ruled that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had been for at least thirty years in continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land; (3) it erred in confirming respondent's title to the exclusion of his co-heirs; and (4) it erred in not holding that respondent's title is not valid as against the state. We find the petition meritorious. It is undisputed that the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in evidence by respondent, which omission is fatal to his application. The submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement 5 of mandatory character. Respondent's counsel on the other hand contends that he submitted the original tracing cloth plan, together with other documents, to the Clerk of Court when he filed the application. The application and supporting documents were then elevated to the Land Registration Commission (now the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration) for approval of the survey plan by the Director of Lands. Respondent argues the fact that the Commissioner of Land Registration issued a Notice of Initial Hearing would indicate that respondent had submitted all the pertinent documents relative to his application. This argument had already been disposed of in Director of Lands vs. Reyes, wherein this Court held Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-submission of the original tracing cloth plan by claiming that the same must be with the Land Registration Commission which checked or verified the survey plan and the technical description thereof. It is not the function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it had no authority to approve original survey plans. If, for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant may easily retrieve the same 7 therefrom and submit the same in evidence. This was not done. Respondent further contends that petitioner failed to object to the blue print copy of the survey plan when the same was offered in evidence, thereby waiving the objection to said evidence. We do not agree. Rule 143 of the Rules of Court provide: These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and elections cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. This Court had applied the aforementioned rule in a naturalization proceeding, and held that By reason of this provision, literal adherence to the Rules of Court, which include rules of evidence, is not obligatory in a proceeding like that under consideration. 8 We see no reason for not applying Rule 143 to the case at bar. Besides, given the mandatory character of the requirement for the submission of the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, said requirement cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly. We likewise find merit in petitioner's argument that respondent had not shown that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land. Respondent made no mention of how his parents came to possess the subject property, or the manner their predecessor-in-interest possessed the 9 same, in his deposition taken before Vice Consul Romulo Villamil at the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
6

Similarly, the testimony of respondent's sister Victoria Anit Manalo, merely narrated who were her brother's predecessor-in-interest and the manner he acquired the subject property. Clearly, respondent's evidence does not establish the nature of his predecessors-in-interest's possession. No 10 evidence was offered to show that his predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land or that they had introduced any improvements thereon. In fact, respondent could only show that property taxes were fully paid 11 12 beginning 1966. As this Court had said in Republic vs. Lee: Private respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner" by which she described her own possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-interest are mere 13 conclusions of law which require factual support and substantiation. Inasmuch as respondent had failed to prove having been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, for at least thirty years, then his application must necessarily fail. Equally damaging to respondent's application is the facts that the subject land was owned by his parents, Servando Anit and Natalia Benitez. When they died in 1967, the land passed by intestate succession to their heirs, respondent and his brothers and sisters. Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that where the land sought to be registered is owned in common, all the co-owners should file the application jointly. Therefore, the application should have been filed in the names of all the heirs of Servando Anit and Natalia Benitez, and not just in the name of respondent. Though Victoria Anit Manalo testified that the subject property was given to respondent as his share of their parents' estate by virtue of the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Servando Anit and Natalia Benitez, the deed evidencing said extrajudicial partition was never presented in evidence before the trial court. This Court has held that where the applicants own merely an undivided share less than fee simple in the land described in the application, the application should be dismissed without prejudice to the right of the various owners of the undivided interest in the 14 land jointly to present a new application for registration. We however do not find merit in petitioner's last contention that respondent's title to the subject land is not valid against the state because he is an American citizen. The appellate court did not err in applying Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution to respondent's case. Said provision provides: Save in case of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Petitioner argues that said provision has no application to the case at bar since the subject land still part of the public domain. We do not agree. It is well-settled that open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years of 15 alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property. It therefore follows that an heir of a person who had occupied a piece of alienable public land in open, continuous and exclusive possession for more than 30 years, may validly file an application for said parcel of land since the same had already been converted to private land. In the case at bar, had respondent proved open, exclusive and continuous possession for more than 30 years by his predecessors-in-interest, there would have been no bar to his application. However, since he had not shown the duration and nature of his predecessors-in-interest's possession of the subject land, his application would necessarily fail. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the instant application of Lino Anit is hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 91189 November 27, 1992 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. SAMUEL BUYCO and EDGAR BUYCO, represented by their attorney-in-fact, RIEVEN H. BUYCO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: In its Decision of 5 February 1985, Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Odiongan, Romblon granted the application of the private respondents, who are American citizens, to bring within the operation of the Land Registration Act a parcel of land with an area of 3,194,788 square meters (319.4788 hectares) which spreads across the barangays of Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol in the municipality of Odiongan, Province of Romblon, and to confirm their title thereto. Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals; he alleged therein that the trial court erred (a) in not declaring the private respondents barred by the Constitution from applying for registration because they are American citizens and are thus disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines, (b) in holding that private respondents had established proprietary rights over the land even before acquiring American citizenship through naturalization, and (c) independently of the issue of alienage, in not dismissing the application for registration on the basis of the private respondents failure to overthrow, by conclusive or well-nigh incontrovertible proof, the presumption that the land 2 applied for is public land belonging to the State. In its Decision of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824, public respondent dismissed the appeal "for lack of 4 merit." Petitioner consequently filed this petition on 11 January 1990 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Reiterating the 5 issues he raised before the respondent Court, he seeks a review and reversal of the latter's decision. In the Resolution of 11 July 1990, this Court gave due course to the petition after the filing by the private respondents 6 of their Comment to the same and by the petitioner of his reply thereto. On 17 April 1991, the parties were required 7 to file their respective Memoranda. The records disclose the following material operative facts and procedural antecedents: A certain Charles Hankins, an American who was married to Laura Crescini and who resided in Canduyong, Odiongan, Romblon, died on 31 May 1937 leaving a will (Exhibit "N"). He was survived by his widow; his son Alexander and William; and his grandchildren Ismael Samuel and Edgar, all surnamed Buyco, who are the legitimate issues of his deceased daughter Lilia and her husband Marcelino Buyco. The will was submitted for probate before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Romblon. Charles Hankins' son Alexander was appointed administrator of the estate in Special Proceedings No. 796. Laura Crescini died on 22 December 1941. It appears that in a Project of Partition dated 25 June 1947 (Exhibit "O") and submitted to the probate court in the aforesaid Special Proceedings No. 796, one of the properties of Charles Hankins described as "a parcel of pastureland, riceland and coconut land containing an area of about 250 hectares, 21 ares and 63 untares . . . assessed at for P6,950.00 as per Tax Declaration No. 15853," was partitioned among his heirs as follows: xxx xxx xxx TO LAURA C. HANKINS, . . .
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(a) 157 acres . . . comprised in what is known as Carabao Pastureland and MilkCow Pasture. (This land is a portion of the land described in tax declaration N0. 15853 . . .) xxx xxx xxx TO ALEXANDER HANKINS, . . . (a) 80 acres of land (pasture) which is a portion of the land described in Tax declaration No. 15853 . . . . xxx xxx xxx TO LILIA HANKINS, . . . (a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which is a portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853 . . . . (b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which is a portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853. xxx xxx xxx TO WILLIAM B. HANKINS, . . . (a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which is a portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853 . . . . (b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in barrio Anajao and which is a portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853 . . . . 8 The total area so adjudicated is 487 acres, or 197.086 hectares (1 hectare = 2.471 acres) On 30 July 1948, Laura's share in the estate of her husband Charles was partitioned among her children. Alexander and William, and her grandchildren, Ismael, Samuel and Edgar who were represented by their father Marcelino Buyco (Exhibit "P"). Thereafter, on the same date, William sold his hereditary shares in the estate of his parents to Marcelino Buyco (Exhibit "R"). On 20 August 1962, Marcelino Buyco donated to his children the property acquired from William together with other properties (Exhibit "S"). On 8 September 1970, the Buyco brothers partitioned among themselves the properties acquired by inheritance from their grandparents and by donation from their father (Exhibit "T"). However, Ismael waived his right to his share therein in favor of Samuel, one of the private respondents in this case. Edgar and Samuel Buyco became naturalized American citizens on 29 January 1972 and 12 September 1975, respectively. On 14 October 1967, Edgar and Samuel, through their attorney-in-fact, Rieven H. Buyco, filed before the then Court of First Instance of Romblon an application for the registration of a parcel of land, described as follows: A parcel of land (Lot I, under surveyed for the heirs of Lilia Hankins situated in the barrios of Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol, Municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon, Tablas Island under PSU 127238) LRC Record No. ________: Bounded on the North by properties of the heirs of Rita Fiedacan and Alexander Hankins; on the Northeast, by Canduyong River and property of Alexander Hankins; on the East, by properties of Andres Cuasay, Escolastica Feruelo, Candido

Mendoza, Raymundo Goray, Pedro Goray, Manuel Yap, Feliza Fedri and Silverio Mierculecio; on the Southeast, by properties of Candido Mendoza, the Heirs of Benita Formilleza Silverio Mierculecio, Zosimo Llorca, Lot 2, and properties of Beatrice Hankins and Zosimo Llorca; on the West, by properties of Maria Llorca and Miguel Llorca; and on the Northwest, by property of Catalino Fabio. Point "I" is S. 33 deg. 24"., 4075.50 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Odiongan, Romblon. Area THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY 9 EIGHT (3,194,788) SQUARE METERS, more or less as Exhibit "C". which they claim to own in fee simple as they acquired the same by inheritance and donation inter vivos. However, they allege in paragraph 9 of the application that should the Land Registration Act be inapplicable, the benefits provided for under C.A. No. 141, as amended, be made to extend to them since both they and their predecessors-ininterest have been in possession thereof since time immemorial. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-48 LRC Record No. N-51706. The above description is based on a survey plan prepared by private land surveyor Santiago Espaol in 1950 (Exhibit "C") and subsequently approved by the Director of Lands. While in their application, private respondents invoked the 10 provisions of the Land Registration Act, they eventually sought for a confirmation of imperfect title pursuant to 11 paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land Act , as further amended by P.D. No. 1073. While only the herein petitioner filed an opposition thereto, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) manifested that the portion of the property pertaining to Samuel Buyco is covered by a mortgage in its favor. After the jurisdictional facts had been established during the initial hearing and a general order of default entered against all other parties, the lower court designated the Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Odiongan as commissioner to receive the evidence for the parties. Samuel Buyco, William Hankins, Manuel Firmalo and Jacinta Gomez Gabay (who was 83 years old when she took the witness stand in October 1979) testified for the applicants. The first two (2) recounted the history of the tract of land up to the time of the abovementioned partitions and the alleged possession of the entire area by the applicants (private respondents herein). On 5 February 1985, the land registration court handed down a Decision
12

the dispositive portion of which reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby orders the registration of title to the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1 Psu-127238 and its technical description together with all the improvements thereon, in the name of the herein applicants, recognizing the interest of the Development Bank of the Philippines to be annotated on the certificate of title to be issued as mortgagee for the amount of P200,000.00 with respect to the share of applicants (sic) Samuel H. Buyco. Upon the decision become (sic) final let the corresponding decree and certificate of title be issued accordingly. The favorable decision is based on the court's conclusion that: The oral and documentary evidence indubitably show applicants and their predecessors-in-interest their grandparents Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini, to their uncle Alexander Hankins, to them thru their administrators Gregorio Gabay and later Manuel Firmalo have possessed the property herein sought to be registered in the concept of owners thereof, and such possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open and public for a period of more than eighty years. And their right over the property is duly recognized by the adjoining owners in their individual affidavits marked as Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-21", inclusive. Moreover, none of the adjoining owners filed any opposition to the herein land registration case, thereby indubitably showing their recognition of the correctness of the boundary (sic) between their individual lots and that of applicants land subject of this registration. The late Charles Hankins declared said land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 15853 (please see description of lot in Exh. "N") and thereafter in the name of applicants and/or their father Marcelino Buyco since 1949 up to the present time (Exhs. "W", "W-1" to "W-19"). Applicants have also paid the real estate taxes thereon since 1948 up to the present time (Exhs. "X", "X-1" to "X-194").

In 1950, the land of applicants was surveyed by Private Surveyor Santiago Espaol and its exact metes and bounds were determined with accuracy in his survey plan PSU-127238 (Exh. "C"). This survey corrected the impreciseness of the land area as mentioned in the several instruments the will, project of partition, deed of partition, deed of sale (Exhs. "N", "O", "P", and "R") under which applicants acquired the land in question. The correctness of this survey is further shown by the fact that none of the other heirs, like Alexander Hankins nor (sic) the adjoining owners ever made a claim over any portion of the lot shown in said Psu-127238. The land in question has been primarily devoted to cattle grazing (sic) and to the cultivation of rice and coconut and it was (sic) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have (sic) been reaping the fruits thereof. The evidence further show (sic) that applicants can rightfully and did validly acquire title and ownership over the land in question because they were then Filipino citizens, their father Marcelino Buyco being a Filipino citizen himself (please see personal circumstances of Marcelino Buyco in Exhs. "P" and "R") and their modes of acquisition by inheritance, intestate succession, and donation inter-vivos are all legally recognized modes to transfer ownership to them from their predecessors-in-interest. Since time immemorial, applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have exercised all the attributes of dominion and absolute ownership over the land in question, and have therefore established their vested proprietary rights and registrable (sic) title over the land in question, rights which they have acquired long before they became citizens of the United States (Edgar Buyco became a U.S. citizen only on January 29, 1972; while Samuel H. Buyco, only on September 12, 1975. As a matter of fact, applicant Samuel H. Buyco mortgaged in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines (Exhs. "U", "U-1" and "U-2") the portion belonging to him in Lot 1, Psu-127238. From the foregoing evidence it has been satisfactorily established that the applicants have acquired an imperfect and incomplete title over the parcel of land subject of this registration proceedings in their own right as citizens of the Philippines so as to entitle them to a confirmation and registration of said lot in their names. Consequently Section II, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to this case, neither (sic) does this case fall under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 13 713. More specifically, the conclusion regarding possession is based on the testimonies of Manuel Firmalo, William Hankins and Jacinta Gomez Gabay which, as summarized by the court, are as follows: xxx xxx xxx Witness Manuel Firmalo testified that from 1970 to 1978 he was the administrator, of the property of applicants; that the said property is located in the Barrios of Anahao, Canduyong, and Tubigon (now forming part of the municipality of Ferrol) and the same is shown in the survey may marked as Exh. "C" (Psu-127238); that said lot is separated from the adjacent properties by concrete monuments, big tress and some barb (sic) wire fence (sic); that previous to his administration thereof, the same property was administered by his father-in-law, Gregorio Gabay; . . . that during his administration, a large part of the land was devoted to cattle grazing and a little portion, to coconut (sic) which are now fruit bearing; that when he took over the administration of the ranch, there was a total of 120 heads of cattle and at the time of termination of his administration there were 300 heads; that from time to time, some cattle in the ranch were sold by him and he rendered an accounting to the applicants, the owners of the ranch; that he employed cowhands to help him ran (sic) the ranch of applicants and the salaries of said cowhands were paid out of the funds of applicant Samuel Buyco from the sale of the cattle; that the proceeds of the coconuts harvested, the money was (sic) deposited with the bank and a portion was used for the payment of the real estate taxes on the land; that during his administration no third person ever claimed ownership over applicants land; that he was the one who procured the execution of the affidavits of adjoining owners (Exhs. "V", "V-1" to "V-21") which were used to support the real estate mortgage with the DBP over said land; that from the proceeds of the sale of the copra harvested from the land of applicants,. he paid the real estate taxes thereon specifically the taxes covered by Exhs. "X-83" to "X-144"; . . . that his administration over said land was adverse, open continuous and public.

William Hankins, then 72 years old and resident (sic) of Odiongan, Romblon, testified . . .; that ever since he was still a small kid, he know (sic) that the big tract of land subject of their partition was already owned by his father (Charles Hankins); that the possession of his father was in the concept of owner, continuous, adverse, public, and open, up to his (Charles Hankins) death; that after receiving his hereditary share from the estates of his father and mother, he sold his said shares to Marcelino Buyco, father of applicants by executing a Deed of Sale (Exh. "R") dated July 30, 1948; that during the lifetime of Charles Hankins; the big tract of land was devoted primarily to cattle grazing and to coconut and rice; that after he sold his hereditary share of (sic) Marcelino Buyco, the latter took possession of his said portion; that after Marcelino Buyco died, the property of Marcelino Buyco (including his share (sic) hereditary share sold under Ex. (sic) "R") was transmitted to his children, namely: Edgar H. Buyco, Ismael Buyco and Samuel H. Buyco (Samuel and Edgar Buyco, the (sic) applicants herein); that he known that at present the owners in possession of the property subject of this registration proceedings are applicants Samuel Buyco and Edgar Buyco; that the said land is devoted to cattle grazing and planted with coconuts and rice. xxx xxx xxx Jacinta Gomez Gabay, 83 years (as of October, 1979) . . . testified that she knew the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini because since the time she can remember, she stayed with said spouses up to the (sic) their death (sic); that having stayed with the Hankins couple, she knew of their properties because she lived with them in Canduyong where the property was situated; that the property is a big tract of land; . . . that when she was living with the Hankins spouses, said spouses already owned and were in possession of this big tract of land, and this land was fenced off with barbed wires, and that said big tract of land has been used for grazing purposes since she reached the age of reason up to the present time; that during all the time that she has been with said Hankins spouses, nobody ever claimed any portion thereof; that this property extended from barrio Canduyong up to barrio Anahao; that after Charles Hankins died, his property was divided among his children Alexander Hankins, William Hankins and Lilia Hankins and the latter's share was received by her children named Ismael, Samuel and Edgar all surnamed Buyco; that before Charles Hankins' estate was partitioned it was placed under the administration of Alexander Hankins (one of the heirs); that after the partition, the portion (sic) that went to the Buyco children (as heirs of Lilia Hankins) were administered by her husband Gregorio Gabay; that her husband's administration over said property started 3 or 4 years after the war which (sic) lasted 25 years or until Gregorio Gabay died; that his son-in-law Manuel Firmalo took over the administration of applicants' property; that the land she was referring to is utilized as a pasture land and it has been a pasture since the time it was it was owned by spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini up to the present time; that Edgar, Samuel and Ismael, all surnamed Buyco have been receiving the fruits of the portion that went to Lilia Hankins; that Charles Hankins' possession of that big tract of land was in the concept of owner, continuous, adverse, open and public; that a portion of this big tract of land went to Edgar H. Buyco, Samuel H. Buyco and Ismael H. Buyco as the heirs of Lilia Hankins; that the possession of the said heirs of the late Lilia Hankins over the portion that went to them was in the concept of owner, continuous, adverse, open and public up to the present time; that as far as she can remember the Hankins family possessed said property for more than eighty 14 (80) years. The land registration court also summarized the testimony of private respondent Samuel H. Buyco as to possession in this wise: Applicant Samuel H. Buyco testified that he was 51 years of age, . . .; that prior to the death of his grandfather Charles Hankins, that big parcel of pastureland was about 500 to 550 hectares, the boundaries of which were marked off by concrete monuments, some big trees, some big stones until it was partitioned in 1948, and to fix the actual boundaries, the land was surveyed by private surveyor Espaol (Exh. "D"); that during the lifetime of their grandfather Charles Hankins this big land was primarily used as a ranch and it was fenced off by barb (sic) wires to prevent the cattle from getting out; that after the death of his grandfather Charles Hankins, the property was administered by his uncle Alexander Hankins, and such administration was terminated when there was a partition in 1948 in accordance with the will of his grandfather; that during the administration of the property by Alexander Hankins, this property was used as a cattle ranch, even during the Japanese time; that after receiving their share form the partition of the estate, they initially planted rice and coconut and later on they reverted to cattle ranch operation (sic); that after he and his brother Edgar became the possessor (sic) of said land, they were the one (sic) who have been

harvesting the fruits of the land; that they did not personally managed (sic) the land but hired in 1949 the services of Mr. Gregorio Gabay to administer the estate for them until 1970 when the latter died, and Manuel Firmalo was hired to take over the administration until 1977 when applicant took over active management of the property because he obtained a loan of P200,000.00 from the Development Bank of the Philippines; . . . that the land was declared in their name (sic) for taxation purposes by their administrator Gregorio Gabay in 1949 (Exhs. "W", "W-1" to "W-19", inclusive) and that the taxes thereon were paid out of their own money since 1948 up to the present (Exhs. "X", "X-1" to "X-194", inclusive); that applicants' possession in the concept of owner over the property sought to be registered has been open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and 15 public. As earlier adverted to petitioner's appeal from the said decision was dismissed by the public respondent for lack of merit. As to the private respondents' title to the land subject of the application, public respondent makes the following findings: Undisputably, applicant-appellees anchored their title to the land in question by means of hereditary succession as well as donation from their own father, Marcelino Buyco, who purchased the entire hereditary share of William Hankins (Exhs. "R"). Subsequently, applicants-appellees and their brother, Ismael, partitioned their hereditary share from their grandparents, the spouses Hankins, including the property donated by their father, Marcelino Buyco, in an instrument dated September 8, 1970 (Exh. "T"). In this partition, the share of Ismael H. Buyco went to applicant-appellee Samuel H. Buyco (Exh. "T-1"). From the records extant in this case, it is Our considered view that from almost (sic) time immemorial or a period of eighty (80) years, applicant-appellees through their predecessors-ininterest have been in actual, continuous, and peaceful possession of the property in question so that the inescapable conclusion is that all along it is private land and had been segregated from the dominion (sic) of the State. Thus, We sustain the conclusion reached by the court a quo that the latter (applicants-appellees) thru their predecessors-in-interest have acquired title by acquisitive 16 prescription over the same. . . . As to the issue of the private respondents citizenship, public respondent held that: . . . it is beyond per adventure (sic) of doubt that applicants-appellees were still Filipinos when they acquired their title thereto. From the death of their grandfather Charles Hankins on May 31, 1937, applicants-appellees right of succession was already vested. Moreover, as early as the year 1962, their father Marcelino Buyco transferred his title thereto by donation inter-vivos so that on September 8, 1970, when the Buyco brothers partitioned the property in question, among themselves, they could validly register the same as they already possess the necessary 17 qualifications to have their title perfected under the Torrens system of registration. The petition is meritorious. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduce, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership base on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal; (b) the "concession especial" or special grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title of purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or 18 possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or gratuitous title. The primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The land registration court and the public respondent are of the opinion, and so held, that the private respondents had this in their favor. Thus, both courts declared that the land applied for had been segregated from the public domain and had become private land. If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time immemorial, the rulings of 19 both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands; . . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the

possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain even before the Spanish conquest. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. ed., 20 594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880. This exception was reiterated in Susi vs. Razon, where the first possessor was in possession was in possession for an undetermined period of time prior to 1880. We stated therein: . . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established, in 22 paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Although this additional pronouncement was rippled by the ruling Manila Electric Co. vs. Castro-Bartolome , to the effect that land would cease to be public only upon the issuance of a certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming 24 it under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, and that a piece of land over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed remains public, this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, 25 in Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, reiterated the Cario and Susidoctrine, thus: The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, 26 as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is covered to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept abovestated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cario andSusi, or for the period prescribe in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos vs.Court of 27 Appeals, adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., now a distinguished member of this Court, that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments. In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable parcel of land of the public domain. On the contrary, based on their own evidence, the entire property which is alleged to have originally belonged to Charles Hankins was pasture land. According to witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay, this land has been pasture land, utilized for grazing purposes, since the time it was "owned" by the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini up to the present time (i.e., up to the date she 28 testified). In Director of Lands vs. Rivas, this Court ruled: Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable). The instant application was filed, heard and decided under the regime of the 1973 Constitution. As to the second matter to be proved, the applicant must present evidence of an imperfect title such as those derived from the old Spanish grants. He may also show that he has been in continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership and for the 29 period prescribed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Simply put, a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence; he should not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the
23 21

oppositors. This rule is certainly not new. In the 1913 case of Maloles vs. Director of Lands, this Court already held that in order that a petitioner may be entitled to have a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system, he has to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the said land; moreover, it is the duty of the court, even in the absence of any oppositor, to require the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as it is possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the land in question. In Santiago vs. de los Santos, this rule was to find anchorage in policy considerations based no less on one of the fundamental objectives of the Constitution, namely the conservation and utilization of our natural resources. We held in the said case that there would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. This Court then set the quantum of evidence needed to be established by the applicant, to wit: well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. In the instant case, private respondents evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, which was conceded by the land registration court and the public respondent, is patently baseless. There is an evident failure to comprehend the meaning and import of 33 the term immemorial. As defined, immemorial simply means beyond the reach of memory, beyond human memory, 34 or time out of mind. When referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of 35 which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned form his elders. Such possession was never present in the case of the private respondents. The trial court and the public respondent based the finding of the more than eighty (80) years of possession by the private respondents and their predecessors-ininterest on the sole testimony of Mrs. Gabay who was eighty-three (83) years old when she testified in October of 1979. Thus, she must have been born in 1896. If the asserted possession lasted for a period of more than eighty (80) years at the time she testified the same must have commenced sometime in 1899, or at the time that she was barely three (3) years old. It is quite impossible that she could fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, the concept of possession of such a big tract of land and testify on the same some eight (8) decades later. In short, therefore, she cannot be relied upon to prove the possession by Charles Hankins of the said property from 1899. Charles Hankins was an American citizen. There is no evidence to show the date of his birth, his arrival in the Philippines particularly in Odiongan, Romblon or his acquisition of the big tract of land; neither is there any evidence to prove the manner of his acquisition thereof. Thus, there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) 36 years, much less since time immemorial. In Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, possession which began in 1880 was not considered as possession "since time immemorial." There is as well, no evidence on record to show that Charles Hankins cultivated, had control over or used the whole or even a greater portion of the big tract of land for grazing purposes. None of the witnesses testified as to the number of heads of cattle which were bought by Charles into the land. There is likewise no competent proof that he declared the land in his name for taxation purposes or that he had paid the taxes thereon. Although his will (Exhibit "N") made mention of Tax Declaration No. 15853, neither the said declaration nor any tax receipt was presented in evidence. Because of such non-production, it cannot be determined when Charles initially declared his alleged land for taxation purpose and what exactly were its natural boundaries, if any. It is clear that the non-production of this tax declaration accounted for the obvious inability of the witnesses to testify with certainty as to the extent of the area of the property. As correctly observed by the petitioner, none of the private respondents' witnesses could give the court a definite idea thereon. Thus, Samuel Buyco declared: I really don't know the exact area, but it is between 500 to 550 hectares. while William Hankins admitted: I cannot exactly tell because that is a very big estate. On the other hand, witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay averred: I could not exactly tell but I have heard that it was a big tract of land because we were staying 39 there. In any event, even if Charles had indeed declared the property for taxation purposes and actually paid taxes, such facts are still insufficient to justify possession thereof, much less a claim of ownership thereon. This Court has
38 37 32

30

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repeatedly held that the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not 40 sufficient to prove ownership. To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that Charles Hankins had possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs in such a manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the Cario and Susi doctrines. Thus, when he died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application. It would have been entirely different if the possession of Charles was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and under a bona fide claim of ownership as provided under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Even if he were an American citizen at that time, he would have had the same civil rights as Filipino citizens pursuant to the original ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution. the pertinent portion of said ordinance reads: (17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the Commonwealth of the Philippines all the civil rights of the citizens and corporations, respectively, thereof. The import of said paragraph (17) was confirmed and reinforced the originally by Section 44 of Act No. 2874 and Section 127 of C.A. No. 141 (The Public Land Act of 1936); the latter provided that: Sec. 127. During the existence and continuance of the Commonwealth and before the Republic of the Philippines is established, citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy the same rights granted to citizens and corporations of the Philippines under this Act. This right, however, vanished with the advent of the Philippine Republic on 4 July 1946.
41

Verily, private respondents had to rely exclusively on their own possession. under the applicable law at the time, it was incumbent upon them to prove that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by 42 war or force majeure. By their own evidence, private respondents admitted that they were never in actual possession of the property prior to the filing of their application. During the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 796, the estate of Charles Hankins appeared to have been administered by his son Alexander. This administration was terminated in 1948 upon the execution of the Project of Partition. Private respondents and their brother Ismael did not take possession of the share which pertained to their mother, Lilia; instead; they allegedly hired Gregorio Gabay to administer the same. There is, however, no competent evidence to show the extent of such administration. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that Gregorio had the property declared for taxation purposes, the correct area and boundaries of the same have not been proven. As evidenced by the Project of Partition, the share of Lilia was only 125 acres or 50.59 hectares, which is clearly not the portion applied for. The area applied for consists of 319.4788 hectares of land based on a survey plan prepared by private land surveyor Espaol on the basis of a survey conducted in 1950. Obviously, therefore, the plan was not prepared to determine Lilia's share alone for, as admitted by the private respondents themselves, this plan includes William Hankins' share which was sold to Marcelino Buyco, private respondents father, and the other properties which the latter donated to the private respondents and Ismael Buyco on 20 August 1962 (Exhibit "S"). However, there is no competent evidence as to the respective boundaries and areas of the properties constituting the said share of William Hankins; neither are there reliable descriptions of the other alleged properties belonging to Marcelino Buyco. Be that as it may, when the survey was conducted by Espaol, private respondents and their brother Ismael did not immediately acquire the portion originating from William Hankins and the other alleged properties of Marcelino Buyco; hence, there was no valid basis for the inclusion of said properties in the survey. And even if both William's share and Marcelino Buyco's properties were included there would still be nothing to support the application for the entire 319,4788 hectares considering that as per the Project of Partition, the share pertaining to William consisted only of 50.59 hectares. There was, moreover, no evidence to show the extent of the alleged "other properties" of Marcelino Buyco. Given such circumstances, it would be reasonable to presume that what was surveyed in 1950 was the entire pasture land alleged to form part of the estate of Charles Hankins, covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853, and which necessarily included the share of Alexander Hankins. Significantly, per Exhibit "O" the latter's share is specified as part of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853. The inclusion then of Alexander's share in the survey and the plan may provide the clue to this unusual increase in the area covered by the survey plan.

Nevertheless, even if We are to assume for argument's sake that there was nothing irregular in the inclusion in the survey plan of the share of William Hankins and the other properties of Marcelino Buyco, the fact remains that the "ownership" thereof could have been acquired by the private respondents and Ismael Buyco only on 20 August 1962 upon the execution of the deed of donation in their favor. To be thus benefited by the possession of William or Marcelino for purposes of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, there should be proof that said predecessors had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof. Unfortunately, no such proof was offered. It is palpably obvious then that at the time Land Registration Case No. N-48 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon on 14 October 1976, private respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title over that which they claimed to have inherited, by representation, from the estate of Charles Hankins. With greater force does this conclusion likewise apply with respect to the properties donated to them in 1962 by their father Marcelino Buyco. This is because they were not able to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the 43 44 application, or from 12 June 1945. Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title over to property before they lost their Philippine citizenship. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the public respondent of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824 is hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of 5 February 1985 of Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Land Registration Case No. N-48, LRC Record No. N-51706 is REVERSED. Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-30240 March 25, 1988 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES as Lessor, ZOILA DE CHAVEZ, assisted by her husband Col. Isaac Chavez, DEOGRACIAS MERCADO, ROSENDO IBANEZ and GUILLERMO MERCADO, as permittees and/or Lessees of public fishponds, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE JAIME DE LOS ANGELES of the court of First Instance of Batangas, (BR. III, Balayan) [later replaced by JUDGE JESUS ARLEGUI] SHERIFF OF BATANGAS, ENRIQUE ZOBEL and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS AT BALAYAN, BATANGAS, respondents.

TEEHANKEE, C.J.: The moment of truth is finally at hand. It is about time to cause the execution in favor of the Republic of the 1 Philippines of the 1965 final and executory judgment of this Court (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia ) affirming that of the CFI of Batangas in Civil Case No. 373 thereof and to recover for the Republic what "Ayala y Cia Hacienda de Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel had illegally expanded [in] the original area of their TCT No. 722 (derived from OCT No. 20) from 9,652.583 hectares to about 12,000 hectares thereby usurping about 2,000 hectares consisting of portions of 2 the territorial sea, the foreshore, the beach and navigable waters properly belong(ing) to the public domain." The Court's decision in said case found that We have gone over the evidence presented in this case and found no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. It has been established that certain areas originally portions of the navigable water or of the foreshores of the bay were converted into fishponds or sold by defendant company to third persons. There is also no controversy as to the fact that the said defendant was able to effect these sales after it has obtained a certificate of title (TCT No. 722) and prepared a "composite plan" wherein the aforesaid foreshore areas appeared to be parts of Hacienda Calatagan.Defendants- appellants do not deny that there is an excess in area between those delimited as boundaries of the hacienda in TCT No. 722 and the plan prepared by its surveyor. This, however, was justified by claiming that it could have been caused by the system (magnetic survey) used in the preparation of the original titles, and, anyway, the excess in area (536 hectares, according to defendants) is within the allowable margin given to a magnetic survey. But even assuming for the sake of argument that this contention is correct, the fact remains that the areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries), were found to be portions of the foreshore, beach, or of the navigable water itself And, it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not 3 convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant. The Solicitor General's Memorandum further points out ... that the modus operandi in said usurpation, i.e. grabbing lands of the public domain, was expressly made of record in the case of Dizon v. Rodriguez, 13 SCRA 704 (April 30, 1965), where it was recounted that Hacienda de Calatagan, owned by Alfonso and Jacobo Zobel, was originally covered by TCT No. 722, and that in 1948, upon the cessation of their sugar mill operations, the hacienda owners converted the pier (used by vessels loading sugar) which stretched to about 600 meters off the shore into the navigable waters of the Pagaspas Bay" into a fishpond dike by enclosing 30 and 37 hectares of the bay on both sides of the pier in the process. Subsequently, in 1949, the owners of the hacienda ordered its subdivision which enabled them to acquire titles to the subdivided lots which were outside the hacienda's perimeter. Thus, these subdivided lots, which were converted into fishponds were illegally absorbed as part of the hacienda and titled in the name of Jacobo Zobel which were subsequently sold and transferred to the Dizons, Gocos and others. In said Dizon case, "this Honorable Court affirmed the court a quo's findings that the subdivision plan was prepared not in accordance with the technical description in TCT No. 722 but in disregard of it." And that the appropriated fishpond lots "are actually part of the territorial waters and belong to the State.
4

But all through the years, as stressed in the Republic's memorandum, "the technical maneuvers employed by Ayala and Zobel [of which the instant petition is an off-shoot] .... undercut the Republic's efforts to execute the aforesaid 5 1965 final judgment" to recover the estimated 2,000 hectares of territorial sea, foreshore, beach and navigable waters and marshy land of the public domain. It may seem incredible that execution of such 1965 final judgment in favor of the Republic no less could have been thwarted for twenty-three years now. But the Republic's odyssey and travails since 1965 through the martial law regime to now are recorded in the annals of our jurisprudence. Suffice it to point out that upon petition of the Republic and its co- petitioners (as permittees and/or lessees of the Republic), mandamus was issued on June 30, 1967 by 6 unanimous decision with one abstention in Republic vs. De los Angeles, overruling the therein respondent-judge's refusal to issue a writ of execution of the aforesaid 1965 final judgment and ordering him to issue such writ. The Court denied reconsideration on September 19, 1967, but on a second and supplemental motion for reconsideration, it set aside the original decision of Jane 30, 1967 and dismissed the petition for mandamus and denied execution, per its 7 Resolution of October 4, 1971 by a split 6-3-2 vote. The court denied the Republic, et al motions for reconsideration 8 by the same split 6-3-2 vote per its Resolution of April 11, 1972. An undermanned Court subsequently denied the Republic's co-petitioner Tolentino's second motion for reconsideration for lack of necessary votes per its Resolution 9 of April 27, 1973. Parenthetically, the complexity magnitude and persistence of respondents' maneuvers are set forth in the series of decisions and extended resolutions and majority and dissenting opinions reported in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated as per the citations hereinabove given. A reading of said reports together with the Memorandum for Granting of the Petition at bar (and giving the case's backgrounder) which I had circulated in the Court as against the proposed contrary draft of Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez (which did not gain the concurrence of the majority of the Court during his seventeen-month incumbency from October 20, 1973 to March 28, 1975) shows the full extent background and scope of these maneuvers, particularly those in the present case. For the sake of brevity and conciseness, I attach the said Memorandum as Annex A hereof and make the same an integral part of this decision, instead of reproducing the same in the body of this opinion. Pending respondents' maneuvers in this Court for thwarting the issuance of a writ for execution of the aforesaid 1965 final judgment for the Republic's recovery of land and waters of the public domain in the 1967 mandamus case brought by the Republic, supra, they intensified their maneuvers to defeat the Republic's judgment for recovery of the public lands and waters when they got the trial judge, notwithstanding this Court's final 1965 judgment for reversion of the public lands, to uphold their refusal to recognize the rights of the Republic's public fishponds permittees and/or lessees to the lands leased by the Republic to them. Thus, the Republic as lessor and said permittees/lessees as copetitioners filed through then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo their Amended Complaint of August 2, 1967 in Civil Case No. 653 against herein respondent Enrique Zobel as defendant and the Register of Deeds of Batangas. As summarized by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum of June 1, 1984: Respondent Zobel had ousted Zoila de Chavez, a government's fishpond permittee from a portion of the subject fishpond lot described as Lot 33 of Plan Swo-30999 (also known as Lots 55 and 66 of subdivision TCT No. 3699) by bulldozing the same, and threatened to eject fishpond permittees Zoila de Chavez, Guillermo Mercado, Deogracias Mercado and Rosendo Ibaez from their respective fishpond lots described as Lots 4, 5, 6 and 7 and Lots 55 and 56, of Plan Swo-30999, embraced in the void subdivision titles TCT No. 3699 and TCT No. 9262 claimed by said respondent. Thus, on August 2, 1967, the Republic filed an Amended Complaint captioned Accion Reinvidicatoria with Preliminary Injunction" against respondent Zobel and the Register of Deeds of Batangas, docketed as Civil Case No. 653, for cancellation of Zobel's void subdivision titles TCT No. 3699 and TCT No. 9262, and the reconveyance of the same to the government; to place aforenamed fishpond permittees in peaceful and adequate possession thereof; to require respondent Zobel to pay back rentals to the Republic; and to enjoin said respondent from usurping and exercising further acts of dominion and ownership over the subject land of public domain; Respondent Zobel, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, dated August 16, 1967, contendinginter alia that said Amended Complaint (Civil Case No. 653) is barred by prior judgment in Civil Case No. 373 (G.R. No. 20950, the 1965 final judgment in favor of the Republic), and arguing that "if TCT Nos. T-3699 and T-9262 had been declared null and void in Civil Case No. 373, the proper procedure would be to secure the proper execution of the decision in the same proceedings and not thru the filing of a new case." He further contended "that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause," and points to the abovementioned mandamus case, G.R. No. 26112 anent execution of Civil Case No. 373 as the said pending case. His aforesaid motion, however, was denied by the trial court in its order of December 13, 1967, and accordingly he was required to file his answer.

But in his answer with counterclaim, respondent Zobel averred, among others, that the subject TCT Nos. 3699 and 9262 registered in his name are valid and subsisting since in the decision under G. R. No. L-20950 "only TCT No. T9550 was specifically declared as null and void and no other;" and that when Civil Case No. 373 was docketed, respondent Enrique Zobel "was and still is at present one of the members and managing .ng partners of Ayala y Cia one of the defendants in the 91 said civil case, and, therefore, privy thereto." He then prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction restoring to him possession of the subject land, and further prayed for judgment ordering Zoila de Chavez and Guillermo Mercado to vacate the premises in question and to surrender possession thereof to defendant Zobel. This was unfortunately granted by respondent Judge De los Angeles per the impugned order at bar of October 1, 1968. (Annex D, petition). Hence, the filing of the instant petition. On March 7, 1969, the Court issued a restraining order in the case at bar, enjoining respondent judge from enforcing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction until further orders. While G.R. No. L-26112 re: execution) and G.R. No. L-30240 (the case at bar) were pending, the Republic filed its motion of July 8, 1970 in Civil Case No. 373, for authority to conduct the necessary resurvey of the lands affected so as to properly segregate from Ayala and Zobel's private land originally covered by TCT No. 722 the areas outside thereof comprising about 2,000 hectares of public land, beach, foreshore and territorial sea. Ayala and Zobel vigorously opposed the same, contending again that the proper step for the government was to ask for a writ of execution; that no other subdivision titles, besides TCT No. T- 9550 were really declared null and void in the 1965 judgment; and that the lower court could not make a ruling on the motion for resurvey "without requiring the presentation of additional evidence, and that, in effect, would be tantamount to reopening a case where the judgment is already final and executory and that the Government's failure to seek a "clarification of the decision to find out what other titles should have been declared null and void" precludes it from doing so now, I since the decision is now final and executory." The respondent judge, having earlier denied execution of the 1965 final judgment, issued his order of October 27, 1970 denying the Government's motion for authority to conduct such prerequisite re-survey; Ayala and Zobel's technical maneuvers to impede execution of the 1965 final judgment again bore fruit, as above indicated, when their second motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. L26112 was granted by a split Court in a Resolution dated October 4, 1971 (41 SCRA 422). As a result, the earlier decision of June 30, 1967 directing the issuance of the writ of execution was set aside and the Republic's petition for certiorari and mandamus impugning the lower court's quashal and denial of the writ of execution was dismissed. While the Court's new majority denied the Republic's motion for reconsideration of aforesaid resolution, per its resolution of April 11, 1972, it, however, made the important modification that said denial "does not constitute a denial of the right of the Republic to the cancellation of the titles nullified by the decision of Judge Tengco (in Civil Case No. 373) affirmed by this Court (in G.R. No. L-20950)." It also stated that: "(E)ven the (trial court's) order of October 27, 1970 about the resurvey merely held the remedy to be premature until the decision in this case has become final. Of course, it is understood that in such eventuality, the resurvey requested by the Provincial Fiscalwould be in order and as soon as the same is completed, the proper writ of execution for the delivery of possession of the portions found to be public land should issue." (G.R. No. I, 26112, 44 SCRA 255, 262 [19721) Thus, the majority's denial of the motions for reconsideration was made expressly "with the clarification aforemade of the rights of the Republic." [Note: My attached Memorandum, Annex A hereof (at pages 2 to 6 thereof), quotes more extensively the same pronouncements of the ponente, Justice Villamor, speaking for the majority, that the Resolution simply cancelled out the final damage award in favor of intervenor Tolentino, as government permittee/lessee it covers as well similar pronouncements from Justice Makalintal in his separate concurrence that "The resolution in no way affects the rights of the Government as declared in the decision," and Justice Barredo's separate concurrence that "I am sure that the five justices whom I am joining in denying Petitioners motion for reconsideration are as firm as the three distinguished dissenters in the resolution not to allow this Court to be an instrument of land-grabbing as they are against the reversal or even modification in any substantial degree of any final and executory judgment whether of this Court or any other court in this country, and, that if there were such possibilities in consequence of the resolution of October 4, 1971 and the present resolution of denial, they would not give their assent to said resolutions. We are certain that in deciding against Petitioner Tolentino, We are not condoning nor permitting that the lands in question remain with the Dizons or with "the Ayalas." In my dissenting opinion, I expressed gratification that the dissents (submitted by then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and myself, both concurred in by Justice J.B.L. Reyes) had contributed to the overriding clarification "that the majority's position although it denies reconsideration and maintains reversal of the June 30, 1967 decision at baris that the Government may now finally effect reversion and recover possession of all usurped areas of the public

domain "outside (Ayala's) private land covered by TCT No. 722, which including the lots in T-9550 (Lots 360, 362, 10 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion." (Paragraph [al of 1965 judgment). After said G.R. No. L-26112 was finally disposed of, herein petitioner filed in Civil Case No. 373, a "Motion to Resurvey." This was granted in an Order dated August 21, 1973, as well as in the Orders of December 27, 1973 and February 26, 1974, respectively. About three (3) years later, a Report on the Re-survey dated August 5, 1977 (Annex "A" to Republic's Comment dated March 30, 1981), as well as the "Final Report" thereon dated September 2, 1977 and the "Resurvey Plan" (Annexes "B" and "C", Ibid.) were approved by the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Re-survey further confirmed the uncontroverted fact that the disputed areas in the case at bar form part of the expanded area already reverted to public dominion. Upon approval of said Re-survey Plan and Report, petitioner submitted the same to the trial court in Civil Case No. 373. However, notwithstanding its approval by the Director of Lands, and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Judge Jesus P. Arlegui [who had been assigned to respondent Judge De los Angeles" court in Batangas upon the latter's retirement] arrogating unto himself the function which properly belongs to the Director of Lands, disapproved the said Report and Re-survey Plan, thereby preventing execution of the subdivision (a) of the decision in Civil Case No. 373. In effect, such disapproval by Judge Arlegui was intended to negate the earlier resolution in G.R. No. L-26112 (44 SCRA 255, 263) that as soon as resurvey "is completed the proper writ of execution for the delivery of possession of the portions found to be public land should issue;" Earlier, in Civil Case No. 653, respondent Zobel filed on July 10, 1969 a Motion to Suspend Further Hearing, etc., praying that the hearings in said Civil Case be indefinitely suspended until the case at bar is resolved by this Honorable Court. He contended that the issues raised in the case at bar are the very issues pending in the case below, Civil Case No. 653, and that the decision that the Court renders here "would greatly affect the respective claims of said parties in (said) case." (G.R. No. 1, 46396, Record, pp. 128-130) The aforesaid motion was followed by respondent Zobel's Motion for Immediate Resolution of Defendant-Movant's Motion to Suspend, etc., dated August 20, 1969. An opposition thereto was filed by plaintiff therein and a reply was filed in turn by respondent Zobel on July 30, 1 969. Acting on the said motions, the trial court issued an order on September 2, 1969 giving the parties certain periods to file their pleadings and cancelling a scheduled hearing until it shall have resolved the motion to suspend. Since that time, however, the trial court chose not, or failed, to act formally on the aforesaid motion to suspend hearings. Then after five (5) years, with the trial court now presided by Judge Arlegui, respondent Zobel flip-flopped and filed a Motion to Dismiss the case below dated January 14, 1976, claiming alleged failure to prosecute and res judicata, which was vigorously opposed by herein petitioner. Judge Arlegui, robot-like, nonetheless dismissed the Republic's complaint for Zobel's alleged grounds of failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time and res judicata per his order of January 12, 1977. A 35-page motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by Petitioner within the extended period sought for in an earlier motion. The then Presiding Judge Arlegui summarily denied the motion for extension of time earlier filed, per its order of March 3, 1977. The "Motion for Reconsideration of Order" dated March 3, 1977, and "Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration of Order" dated March 3,1977, were similarly denied by Judge Arlegui in his order dated June 14, 1977. Petitioner Republic thus elevated the matter to this Court by certiorari and mandamus which was docketed as G.R. No. L11 46396 and asked that it be consolidated with the case at bar which from the beginning was assigned to the Court en banc. However, G.R. No. L-46396 was somehow assigned to the Second Division of the Court which peremptorily dismissed the petition per its minute resolution dated December 1 7, 1977, which reads: Acting on the petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case as well as the comment thereon of the private respondent and the reply of petitioner and rejoinder thereto of said respondent, the Court resolved to DISMISS the petition, considering that although the motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of petitioner dated February 19, 1977 may be deemed as filed within the reglementary period for appeal, the same did not suspend said period which expired on February 21, 1977 (Gibbs v. Court of First Instance of Manila, 80 Phil. 160, where the appeal albeit late by one day, was nevertheless allowed on the ground that under the peculiar circumstances of the case showing utmost effort on the part of appellant to make the same on time, there was excusable neglect, which does not obtain here) because "the petition for extension of time should

not .interrupt the period fixed by law for the taking of the appeal" on the ground that "the only purpose of said petition is to ask the court to grant an additional period to that fixed by law to that end." (Alejandro v. Endencia 64 Phil, 321) Soon after the dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 46396, respondent Zobel filed in this case a "Motion to Dismiss Petition" and "Manifestation and Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order" issued on March 7, 1969, and another supplemental motion, on the ground that the instant case has become moot and academic by the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 653 in the court below. This was refuted by the herein petitioner in its Comment dated March 30, 1981. On December 15, 1981, Judge Arlegui precipitately rendered in Civil Case No. 653 a decision on the Counterclaim of herein respondent Zobel, declaring him the true, absolute and registered owner of the lands covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 3699, T-7702 and 9262 (now No. 10031) and directing the Government's licensees and permittees occupying the same to vacate the lands held by them. Subsequently, on March 9, 1982, Judge Arlegui issued a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 653, prompting the heirs of Guillermo Mercado to file in this case an Urgent Motion dated March 22,1982 to stay the same. Acting on the Urgent Motion, the "Court issued another restraining order dated June 17, 1982, emphasizing the necessity therefor in this wise: ... the issuance of the restraining order now prayed for by movants-heirs of Guillermo Mercado is necessary to retain the status quo since whatever rights they have are only in representation of the petitioner Republic who claims the said lands by virtue of their reversion to the public dominion as specifically adjudged by this court in G.R. No. L- 26112., Respondent Zobel then moved for a reconsideration and lifting of aforesaid restraining order. The heirs of intervenor Zoila de Chavez on the other hand, moved for a preliminary mandatory injunction to restore them in possession of a Portion of the land in dispute from where they had been ousted by virtue of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 653. In a Consolidated Comment dated September 30, 1982, petitioner Republic opposed the said motion of respondent Zobel, and at the same time concurred with the motion filed by the heirs of Zoila de Chavez for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. On or about November 8, 1983, the heirs of intervenor Guillermo Mercado filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt and Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, etc.," as respondent Zobel's representative, in spite of the restraining order enjoining them from enforcing the writ of execution, had begun to acquire possession of the land in question by cutting off trees in the undeveloped fishpond being leased by Mercado from the 7 government. On November 10, 1983, the Court issued the corresponding restraining order prayed for "enjoining respondent Enrique Zobel or his duly authorized representative from further cutting off the trees in the undeveloped fishpond of Guillermo Mercado having an area of two (2) hectares, more or less, and from hauling the big trees already cut off costing P10,000.00 "Resolution dated November 13, 1983). On or about November 23, 1983, the heirs of Guillermo Mercado filed a "Second Urgent Motion for Contempt and a Second Restraining Order, etc." since, in spite of the foregoing restraining order issued by this Court, respondent Zobel and his agent were still cutting off the trees in the disputed areas. On December 6, 1983, after the hearing en banc of this case on the merits, a resolution was rendered by this Court "to ISSUE a second temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Enrique Zobel and his agents, representatives and/or any other person or persons acting on his behalf to desist from cutting off or removing any tree in the questioned areas which were declared reverted to the public domain and which are claimed by the Republic, effective immediately and until further orders by the Court. Against this background, respondent Zobel now contends that his TCT No. 3699 and TCT No. 9262 (now T-10031) are valid and subsisting as said titles "cannot be considered automatically annulled" by the decision in G.R. No. L20950; that the decision in G.R. No. L-20950 annulled only TCT No. 9550 and no other; that he cannot be bound by the decision in said G.R. No. L-20950 since he was not a party thereto; that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 653 and

of the appeal therefrom by the Republic has quieted his questioned titles and has rendered the instant petition moot and academic; that the decision on his counterclaim in Civil Case No. 653 declaring him to be the true and registered owner of the subject land had long become final and executory, and that under the principle of res judicata the present petition ought to be dismissed; and that intervenors Mercado and Chavez have no right of possession over the land in question. The Republic's petition is patently meritorious. 1. On the original issue at bar brought against respondent Judge Angeles" issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction per the questioned Order of October 1, 1968, petitioner Republic and its co-petitioner licensees are manifestly entitled to the restraining orders issued by the Court on March 7, 1969 enjoining respondent judge from enforcing the preliminary mandatory injunction that he had issued that would oust the Republic and its licensees from the public lands in question and transfer possession thereof to respondent Zobel; that issued on June 17, 1982 enjoining enforcement of respondent Judge Arlegui's writ of execution issued on March 9, 1982 declaring without trial respondent Zobel (on his counterclaim to the dismissed complaint) as the true and registered owner of the lands covered by TCT Nos. 3699, 7702 and 9262 (now 10031) and directing the Republic's licensees to vacate the same; and that issued on December 6, 1983 after the hearing on the merits, "enjoining respondent Enrique Zobel and his agents, representatives and/ or any other person or persons acting on his behalf to desist from cutting off or removing any tree in the questioned areas which were declared reverted to the public domain and which are claimed by the Republic." Respondent Judge Arlegui, after he succeeded Judge Angeles as presiding judge, committed the gravest abuse of discretion, when, instead of granting the preliminary injunction sought by the Republic and its co-petitioners to enjoin respondent Zobel from usurping lands of the public domain covered by his voided expanded subdivision titles, he dismissed the complaint on January 12, 1977 and almost four years later on December 15, 1981, without any trial, granted said respondent's counter prayer in his Answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 653 for the issuance of a mandatory injunction upon a P10,000.00 bond to oust petitioner Republic and its permittees and/or lessees from the property and to deliver possession thereof to respondent Zobel. It is settled doctrine that as a preliminary mandatory injunction usually tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction 12 prior to the final hearing and that it may issue only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right is very clear. Contrary to respondent Zobel's assertion, the 1965 final judgment in favor of the Republic declared as null and void, not only TCT No. 9550, but also "other subdivision titles" issued over the expanded areas outside the private land of 13 Hacienda Calatagan covered by TCT No. 722. As shown at the outset, after respondents ordered subdivision of the Hacienda Calatagan which enabled them to acquire titles to and "illegally absorb" the subdivided lots which were outside the hacienda's perimeter, they converted the same into fishponds and sold them to third parties, But as the Court stressed in the 1965 judgment and time and again in other cases, 'it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into 14 properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant." This is crystal clear from the dispositive portion or judgment which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (a) Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T 550 (or Exhibit "24") of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which including the lots in T-9550 (lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion." This final 1965 judgment reverting to public dominion all public lands unlawfully titled by respondent Zobel and Ayala and/or Hacienda Calatagan is now beyond question, review or reversal by any court, although as sadly shown hereinabove, respondents' tactics and technical maneuvers have all these 23 long years thwarted its execution petition and the Republic's recovery of the lands and waters of the public domain. Respondent Zobel is bound by his admission in his Answer to the Complaint below that when Civil Case No. 373 was docketed, he "was and still is at present one of the members and managing partners of Ayala y Cia one of the defendants in the said civil case, and, therefore. privy thereto."

Clearly, the burden of proof lies on respondent Zobel and other transferees to show that his subdivision titles are not among the unlawful expanded subdivision titles declared null and void by the said 1965 judgment. Respondent Zobel not only -did not controvert the Republic's assertion that his titles are embraced within the phrase "other subdivision titles" ordered cancelled but failed to show that the sub division titles in his name cover lands within the original area covered by Ayala's TCT No. 722 (derived from OCT No. 20) and not part of the beach, foreshore and territorial sea belonging and ordered reverted to public dominion in the aforesaid 1965 judgment. 2. The issues at bar have been expanded by the parties, as shown by the voluminous records of the case (which have expanded to 2,690 pages in three volumes), to cover the questioned actions of respondent Judge Arlegui (a) in dismissing the Republic's complaint in Civil Case No. 653 of his court per his Order of January 12, 1977 (subject of the Court's Second Division's Resolution of December 17, 1979 dismissing the Republic's petition for review in Case G.R. No. L,46396); and (b) his decision of December 15, 1981, after almost four years, on respondent Zobel's counterclaim in the same case, declaring him the true and registered owner of the lands covered by some three 15 subdivision titles in his name, as well as (c) the resurvey of the lands affected so as to properly segregate from Ayala's expanded TCT No. 722 the estimated 2,000 hectares of territorial sea, foreshore, and navigable waters, etc., of the public domain and enforcement and execution of the 1965 final judgment reverting these usurped public areas 16 to public dominion. 3. On the first question of the precipitate dismissal of the Republic's complaint in the case below, Civil Case No. 653, the . records show respondent judge's action to have been capricious , arbitrary and whimsical. His first ground of non-prosecution of the action by the Republic is belied by his very Order which shows that the proceedings had been suspended all the while since its filing in 1967 upon insistent motions of respondent Zobel. against petitioner's vigorous opposition, that it was necessary as a cuestion previa to await the Court's resolution of the case at bar. His second ground of res judicata is likewise devoid of logic and reason. The first case (the 1965 judgment in Case L20950) decreeing the reversion to public dominion of the public lands and waters usurped by respondent's unlawfully expanded titles -and ordering the cancellation of all such titles and their transfers could not possibly be invoked as res judicata in the case at bar on respondent Zobel's untenable submission that his unlawfully expanded titles were not specifically mentioned in the 1965 judgment. The Court in said 1965 judgment had stressed the elementary rule that the generally incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens Certificate of Title does not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of registration, as in this case, being part of the sea, beach, foreshore or navigable 17 water or other public lands incapable of registration. It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a Sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel 18 or laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its 19 application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. Respondent Judge Arlegui's refusal to grant the Republic a simple 15-day extension of time to file a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that such motion was filed on the last day (following a Sunday) and he could no 20 longer act thereon within the original period per his Orders of March 3, 1977 and June 14, 1977 depict an incomprehensible disregard of the cardinal principle that procedural rules are supposed to help and not hinder the administration of justice and crass indifference, if not outright hostility against the public interest. At any rate, such dismissal of the complaint and dismissal on December 17, 1979 of the petition for certiorari thereof by the Court's Second Division, based on purely procedural and technical grounds, does not and cannot in any way have any legal significance or prejudice the Republic's case. Such dismissal by the Second Division cannot in any way affect, much less render nugatory, the final and executory 1965 judgment in G.R. No. L-20950 reverting the public lands and waters to public dominion. Much more so when we take into account the mandatory provisions of Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the 1987 Constitution (and its counterpart Article X, Section 2(3) of the 1973 Constitution) to the effect that only the Supreme Court en banc may modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law or ruling laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division. 3. Respondent judge's "decision" on respondent Zobel's counterclaim and declaring him, four years after dismissal of the Republic's complaint, as the true owner of the lands unlawfully titled in Zobel's name is properly before the Court in the case at bar. We declare the same null and void for want of jurisdiction over the subject properties which were reverted to public dominion in the final 1965 judgment which annulled all expanded titles unlawfully secured by respondents and their transferees to public waters and lands. 4. As to the third and most important question of finally executing and enforcing the 1965 judgment in favor of the Republic and reverting all usurped areas to public dominion, the Solicitor General has complained rightfully in his Memorandum that "mass usurpation of public domain remains unabated . ... for almost (23) years now execution of

the 1965 final judgment in G.R. No. L-20950, ordering the cancellation of the subdivision titles covering the expanded areas outside the private lands of Hacienda Calatagan, is being frustrated by respondent Zobel, the Ayala and/or Hacienda Calatagan. As a consequence, the mass usurpation of lands of public domain consisting of portions of the territorial sea, the foreshore, beach and navigable water bordering Balayan Bay, Pagaspas Bay and the China Sea, still remain unabated . ... (T)he efforts of Ayala and Zobel to prevent execution of said final judgment are evident from the heretofore-mentioned technical maneuvers they have resorted to. In brief, they moved to quash and secured the quashal of the writ of execution, succeeded in opposing the issuance of another writ of execution, opposed the motion to conduct re-survey, opposed the approval and secured a disapproval of resurvey plan, moved to dismiss and got a dismissal of Civil Case No. 653, ousted government fishpond permittees from the subject lands and threatened to eject the other permittees therefrom, and secured from the lower court a declaration of validity of their void titles. Also, in this case, respondent Zobel is trying to prevent the cancellation of his void titles by resorting to 21 frivolous technicalities thus flouting this Honorable Court's decision in G.R. No. L-20950 . " We heed the Republic's pleas that "It bears stressing that the Re-survey Plan (Annex "C", together with Annexes "A" and "B" of Republic's Comment dated March 30,1981, being a Report on the Re-survey dated August 5,1977 and the "Final Report" dated September 2, 1977, respectively) delineating the expanded areas covered by subdivision titles derived from TCT No. 722 has been prepared by a Committee created by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources wherein Ayala and/or Hacienda Calatagan was represented by Engineer Tomas Sanchez, Jr. and approved by the Director of Lands. Well to recall that under G.R. No. 26112 (44 SCRA 255, 263), this Honorable Court, in a Resolution dated April 11, 1972, declared that as soon as said resurvey Is completed the proper writ of execution for the delivery of possession of the portion found to be public land should issue." Thus: [See pages 3-5 of Annex "A" hereof for text of Resolution.] "By virtue of the aforesaid resolution, therefore, there should no longer be any legal impediment against the execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 373 (G.R. No. L-20950), the issuance of which is purely ministerial the dubious decision in Civil Case No. 653 notwithstanding. Accordingly, to give legal significance to the earlier decision and resolution of this Honorable Court in G.R. No. L-20950 and 26112, respectively, and to foreclose any further legal obstacle on the matter, we pray this Honorable Court to declare the proceedings conducted by respondent judge in Civil Case No. 653 null and void ab initio, and to consider the resurvey plan as sufficient basis for the immediate issuance of the corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 373. For it is only upon said execution that the oft revived issues of ownership and possession over the land in question, as well as over all other lots covered by the subdivision titles outside the private land covered by TCT No. 722, may be finally laid to rest. Indeed, under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 373 is long 22 overdue ." To allow repetition after repetition of the maneuvers hereinabove set forth in detail, notwithstanding the final 1965 judgment in favor of the Republic, and to protract further the return to the Republic of the usurped lands pertaining to the public domain would be to sanction a legal abomination As stated by the late Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, to frustrate delivery and return of the usurped lands to the Republic would: (1) Establish a precedent-fraught with possibilities tending to impair the stability of judicial decisions and affording a means to prolong court proceedings or justify the institution of new ones, despite the finality of the judgment or decree rendered in the main case, by sanctioning a departure from the clear, plain and natural meaning of said judgment or decree; (2) Contribute to the further increase of the steadily mounting number of cases pending before our courts of justice, and thus generate greater delay in the determination of said cases, as well as offset the effect of legislative and administrative measures taken-some upon the suggestion or initiative of the Supreme Court to promote the early disposal of such cases; (3) Impair a normal and legitimate means to implement the constitutional mandate for the protection and conservation of our natural resources and the patrimony of the nation; and (4) Promote usurpations of the public domain, as well as the simulation of sales thereof by the original usurper, by exempting him from responsibility for damage which would not have been sustained were it not for the irregularities committed by him so long as he has conveyed the subject 23 matter thereof to a purchaser for value, in good faith.

As in Air Manila, Inc. v. CIR and several other cases in order to avoid further intolerable delay and finally bring to reality the execution of the 1965 judgment that would enable the State to recover at last the estimated 2,000 hectares of lands and waters of the public domain, the Court will order its Clerk of Court to issue directly the corresponding writ of execution of judgment addressed to the sheriffs of the locality. We declare respondent judge's gratuitous "disapproval" of the Re-survey Plan and Report duly approved by the Director of Lands and the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as null and void for being ultra vires and lack of jurisdiction over the same. It is well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no supervising " power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, 25 and findings of fact. There should be no thought of disregarding the traditional line separating judicial and administrative competence, the former being entrusted with the determination of legal questions and the latter being 26 limited as a result of its expertise to the ascertainment of the decisive facts. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered 1. Annulling the questioned mandatory injunction of October 1, 1968 issued by respondent-judge and making permanent the restraining orders issued by the Court; 2. Declaring as null and void the questioned decision of December 15, 1981, as well as the corresponding writ of execution therefore having been issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction, and for being in contravention of the final 1965 decision in Civil Case No. 373 as affirmed in G.R. No. L-20950; 3. Declaring the Re-survey Plan duly approved by the Director of Lands as sufficient basis for the execution of the final judgment in the aforesaid Civil Case No. 373 as affirmed in G.R. No. L- 20950; and 4. Directing the Clerk of this Court to forthwith issue the corresponding writ of execution in the case at bar for Civil Case No. 373 of the Regional Trial Court (formerly Court of First Instance) of Batangas (Balayan Branch) reverting to public dominion and delivering to the duly authorized representatives of the Republic all public lands and lots, fishponds, territorial bay waters, rivers, manglares foreshores and beaches, etc. as delineated in the aforesaid duly approved Re-survey Plan (Annex "C") and any supplemental Re-survey Plan as may be found necessary *and duly approved by the Secretary of Agriculture. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration will be granted.

24

G.R. No. 73974 May 31, 1995 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Represented by the Director of Lands), petitioner, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON, MANUEL G. ATIENZA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (Lucena Branch) and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

ROMERO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate 2 Court reversing the decision of the former Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II at Lucena City which annulled Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13840 and Free Patent (FP) No. 324198 issued to Manuel Atienza for a 17-hectare piece of land which turned out to be within the forest zone in Pagbilao, Quezon. On April 18, 1967, Atienza was awarded FP No. 324198 over a parcel of land located in Ila, Malicboy, Pagbilao, Quezon, with an area of 172,028 square meters. By virtue of such award, he was issued on May 5, 1967, OCT No. P13840. Sometime in 1968, an investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in connection with alleged land grabbing activities in Pagbilao. It appeared that some of the free patents, including that of Atienza's, were fraudulently acquired. Thus, on March 19, 1970, a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, against Atienza and four other persons for allegedly falsifying their applications for free patent, the survey plans, and other documents pertinent to said applications. In its decision dated October 4, 1972, the court acquitted the accused of the crime charged but, finding that the land covered by the application for free patent of private respondent was within the forest zone, declared as null and void OCT No. P-13840 in Atienza's name and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon to cancel the same. Meanwhile, before the promulgation of said decision, or on May 10, 1972, then Acting Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco filed for the petitioner a complaint against Atienza, the Register of Deeds of Quezon, and the Rural Bank of Sariaya, which was later dropped as defendant and, in an amended complaint, substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines as actual mortgagee of the subject parcel of land. Docketed as Civil Case No. 7555, the complaint prayed for the declaration of nullity of FP No. 324198 and OCT No. P-13840. In his answer, Atienza claimed that the land in question was no longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application for free patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land "was already alienable and disposable public agricultural land." Since the subject land was a very small portion of Lot 5139 of the Pagbilao Cadastre, an area which had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court on March 9, 1932 in Cadastral Case No. 76 entitled "El Govierno Filipino de las Islas Filipinas contra Jose Abastillas, et al., G.L.R.O. cadastral Record No. 1124," he also averred that the Director of Lands had given due course to free and homestead patent applications of claimants to Lot 5139. He further alleged that through a certain Sergio Castillo, he had been in possession of the land since the Japanese occupation, cultivating it and introducing improvements thereon. The DBP, after due and proper investigation and inspection of his title, even granted him a loan with the subject property as collateral. Finally, he stated that his acquittal in the criminal case proved that he committed no fraud in his application for free patent. On July 27, 1981, the lower court rendered a decision with the categorical finding based on "solid evidence" that "the land in question was found definitely within the forest zone denominated as Project 21-A." The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, (J)udgment is hereby rendered: (a) Declaring as null and void Original Certificate of Title No. P-13840 in the name of defendant Manuel G. Atienza, as well as Free Patent No. V-324198;
1

(b) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the Development Bank of the Philippines, Lucena City Branch, the sum of P15,053.97, and all interests due thereon; and (c) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED. On appeal, Atienza maintained that the land in question was not within the unclassified public forest land and therefore alienable land of the public domain. The then Intermediate Appellate Court relied only on the arguments he raised since petitioner had not filed any brief, and arrived at the conclusion that "(t)he litigated land is part of public land alienable and disposable for homestead and [F]ree Patent." On December 27, 1985, the appellate court set aside the lower court's decision, declared as valid and subsisting Atienza's OCT, and dismissed the cross-claim of the DBP. After receiving a copy of said decision, Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili informed the Director of Lands of the adverse decision of the appellate court, which noted that no appellee's brief had been filed in said court. Agcaoili also stated that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had not been furnished with the appellant's brief; that the Bureau of Lands received notice of hearing of the record on appeal filed by the appellant but the OSG had not been informed of the "action taken thereon;" that since the Bureau of Lands had been furnished directly with relevant pleadings and orders, the same office should "take immediate appropriate action on the decision;" and that it may file a motion for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from January 6, 1986, the date of receipt by the OSG of the copy of the decision sought to be appealed. On January 28, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated February 12, 1986. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said resolution was likewise denied. The instant petition for review on certiorari raises the following arguments: (a) petitioner was denied due process and fair play when Atienza did not furnish it with a copy of his appellant's brief before the then Intermediate Appellate Court thereby depriving it of the opportunity to rebut his assertions which later became the sole basis of the assailed decision of December 27, 1985; (b) the appellate court erred in holding that the land in question is part of the alienable and disposable public land in complete disregard of the trial court's finding that it forms part of the unclassified public forest zone; and (c) the appellate court erred in declaring that the land in question could be alienated and disposed of in favor of Atienza. We find for the petitioner. Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a 3 party of the right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious. Respect for the appellant's right, however, carries with it the corresponding respect for the appellee's similar rights to fair play and justice. Thus, appeal being a 4 purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Of paramount importance is the duty of an appellant to serve a copy of his brief upon the appellee with proof of 5 service thereof. This procedural requirement is consonant with Section 2 of Rule 13, which mandates that all pleadings and papers "shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties affected thereby." The importance of 6 serving copies of the brief upon the adverse party is underscored in Mozar v. Court of Appeals, where the Court held that the appellees "should have been given an opportunity to file their appellee's brief in the Court of Appeals if only to emphasize the necessity of due process." In this case, however, the Court of Appeals, oblivious of the fact that this case involves public lands requiring as it does the exercise of extraordinary caution lest said lands be dissipated and erroneously alienated to undeserving or unqualified private individuals, decided the appeal without hearing the government's side. Atienza avers that he furnished Atty. Francisco Torres, a lawyer in the Bureau of Lands and designated special attorney for the Office of the Solicitor General, with two copies of the appellant's brief, thereby implying that it was not his fault that petitioner failed to file its appellee's brief.

Such an assertion betrays a lack of comprehension of the role of the Solicitor General as government counsel or of 7 the OSG as the government's "law office." Only the Solicitor General, as the lawyer of the government, can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and, therefore, actions filed in the name of the Republic, if 8 not initiated by the Solicitor General, will be summarily dismissed. Specifically, he is empowered to represent the 9 Government in all land registration and related proceedings, such as, an action for cancellation of title and for 10 reversion of a homestead to the government. Hence, he is entitled to be furnished with copies of all court orders, notices and decisions. Consequently, service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary period for filing appeals and for finality of decisions. His representative, who may be a lawyer from 11 the Bureau of Lands, has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal should be made. Service of the appellant's brief on Atty. Torres was no service at all upon the Solicitor General. It may be argued that Atty. Torres could have transmitted one of the two copies of appellant's brief upon the Solicitor General, but such omission does not excuse Atienza's failure to serve a copy of his brief directly on the Solicitor General. On the part of the appellate court, its decision based solely on, and even quoting verbatim from, the appellant's brief was certainly arrived at in grave abuse of discretion. It denied appellee (petitioner herein) of the opportunity to be heard and to rebut Atienza's allegations, in rank disregard of its right to due process. Such violation of due process 12 could have been rectified with the granting of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the appellate court, but even the door to this recourse was slammed by the appellate court with the denial of petitioner's motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 12, 1986, which ruling erroneously applied 13 the Habaluyas doctrine. Such denial notwithstanding, petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. Considering the clear allegations thereunder, the appellate court would have done well, in the interest of justice, not to blindly adhere to technical rules 14 of procedure by dismissing outright said motion. As we declared in Villareal v. Court of Appeals: . . . The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain and air their side. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling taken. (Emphasis supplied) In view of the foregoing and the long-standing procedural rule that this Court may review the findings of facts of the 15 Court of Appeals in the event that they may be contrary to those of the trial court, in order to attain substantial justice, the Court now reviews the facts of the case. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains 16 unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, 17 and ultimately, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural 18 Resources). Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department through 19 20 the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption 21 of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant who, in this case, is Atienza. The 22 records show, however, that he failed to present clear, positive and absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to support his claim. Atienza's claim is rooted in the March 9, 1932 decision of the then Court of First Instance of Tayabas in Cadastral Case No. 76, which was not given much weight by the court a quo, and for good reasons. Apart from his assertions before this Court, Atienza failed to present proof that he or his predecessor-in-interest was one of the claimants who answered the petition filed by the then Attorney-General in the said cadastral proceedings. The document reflecting said cadastral decision, a xerox copy, indicated the claimants simply as "Jose Abastillas et al." In support of that decision, Atienza presented a certification purportedly issued by someone from the Technical Reference Section of the Surveys Division, apparently of the Bureau of Lands, stating that "Lot 5886 is a portion of

Lot 5139 Pagbilao Cadastre," which evidence is, however, directly controverted by the sketch plan showing that the land in controversy is actually outside the alienable and disposable public lands, although part of Lot 5139. The fact that Atienza acquired a title to the land is of no moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of titles issued 23 under the Torrens system. In Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. The "fraud" contemplated by 24 the law (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, that is, "an intentional omission of fact required by law," which in the case at bench consisted in the failure of Atienza to state that the land sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest lands. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the court a quo dated July 27, 1981, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 41968 February 15, 1995 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. THE HON. JUDGE DELIA P. MEDINA and DOMINGO REYES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.: In 1968 Damingo Reyes sought the registration of eight (8) parcels of land in the barrios of Vigo, Catidang, and Tala in San Narciso (now San Andres), Quezon before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch I, as a land registration court. The Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application as did several private individuals. In due course, the court issued a general order of default except for the Director of Lands and the private oppositors. During the hearings of the case, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon appeared as counsel for both the Director of Lands and the then Director of Forestry. Although the latter did not formally enter his appearance in the case, the court allowed him, through the Provincial Fiscal, to introduce evidence in support of the fact that 176 hectares of the area sought to be registered fell within the forest classification and, therefore, were inalienable and unregisterable. On July 31, 1974, Judge Delia P. Medina rendered a decision adjudicating to Domingo Reyes the four (4) parcels of land sought to be registered and ordering their registration in his name. The Provincial Fiscal received a copy of the Decision on August 8, 1974, but the Solicitor General received his copy only on November 13, 1974. On December 12, 1974, within the 30-day period then required for interposing an appeal, the Solicitor General filed for the Directors of Land and Forest Development, a notice of appeal and an urgent motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal, which the Provincial Fiscal eventually filed on January 2, 1975. On December 26, 1974, however, counsel for Domingo Reyes filed an opposition to the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file record on appeal. He contended that since it was principally the Provincial Fiscal who represented both the Directors of Land and Forest Development and who received the copy of the Decision on August 8, 1974, the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time filed by the Solicitor General had been filed out of time, the Decision, having become final and executory. The Solicitor General replied that since he was the counsel of record and principal counsel with the Provincial Fiscal appearing merely as his representative in the case, he should have been served all pleadings and processes in the case and that receipt by the fiscal of the decision was not equivalent to his receipt inasmuch as such representation did not divest him of control over the case as its principal counsel. Domingo Reyes reacted to these avertments by arguing that although the Office of the Solicitor General filed for the Bureau of Lands an opposition to his application for registration, there was no justification for the Solicitor General's claim that he was the principal counsel for the oppositors as other lawyers had appeared for and in behalf of both the private and public oppositors. Moreover, it was the Provincial Fiscal who "carried the brunt for the oppositor Bureau of Forestry" and not the Solicitor General who did not appear and participate during the hearings of the case. In his rejoinder, the Solicitor General asserted that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 478, he was the government's representative in land registration cases; that his authority to deputize the Provincial Fiscal in the performance of his duties did not divest him of control over the case; and that in the land registration case at hand, he did not empower the Provincial Fiscal to receive pleadings and court processes. On March 31, 1975, Judge Medina issued an order ruling that, as far as the Director of Lands was concerned, the period to file an appeal should be counted from receipt of the Decision by the Solicitor General considering that the Provincial Fiscal who had appeared as counsel of record "with personality separate and distinct from that of the Solicitor General('s)," had expressly informed the court and the adverse party that he was a mere representative of 1 the Solicitor General. Citing Circular No. 41, which was issued on November 28, 1973 by the Secretary of Justice,

Judge Medina opined that in cases where fiscals had been authorized to appear by the Solicitor General, they appeared as special attorneys of the Office of the Solicitor General. Judge Medina also stated: The Fiscal, being thus a mere representative and extension of the personality of the Solicitor General cannot be considered as a separate counsel of record for the oppositor, Director of Lands, notice to whom is also notice to the Solicitor General, as contemplated in the case of Palteng vs. Court of Appeals (26 SCRA 736). The Solicitor General being the principal counsel; is entitled to service of the orders, pleadings and the decision in this case and pursuant to Circular No. 41 of the Department of Justice, the service to him of the decision rendered in this case shall be the basis of the finality thereof. However, the above is true only with respect to the opposition of the Director of Lands, since it was only the Director of Lands for whom the Solicitor General entered a formal opposition and specifically authorized the Fiscal to appear in his behalf, in the light of Circular No. 41 of the Department of Justice. The record shows that the Director of Forestry was represented only by the Fiscal who did not interpose for him a timely appeal despite receipt of the Decision on August 8, 2 1974, hence, said Decision has become final and executory as to the Director of Forestry. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal of the Director of Forestry, gave due course to the appeal of the Director of Lands, and directed the Solicitor General to amend the notice of appeal and record on appeal within ten (10) days from notice. In behalf of the Director of Forest Development, the Solicitor General filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Order of March 31, 1975, on the ground that since Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 478 vests upon the Solicitor General the exclusive authority to represent the government and its officers, service of the Decision upon the Provincial Fiscal who had "no legal personality by himself to appear for the Director of Forestry" produced "no legal effect whatever and his inaction" could not bind the Director of Forestry. The Solicitor General also contended that although he had not filed a formal opposition to the application for land registration in behalf of the Director of Forestry, he should be "deemed for all legal intents and purposes" said Director's counsel and receipt by him of copy of the Decision should be determinative of its finality. Said motion was denied by the lower court on June 17, 1975 for lack of merit. On July 22, 1975, the Solicitor General filed a motion for a 30-day extension within which to submit an amended record on appeal. Domingo Reyes opposed the motion, and on July 31, 1975, the lower court dismissed the Solicitor General's appeal for his failure to amend the notice of appeal and record on appeal as required in the order of March 31, 1975, after a lapse of more than three months. It turned out, however, that a motion for extension of time dated July 23, 1975, had in fact been filed by the Solicitor General because on August 1, 1975 the lower court issued an Order holding that such motion had been "rendered moot and academic" by its Order of July 31, 1975, dismissing the appeal interposed by the Solicitor General. Nevertheless, on August 14, 1975, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an amended notice of appeal to the Court of appeals. On August 22, 1975, a special counsel filed a motion and manifestation stating that upon the instruction of the Provincial Fiscal, he was submitting a motion for reconsideration signed by the Assistant Solicitor General and an amended record on appeal incorporating relevant pleadings and orders. He manifested that "the Office of the Provincial Fiscal was not able to immediately comply with the wire-request dated July 22, 1975 for the reason that said wire-request was received by this Office only on July 30, 1975, aside from the fact that the record 3 of this office regarding this case has all been forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor General." The said motion for reconsideration of the Order of July 31, 1975, was filed by the Solicitor General for the Director of Lands. It alleged: xxx xxx xxx 2. That previously, on April 29, 1975 a partial motion for reconsideration of the Order of March 31, 1975 was presented by undersigned counsel which was denied in an Order dated June 17, 1975, which second order although received by the office of the Solicitor General on June 23, 1975 was actually delivered to the undersigned Solicitor in charge of the case only on July 16, 1975;

3. That, thereupon, on July 22, 1975 the Solicitor General wired the Provincial Fiscal directing him to file immediately the amended record on appeal pursuant to the order of March 31, 1971, at the same time filing a motion for extension of time to file the amended record on appeal but which was erroneously filed with the Court of Appeals on July 22, 1975. Sad to state said Provincial Fiscal did not comply with aforesaid instruction to file the amended record on appeal. Had he immediately done so upon receipt of the wire dated July 22, 1975, there would have been no occasion for this Court to issue the Order dated July 31, 1975 since the desired amendment, as we see it, merely involves the simple expedient of deleting or striking out from the notice of appeal dated December 12, 1974, the Director of Forest Development as party appellant thereby leaving the Director of Lands as the sole appellant herein, which act the Clerk of Court may well do by himself upon the direction of the Court; 4. That there being no showing that the amendment directed by the Court is necessary for the proper understanding and resolution of the issues, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 41, Rev. Rules of Court, the omission of the Fiscal in making such amendment should not prejudice the Director of Lands who has seasonably perfected his appeal; . . . To this motion, the Solicitor General attached the amended record on appeal. In an order dated November 12, 1975, the lower court denied the said two motions. Thereupon, the Solicitor General instituted the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of the Directors of Land and Forest Development. He averred that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, "or at least, in violation of law," in dismissing the appeal of the Director of Forestry, because while said official did not file a written opposition to the application for land registration, the lower court allowed him to adduce evidence which fact "could not legally foreclose the said petitioner's right to appeal through his principal counsel the Solicitor General who . . . interposed for him a timely appeal." The Solicitor General also charged the lower court with having acted with grave abuse of discretion, "or at least in violation of law," in dismissing the appeal of the Director of Lands for his failure to file an amended record on appeal within the ten-day period granted him. He argued that while Sec. 7, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates the inclusion in an amended record on appeal of any matter essential to the determination of a case, the lower court directed the exclusion of the Director of Forestry as a party litigant as well as all pleadings bearing on his opposition. In his manifestation and motion, private respondent alleged, among others, that certain portions of the tract of land subject of his application for registration are within the alienable and disposable areas of the public forest lands. The Solicitor General disputed said allegation, stating that according to the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), the areas referred to by private respondent are not entirely alienable and disposable. Although the avertments of the parties are factual matters which are not within the ambit of this Court's jurisdiction, the contradictory allegations on such factual issues necessitate a review of the merits of the application for land registration. Such a review may only be done upon a favorable action on the instant petition which we find to be impressed with merit. The instant petition actually requires an examination of the extent of the authority of the Solicitor General to represent the government and to delegate his authority to the Provincial Fiscal, although principally assailing the ruling of the lower court as regards the timeliness of the appeal interposed by the petitioners. As regards the authority of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the government when he entered an opposition to the private respondent's application for land registration, the law then governing was the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, which states: Sec. 1661. Duties of the Solicitor General. As principal law officer of the Government, the Solicitor-General shall have authority to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. Upon the request of the President or Speaker of any of the Houses of the Congress of the Philippines, the Solicitor-General or his authorized representative shall assist and attend any legislative committee that may be practicing any investigation ordered by the Congress, or by any of the Houses thereof.

It shall, among other things, be his duty, in person or by proper subordinate: xxx xxx xxx (b) To represent (the United States in the Supreme Court in all criminal cases, and to represent the United States and) the Government of the Philippines in the Supreme Court in all civil actions and special proceedings in which (either of) said Government, or any officer thereof in his official capacity, is a party. xxx xxx xxx When the decision in the land registration case was promulgated on July 31, 1974, the law in force was Presidential 4 Decree No. 478, the Magna Carta of the Office of the Solicitor General, which took effect immediately after its 5 issuance on June 4, 1974. This law provides that: Sec. 1. Functions and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx (e) Represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings. Institute actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution. xxx xxx xxx (g) Deputize, whenever in the opinion of the Solicitor General the public interest requires, any provincial or city fiscal to assist him in the performance of any function or discharge of any duty incumbent upon him, within the jurisdiction of the aforesaid provincial or city fiscal. When so deputized, the fiscal shall be under the control and supervision of the Solicitor General with regard to the conduct of the proceedings assigned to the fiscal, and he may be required to render reports or furnish information regarding the assignment. The Solicitor General, therefore, has "control and supervision" over the fiscal who has been deputized to appear for him. As such deputy, the fiscal is no more than the "surrogate" of the Solicitor General in any particular 6 proceeding. The Solicitor General's request for his representation does not make the fiscal the counsel of the 7 Republic. As the principal counsel, the Solicitor General is entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, 8 and decisions. Since court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as an agent of the Solicitor General in land 9 registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General, "service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary 10 period for filing appeals and for determining whether a decision had attained finality." All these jurisprudential pronouncements inexorably point to no other conclusion than that the appeal herein involved was timely filed by the Solicitor General. Considering, however, that the Solicitor General entered his appearance only for the Director of Lands, was the appeal interposed by the Director of Forestry (later Forest Development) likewise deemed timely filed? We hold that under the law and the peculiar circumstances of this case, such appeal was timely filed. After he had entered his appearance as counsel for the Director of Lands and deputized the provincial fiscal to appear during the hearings, the latter appeared, not only as counsel for the Director of Lands, but also for the Director of Forestry. In fact, the court allowed the Provincial Fiscal to adduce evidence for the latter official and his government agency without the private respondent registering any opposition. That fact estopped the court and the private respondent from later questioning the personality of the Director of Forestry. Moreover, pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of

the Revised Administrative Code and P.D. No. 478, the Solicitor General acts ascounsel for the government in land registration cases and not that of any particular government official and agency. His appearance therein is premised on his authority to protect the interest of the government and not that of any particular government official or agency. Considering the foregoing, the lower court gravely abused its discretion on dismissing the appeal of the government on the basis of what it perceived as a procedural lapse. The lower court should be reminded that the ends of substantial justice should be the paramount consideration in any litigation or proceeding. As this Court ruled in Republic v. Associacion Benevola de 11 Cebu, "to dismiss the Republic's appeal merely on the alleged ground of late filing is not proper considering the merits of the case" and to ignore the evidence presented by the provincial fiscal in behalf of the Director of Forestry which constituted the crux of the government's case "would defeat the time-honored Constitutional precepts and the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony." This notwithstanding, we need not discuss the issue raised as regards the filing of the record on appeal, as such procedural requirement has been dropped under Sec. 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines dated January 11, 1983. Now, a word about the working relationship between the Solicitor General and his deputy, the Provincial Fiscal. The problems ventilated in this petition would not have arisen had there been close coordination between the two officials and their respective offices to the end that all problems, whether substantive or procedural, could have been ironed out before they worsened. They should have remembered that they were representing the interests of the Republic which should, in no case, be compromised through neglect, inefficiency, or even ignorance, but accorded utmost attention. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby GRANTED and the questioned orders of the lower court dismissing the appeal interposed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the government are SET ASIDE. The Solicitor General is directed to file the proper petition for review before the Court of Appeals which shall resolve with dispatch the instant land registration case which has been pending for some twenty years. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-43445 January 20, 1988 EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA and SATURNINA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE PACADA, oppositorsappellants, vs. ANGEL ALBANO, ARSENIO ALBANO, ENCARNACION ALBANO, ROSALIA ALBANO, assisted by her husband, JUANITO ALBANO, ROSITA ALBANO, assisted by her husband, ALFREDO RAMIREZ, MIGUEL ALBANO, CHARITO ALBANO, and PEDRO ALBANO, petitioners-appellees. RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, in his capacity as Judge of Sala I, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, respondent.

NARVASA, J.: On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente, etc., et al., ruling that: (1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a cadastral court in accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496), or his successor-in-interest, has "a perfect right not only to the title of the land, but also to its possession;" (2) he has the right, too, under Section 17 of the same Act, to a writ of possession as against any "party to the registration proceeding and who is directly and personally affected and reached by the decree" (or who had 2 been served with process therein but had not appeared nor answered); and (3) his right to obtain a writ of 3 possession is not subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding execution of judgments, since the decree "is to exist forever." These doctrines have since been reiterated and reaffirmed. "The fundamental rule," the Court said some forty-three years later, "is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree." It also pointed out that neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land 5 registration case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. to the following effect: We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant. ... except insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment. ... (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceedings to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. ... ... There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is ... that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered. The Court restated those same principles in Lucero v. Loot some months later and took occasion to stress that in Marcelo v. Mencias, decided in 1960, the Court had gone "so far as to hold that if the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, ... a writ of
6 4 1

demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would be ineffective." The appeal at bar entails nothing more than the application of these established jurisprudential precepts to the undisputed facts. In Cadastral Proceeding No. 44 (LRC Rec. No. 1203) of the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, a decision 7 was rendered on July 31, 1941 adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No. 9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. One 8 of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. However, for reasons not disclosed by the record, but as to which no sinister or prejudicial character is imputed by the appellants, the decree of registration did not issue except until after the lapse of fourteen (14) years or so, or on October 14, 1955; and it was only after twenty-four (24) years had passed, or on November 17, 1979, that an original certificate of title (No. C-2185) was 9 issued in Delfina Aquino's name. On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration had been handed down but before title issued in Delfina Aquino's favor, the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual appellants Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca-brought suit in the same Court of First Instance against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino appellees Angel Albano, et 10 al. Said appellants alleged that they, and their mother, Ruperta Pascual, had been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; and they prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, that the 11 defendants be commanded to reconvey the land to them, and that a new title be made out in their names. It appears, parenthetically, that Delfina Aquino's title encroached upon a 4-square-meter portion of an adjoining lot, No. 9822, belonging to a Cesar Castro. So, Castro filed, with leave of court, a complaint in intervention on February 22, 1987 for the recovery thereof. After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered dismissing the Barroga's and Padaca's complaint, and declaring 12 intervenor Castro owner of the 4-square-meter portion overlapped by Delfina Aquino's title. The correctness of this judgment cannot be gainsaid in light of the recorded facts. The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for recovery of title Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership over the property, and in which proceeding the former's predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta Pascual, had taken part as oppositor but had been declared in default. The judgment of the cadastral court was one "against a specific thing" 13 and therefore "conclusive upon the title to the thing." It was a judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole 14 world, inclusive of persons not parties thereto, and particularly upon those who had actually taken part in the proceeding (like the appellants' predecessor, Ruperta Pascual, who had intervened therein as an oppositor) as well as "their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, 15 litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. The judgment became final and executory, the appeal taken therefrom to the Court of appeals by Barroga and Padaca having been dismissed because of their failure to file brief, and this Court having thereafter refused to set aside that dismissal on certiorari. Thereafter, at the instance of defendants Angel Albano, et al., the Court of First Instance ordered execution of the judgment on December 6, 1973. Plaintiffs Barroga and Padaca - moved to quash the writ of execution, on December 22, 1973. They argued that there was nothing to execute since the verdict was 16 simply one of dismiss of the complaint; they moreover invoked Section 11, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court. But here the matter apparently ended. No further development anent this case appears in the record. What the record does show is that on August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an Order in Case No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of possession as regards Lot No. 9821; and pursuant thereto, a writ of possession dated August 28, 1975 was issued. Again Barroga and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by Angel Albano, et al. They filed a "Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of Execution 17 Issued and to Revoke Writ of Possession Issued" under date of September 23, 1975. Their argument was that as possessors of the lot in question, they could not be ejected therefrom by a mere motion for writ of possession. The motion was heard on October 24, 1975, at which time the parties and their counsel stipulated upon the following facts, to wit: 1. That the claimants-petitioners Angel Albano, Arsenio Albano, Encarnacion Albano, Rosalia Albano, Rosita Albano, Miguel Albano, Jr., Charito Albano, Federico Albano, Jr. and Pedrito Albano

are the children-heirs and successors of Delfina Aquino, who is the registered owner of Lot No. 9821 covered by O.C.T. No. 0-2185, which decree was issued on July 31, 1941, marked Exh. A for the petitioners-claimants; 2. That movants-oppositors Eufemia Villanueva de Barroga and Saturnina Vda. de Pacada are the children-heirs and successors of Ruperta Pascual, who was an oppositor in Lot No. 9821, Cad. Case No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, and who was defaulted in said cadastral case, and decided on July 31, 1941 as follows: Lote No. 9821 Por incomparecencia injustificada de la opositora Ruperta Pascual, se desestima su contestacion. Se adjudica este lote No. 9821, con las mejoras en el existentes, en nombre de Delfina Q. Aquino, filipina, major de edad, viuda y residents del municipio de Lauag de la provincia de Ilocos Norte. 3. That the heirs of Ruperta Pascual, namely, Eufemia Villanueva de Barroga and Saturnina Vda. 18 de Padaca , are in possession of the lot in question since 1941 up to the present time. The motion was thereafter denied by the Court a quo, by Order dated September 22, 1975. The Court stated that the writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal 19 Marcos v. de Banuvar and Lucero v. Loot, It also declared that the segregation of the 4-square meter portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as integral part of Lot 9822, had no effect whatever on the Albanos' right to the writ of possession, which was the appropriate process for the enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case. Barroga and Padaca moved for reconsideration. When this proved unavailing, they appealed to this Court. The inevitable verdict should by now be apparent. Conformably with the established axioms set out in the opening paragraphs of this opinion, the appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication of the title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may correctly be enforced against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of Ruperta Pascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ of possession, despite the lapse of many, many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against 20 the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. The appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough. They should no longer be allowed to continue doing so. WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by appellants Eufemia Villanueva Vda. de Barroga and Saturnina Villanueva Vda. de Padaca is DISMISSED, and the Orders of the Court a quo dated August 8, 1975, September 22, 1975 and March 17, 1976 are AFFIRMED, as being in accord with the facts and the law. This decision is immediately executory, and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration will be entertained.

G.R. No. L-59266 February 29, 1988 SILVESTRE DIGNOS and ISABEL LUMUNGSOD, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ATILANO G. JABIL, respondents.

BIDIN, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the: (1) Decision * of the 9th Division, Court of Appeals dated July 31,1981, affirming with modification the Decision, dated August 25, 1972 of the Court of First Instance ** of Cebu in civil Case No. 23-L entitled Atilano G. Jabil vs. Silvestre T. Dignos and Isabela Lumungsod de Dignos and Panfilo Jabalde, as Attorney-in-Fact of Luciano Cabigas and Jovita L. de Cabigas; and (2) its Resolution dated December 16, 1981, denying defendant-appellant's (Petitioner's) motion for reconsideration, for lack of merit. The undisputed facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: The Dignos spouses were owners of a parcel of land, known as Lot No. 3453, of the cadastral survey of Opon, Lapu-Lapu City. On June 7, 1965, appellants (petitioners) Dignos spouses sold the said parcel of land to plaintiff-appellant (respondent Atilano J. Jabil) for the sum of P28,000.00, payable in two installments, with an assumption of indebtedness with the First Insular Bank of Cebu in the sum of P12,000.00, which was paid and acknowledged by the vendors in the deed of sale (Exh. C) executed in favor of plaintiff-appellant, and the next installment in the sum of P4,000.00 to be paid on or before September 15, 1965. On November 25, 1965, the Dignos spouses sold the same land in favor of defendants spouses, Luciano Cabigas and Jovita L. De Cabigas, who were then U.S. citizens, for the price of P35,000.00. A deed of absolute sale (Exh. J, also marked Exh. 3) was executed by the Dignos spouses in favor of the Cabigas spouses, and which was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3344. As the Dignos spouses refused to accept from plaintiff-appellant the balance of the purchase price of the land, and as plaintiff- appellant discovered the second sale made by defendants-appellants to the Cabigas spouses, plaintiff-appellant brought the present suit. (Rollo, pp. 27-28) After due trial, the Court of first Instance of Cebu rendered its Decision on August 25,1972, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the deed of sale executed on November 25, 1965 by defendant Isabela L. de Dignos in favor of defendant Luciano Cabigas, a citizen of the United States of America, null and void ab initio, and the deed of sale executed by defendants Silvestre T. Dignos and Isabela Lumungsod de Dignos not rescinded. Consequently, the plaintiff Atilano G. Jabil is hereby ordered to pay the sum, of Sixteen Thousand Pesos (P16,000.00) to the defendants-spouses upon the execution of the Deed of absolute Sale of Lot No. 3453, Opon Cadastre and when the decision of this case becomes final and executory. The plaintiff Atilano G. Jabil is ordered to reimburse the defendants Luciano Cabigas and Jovita L. de Cabigas, through their attorney-in-fact, Panfilo Jabalde, reasonable amount corresponding to the expenses or costs of the hollow block fence, so far constructed. It is further ordered that defendants-spouses Silvestre T. Dignos and Isabela Lumungsod de Dignos should return to defendants-spouses Luciano Cabigas and Jovita L. de Cabigas the sum of P35,000.00, as equity demands that nobody shall enrich himself at the expense of another. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on September 23, 1966, automatically becomes permanent in virtue of this decision.

With costs against the defendants. From the foregoing, the plaintiff (respondent herein) and defendants-spouss (petitioners herein) appealed to the Court of Appeals, which appeal was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 54393-R, "Atilano G. Jabil v. Silvestre T. Dignos, et al." On July 31, 1981, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court except as to the portion ordering Jabil to pay for the expenses incurred by the Cabigas spouses for the building of a fence upon the land in question. The disposive portion of said decision of the Court of Appeals reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, except as to the modification of the judgment as pertains to plaintiff-appellant above indicated, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. With costs against defendants-appellants. SO ORDERED. Judgment MODIFIED. A motion for reconsideration of said decision was filed by the defendants- appellants (petitioners) Dignos spouses, but on December 16, 1981, a resolution was issued by the Court of Appeals denying the motion for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. In the resolution of February 10, 1982, the Second Division of this Court denied the petition for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed on March 16, 1982. In the resolution dated April 26,1982, respondents were required to comment thereon, which comment was filed on May 11, 1982 and a reply thereto was filed on July 26, 1982 in compliance with the resolution of June 16,1 982. On August 9,1982, acting on the motion for reconsideration and on all subsequent pleadings filed, this Court resolved to reconsider its resolution of February 10, 1982 and to give due course to the instant petition. On September 6, 1982, respondents filed a rejoinder to reply of petitioners which was noted on the resolution of September 20, 1982. Petitioners raised the following assignment of errors: I THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN GROSSLY, INCORRECTLY INTERPRETING THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT, EXHIBIT C, HOLDING IT AS AN ABSOLUTE SALE, EFFECTIVE TO TRANSFER OWNERSHIP OVER THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION TO THE RESPONDENT AND NOT MERELY A CONTRACT TO SELL OR PROMISE TO SELL; THE COURT ALSO ERRED IN MISAPPLYING ARTICLE 1371 AS WARRANTING READING OF THE AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT C, AS ONE OF ABSOLUTE SALE, DESPITE THE CLARITY OF THE TERMS THEREOF SHOWING IT IS A CONTRACT OF PROMISE TO SELL. II THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN INCORRECTLY APPLYING AND OR IN MISAPPLYING ARTICLE 1592 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AS WARRANTING THE ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT THE NOTICE OF RESCISSION, EXHIBIT G, IS INEFFECTIVE SINCE IT HAS NOT BEEN JUDICIALLY DEMANDED NOR IS IT A NOTARIAL ACT. III THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN REJECTING THE APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLES 2208,2217 and 2219 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE AS TO WARRANT THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PETITIONERS.

IV PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, HE HAVING COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS. V BY AND LARGE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DUE TO GRAVE MISINTERPRETATION, MISAPPLICATION AND MISAPPREHENSION OF THE TERMS OF THE QUESTIONED CONTRACT AND THE LAW APPLICABLE THERETO. The foregoing assignment of errors may be synthesized into two main issues, to wit: I. Whether or not subject contract is a deed of absolute sale or a contract Lot sell. II. Whether or not there was a valid rescission thereof. There is no merit in this petition. It is significant to note that this petition was denied by the Second Division of this Court in its Resolution dated February 1 0, 1 982 for lack of merit, but on motion for reconsideration and on the basis of all subsequent pleadings filed, the petition was given due course. I. The contract in question (Exhibit C) is a Deed of Sale, with the following conditions: 1. That Atilano G..Jabilis to pay the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos P12,000.00) Phil. Philippine Currency as advance payment; 2. That Atilano G. Jabil is to assume the balance of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) Loan from the First Insular Bank of Cebu; 3. That Atilano G. Jabil is to pay the said spouses the balance of Four. Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) on or before September 15,1965; 4. That the said spouses agrees to defend the said Atilano G. Jabil from other claims on the said property; 5. That the spouses agrees to sign a final deed of absolute sale in favor of Atilano G. Jabil over the above-mentioned property upon the payment of the balance of Four Thousand Pesos. (Original Record, pp. 10-11) In their motion for reconsideration, petitioners reiterated their contention that the Deed of Sale (Exhibit "C") is a mere contract to sell and not an absolute sale; that the same is subject to two (2) positive suspensive conditions, namely: the payment of the balance of P4,000.00 on or before September 15,1965 and the immediate assumption of the mortgage of P12,000.00 with the First Insular Bank of Cebu. It is further contended that in said contract, title or ownership over the property was expressly reserved in the vendor, the Dignos spouses until the suspensive condition of full and punctual payment of the balance of the purchase price shall have been met. So that there is no actual sale until full payment is made (Rollo, pp. 51-52). In bolstering their contention that Exhibit "C" is merely a contract to sell, petitioners aver that there is absolutely nothing in Exhibit "C" that indicates that the vendors thereby sell, convey or transfer their ownership to the alleged vendee. Petitioners insist that Exhibit "C" (or 6) is a private instrument and the absence of a formal deed of conveyance is a very strong indication that the parties did not intend "transfer of ownership and title but only a

transfer after full payment" (Rollo, p. 52). Moreover, petitioners anchored their contention on the very terms and conditions of the contract, more particularly paragraph four which reads, "that said spouses has agreed to sell the herein mentioned property to Atilano G. Jabil ..." and condition number five which reads, "that the spouses agrees to sign a final deed of absolute sale over the mentioned property upon the payment of the balance of four thousand pesos." Such contention is untenable. By and large, the issues in this case have already been settled by this Court in analogous cases. Thus, it has been held that a deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a "Deed of Conditional Sale" where nowhere in the contract in question is a proviso or stipulation to the effect that title to the property sold is reserved in the vendor until full payment of the purchase price, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract the moment the vendee fails to pay within a fixed period Taguba v. Vda. de Leon, 132 SCRA 722; Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305). A careful examination of the contract shows that there is no such stipulation reserving the title of the property on the vendors nor does it give them the right to unilaterally rescind the contract upon non-payment of the balance thereof within a fixed period. On the contrary, all the elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, are present, such as: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. In addition, Article 1477 of the same Code provides that "The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon actual or constructive delivery thereof." As applied in the case of Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al. (12 SCRA 276), this Court held that in the absence of stipulation to the contrary, the ownership of the thing sold passes to the vendee upon actual or constructive delivery thereof. While it may be conceded that there was no constructive delivery of the land sold in the case at bar, as subject Deed of Sale is a private instrument, it is beyond question that there was actual delivery thereof. As found by the trial court, the Dignos spouses delivered the possession of the land in question to Jabil as early as March 27,1965 so that the latter constructed thereon Sally's Beach Resort also known as Jabil's Beach Resort in March, 1965; Mactan White Beach Resort on January 15,1966 and Bevirlyn's Beach Resort on September 1, 1965. Such facts were admitted by petitioner spouses (Decision, Civil Case No. 23-L; Record on Appeal, p. 108). Moreover, the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated December 16,1981 found that the acts of petitioners, contemporaneous with the contract, clearly show that an absolute deed of sale was intended by the parties and not a contract to sell. Be that as it may, it is evident that when petitioners sold said land to the Cabigas spouses, they were no longer owners of the same and the sale is null and void. II. Petitioners claim that when they sold the land to the Cabigas spouses, the contract of sale was already rescinded. Applying the rationale of the case of Taguba v. Vda. de Leon (supra) which is on all fours with the case at bar, the contract of sale being absolute in nature is governed by Article 1592 of the Civil Code. It is undisputed that petitioners never notified private respondents Jabil by notarial act that they were rescinding the contract, and neither did they file a suit in court to rescind the sale. The most that they were able to show is a letter of Cipriano Amistad who, claiming to be an emissary of Jabil, informed the Dignos spouses not to go to the house of Jabil because the latter had no money and further advised petitioners to sell the land in litigation to another party (Record on Appeal, p. 23). As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that Amistad was properly authorized by Jabil to make such extra-judicial rescission for the latter who, on the contrary, vigorously denied having sent Amistad to tell petitioners that he was already waiving his rights to the land in question. Under Article 1358 of the Civil Code, it is required that acts and contracts which have for their object the extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document.

Petitioners laid considerable emphasis on the fact that private respondent Jabil had no money on the stipulated date of payment on September 15,1965 and was able to raise the necessary amount only by mid-October 1965. It has been ruled, however, that "where time is not of the essence of the agreement, a slight delay on the part of one party in the performance of his obligation is not a sufficient ground for the rescission of the agreement" (Taguba v. Vda. de Leon, supra). Considering that private respondent has only a balance of P4,000.00 and was delayed in payment only for one month, equity and justice mandate as in the aforecited case that Jabil be given an additional period within which to complete payment of the purchase price. WHEREFORE, the petition filed is hereby Dismissed for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed in toto. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24771 June 30, 1970 ALFONSO ACEDO and ESMEA AMBROS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, TERESA SORIANO, UBALDO DUMLAO, ALBERTO CRISOSTOMO, ROSITA ROLLUDA, FERMIN MARCOS, MARCELO MARCOS, and VALENTIN MARQUEZ, in representation of his children, CIRIACO, VICTORIA, RESTITUTA, NESTOR, AGRIPINA, and FELICIDAD, all surnamed MARQUEZ,respondents. Vicente M. Tupasi for petitioners. Cipriano A. Tan and Arcadio Dumlao for respondents.

BARREDO, J.: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28006-R entitled Teresa Soriano, et al., plaintiffs appellees, versus Alfonso Acedo, et als., defendants-appellants, and Fermin Marcos, et als., intervenors, affirming with modifications the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya in its Civil Case No. 722 in favor of plaintiffs and intervenors, herein private respondents, declaring them owners of the lands in question as against the defendants, herein petitioners. As found by the Court of Appeals, the background facts are: On July 26, 1916, upon a homestead patent, Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 was issued in the name of Carolina Aggasid covering a parcel of land in Barrio Cuccub, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. On April 29, 1925, Carolina Aggasid sold one-half pro-indiviso portion of the land to Tomas Marcos. That sale was recorded at the back of Carolina Aggasid's O.C.T. No. R-827. In the cadastral proceedings, that land was broken into two: Lot No. 984 and Lot No. 985. Carolina Aggasid claimed Lot 984. The court, on April 15, 1932, ordered the registration of said lot in the name of Carolina Aggasid and the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. R-827. On May 23, 1952, Victoria Paculla, sole heir of Carolina Aggasid, in an "Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement," adjudicated unto herself the "entire one-half () unsold portion" of Carolina's land as covered by Original Certificate of Title No. R-827. That affidavit, too, was annotated at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. R-827. On May 30, 1952, Victoria Paculla sold to her son Alberto Crisostomo (Married to Rosita Rolluda) the said portion she adjudicated to herself. Similarly, this was entered at the back of Title No. R-827. On June 12, 1952, the spouses Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda sold the same portion of land to Teresa Soriano, married to Ubaldo Dumlao. Lot 985 was listed in a cadastral case different from that which covered Lot 984. No claim thereto was filed. Hence, it was declared public land. One Trinidad Agsunod obtained a homestead patent thereto Lot 985 and was issued Original Certificate of Title G.R. No. 420 on January 26, 1932. On April, 12, 1937, Trinidad Agsunod sold the lot to the spouses Alfonso Acedo and Esmea Ambros. The deed of sale was first annotated on Trinidad Agsunod's Title No. 420. Later, on

September 19, 1940, Title No. 420 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3788 was issued to the vendees Acedo and Ambros. Then came the suit filed by Teresa Soriano and others against the spouses Alfonso Acedo, and Esmea Ambros for the recovery of ownership and possession of Lot 985 and damages. Tomas Marcos' heirs intervened and joined hands with plaintiffs. The judgment below reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, decision is hereby rendered, declaring the plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano, owners with right to possess, the one-half western portion of LOT No. 984 of the Bayombong Cadastre, and the intervenors Fermin Marcos, Marcelo Marcos and Valentin Marquez, the latter in his own behalf and in it presentation of his children, Ciriaco, Victoria, Restituta, Nestor, Agripino and Felicidad, all surnamed Marquez, owner's with right to possess the other one-half () eastern portion of said Lot No. 984; declaring the plaintiffs Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda owners with right to possess the western one-half () portion of Lot No. 985 of the Bayombong Cadastre, and the intervenors Fermin Marcos, Marcelo Marcos and Valentin Marquez, the latter in his own behalf and in representation of his children, Ciriaco, Victoria, Restituta, Nestor, Agripino and Felicidad, all surnamed Marquez, owners with right to possess the other eastern one-half (1/2) portion of said Lot No. 985; and further ordering the defendants Alfonso Acedo and Esmea Ambros to surrender to the plaintiffs Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda and the intervenors, Fermin Marcos, Marcelo Marcos and Valentin Marquez, the latter in his own behalf and in representation of his children, Ciriaco, Victoria, Restituta, Nestor, Agripino and Felicidad, all surnamed Marquez, the possession of Lot No. 985 of the Bayombong Cadastre, in the proportion already stated; and ordering, lastly, the cancellation of the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 420 in the name of Trinidad Agsunod (Exhs. 10 and 3-Intervenors), and the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3788 in the name of the herein defendants, spouses Alfonso Acedo and Esmea Ambros (Exhs. 13 and 2Intervenors), together with their corresponding originals existing in the office of the Register of Deeds for Nueva Vizcaya, upon payment of the legal fees. And without special pronouncement as to costs. 'SO ORDERED. Defendants appealed. On the basis of these facts, the Court of Appeals rendered the following judgment: Lot No. 985 was part of a homestead previously placed under the operation of the Torrens system. Therefore, the subsequent adjudication of said lot in the cadastral proceedings is null and void. Title No. 420 and Title No. 3788 issued in lieu thereof, accordingly, must be cancelled; defendants acquired nothing thereby. Normally, an appellate court does not give relief to appellees. Of course, this is understood as against the appellants. Reason therefor is that a party who does not appeal must be deemed, for legal purposes, to have remained decision below. But the situation here involved stands upon a different plane. Appellees themselves have asked this Court in their brief that, for purposes of rectifying an obvious error in the decision, the share of Lot 985 be adjudicated not to the spouses Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda, as was done below but to the other plaintiffs Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo Dumlao, the real owners entitled to the possession thereof. Peace of mind amongst them must have compelled appellees to do so.

Not that appellees are without reason. The recorded evidence, the deed of sale, Exhibit C, as to which appellees are agreed, establishes the fact that the other half i.e., the western half of Lot 985 (after deducting the half sold to Marcos) had already been sold by plaintiffs spouses Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda to their co-plaintiffs Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo Dumlao. Accordingly, the dispositive part of the decision is hereby amended by (1) declaring that plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano are the owners with right to possess the one-half () portion of Lot No. 985 of the Bayombong Cadastre aforesaid, and (2) ordering defendants Alfonso Acedo and Esmea Ambros to surrender to said plaintiffs and the intervenor the possession of the entire Lot No. 985. Modified as just indicated, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants.<re||an1w> A motion for reconsideration of this decision was filed on the following grounds: 1. That the decision is not only not supported by the facts and evidence of record, but also that it is contrary to such facts and evidence; and 2. That the decision is not only not in consonance with, but also contrary to, law and jurisprudence on the matter, particularly, the protection of the rights of an innocent purchaser for value, which is the case of the defendants-appellants." but said motion was denied, hence this appeal. Petitioners claim that: I. The Court of Appeals erred, in not finding that notwithstanding her free patent certificate of title, Exhibit A, Carolina Aggasid could not be deemed as to have been the owner of that portion embraced in said free patent certificate of title, which, during the cadastral survey, was designated as Lot No. 985, because she has never claimed, nor possessed, nor occupied, the same, either by herself or through her predecessors in interest, since July 4, 1907, or prior thereto, or even at anytime thereafter; II. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that Carolina Aggasid, by her inaction and neglect for a period of 23 years, was guilty of laches; and III. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners herein, Alfonso Acedo and Esmea Ambros, are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, and their rights as such should be protected." None of these assigned errors can be sustained. This is a clear case of a second Torrens title having been issued covering a land already previously registered, being part of a duly registered bigger land. It is undisputed that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3788 in the name of herein petitioners was derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 420 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest Trinidad Agsunod who, in turn, acquired her title by virtue of a homestead patent obtained by her on January 28, 1932, and it is admitted that at that time, the land covered by said patent had already been registered, as part of a bigger registered parcel, as early as July, 26, 1916 in the name of Carolina Aggasid from whom private respondents herein have either successively or separately secured their respective interests. The fact that Trinidad Agsunod was able to obtain her homestead patent in 1932 because the land in question was declared public in a cadastral proceeding in which the holder of the first title did not file any opposition does not improve in any manner the position of petitioners. With or without such opposition, the cadastral court had absolutely no jurisdiction to declare as public Aggasid's land which had been previously registered already under the Torrens System. This is not only a definitely settled question 1 in this Court, it is indeed good law; it is a direct consequence of the indefeasibility of a torrens title. Petitioners contend that the earlier title of Carolina Aggasid was void inasmuch as she had no right to any homestead patent, it having been proven at the trial, and the trial court so held, that neither Aggasid nor anyone on her behalf has possessed the land in dispute since earlier than 1907. To begin with, the decision of the Court of Appeals now before Us contains no such finding and We are without authority to base Our decision hereof directly on findings of fact of the trial court, this case having been appealed on issues of fact and law to the said appellate court. Even assuming, however, that what petitioners claim is true, that is, that neither Aggasid nor any of her successors-in-

interest had ever possessed the land here in dispute, the very case cited by them that ofZarate v. Director of Lands, 34 Phil. 418, is clear authority for Us to overrule their contention. As quoted in their brief, We held therein that date, the adverse claimant does not seek to contest on the ground of fraud the right of the patentee, he is forever barred from questioning the rights of the patentee, as the title issued by virtue of the patent duly registered shall then have acquired all the characteristics that determine the finality and indefeasibility of a Torrens title." Incidentally, this doctrine cannot apply to private respondents in so far as the homestead patent of Agsunod is concerned for the simple reason that said patent is null and void, the land covered by it having been previously registered already as private land in the name of Aggasid. Neither is petitioners' pose that they are purchasers in good faith tenable. It is true they bought the land in reliance of Original Certificate of Title No. 420 of Trinidad Agsunod. It may also be true they parted with valuable consideration. The sad fact, however, is that the said Torrens title of Agsunod is null and void and such nullity, it is settled, affects even bona fide purchasers for value. In Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, this Court held: We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between original parties and in case of successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who rely on the second certificate. The purchaser from the owner of the latter certificate and his successors, should resort to his vendor for redress, rather than molest the holder of the first certificate and his successors, who should be permitted to rest secure in their title. This doctrine has been followed in subsequent cases and We see no reason at all for Us to change it now. As they did in their answer in the trial court, as well as in their brief in the Court of Appeals, petitioners are raising here, again the issue, of laches. We note, however, that inspite of the fact that the Court of Appeals did not pass on the said issue, in their motion for reconsideration in that court, petitioners seemingly abandoned the same, since no mention of it was made therein. As already stated earlier, the only points pressed upon in said motion were: (1) that the earlier title and even the homestead patent of Aggasid were void for lack of the requisite actual possession of the land in question; and (2) that petitioners are bona fide purchasers for value. Accordingly, We do not feel we can rule on the said issue in this appeal. In any event We do not believe that the precedent in the cited case of Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil, 277, nor the later case of Miguel v. Catalino, 26 SCRA 234, wherein Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes reiterated and further elucidated on the doctrine in Gamponia, may be applied to private respondents in the present case. There is one vital point of difference between the situation of the private respondents here, on the one hand, and the defendants in the two mentioned cases, on the other. In those cases, the defendants, either by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest, had acquired the lands therein disputed from the original title holders, and although such acquisitions were found to be defective and legally unenforceable, the said title holders, allowed the said defendants to take possession of and continue possessing the said lands and otherwise perform other acts of dominion in regard thereto, without questioning their right to do so for unusually extended periods of time. Thus, in the Catalino case, Bacaquio, the original owner of the land in controversy sold the same to Catalino Agyapao, father and successional predecessor-ininterest of plaintiffs, but said sale which took place in 1928 was technically invalid for lack of approval by the Governor-General which under the law then in force was indispensable for such transactions of non-christians. Inspite of said invalidity, however, the vendee was allowed by the vendor to take possession of and enjoy the property from 1928 to 1943 and even the heir of Bacaquio, the plaintiffs, did not disturb the buyer nor his successorsin-interest, the defendants, nor was the ownership of said defendants or their predecessor-in-interest ever questioned before 1962, or for a period of practically thirty-five years. Under these facts, this Court held: Since the 1928 sale is technically invalid, Bacaquio remained, in law, the owner of the land until his death in 1943, when his title passed on, by the law on succession, to his heirs, the plaintiffsappellants. Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed decision, we are of the opinion that the judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino must be sustained. For despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father of defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter, possess and enjoy the land in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943, when the seller died; and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding the deceased, also remained inactive, without taking any step to reivindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the
2

present suit was commenced in court. Even granting appellants' proposition that no presumption lies against their father's recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years (19281962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants must be considered barred and the court below correctly so held. Courts can not look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense. .... Similarly, in the case of Gamponia, the original landowner Domingo Mejia, shortly after the issuance of the Free Patent No. 3699 to his land on March 13, 1916, sold the same to one Zacarias Ciscar in violation of Section 35 of the Public Land Act on March 24, 1916. Inspite of the sale, the corresponding certificate of title was issued in the name of Domingo Mejia when the patent referred to was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1916. Notwithstanding the invalidity of the sale, however, Domingo Mejia allowed Ciscar to take immediate possession and enjoyment of the property. Pedro Mejia, the brother of Domingo Mejia, who after the latter's death, succeeded him, also did nothing to recover the land during all the time that it was possessed and enjoyed by the original purchaser Ciscar, as well as said vendee's successors-in-interest, Roque Sanchez and later Andres Gamponia. It was only after the above named possessors of the property had continuously and successively enjoyed it for a period of more than 37 years that Pedro Mejia's daughter Concordia Mejia de Lucas tried to recover possession and ownership of the land sold by Domingo Mejia relying on the strength of the certificate of title still in the name of Domingo Mejia. In these circumstances, this Court ruled: Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find, however, that while no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. We hold that the defense of prescription of adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of laches. Otherwise stated, we hold that while defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors' long continued possession for 37 years, the original owner's right to recover back the possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.<re||an1w> On the other hand, in the case at bar, it does not appear that either Aggasid, the original owner of the disputed land or any of her successors-in-interest, has ever conveyed to or otherwise disposed of in favor of Agsunod or her successor-in-interest, the herein petitioners, any part of the land herein involved. In the record of this case, the only transfer of said land that appears is that of Aggasid to Tomas Marcos, the predecessor-in-interest of intervenorsrespondents, involving one-half thereof pro-indiviso. Clearly, therefore, the theory of laches being urged by petitioners is not based on any positive act of the respondents or their predecessors which could have induced the former to believe that they would no longer claim ownership of the land in issue as against petitioners. The mere failure of private respondents to file oppositions in the cadastral proceedings is not inconsistent with their indefeasible rights under their registered title. In other words, in the cases of Catalino and Gamponia wherein this Court sanctioned the defense of laches even as against the holder of a Torrens title, present always was one element, not found in the case at bar, namely, that of "conduct on the part of defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy." This conduct consisted not only of inactivity or silence, which are negative in character, in the face of adverse possession and other assertions of ownership by the other party but of the positive act of transferring title to said other party, albeit in an illegal manner, and then doing nothing for more than thirty years to disengage themselves from such illegal transfer, thereby making the transferees believe that such illegality was being impliedly, if not actually, waived. Even if such waiver may be, in law, ineffective by itself alone, to create any right in favor of the vendee, if the failure of the title holder to act contrarywise for such a long time is added to it, a situation is created which in equity renders any further attempt of the holder of the title to vindicate his rights under it too stale to be judicially cognizable. Indeed, it may be said that in order to defeat a Torrens Title, the laches must be such as to be somehow in the nature of estoppel in pais. All the foregoing notwithstanding, We do not consider it in order to just affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals as is, without any explanation. We note that in its dispositive portion, said court not only declared the respondents Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano owners of one-half portion of Lot No. 985 of the Bayombong Cadastre but also ordered petitioners to surrender to said respondents and the intervenors-respondents, presumably the successors-ininterests of Tomas Marcos, the possession of the entire Lot No. 985. These disposition seem to be inconsistent with said court's own findings which in effect mean that what remained as her one-half share of the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. R-827, after she sold the other half, pro-indiviso, to Tomas Marcos in 1925, was Lot

No. 984 which she precisely claimed in the cadastral proceedings and of which she was again declared owner by the cadastral court. Consequently, what would appear to have been sold to Tomas Marcos was Lot 985 and, therefore, the intervenors-respondents would also appear to be entitled to the whole of Lot 985, thus leaving to plaintiffsrespondents Dumlao and Soriano the whole of Lot 984 instead of one-half of each of the said two lots going to the plaintiffs-respondents and the other one-half of each of them to the intervenors-respondents, as decided, in effect, by the Court of Appeals. To straighten out this apparent confusion, We have found it necessary to go beyond the decision to the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties filed with the appellate court. In the decision of the trial court, an indication of the cause of the confusion appears in the following discussion: The plaintiffs claim as stated above that the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exh. A) is equivalent to Lots. 984 and 985 of the Cadastral Survey of Bayombong (certificate issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, dated November 90, 1952, Exhs. D and 4-Intervenor). However, the plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano are only in possession of one-half () of Lot No. 984 (western side), and the intervenors, Fermin Marcos, Marcelo Marcos and Valentin Marquez, in his own behalf and in representation of his children, Ciriaco, Victoria, Restituta, Nestor, Agripino and Felicidad, all surnamed Marquez are in possession of the other half of said Lot No. 984 (eastern side), as owners, it being a portion of what their predecessor in interest, the late Tomas Marcos had purchased from the original registered owner Carolina Aggasid, whose title was annotated at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 Exh. A, as per entry No. 274 (Exh. I-Intervenor). (See Exh. 5-Intervenor and par. 3 of the second amended complaint.) Plaintiffs-spouses Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano are claiming one-half () of Lot No. 985 (western side) while the intervenors Fermin Marcos, et al., are claiming the other one-half () portion (eastern side) of said Lot No. 985. The defendants Alfonso Acedo and Esmea Ambros on their part aver that they are in the actual possession of Lot No. 985 ever since they purchased it from Trinidad Agsunod on April 12, 1937 in a deed of absolute sale (Exh. 12), which was duly inscribed in the office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya, causing thereby the issuance in their favor of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3788 (Exhs. 13 and 2-Intervenor) on September 19, 1940; that before the sale in favor of the spouses Alfonso Acedo and Esmea Ambros of Lot No. 985, the vendor Trinidad Agsunod had been in possession as owner, as shown by homestead patent No. 17935, issued on January 9, 1932 and transcribed as Original Certificate of Title No. 420 (Exhs. 10 and 3-Intervenor) in the office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on January 28, 1932; and that said defendants Alfonso Acedo and Esmea Ambros as well as the vendor Trinidad Agsunod had declared Lot No. 985 for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon from 1930 up to the present. (Exhs. 14, 14a to 14-c; 15, 15-a to 15-f; 17 and 17-a to 17-e.) It has been agreed by the parties that the plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano never possessed Lot No. 985 since their acquisition of the land from Alberto Crisostomo in Exhibit C. It has been admitted by plaintiff Ubaldo Dumlao that when he attempted to possess the land which he and his wife Teresa Soriano bought from Alberto Crisostomo on June 2, 1952, he learned that defendant Alfonso Acedo was in possession of Lot No. 985. It has been likewise agreed by the parties that defendant Alfonso Acedo has been farming Lot No. 985; that he has been in possession thereof and has harvested all the crops raised thereon for his own benefit. It is shown by the evidence that neither the plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano nor their predecessors-in-interest Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda, nor Victoria Pacula and Carolina Aggasid had ever possessed Lot No. 985 and that said Lot No. 985 has always been in the possession of Trinidad Agsunod and later on of the defendants Alfonso Acedo and Esmea Ambros up to the present. The plaintiffs and the intervenors contend that Original Certificate of Title No. 420, in the name Trinidad Agsunod (Exhs. 10 and 3-Intervenor), issued on January 28, 1932, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3788, in the name of the spouses Alfonso Acedo and Esmea Ambros (Exhs. 13 and 2-Intervenor), which cover Lot No. 985, are null and void, on the ground that said Lot No. 985 is embraced in a bigger parcel of Land covered by a previous title, which is Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exh. A), in the name of Carolina Aggasid, issued on July 26, 1916.

The Court has as already stated arrived at the conclusion that what was sold by plaintiffs Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda to their co-plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano, was Lot No. 984. Considering that Victoria Pacula, the registered owner of the remaining one-half () portion of the parcel of land described in Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exh. A) as per Entry No. 15848 (Exh. A-2) at the back thereof, had sold the said remaining undisposed one-half () portion to Alberto Crisostomo on May 30, 1952, in a deed of absolute sale (Exhs. B and 5), the latter is entitled to claim one-half () of Lot No. 985, which is embraced in the parcel of land described in Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exh. A). Likewise, the intervenors Fermin Marcos, Marcelo Marcos and Valentin Marquez, the latter in his own behalf and in representation of his children, Ciriaco, Victoria, Restituta, Nestor, Agripino and Felicidad, all surnamed Marquez, are also entitled to claim the other half of Lot No. 985, which formed part of the undivided one-half portion which their predecessor in interest Tomas Marcos, had purchased from the original registered owner Carolina Aggasid, as per Entry No. 274 (Exh. I-Intervenor) at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exh. A). On the other hand, in petitioners' brief as appellants in the Court of Appeals, the first and second assignments of error and their corresponding discussion read thus: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN 'DECLARING THE PLAINTIFFS ALBERTO CRISOSTOMO AND ROSITA ROLLUDA OWNERS WITH RIGHT TO POSSESS THE WESTERN ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION OF LOT NO. 985 OF THE BAYOMBONG CADASTRE, AND THE INTERVENORS FERMIN MARCOS, MARCELO MARCOS AND VALENTIN MARQUEZ, THE LATTER IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF HIS CHILDREN, CIRIACO, VICTORIA, RESTITUTA, NESTOR, AGRIPINO AND FELICIDAD, ALL SURNAMED MARQUEZ, OWNERS WITH RIGHT TO POSSESS THE OTHER EASTERN ONE-HALF () PORTION OF SAID LOT NO. 985.<re||an1w> SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN 'ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS ALFONSO ACEDO AND ESMEA AMBROS TO SURRENDER TO THE PLAINTIFFS ALBERTO CRISOSTOMO AND ROSITA ROLLUDA AND THE INTERVENORS, FERMIN MARCOS, MARCELO MARCOS AND VALENTIN MARQUEZ, THE LATTER IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF HIS CHILDREN CIRIACO, VICTORIA, RESTITUTA, NESTOR, AGRIPINO AND FELICIDAD, ALL SURNAMED MARQUEZ, THE POSSESSION OF LOT NO. 985 OF THE BAYOMBONG CADASTRE IN THE PROPORTION ALREADY STATED. Being closely related with one another the second being the necessary effect of the first we beg leave of this Honorable Court of Appeals to discuss these two assignments of error together in order to avoid repetition and for the sake of brevity. The plaintiffs Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda based their present action upon their deed of sale (Exhibit B which is also marked as Exhibit 5). The intervenors also based their intervention upon the recorded lien or gravamen in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Tomas Marcos (Exhibit 1-Intervenors), which is also embodied in the decision of the Cadastral Court dated April 15, 1932 (Exhibit 1 which is also marked as Exhibit 6-Intervenors). While the deed of sale (Exhs. B and or 5) in favor of Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda does not specifically state the land sold thereby any clearer or more specific than stating "the remaining undisposed half-portion" of the parcel of land described in the deed of sale, yet, in the affidavit (Exhibit 2) of Alberto Crisostomo himself, particularly paragraph 3 thereof, he stated 'that in truth and in fact, Cadastral Lot No. 984 ... which was claimed by my father, Domingo Crisostomo, is the same land as that unsold portion of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Free Patent No. 3983) in the name of Carolina Aggasid, which was extrajudicially adjudicated in favor of Victoria Pacula as the nearest forced heir, and which the latter conveyed to me for valuable consideration as evidenced by deed of conveyance duly registered and annotated on the memorandum page of Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 of the Land Records of Nueva Vizcaya

aforesaid' (Exhibit 2-a). Likewise, Victoria Pacula the vendor of Alberto Crisostomo, in her affidavit (Exhibit 4) particularly in paragraph 3 thereof, she stated "that in truth and in fact, Cadastral Lot. 984 ... which was continuously cultivated by my said late husband (Domingo Crisostomo) is the same as that unsold portion of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Free Patent No. 3983) in the name of Carolina Aggasid aforesaid' (Exhibit 4a). What, therefore, was a vague description or identity of the land sold as 'the remaining undisposed half-portion" in the deed of sale (Exhibit B and/or 5), was made clear, specific and definite by the affidavits of the vendor (Exhs. 4 and 4-a) and of the vendee (Exhs. 2 and 2-a) to be no other than Cadastral Lot No. 984. The deed of sale (Exhibits B and/or 5) was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for Nueva Vizcaya, and annotated, on the memorandum page of Original Certificate, of Title No. R-827 (Exhibit A) as Entry No. 15911 (Exhibit A-1). Later on, the plaintiffs-appellees, Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda sold the parcel of land which they bought from Victoria Pacula by their deed of sale (Exhibits B and/or 5) which was registered and annotated on the back of Original of Title No. R-827 (Exhibit A) under Entry No. 15911 (Exhibit A-1) to their co-plaintiffs, Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo Dumlao. In the deed of sale (Exh. 6 which is also marked as Exh. C) which the plaintiffsappellees, Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda executed in favor of their co-plaintiffs Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo Dumlao there is no mistake as to the identity of the land sold to be Lot No. 984 because it is so stated in the said deed of sale in the following tenor: '(This is the same land referred to as Lot No. 984 ... formerly claimed, for and in behalf of the true owner, Carolina Aggasid, by Domingo Crisostomo, deceased ...)' (See portion of Exhibit 6 and/or C, underlined with red pencil). From these series of transactions it is very clear that whatever land the plaintiffs-appellees Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda bought from Victoria Pacula by means of Exhs. B and/or 5, they have sold the same to their co-plaintiffs Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo Dumlao by means of Exhibits 6 and/or C. There is no evidence of record of any claim of ownership, either by purchase or otherwise, of the plaintiffs-appellees, Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda for and over Lot No. 985 or any portion thereof. It could not be said that the said plaintiffs-appellees Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda are the owners of the western one-half portion of Lot No. 985, as the trial court erroneously declared, by virtue of their deed of sale (Exhibit B and/or 5) because their deed of sale, as we have shown above, specifically refers to Lot 984. Moreover, they have already sold to their co-plaintiffs Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo Dumlao all what they have bought from Victoria Pacula. Consequently, said plaintiffs-appellee Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda could no longer have any interest, ownership or otherwise, to and over any portion of the land embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exhibit A), much less, to and over Lot 985 or any portion thereof. In the case of intervenors-appellees, we have already stated at the beginning of this argument that they based their intervention upon the recorded lien or gravamen in favor of Tomas Marcos, their predecessor-in-interest (Exhibit 1-Intervenors) which lien or gravamen is also embodied in the decision of the Cadastral Court dated April 15, 1932 (Exhibits I and/or 6-Intervenors). While as recorded or annotated on the back of Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exhibit A) as Entry No. 274 (Exhibit 1-Intervenors), the lien or gravamen in favor of Tomas Marcos, the predecessor-ininterest of the herein intervenors-appellees, does not relate to any specific or particular portion of the land embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. R-827 (Exhibit A), yet, when the Cadastral Court passed judgment over Lot No. 984 which it found was embraced by Original Certificate of Title No. R-827, it also had the occasion to pass judgment over the recorded or annotated lien or gravamen in favor of Tomas Marcos, so that in the decision (Exhibit 1 and/or 6-Intervenors) which the Cadastral Court rendered over Lot No. 984, it is therein stated: 'EN SU VIRTUD, se ordena la cancelacion del Certificado de Titulo No. R-827, Patent No. 3983, y, en su lugar, expidase el titulo del catrastro a nombre, de la referida Carolina Aggasid, sujeto desde luego al gravamen a favor de Tomas Marcos, tal como aparece al respaldo de dicho titulo debidamente inscrito en al Registro de la Propiedad de esta Provincia.' (Dispositive portion of the Decision, Exhibit 1 and/or 6 Intervenors) So what has been a vague identity of the land subjected to the lien or gravamen in favor of Tomas Marcos as recorded, has been made clear, specific, and definite in the decision of the Cadastral Court (Exhibit 1 and/or 6-Intervenors) as to be Lot No. 984 and no other else.

As in the case of the plaintiffs-appellees Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda, there is no evidence of record of any claim of ownership or otherwise, either by purchase or by any other means, of the intervenors-appellees for and over Lot No. 985 or particularly the western portion thereof. It could not be said that the intervenors-appellees are the owners of the eastern one-half portion of Lot No. 985, as the trial court erroneously declared, by virtue of the recorded lien or gravamen in favor of Tomas Marcos (Exh. 1-Intervenors) who is their predecessor-in-interest because such recorded lien orgravamen refers to Lot No. 984 as found and declared by the Cadastral Court (Exhibit 1 and/or 6-Intervenors). Consequently, the herein intervenors-appellees do not have any interest, ownership or otherwise, to and over the eastern one-half portion of Lot No. 985. As has been correctly found by the trial court, 'neither the plaintiffs Ubaldo Dumlao and Teresa Soriano, nor their predecessors-in-interest Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda, nor Victoria Pacula and Carolina Aggasid had ever possessed Lot No. 985, and that said Lot No. 985 had always been in the possession of Trinidad Agsunod and later on of the defendants Alfonso Acedo and Esmea Ambros up to the present' (Decision, Records, p. 29; 38-39). On the other hand, the evidence of records shows that Carolina Aggasid, and later on, her daughter Victoria Pacula, then later on the vendees, the plaintiffs-appellees Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda, and then lastly, the plaintiffs Teresa Soriano and Ubaldo Dumlao, have been in possession successively of the western one-half portion of Lot No. 984; and that similarly, Tomas Marcos, and later on his successors-in-interest the herein intervenors-appellees have been in possession successively of the eastern one-half portion of Lot No. 984 only. If the overt act of possession is a positive way of asserting or exercising the right of ownership, then, we respectfully submit, that Carolina Aggasid, and later on, Victoria Pacula and still later on, the plaintiffs-appellees Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda asserted and/or exercised their right of ownership over the western one-half portion of Lot No. 984 only; and Tomas Marcos, then later, the intervenors-appellees asserted and/or exercised their right of ownership of the eastern one-half portion of Lot No. 984 only. As we have shown above that the plaintiffs-appellees Alberto Crisostomo and Rosita Rolluda, and the intervenors-appellees, have no interest, ownership or otherwise, to and over Lot No. 985, the trial court, therefore, has flagrantly committed the second error assigned. The net result is that whereas, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the latter impliedly, both found that what was actually sold by Aggasid to Tomas Marcos was one-half of Lot 984 and one-half of Lot 985, what was claimed by Aggasid in the cadastral proceedings and actually adjudicated to her by the cadastral court was Lot 984, said adjudication being made subject, as stated in the above quotation from petitioners' brief 'desde luego al gravamen a favor de Tomas Marcos, tal como aparece al respaldo de dicho titulo debidamente inscrito en el Registro de la Propiedad de esta Provincia" and Lot No. 985 was declared by the same cadastral court to be land of the public domain. In other words, the cadastral court found that what Aggasid sold to Tomas Marcos was only a portion, if onehalf, of Lot No. 984. Indeed, the findings of the trial court as to the parts of the land here in question actually possessed respectively by the petitioners and respondents, would seem to support such conclusion. All these are, however, out of the question here. We have no authority to modify the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals; much less may we refer for any holding on any argument or statement of fact of petitioners in their brief filed with said court. We have brought out these matters only to explain and clarify the apparent confusion arising from what appear to be inconsistent portions of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Besides, in their brief, filed with this Court, petitioners expressly admit that in the cadastral survey, the land covered by the free patent certificate of title No. R-827 "was broken ... into two lots, namely Lot 984 and Lot 985." With this admission, it is of no consequence to petitioners how the lands herein involved are divided between respondents-plaintiffs and respondents-intervenors, there being no controversy as between them. As far as petitioners are concerned, since We are holding that the original patent title of Aggasid must prevail over the later patent and title issued in favor of Agsunod, they have no interest nor right of any kind on said lands; they must surrender the possession of Lot 985, as directed by the Court of Appeals, the one-half western portion thereof to plaintiffs-respondents and the other eastern half to the intervenorsrespondents. How these respondents will subsequently adjust the partition of the whole land previously covered by original Certificate Title No. R-827 to reconcile with Aggasid's claim over Lot 984 in the cadastral court, thus implying that the portion she had sold to Tomas Marcos was Lot 985, is a problem exclusively for respondents to settle among themselves. As the record before Us stands, We cannot make any specific pronouncements on the matter. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We have no alternative but to affirm, as We do affirm, the decision of the Court of Appeals as is, with costs against petitioners.