PEOPLE V.

MUSA - 217 SCRA 597 FACTS: Accused seeks the reversal of his conviction for violating the D angerous Drugs Act. He was found guilty of selling marijuana leaves to a police officer in an entrapment operation. HELD: There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon incriminating the person of the person arrested. Hence, in a buybust operation conducted to entrap a drugpusher, the law enforcement agents may seized the marked mo ney found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest or search warrants. Furthermore, it may extend beyond to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.

are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the object. In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved intothe kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said object. Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. *** SC enumerated the elements of a valid seizure based on the plain view doctrine, as follows: (a) Prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) Inadvertent discovery of the evidence by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct asurveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaperwrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuanaleaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.

The plain view doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures, nor to extend to a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. (nachura)

People vs. Figueroa Facts: The accused was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions and and of RA 645 and subsequently convicted by the RTC Br. 23 of Trece Martires in Cavite. While serving the warrant of arrest, the officers noticed, strewn around, aluminum foil packages of different sizes in the sala. Suspecting thus the presence of "shabu" in the premises, the arresting officers requested appellant, as well as his brother and sister, to acquiesce to a search of the house. The search yielded a .45 caliber pistol, a magazine, seven live ammunitions, and a match box containing an aluminum foil package with "shabu." Confronted, Figueroa denied ownership of the items. An inventory was conducted by the PC team, attested to by Barangay Captain Bigornia, of the seized items. The accused questions the admissibility in evidence of the firearm and confiscated ammunition for it was discovered during a warrantless search. Issue: Was their an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. Held:

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and themarijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view

No. the search and seizure of the articles sought is a valid being a search incidental to an arrest. The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds of ammunition were not unlawfully obtained. While the SC might concede difficulty in readily accepting the statement of the prosecution that the search was conducted with consent freely given by appellant and members of his household, it should be pointed out, in any case, that the search and seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of a lawful arrest. A significant exception from the necessity for a search warrant is when the search and seizure is effected as an incident to a lawful arrest. As a doctrine in jurisprudence, the warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surrounding under his immediate control. Objects in the `plain view' of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."

answered in the positive be considered as waiver on Caballes part on warrantless search and seizure. Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute probable cause as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive. By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The consent given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the

*** While serving warrant of arrest, police officers searched the house and found a pistol, a magazine and seven rounds of ammunition, the seizure of the firearm and ammunition was held lawful, because the objects seized were in plain view of the officer who had the right to be in the place where he was.

Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002] First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with kakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari. Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter will look at the contents of his vehicle and he

consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure. ***An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized is inside a closed package, the object is not in plain view and, therefore, cannot be seized without a warrant . However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.

People v. Nuevas GR No. 170233 22 February 2007 Tinga, J. Police officers Fami and Cabling, during a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking in Olongapo City, came across Jesus Nuevas, who they suspected to be carrying drugs. Upon inquiry, Nuevas showed them a plastic bag which contained marijuana leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. He then informed the officers of 2 other persons who would be making marijuana deliveries. The police officers then proceeded to where Nuevas said his associates, Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, could be located. Din was carrying a plastic bag which contained marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein. When the police officers introduced themselves, Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag over to them. After the items were confiscated, the police officers took the three men to the police office. Police officer Fami then revealed that when the receipt of the evidence was prepared, all 3 accused were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one who escorted all the accused during their physical examination. He also escorted all 3 to the Fiscals office where they were informed of the charges against them. The 3 were found guilty by the trial court, and the case was automatically elevated to the CA for review. However, Nuevas withdrew his appeal. Thus, the case was considered closed and terminated as to him. The CA affirmed the trial court. Issue: W/N Din and Inocencio waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Held: NO. The search conducted in Nuevas case was made with his consent. However, in Dins case, there was none. There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal

liability, he cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag, and even revealed his associates, offering himself as an informant. His actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find excuses, blame others, and save oneself even at the cost of others lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal. On the other hand, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had actually been given. The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by which they got hold of the plastic bag. Neither can Dins silence at the time be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Thus, the prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. On the other hand, Inocencios supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was carrying. The act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The exceptions are: (1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) Search of evidence in plain view; (3) Search of a moving vehicle; (4) Consented warrantless search; (5) Customs search; (6) Stop and frisk; and (7) Exigent and emergency circumstances. Elements of search of evidence in plain view: (e) Prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (f) Inadvertent discovery of the evidence by the police who have the right to be where they are; (g) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and (h) Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search and seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The arrest, however, must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are

obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. It must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and searchthe consent must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obstrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that: (1) The right exists; (2) The person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) The said person had an actual intention to relinquish such right. Obiter: To behold is not to hold.

room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the [6] residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door [7] open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the [8] house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared [9] to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of [10] approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was [11] prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the [13] confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 [14] grams, were found to be marijuana. For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano. Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed [15] over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof. When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the [16] paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 [17] caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods. The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused[18] appellant was detained. Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other valuables The Search Warrant issued by the judge states:

People vs Salanguit Facts: Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged: That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged: That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug. On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellants room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his
[5]

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after

examining under oath SR. INSP. Rodolfo Aguilar, PNP and his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, PNP, that there is probable cause to believe that Robert Salanguit has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex A, the properties to wit: UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA.

Issue: Considering that during the deposition-taking, no witness testified on anything about drug paraphernalia, should the warrant be nullified for having been issued without probable cause?

Held: No. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia were seized by the police. But none was taken by virtue of the search warrant. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of shabu about which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.

However, in a case, two search warrants were issued for the immediate search of the residence of petitioner at Int. David Santos, C. Arellano St., Malabon, Metro Manila, including the rooms located therein for the seizure of prohibited drugs and assorted firearms. A team of NBI agents raided the house of petitioner located at Int. David Santos and C. Arellano Sts., Malabon, Metro Manila, which consisted of a 2-storey house made up of strong materials and a workshop room at the ground floor made up of light materials where packs of shabu and firearms were found. Against the petitioners claim that the search warrants failed to particularly describe the place to be searched because there are two houses located in the address stated in the warrants, it was held that the workshop room where the packs of shabu were found is actually an integral part of petitioners residence. Hence, it cannot be argued that there are two houses in the address stated in the warrants and that the same failed to particularly describe the place to be searched. (People vs. Cupcupin, 392 SCRA 203 [2002]). In another case, two search warrants were issued namely: No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-83 [b]. Upon perusal, the warrants immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for seizure of subversive materials allegedly concealed in two places: one at No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and the other , at 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Objection was made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 [b] at 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City because both search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was error, of course but the error was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrantsfor the search of only one place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two distinct addresses, and that in fact the address 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 [b], the Supreme Court concluded that evidently, this was the address the Judge intended to be searched when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82 [b]; and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the obviously typographical error, the officer executing the warrant could consult the records in the official court file. (Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800 [1984]) And in another case, the search warrant exactly reproduced the officers description of the place in their application and in the affidavit appended thereto as follows: premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apot. 1207, Area F. Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. The search warrant was made more restrictive by the Judges admonition that the search be limited only to the premises herein described. At the time of the application, there were at least five distinct places in the area involved: the store known as the Abigails Variety Store and four separate and independent residential apartment units. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend to search all five places, but of only one of the residential units in the rear of Abigails Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1). Thereafter, a search was made not on Abigails Variety Store but on Apartment No. 1 resulting to the arrest of Pakistani nationals and seizure of

c.)The search warrant must particularly describe the place or the person to be searched and the things to be seized;. The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. (Cupcupin vs. People 392 SCRA 203, 216-217 [2002]; People vs. Francisco, 387 SCRA 569, 577 [2002]; People vs. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 690, 697-698 [2001]. But the place to be searched cannot be amplified or modified by the police officers own personal knowledge of thje premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant (People vs. CA, 291 SCRA 400, 412 [1998] In a case, the search warrant was issued by the trial court authorizing the search of shabu and paraphernalia at No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. The application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch of the area. The search was actually conducted at No. 120 Hizon St., Caloocan City, where shabu and shabu paraphernalia were seized. In nullifying the search warrant, the Supreme Court held that the controlling subject of search warrants is the place indicated in the warrant itself and not the place identified by the police. Consequently, all the items seized during the illegal search are prohibited from being used in evidence. (People vs. Francisco, 387 SCRA 569, 578 and 580 [2002]).

explosives and firearms. The Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the trial court declaring inadmissible in evidence the items seized under the warrant. (People vs. CA, 291 SCRA 400, 412 [1998]; see also Paper Industries Corp. vs. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253, 273 [1999]) And still in another case, the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch of the compound at 516 San Jose dela Montana St., Mabilo Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private respondent with a large X enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouses. With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabilo, Cebu City. It was held that this description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement. Consequently, when search was conducted in a warehouse st Lot No. 38 within the same compound while respondents house is actually located at Lot No. 41, the searching team went beyond the scope of the search warrant. (People vs. Estrada, 296 SCRA 383, 400-401 [1998]). ***the peace officers entered the dwelling armed with a search warrant for the seizure of shabu and drug paraphernalia. In the course of the search, they (presumably) found the shabu first, and then came upon an article wrapped in newspaper which turned out to be marijuana. On the issue of whether the marijuana may be validly seized, the SC said once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. (Note that the marijuana was wrapped in newspaper which was not transparent.)