Aspects regarding Egypt's geostrategic importance in todays political context

by Catalina Oancea
Egypt is considered an important geo-strategic factor in the economic and political configuration of its region, both through its role in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and also by holding power through economic force over one of the key shipping routes of the world, the Suez Canal, as well as through its historical influence on the Arab world. Along with the straits of Malacca, Gibraltar and Hormuz, the Suez Canal is among the "seven gates" of world trade. According to the latest official figures, about 7% of goods sold worldwide pass through this canal: European equipment or agricultural products going to Asian countries, and Asian consumer products going to Europe. Thus, 1.2 million barrels of crude oil pass daily through the Suez Canal, representing 6% of the Gulf countries export. This is sufficient data to justify the expressed fears of Secretary General of OPEC, Abdallah el-Badri, who stated that there is a risk of a "real shortage" of oil should the unrest in Egypt affect traffic through the canal. Oil tankers will thus be obliged to take a route around Africa (10,000 km more), meaning huge transport costs. Egypt is internationally considered leader of the Arab World. It has the largest population, holding over 80 million inhabitants. It is known as the first state that had the courage to make peace with Israel in 1979, and continues to this day to be the key-mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this being the reason for Israeli leaders concerns regarding the aftereffects of Mubaraks removal from leadership. Egyptian influence also manifests itself in other areas of the region, including the cultural one. It is also of great import the fact that Egypt, and Mubarak personally, has been a faithful and active ally of the West against terrorism, as well as the Iranian nuclear program. The first parliamentary elections after Hosni Mubaraks removal from power The term revolution has been used most of the times when describing the popular movements that took place in Egypt last year, but there are at least two arguments which demonstrate that it was not a revolution in the true sense of the word. First, there were approximately four hundred thousand people who protested, out of 80 million citizens, representing a very small segment of the population. Second, the protesters demanded that Hosni Mubarak be removed from power, without having any claims leading to a change in the political regime. Therefore, the movements within the Egyptian state could be considered rebellions, not revolutions. After Mubaraks resignation, the power was taken over by the Army High Council, composed of 21 senior officers, but the actual executive leadership is in the hands of only five officers: Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Sami Hafez Anan, Mohab Mamish, Reda Mahmoud Hafez Mohamed and Abd El Aziz Seif-Eldeen. In terms of legislative power, on November 28th to 29th 2011, elections were held for the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Egyptian Parliament. Then there were the Upper House elections (Shura) between January the 20th and March 11th, 2012. [2] Following the preliminary results, the Freedom and Justice Party, the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm, has the lead in nine governorates, followed by the Islamist party Al-Nour. [3] In Egypt, the possible shift of power from military to civilian rule could generate both a religious radicalization and a majority government of the Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most important Egyptian Islamist group, founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, in the hopes of establishing the Quran law in all the Muslim countries and fighting off Western influences. Also, starting with the interwar period, the group has since exceeded its political force status limited to the Egyptian space, establishing outposts in Jordan, Palestine and Syria. Its members took part in the Arab-Israeli War (19481949), the one in Algeria, the war in Afghanistan (1979) or the one in Chechnya, and in the Palestinian territories, the Brotherhood created the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). [4] Should the Brotherhood become the main power in Egypt, one can expect that the Peace Treaty between this state and Israel, which places the Sinai Peninsula within Egyptian borders, will be nullified.

Effects of the political instability

From a military point of view, the strategic cooperation with the U.S. provides, in general, military security for
the Egyptian state and its needs in terms of weapons, resuming the discussions in 2006 of possibly reactivating the nuclear program, but the main threat to the military comes from the inside, its status becoming increasingly challenged by various radical Muslim movements. [5] One of the sources of instability in Egypt is the socio-political one. It manifests itself through protests, riots, antigovernment demonstrations, internal disorder and revolutions. A week before the parliamentary elections started, clashes were triggered between Egyptian security forces and protesters, the Tahir market once again becoming the scene of violent demonstrations against the Egyptian regime. The frequencies of unrest and popular movements have a negative effect on Egypts economic growth. Considered manifestations that could lead to chaos and social disarray, they decrease the states development rate, drastically reduce living standards, with related consequences: widespread corruption, increasing crime rate, black market development etc. Also, an important factor that can directly or indirectly affect economic performance (through changes in policy), depending on the level of internal political stability, is the existence of an external political instability. The numerous vulnerabilities facing Egypt are amplified by the continuous state of conflict in Libya and Sudan. Thus, political instability, measured by frequent changes in state regime, by disorder and violence, is seen as a source of the states counterdevelopment. [6] Outside the political struggle, there will be a struggle between the civilians and the military, as well as within these factions, for division of influence and control over economic sectors, given the empty place left since the departure from power by the party and Mubaraks and his sons, Gamal, faithful followers. On the other hand, the six decades of military rule in Egypt enshrines the Egyptian military as a guarantor of state stability, and the way in which the Army handled recent events led to increasing prestige.[7] Instead of conclusions Consequence of the Arab riots, some changes in the geopolitical field can have, in time, significant implications over the national and regional security environment. Redistribution of geopolitical influence is the early 2011 events most notable result. [8] According to a Stratfor analysis, George Friedman believes that establishing an Islamic regime in Egypt would be a "strategic disaster" for the United States, because one such a situation would change both the dynamics of the Arab world and Americas applied strategy after the end of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. Cooperation between Egyptian and US intelligence after September 11 was instrumental in countering and undermining al-Qaeda. If Egypt ceases to cooperate or becomes hostile, the U.S. strategy would be undermined. [9] In terms of the importance of energy resources, Egypt can play a strategic role in the European Unions energy supply diversification, as a potential supplier for the Nabucco pipeline. [10] Popular movements in Egypt show the vulnerability to which regimes in the region are subject. Thus, one can talk about a domino effect, since protests broke out, in turn, in Tunisia, then affecting Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon and Jordan. On the other hand, regarding the effects of globalization, riots were encouraged by the convenience of online environment, being catalyzed by the Internets exponential growth. For example, one rapid response measure the Mubarak regime in Egypt took was limiting the access to Internet services, but the attempt was doomed to failure. [11] Finally, Egypt is a country with an important position in international relations, and the new regime will have to decide on how to strengthen their position as a regional and international player in the new security architecture, considering the struggles for regional hegemony.