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Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War Author(s): John J.

Mearsheimer Source: International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer, 1990), pp. 5-56 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538981 . Accessed: 24/10/2011 16:50
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J. Back to the Future John Mearsheimer


Instability Europe in Afterthe Cold War

The profoundchanges now underwayin Europe have been widely viewed as harbingersof a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the threatof war thathas hung over Europe formore than fourdecades is lifting. Swords can now be beaten into ploughshares; harmonycan reignamong the states and peoples of Europe. Central Europe, which long groaned under the massive forces of the two military blocs, can convertits military bases into industrialparks, playgrounds,and condominiums. Scholars of security affairscan stop their dreary quarrels over militarydoctrine and balance assessments, and turn their attention to finding ways to prevent global warming and preserve the ozone layer. European leaders can contemplate how to spend peace dividends. So goes the common view. This articleassesses this optimistic view by exploringin detail the consequences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. Specifically, examine the I effectsof a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end. The Soviet Union withdraws all of its forcesfromEastern Europe, leaving the states in that region fullyindependent. Voices are thereupon raised in the United States, Britain,and Germany,arguingthatAmericanand British forcesin Germany have lost theirprincipalraisond'etre,and these military forcesare withdrawnfromthe Continent.NATO and the Warsaw Pact then dissolve; they may persist on paper, but each ceases to functionas an alliance.1 As a result,the bipolar structure that has characterizedEurope since
This article emerged froma paper writtenfor a February 1990 conferenceat Ditchley Park, England, on the futureof Europe, organized by JamesCallaghan, Gerald Ford, ValeryGiscard d'Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt. An abridged version of this article appears in the Atlantic, August 1990. I am gratefulto RobertArt, Stacy Bergstrom, RichardBetts,Anne-Marie Burley, Dale Copeland, Michael Desch, Markus Fischer, Henk Goemans, Joseph Grieco, Ted Hopf, Craig Koerner,Andrew Kydd, Alicia Levine, JamesNolt, Roger Petersen,BarryPosen, Denny Roy, JackSnyder,Ashley Tellis, Marc Trachtenberg, Stephen Van Evera, Andrew Wallace, and Stephen Walt fortheirmost helpfulcomments. Mearsheimer Professor ChairoftheDepartment Political is and John of Science,University Chicago. of 1. There is considerable support withinNATO's highercircles,includingthe Bush administration, formaintainingNATO beyond the Cold War. NATO leaders have not clearlyarticulated the concrete goals that NATO would serve in a post-Cold War Europe, but they appear to conceive the futureNATO as a means forensuringGerman security, thereby removingpossible German motives foraggressive policies; and as a means to protectother NATO states against
International Security, Summer 1990 (Vol. 15, No. 1) C 1990 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.

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the end of World War II is replaced by a multipolarstructure.In essence, the Cold War we have known for almost half a centuryis over, and the postwar order in Europe is ended.2 How would such a fundamentalchange affect the prospects forpeace in Europe?3Would it raise or lower the riskof war? I argue that the prospects formajor crises and war in Europe are likelyto increase markedlyif the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violentas the first years of this century, 45 but would probablybe substantiallymore prone to violence than the past 45 years. This pessimisticconclusion restson the argumentthatthe distribution and character military of power are the rootcauses of war and peace. Specifically, the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been a consequence of three factors: bipolar distribution military the of power on the Continent;the rough military equalitybetween the two statescomprisingthe two poles in Europe,

German aggression. However, the Germans, who now provide the largestportionof the Alliance's standingforces,are likelyto resistsuch a role forNATO. A security structure this sort of assumes thatGermanycannot be trustedand thatNATO must be maintainedto keep it in line. A united Germany is not likely to accept forvery long a structure that rests on this premise. Germans accepted NATO throughoutthe Cold War because it secured Germany against the Soviet threatthat developed in the wake of World War II. Withoutthat specificthreat,which now appears to be diminishingrapidly,Germanyis likelyto rejectthe continued maintenance of NATO as we know it. 2. I am not arguing that a complete end to the Cold War is inevitable;also quite likelyis an intermediateoutcome, under which the status quo is substantiallymodified, but the main outlinesof the current orderremainin place. Specifically, Soviet Union may withdrawmuch the of its forcefromEastern Europe, but leave significant forcesbehind. If so, NATO forcelevels would probably shrink markedly,but NATO may continue to maintain significant forces in Germany.Britainand the United States would withdrawsome but not all of theirtroops from the Continent.If this outcome develops, the basic bipolar military competitionthathas defined the map of Europe throughoutthe Cold War will continue. I leave this scenario unexamined, and instead explore what follows froma complete end to the Cold War in Europe because this latterscenario is the less examined of the two, and because the consequences, and therefore the desirability, completelyending the Cold War would stillremainan issue iftheintermediate of outcome occurred. 3. The impact of such a change on human rightsin Eastern Europe will not be considered in directly this article.Eastern Europeans have suffered great hardship as a resultof the Soviet occupation. The Soviets have imposed oppressive political regimes on the region, denying EasternEuropeans basic freedoms.Soviet withdrawalfrom EasternEurope will probablychange that situationforthe better,although the change is likelyto be more of a mixed blessing than most realize. First, it is not clear that communism will be promptlyreplaced in all Eastern European countries with political systems that place a high premium on protectingminority and civilliberties.Second, the longstandingblood feuds among the nationalities Eastern rights in Europe are likelyto re-emergein a niultipolarEurope, regardlessof the existingpoliticalorder. If wars break out in Eastern Europe, human rightsare sure to suffer.

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the United States and the Soviet Union; and the factthat each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal.4 Domestic factorsalso affectthe likelihood of war, and have helped cause the postwar peace. Most importantly, hyper-nationalism helped cause the two world wars, and the decline of nationalismin Europe since 1945 has contributedto the peacefulness of the postwar world. However, factors of militarypower have been most important shaping past events, and will remain centralin the future. in The departure of the superpowers fromCentral Europe would transform Europe froma bipolar to a multipolarsystem.5Germany,France, Britain, and perhaps Italywould assume major power status;the Soviet Union would decline fromsuperpower status but would remaina major European power, givingrise to a systemof fivemajor powers and a numberof lesser powers. The resultingsystemwould suffer problems common to multipolarsysthe be Power inequities tems, and would therefore more prone to instability.6 could also appear; if so, stability would be underminedfurther. The departure of the superpowers would also remove the large nuclear arsenals they now maintainin Central Europe. This would remove the pacifyingeffect that these weapons have had on European politics. Four principal scenarios are possible. Under the first scenario, Europe would become nuclear-free, thus eliminatinga centralpillar of order in the Cold War era. Under the second scenario, the European statesdo not expand theirarsenals to compensate for the departure of the superpowers' weapons. In a third takes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are scenario, nuclear proliferation

4. It is commonplace to characterizethe polarity-bipolar or multipolar-of the international systemat large, not a specificregion. The focus in this article,however, is not on the global distribution power, but on the distribution power in Europe. Polarityargumentscan be of of in used to assess the prospects forstability a particular region,provided the global and regional balances are distinguished fromone another and the analysis is focused on the structureof power in the relevantregion. 5. To qualifyas a pole in a global or regional system,a state must have a reasonable prospect The United States of defendingitselfagainst the leading state in the systemby its own efforts. and the Soviet Union have enjoyed clear military superiority over other European states, and all non-European states, throughoutthe Cold War; hence they have formedthe two poles of both the global and European systems.What is happening to change thisis thatboth the Soviet Union and the United States are moving forcesout of Central Europe, which makes it more difficult them to project power on the Continentand thus weakens theirinfluencethere; for and reducing the size of those forces,leaving them less military power to project. Because of its proximity Europe, the Soviet Union will remain a pole in the European systemas long as to it retainssubstantialmilitary forcesop its own territory. United States can remaina pole in The Europe only if it retainsthe capacityto project significant military power into Central Europe. is 6. Stability simplydefined as the absence of wars and major crises.

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taken to dampen the many dangers inherentin the proliferation process. All threeof these scenarios would raise serious risksof war. in In the fourth and least dangerous scenario, nuclear weapons proliferate Europe, but the process is well-managed by the currentnuclear powers. They take steps to deter preventivestrikeson emergingnuclear powers, to set boundaries on the proliferation process by extendingsecurityumbrellas over the neighbors of emerging nuclear powers, to help emergingnuclear powers build secure deterrent forces,and to discourage themfromdeploying This outcome counterforce systemsthatthreatentheirneighbors'deterrents. probablyprovides the best hope formaintaining peace in Europe. However, it would stillbe more dangerous than the world of 1945-90. Moreover,it is not likelythat proliferation would be well-managed. Three counter-arguments mightbe advanced against this pessimistic set of predictionsof Europe's future.The firstargumentholds that the peace will be preserved by the effectsof the liberal international economic order that has evolved since World War II. The second rests on the observation thatliberaldemocracies veryseldom fight wars against each other,and holds that the past spread of democracy in Europe has bolstered peace, and that the ongoing democratizationof Eastern Europe makes war still less likely. The thirdargumentmaintainsthatEuropeans have learned fromtheirdisastrous experiencesin this centurythatwar, whetherconventionalor nuclear, is so costlythat it is no longer a sensible option forstates. But the theories behind these argumentsare flawed, as I explain; hence theirpredictionof peace in a multipolarEurope is flawed as well. Three principal policy prescriptionsfollow fromthis analysis. First, the in United States should encourage a process of limitednuclear proliferation will be more stable ifGermanyacquires a secure Europe. Specifically, Europe nuclear deterrent, but proliferation does not go beyond that point. Second, the United States should not withdrawfullyfromEurope, even ifthe Soviet Union pulls its forcesout of EasternEurope. Third,the United States should in take steps to forestall of the re-emergence hyper-nationalism Europe.
METHODOLOGY: HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT EUROPE S FUTURE?

Predictionson the futurerisk of war and prescriptionsabout how best to maintainpeace should rest on general theoriesabout the causes of war and peace. This point is true forboth academics and policymakers.The latterare seldom self-consciousin their uses of theory.Nevertheless, policymakers'

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views on the futureof Europe are shaped by theirimplicit preference one for theoryof internationalrelations over another. Our task, then, is to decide which theories best explain the past, and will most directlyapply to the future;and then to employ these theories to explore the consequences of probable scenarios. Specifically, should first we of surveythe inventory international relations thatbear on the problem. What theoriesbest explain the period of theories violence before the Cold War? What theoriesbest explain the peace of the past 45 years?Are thereothertheoriesthatexplain littleabout pre-Cold War Europe, or Cold War Europe, but are well-suitedforexplainingwhat is likely to occur in a Europe withouta Soviet and Americanmilitary presence? Next, we should ask what these theories predict about the nature of international politics in a post-Cold War multipolarEurope. Will the causes of the postwar peace persist,will the causes of the two world wars return, or will othercauses arise? We can then assess whetherwe should expect the nextdecades to be more peaceful, or at least as peaceful, as the past 45 years, or whetherthe future is more likelyto resemble the first years of the century.We can also ask 45 what policy prescriptions these theoriessuggest. The studyof international relations,like the othersocial sciences, does not yet resemble the hard sciences. Our stock of theories is spotty and often poorly tested. The conditions required forthe operation of established theories are oftenpoorlyunderstood. Moreover,politicalphenomena are highly are complex;hence precise politicalpredictions impossiblewithoutverypowerfultheoreticaltools, superior to those we now possess. As a result, all is politicalforecasting bound to include some error.Those who venture to predict,as I do here, should therefore take care not proceed with humility, to claim unwarranted confidence, and admit that later hindsightwill undoubtedlyreveal surprisesand mistakes. Nevertheless, social science shouldofferpredictionson the occurrenceof in momentousand fluidevents like those now unfolding Europe. Predictions can informpolicy discourse. They help even those who disagree to frame theirideas, by clarifying points of disagreement. Moreover, predictionsof events soon to unfold provide the best tests of social science theories, by making clear what it was that given theories have predicted about those events. In short, the world can be used as a laboratoryto decide which theoriesbest explain international politics. In this articleI employ the body

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of theories that I find most persuasive to peer into the future. Time will reveal whether these theoriesin facthave much power to explain international politics. The next section offersan explanation for the peacefulness of the postWorld War II order. The section thatfollowsargues thatthe end of the Cold War is likelyto lead to a less stable Europe. Next comes an examinationof the theories underlyingclaims that a multipolarEurope is likely to be as peaceful,ifnot more peaceful,than Cold War Europe. The concludingsection suggests policy implicationsthat follow frommy analysis. Explaining "LongPeace" the The past 45 years representthe longestperiod of peace in European history.7 During these years Europe saw no major war, and only two minorconflicts (the 1956 Soviet intervention Hungary and the 1974 Greco-Turkish in war in Cyprus). Neither conflict threatenedto widen to other countries. The early years of the Cold War (1945-63) were marked by a handful of major crises, although none brought Europe to the brink of war. Since 1963, however, therehave been no East-Westcrises in Europe. It has been difficult-ifnot impossible-for the last two decades to findserious national security analysts who have seen a real chance that the Soviet Union would attack Western Europe. The Cold War peace contrastssharplywith European politics during the first years of this century, 45 which saw two world wars, a handfulof minor wars, and a number of crises that almost resulted in war. Some 50 million Europeans were killed in the two world wars; in contrast, probablyno more than 15,000 died in the two post-1945European conflicts.8 Cold War Europe is farmore peaceful than early twentieth-century Europe. Both Europeans and Americans increasingly assume that peace and calm are the natural order of things in Europe and that the first years of this 45 century,not the most recent, were the aberration.This is understandable,
7. The term "long peace" was coined by JohnLewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability the Postwar International in System,"International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142. 8. There were approximately10,000 battle deaths in the Russo-Hungarian War of OctoberNovember 1956, and some 1500-5000 battledeaths in the July-August 1974 war in Cyprus. See Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1989 (Washington,D.C.: World Priorities, 1989), p. 22; and Melvin Small a'nd J. David Singer, Resortto Arms:International Civil and Wars,1816-1980 (BeverlyHills, Calif.: Sage, 1982), pp. 93-94.

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proportion since Europe has been freeofwar forso long thatan ever-growing of the Westernpublic, born afterWorld War II, has no directexperiencewith view is incorrect. great-power war. However, this optimistic The European state systemhas been plagued with war since its inception. centurieswar was underway Duringmuch of the seventeenthand eighteenth held longer The nineteenth century somewhereon the European Continent.9 halfof that periods of peace, but also several major wars and crises. The first the protractedand bloody Napoleonic Wars; later came centurywitnessed The the CrimeanWar,and the Italian and Germanwars of unification.10 wars of 1914-45 continued this long historicalpattern.They representeda break fromthe events of previous centuriesonly in the enormous increase in their scale of destruction. This era of warfarecame to an abrupt end with the conclusion of World War II. A wholly new and remarkably peaceful orderthen developed on the Continent.
THE CAUSES OF THE LONG PEACE: MILITARY POWER AND STABILITY

What caused the era of violence before1945? Why has the postwar era been so much more peaceful? The wars before1945 each had theirparticularand unique causes, but the distributionof power in Europe-its multipolarity and the imbalances of power that oftenoccurredamong the major states in that multipolarsystem-was the crucial permissive condition that allowed these particularcauses to operate. The peacefulness of the postwar era arose of forthreeprincipalreasons: the bipolarity the distribution power on the of power between those two polar Continent,the rough equality in military states, and the appearance of nuclear weapons, which vastly expanded the violence of war, making deterrencefarmore robust.11

9. For inventoriesof past wars, see JackS. Levy, WarIn theModernGreatPowerSystem, 14951975 (Lexington:UniversityPress of Kentucky,1983); and Small and Singer,Resort Arms. to 10. Europe saw no major war from1815-1853 and from1871-1914,two periods almost as long as the 45 years of the Cold War. There is a crucialdistinction, however, between the Cold War in and these earlierperiods. Relationsamong the greatpowers deteriorated markedly the closing years of the two earlier periods, leading in each case to a major war. On the other hand, the Cold War order has become increasinglystable with the passage of time and thereis now no serious threatof war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Europe would surely remain at peace forthe foreseeable futureif the Cold War were to continue, a point that highlightsthe exceptionalstability the present European order. of 11. The relativeimportanceof these'three factorscannot be stated precisely,but all three had substantialimportance.

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These factorsare aspects of the European state system-of the character of military power and its distribution among states-and not of the states themselves.Thus the keys to war and peace lie more in the structure the of international system than in the nature of the individual states. Domestic factors-most notablyhyper-nationalism-also helped cause the wars of the pre-1945era, and the domestic structures post-1945European states have of been moreconducive to peace, but these domesticfactors were less important than the characterand distribution military of power between states. Morewas caused in large part by securitycompetition over, hyper-nationalism among the European states, which compelled European elites to mobilize publics to support national defense efforts; hence even this importantdomesticfactorwas a more remote consequence of the international system. Conflict common among states because the international is systemcreates powerfulincentives for aggression.12The root cause of the problem is the anarchic nature of the internationalsystem. In anarchy there is no higher body or sovereign that protectsstates fromone another. Hence each state livingunder anarchyfaces the ever-present possibility thatanotherstate will use forceto harm or conquer it. Offensivemilitary action is always a threat to all states in the system. Anarchyhas two principalconsequences. First,thereis littleroom fortrust among states because a statemay be unable to recoverifits trustis betrayed. Second, each state must guarantee its own survivalsince no otheractorwill provideits security. otherstatesare potentialthreats, All and no international institution capable of enforcing is order or punishing powerfulaggressors. States seek to survive under anarchy by maximizingtheirpower relative to other states, in order to maintain the means for self-defense.Relative power, not absolute levels of power, matters most to states. Thus, states seek opportunitiesto weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power position. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate more power at the expense of rivals. This competitiveworld is peaceful when it is obvious that the costs and risksof going to war are high, and the benefitsof going to war are low. Two aspects of militarypower are at the heart of this incentive structure:the distribution power between states, and the nature of the military of power
12. The two classic works on this su1ject are Hans J. Morgenthau,Politics AmongNations:The Struggle Powerand Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973); and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory for of International Politics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979).

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available to them. The distributionof power between states tells us how well-positionedstates are to commit aggression, and whether other states are able to check their aggression. This distributionis a functionof the number of poles in the system, and their relative power. The nature of military power directly affects the costs, risks,and benefitsof going to war. If the military weaponry available guarantees that warfarewill be very destatesare more likelyto be deterredby the cost of war.13 Ifavailable structive, weaponry favorsthe defense over the offense,aggressorsare more likelyto be deterred by the futility aggression, and all states feel less need to of commit aggression, since they enjoy greater securityto begin with, and therefore feel less need to enhance theirsecurity expansion.14 If available by weaponry tends to equalize the relative power of states, aggressors are discouraged from going to war. If militaryweaponry makes it easier to estimatethe relativepower of states, unwarrantedoptimismis discouraged and wars of miscalculationare less likely. One can establish that peace in Europe during the Cold War has resulted frombipolarity, approximatemilitary the balance between the superpowers, and the presence of large numbersof nuclear weapons on both sides in three ways: first, showing that the general theorieson which it rests are valid; by thatthese theoriescan explain the conflicts the of second, by demonstrating pre-1945era and the peace of the post-1945era; and third,by showing that competingtheoriescannot account forthe postwar peace. THE VIRTUES OF BIPOLARITY OVER MULTIPOLARITY. The two principal arand multipolarity.15 rangementsofpower possible among statesare bipolarity
13. The prospects fordeterrencecan also be affected crisisstability by calculations. See JohnJ. Mearsheimer, "A StrategicMisstep: The MaritimeStrategyand Deterrence in Europe," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 6-8. 14. See RobertJervis,"Cooperation Under the SecurityDilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January1978), pp. 167-214; and Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War" (unpub. PhD dissertation,Universityof Californiaat Berkeley,1984), chap. 3. As noted below, I believe that the distinctionbetween offensiveand defensive weapons and, more generally,the concept of an offense-defense balance, is relevantat the nuclear level. However, I do not believe those ideas are relevantat the conventionallevel. See JohnJ. Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 25-27. 15. Hegemony represents a thirdpossible distribution. Under a hegemony there is only one major power in the system. The rest are minorpowers that cannot challenge the major power, but must act in accordance with the dictatesof the major power. Every state would like to gain hegemony,because hegemony confersabundant security: challengerposes a serious threat. no Hegemony is rarelyachieved, however,because power tends to be somewhat evenlydistributed among states, because threatened states have strongincentivesto join togetherto thwartan aspiring hegemon, and because 'the costs of expansion usually outrun the benefits before domination is achieved, causing extension to become overextension. Hegemony has never

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A bipolar systemis more peaceful forthreemain reasons. First,the number of conflict dyads is fewer,leaving fewerpossibilitiesforwar. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects fordeterrenceare greaterbecause miscalculations of relativepower and of opponents' resolve are fewerand less likely.16 In a bipolar system two major powers dominate. The minorpowers find it difficult remain unattached to one of the major powers, because the to major powers generallydemand allegiance fromlesser states. (This is especially true in core geographical areas, less so in peripheralareas.) Furtherto against more,lesser stateshave littleopportunity play the majorpowers off each other,because when great powers are fewerin number,the systemis more rigid. As a result, lesser states are hard-pressed to preserve their autonomy. In a multipolarsystem,by contrast, threeor more major powers dominate. alliance regarding Minorpowers in such a systemhave considerableflexibility The exactform a multipolar of system partners and can opt to be freefloaters. can vary markedly,depending on the number of major and minor powers in the system,and theirgeographical arrangement. A bipolar system has only one dyad across which war mightbreak out: only two major powers contend with one another, and the minor powers are not likely to be in a position to attack each other. A multipolarsystem has many potential conflict situations.Major power dyads are more numerous, each posing the potential for conflict.Conflictcould also erupt across dyads involving major and minor powers. Dyads between minor powers could also lead to war. Therefore,ceteris paribus,war is more likely in a multipolarsystemthan a bipolar one. Wars in a multipolarworld involvingjust minorpowers or only one major between two major power are not likely to be as devastating as a conflict
characterizedthe European state systemat any point since it arose in the seventeenthcentury, and thereis no prospectforhegemonyin the foreseeablefuture; hence hegemonyis not relevant to assessing the prospects forpeace in Europe. 16. The key works on bipolarityand multipolarity include Thomas J. Christensen and Jack InterSnyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: PredictingAlliance Patternsin Multipolarity," nationalOrganization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; Karl W. Deutsch and J.David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and InternationalStability,"WorldPolitics,Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964), pp. 390-406; Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," Journal Conflict of Resolution, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 1966), pp. 314-327; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stabilityof a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909; and Waltz, Theory International of Politics,chap. 8. My conclusions about bipolarityare similar to in Waltz's, although there are importantdifferences our explanations,as will be seen below.

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powers. However, local wars tend to widen and escalate. Hence there is always a chance that a small war will trigger general conflict. a Deterrenceis more difficult a multipolarworld because power imbalin ances are commonplace, and when power is unbalanced, the strongbecome 17 hard to deter. Power imbalances can lead to conflict two ways. First,two in states can gang up to attack a third state. Second, a major power might simplybully a weaker power in a one-on-one encounter,using its superior strength coerce or defeat the minorstate.18 to Balance of power dynamics can countersuch power imbalances, but only 19 iftheyoperate efficiently.No statecan dominateanother,eitherby ganging up or by bullying,if the others coalesce firmly against it, but problems of geography or coordination often hinder the formation such coalitions.204 of These hindrancesmay disappear in wartime,but are prevalentin peacetime, and can cause deterrencefailure,even where an efficient coalitionwill eventuallyformto defeat the aggressor on the battlefield. First,geography sometimes preventsbalancing states fromputtingmeaningfulpressure on a potential aggressor. For example, a major power may not be able to put effective military pressure on a state threatening cause to states lie in between. trouble,because buffer In addition, balancing in a multipolarworld must also surmountdifficult coordinationproblems. Four phenomena make coordinationdifficult. First, alliances provide collectivegoods, hence allies face the formidable dilemmas of collectiveaction. Specifically, each state may tryto shiftalliance burdens onto the shoulders of its putative allies. Such "buck-passing" is a common featureof alliance politics.21 It is most common when the number of states
17. Although a balance of power is more likely to produce deterrencethan an imbalance of will obtain. States power, a balance of power between states does not guarantee thatdeterrence sometimes find innovative militarystrategiesthat allow them to win on the battlefield, even withoutmarkedadvantage in the balance of raw military capabilities.Furthermore, broader the political forces that move a state towards war sometimes force leaders to pursue very risky military strategies,impelling states to challenge opponents of equal or even superior strength. See Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence, especially chap. 2. 18. This discussion of polarityassumes thatthe military strength the major powers is roughly of equal. The consequences of power asymmetries among great powers is discussed below. 19. See Stephen M. Walt, The OriginsofAlliances(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Waltz, Theory International of Politics, pp. 123-128. 20. One exceptionbears mention:gangingup is stillpossible under multipolarity the restricted in case where thereare only threepowers in the system,and thus no allies available forthe victim state. 21. See Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Reviewof Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 266-279; and BarryR. Posen, The

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required to forman effective blockingcoalitionis large. Second, a state faced with two potentialadversariesmightconclude thata protracted war between those adversaries would weaken both, even if one side triumphed;hence it may stay on the sidelines, hoping therebyto improve its power position relativeto each of the combatants.(This strategy can fail,however, if one of the warringstates quickly conquers the other and ends up more powerful, not less powerful,than before the war.) Third, some states may opt out of the balancing process because theybelieve that theywill not be targetedby the aggressor, failingto recognize that they face danger until afterthe aggressor has won some initial victories. Fourth, diplomacy is an uncertain process, and thus it can take time to build a defensivecoalition. A potential aggressormay conclude thatit can succeed at aggressionbeforethe coalition is completed, and further may be prompted to exploit the window of opthat this situationpresentsbeforeit closes.22 portunity Ifthese problemsof geographyand coordinationare severe, statescan lose faithin the balancing process. If so, theybecome more likelyto bandwagon with the aggressor, since solitary resistance is futile.23 Thus factors that weaken the balancing process can generatesnowball effects thatweaken the process stillfurther. The third major problem with multipolarity in its tendency to foster lies miscalculation of the resolve of opposing individual states, and of the of strength opposing coalitions. War is more likely when a state underestimatesthe willingness of an It opposing state to stand firmon issues of difference. then may push the when in factthe opponent otherstate too far,expectingthe otherto concede, will choose to fight.Such miscalculationis more likelyunder multipolarity because the shape of the internationalorder tends to remain fluid, due to the tendencyof coalitions to shift.As a result,the international "rules of the road"-norms of state behavior,and agreed divisions of territorial rightsand other privileges-tend to change constantly.No sooner are the rules of a given adversarialrelationship worked out, thanthatrelationship may become a friendship,a new adversarial relationshipmay emerge with a previous
SourcesofMilitaryDoctrine: between WorldWars (Ithaca: Cornell the France,Britain, and Germany University Press, 1984). 22. Domestic political considerations can also sometimes impede balancing behavior. For example, Britainand France were reluctantto ally with the Soviet Union in the 1930s because of theirdeep-seated antipathyto communism. 23. See Walt, OriginsofAlliances, pp. 28-32, 173-178.

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friendor neutral,and new rules must be established. Under these circumstances,one state may unwittingly push anothertoo far,because ambiguities as to national rightsand obligationsleave a wider range of issues on which a statemay miscalculateanother's resolve. Norms of statebehavior can come to be broadly understood and accepted by all states, even in multipolarity, just as basic norms of diplomaticconduct became generallyaccepted by the European powers during the eighteenthcentury.Nevertheless, a well-defineddivision of rightsis generallymore difficult when the numberof states is large, and relationsamong them are in flux,as is the case with multipolarity. War is also more likely when states underestimatethe relativepower of an opposing coalition, either because they underestimatethe number of stateswho will oppose them,or because theyexaggeratethe numberof allies who will fighton theirown side.24Such errorsare more likelyin a system of many states, since states then must accuratelypredict the behavior of manystates,not just one, in orderto calculatethe balance of power between coalitions. A bipolar systemis superiorto a multipolarsystemon all of these dimensions. Bullyingand ganging up are unknown, since only two actorscompete. Hence the power asymmetries produced by bullyingand gangingup are also unknown. When balancing is required, it is achieved efficiently. States can balance by either internal means-military buildup-or external meansstates tend to balance by exdiplomacy and alliances. Under multipolarity ternal means; under bipolaritythey are compelled to use internalmeans. Internalmeans are more fullyunder state control,hence are more efficient, and are more certain to produce real balance.25The problems that attend efforts balance by diplomatic methods-geographic complications and to coordinationdifficulties-arebypassed. Finally,miscalculationis less likely than in a multipolar world. States are less likely to miscalculate others' resolve,because the rules of the road withthe main opponent become settled over time, leading both parties to recognize the limitsbeyond which they cannot push the other. States also cannot miscalculate the membershipof the opposing coalition,since each side faces only one main enemy. Simplicity breeds certainty; bolsterspeace. certainty
24. This point is the centralthemeofWaltz, "The Stability a BipolarWorld." Also see Geoffrey of Blainey,TheCauses ofWar (New York: Free Press, 1973), chap. 3. 25. Noting the greaterefficiency internalover externalbalancing is Waltz, Theory Internaof of tional Politics, pp. 163, 168.

International Security 15:1 | 18

There are no empirical studies that provide conclusive evidence of the effects bipolarity of and multipolarity the likelihoodof war. This undoubton edly reflectsthe difficulty the task: fromits beginning until 1945, the of European state system was multipolar,leaving this historybarren of comand parisons thatwould reveal the differing effects multipolarity bipolarity. of Earlierhistorydoes affordsome apparent examples of bipolar systems,including some that were warlike-Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthagebut this historyis inconclusive, because it is sketchyand incomplete and therefore does not offer enough detail to validate the comparisons. Lacking a comprehensive survey of history,we cannot progress beyond offering examples pro and con, withoutknowing which set of examples best represents the universe of cases. As a result the case made here stops short of and rests chiefly deduction. However, I believe empiricaldemonstration, on that this deductive case provides a sound basis foraccepting the argument thatbipolarity more peaceful than multipolarity; deductivelogic seems is the compelling,and there is no obvious historicalevidence that cuts against it. I show below that the ideas developed here apply to events in twentieth centuryEurope, both beforeand after1945. THE VIRTUES OF EQUALITY OF POWER OVER INEQUALITY. Power can be more or less equally distributedamong the major powers of both bipolar and multipolar systems.Both systemsare more peacefulwhen equalityis greatest among the poles. Power inequalities invite war by increasingthe potential for successful aggression; hence war is minimized when inequalities are
least.26

of How should the degree of equalityin the distribution power in a system the be assessed? Under bipolarity, overall equality of the systemis simplya functionof the balance of power between the two poles-an equal balance creates an equal system, a skewed balance produces an unequal system. Under multipolarity the focus is on the power balance between the two leading states in the system, but the power ratios across other potential conflictdyads also matter.The net system equality is an aggregate of the degree of equalityamong all of the poles. However, most generalwars under have arisen from wars ofhegemonythathave pittedthe leading multipolarity state-an aspiring hegemon-against the othermajor powers in the system. Such wars are most probable when a leading state emerges, and can hope
26. This discussion does not encompass the situationwhere power asymmetriesare so great that one state emerges as a hegemon. See note 15.

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to defeateach of the others if it can isolate them. This patterncharacterized the wars that grew fromthe attemptsat hegemony by Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV, Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, WilhelmineGermany,and Nazi Germany.27 Hence the ratiobetween the leader and its nearest competitor-in bipolarityor multipolarity-has more effecton the stabilityof the the systemthan do otherratios, and is therefore key ratiothatdescribes the equalityof the system. Close equality in this ratiolowers the riskof war. The polarityof an international systemand the degree of power equality of the system are related: bipolar systems tend more toward equality, because, as noted above, states are then compelled to balance by internal than externalbalancing. methods, and internalbalancing is more efficient Specifically,the number-two state in a bipolar system can only hope to balance against the leader by mobilizingits own resourcesto reduce the gap between the two, since it has no potential major alliance partners. On the other hand, the second-strongest state in a multipolarsystem can seek securitythroughalliances with others, and may be tempted to pass the buck to them, instead of building up its own strength.Externalbalancing of this sort is especially attractivebecause it is cheap and fast. However, such behavior leaves intact the power gap between the two leading states, and thusleaves in place the dangers thatsuch a power gap creates.Hence another source of stability under bipolaritylies in the greatertendencyforits poles to be equal. THE VIRTUES OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. Deterrence is most likely to hold when the costs and risks of going to war are obviously great. The more horriblethe prospect of war, the less likelyit is to occur. Deterrenceis also most robustwhen conquest is most difficult. Aggressorsthen are more likely to be deterredby the futility expansion, and all states feel less compelled of to expand to increase their security,making them easier to deter because theyare less compelled to commitaggression.
27. This point is the centraltheme of Ludwig Dehio, ThePrecarious Balance:FourCenturies the of European PowerStruggle, trans. Charles Fullman (New York: Knopf, 1962). Also see Randolph M. Siverson and Michael R. Tennefoss, "Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Vol. 78, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 1057Conflict, 1815-1965,"American PoliticalScience Review, 1069. The two lengthyperiods of peace in the nineteenthcentury(see note 10 above) were mainlycaused by the equal distribution power among the major European states. Specifically, of there was no aspiring hegemon in Europe for most of these two periods. France, the most powerfulstatein Europe at the beginningof the nineteenthcentury, soon declined to a position of rough equality with its chief competitors,while Germany only emerged as a potential hegemon in the early twentiethcentury.

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Nuclear weapons favorpeace on both counts. They are weapons of mass destruction, and would produce horrendousdevastationifused in any numbers. Moreover,ifboth sides' nucleararsenals are secure from attack,creating a mutually assured retaliation capability (mutual assured destruction or MAD), nuclear weapons make conquest more difficult; international conflicts revertfromtests of capabilityand will to purer tests of will, won by the side willing to run greaterrisks and pay greatercosts. This gives defendersthe advantage, because defenders usually value their freedom more than aggressorsvalue new conquests. Thus nuclear weapons are a superb deterrent: they guarantee high costs, and are more useful for self-defensethan for
aggression.28

In addition, nuclear weapons affect the degree of equality in the system. the situation created by MAD bolsterspeace by moving power Specifically, relationsamong statestoward equality.States thatpossess nuclear deterrents can stand up to one another, even if theirnuclear arsenals vary greatlyin size, as long as both sides' nuclear arsenals are secure from attack. This situationof closer equality has the stabilizingeffects noted above. Finally,MAD also bolsterspeace by clarifying relativepower of states the and coalitions.29 States can stillmiscalculateeach other's will, but miscalculations of relativecapabilityare less likely,since nuclear capabilitiesare not elastic to the specific size and characteristics forces; once an assured of destruction capabilityis achieved, further increments nuclear power have of littlestrategic importance.Hence errorsin assessing these specificcharacteristicshave littleeffect. Errorsin predicting membershipin war coalitionsalso have less effect, since unforeseenadditions or subtractions fromsuch coalitions will not influencewar outcomes unless they produce a huge change in the nuclear balance enough to give one side meaningfulnuclear superiority. THE DANGERS OF HYPER-NATIONALISM. Nationalism is best defined as a set of political beliefs which holds that a nation-a body of individuals with characteristics that purportedlydistinguish them fromother individuals-

28. Works developing the argument that nuclear weapons are essentiallydefensive in nature are Shai Feldman, IsraeliNuclearDeterrence: Strategy the1980s (New York: Columbia UniA for versity Press, 1982), pp. 45-49; Stephen Van Evera, 'Why Europe Matters,Why the ThirdWorld Doesn't: American Grand Strategyafterthe Cold War," Journal Strategic of Studies,Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1990, forthcoming); and Vaq Evera, "Causes of War," chap. 13. 29. See Feldman, IsraeliNuclearDeterrence, 50-52; and Van Evera, "Causes of War," pp. 697pp. 699.

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should have its own state.30Although nationalistsoftenbelieve that their nation is unique or special, this conclusion does not necessarilymean that theythinktheyare superiorto otherpeoples, merelythattheytake pride in theirown nation. turns into ugly hyperHowever, this benevolent nationalism frequently nationalism-the belief that other nations or nation-statesare both inferior and threatening be and must therefore dealt withharshly.In the past, hypernationalismamong European states has arisen largelybecause most European states are nation-states-states comprisedof one principalnation-and these nation-statesexist in an anarchic world, under constant threatfrom otherstates. In such a situationpeople who love theirown nation and state can develop an attitude of contemptand loathing toward the nations who inhabitopposing states. The problemis exacerbatedby the factthatpolitical elites oftenfeel compelled to portrayadversarynations in the most negative policies. way so as to mobilize public support fornational security systems Malevolent nationalism is most likelyto develop under military thatrequirerelianceon mass armies; the statemay exploitnationalistappeals to mobilize its citizenryforthe sacrificesrequired to sustain large standing armies. On the otherhand, hyper-nationalism least likelywhen states can is military rely on small professional armies, or on complex high-technology organizations that do not require vast manpower. For this reason nuclear weapons work to dampen nationalism,since they shiftthe basis of military power away frompure relianceon mass armies, and toward greaterreliance on smallerhigh-technology organizations. In sum, hyper-nationalism the most importantdomestic cause of war, is its although it is still a second-orderforcein world politics. Furthermore, causes lie largelyin the international system.

THE CAUSES

OF THE LONG PEACE:

EVIDENCE

The historicalrecord shows a perfect between bipolarity, correlation equality of militarypower, and nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the long arose and nuclear weappeace, on the otherhand. When an equal bipolarity ons appeared, peace broke out. This correlationsuggests that the bipolarity
30. This definition drawn fromErnest Gellner,Nationsand Nationalism is (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1983), which is an excellent study of the origins of nationalism. Nevertheless, Gellnerpays littleattentionto how nationalismturnsinto a malevolentforcethatcontributes to instability the international in system.

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theory,the equality theory,and the nuclear theoryof the long peace are all valid. However, correlationalone does not prove causation. Other factors stillmay account forthe long peace. One way to rule out this possibilityis to enumerate what the three theories predict about both the pre-war and postwar eras, and then to ask ifthese predictionscame truein detail during those different periods. BEFORE THE COLD WAR. The dangers of multipolarity are highlightedby events before both world wars. The existence of many dyads of potential conflictprovided many possible ways to light the fuse to war in Europe. Diplomacy before World War I involved intense interactionsamong five major powers (Britain,France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany),and two minor powers (Serbia, and Belgium). At least six significant adversarial relationships emerged: Germanyversus Britain, France,Russia, and Belgium; and Austria-Hungaryversus Serbia and Russia. Before World War II five major powers (Britain,France, the Soviet Union, Germany,and Italy) and seven minor powers (Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Finland) interacted.These relationsproduced some thirteen important conflicts: Germany versus Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Austria; Italy versus Britainand France; the Soviet Union versus Finland and Poland; Czechoslovakia versus Poland and Hungary; and Romania versus Hungary. This multiplicity conflicts of made the outbreak of war inherentlymore likely. Moreover, many of the state interestsat issue in each of these conflicts were interconnected, raising the riskthat any single conflict that turnedviolentwould trigger general war, a as happened in both 1914 and 1939. Before World War II Germany was able to gang up with others against some minorstates, and to bully othersinto joining with it. In 1939 Germany bolstered its power by ganging up with Poland and Hungary to partition Czechoslovakia, and then ganged up with the Soviet Union against Poland. In 1938 Germanybullied the Czechs into surrendering Sudetenland, and the also bullied the Austrians into complete surrender.31 these successes By Germany expanded its power, leaving it far strongerthan its immediate neighbors,and therebymaking deterrencemuch harder. German power could have been countered before both world wars had the otherEuropean powers balanced efficiently against Germany.If so, Ger31. Austria is not a pure case of bullying;therewas also considerable pro-Germansupport in Austria during the late 1930s.

to Future 23 Back the |

many might have been deterred, and war prevented on both occasions. However, the other powers twice failed to do so. Before 1914 the scope of this failure was less pronounced; France and Russia balanced forcefully against Germany,while only Britain failedto commitfirmly against Germany beforewar began.32 Before1939,failureto balance was farmorewidespread.33 The Soviet Union failed to aid Czechoslovakia against Germanyin 1938, partlyforgeographic reasons: they shared no common border,leaving the Soviets with no direct access to Czech territory. France failedto give effective to the Czechs and aid Poles, partlybecause French military doctrinewas defensivelyoriented,but also because France had no direct access to Czech or Polish territory, and therefore could not easily deploy forcesto bolsterCzech and Polish defenses. Britainand France each passed the buck by transferring cost of deterthe ringGermanyonto the other,therebyweakening theircombined effort. The Soviet Union, with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, sought to turnthe German armieswestward, hoping thattheywould become bogged down in a war of attrition similar to World War I on the Western Front. Some of the minor European powers, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the Scandinavian states, passed the buck to the major powers by standing on the sidelines during the crises of 1938 and 1939. Britain and the United States failedto recognize thattheywere threatened by Germany until late in the game-1939 for Britain,1940 for the United States-and they therefore failed to take an early stand. When they finally recognized the danger posed by Germany and resolved to respond, they lacked appropriatemilitary forces.Britain could not pose a significant military threatto Germanyuntil afterit built up its own military forcesand coordinated itsplans and doctrinewithitsFrenchand Polish allies. In the meantime
32. Britain'sfailureto commititselfexplicitly a Continentalwar before the JulyCrisis was to probablya mistake of great proportions.There is evidence that the German chancellor,Bethmann-Hollweg,triedto stop the slide towards war once it became apparent that Britainwould fight with France and Russia against Germany,turninga Continentalwar into a world war. See Imanuel Geiss, ed., July1914: The Outbreak theFirst WorldWar (New York: Norton, 1967), of chap. 7. Had the Germans clearlyunderstood Britishintentionsbefore the crisis, they might have displayed much greatercaution in the early stages of the crisis,when it was stillpossible to avoid war. 33. See WilliamsonMurray,The Changein theEuropean BalanceofPower,1938-1939: The Path to Ruin(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1984); Posen, Sources Military of Doctrine; and Arnold and Francebetween Versailles World to Wolfers,Britain Two WYars: Conflicting Strategies Peacefrom of WarII (New York: Norton, 1968); and BarryR. Posen, "CompetingImages of the Soviet Union," World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 4 (July1987), pp. 579-597.

International Security 15:1 | 24

deterrencefailed. The United States did not launch a significant military buildup until afterthe war broke out. Multipolarity also created conditionsthatpermitted serious miscalculation before both world wars, which encouraged German aggression on both occasions. Before 1914, Germany was not certainof Britishopposition if it reached forcontinental hegemony,and Germanycompletelyfailedto foresee thatthe United States would eventuallymove to containit. In 1939,Germany hoped that France and Britainwould stand aside as it conquered Poland, and again failed to foreseeeventual Americanentryinto the war. As a result Germanyexaggeratedits prospectsforsuccess. This undermineddeterrence by encouragingGerman adventurism. In sum, the events leading up to the world wars amply illustrate the risks that arise in a multipolarworld. Deterrencewas undermined in both cases by phenomena that are more common under a multipolarrather than a bipolar distribution power.34 of Deterrencewas also difficult beforeboth wars because power was distributed asymmetrically among the major European powers. Specifically, Germany was markedlystrongerthan any of its immediate neighbors. In 1914 over all of its European rivals;only Germanyclearlyheld military superiority together were theyable to defeatit, and then only with Americanhelp. 1939 is a more ambiguous case. The resultsof the war reveal thatthe Soviet Union had the capacity to stand up to Germany,but this was not apparent at the beginning of the war. Hitler was confidentthat Germanywould defeat the Soviet Union, and this confidencewas key to his decision to attackin 1941. Finally,the events leading up to both world wars also illustratethe risks that arise in a world of pure conventionaldeterrencein which weapons of mass destructionare absent. World War I broke out partlybecause all of the importantstates believed that the costs of war would be small, and that successfuloffensewas feasible.35 BeforeWorld War II these beliefswere less The widespread, but had the same effect.36 lesser powers thoughtwar would
34. The problems associated with multipolarity were also common in Europe before 1900. Consider,forexample, thatinefficient fourcoalitions balancingresultedin the collapse ofthe first arrayedagainst Napoleonic France. See Steven T. Ross, European Diplomatic History, 1789-1815: FranceAgainstEurope(Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969). 35. Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensiveand the Origins of the FirstWorld War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. Also see JackSnyder,TheIdeology oftheOffensive: Military Decision-Making theDisasters 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University and of Press, 1984). 36. Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence, chaps. 3-4.

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be costly and conquest difficult, but the leaders of the strongeststateGermany-saw the prospect of cheap victory, and this beliefwas enough to destroy deterrenceand produce war. Had nuclear weapons existed, these beliefswould have been undercut,removinga key conditionthat permitted both wars. What was the role of internalGerman politicsin causing the world wars? So far I have focused on aspects of the internationalsystem surrounding Germany. This focus reflectsmy view that systemicfactorswere more important.But German domestic politicaland social developmentsalso played a significant role, contributing the aggressivecharacter German foreign to of policy. Specifically, German societywas infectedwith a virulentnationalism between 1870 and 1945 thatlaid the basis forexpansionistforeignpolicies.37 However, two points should be borne in mind. First, German hypernationalismwas in partfueledby Germany'spronounced sense ofinsecurity, which reflected Germany's vulnerablelocation at the centerof Europe, with relatively open borders on both sides. These geographicfactsmade German security problems especially acute; this situation gave German elites a uniquely strong motive to mobilize their public for war, which they did largelyby fanningnationalism.Thus even Germanhyper-nationalism be can ascribed in part to the nature of the pre-1945international system. Second, the horrorof Germany'smurderousconduct duringWorld War II should be distinguished from the scope of the aggressiveness of German foreignpolicy.38 Germany was indeed aggressive, but not unprecedentedly so. Other states have aspired to hegemonyin Europe, and sparked wars by theirefforts; Germanywas merelythe latest to attemptto convertdominant into hegemonic power. What was unique about Germany's conduct was its policy of mass murder toward many of the peoples of Europe. The causes of this murderous policy should not be conflatedwith the causes of the two
37. See Ludwig Dehio, Germany World and Politics theTwentieth in trans.Dieter Pevsner Century, (New York: Norton, 1967); FritzFischer,WarofIllusions:German Policies 1911 to 1914, trans. from Marian Jackson (New York: Norton, 1975); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980), chap. 18; Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany: Education a Nation(New York: Harper Torchbook,1965), chaps. 7-12; and Louis The of L. Snyder,German Nationalism: Tragedy a People(Harrisburg,Pa.: Telegraph Press, 1952). The of 38. There is a voluminous literatureon the German killingmachine in World War II. Among the best overviews of the subject are Ian Kershaw, TheNazi Dictatorship: Problems Perspectives and ofInterpretation, ed. (London: Arnold, 1989), chaps. 5, 8, 9; HenryL. Mason, "Imponderables 2nd of the Holocaust," WorldPolitics,Vol. 34, No. 1 (October 1981), pp. 90-113; and Mason, "Implementingthe Final Solution: The Ordinary Regulating of the Extraordinary," WorldPolitics, Vol. 40, No. 4 (July1988), pp. 542-569.

International Security 15:1 | 26

world wars. The policy of murder arose chieflyfromdomestic sources; the wars arose mainlyfromaspects of the distribution and character power in of Europe. THE COLD WAR RECORD. The European state systemabruptlyshiftedfrom multipolarto bipolar after 1945. Three factorswere responsible: the nearcompletedestruction German power, the growthof Soviet power, and the of permanentAmerican commitmentto the European Continent. The weakening of the German Reich was accomplished by allied occupation and dismemberment.Silesia, Pomerania, East Prussia, and parts of West Prussia and Brandenburgwere given to other countries,the Sudetenland was returned to Czechoslovakia, and Austria was restoredto independence. The rest of the German Reich was divided into two countries, East and West Germany,which became enemies. This reductionof Germanpower, coupled withthe physicalpresence of Americanand Soviet military mightin the heart of Europe, eliminatedthe threatof German aggression.39 Meanwhile the Soviet Union extended its power westward, becoming the dominantpower on the Continentand one of the two strongestpowers in the world. There is no reason to think that the Soviets would not have reached forcontinentalhegemony,as the Spanish, French,and Germans did earlier,had theybelieved theycould win a hegemonic war. But the Soviets, unlike their predecessors, made no attempt to gain hegemony by force, leaving Europe in peace. Bipolaritysupplies part of the reason. Bipolaritymade Europe a simpler place in which only one point of friction-theEast-Westconflict-had to be managed to avoid war. The two blocs encompassed most of Europe, leaving fewunprotectedweak statesforthe Soviets to conquer. As a resultthe Soviets have had few targetsto bully. They have also been unable to gang up on the few states that are unprotected,because theirWest-blocadversaryhas been theironly potentialganging-up partner. Bipolarityalso leftless room formiscalculationof both resolve and capability.During the first fifteen years of the Cold War, the rules of the road for the conflictwere not yet established, giving rise to several serious crises. However, over time each side gained a clear sense of how farit could push the other,and what the other would not tolerate.A set of rules came to be agreed upon: an understandingon the division of rightsin Austria, Berlin,
39. See Anton W. DePorte, Europebetiveen Superpowers: Enduring the The Balance,2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

Back the to Future 27 |

and elsewhere in Europe; a proscription secretunilateralre-deployment on of large nuclearforcesto areas contiguousto the opponent; mutual toleration of reconnaissance satellites; agreement on rules of peacetime engagement between naval forces; and so forth.The absence of serious crises during 1963-90 was due in part to the growthof such agreementson the rightsof both sides, and the rules of conduct. These could develop in large part meant that the same because the systemwas bipolar in character.Bipolarity two statesremained adversaries fora long period, givingthem timeto learn how to manage theirconflict without war. By contrast,a multipolarworld of shifting coalitions would repeatedly have forced adversaries to re-learn how theiropponents definedinterests, reach new accords on the division of rights, and establish new rules of competitiveconduct. Bipolarityalso left less room to miscalculate the relative strengthof the opposing coalitions. The composition of possible war coalitions has been clear because only two blocs have existed, each led by an overwhelmingly dominant power that could discipline its members. Either side could have but removed ambiguity miscalculatedits relativemilitary strength, bipolarity about relativestrengthof adversarial coalitions arising fromdiplomaticuncertainties. balance in Europe has been roughlyequal throughThe East-Westmilitary out the Cold War, which has further bolstered stability.This approximate paritystrengthened deterrenceby ensuringthatno statewas temptedto use force to exploit a power advantage. Parityresulted partlyfrombipolarity: because the two blocs already encompassed all the states of Europe, both sides have balanced mainly by internalratherthan externalmeans. These more efficient means have produced a more nearlyequal balance. Nuclear weapons also played a key role in preventingwar in post-World War II Europe. Westernelites on both sides of the Atlanticquicklyrecognizedthatnuclear weapons were vastly destructiveand that theirwidespread use in Europe would cause unprecedented devastation. The famous CarteBlanche exercises conducted in Germanyin 1955 made it manifestly clear thata nuclear war in Europe would involve fargreatercosts than anotherWorldWar II.40 Accordingly, Western policymakers rarely suggested that nuclear war could be "won," and instead emphasized the horrorsthatwould attend nuclear war.
40. See Hans Speier, German Rearmament Atomic and War:TheViewsofGerman Military Political and Leaders (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957), chap. 10.

International Security 15:1 | 28

Moreover, they have understood that conventionalwar could well escalate on to the nuclear level, and have in factbased NATO strategy that reality. Soviet leaders also recognized the horrendous results that a nuclear war would produce.41Some Soviet military officers have asserted that victoryis possible in nuclearwar, but even theyhave acknowledged thatsuch a victory would be Pyrrhic.Soviet civilians have generallyargued that victoryis imthe possible. Furthermore, Soviets long maintained that it was not possible to fighta purely conventionalwar in Europe, and that conventionalvictory would only prompt the loser to engage in nuclear escalation.42 The Soviets later granted more possibilitythat a conventionalwar mightbe controlled, Under Gorbachev, Soviet milibut stillrecognized that escalation is likely.43 tarythinking has placed even greateremphasis on the need to avoid nuclear war and devoted more attentionto the dangers of inadvertent nuclear war.44 on both sides have also behaved very Official rhetoric aside, policymakers cautiouslyin the presence of nuclear weapons. There is not a single case of a leader brandishing nuclear weapons during a crisis, or behaving as if nuclearwar mightbe a viable option forsolvingimportant politicalproblems. On the contrary, policymakershave never gone beyond nuclear threatsof a very subtle sort, and have shown great caution when the possibility of nuclear confrontation emerged.45 has This cautious conduct has lowered the riskof war. on Nuclear weapons also imposed an equality and clarity the power relations between the superpowers. This equality and clarityrepresented a
41. See RobertL. Arnett,"Soviet AttitudesTowards Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They Studies,Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 1979), pp. 172-191; and David Can Win?" Journal Strategic of Press, 1983). Holloway, The SovietUnionand theArmsRace (New Haven: Yale University weap42. Thus Nikita Khrushchevexplained, "Now thatthe big countrieshave thermonuclear ons at theirdisposal, theyare sure to resortto those weapons iftheybegin to lose a war fought with conventionalmeans. If it ever comes down to a question of whetheror not to face defeat, there is sure to be someone who will be in favorof pushing the button,and the missiles will The trans. and ed. by Remembers: Last Testament, begin to fly."Nikita Khrushchev,Khrushchev StrobeTalbott(New York: Bantam, 1976), pp. 603-604. 43. See James M. McConnell, "Shiftsin Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of MilitaryDevelVol. 37, No. 3 (April 1985), pp. 317-343. opment," World Politics, 44. See Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New PoliticalThinking on Security,"International Security, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 134-138. A Analysis and and 45. See Hannes Adomeit, SovietRisk-taking CrisisBehavior: Theoretical Empirical and (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982); RichardK. Betts,NuclearBlackmail NuclearBalance(WashChoices abouttheBomb ington,D.C.: Brookings,1987); and McGeorge Bundy,Dangerand Survival: in theFirstFifty Years(New York: Random House, 1988). Also see JosephS. Nye, Jr.,"Nuclear Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer Learning and U.S.-Soviet SecurityReg'imes,"International 1987), pp. 371-402.

Backto theFuture| 29

marked change fromthe earlier non-nuclearworld, in which sharp power inequalitiesand miscalculationsof relativepower were common.46 During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union have exhibited markedlyless hyper-nationalism than did the European powers before 1945. After WorldWar II, nationalismdeclined sharplywithinEurope, partly because the occupation forces took active steps to dampen it,47and also because the European states, no longer providing theirown security,now lacked the incentive to purvey hyper-nationalism order to bolster public in support for national defense. More importantly, however, the locus of European politicsshiftedto the United States and the Soviet Union-two states that,each forits own reasons, had not exhibitednationalismof the virulent type found earlierin Europe. Nor has nationalismbecome virulentin either superpower during the Cold War. In part this reflects greaterstability the of the postwar order, arising from bipolarity,militaryequality, and nuclear weapons; with less expectation of war, neither superpower has faced the need to mobilize its population for war. It also reflectsa second effectof nuclear weapons: they have reduced the importance of mass armies for preservingsovereignty,thus diminishingthe importanceof maintaininga hyper-nationalized pool of manpower.
THE CAUSES OF THE LONG PEACE: COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

The claim that bipolarity,equality, and nuclear weapons have been largely responsible for the stabilityof the past 45 years is further strengthened by the absence of persuasive competingexplanations. Two of the most popular theories of peace-economic liberalism and peace-loving democracies-arenot relevaint the issue at hand. to Economic liberalism,which posits that a liberal economic order bolsters peace (discussed in more detail below), cannotexplainthe stability postwar of Europe, because therehas been littleeconomic exchange between the Soviet Union and the West over the past 45 years. Although economic flows be-

46. Some expertsacknowledge that nuclear weapons had deterrent value in the early decades of the Cold War, but maintain that they had lost theirdeterrent value by,the mid-1960swhen the Soviets finally acquired the capabilityto retaliatemassivelyagainst the Americanhomeland. I rejectthis argumentand have outlined my views in JohnJ. Mearsheimer,"Nuclear Weapons and Deterrencein Europe," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter1984/85), pp. 19-46. 47. See Paul M. Kennedy, "The Decline of NationalisticHistoryin the West, 1900-1970,"Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January1973), pp. 77-100; and E.H. Dance, History the Betrayer (London: Hutchinson, 1960).

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in tween Easternand WesternEurope have been somewhat greater, no sense has all of Europe been encompassed by a liberaleconomic order. The peace-loving democracies theory (also discussed below) holds that democracies do not go to war against other democracies,but concedes that states. This democracies are not especially pacificwhen facingauthoritarian theory cannot account for post-World War II stabilitybecause the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe have not been democraticover the past 45 years. A thirdtheoryof peace, obsolescence war,proposes thatmodern convenof tional war had become so deadly by the twentiethcenturythat it was no longerpossible to thinkofwar as a sensiblemeans to achieve nationalgoals.48 It took the two world wars to drive this point home, but by 1945 it was clear that large-scale conventional war had become irrationaland morallyunacceptable, like institutions such as slaveryand dueling. Thus, even without nuclear weapons, statesmen in the Cold War would not seriously have it countenancedwar, which had become an anachronism.This theory, should be emphasized, does not ascribe the absence of war to nuclear weapons, but instead points to the horrorsof modern conventionalwar. This argument probably provides the most persuasive alternativeexplanation for the stabilityof the Cold War, but it is not convincing on close inspection. The factthat World War II occurredcasts serious doubt on this theory;ifany war could have convincedEuropeans to forswearconventional war, it should have been World War I, with its vast casualties. There is no doubt that conventionalwar among modern states could devastate the parbeticipants. Nevertheless, this explanation misses one crucial difference tween nuclear and conventionalwar, a difference that explains why war is still a viable option for states. Proponents of this theory assume that all conventional wars are protractedand bloody wars of attrition, like World I on the Western front.However, it is possible to score a quick and War decisive victory a conventionalwar and avoid the devastationthatusually in attends a protractedconventionalwar.49Conventional war can be won; nuclear war cannot be, since neitherside can escape devastationby the other, regardless of the outcome on the battlefield. Thus, the incentivesto avoid

48. This theoryis most clearlyarticulatedby JohnE. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence Major War(New York: Basic Books, 1989). See also Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A of Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 42-64. 49. See Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence, chaps. 1-2.

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war are far greaterin a nuclear than a conventionalworld, making nuclear deterrencemuch more robust than conventionaldeterrence.50 Predicting Future:The Balkanization Europe? the of What new order will emerge in Europe if the Soviets and Americans withdraw to theirhomelands and the Cold War orderdissolves? What characteristicswill it have? How dangerous will it be? It is certainthatbipolarity will disappear, and multipolarity emerge in will the new European order. The other two dimensions of the new order-the distribution power among the major states,and the distribution nuclear of of weapons among them-are not pre-determined,and several possible arrangements could develop. The probable stabilityof these arrangements would vary markedly.This section examines the scope of the dangers that each arrangement would present,and the likelihoodthat each will emerge. The distribution and deploymentpatternsof nuclear weapons in the new Europe is the least certain,and probablythe most important, elementof the new order. Accordingly,this section proceeds by exploringthe characterof the fourprincipalnuclearworlds thatmightdevelop: a denuclearizedEurope, continuationof the currentpatternsof nuclear ownership, and nuclear proliferation eitherwell- or ill-managed. The best new order would incorporatethe limited,managed proliferation of nuclear weapons. This would be more dangerous than the currentorder, but considerablysaferthan 1900-45. The worstorderwould be a non-nuclear Europe in which power inequities emerge between the principal poles of power. This orderwould be more dangerous than the current world, perhaps almost as dangerous as the world before 1945. Continuationof the current
50. German decision-makingin the early years of World War II underscores this point. See Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence, chap. 4. The Germans were well aware fromtheirexperience in World War I that conventional war among major powers could have devastating consequences. Nevertheless, they decided threetimes to launch major land offensives: Poland (1939); France (1940); and the Soviet Union (1941). In each case, the Germans believed thatthey could win a quick and decisive victory and avoid a costlyprotracted war like WorldWar I. Their calculations proved correctagainst Poland and France. They were wrong about the Soviets, who thwartedtheirblitzkrieg and eventuallyplayed the centralrole in bringing down the Third Reich. The Germans surely would have been deterredfromattackingthe Soviet Union if they had foreseen the consequences. However, the key point is that they saw some possibilityof winningan easy and relatively cheap victory against the Red Army.That option is not available in a nuclear war.

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would be worse than the world of pattern, or mismanaged proliferation, today,but saferthan the pre-1945world.
EUROPE WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Some Europeans and Americans seek to eliminate nuclear weapons from Europe, and would replace the Cold War order with a wholly non-nuclear order. Constructingthis nuclear-free Europe would require Britain,France and the Soviet Union to rid themselves of nuclear weapons. Proponents believe that a Europe withoutnuclear weapons would be the most peaceful Europe would be the possible arrangement;in fact,however, a nuclear-free effects most dangerous among possible post-Cold War orders. The pacifying of nuclear weapons-the securitythey provide, the caution they generate, therough equalitytheyimpose, and the clarity relativepower theycreateof would be lost. Peace would then depend on the other dimensions of the of new order-the numberof poles, and the distribution power among them. be However, the new order will certainly multipolar,and may be unequal; of hence the systemmay be very prone to violence. The structure power in Europe would look much like it did between the world wars, and it could well produce similarresults. The two most powerful states in post-Cold War Europe would probably be Germany and the Soviet Union. They would be physicallyseparated by a band of small, independent states in Eastern Europe. Not much would change in Western Europe, although the states in that area would have to be concerned about a possible German threaton theireastern flank. The potential for conflictin this system would be considerable. There would be many possible dyads across which war mightbreak out. Power imbalances would be commonplace as a result of the opportunities this systemwould present forbullyingand ganging up. There would be considerable opportunityfor miscalculation. The problem of containing German of power would emerge once again, but the configuration power in Europe would make it difficult forman effective to counterbalancingcoalition, for coalition failed to much the same reason that an effective counterbalancing formin the 1930s. Eventually the problem of containingthe Soviet Union could also re-emerge.Finally,conflicts may eruptin EasternEurope, providing the vortexthat could pull othersinto a wider confrontation. A reunifiedGermany would be surrounded by weaker states that would find it difficult balance against German aggression. Without forces stato tioned in states adjacent to Germany,neitherthe Soviets nor the Americans

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would be in a good position to help them contain German power. Furthermore, those small states lyingbetween Germanyand the Soviet Union might fearthe Soviets as much as the Germans, and hence may not be disposed to cooperate with the Soviets to deter German aggression. This problemin fact arose in the 1930s, and 45 years of Soviet occupation in the interimhave done nothingto ease East European fearsof a Soviet military presence. Thus, scenarios in which Germany uses military forceagainst Poland, Czechoslovakia, or even Austria become possible. The Soviet Union also mighteventuallythreaten new statusquo. Soviet the withdrawalfromEastern Europe does not mean that the Soviets will never feel compelled to returnto Eastern Europe. The historicalrecord provides abundant instances of Russian or Soviet involvementin Eastern Europe. Indeed, the Russian presence in Eastern Europe has surged and ebbed repeatedly over the past few centuries.51 Thus, Soviet withdrawalnow hardly guarantees a permanentexit. Conflictbetween Eastern European states is also likely to produce instabilityin a multipolarEurope. There has been no war among the states in thatregion during the Cold War because the Soviets have tightly controlled them. This point is illustrated the serious tensionsthatnow existbetween by of Hungary and Romania over Romanian treatment the Hungarian minority in Transylvania,a region that previouslybelonged to Hungary and stillhas roughly2 million Hungarians living withinits borders. Were it not forthe Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, this conflict could have broughtRomania and Hungary to war by now, and it may bringthem to war in the future.52 This will not be the only danger spot within Eastern Europe if the Soviet empire crumbles.5 to Warfarein Eastern Europe would cause great suffering Eastern Europeans. It also mightwiden to include the major powers, because theywould
51. See, interalia: Ivo J. Lederer,ed., RussianForeign Policy:Essaysin Historical Perspective (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1962); Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe,1825-1878 (Ann Arbor,Mich.: George Wahr Publishing,1954); and Marc Raeff,Imperial Russia, 1682-1825: The Coming Age ofModernRussia (New York: Knopf, 1971), chap. 2. of 52. To get a sense of the antipathybetween Hungaryand Romania over thisissue, see Witnesses to Cultural Genocide: First-Hand Reports Romania's on Minority PoliciesToday(New York: American TransylvanianFederation and the CommitteeforHuman Rightsin Romania, 1979). The March 1990 clashes between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in TfrguMures (Romanian Transylvania) indicate the potentialforsavage violence thatis inherentin these ethnicconflicts. Vol. 68, No. 5 53. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-CommunistNationalism," ForeignAffairs, (Winter -1989/1990), 1-13; and Mark Kramer,"Beyond the BrezhnevDoctrine:A New Era in pp. Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter1989/90), Soviet-EastEuropean Relations?" International Security, pp. 5154.

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be drawn to competeforinfluencein thatregion,especiallyifdisordercreated fluid politics that offeredopportunitiesfor wider influence,or threatened defeat for friendlystates. During the Cold War, both superpowers were drawn into Third World conflicts across the globe, oftenin distant areas of littlestrategicimportance. Eastern Europe is directlyadjacent to both the Soviet Union and Germany, and has considerable economic and strategic importance;thus trouble in Eastern Europe could offereven greatertemptations to these powers than past conflictsin the Third World offeredthe superpowers. Furthermore,because the results of local conflictswill be largelydeterminedby the relative success of each partyin findingexternal allies, Eastern European states will have strongincentivesto drag the major Thus both push and pull considerations powers into theirlocal conflicts.54 would operate to enmesh outside powers in local Eastern European w%ars. Miscalculation is also likely to be a problem in a multipolarEurope. For example, the new order might well witness shiftingpatterns of conflict, leaving insufficient timeforadversariesto develop agreed divisions of rights and agreed rules of interaction,or constantlyforcingthem to re-establish new agreementsand rules as old antagonismsfade and new ones arise. It is not likelythatcircumstances would allow the developmentof a robust set of agreementsof the sortthathave stabilizedthe Cold War since 1963. Instead, Europe would resemble the pattern of the early Cold War, in which the absence of rules led to repeated crises. In addition, the multipolarcharacter of the systemis likelyto give rise to miscalculationregardingthe strength of the opposing coalitions. It is difficult predictthe precise balance of conventionalmilitary to power thatwould emergebetween the two largestpowers in post-Cold War Europe, of especially since the future Soviet power is now hard to forecast.The Soviet Union might recover its strengthsoon afterwithdrawingfromCentral Europe; if so, Soviet power would overmatchGerman power. Or centrifugal national forces may pull the Soviet Union apart, leaving no remnantstate that is the equal of a united Germany.55 What seems most likely is that
54. The new prime ministerof Hungary, JozsefAntall, has already spoken of the need for a "European solution" to the problem of Romania's treatmentof Hungarians in Transylvania. Celestine Bohlen, "Victorin Hungary Sees '45 as the Best of Times," New YorkTimes,April 10, 1990, p. A8. 55. This articlefocuses on how changes in the strengthof Soviet power and retraction the of Soviet empire would affectthe prospects for stability Europe. However, the dissolution of in the Soviet Union, a scenario not explored here in any detail, would raise dangers that would be different fromand in addition to those discussed here.

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Germanyand the Soviet Union might emerge as powers of roughly equal strength. The first two scenarios, with theirmarked inequalitybetween the two leading powers, would be especiallyworrisome,althoughthereis cause forconcerneven if Soviet and German power are balanced. Resurgenthyper-nationalism probablypose less danger than the probwill lems described above, but some nationalism is likely to resurfacein the absence of the Cold War and may provide additional incentivesforwar. A non-nuclearEurope is likelyto be especially troubledby nationalism,since securityin such an order will largelybe provided by mass armies, which oftencannot be maintained withoutinfusingsocieties with hyper-nationalism. The problem is likelyto be most acute in Eastern Europe, but there is also potentialfortroublein Germany.The Germans have generallydone an admirablejob combattingnationalismover the past 45 years, and in rememberingthe dark side of theirpast. Nevertheless,worrisomeportentsare now visible; of greatestconcern, some prominentGermans have latelyadvised a return greaternationalismin historical to education.56 Moreover,nationalism will be exacerbatedby the unresolved borderdisputes thatwill be uncovered is by the retreat American and Soviet power. Especially prominent thatof of the border between Germany and Poland, which some Germans would change in Germany's favor. However, it seems veryunlikelythatEurope will actuallybe denuclearized, despite the present strength anti-nuclear of feelingin Europe. For example, it is unlikelythat the French, in the absence of America's protectivecover and faced with a newly unified Germany,would get rid of their nuclear weapons. Also, the Soviets surelywould remainconcerned about balancing and will therefore retaina deterrent their of the Americannuclear deterrent, own.
THE CURRENT OWNERSHIP PATTERN CONTINUES

A more plausible order for post-Cold War Europe is one in which Britain, Franceand the Soviet Union keep theirnuclearweapons, but no new nuclear zone in Central powers emerge in Europe. This scenario sees a nuclear-free Europe, but leaves nuclear weapons on the European flanks.
56. Aspects of this story are recounted in Richard J. Evans, In Hitler'sShadow: WestGerman to the Historians and theAttempt Escapefrom Nazi Past (New York: Pantheon, 1989). A study of past German efforts mischaracterizehistoryis Holger H. Herwig, "Clio Deceived: Patriotic to Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall Security, Self-Censorshipin Germany Afterthe Great War," International 1987), pp. 5-44.

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This scenario, too, also seems unlikely,since the non-nuclear states will have substantialincentivesto acquire theirown nuclear weapons. Germany would probablynot need nuclear weapons to deter a conventionalattackby its neighbors,since neitherthe Frenchnor any of the EasternEuropean states would be capable of defeatinga reunifiedGermanyin a conventionalwar. The Soviet Union would be Germany's only legitimateconventionalthreat, but as long as the states of Eastern Europe remained independent, Soviet ground forceswould be blocked froma directattack.The Germans,however, mightnot be willing to rely on the Poles or the Czechs to provide a barrier and might instead see nuclear weapons as the best way to deter a Soviet conventionalattack into Central Europe. The Germans mightchoose to go nuclear to protectthemselves fromblackmail by other nuclear powers. Finally,given thatGermanywould have greatereconomic strength than Britain or France, it mighttherefore seek nuclearweapons to raise its military status to a level commensuratewith its economic status. The minor powers of Eastern Europe would have strong incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Withoutnuclearweapons, these EasternEuropean states would be open to nuclear blackmailfromthe Soviet Union and, if it acquired nuclear weapons, fromGermany.No Eastern European state could match the conventional strengthof Germany or the Soviet Union, which gives these minorpowers a powerfulincentiveto acquire a nuclear deterrent, even if the major powers had none. In short,a continuationof the current patternof ownership withoutproliferation seems unlikely. How stable would this orderbe? The continuedpresence of nuclear weapons in Europe would have some pacifying effects. Nuclear weapons would induce greater caution in their owners, give the nuclear powers greater tend to equalize the relativepower of states thatpossess them,and security, reduce the risk of miscalculation.However, these benefitswould be limited if nuclear weapons did not proliferate beyond theircurrent owners, forfour main reasons. First,the caution and the securitythatnuclear weapons impose would be missing fromthe vast center of Europe. The entireregion between France and the Soviet Union, extendingfromthe Arcticin the northto the Mediterranean in the south, and comprising some eighteen significantstates, would become a large zone therebymade "safe" forconventionalwar. Second, asymmetricalpower relations would be bound to develop, between nuclear and non-nuclear states and among non-nuclear states, raising the dangers that attend such asymmetries. Third, the risk of miscalculation

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would rise, reflecting multipolarcharacter this systemand the absence the of of nuclear weapons from a large portion of it. A durable agreed political orderwould be hard to build because politicalcoalitionswould tend to shift over time,causing miscalculationsof resolve between adversaries. The relative strength potentialwar coalitions would be hard to calculate because of coalitionstrength would depend heavily on the vagaries of diplomacy. Such uncertainties about relative capabilitieswould be mitigatedin conflicts that arose among nuclear powers: nuclear weapons tend to equalize power even among statesor coalitionsof widely disparateresources,and thus to diminish the importance of additions or defections from each coalition. However, uncertainty would still be acute among the many states that would remain non-nuclear. Fourth, the conventionally-armedstates of Central Europe would depend for their securityon mass armies, giving them an incentive to infuse their societies with dangerous nationalism in order to maintain public support fornational defense efforts.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, WELL-MANAGED OR OTHERWISE

The most likely scenario in the wake of the Cold War is further nuclear proliferation Europe. This outcome is laden with dangers, but also might in provide the best hope formaintainingstability the Continent.Its effects on could prodepend greatlyon how it is managed. Mismanaged proliferation duce disaster, while well-managed proliferation could produce an order nearlyas stable as the currentorder. Unfortunately, however, any proliferation is likelyto be mismanaged. Four principaldangers could arise ifproliferation not properlymanaged. is First,the proliferation process itselfcould give the existingnuclear powers strongincentives to use forceto prevent theirnon-nuclearneighbors from gaining nuclear weapons, much as Israel used force to preempt Iraq from acquiringa nuclear capability. was completed, a stable nuclear competiSecond, even afterproliferation tion mightnot emerge between the new nuclear states. The lesser European powers mightlack the resources needed to make theirnuclear forcessurvivable; if the emergingnuclear forceswere vulnerable, this could create firststrike Because theireconomies are incentivesand attendantcrisisinstability. farsmaller,they would not be able to develop arsenals as large as those of the major powers; arsenals of small absolute size mightthus be vulnerable. theirlack of territorial Furthermore, expanse deprivesthemofpossible basing modes, such as mobile missile basing, that would secure their deterrents.

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Several are landlocked, so they could not base nuclear weapons at sea, the most secure basing mode used by the superpowers. Moreover, their close proximity one anotherdeprives them of warningtime,and thus of basing to schemes thatexploitwarningto achieve invulnerability, such as by the quick launch of alert bombers. Finally, the emergingnuclear powers might also lack the resources required to develop secure command and control and adequate safetyprocedures forweapons management,thus raising the risk of accidental launch, or of terrorist seizure and use of nuclear weapons. Third,the elitesand publics of the emergingnuclearEuropean statesmight not quickly develop doctrinesand attitudesthat reflect grasp of the deva astating consequences and basic unwinnabilityof nuclear war. There will probably be voices in post-Cold War Europe arguing that limited nuclear war is feasible, and that nuclear wars can be foughtand won. These claims mightbe taken seriouslyin states thathave not had much directexperience with the nuclear revolution. Fourth,widespread proliferation would increase the numberof fingers on the nuclear trigger, which in turnwould increase the likelihoodthatnuclear weapons could be fireddue to accident,unauthorized use, terrorist seizure, or irrationaldecision-making. If these problems are not resolved, proliferation would presentgrave dangers. However, the existingnuclear powers can take steps to reduce these dangers. They can help deter preventiveattack on emergingnuclear states by extending securityguarantees. They can provide technicalassistance to help newly nuclear-armedpowers to secure theirdeterrents.And they can help socialize emerging nuclear societies to understand the nature of the forces they are acquiring. Proliferation managed in this manner can help bolsterpeace. How broadly should nuclear weapons be permittedto spread? It would be best ifproliferation were extendedto Germanybut notbeyond.57 Germany has a large economic base, and can therefore sustain a secure nuclear force. Moreover, Germany will feel insecure without nuclear weapons; and Germany's great conventional strengthgives it significant capacity to disturb Europe if it feels insecure. Other states-especially in Eastern Europe-may also want nuclear weapons, but it would be best to preventfurther proliferation.The reasons are, as noted above, thatthese states may be unable to
57. See David Garnham, "ExtendingDeterrencewith German Nuclear Weapons," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 96-110.

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and the unlimitedspread of nuclearweapons secure theirnuclear deterrents, raises the risk of terrorist seizure or possession by states led by irrational elites. However, ifthe broader spread of nuclear weapons proves impossible to preventwithouttakingextremesteps, the existingnuclear powers should let the process happen, while doing theirbest to channel it in safe directions. were well-managed, significantdangers However, even if proliferation would remain. Ifall the major powers in Europe possessed nuclearweapons, history suggests thattheywould stillcompete forinfluenceamong the lesser The superpowers, despite powers and be drawn into lesser-powerconflicts. the securitythat their huge nuclear arsenals provide, have competed inareas such as South tenselyforinfluencein remote,strategically unimportant Asia, Southeast Asia, and CentralAmerica. The European powers are likely to exhibitthe same competitiveconduct, especially in Eastern Europe, even if theypossess secure nuclear deterrents. The possibilityof ganging up would remain: several nuclear states could join against a solitarynuclear state, perhaps aggregatingenough strength to overwhelm its deterrent.Nuclear states also mightbully theirnon-nuclear neighbors.This problem is mitigatedifunbounded proliferation takes place, leaving few non-nuclearstates subject to bullyingby the nuclear states, but such widespread proliferation raises risksof its own, as noted above. Well-managed proliferation would reduce the danger that states might of miscalculatethe relativestrength coalitions,since nuclear weapons clarify the relativepower of all states, and diminishthe importanceof unforeseen additions and defections from alliances. However, the risk remains that resolve will be miscalculated, because patterns of conflictare likely to be somewhat fluid in a multipolarEurope, thus precluding the establishment of well-definedspheres of rightsand rules of conduct. Unbounded proliferation, even if it is well-managed, will raise the risks that appear when there are many fingerson the nuclear trigger-accident, unauthorized or irrational use, or terrorist seizure. In any case, it is not likely that proliferation will be well-managed. The nuclear powers cannot easily work to manage proliferation while at the same time resistingit; there is a natural tension between the two goals. But they have several motives to resist. The established nuclear powers will be reluctantto give the new nuclear powers technicalhelp in building secure deterrents,because it runs against the grain of state behavior to transfer military power to others, and because of the fear that sensitive military technology could be turned against the donor state if that technology were further

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transferred its adversaries. The nuclear powers will also be reluctantto to Treaty by undermine the legitimacyof the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation allowing any signatoriesto acquire nuclear weapons, since this could open the floodgatesto the wider proliferation thattheyseek to avoid, even ifthey would otherwise favorvery limitedproliferation. these reasons the nuFor clear powers are more likely to spend their energy tryingto thwart the process of proliferation, ratherthan managing it. Proliferation can be more easily managed if it occurs during a period of relativeinternational calm. Proliferation thatoccurredduringa time of crisis would be especially dangerous, since states in conflictwith the emerging the nuclear powers would then have a strongincentiveto interrupt process by force. However, proliferation likelynot to begin until the outbreak of is domestic opposition to proliferation crisis,because there will be significant withinthe potentialnuclear powers, as well as significant externalresistance from establishednuclear powers. Hence it may requirea crisisto motivate the costs of the potential nuclear powers to pay the domestic and international moving to build a nuclear force.Thus, proliferation more likelyto happen is under disadvantageous international conditionsthan in a period of calm. Finally,there are limitsto the abilityof the established nuclear powers to For assist small emergingnuclearpowers to build secure deterrents. example, small landlocked powers cannot be given access to sea-based deterrentsor land-mobile missile systems requiringvast expanses of land; these are geoeven ifthe existing graphicproblems thattechnologycannot erase. Therefore nuclear powers move to manage the proliferation process early and wisely, thatprocess stillmay raise dangers that theycannot control. Peace Alternative Theories thatPredict Many students of European politics will reject my pessimistic analysis of post-Cold War Europe and instead argue that a multipolarEurope is likely to be at least as peaceful as the present order. Three specificscenarios fora peaceful futurehave been advanced. Each rests on a well-knowntheoryof international relations. However, each of these theoriesis flawed and thus cannot serve as the basis for reliable predictions of a peaceful order in a multipolar Europe; hence the hopefulscenariostheysupportlack plausibility. Under the firstoptimistic scenario, even a non-nuclear Europe would remain peaceful because Europeans recognize that even a conventionalwar

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would be horrific. Sobered by history, national leaders will take greatcare to avoid war. This scenario rests on the "obsolescence of war" theory. Although modern conventionalwar can certainly verycostly,thereare be several flaws in this argument.There is no systematic evidence demonstrating that Europeans believe war is obsolete. However, even if it were widely believed in Europe that war is no longer thinkable,attitudescould change. Public opinion on national security issues is notoriously fickle and responsive to elite manipulation and world events. Moreover, only one countryneed decide war is thinkableto make war possible again. Finally,it is possible that a conventionalwar could be foughtand won withoutsuffering grave losses, and elites who saw this possibilitycould believe war is a viable option. Under the second optimisticscenario, the existingEuropean Community (EC) grows strongerwith time, a development heralded by the Single European Act, designed to create a unifiedWesternEuropean marketby 1992. A strongEC then ensures that this economic order remains open and prosperous, and the open and prosperous characterof the European economy keeps the states of WesternEurope cooperatingwith each other.In thisview, the present EC structuregrows stronger,but not larger. Therefore,while of conflict mightemergein EasternEurope, the threat an aggressiveGermany would be removed by enmeshing the newly unifiedGerman state deeply in the EC. The theoryunderpinningthis scenario is "economic liberalism." A variantof this second scenario posits thatthe EC will spread to include and peace EasternEurope and possibly the Soviet Union, bringing prosperity to these regions as well.58Some also maintainthat the EC is likelyto be so successfulin the decade ahead that it will develop into a state apparatus: a unified Western European super-statewould emerge and Germany would be subsumed in it. At some futurepoint, the remainderof Europe would be incorporatedinto that super-state. Either way, suggest the proponents of this second scenario and its variants,peace will be bolstered. Under the third scenario, war is avoided because many European states have become democratic since the early twentiethcentury,and liberal democraciessimplydo not fight against each other.At a minimum,the presence of liberal democracies in Western Europe renders that half of Europe free from armed conflict. a maximum,as democracyspreads to EasternEurope At and the Soviet Union, it bolsters peace among these states, and between
Vol. 14, No. 4 58. JackSnyder, "AvertingAnarchy in the New Europe," International Security, (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41.

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these states and WesternEurope. This scenario is based on the theorythat can be called "peace-loving democracies."
ECONOMIC LIBERALISM OF THE THEORY.

Economic liberalismrejectsthe notion that the prospects for peace are tightly linked to calculations about military power, and posits instead thatstability mainlya function international is of economic motivatedby the considerations.It assumes thatmodern states are primarily desire to achieve prosperity,and that national leaders place the material welfare of their publics above all other considerations,including security. This is especially true of liberal democracies,where policymakersare under special pressure to ensure the economic well-being of their populations.59 Thus, the key to achieving peace is establishmentof an internationaleconomic systemthat fostersprosperity all states. for The taprootof stability, accordingto this theory, the creationand mainis tenance of a liberal economic order that allows free economic exchange and enhance political between states. Such an orderworks to dampen conflict cooperationin threeways.60 First,it makes states more prosperous; this bolsters peace because prosperous states are more economicallysatisfied,and satisfiedstates are more
THE LOGIC

59. This point about liberal democracies highlightsthe fact that economic liberalismand the theoryof peace-loving democracies are oftenlinked in the writingsof internationalrelations scholars. The basis of the linkage is what each theoryhas to say about peoples' motives. The claim thatindividuals mainly desire materialprosperity, centralto economic liberalism,meshes nicely with the belief that the citizenryare a powerfulforceagainst war, which, as discussed below, is centralto the theoryof peace-loving democracies. theoriesadvanced 60. The threeexplanationsdiscussed here reston threeofthe mostprominent in the international politicaleconomy (IPE) literature. These threeare usually treatedas distinct theoriesand are given various labels. However, theyshare important common elements. Hence, for purposes of parsimony, I treat them as three strands of one general theory: economic liberalism. A caveat is in order. The IPE literatureoften fails to state its theories in a clear fashion,makingthemdifficult evaluate. Thus, I have construedthese theoriesfrom to sometimes opaque writingsthat might be open to contraryinterpretations. My descriptionof economic liberalismis drawn from the following works, which are among the best of the IPE genre: Richard N. Cooper, "Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policies in the Seventies," World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 2 (January1972), pp. 158-181; ErnstB. Haas, "Technology,Pluralism,and the New Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,ed., International Regionalism (Boston: Little,Brown, 1968), pp. 149-176; Robert0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Powerand Interdependence: World Politics Transition in (Boston: Little,Brown, 1977); Robert0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discordin the WorldPoliticalEconomy (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1984); David Mitrany,A Working Peace System(Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1966); Edward L. Morse, "The Transformation Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization," of World Politics,Vol. 22, No. 3 (April 1970), pp. 371-392; and Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of theTrading State:Commerce Conquest theModernWorld and in (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

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peaceful. Many wars are waged to gain or preserve wealth, but states have less motiveforsuch wars if they are already wealthy.Wealthysocieties also stand to lose more if theirsocieties are laid waste by war. For both reasons theyavoid war. Moreover,the prosperityspawned by economic liberalismfeeds itself,by promotinginternationalinstitutions that fostergreaterliberalism,which in turn promotes still greaterprosperity.To functionsmoothly,a liberal economic order requires internationalregimes or institutions, such as the EC, the General Agreementon Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the International MonetaryFund (IMF). These institutions perform two limitedbut important functions. First,theyhelp statesto verify thatpartnerskeep theircooperative commitments. Second, they provide resources to governmentsexperiencing short-term problems arising from their exposure to internationalmarkets, and by doing so they allow states to eschew beggar-thy-neighbor policies thatmightotherwiseunderminethe existingeconomic order. Once in place, these institutionsand regimes bolster economic cooperation, hence bolster prosperity.They also bolster themselves: once in existence they cause the expansion of theirown size and influence, provingtheirworthand selling by themselves to states and publics. And as their power grows they become better able to promotecooperation,which promotesgreater which prosperity, further bolsterstheirprestigeand influence.In essence, a benevolent spirallike relationshipsets in between cooperation-promoting regimes and prosin perity, which each feeds the other. Second, a liberaleconomic orderfosters economic interdependenceamong states. Interdependence is defined as a situation in which two states are mutuallyvulnerable; each is a hostage of the otherin the economic realm.61 When interdependenceis high, this theoryholds, thereis less temptation to cheat or behave aggressively towards other states because all states could retaliate. Interdependence allows states to compel each other to cooperate on economic matters,much as mutual assured destructionallows nuclear powers to compel each other to respect theirsecurity.All states are forced by the othersto act as partnersin the provisionof materialcomfort their for home publics. Third,some theoristsargue thatwith ever-increasing politicalcooperation, internationalregimes will become so powerful that they will assume an
61. See KennethN. Waltz, "The MythofNational Interdependence,"in Charles P. Kindelberger, ed., TheInternational Corporation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 205-223.

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independent lifeof theirown, eventuallygrowinginto a super-state.This is a minority view; most economicliberalsdo not argue thatregimescan become so powerful that they can coerce states to act against their own narrow interests.Instead most maintainthatregimesessentiallyreflect interests the of the states that created and maintain them, and remain subordinate to other interestsof these states. However, the "growth to super-statehood" view does representan important strandofthoughtamong economicliberals. The main flawin thistheoryis thatthe principalassumptionunderpinning it-that states are primarily motivatedby the desire to achieve prosperityis wrong. States are surely concerned about prosperity, and thus economic calculations are hardly trivialforthem. However, states operate in both an international political environmentand an international economic environment, and the formerdominates the latterin cases where the two systems come into conflict.The reason is straightforward: international the political systemis anarchic, which means that each state must always be concerned to ensure its own survival.Since a statecan have no highergoal than survival, when push comes to shove, internationalpolitical considerations will be paramount in the minds of decision-makers. Proponentsof economic liberalismlargelyignore the effects anarchyon of state behavior and concentrateinstead on economic considerations. When this omission is corrected,however, theirargumentscollapse, fortwo reasons. First,competitionforsecurity makes it verydifficult statesto cooperate. for When securityis scarce, states become more concerned about relativegains than absolute gains.62They ask of an exchange not, "will both of us gain?" but instead, "who will gain more?"63When securityis scarce, they reject even cooperation that would yield an absolute economic gain, if the other state would gain more of the yield, fromfear that the other mightconvert its gain to military and then use this strength win by coercion strength, to in later rounds.M4 Cooperation is much easier to achieve if states worryonly about absolute gains, as they are more likelyto do when securityis not so
62. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,"International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507; and Grieco, Cooperation and Non-Tariff amongNations:Europe,America Barriers to Trade(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 63. Waltz, Theory International of Politics, 105. p. 64. It is importantto emphasize that because militarypower is in good part a functionof economicmight,the consequences ofeconomic dealings among statessometimeshave important securityimplications.

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scarce. The goal then is simply to insure that the overall economic pie is at expandingand each stateis getting least some partofthe resulting benefits. will oftenbe scarce;thisheightens However, anarchyguaranteesthatsecurity states' concerns about relativegains, which makes cooperation difficult unless gains can be finelysliced to reflect, and thus not disturb,the current balance of power. In contrast to this view, economic liberals generally assume that states worrylittleabout relativegains when designingcooperativeagreements,but instead are concerned mainlyabout absolute gains. This assumption underlies their optimism over the prospects for internationalcooperation. However, it is not well-based: anarchy forces states to reject agreements that resultin asymmetrical payoffsthat shiftthe balance of power against them. Second, interdependence is as likely to lead to conflictas cooperation, because states will struggleto escape the vulnerability thatinterdependence creates, in order to bolster their national security.States that depend on others for criticaleconomic supplies will fear cutoff blackmail in time of or crisisor war; theymay tryto extend politicalcontrolto the source of supply, giving rise to conflict with the source or with its other customers. Interdependence, in other words, mightvery well lead to greatercompetition,not to cooperation.65 Several otherconsiderations,independent of the consequences of anarchy, also raise doubts about the claims of economic liberals. First,economic interactionsbetween states often cause serious frictions, even ifthe overallconsequences are positive. Therewill invariably winners be and losers within each state, and losers rarelyaccept defeat gracefully.In modern states, where leaders have to pay carefulattentionto theirconstit65. There are numerous examples in the historicalrecordof vulnerable states pursuing aggressive military policies forthe purpose of achievingautarky.For example, thispatternof behavior in was reflected both Japan's and Germany's actions during the interwarperiod. On Japan, see Michael A. Barnhart,JapanPrepares Total War: The Searchfor Economic for Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1987); and James B. Crowley, Japan'sQuest for Autonomy (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1966). On Germany,see WilliamCarr,Arms,Autarky and Aggression: Studyin German A Foreign Policy, 1933-39 (New York: Norton, 1973). It is also worth noting that during the Arab oil embargo of the early 1970s, when it became apparent that the United States was vulnerable to OPEC pressure, there was much talk in America about using military force to seize Arab oil fields. See, for example, Robert W. Tucker,"Oil: The Issue of American Intervention,"Commentary, January1975, pp. 21-31; Miles Ignotus [said to be a pseudonym forEdward Luttwak],"Seizing Arab Oil," Harpers, March 1975, pp. 45-62; and U.S. Congress, House Committeeon International Relations,Report Oil Fieldsas Military on Objectives: A Feasibility Study,prepared by John M. Collins and Clyde R. Mark, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office[U.S. GPO], August 21, 1975).

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uents, losers can cause considerable trouble. Even in cases where only winners are involved, there are sometimes squabbles over how the spoils are divided. In a sense, then, expanding the networkof contactsamong states increases the scope forinternational disagreementsamong them. They now have more to squabble about. Second, therewill be opportunitiesforblackmailand forbrinkmanship in a highlydynamiceconomic systemwhere statesare dependent on each other. For example, although mutual vulnerabilities may arise among states, it is likelythat the actual levels of dependence will not be equal. The less vulnerable states would probablyhave greaterbargainingpower over the more dependent states and mightattemptto coerce them into makingextravagant concessions. Furthermore, different political systems, not to mention individual leaders, have different capacities for engaging in tough bargaining situations. THE HISTORICAL RECORD. During two periods in the twentiethcentury, Europe witnessed a liberal economic order with high levels of interdependence. Stability should have obtained duringthose periods, accordingto economic liberalism. The firstcase clearly contradictsthe theory.The years between 1890 and 1914 were probably the time of greatesteconomic interdependencein Europe's history.Yet World War I broke out followingthis period.66 The second case covers the Cold War years. During this period there has been much interdependence among the EC states, while relations among these states have been very peaceful. This case, not surprisingly, the is centerpieceof the economic liberals' argument. The correlationin this second case does not mean, however, that interdependence has caused cooperation among the Western democracies. It is more likely that the prime cause was the Cold War, and that this was the main reason that intra-ECrelationshave flourished.67 The Cold War caused these resultsin two different mutuallyreinforcing but ways. First,old-fashionedbalance of power logic mandated cooperation among the Western democracies. A powerful and potentially dangerous Soviet
66. See Richard N. Rosecrance, et al., "WhitherInterdependence?" International Organization, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 1977), pp. 432-434. 67. This theme is reflected BarryBuzan, "Economic Structure in and International Security:The Limits of the Liberal Case," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 597624; RobertGilpin, U.S. Powerand theMultinational The Corporation: PoliticalEconomy Foreign of DirectInvestment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and RobertA. Pollard, Economic Security the and OriginsoftheCold War,1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

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Union forcedthe Westerndemocraciesto band together meet the common to threat.Britain,Germany,and France no longer worried about each other, because all faced a greatermenace fromthe Soviets. This Soviet threatmuted concernsabout relativegains arisingfromeconomic cooperation among the EC states by giving each Western democracya vested interestin seeing its alliance partnersgrow powerful, since each additional incrementof power helped deter the Soviets. The Soviet threatalso muted relative-gainsfears among WesternEuropean states by giving them all a powerfulincentiveto avoid conflictwith each other while the Soviet Union loomed to the east, ready to harvestthe gains of Westernquarrels. This gave each Westernstate greater confidence that its Western partners would not turn their gains against it, as long as these partnersbehaved rationally. Second, America's hegemonic position in NATO, the military counterpart to the EC, mitigatedthe effects anarchyon the Westerndemocracies and of facilitatedcooperation among them.68As emphasized, states do not trust each otherin anarchyand theyhave incentivesto commitaggressionagainst each other. America, however, not only provided protectionagainst the Soviet threat,but also guaranteed that no EC state would aggress against another. For example, France did not have to fear Germany as it rearmed, because the American presence in Germany meant that the Germans were not freeto attackanyone. Withthe United States servingas nightwatchman, relative-gains concerns among the WesternEuropean states were mitigated and, moreover,those states were willingto allow theireconomies to become tightly interdependent. of In effect, relationsamong EC states were spared the effects anarchyfears about relative gains and an obsession with autonomy-because the United States served as the ultimatearbiterwithinthe Alliance. If the present Soviet threatto WesternEurope is removed, and American forcesdepart forhome, relationsamong the EC stateswill be fundamentally altered. Without a common Soviet threatand without the American night watchman, Western European states will begin viewing each other with greaterfear and suspicion, as they did forcenturiesbeforethe onset of the Cold War. Consequently, they will worryabout the imbalances in gains as well as the loss of autonomy that resultsfromcooperation.69 Cooperation in
Policy,No. 54 (Spring 1984), pp. 6468. See JosefJoffe, "Europe's American Pacifier,"Foreign 82. extended 69. Consider, forexample, a situationwhere the European Communityis successfully

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thisnew orderwill be more difficult than it has been in the Cold War. Conflict will be more likely. In sum, thereare good reasons forlooking with skepticismupon the claim that peace can be maintainedin a multipolarEurope on the basis of a more powerfulEC.
PEACE-LOVING DEMOCRACIES

The peace-loving democracies theory holds that domestic political factors, not calculations about military power or the international economic system, are the principaldeterminant peace. Specifically, argumentis thatthe of the presence of liberal democracies in the international systemwill help to produce a stable order.70 The claim is not that democracies go to war less often than authoritarian states. In fact,the historical recordshows clearlythatsuch is not the case.71 Instead, the argumentis thatdemocracies do not go to war against otherdemocracies. Thus, democracymust spread to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to insure peace in post-Cold War Europe. It is not certainthat democracywill take root among the states of Eastern Europe or in the Soviet Union. They lack a strongtraditionof democracy; institutions that can accommodate the growthof democracywill have to be built fromscratch.That task will probablyprove to be difficult, especially in an unstable Europe. But whether democracytakes root in the East matters
to include Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and that over time all states achieve greater prosperity.The Germans, however, do significantly betterthan all other states. Hence their relativepower position, which is already quite strong,begins to improve markedly.It is likely that the French and the Soviets, just to name two states, would be deeply concerned by this situation. 70. This theoryhas been recently articulated Michael Doyle in threearticles:"Liberalismand by World Politics,"American PoliticalScience Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,"Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer1983), pp. 205-235; and "Kant, LiberalLegacies, and ForeignAffairs, Part2," Philosophy and PublicAffairs, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1983), pp. 323-353. Doyle draws heavily on Immanuel Kant's classic writingson the subject. This theoryalso provides the centralargumentin Francis Fukuyama's widely publicized essay on "The End of History?"in The NationalInterest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18. For an excellentcritiqueof the theory,see Samuel P. Huntington, "No Exit: The Errorsof Endism," TheNationalInterest, No. 17 (Fall 1989), pp. 3-11. 71. There is a good empiricalliterature the relationshipbetween democracyand war. See, on forexample, Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror the Wall . .. Are the FreerCountriesMore Pacific?" on Journal Conflict of Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 617-648; Erich Weede, "Democracyand War Involvement,"in ibid., pp. 649-664; Bruce M. Russettand R. JosephMonsen, "Bureaucracyand PolyarchyAs Predictorsof Performance," Comparative Political Studies,Vol. 8, No. 1 (April 1975), pp. 5-31; and Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-Pronenessof Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965," The Jerusalem Journal International of Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Summer 1976), pp. 50-69.

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littleforstability Europe, since the theoryof peace-loving democracies is in unsound. THE LOGIC OF THE THEORY. Two explanations are offered support of the in claim that democracies do not go to war against one another. First,some claim that authoritarian leaders are more prone to go to war than leaders of democracies, because authoritarian leaders are not accountable to theirpublics, which carrythe main burdens of war. In a democracy, by contrast,the citizenrythat pays the price of war has greatersay in the decision-making process. The people, so the argumentgoes, are more hesitant to starttrouble because it is they who pay the blood price; hence the greatertheirpower, the fewerwars. The second argumentrests on the claim that the citizens of liberal democracies respectpopular democraticrights-those of theirfellowcountrymen, and those of individuals in other states. As a result they are reluctantto wage war against other democracies,because theyview democraticgovernments as more legitimatethan others, and are loath to impose a foreign regime on a democraticstate by force. This would violate theirown democraticprinciplesand values. Thus an inhibitionon war is introducedwhen two democracies face each other that is missing in other international relationships. The first these argumentsis flawed because it is not possible to sustain of the claim that the people in a democracyare especially sensitiveto the costs of war and therefore less willingthan authoritarian leaders to fight wars. In fact,the historicalrecord shows that democracies are every bit as likely to fight wars as are authoritarian states. Furthermore, mass publics, whetherdemocraticor not, can become deeply imbued with nationalisticor religiousfervor, makingthem prone to support aggression,regardless of costs. The widespread public support in post-revolutionaryFrance forNapoleon's wars of aggression is just one example of thisphenomenon. On the otherhand, authoritarian leaders are just as likely as democraticpublics to fear going to war, because war tends to unleash democraticforces that can undermine the regime.72 War can impose high costs on authoritarian leaders as well as on theircitizenries. The second argument, which emphasizes the transnationalrespect for democratic rightsamong democracies,restson a weaker factor thatis usually
72. See, for example, Stanislav Andreski, "On the Peaceful Disposition of MilitaryDictatorships," Journal Strategic of Studies,Vol. 3, No. 3 (December 1980), pp. 3-10.

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overriddenby otherfactorssuch as nationalismand religiousfundamentalism. There is also anotherproblemwiththe argument.The possibility always exists that a democracy will revertto an authoritarian state. This threatof backslidingmeans that one democraticstate can never be sure that another democraticstate will not change its stripesand turn on it sometime in the future. Liberaldemocraciesmusttherefore worryabout relativepower among themselves, which is tantamountto saying that each has an incentive to consideraggression against the otherto forestall futuretrouble.Lamentably, it is not possible foreven liberal democracies to transcendanarchy. THE HISTORICAL RECORD. Problems with the deductive logic aside, the historicalrecord seems to offerstrong support for the theoryof peace-loving democracies. There appears to have been no case where liberal democracies foughtagainst each other. Although this evidence looks impressive at first glance, closer examinationshows it to be indecisive. In fact,history provides no clear test of the theory. Four evidentiaryproblems leave the issue in doubt. First,democracies have been few in number over the past two centuries, and thus therehave not been many cases where two democracieswere in a position to fightwith each other. Only three prominentcases are usually cited: Britainand the United States (1832-present);Britainand France (183249, 1871-1940); and the Westerndemocracies since 1945. Second, thereare otherpersuasive explanationsforwhy war did not occur in those three cases, and these competing explanations must be ruled out beforethe peace-loving democracies theorycan be accepted. While relations between the Britishand the Americans during the nineteenthcenturywere hardly free of conflict,73 theirrelationsin the twentiethcenturywere quite harmonious, and thus fit closely with how the theorywould expect two democracies to behave towards each other. That harmony, however, can easily be explained by the presence of a common threatthat forcedBritain 74 and the United States to work closelytogether. Bothfaced a serious German threatin the firstpart of the century,and a Soviet threatlater. The same basic argumentapplies to France and Britain.While Franco-British relations
73. For a discussion of the hostile relationsthat existed between the United States and Britain during the nineteenthcentury,see H.C. Allen, GreatBritain and theUnitedStates:A History of Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1952 (London: Odhams, 1954). 74. For a discussion of this rapprochement,see Stephen R. Rock, WhyPeace BreaksOut: Great PowerRapprochement Historical in Perspective (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 2.

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they imwere not the best throughoutmost of the nineteenthcentury,75 withthe rise ofa common proved significantly around the turnof the century threat:Germany.76 Finally,as noted above, the Soviet threatcan explain the absence of war among the Westerndemocracies since 1945. Third,itbears mentionthatseveral democracieshave come close to fighting one another,which suggests that the absence of war may be due simply to chance. France and Britainapproached war duringthe Fashoda crisisof 1898. France and Weimar Germanymighthave come to blows over the Rhineland strength challenge to duringthe 1920s, had Germanypossessed the military France. The United States has clashed witha numberof elected governments in the Third World during the Cold War, including the Allende regime in Chile and the Arbenz regimein Guatemala. Lastly, some would classifyWilhelmine Germany as a democracy,or at least a quasi-democracy;if so, World War I becomes a war among democracies.77 Conclusion This article argues that bipolarity,an equal militarybalance, and nuclear weapons have fosteredpeace in Europe over the past 45 years. The Cold War confrontation produced these phenomena; thus the Cold War was prina violent region into a very cipally responsible fortransforming historically peaceful place. There is no doubt that the costs of the Cold War have been substantial.It inflicted oppressive politicalregimeson the peoples of EasternEurope, who were denied basic human rightsby theirforcedmembershipin the Soviet
75. For a good discussion of Franco-British relationsduring the nineteenthcentury,see P.J.V. Rolo, Entente Cordiale:The Originsand Negotiation theAnglo-French of Agreements 8 April1904 of (New York: St. Martins, 1969), pp. 16-109. 76. Stephen Rock, who has examined the rapprochement between Britainand France, argues that the principal motivatingforce behind theirimproved relations derived fromgeopolitical considerations,not shared politicalbeliefs. See Rock, WhyPeace Breaks Out, chap. 4. 77. Doyle recognizes this problem and thus has a lengthyfootnotethat attemptsto deal with it. See "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs[Part One]," pp. 216-217, n. 8. He argues that "Germany was a liberal state under republican law for domestic issues," but that the "emperor's active role in foreignaffairs. .. made imperialGermanya state divorced fromthe control of its citizenryin foreignaffairs."However, an examination of the decision-making process leading to World War I reveals that the emperor(WilhelmII) was not a primemover in foreignaffairsand that he was no more bellicose than other members of the German elite, includingthe leading civilianofficial, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg.

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empire. It consumed national wealth, by giving rise to large and costly defense establishmentsin both East and West. It spawned bloody conflicts in the Third World; these produced modest casualties forthe superpowers, but large casualties forthe ThirdWorldnations. Nevertheless,the net human and economic cost of the Cold War order has been farless than the cost of the European order of 1900-45, with its vast violence and suffering. A Cold War order without confrontation would have been preferableto the order that actually developed; then the peace that the Cold War order produced could have been enjoyed withoutits attendantcosts. However, it was East-Westenmitythatgave rise to the Cold War order;therewould have been no bipolarity,no equality, and no large Soviet and American nuclear forcesin Europe withoutit. The costs of the Cold War arose fromthe same cause-East-West confrontation-as did its benefits.The good could not be had withoutthe bad. This articlefurther argues that the demise of the Cold War order is likely to increase the chances thatwar and major criseswill occur in Europe. Many observers now suggest that a new age of peace is dawning; in fact the opposite is true. The implications of my analysis are straightforward, paradoxical. The if West has an interestin maintainingpeace in Europe. It thereforehas an in interest maintainingthe Cold War order,and hence has an interestin the continuationof the Cold War confrontation; developments that threatento end it are dangerous. The Cold War antagonismcould be continuedat lower levels of East-Westtension than have prevailed in the past; hence the West is not injured by relaxingEast-Westtension,but a complete end to the Cold War would create more problems than it would solve. The fate of the Cold War, however, is mainly in the hands of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is the only superpower thatcan seriouslythreaten to overrun Europe; it is the Soviet threatthat provides the glue that holds NATO together.Take away that offensivethreatand the United States is likely to abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance it has headed for fortyyears may disintegrate.This would bring to an end the bipolar order that has characterizedEurope forthe past 45 years. The foregoinganalysis suggests thatthe West paradoxicallyhas an interest in the continued existence a powerfulSoviet Union with substantialmili-of tary forces in Eastern Europe. Western interestsare wholly reversed from those that Western leaders saw in the late 1940s: instead of seeking the retraction Soviet power, as the West did then, the West now should hope of

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that the Soviet Union retains at least some militaryforces in the Eastern European region. There is littlethe Americans or the WesternEuropeans can or are likelyto do to perpetuate the Cold War, forthreereasons. First,domesticpoliticalconsiderationspreclude such an approach. Western leaders obviouslycannotbase nationalsecurity policyon the need to maintain forcesin CentralEurope forthe purpose simplyof keeping the Soviets there. The idea of deploying large forcesin order to bait the Soviets into an orderkeeping competition would be dismissed as bizarre, and contraryto the general belief that ending the Cold War and removingthe Soviet yoke from Eastern Europe would make the world saferand better.78 Second, the idea of propping up a decliningrivalruns counterto the basic behaviorof states. States are principally concernedabout theirrelativepower position in the system;hence, theylook foropportunitiesto take advantage of each other. If anything,they preferto see adversaries decline, and thus will do whatevertheycan to speed up the process and maximizethe distance of the fall. In other words, states do not ask which distribution power of best facilitates stability and then do everything possible to build or maintain such an order. Instead, they each tend to pursue the more narrow aim of maximizingtheirpower advantage over potentialadversaries. The particular international order that resultsis simplya byproductof thatcompetition, as illustrated the originsof the Cold War orderin Europe. No stateintended by to createit. In fact,both the United States and the Soviet Union worked hard in the early years of the Cold War to undermine each other's position in Europe, which would have ended the bipolar order on the Continent. The remarkably stable system that emerged in Europe in the late 1940s was the unintended consequence of an intense competitionbetween the superpowers. Third, even if the Americans and the WesternEuropeans wanted to help the Soviets maintaintheirstatus as a superpower,it is not apparent thatthey could do so. The Soviet Union is leaving Eastern Europe and cuttingits

78. This point is illustratedby the 1976 controversy over the so-called "SonnenfeldtDoctrine." Helmut Sonnenfeldt,an adviser to Secretaryof State Henry Kissinger,was reported to have said in late 1975 that the United States should support Soviet dominationof Eastern Europe. It was clear fromthe ensuing debate thatwhetheror not Sonnenfeldtin factmade such a claim, no administration could publiclyadopt that position. See U.S. Congress, House Committeeon International Relations, Hearingson UnitedStatesNationalSecurity PolicyVis-a-VisEasternEurope (The "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine"), 94thCong., 2nd sess. (Washington,D.C.: U.S. GPO, April 12, 1976).

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military forceslargelybecause its economy is foundering.It is not clear that the Soviets themselves know how to fix their economy, and there is little that Westerngovernmentscan do to help them solve theireconomic problems. The West can and should avoid doing malicious mischiefto the Soviet economy, but at this juncture it is difficult see how the West can have to significant positive influence.79 The fact that the West cannot sustain the Cold War does not mean that the United States should abandon all attemptsto preservethe current order. The United States should do what it can to directevents toward avertinga complete mutual superpower withdrawal from Europe. For instance, the Americannegotiatingposition at the conventionalarms controltalks should aim toward large mutual forcereductions,but should not contemplatecomplete mutual withdrawal. The Soviets may opt to withdraw all theirforces unilaterally anyway; thereis littlethe United States could do to preventthis.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

If complete Soviet withdrawalfromEastern Europe proves unavoidable, the West faces the question of how to maintain peace in a multipolarEurope. Three policy prescriptions in order. are First,the United States should encourage the limitedand carefullymanaged proliferation nuclear weapons in Europe. The best hope foravoiding of war in post-Cold War Europe is nuclear deterrence;hence some nuclear proliferation necessaryto compensate forthe withdrawalof the Soviet and is American nuclear arsenals fromCentral Europe. Ideally, as I have argued, nuclear weapons would spread to Germany,but to no other state. Second, Britainand the United States, as well as the Continental states, will have to balance activelyand efficiently against any emergingaggressor to offset ganging up and bullyingproblemsthatare sure to arise in postthe Cold War Europe. Balancing in a multipolarsystem,however, is usually a problem-ridden enterprise,eitherbecause of geographyor because of significant coordinationproblems. Nevertheless,two steps can be taken to maximize the prospects of efficient balancing. The initial measure concerns Britainand the United States, the two prospectivebalancing states that,physicallyseparated fromthe Continent,may
79. For an optimisticassessment of h,ow the West can enhance Gorbachev's prospects of succeeding, see JackSnyder, "InternationalLeverage on Soviet Domestic Change," World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 1 (October 1989), pp. 1-30.

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thus conclude that they have little interestin what happens there. They would thenbe abandoning theirresponsibilities and, more importantly, their interestsas off-shore balancers. Both states' failureto balance against Germany before the two world wars made war more likely in each case. It is essential for peace in Europe that they not repeat theirpast mistakes, but instead remain actively involved in maintainingthe balance of power in Europe. Specifically, both states must maintainmilitary forcesthatcan be deployed to the Continentto balance against states that threatento starta war. To do this they must also socialize theirpublics to support a policy of continued will be more difContinentalcommitment.Support forsuch a commitment ficult mobilize than in the past, because its principalpurpose would be to to preservepeace, ratherthan to preventan imminent hegemony,and the latter is a simplergoal to explain publicly.Moreover,it is the basic nature of states to focus on maximizing relative power, not on bolsteringstability, this so prescription asks them to take on an unaccustomed task. Nevertheless, the Britishand American stake in peace is real, especially since there is a sure riskthat a European war mightinvolve large-scaleuse of nuclear weapons. It should thereforebe possible for both countries to lead their publics to recognize this interestand support policies thatprotectit.80 The other measure concerns American attitudes and actions toward the Soviet Union. The Soviets may eventuallyreturnto theirpast expansionism and threatento upset the status quo. If so, we are back to the Cold War; the West should respond as quicklyand efficiently it did the first as time. Howif the Soviets adhere to status quo policies, Soviet power could play a ever, key role in balancing against Germanyand in maintainingorder in Eastern Europe. It is importantthat,in those cases where the Soviets are actingin a balancingcapacity,the United States recognizethis,cooperate withits former with the adversary,and not let residual distrustfromthe Cold War interfere balancing process. at should be made to keep hyper-nationalism bay, Third,a concertedeffort especially in Eastern Europe. This powerfulforcehas deep roots in Europe and has contributedto the outbreakof past European conflicts. Nationalism has been contained during the Cold War, but it is likelyto reemerge once

80. Advancing this argument is Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't."

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Soviet and Americanforcesleave the heart of Europe.81It will be a forcefor troubleunless it is curbed. The teaching of honest national historyis especially important,since the teaching of false chauvinist historyis the main vehicle for spreading virulentnationalism. States that teach a dishonestly self-exculpating self-glorifying or historyshould be publicly criticizedand
sanctioned.82

On this count it is especially importantthat relationsbetween Germany and its neighbors be handled carefully.Many Germans rightlyfeel that Germanyhas behaved veryresponsiblyfor45 years,and has made an honest effort remember to and make amends foran uglyperiod ofitspast. Therefore, Germans quickly tire of lectures fromforeigners demanding that they apologize once again for crimes committedbefore most of the currentGerman population was born. On the otherhand, peoples who have suffered the at hands of the Germans cannot forget theirenormous suffering, inevitably and ask forrepeated assurance that the past will not be repeated. This dialogue has the potential to spiral into mutual recriminations that could spark a renewed sense of persecution among Germans, and with it, a rebirthof German-nationalism. is therefore It incumbenton all partiesin this discourse to proceed with understandingand respect for one another's feelings and experience.Specifically, others should not ask today's Germans to apologize forcrimesthey did not commit,but Germans must understand that others' ceaseless demands for reassurance have a legitimatebasis in history,and should view these demands with patience and understanding. None of these tasks will be easy to accomplish. In fact,I expect that the bulk of my prescriptions will not be followed; most run contrary powerful to strainsof domesticAmericanand European opinion, and to the basic nature of statebehavior. Moreover,even iftheyare followed,thiswill not guarantee the peace in Europe. If the Cold War is trulybehind us, the stability the of past 45 years is not likelyto be seen again in the coming decades.
81. On the evolution of nationalistichistory-teaching Europe see Kennedy, "The Decline of in NationalisticHistory,"and Dance, History Betrayer. the 82. My thinking this matterhas been influencedby conversationswith Stephen Van Evera. on

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