Husserl Studies 2:3-32 (1985). 1985 Martinus Ni]hoffPublishers, Dordrecht. Printed in the Netherlands.

Edmund Husserl, The Apodicticity of Recollection

Translated and introduced by DEBORAH CHAFFIN

San Diego State University

I. Introduction These new forms of consciousness alone make a life of spirit possible - a life of recognition, willing, valuing and doing. If there were no recollection ..., then the ego would only have circumstantial perceptually constituted objectivity in its present temporal becoming. For in the full sense there simply would not be an object for the ego: the ego would lack consciousness ... of something to which one could always return and recognize as the same, and further, which one could have as one's own freely available possession. (Hua XI, 326)

The text "The Apodicticity of Recollection" dates from 1922-23, and may be viewed as Husserl's clear recognition o f the extent to which the descriptive phenomenology of immediacy is bound up with a reconstructive phenomenology o f justificiation. ~ Such recognition is manifest through the original treatment he gives the analysis of internal time-consciousness, and especially memory. In addition, his remarks on the nature o f the transcendental ego add much strength to the interpretation of this text as a contribution to Husserl's longstanding concern with 'phenomenology of reason.' In the following brief introduction, I will indicate the text's contributions to the analysis o f timeconsciousness as well as the new understanding of the relation between immediate experience and authentic truth which the analysis entails. ~

4 In "The Apodicticity of Recollection" Husserl's analysis of our recollection of an object unfolds against the "threatening" possibility that there may only be momentary truth - that even my statements about my own past merely possess a "barren, fleeting adaptation to the fleeting life of the present." As Husserl notes, such statements are "... really barren, since any fruitfulness is a thing of abiding value and not something which subsists merely at the moment of growth" (Hua XI, 366). If there were no enduring truth, i.e., truth which could be reiterated and reverified, then there would be no infinite transcendental life, a possibility whose necessity Husserl seeks to explicate throughout the text. For it is only on the basis of an infinite transcendental life that the identity of an object can be established. Husserl turns, then, to recollection as the source of the evidence essential for the establishment of that abiding identity underlying all temporal change. Far from being merely an indirect and nonoriginal source of evidence as in his earlier analyses of recollection, 3 in this text Husserl argues that recollection is the source of the apodictic certainty we have that an identical self presents itself in our reflections upon the past. Indeed, only recollection can give apodictic evidence for the actuality of the past, even if every real recollection is accompanied by a "margin of uncertainty" (Hua XI, 383). Although Husserl's argument for the apodicticity of recollection is not presented in any straightforwardly systematic fashion, we might reconstruct the argument in the following way: (1) We begin with the analysis of our recollection of an object. Husserl's own examples will then allow us to move to (2) the more general level of the structure of recollective acts as Vergegenwgirtigungen. The structure of recollective acts will be seen to rest on (3) the movement of repetition and reproduction. Finally, we will notice (4) the way in which both repetition and reproduction presuppose an "awakened Ego," or, the transcendental Ego as the Selbstzeitigung which underlies all authentic temporal objects. 1) As in the earlier lectures and working papers on internal timeconsciousness written between 1893-1917 (and collected in Hua X), in the present text Husserrs privileged example of a temporal object is a song. In this treatment, however, he is not so much concerned with the song, or our recollection of it, insofar as it forms the basis for the constitution of immanent time; rather, Husserl focuses upon our recollection of the song insofar as it exhibits the basis for a method of transcendental reflection (Hua XI, 367-368).

Husserl's primary concern is to show that recollection is a legitimate mode of transcendental reflection, for there are only two sources of apodictic self-evidence for the transcendental Ego or ego cogito (Hua XI, 366-367). In the earlier analyses of temporality, Husserl had concentrated upon the concrete flow of the living present as a source of such evidence, and his focus was accordingly upon the ego now perceiving, now willing or now recollecting. Yet, as he now notes, the ego is also "given to itself" through reproductive acts; for there is a selfgivenness involved in all reproductive acts which relates not only to the ego's past life, but to the general structure of all conscious life. In other words, recollection, since it is a type of presentification (Vergegenwdrtigung), can be a source of evidence for the self-givenness of the transcendental ego or ego cogito. The first step in Husserl's argument for the evidential status of recollection consists in his claim that there are two phenomenological or transcendental reductions involved in recollection, as in all cases of presentification (Hua XI, 366-368). When we simply remember a song we begin with the natural, or "unphenomenological" reflection: "I have heard the song." In this reflection (reflection1) we are more or less concerned with all of the circumstances of the original hearing: we remember, for example, that it was Mahler's setting of the 'Night-song' from Nietzsche's Also sprach Zarathustra, performed by Ortrun Wenkel in London, in 1979. Yet we may make use of a first, universal phenomenological reduction on the present memory (reflection1) in order to arrive at the intentional object of the original hearing. The intentional object of this reflection (reflection2) is the "past singing of some singer" (Hua XI, 367). Although Husserl might appear at first sight to confuse the issue by calling this a "natural reflection" (Hua XI, 367), it is clear from the text that such a reflections is only arrived at by means of an explicitly phenomenological reflection on a present recollection. Indeed, the first reduction issues in the reflections : "I now have this recollection." As Husserl notes, however, this reduction and the reflections consequent upon it, merely form the "starting-point" in a phenomenological analysis of the song as recollected. And we will soon see that while this reduction does provide evidence of the experience of temporal objectivity, it does not in itself provide apodictic evidence for the endurance of the identity of such objectivity. As Husserl argues, the first reduction only "discloses to each his own Ego with its stream of

lived experiences" (Hua XI, 382), it does not yield the Ego as a domain of possible apodictic experience. Accordingly, we find in this text a second, apodictic reduction which has the content of such memories as its intentional object. The intentional object of the phenomenologist is now the recollection (reflection~) which has the song as its intentional object. The relevant expression for this reflection3 is: "I have heard the song," or it was the "song heard earlier by me" (Hua XI, 367; my emphasis). Moreover, it is precisely because of this third type of reflection made available through a second reduction, that we are able, finally, to establish the identity of the Ego which underlies all temporal objectivity. Indeed, Husserl here suggests that it is the identity of the transcendental Ego or ego cogito, and the possibility of its temporal infinity, which constitutes the basis of temporal objectivity. Although the spatio-temporal actuality of the past is bracketed in the two reductions, the Ego is not bracketed: thus, the second reduction enables the phenomenologist to focus upon the transcendental Ego as that which constitutes temporal objectivity. 2) It is true that recollection does not actually present or make possible an actual perception of the past object; as in all presentification, in recollection there is a representation or reproduction of the past object. Yet with the preceeding analysis of the twofold reduction in recollection, we now realize that although the object presented is present in a nonoriginal way, the ego presenting, or the intentionality which intends the temporal object, is only able to be given through higher order acts, like recollection. Husserl also holds that the fundamental intentional characteristic of recollection, in distinction from retention (or the other intentional modes of protention and primal impression), is "reproduction" (Hua XI, 371 ). As in phantasy, for instance, in recollection there is a presentification which is not a presentation of an object: in recollection we perceive "in a way" (gleichsam), but only just "in a way" (Hua XI, 371 ). Unlike the unitary intentionality of the primordial consciousness of the past present in retention, in recollection there is a double intentional aspect: first, the memorial Now (erinnerungsmdssiges Jetzt) of recollection is something which is re-presented in the form of renewal or re-perception (Hua XI, 371-371); but second, the memorial Now is a perception' (a present perception of the past) which takes place "in a way" (Hua XI, 371).

7 3) Husserl claims, however, that recollection is an essential "consciousness of the past" (Hua XI, 372). That this is so, in spite of its nonoriginal character as reproduction, stems from the possibility, which recollection holds in itself, of providing intuitive fulfillment for the " e m p t y representations" of retention (Hua XI, 372). For in addition to reproduction, recollection also essentially involves reiteration or repetition (Erneuerung) (Hua XI, 372). 4 Because of its reiterative character, recollection holds in itself the possibility of providing fulfilled selfevidence - "that fullness reestablished through reiteration." In recollection, "the intuitive presents itself as the fulfilling, or true self, of the emptily represented object of retention" (Hua XI, 372). The m o m e n t of reiteration also provides evidence for Husserl's claim that with recollection there is a limit of complete, perfected fulfillment. If recollection is fulfilled at all, then it is fulfilled unequivocally. And it is precisely the identity of the object which establishes unequivocal, or univocal, fulfillment. Through a series of reiterations of the same object, that object comes to be given with higher degrees of clarity: "The object or empty retention receives the most complete explication through perfect memory; perfect memory awakens everything again which had become obscure and effaced in the object of an empty retention" (Hua XI, 377-378). Thus, even though Husserl's main emphasis is upon our recollection of what is retained (through Section 9) (Hua XI, 365-376), he does not limit recollection to the presentification of the past "closest to us." 4) In conclusion let us direct our attention to Section Ten: "The Immortality of the Transcendental Ego" (Hua XI, 377-381). This section is certainly complex and perhaps finally suggests much more than it establishes, but it is nevertheless quite illuminating with regard to the character of that consciousness which underlies all temporality for Husserl. Although he does not label it "transcendental subjectivity" here, it does seem that the later concept might be elucidated by heeding the present development of the concept of the transcendental Ego. Husserl's treatment of the concept of the transcendental Ego arises in the context of his consideration of the "necessity of the endurance of presence" (Hua XI, 377). That is, it arises from the necessity of establishing enduring objectivity. The actual argument is perhaps quite similar to Kant's argument for the antithesis in the First Antinomy: Husserl says, "It is inconceivable that everything should cease and that then there would be nothing. As soon as one represents to oneself the

thought o f the 'then-not-being' one presupposes a 'then-being' with which non-being struggles" (Hua XI, 377-378). Husserl holds that philosophers have mistakenly believed that the process of "endurance" can cease, because they have not distinguished between that which endures and the process of the endurance itself. Yet cessation itself presupposes "a consciousness in which the cessation is something of which we may be conscious" (Hua XI, 378). Endurance itself is "immortal" (Hua XI, 377). The transcendental Ego is, then, that consciousness within which the constitution of new objects is established, as well as that consciousness upon whose basis the structure of progressing time-consciousness may be described (Hua XI, 378). The "immortality" of the transcendental Ego thus denotes both that the constitution of objects only takes place on the basis of an infinite time, and that we may in principle make reference to the same object(s) an infinite number of times with the assurance that such reference is to the s a m e object(s). The identity of an object thus requires a c t i v e recollection, which itself presupposes "... an identical infinite time in the necessary mode o f the infinite past" (Hua XI, 379).

There are numerous themes and arguments in Husserl's text which I have not brought out in this short introduction: in fact, the single most striking feature of this text is perhaps its sheer provocativeness. Yet by approaching the text insofar as it argues for recollection as a source of phenomenological evidence, I hope at least to have indicated how Husserl's preoccupation with m e m o r y remained the same throughout his earlier writings and into the years 1922-1923. Even if Husserl made significant alterations in his theory o f memory, he nevertheless remained steadfast in his belief that it provided an essential source of evidence - as he put it The possibility of facts which are an sich is rooted in recollection; facts which can be experienced in perception ... as often as we please and which can be reidentified as the same (and accordingly be described in an identical manner and in an identical truth as often as we please). Hence - and this means the same thing there is an enduring in contrast to a momentary truth. (Hua XI, 370)

NOTES

1.

``Die Apdiktizitiit der Wiedererinnerung1922192

3 appears asBeilage VI in Husserliana

2.

3. 4. S.

XI, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (1918.1926), edited by Margot Fleischer, 1966. The text is collected in Konvolut F I 29, with the exception of approximately two pages which are in D 19 (Hua XI, 379, line 40 - 381, line 5). All of the material in "The Apodicticity of Recollection" is a part of the Vorlesung sequence from 1922-1923 collected under Husserl's general title "Einleitung in die Philosophie (auf Grund der vier Londoner Vet. lesungen)." The manuscripts of the four London Vorlesungen on the theme of "phenom~ enological method and phenomenological philosophy," are collected in F II 3 and M II 3/F II 3. The significance of this essay has become a matter of increasing critical concern in recent years: cf. especially David Krell, "Phenomenology of Memory from Husserl to MerleauPonty," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XLII, No. 4 (June 1982), pp. 492505; Leonard Lawlor, "Temporahty and Spatiality: A Note to a Footnote in Jacques Derrida's Writing and Difference," Research in Phenomenology XII (1982), pp. 149-165; and Denn Welton, "Transcendental Psychologism," an unpublished working paper presented at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, twenty-second annual meeting, St. Louis, Missouri, 1983. For example, his discussion of recollection in Ideas, # 1 3 8 and #140. For the most part, I have translated "Erneuerung" as "reiteration" (Hua XI, 372); 1 sought to reserve "repetition" for Husserl's "Wiederholung" (Hua XI, 372-374). An English translation of Husserliana XI is presently being prepared by Professor William R. McKenna, to whom I owe a special debt of gratitude for his comments on an earlier version of the present Introduction.

10 II. The Apodicticity of Recollection (Hua XI, 365-383)

1. [The consequences o f the assumption that recollection is doubtful. ] 1

Indeed, there appears a skeptical apparition which grows ever more threatening: the spectre of the doubtfulness of m e m o r y (Erinnerung). Without further ado, I have spoken of m y stream of consciousness and I have thoughtlessly used m e m o r y not only as a present phenomenon, but also as an entry into the transcendental past o f m y lived experience. But if m e m o r y is no longer a source of apodictic certainty for m y past cogitations, then I m a y no longer speak of m y infinite stream o f life, of m y past ego and m y past intentional lived experiences; also in this respect, I must let the phenomenological reduction reign. I only have the momentarily present (gegenwdrtige) "ego cogito," and I only have it while m y reflective gaze is directed at it. And if during its flowing, I make a statement (Aussage) about [this "ego cogito"] which would adapt itself adequately to that which is phenomenologically experienced, I can still never reiterate the statement. Therefore, I have neither the given "ego cogito" as a fact in the proper sense, nor do I have the relevant proposition (Satz) "ego cogito" as a reiterable or reverifiable truth. If the ego cogito is past (verflossen) (insofar as I can even state this much with apodicticity), I can remember it myself, to be sure, but even if I am absolutely certain o f the present m e m o r y qetzigen Erinnerung) as a present experience (gegenwdrtiges Erlebnis), I am not absolutely certain o f that which I remember. Thus, I cannot be absolutely certain whether that lived experience which hovers before me as past was actual (wirklich). 2 According to m y guiding (hodegetisch) principle, if I cannot be absolutely certain, then I am not at all permitted to refer to [the past lived experience which is present now] in order to justify my claims (in Anspruch nehmen) - and just as little may I refer to the statement made about it when it was still present. If I repeat this [initial statement], I have a new statement, but one which I could not verify in any other way than through an appeal to the unfortunately useless recollection (Wiedererinnerung). Hence I may not speak at all of m y infinite stream of life, of m y life extending itself throughout an endless past and into an infinite future;

11 I may not speak any longer about phenomenological time as an actual form of actual life, and so forth. Thus I am bound, so it seems, to the absolutely sterile "I am": I perceive - now, while I am perceiving; I think, that is, while I am now thinking; I feel, and only while I am feeling, and so forth. While I am [thus engaged with perceiving, thinking or feeling], I can be a reflective spectator and make totally useless statements, none o f which attains as much as a shadow of enduring truth (standhaltende Wahrheit), but rather only a barren, fleeting adaptation to the fleeting life o f the present (Gegenwartsleben). Yes, really barren, since any fruitfulness is a thing of abiding value and not something which subsists merely at the m o m e n t of growth (ira Moment des Er-

wachsens Seiendes).

2. [ The twofold transcendental reduction in recollection. ]

I am given to myself apodictically as transcendental ego and ego cogito, so it seems, in transcendental self-perception, but only as the ego now perceiving, now recollecting, now feeling [or] willing. And perhaps even here I must search for limits. But I am also given to myself through reproductive acts: for example, through recollection as a past I with its perceiving, recollecting, feeling, hoping, etc. [In reproductive acts I am given] not only as a past empirical I, as a past man in the past time of the world. We must now present some points which will become clear to us easily once we have gained a little practice in phenomenological vision. There are two kinds o f phenomenological or better transcendental reductions for a recollection, and the same holds for all cases of presentification (Vergegenwartigungen). 3 Suppose we have a recollection of a song. Then we have (1) a phenomenological reduction o f the recollection which now, as lived experience, is evidently actual: [the recollection which] has as its intentional object the past singing of some singer. The starting-point here is the natural reflection, "I now have this recollection." (2) Oddly enough, there is not only a reflection on the present recollection, but there is also a reflection within the recollection. For it belongs to the essence [of recollection], as we have earlier observed, 4 that it, in general, not only makes something which was past intuitable, but that it also re-presents [it] as something perceived earlier by me. The song is not only a temporally preceding

12 song, but, corresponding to the proper meaning (Sinn) of recollection, it is a song heard by me. I myself discover this by means of a reflection which I accomplish by going into the recollection, [i.e.,] into its intentional content. If I begin from this still wholly unphenomenological reflection, "I have heard the song," I can now, as a phenomenologist, perform a reduction and bracket the spatio-temporal actuality (Weltwirklichkeit) of song and singer. In this way I gain the transcendental phenomenon, namely [I gain] the past transcendental phenomenon of my, i.e., the Ego's, earlier perception of the song whereby the actual song itself becomes only an intentional object of the hearing. [By making use of the reduction,] I can gain the entire field of my memories not only as present facts but as phenomenologically reduced according to their remembered intentional content. I thus gain all memories of objectively mundane things and processes, and then, all memories tout court, for instance, of mathematical proofs which I have completed. What finally results [with such a method] is my past transcendental life, that is, the Ego's [life] with all its past poles. [Since the Ego's past poles are] object-poles, they are bracketed. But the I which is everywhere identical is the transcendental I which should not be bracketed, just as little as past transcendental lived experiences should. One might also put it this way: In the case of recollections and in all other cases of presentification (which will be dealt with later), we deviate from our former principle which involved the suspension of all positings which are completed in the lived experience itself. I only suspend the positing (Setzung), 5 the belief in the past objectivity which my memory suggests, but not the belief implied in it - [the belief] in my past I, my past mental life (Erleben) and my past perceiving in which [I] was conscious of [my] past life [existing] after the manner of perception. This is what we are emphasizing, because the past transcendental subjective m o m e n t is also transcendentally subjective, and because, first of all, we want to make the entire transcendental subjectivity ours as far as the unity of the Ego and of its lived experiences can reach, no matter whether [these lived experiences] are present or past. By proceeding in this manner we are following the evidence which itself lies partly in phenomenological reflection upon the present, and partly in phenomenological reflection upon the past (i.e., that reflection which goes into the intentional content of memories). But now we do not ask whether this evidence is apodictic or not; whether it is better

13 or not than, for example, the evidence of external perception (questions which we had to suspend at the philosophical starting-point). 6 Just as we may proceed with backward memory (Riickerinnerungen) we can proceed with memory forwards, that is, with expectation. The expectation of some future course of a natural occurrence to which I look forward during perception becomes, by way of phenomenological reduction, an expecting of the future transcendental life of the Ego (Ichlebens). In conclusion, the transcendental or phenomenological stream of lived experiences and the concrete transcendental subjectivity which I thus gain have their movable phase of presence (bewegliche Gegenwartsphase) and, in addition, [they have] an endless stream from the past and an endless stream into the future. It is only by allowing presentifications to be taken as valid (Geltenlassen) that the transcendental ego has an endless life with an endless immanent temporal form on both sides.

3. [The evidences within the flow of perception and the evidence within the expression which belongs to this flow. ]
1) An immanent perception is apodicticaUy evident with regard to the persisting individual presence of the object; thus, in our example, it is the phenomenologically reduced tone toward which we are directed as if we were swimming together with something which is now, and which continues to persist now. This "swimming along with" is, at the same time, a swimming toward; the grasping goes toward that which is now lighting up and moves constantly toward that which lights up anew that is, toward the new now which it grasps with open arms. This is a continuous grasping which grasps continually new things and by doing so also grasps that which is enduring as such: [The enduring as such] is the enduring tone as that which endures and continues to endure. The grasping intention is a re-intention which is fulfilling itself continually to the point of satiation and is likewise continual in this fulfillment; i.e., it is [an intention which] is directed to the continually new and which fulfills itself anew and so on perennially. It is precisely in virtue of this very fact that the being of the tone is given adequately as an enduring presence, i.e., as a primordial being in endurance. It should be noted that this ineliminability (Undurchstreichbarkeit) is the consequence of adequation as fulfilled, really full self-giving. As we said before, it is a constantly fufilled intention.

14 2) But we also have another kind of evidence of the enduring tone. It is apparent that duration and the evidence of this duration has two senses. Hence, we must distinguish: A) That which endures, the enduring tone itself, and B) The tone expanse which is past and is culminating in the "enduring" present. In this expanse we are retentionally conscious of each phase in a different and, at the same time, steadily changing mode "just past." We also have ineliminability here, but we no longer have adequation in the genuine sense of the term. Here we do not have full, i.e., fulfilled self-givenness, but only still-having-in-one's-grasp, still-having-theconsciousness-of in the mode of certainty which is, nevertheless, ineliminable to a certain degree. Just as the tone itself of whose endurance we have consciousness has a mode of certainty, we see here, in general, the necessity that the tone of which we are conscious as just past also has the mode of certainty. The mode of certainty runs unalterably through the entire continuum of intentionality. But it is good to consider the content (das Inhaltliche) of what is certain as well, and the evidence of the dese.ription which adapts itself to the phenomenon. Perception of the tone per se is a grasping of the persisting tone, and this [tone] is given in its entire fullness precisely as something which constantly fulfills itself. If we call it a "violin tone," or, more generally, "tone," then the meaning of the word adapts itself to its corresponding m o m e n t which lies in the adequately given tone itself - [a moment] which continuously coincides with itself throughout its persistence. In as much as we have such a m o m e n t which remains equal to itself through the continual "preserving" of itself (and which, in so doing, also finds continuous coincidence); and insofar as we have a word which adapts its intention with precision to this moment, then, to this extent, we have evidence for the statement, even if, to be sure, it is limited to endurance itself. However, at least the universal, "tone," is necessarily present; a unity of the perceptual givenness of what which is persisting cannot be conceived of as a unity of continual synthesis unless the entire unity was supported by a presence (Bestand) of thoroughgoing coincidence, i.e., by a universality of essence which all phases must have in common. Hence we may in this way speak with absolute adequation of the tone, or more specifically, of the violin tone, of a sharp, of a loud tone, etc. This original self-coincidence (Selbstdeckung) in endurance takes place in the intuitive province of

15 primordial presence. This province of living intuitable presence is not a mathematical point, but it rather already has a thoroughly intuitively fulfilled spread with a culminating point in the absolute Now. In this province, continuity and alteration, change of intensity, leaps from one quality to another, etc., are seized in their most primordial forms. For it is also the case, after all, that an alteration can continually preserve itself in the endurance of a tone and may, in general, come to be stated with fulfilled evidence. If a glance directs itself to the empty parts of the concrete present, then all descriptions [of these parts], despite their emptiness, can have an evident content. [Such an evident content is gained] through a kind of transference in all those cases where within the actual present of genuine perception (in which a fulfilled intuition with regard to all of what is stated takes place) things are given which can coincide with [things of] the same [kind] in the retentional sphere. For example, the empty tone-retention is a continuum of coincidence which terminates in intuitable tone-givenness - thus may I speak of a just past tone. Even if I am only now using it for the first time, the general word (allgemeine Wort) adapts itself to the whole continuum. What is just now intuitively given is tone, [and] that which is past, [because it] coincides with the intuitable according to its empty intention, is tone as well. Thus the evidence of the description could be derived in a certain way from the intuitable sphere of perception. In those cases where contents which are drawn from continuous perception itself give a, so to speak, metaphorical evidence and an evident interpretation to the empty retention by coinciding with it - in such cases recollection has no role to play. The evidence of description then rests on and presupposes [the fact] that the retentional objectivity under consideration is grasped apart and in distinctness (even if it should be empty). [Likewise it must be] interpreted through comparing coincidence in the sense originally drawn out of the primordial intuition. For instance in the case of a momentary screeching of a tone one follows it and holds onto it (while the screeching sinks into the past); in such a case, where such an original adaptation of the expression to something whose presence is originally given - there no doubt arises, and the expression as well sinks [into the past] and necessarily retains the belief in its expressiveness (Ausdrucksglauben). To reiterate the expression would already be a matter for recollection. All of the [types of] evidence which have been described up to now

16 have only a momentary ineliminable certainty which is attached to the flow of perception and retention. But with [these types of evidence] we have no equally apodictic certainty of the infinite past and future of life, no [certainty about] the identical I which is [the] subject of this infinite life and [the] subject of certainties which may be verified again and again, even after the primordial living certainty (which arose out of the original perception) has passed away together with it. The "always again" exists only by the grace of recollection, and the possibility of facts which are in themselves is rooted only in [this] ; [facts] which are originally experienced in perception (but can be experienced again as often as we please) and which can be reidentified as the same (and accordingly be described in an identical manner and in an identical truth as often as we please). 7 Hence - and this means the same thing there is an enduring in contrast to a momentary truth. But the question will be how this is to be clarified and how things stand with regard to apodicticity and adequation. Retention is an ineliminable certainty with regard to just past things. But the comprehending I which attempts to seize its object, [which attempts] to enter knowingly into its object as it is in itself, reaches out into an empty space. Intention directed [at this object] has its fulfillment form in recollection. [Such an intention] gives the past thing itself in its state of fulfillment. The fact that recollection can deceive is the unanimous doctrine of philosophers, and indeed, who would like to deny this possibility of deception. This applies likewise to transcendental recollection, i.e., the very recollection in the transcendentally reduced sphere. Every transcendental reduction upon a naive-natural recollection which turns out to be a deception results, as one can easily convince oneself of, in a transcendentally reduced recollection which proves to be deceptive. Nevertheless here I must also deviate from the tradition; I must reject uninhibited repudiations of apodictic evidence as such in the sphere of recollection; and hence, I must explain them by [pointing out] a lack in their analysis.

4.

[Recollection as reproduction and its relationship to retention. ]

The basic character of recollection is "reproduction" (Reproduktion); this implies two things and even a double-sense. Reproduction can sig-

17 nify presentification; this is a universal characteristic which recollection shares with other presentifications. Every phantasy, arising contingently or freely produced, is a presentification, but, therefore, not as yet a recollection. Intuitive presentification necessarily presents itself as a modification of perception. To represent something in the manner of phantasy, but to represent it as well in a recollection means "to perceive in a way," (gleichsam) but only just "in a way." The tone which is perceived in a way begins and endures, [as do] the entire constitutive configurations (Gestalten) which belong to perception; the entire interplay of retentions and of the forward-directed expectation-intentions and also the transitional sphere of primordial impression (Urimpression) - all this belongs to the composition (Bestand) of presentification. But all of this takes place in the mode of the "in a way." The certainty of memory corresponds to perceptual certainty as a certainty attached to the present (/etzig) individual being of the tone. But the memorial (erinnerungsmiissige) now, which also has the mode of "in a way," is not believed, is not certain as a pure and simple (schlechthin) Now. Rather, this memorial Now (just as the entire content of the remembered) has the character of an again presentified (vergegenwdrtigt) Now which is presentified in the form of renewal, of re-perception, and of a perception which takes place yet again "in a way." The most primordial consciousness of the past is the retentional consciousness which belongs to every perception like the tail of a comet. Should recollecting, which is of such an essentially different character, also be called consciousness of the past, then it must have a relation of essentiality to retention; more precisely, [recollecting must be related to retention] in a synthesis of identifying coincidence, or recollecting could essentially assume such a synthesis. Where does such a synthesis produce itself?. First, while a retention is still elapsing and consequently while we are conscious of something just past as still in relief (even if this consciousness is empty), a corresponding recollection can obviously emerge as recollection of the same thing (or possibly [it can] be produced arbitrarily). A tone-phrase has sunk back, the same phrase is heard "in a way" one more time, the phrase runs its course again "in a way" from beginning to end in the mode of reproduction. "The same tone-phrase" - we are conscious of this [identity] ; this means that the empty retention which admittedly in the course of all this continues to pursue its own play (namely to let the past thing appear as always further past but yet in itself identical);

18 this e m p t y intention, I say, is synthetically identical with the tonephrase which is "in a w a y " newly sounding. And in this coincidence the emptiness o f retention fulfills itself with that fullness reestablished through reiteration (Erneuerung); the intuitive presents itself as the fulfilling, or true self, o f the emptily represented [object of] retention. At the same time, in the fullness of intuition, in complete recollection, the whole fullness o f its inner moments and articulations emerge as well all of which was rendered indeterminate and effaced in retention.

5. [The degrees of clarity within recollection. ]

To be sure, we have yet to take into account something quite singular about recollection - as in all cases o f presentification. 8 Recollection can be presentification with quite different degreeS o f clarity - the clarity o f presentification may fluctuate in the course of its own elapsing. Once recollection has elapsed, it becomes empty in a way similar to that in which a perception is empty after it has elapsed. However, recollection is not then simply an empty retention, but is rather an e m p t y recollection, which in its emptiness has the peculiarity of being the recollection of an e m p t y retention. At the same time, however, such a recollection is the actual retention o f the just actually elapsed lived experience o f intuitive recollection. We also learn, however, of gradations of clarity within recollections through the peculiarity they have of being "reproducible" as repetitions o f the same past, and in our case, of the same retentional past. This has been, in a way, unveiled through the first recollection; but in this process, [the same retentional past] still remains in our grasp, and remains even more properly in our grasp through new recollections which unveil it yet again. For after the elapse of the first recollection, an e m p t y consciousness was indeed there again. From this we see that the various recollections in their transitions into one another coincide as far as the object is concerned, but yet need not be completely the same; that [some recollections] may unveil more of the object, and some unveil less; that one [recollection] may have greater richness than another in the features which come into relief in it and are intuitable. Hence, a gradation of inner fullness and emptiness lies within recollection as presentification in accordance with its essence; [this gradation has] an upper limit which we call perfect memory. [Perfect memory] repro-

19 duces perceptual objectivity and, implicitly, perception itself in a perfect way. The object of empty retention receives the most complete explication through [perfect memory] ; [perfect memory] awakens everything again which had become obscure and effaced in the object of an empty retention. If one should ask how we know that all of the preceding is not a constructive fairy-tale, the answer lies in the reference to a sequence of repetitions (or possible sequence of repetitions) of recollections of the same thing. By means of such a sequence we may eventually arbitrarily penetrate to higher degrees of clarity. In the transitions [from one sequence to the other] we see that the same thing comes to intuitive givenness more and more completely; the same thing which was previously meant, but which we were conscious of in a still partially empty manner. We even obtain evidence for one limit of complete, perfected fulfillment - a limit which lies in the particular direction of advance in this sequence. We attain the knowledge that, in general, there must be a limit since every possible recollection, when it is fulfilled at all, is fulfilled univocally, [is fulfilled] as precisely the identity of the object.

6. [Deception and apodicticity within recollection. ]

However, we are also aware of possibilities for deception [within recollection]: first of all, there are possibilities of "painting-over" ((rber. malung) in recollection. The recollected object is the one originally emptily intended which should find its fulfillment in the content of the renewed intuition, [i.e.,] in the "in a way" modified perception. The created, intuitively emerging image coincides with the emptily intended [image]. But a clear image can arise which, though fundamentally an actually fulfilled representation (Vorstellung) of what is meant, has, nevertheless, painted-in other features which do not belong, i.e., features which are not fulfilling the corresponding features of the meaning. Often such deception can itself be noticed from within. An empty intention is enriched by illustrative intuition (Veranschaulichung); when these new features of the empty intention are awakened, one may also become conscious of the fact that intuitive features have intruded which are incompatible with such newly awakened components of the intention and are not its fulfillments, but are rather false over-paintings. Yes, it can turn out that a merging occurs in the unity of a recollection-

20 image (WiedererinnerungsbiM); [a merging of elements,] which stems from diverse pasts and which was not noticed as such initially because the empty retention was quite indifferent and the anticipatory (voreilend) illustrative intuition had slipped into another sphere of the past through "association." With more profound considerations of this nature one might well come to understand that recollection can be deceptive. But it is equally doubtless that recollection has apodictic contents too (we shall remain, for the moment, within the province of the disclosure (Enthiillung) of retentions). It is absolutely evident that I have just heard a tone-formation, that I have just seen a countryside; and [it is as evident] that I do not erroneously posit the tone-formation which I have in recollection instead of the perception of a countryside, etc. And with this it is absolutely evident that I have affairs with a past [object], something individual and temporal of a certain, general character [such as] landscape, etc. The ineliminable certainty of a retention belongs, of course, to recollection insofar as we conceive it as being in fulfilling coincidence with this retention; and precisely with this certainty we have apodictic certainty that a true self presents itself in the recollected image; [a self] which may be approached by means of a limiting process; [a self] eventually reached in the consciousness of fulfillment. But we must also notice here that the "just-past" of retention discloses itself as a Now presentified again (wiedervergegenwiirtigtes Jetzt). And in every repetitive recollection such a Now comes forth as identically the same re-presentified thing by virtue of the synthesis which stretches throughout the repetitions; [this Now]is, therefore, at the same time, the "just" of the past. It is of the essence of recollection that it characterizes the remembered thing as the thing perceived in a way, and perceived again; that is, as in a way again persisting presence. The "just past" of retention discloses itself in recollection since it is fulfillment. Insofar as the given thing in the original Now of the perception continually passes over into the "just now" of retention, and then again shows itself in a renewed fashion in the "in a way now" of recollection and possibly in new recollections which may be artibrarily repeated, the thing given in multiple modes of evidence comes forth (by virtue of synthetic identification) as the same - as the same individual, as the same temporal object with the same temporal locus and temporal duration. Perceptual or original presence, memorial or re-presence (Wieder-

21

gegenwart), are modes of givenness; they are the ways the same individual may appear - [the individual] whose primordial being as a continually emerging endurance (i.e., as the unity of a continually emerging duration) is reproducible and recognizable again and again as absolutely the same; that is, "again"-experienceable.

7. [The modes of the past of a repeatedly remembered thing. ]

In repetition (Wiederholung) every new recollection is, as a lived experience, itself a new present. And although every [recollection] reproduces the same thing and has the same content with the same degree of clarity, nevertheless there is an essential difference of irrevocable necessity. In every recollection the thing which is repeated in exactly the same way, [e.g.,] the same enduring tone, necessarily has a new mode of the past. In making us conscious of the same not-Now in a new Now (in which a new present develops itself in the original "enduring"), every recollection gives a new mode to the remembered thing in relation to this present itself. But it does so only insofar as every recollection holds in itself an as yet undeveloped intentionality which is modified for every new recollection. Of course, it is only with a fulfilling development that one becomes aware of what kind of intentionality this is and what the changing past finally signifies. More precisely: In any recollection whatsoever there lies an intentional tendency which points beyond its own recollected content. The fulfiUment [of this recollection] leads constantly into a continuum of progressing recollections in such a way that a continuum of re-presentifled presents (vergegenwdrtigten Gegenwarten); [i.e.,] a continually fulfilled time, re-presentifies itself. This continually unfolding recollection finally terminates in continually enduring perceptual presence. For example, I just now have the recollection of a conversation in my office. I let this recollection run its course, I recollectively follow the tendency to connect and continually fulfiU recollections. I remember there the striking of the clock, the consciousness, "It is time to go to the lecture," then [I remember] going; finally, I am precisely here, now, in this actual perceptual present in which I am actually lecturing.

22

8. [Recollection and its horizon o f expectation. ]

In general, here we must set forth the following: Every original selfgiving [of the object], every perception, holds in itself, as we know, a persistent protentional tendency. It has a horizon of expectation which points into the future. Every actual (aktuelle) primordial presence (Urgegenwart) appears as a fulfillment of the continually preceding protention. Analogously, every recollection holds in itself a protentional tendency, since it is characterized in itself as a modal modification of perception, as a perception in the mode of the "again" or the "in a way." In the same way every phase of presence which appears in the mode of the "again" or the "in a way" (i.e., the past Now) appears as a fulfillment. But the situation is not so simple here if only because recollection is, at the same time, a present lived experience; thus, [recollection] itself appears as [a] perceptual present and is, at the same time, because of its intentionality, a presentification of a past. In this last respect, [recollection] reproduces the continuous fulfillment of an intention of expectation. But more than this: whereas in perception that which is coming is new and does not completely determine itself in its full content until it is coming (and perhaps determines itself in contrast to an all too determined expectation) and whilst here [i.e., in perception] things completely different from what had been presupposed could arise insofar as the unity of the object breaks up in time, and now some completely new object is perceived, the situation in recollection is this: that which becomes certain is not at all new, but was already known in advance. It has in fact already been there, and is [now] only recollected. This implies that the recollected object is expected [as having] in itself a determinate content. And [it] has, in the unity of a certain and clear sequence of memory, the character of being thoroughly in accordance with expectation (with regard to its content) and of having the character of that which must-necessarily-come-about-in-this-way. In the necessity of the sequence with regard to a determinate content, memory (Erinnerung) confirms itself because it belongs to its essence if it is perfect [memory] to offer nothing new, but [only] that which has already been known for a long time. On the other hand, with regard to recollection as a phenomenon of presence, there belongs to it a forward-directed tendency, [a tendency] of associative expectation placed on recollections in the sequence of the elapse. Both nexuses (that of the necessary

23 sequence of pasts and that of associations) terminate in the final perception (Endwahrnehmung). The first [sequence] terminates in the objective present, the other in the presence of the perceptually lived experience which constitutes this present object.

9. [Recollection of distant pasts.]

Up to now we have treated the necessary properties of that [type of] recollection which establishes itself within the sphere of fresh retention. If we now move on to the properties of recollections in general, and consider recollections of distant pasts, then we will obviously have to say that everything that is essential to what was [formerly] the special function of this retention remains unaffected. But now we are referred to an undifferentiated empty horizon. A more precise investigation here would show that the undifferentiated, empty retentional horizon is first awakened by a development of an associative tendency of some salient features or others within the present life of the subject. In their fulfillment [these features] signify a standing out in relief from what has already become indifferent on the empty horizon. If there is already a recollection, and if it is intuitively progressing, then the presence which is represented in this recollection can have, for its part, the function of awakening - that is, [it can awaken] new moments of the empty horizon. In other words, [recollection] can summon new [moments that had been] forgotten. This would be a contrasting in the mode of "again," but surely not a recollective return of old retentions in their primordial retentional flow. Such a retention is something abstract, and can only exist in the concrete flow. But it is a concrete, even if empty, intention which is awakened and now carries in itself an affective force of its own. And this [empty intention] can now attain (zueignen) fulfillment through a process of recollection by which [fulfillment] unfolds. Empty content is thus brought to the fullness of self-givenness. Then recollection itself carries its forward-pointing intentions along with it, therefore requiring new fulfillment. Thus the sequence of recollections reproduces itself until it attains the presence of the Now. This older intention emerging here presents itself as emerging from the empty horizon, as emerging from the night of forgetfulness, and hence, as the differentiation of something indifferent, into which different retentions had passed.

24 Every reiteration of the original recollection and of its elapsing results in identically the same objectivities, or the same events with identically the same particular time-points and durations; and all in all, the same complete expanse of the past. But yet, not entirely the same. For presence has progressed in its becoming present. Although the reiteration of the recollective process leads anew from the same starting-point to the actual present, this present is nevertheless new and what was previously present has become past; i.e., [this present] now forms the final portion of time elapsed in recollection. Consequently it is clear that even where recollection is not unfolded with regard to its protentions, it nevertheless implies in itself that it carries in itself intentionally (even if undeveloped) the temporal sequence leading to the present to which it itself beongs as lived-experience, and this in the mode of elapse, [which we call] "fulfilling development." Hence, several recollections of the same thing necessarily bring this same thing to consciousness in different ways; [these recollections] characterize the thing as past, with different distances of pastness. [They characterize it] as past always insofar as it relates to living presence as the final goal of the mobile temporal expanse. The mobile end moves forward, and, accordingly, the same past becomes a more distant past with every new recollection. The entire content of prior recollection and of the sequence of recollection is necessarily contained in [the content of] every following recollection; and to the extent that the [contents of different recollections] coincide, the temporal sequence is identically the same - it is the same sequence of individually enduring objects, or events (Vorgdngen).

10. [The immortality o f the transcendental ego the impossibility o f the transcendental ego being born. ] Let us make an important new step. Let us therefore consider the necessity of the endurance of presence; in doing so, we shall give a part of the critique of expectation. The present is by necessity [a] necessarily fulfilled present. Even if the currently "enduring" unitary object, or event, can cease, the process of the "endurance" itself cannot cease. Endurance is "immortal." If the tone ceases, something else is there in its place as an enduring

25 present. The world might not be - as we have shown, this is a possibility. However, it would be absurd to say that immanent being ceases, that this process of the self-constitution of present being in endurance ceases. It is inconceivable that everything should cease and that then there would be nothing. As soon as one represents to oneself the thought of the "then-not-being" (Dann-nicht-sein), one presupposes a "then-being" (Dann-sein) with which non-being (Nichtsein) conflicts. One falsely ascribes to the possible cessation of each particular arbitrarily chosen being an alleged cessation of the stream of life. Cessation itself as objective cessation presupposes a non-cessation, i.e., [it presupposes] a consciousness in which one is conscious of the cessation. Thus, although determinate expectation may deceive, the structure of progressing time-consciousness and of the constitution of new presences is, nevertheless, a structure of rigid necessity. Hence, both living on (Fortleben) and the Ego which lives on are immortal - note well that [here we mean] the pure transcendental ego, not the empirical worldly Ego which very well may die. We do not at all deny the latter's death, its bodily decomposition and, hence, its unlocateability (Unauffindbarkeit) in the objective spatio-temporal world - its nonexistence. Granted, with the immortality of the ego as it now presents itself, i.e., as the ineliminability of every newly fulfilling presence, there is not yet posited an infinite future time: this still remains to be deduced. However, we have not yet deduced at all infinite time in the direction of the past and remain in the process of doing so. But if we now consider the present by looking back on it, rather than looking forward, then every present appears with absolute necessity as the fulfillment of a past. That is, every presence, every "enduring" being, not only has an ineliminable protentional form in itself, on the one hand - "a new Now must come" - but on the other hand [every presence had] a retentional form too which is ineliminable. Moreover, it is not only the case that every Now leaves retentions in its wake, no Now is conceivable which does not already have retentions. Granted the new tone which appears, which is newly sounded (Einsetzen), does not as yet have a milieu of retentions of its own, but there preceded necessarily a just-having-been (Soeben-gewesen), i.e., a perception. Just as cessation is only conceivable as something which occurs in process, while it is inconceivable that the process itself would cease, so the beginning is conceivable only in process, but not as the beginning of the

26 process. The "nothing" (das Nichts) which preceded the beginning already presupposes a "something" in order to be able to conflict with it. An emptiness may lie before the beginning, an indifferent, monotonus, mute dullness - but even this [dullness] itself is past and has the essential structure of something temporal. The fact that every recollection necessarily has an intentional horizon which belongs to the beginning, i.e., which belongs to the awakening of recollected "endurance," conforms to the preceding. Such an horizon, so it seems, is able to be reawakened, and thus we arrive ad infinitum at new possible recollections. But perhaps we are being too hasty. For, indeed, we do not yet know the essential conditions of a possible reawakening, i.e., of recollection. One sees, through more precise considerations which are out of place here, that recollection is a modification of perception as an act, and hence [that it] presupposes an awakened Ego (waches Ich). Even the awakening of backgrounds through association presupposes that something is brought into relief which concomitantly implies an affection of the Ego. Hence, the Ego is also awakened. Where nothing is in relief, where the Ego sleeps completely, not even association would be possible. It follows that the preceding has not been correctly expressed. Therefore, time-constitution cannot simply be established on the basis of the reawakening of recollection ad infinitum. Are things any different in intersubjectivity? After what has been said about the possibility of the reiterative recollection of the same thing, we come to an identical infinite time in the necessary mode of the infinite past; this mode is necessarily variable, since all past times must be given in incessantly changing and necessarily constantly changing modalities of the past. Time is only possible as the original present, as past, or as the approaching future. But the original present is the enduring present, which is a constant change of the present toward the future. And accordingly, every past is an enduring past which changes along with the present which pertains to it. In the changing of these modes, however, the one infinite time (to the extent that it is already past), and every position, every interval of this time, is absolutely rigid and identical, i.e., they are identifiable with complete certainty as the same again and again. Consequently, transcendental life and the transcendental Ego cannot be born, only man in the world can be born. Ego as transcendental Ego was eternally; I am now, and belonging to this Now is a horizon of the past which can be unfolded (aufwickelbar) to infinity - this means in itself that the Ego was from eternity.

27 It is easy to see that the future finally signifies infinite time. Recollection teaches us that again and again and necessarily the expected thing in every past present has become a new present, and that it has become a past. We must now see, in general, the necessity o f the possibilities of fulfillment within the protentional horizon which adhered to every present. But [this horizon has such possibilities of fulfillment] only in the form of an expected present, and consequently, of an expected past. What is of the future, what will be, is an identical thing which is, first of all, identifiable through reiterated pre-memories (Vorerinnerung), i.e., memories which have the character of the anticipation of perceptions; or they have [the character of anticipation] o f presents. And [these pre-memories] can find their fulfillment only because such perceptions take place, and because of an identifying recollection after they have taken place. Hence, what will be the case must become present and past - it must become identifiable time. The necessity o f an infinite immanent time results; or, what is the same - I wouldn't know how one could escape this absolute evidence the infinity of past transcendental life. This by no means implies that transcendental life is always a background of different acts and lived experiences which may be disclosed. Nor does it mean, in other words, that the transcendental Ego always [has had] an awakened life, a life in which all varieties of different things happened. Rather, we can easily conceive o f a mute and e m p t y life - a dreamless, empty sleep, so to speak - as a life which to be sure, also had this necessary structure, but which only appeared in passive, internal perception. [A life,] then, without any contrast (Abhebung), hence without any apprehension of the Ego, without any interplay of individual affects and acts. The Ego had, so to speak, not [ y e t made its] appearance on the stage and was a dormant Ego, a mere potentiality for the ego cogito. The possibility constantly remains, however, that contrast can enter through modification of life, and hence, the possibility o f awakening remains. Let us forego a more profound discussion of the empirical data in the sphere o f recollection. (Perhaps it could be shown that every recollection reproduces its recollected thing with some apodictic content, and hence that even a recollection which may be negated or false has a necessary truth-content.) Let us turn to the sphere o f expectation. There the easily clarifiable statement suffices, that every Now has its future horizon, or, as we can also say, that [every Now] necessarily goes over into a new Now.

28 The cessation of the tone means the breaking-off of the self-constituting intentional unity? But a new fulfilled Now is necessarily present and transforms itself again. Or, rather, [this new Now] is a steady form whose intentional sense immediately goes over into retention when it attains primordial foundation. Whereas in the form of the Now a new primordial foundation takes place. Expectation is never apodictic yet, with respect to its form, it is apodictic. The Ego continues to live, it always and necessarily has its transcendental future before it; that which is expected with regard to this or that content need not happen, but some other content will always be there instead of it - something always happens. And there is a forward-directed "always" for me as the Ego. This future, however, has a temporal form and is the same as the past - although [the future is] constituted quite differently. That which is to come has its intuitive presentification in the form of a prepresentification, of an image of expectation. [An image which] anticipates a Now and, hence, the entire flow of the streaming away (Abstr6men) into retentions. Hence [that which is to come] has a past which appertains to it, but which is now anticipated as the coming past. What is o f the future will be past after it has been present. And [this present] will merge with the actual Now which then, correspondingly, will be a past set even further back along with all of that which is now the past. This last past, too, will correspondingly be moved back. The structure of the future creates, therefore, the being-directed-toward-thefuture (Zukunftszug) of subjectively oriented time - a time oriented toward the variable zero point of temporal orientation: the Now, at which I am standing as a perceiving Ego, as an Ego of the present. Again it is inconceivable that the transcendental Ego should cease. You will easily understand that this doesn't mean that man has lived eternally, and will so live; we mean rather that birth and death, the emergence and disappearance of men in nature, for example, through creation or destruction, are quite compatible with the transcendental infinity of life. In principle, the soul of the body is not immortal, i.e., it is not to be conceived of as necessarily immortal; that the soul actually perishes we see in everyday experience. But every human Ego holds in itself, in a certain way, its transcendental Ego which does not perish and which does not come to be. [The transcendental Ego] is an eternal being in becoming (ein ewiges Sein im Werden).

29

11. [The apodicticity o f recollection, on the one hand, and o f expectation on the other. ]
In the preceding we have seen necessities which no one could arbitrarily change. And consequently a recollection may be incomplete, and it may be illusory; but nevertheless [it] does share in those necessities. It is recollection, and hence it is utterly impossible that it not contain any apodictically evident thing. It is my absolute life, with the essential form of immanent time in the mode of the past, which underlies [recollection]. The deception of recollection signifies: "The intended past can be painted-over." But behind [this painting-over] lies the past, and identical time and identical individual life-contents of time in the necessary mode of the changing past. Expectation directs itself toward the future. [Expectation] is merely anticipating, and can deceive as is the case with all anticipation. But life is living on, and the law of time imputes an apodictic content also to expectation. In this direction we could advance still further. To transcendental experience there also belongs a lawfulness of expectation. It is known by the title of associative, or inductive, expectation. [This expectation] allows us to order certain contents into the empty form of the future. Only think of the transcendental turn which turns natural perceptual belief into the certainty of the elapse of those transcendental phenomena in which the same object of experience, the same natural, physical object presents itself. Such matters may serve as a vast class of examples, just like the transcendental turning over of the natural, naive certainty of empathy, or respectively, like the turn of the certainty of the objective existence of animals and men. Obviously the possibility that expected things will not happen (Nichteintretens) belongs to the essence of expectation; thus, no such inductive experience can have apodictic validity. Also in this case there are apodictic contents which nonetheless provide a transition to doxic modalities (Glaubenmodalit~iten), for instance into that of real possibility or probability. This is valid wherever the certainty of expectation has a role.

12. [Recapitulation. ] At the close of our investigation we can characterize the result in the

30 following way. The universal phenomenological reduction had disclosed to each his or her own Ego with its stream of lived experiences [serving] as a center of an Ego-universe with the appropriate streams of life. The apodictic reduction yielded the mere Ego as a domain of possible apodictic experience and almost the entire investigation attempted to demarcate the scope of the ego cogito with its apodictic contents. I am. As soon as I reflect on myself, I cannot posit myself as notbeing, and not only with regard to the living flowing present; and not only is the streaming cogito itself here incapable of being negated. I exist with an infinite temporal field with its changeable and solidly formed manner of appearance - [I exist] with an infinite sphere of the past and an open infinity into the coming future. To be sure, in order [to perform] the apodictic reduction, I must bracket huge segments of my infinite temporal life, regardless of the apodictic certainty of this infinity itself. For instance, [I must bracket] every determinate being-thus [So-sein] of the future (which is to bracket more than the temporal form itself and the form of its changeable modes of givenness). Already the past, the realm of that which is completed, offers me very much more. Because of the peculiarity of recollection and of my evident faculty (Verm6gen) to keep something in mind, to strive for clarity, to reiterate recollections of the same thing, and so on, I can gain evidence of the identity of the thing which I experience even with respect to its being-thus. Thus in the realm of immanence, more particularly in past immanence, I can carry-out, so to speak, "objective" experience by observation, fixation, or intuitive determination; [I can] assure myself of whatever has temporal being and being-thus. But we only have apodictic evidence with some degree of perfection for recollections of the retentional sphere near to us and with regard to the concrete content of the recollected thing; that is, [in this sphere we have] assurance against overlapping or confusion. And here, too, the limit of absolute clarity which lets the full individual self of the past come into relief is a borderline case not entirely free from doubt, and surely not a limit which can be arbitrarily produced at any place. Thus, for example, if we wanted to repeat a vague streaming phantasy, or even a vague streaming recollection as such, as the lived experience that it is, and now a second, vague reproduction occurs, how can we make ourselves certain that both streaming vaguenesses have absolutely identically vague contents?

31

In general terms we therefore may state: To a significant degree, immanent experience is, to be sure, objective and apodictic with regard to that which is experienced, but the experienced thing (das Erfahrene) is only determined typically with regard to its determinate content. And even more, it refers to the idea of an individual data of the past (Fergangenheitsdatums), which is completely determined and not only to be characterized as typically-general. With regard to the more distant past things are similar, but here the typical universality (die typische Allgemeinheit) [of the object] is such that it leaves open the possibility of even confusions and deceptions with regard to the particular distinctive traits through which it is given more specifically. The method which eventually confirms [that universality] again refers us to the idea of a true thing and it gives apodictic certainty of the being of true things which can be brought into relief in ideal possibility. Nevertheless, every real recollection will have its margin of uncertainty, although it will always and necessarily also have a certain, universal and ineliminable content.*

NOTES 1. With the exception of the brackets around the section headings which were supplied by Margot Fleischer, all material within square brackets in the text has been added by the translator. 2. Unless otherwise noted in what follows, all forms of wirklich are translated with a form of

actuality.
3. Although I generally follow Dorion Cakns' excellent Guide for Translating Husserl (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), in the case of Fergegenwdrtigung I diverge from his suggested 'presentation," and use 'presentification' for all cases, unless otherwise noted in the text. 4. Husserl is referring to the other Forlesung materials collected in Konvolut F I 29 (cf. Hua XI, 513 and 517 for the itinerary of this text). Husserl labelled these materials "Forlesun-

gen Winter 1922/23. Einleitung in die Philosophie (auf Grund der vier Londoner Forlesungen]," and viewed them as predecessors of his work Erste Philosophie I 1923-24 (Hua VII, 6), English translation by Jeffner Allen: First Philosophy (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978).
5. That is, Husserl may be taken to imply here that only the noetic aspect is suspended. 6. That is, when the lectures "Einleitung in die Philosophie" began in October, 1922. 7. Husserl elaborates upon this point concerning the dependence of 'objectivity' on presentifying acts, specifically recollection, in "Bewusstsein und Sinn - Sinn und Noema," No. 15. "'Wiedererinnerungund Objektivierung. 'Gegenstand'," (Hua XI, 326-327). 8. Although the text reads 'Gegenwiirtigung,' it is obvious from his argument and from the following sentence, that Husserl here intended to refer to 'Vergegenwiirtigung." 9. Husserl's terms here are 'Abbruch tier sich konstitutierenden intentionalen Einheit' (Hua XI, 380). I have decided to translate sich konstitutierende Einheit as "self-constituting unity" in spite of the obvious Hegelian overtones, in order to contrast the present description of intentional unity to that which appeared earlier in the text when Husserl was de-

32
scribing the possibilities of deception which lie in every recollection (Hua XI, 373-374). The anschaulich sich gestaltende Bild is, indeed, an emerging image (Hua XI, 373), but it must be contrasted with the self-constituting (full) intentional unity present in the intentional form of expectation. In his Guide for Translating Husserl, Dorion Cairns also suggests that konstitutierend be translated with "constituting," "constitutive," or "constituent" (cf. Cairns, Guide, p. 77). 10. 1 would like to especially thank Mr. Benedikt Hailer of the Philosophisches Seminar, T~bingen University, and Professor Karl Schuhmann, co-editor of Husserl Studies, for their careful readings and many helpful comments on earlier versions of the present translation.