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The Context of Social Identity: Domination, Resistance, and Change Author(s): Stephen Reicher Source: Political Psychology, Vol.

25, No. 6, Symposium: Social Dominance and Intergroup Relations (Dec., 2004), pp. 921-945 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792283 . Accessed: 12/05/2011 21:47
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Political Psychology, Vol.25, No. 6, 2004

The Context of Social Identity: Domination, Resistance, and Change


Stephen Reicher
School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews, Scotland

The task of social psychology is to explain theflexibility of humanbeings in creating and relating to their social worlds. Social identity and self-categorizationtheories provide a thoroughgoinginteractionistframeworkfor achieving such a task. However, in order to do so, it is necessary to avoid reductionistmisreadingsof the theories that would explain human social action simply by reference to psychological processes, without examining how the play of process dependson the culturaland structuralsettings in which they occur More specifically, to the extent that self-categories shape social action, flexibility is achieved throughthe categories to which we belong, the others with whom we compare ourselves, and the dimensionsalong which such comparisonsoccur These are not a fixed aspect of the human condition but are a focus for argumentprecisely because of their world-makingconsequences.
KEY WORDS: groups, social identity,social change

Above all else, the social identity traditionis based on an insistence that humansocial action needs to be understoodin its social context. Action is a function of context because the operationof psychological processes dependson social Thus, whereas social psychologists all too frequentlyseek to use psyparameters. chological universalsto explain the social domain (and hence turnus away from any analysis of social specificity), the social identity traditionforces us to turn towardthe social world. It forces us to addressthe ideological and structural features of that world. Only by doing so will we understandhow our psychology relates to what we do. As Turner(1999) put it: "Process theories such as social identity and self-categorizationrequirethe incorporationof specific content into theiranalyses before they can make predictionseitherin the laboratory the field or and are designed to requiresuch an incorporation" 34). (p.

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However, it is the fate of many psychological theories to see all their richness reduced to a single aphorism and all their complexity reduced to a single hypothesis. Perhaps this is due to a failure to read original sources, perhaps it reflects an overly narrow vision of science as a particularmode of hypothesis testing (see Blumer, 1969), or perhapsit is inherentin the process of transmission over time (see Bartlett, 1932). But whatever the reason may be, the danger of abstractinga specific claim from the largertheoreticaledifice is not only that one fails to appreciatethe edifice as a whole, but also that one distorts the specific claim in the process. I arguethatmany contemporary uses of the social identradition-most notably, the reduction of the traditionto a claim that mere tity division into groups necessarily leads to intergroupdiscrimination-are prone to such myopia and such distortion.It is particularlyironic that an approachwhose whole raison d'etre lies in an attemptto contextualizehumanthoughtand action and should fall prey to such reductionistinterpretations, the consequences are all the more serious for it. In effect, they turnthe theory againstits own meta-theory. My primaryaim in this paper,then, is to challenge the various reductionist treatmentsof the social identity traditionand to reassertthe necessity for a contextualizedapproach-that is, I want to bringthe theoryand the meta-theoryback into alignment.Only when that is done can one make a fair comparisonbetween this traditionand alternativepsychological accounts of intergrouprelations and intergroupconflict. On one hand, the act of reducing such an extensive and substantive conceptual corpus leaves an insubstantialfigure that is much easier to dismiss. On the other hand, it portrayswide stretchesof groundas empty and as demandingto be filled. Possibly, were it to be appreciatedthat the territoryis not virgin, then acts of settlementwould seem both less pressing and less legitimate. Of course, although it is true that a narrowview of the social identity tradition would require the elaborationof alternatives,it does not follow that a broader view excludes them. However, when understoodin context, the traditiondoes indeed provide a better framework for understandingcollective behavior in thanits rivals. Thatis not to say that general (and collective conflict in particular) it is in any way beyond reproachor beyond improvement.My point is less that it representsthe finishedarticlethanthatit representsa propitiousbeginning.This is not simply a matterof furnishingbetteranswers;it is equally-if not even more fundamentally-a matterof how it conceptualizesthe underlyingquestions. At first sight, this might seem a ratherodd assertion.After all, whateverelse we disagree about, surely we agree on the reasons we are here in the first place. In the period since the Second WorldWar,grouppsychology has been dominated by the shadow of the Holocaust. Our theories and models have been dominated by the issue of how more than6 million people could be murdered simply because to be Jews or gypsies or homosexualsor socialists. Lest we became they happened complacent with the passage of time, a regular stream of horrors-the killing fields of Cambodia, genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia-has constantlyremindedus thatthe Holocaustwas no uniqueexcep-

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tion. With depressingregularity,Le Monde Diplomatiquepublishes an "Atlas of Conflicts." The 2001 edition, which featured a map of the globe studded with conflicts," "serious intersymbols representing"borderdisputes,""international nal troubles,"and "civil wars" (Le Monde Diplomatique,2001, p. 8), was out of date within months, as it omitted the escalating conflict between Albanian separatists and the Macedonian state. It is all too easy to conclude from this weight than resolving of evidence that barbarismis "nearlyubiquitous"and that "rather the problems of intergrouphostility, we merely appearto stumble from viciousness to viciousness" (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 3). It only remains to ask, and to answer, the question "Why?"Why is it that aggression, murder,and genocide seem to be such universalfeaturesof the humancondition? But are they? Are we not in danger of being swayed by extremes, by that which we fear most, by that which dominatesour attentionratherthan that which dominatesthe field? On the map of world conflicts, our eye may be drawnto the bold star symbols of conflict but may ignore the large expanses free of any symbols. Moreover,if one looks closer, the map is also replete with instances of negotiations in progress or completed, of conflicts attenuatedor even ended. In the end, conflicts are ratherrare;for any example of tensions between groups,one can think of numerousexamples where the tension is absent. As Renan (1990) argued in his famous text on nationhood,our contemporaryorganizationof the social world always depends on forgettingprevious conflicts: "No Frenchcitizen knows whether he is a Burgundian,an Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomewor the massacresthattook place in the Midi in the thirteenth century"(p. 11). How could France exist today if Catholics were still slaughteringthe Protestantenemy (and vice versa) as they did on St. Bartholomew'sday in 1572? To focus on tensions between Catholics and Protestantsin NorthernIrelandtoday without focusing on the lack of similar tensions in contemporaryFrance would give us a decidedly one-sided view of our social world. Lest examples fail to convince, let us consider some figures. If groups are seen as prone to aggressive and discriminatory behavior,it is commonly assumed that these tendencies reach their climax in the barbarity crowds. The origins of of crowd psychology in late 19th-century Francelie precisely in such an assumption and in correspondingfears of the mass (Nye, 1975). Of all the crowd events of the period, one above all hauntedthe crowd theorists of the day-the massacre duringa strikeat Decazeville in 1886. This was used as emblematicof crowds as a whole. However, as Barrows(1981) showed, of some 3,000 strikesin the period, demonstrations, only 10% led to confrontational only 1%led to violence, and in one case was anyone killed-the case of Decazeville. only Let me be clear. None of this is meant to deny the existence of brutality,nor to downplay its significance where and when it occurs. However, it does suggest that the assumption of near-ubiquityis an unhelpful way of approachingsuch phenomena.If nothingelse, the assumptionthatconflict is almost bound to occur

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prevents us from asking where and when it does occur. Of equal importance,it stops us from addressingthe forms taken by such instances of conflict. To insist on the universalcharacter conflictualrelationsdependson takinga whole series of of diverse phenomena and grouping them together as a single unit; that is, it (Barker,1981). depends on a process of "preformation" Barker'sconcern was with the origins of such units. As he put it: "Consider
the term 'aggression' . . . what reason is there, merely from examining its behav-

ioural elements, to suppose that there is one common determiningfactor to war, murder,rape, sport and chess playing?"(1981, p. 90). Or again, and more generally: "Thereis no obvious charactermarkingaggression as a unit, nor male dominance, nor pride" (p. 105). However, my concern for now is more with the explanatoryconsequences of preformation.To talk of "conflict"or "aggression" or "violence" leads us to ignore what people actually do in any given situation. It leads us to reduce the rich diversity of human action to an abstractuniformity to and, by ignoringthe specifics of action, it renderssuch actions refractory explanation. To illustratethis point, let us returnto one of the most bloody examples France.Davis we have encounteredthus far-the religious wars of 16th-century (1978) analyzed the confrontationsthat culminatedon St. Bartholomew'sday in some detail. She showed that Catholics would not only kill their Protestantrivals but also rip out the entrails,cut the head from the torso, and tear the genitalia off as trophies. Prior chroniclers did indeed respond to such acts with an underBut standablecry of "barbarity." Davis explored the collective beliefs that shaped the form of action. She showed that each side attackedthe other as hereticalbut conceptualized the offense in different ways. Thus, for Catholics, heresy lay in the body of the Protestant,and thereforethe bodies of individualProtestantswere desecrated.Conversely,for the Protestantsin these riots, heresy lay in the rites of Catholicismand therefore,on the whole, the bodies of Catholics were sparedand the objects of the Holy Mass were the targetsof desecration. Another historian, summarizingthe complex and varying forms taken by a differentset of Frenchriots, used a phrasethat refers equally well to the analysis provided by Davis. Reddy (1977) stated that "the targetsof these crowds glitter in the eye of history as signs of the labourers'conception of the natureof society" (p. 84). The consequence of unit formationand the use of specific events as mere illustrationsof a general tendency to violence is to reduce all this glitteringvariability to a dull uniformity.What we lose in the process is any ability to explain when groups enter into conflict, what conditions lead to such conflict, who they targetin their actions, and the precise forms takenby their action. This is a heavy cost indeed! To put it slightly differently,our task is to explain that fixity is a conceit that derives more from the natureof the analysts'gaze than from what is gazed upon. The world we live in is a world of flux. Whom we categorize as ingroupand outgroup, whom we see as ally or enemy, and the bases upon which we treat those

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so categorized are all in constant motion. There is no given form of social categorizationor of relationsbetween categories that obtains across all contexts, and no given context has always been stratifiedin terms of the same categories and categoryrelations.As Wallerstein(1991) stated,"peoplehoodis not merely a constructbut one which, in each particularinstance, has constantlychanging boundaries. Maybe a people is something that is supposed to be inconstant in form" (p. 77). Sometimes such inconstancyis signaled by a change of terms;sometimes it is camouflagedby terminologicalconstancy.Thus, althoughwe might continue to talk in terms of "young"and "old,"the actual age categories we use-such as "child"or "adolescent"or "pensioner"-change over time. So do the definitions of who fits into these categories; the meanings, expectations, and rights associated with the categories; the contexts in which age categories are held to be relevant; and, perhaps more than anything else, the relations between different age categories (e.g., Burman, 1994; Emler & Reicher, 1995; Hobsbawm, 1994). Indeed, Hobsbawm suggested that "the snapping of the links between generations" was one of the most profound transformationsof the "short twentieth century"(1994, p. 15). in However, if anything, Hobsbawm viewed transformations the nature of gender and gender relationsover the centuryas even more far-reaching.In 1940, fewer than 14%of women in the United States were married,lived with theirhusbands, and worked for pay. In 1980, the figure was more than 50%. Of course, overall, gender inequalityremains, but the importance,meaning, and manifestation of gender in virtually any given social location has changed. In some areas, Otherareas, such as the gender ceased to be a critical dimension of stratification. caring professions, went from being largely masculine to being powerfully feminized. These changes in social location filtereddown into even the most mundane forms of social being. For instance, Dom (1983) showed how the gendering of the labor marketis reflected in the drinkingbehavior of women. Where labor is predominantlymanualand masculine, women in bars tend to wait for their male partnersto buy them drinks and then sit quietly sipping from small half-pint glasses. However, in areasdominatedby a feminized service sector,women drink together,buy their own drinks,and are altogethermore raucousand assertive.All in all, there are no special domains in our social world that are beyond the iron law of flexibility.What we need to explain, then, is not the inevitable occurrence of any particularform of intergrouprelations irrespectiveof context, but rather the flexibility of behavior across differing contexts. We cannot answer the question of why barbarity occurs in some situationswithout asking why it does not in others. But this is still not quite right. The contrastbetween fixity and flexibility is overdrawn.Although it is importantto challenge the way in which the notion of fixity has traditionallybeen used, it cannot be rejectedentirely.Indeed, the more radicalthe claims we make for flexibility,the morewe need to reintroduce notion a

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of fixity, albeit in a differentguise. To clarify this point, it is helpful to returnto Wallerstein's (1991) argumentconcerning the changing boundaries of peoplehood. Such change, he argued,is not incidental;rather, the very inconstancy of peoplehood categories turnsout to be crucially important.For while capitalism as a historical system requiresconstant of inequality,it also requiresconstantrestructuring economic processes. Hence what guaranteesa particularset of hierarchicalsocial relations today may not work tomorrow.The behaviourof the work force must change without underminingthe legitimacy of the system. (p. 84) The point I want to stress here is that if categories serve to legitimate social relations, they must be seen as necessary ratherthan contingent.Contingencywould point to the possibility of other forms of social relations, and hence would open up the possibility of a critiqueof the present.Thus, even if categorieschange over time, they must always be seen as fixed at any specific point in time. What we need to address, then, is not simply flexibility, but the combinationof flexibility with the conviction that whereverwe happento be is where we always have been and always will be-what Wallersteincalled "the reality of inconstancy and the denial of this reality"(1991, p. 77). By reframingthe challenge in this way, it is clear that there also needs to be a change in the sort of response that is needed. Or, in Thomas Pynchon's delightful phrase, "if they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry aboutthe answers"(1972, p. 251). The idea of universaland fixed features of human behaviornecessarily leads to a search for some underlyingpredisposition in human nature that drives the behavior of individuals in society and the natureof society itself. Of course, there may be many different ways of characterizingthis dispositionand of explainingits origins. But even if the questiondoes not settle which form of predispositionismis adopted, predispositionismitself becomes inviolate. This is not to say that the role of society is entirely excluded. However, the role of society is reduced to that of providing the terrainand the tools throughwhich inherenttendencies are played out. It is an interactionismof sorts, but a very pallid form of interactionismin which biology and psychology and predominate social forms arelargelytreatedas epiphenomenathatareof interest only insofar as they reflect these underlyingforces. By contrast,a stress on contextual variabilityand an opposition to the idea of behavioraluniversals is in no way opposed to the notion of a general human nature.However, it is based on a very differentconception of that natureand of how its generality reflects itself (and hence is to be found) in our behavior.The contrastis essentially that between a view of our biology as destiny and a view of our biology as possibility. It is exemplified by the recent debate surrounding efforts to decode the humangenome. As Lewontin (1993, 2000) has pointed out, to this endeavorhas been used in many quarters buttressdeterministicprojections concerning our eventual ability to find a genetic cause of everythingfrom crimi-

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nality to religion. However, the real reason why such efforts are being fundedand supportedis because they hold out the prospect of genetic engineering. In other words, our human naturenot only allows us to constructthe societies in which we live and hence to escape the tyranny of environmentaldeterminism,it also allows us to reconstruct our biological foundations. In every sense, then, "it belongs to our natureto go beyond it" (Eagleton, 1996, p. 73). Or, in Simone de Beauvoir's more enigmatic formulation,humans are "l'etre don't l'etre est de n'etre pas": the being whose essence is in not having an essence (quoted in Lewontin, 1993, p. 123). If our naturebequeathsus so manypossibilities, it is throughthe way in which we are able to abstractourselves from the world-to imagine differentcourses of action and the way in which they may transformthe world-and hence to plan ahead.The uniquenessof the humanspecies lies in the capacities that allow us to create worlds that suit us, ratherthan simply adapt to the world as it is. Hence, the condition of humancreativitylies in the capacity for symbolic representation and manipulation.To be more concrete, our advantage depends on us having evolved neither as competitive beings nor as cooperative beings, not as violent nor as peaceful, not as dominantnor as submissive, but above all as linguistic and culturalbeings. Thus, culture is not in opposition to biology, nor even in simple additionto biology. It is no denial of humannatureto arguethat "we are, in sum, incomplete or unfinishedanimals who complete or finish ourselves throughculture"(Geertz, 1993, p. 49). Rather,it is a statementof humannature.Ourbiology demandsthat we are culturalanimals, and hence animals whose behavior cannot be explained directly in terms of biological imperatives.The very flexibility of our biological existence rendersa differenttype of informationalsystem necessary,the cultural system. Because we have no genetic system of informationfor humanbehavior, we require a cultural system. No culture exists without such a system. Hence, wherever one finds humanbeings, one cannot find a nonsymbolic mode of existence and, still less, action thatis nonsymbolic.Or, to put it the otherway around, the search for a genetic system that drives our behaviordirectly is not only problematic at an empirical level. More seriously, it is based on a misunderstanding of the very natureof human action (Geertz, 1993). In sum, we must eschew that form of psychological fossil huntingthat consists of seeking traces of our evolutionarypast in all our presents. Generalityis not to be found in forms of behaviorthat are consistentirrespectiveof setting, but ratherin the ways thatwe are culturallyvarious(Geertz, 1993). The task thatconfrontsus as psychologists is then to explain the processes that allow us to be completed in culture.What are the mediatingmechanismsthroughwhich phenomena in the social domain articulatewith the ways in which human subjects act? What are the implicationsof these mechanismsfor our understanding the aspects of of social reality that are critical in shaping our action? What does this then tell us about the ways in which different social realities lead to variationsin what we

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do? More specifically, what does this psychology have to say about the way in which we conceptualizeour relationsto others within differentsocial settings and the conditions under which we see them as members of a group that we need to destroy? My contentionis thatthe social identitytraditionis able to addressthese questions precisely because the very notion of social identity was conceptualizedin such a way as to provide a point of pivot between the social and the individual. It is designed to explain how individualscan come to define themselves in terms of a constructthat is irreduciblycultural,and to explain that this culturalcontent gives shape to all the processes that flow from our sense of who we are: how we relate to others, how we define and pursue our goals, what we see as possible, and what we want as desirable.To demonstratethis, however, I must first return of to the task of challenging reductionistappropriations the tradition. (Mis)Understandingthe Social Identity Tradition Reductionistreadingsof the social identitytraditioncan be linked to a deconof textualized interpretation the minimal-groupstudies from which the tradition arose. It may thereforebe helpful to startby considering these studies (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel,Flament,Billig, & Bundy, 1971) and their links to the theory.In the first phase, subjects are told that they have been divided into two groups on the basis of either a trivial criterion (preference for Klee or the Kandinskypaintings, overestimatingor underestimating numberof dots in a pattern) or else on explicitly random grounds-although in fact, allocation to groups is always done randomly.All they know is what group they are in; they have no knowledge of who else is in which group, nor do they have any interaction with members of the ingroup or outgroup.They are then given the task of allocating points between two individuals,one of whom is identified solely as a member of the ingroup and the other solely as a member of the outgroup.The allocation task is performedusing specially designed matrices that allow one to distinguish between different allocation strategiesused by the subjects. The key finding is that, among the strategiesthat are used, there is a tendency to sacrifice absolute level of rewardto the ingroupin orderto increasethe differencebetween the amount allocated to the ingroup and the amount allocated to the outgroupthe so-called strategyof maximumdifferentiation. Social identitytheoryexplains these results in the following terms(see Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner,1979, 1986; Turner,1975). The startingpoint lies in the concept of social identity itself. In contrastto the notion that the self is unitary and sovereign, the social identity traditionviews the self as a complex system. We can define ourselves either in terms of what makes us unique compared to other individuals (personal identity) or in terms of our membership in social groups (social identity).Moreover,we clearly belong to a varietyof social groups thatare differentiallysalientto us in differentconditions:In the lecturehall, I may

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think of myself as a psychologist; when I attenda meeting in the evening, I may think of myself as a socialist; if I were to watch a game, I would ratherconsider myself a Dundee United fan (a ratherrare breed). It is the shift from personalto to social identity that underliesthe behavioralshift from interpersonal intergroup behavior. Moreover, when I behave in terms of any given social identity, I am guided by the norms, values, and beliefs that define the relevant identity.As a psychologist, I may endeavor to be dispassionate,objective, and fair; as a football fan, I put more value on being passionate,partisan,and loyal. The key point to rememberis that social identityis simultaneouslysomethingintensely personal and important me as an individual,but also somethingthat,in substance,cannot to be reducedto me as an individualbut is rathera culturaland historicalconstruct. It is the fact that social identity is so deeply personal and yet so irreduciblycultural that sustains the claim that it provides a pivot between the individual and the social. Throughsocial identity,the subject is defined in social terms. behaviorstartswith subjectsadoptFor social identitytheory,then, intergroup a social identification.However,just as personalidentity defines our uniqueing ness relative to other individuals, so our distinctive social identity is defined by what marks us out as differentfrom other groups. Social identities are necessarily defined in comparativeterms, and so group members indulge in social comto parisonbetween theiringroupand relevantoutgroups.It is important stress that the comparisonoccurs at a collective level. It is not how I, as an individualgroup member,compareto you, an individualmemberof anothergroup.It is ratherhow to we as a whole compareto you as a whole. More generally,it is important realize that when social identity is salient, all self-relatedprocesses and constructsmust be relatedto the relevantcollective self. Most notably,this includes the notion of self-esteem. Thus, when social identity theory proposes that group membersseek to achieve positive self-esteem, this needs to be understoodas esteem relatingto the evaluation of the specific category underconsideration. If group membersseek a positive evaluationof the ingroupand if the group can only be defined in comparisonto outgroups,it follows that people can only achieve such an evaluation by seeking to make their own group better than outgroups.To be more specific, group memberswill seek to differentiatethemselves from the outgroupon valued dimensions of comparison.Putting it all together, the mere salience of group divisions is sufficient to instigate a psychological This may be a generalprocess, but the differentiation. dynamic towardintergroup in which it translatesinto action is a functionof a series of contextualfactors. way This is as true of the minimal-groupcontext as of any other context. Hence, to conflatebehaviorsand process-to extrapolatefrom the behaviorsobtainedin the minimal-groupstudies to groupbehavioras a whole-is both to distortthe theory and to misrepresentthe natureof humancollective action. The first set of issues derives from ignoring what is present in the minimalgroup paradigm. In this paradigm, there is only one set of categories through which it is possible to make sense of the situation-that imposed by the experi-

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make sense of events menters. Outside the laboratory,we can characteristically with the use of a series of differentcategories; for instance, a phenomenonsuch as the influx of migrantsinto low-paidjobs can be construedas a matterof "race," of nation, or of class. How we react will be fundamentallyaffected by the categories throughwhich we define ourselves and others. That is, the issue of how events come to be construedin terms of given categories is a necessary precursor to understandingrelations between categories. For example, we need to address"racialization" before we can understand race relations,or nation formation before we can understandinternational relations (see Reicher, 1986; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a). By ignoring what is given in the minimal-groupparadigm, we are in dangerof taking the natureof social categories for granted. Equally,having acceptedthe ingroupcategoryimposed by the experimenters, the paradigmallows only one outgroupcategory with which to compareoneself (the Kandinskygroup if one is in the Klee group, dot overestimatorsif one is in the dot underestimator group). Once again, comparisons outside the laboratory are characteristicallymuch more open. I can compare my racial group to many other possible groups, and the same goes for my nation and my class. Withindifferent comparisons, my understandingof who I am and what I am worth will differradicallyand, as a consequence,my groupandintergroup behaviorwill shift likewise. In this instance, by ignoring what is given in the minimal-groupparadigm, we are in dangerof taking the natureof social comparisons(and hence the substantivecontent of social categories) for granted. Finally, having accepted both the ingroup category and the outgroupcomparison, there is only one dimension throughwhich one can differentiateoneself from the outgroup-the dimension of monetaryreward. Here too, most groups outside the laboratoryallow for a wide range of dimensions along which to differentiatethe ingroup from the outgroup,because most groups value more than one thing. Moreover, whereas in some cases the values of the group may mean that differentiationresults in antisocial behavior toward the outgroup,this need not always be the case. Whereingroupnormsarepositive, prosocialbehaviormay result (see Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996). That is, one may compete to show that one is kinder,more generous, more helpful than others. Here, ignoring what is given in the minimal-groupparadigmleads us to take the behavioralexpression of the differentiationprocess for grantedand to make the critical mistake of reading differentiationas discrimination. All in all, it could be argued that the minimal-groupexperiments could equally well be described as "maximal-group experiments."They may involve only the most basic conditions for groupbehavior-simple division into two categories-but they also presentan environmentthat affordsno basis for action but those two categories. Subjects are isolated, they have no personal information aboutothers, and they only have the specifically availablegroup to go on. Hence, within the laboratory world, the seemingly trivial categories become allimportant. The very absence of substantive content or alternative constraint

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becomes an importantdeterminantof what people do. But what happens when alternativesdo exist and when there are multiple forms of constraint on how people act? What happens to the categorizationprocess when it is considered in a world of competing ideologies and structural inequalities? This, in fact, was Tajfel's principal concern. For him, the minimal-group studies and the identification/comparison/differentiation triad were a point of not a point of completion.They constitutea psychological dynamicbut departure, raise the question of how that dynamic plays itself out as a function of different contextual features (or, to put it the other way round, how contextual features affect humanaction). In particular, Tajfel's interestwas in groups that are subordinated and negatively evaluated-groups where membershipconfers negative esteem. How will group members respond to this, and more specifically, when will they act collectively to challenge their oppression?That is, the primaryfocus was not so much on discriminationas on resistance; it was concerned not with the inevitabilityof dominationbut with the possibility of change. Indeed,as Tajfel statedexplicitly, the very concept of social identity is not of interest"for 'what it is' in a static sense," but rather"as an interveningcausal mechanismin situations of 'objective social change'" (1978, p. 86). This takes us to a second set of issues that derive from ignoring what is absent from the minimal-groupparadigm. According to social identity theory, it is necessary to consider three sets of conditions in orderto understand how membersof subordinated groups will act. The first set relates to whether such people will act individually or collectively. When the boundariesbetween categories are seen as permeable(such thatpeople can succeed by distancing themselves from the group), they will indeed follow such individualisticpaths-the strategyof "exit."However, when the boundaries are seen as impermeable(and where, no matterwhat one does, the person's fate will be tied to group membership),then people will act collectively-the strategy of "voice." Second, the step from collective self-definition to challenging the status of the dominantgroup dependsboth on perceiving the dominantgroup's superiority as illegitimate and on being able to conceive of a more equitable world-the existence of "cognitive alternatives."These twin factors give rise to a sense of "insecure social identity"; they make comparisons with the dominant group relevant and meaningful.As Turnerand Brown put it in 1978, it is those situations that are perceived as both illegitimate and amenable to alternativesthat are most conducive to the rejection of consensual inferiority by the low-status groups. They argued that it is the combinationof such conditions that explains the upsurge of agitation among such groups as American blacks, French Canadians,Maoris,and otherminoritygroupsduringthe 1970s. In particular, they suggested that the liberation movements in Africa had a profound effect on the conceptions and actions of the American civil rights movement. Moreover, movements and their impact on understandings the of knowledge of international domestic context may explain why more privileged, more educated, and less

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objectively disadvantagedblack people were more likely to participatein riots and other protest activities. Third,conditions of insecure social identity and insecure social comparisons between a subordinategroup and a dominantgroup do not in themselves determine the natureof collective action. Rather,they lead to a complex set of strategies under which subordinategroup memberschallenge the social hierarchyand dominantgroupmembersseek to reassertit. Thereare severalways in which those in the subordinated groupmay act:They can seek to change theirposition on those dimensions where they have previously been defined as inferior;they can reinterpretas positive those dimensionsof the groupthathad previouslybeen defined as negative;or they can createnew dimensionson which they can be definedpositively. Which strategyis chosen will dependpartlyon practicalconstraints.Thus, the effectiveness of the first strategywill depend on the group breakingthe barriersthatpreventaccess to superiorconditions.Choice of strategywill also depend on the reactions of the dominantgroup. Thus, the use of the second two strategies will depend on the past, present,or futurewillingness of the dominantgroup to concede that the relevantdimensions should be positively evaluated. Even from this cursory summary,it can be seen that there are at least five types of contextual factor that must be taken into account before one can determine whetherand how a subordinated group will seek positive differentiationin relationto dominantgroups.These are the permeabilityof group boundaries,the legitimacy of inequalities,the existence of cognitive alternativesto the statusquo, practical constraintson claiming valued resources, and the actions of dominant group members-to which should be added a sixth factor that is imminent throughoutthe analysis: the issue of power. The whole point of Tajfel's model is to look at psychological dynamics in the context of unequal power relations. Whateverthe psychological instigationto act, one needs power to overcome the constraintand sanctions of others if instigationsare to become actions (e.g., Ng, 1980; Reicher & Levine, 1994; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). Once one acknowledges the centralityof power, it becomes evident not only that it is senseless to suggest that groups always discriminate(in the sense of forms of action that create and maintainsocial inequality),but also that it is misleading to suggest that those in subordinate positions discriminateunderany conditions. In the firstplace, by definitionthey arecharacteristically more constrained in their ability to translatewhateverpsychological impulses they have into forms of action that would disadvantage the more powerful outgroup. Second, even where subordinategroup membersdo have the power to act despite the sanctions of the dominant outgroup, their actions will be aimed at challenging and disof mantlingcurrentstructures inequalityratherthan creatingand defendingthem. as Reynolds and Turner(in press) argue,discriminationis associatedwith Hence, dominantgroups,which do so primarilyunderconditions of insecure social identity and social comparison. The fact that social identity theory concentrateson subordinatedgroups is thereforea furtherindicationthat its primaryconcern is not with the fact of dis-

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crimination;rather,the reality of discriminationmotivated its concern with the conditions and dynamics of resistance and change. Equally,the focus on collective action in the social identity traditionis not based on an empiricalevaluation of how often we define ourselves and act as group members, but ratherbecause it is only throughcollectivity that the powerless gain power and are able to effect change. In one sense, there is a point of convergence here between approaches.The social identity approach,social dominancetheory,and systemjustificationtheory are all equally concernedwith power and domination.Yet there are profounddifferences, especially between the social identityand social dominanceapproaches. For the social identity tradition,dominance is a social relationshipthat is both a condition and a productof social action: Dominance determineswhetherwe act collectively, and it is broughtabout by acting collectively. In other words, dominance relations are part of the social process. It is not something broughtto the social process from the outside (a psychological disposition or even an evolutionaryuniversal)thatdeterminesthe form thatthe process should take.As a consequence, the purposeof the analysis is to examine how varying social conditions articulatewith psychological processes in orderto bring aboutvariationsin dominance relations.It is not to use psychology in orderto posit invariantconditions across all social conditions. The same distinction can also be made at a more general meta-theoretical level. Social identityis intendedas a concept thatmediatesbetween social context and the action of human subjects. It is not seen as a psychological reality that determinessocial reality.The social identity traditionis thereforefundamentally oriented toward variabilityand possibility in human social behavior,ratherthan towardsingularityandconstraint.Its broadapproachfits well with Geertz's(1993) argumentthat human natureis to be found not in behavioraluniformitiesbut in the patterning of behavioral differences: "If we want to discover what man amounts to, we can only find it in what men are: and what men are, above all other things, is various. It is in understandingthat variousness-its range, its nature,its basis and its implications-that we shall come to constructa concept of human naturethat, more than a statistical shadow and less than a primitivist dream,has both substanceand truth"(pp. 51-52). What the work on social identification and self-categorizationprovides is a basis for understanding this variousness throughthe concept of social identity and, more precisely, by reference to the dimensions along which the substantivenatureof any given identity may vary. ThreeDimensions of Collective Variation Before we can act as groupmembers,we need to define ourselves as members of the said group. Before we can hold attitudesor act towardothers on the basis of their group membership,we need to define them in terms of a common group membership.Moreover,how we act ourselves andhow we treatotherswill depend

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on which categories we use to define self and other.One of the key tenets of the social identity traditionis that we have a range of possible social identities and that when we behave in terms of any given social identity,we act on the basis of the beliefs, norms, and values associated with that identity. Insofar as different identitiesareassociatedwith differentbeliefs, norms,andvalues, we would expect radically different behaviors as a function of how we categorize ourselves and others in any given context (Haslam, 2000; Turner,1982; Turner,Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner,Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty,1994). The choice of categories throughwhich we segment any given social context into self and other is therefore a key basis of behavioral flexibility. As I have already indicated, there is no identity that will determineour behavior irrespective of context, and no behavior that will be insensitive to variationsin identity. It may be that certaincontexts in our world are chronicallyorganizedin terms of certaincategories-such as gender-and hence those categories come to acquire a sense of being natural.However,as I have also indicated,when one views things historically,it becomes clear thatthe way things are organizedchanges over time, and moreover,when one can experimentallyvary the relevanceof categories,then both our identities and our behaviors change likewise. This applies to all categories without exception. For instance, in one of our own studies, female physical education students were primarilyconcerned with disfiguringdiseases when genderidentitywas salient,but this gave way to a concernwith disablingailments when their disciplinaryidentity came to the fore (Levine & Reicher, 1996). More generally,Guimond(2000) showed thatthe effect of socializationin a groupupon attitudesand beliefs is dependenton identificationwith the group in question. All this leads to an obvious and critical question:What determineshow we categorize ourselves and others in the social world? One of the most remarkable featuresof contemporarysocial psychology is the raritywith which this question is eitherposed or answered.It is also one of the most perniciousfeaturesbecause, as noted above, failure to question the nature of social categories all too easily leads to the reification of social categories (Hopkins, Reicher, & Levine, 1997; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b). We are very good at asking about the consequences of categorizationand about how groups relate to each other,but we are far more reticentin asking how we came to categorize the world in terms of those groups in the first place. Researcherstend to project their categorizationsof the social world upon their subjects, and they include subjects in their analyses only to the extent that they accept those categories. When the question of how we categorize the world is addressed,it tends to be approached a cognitivist manner.That is to say, it is assumedthatthe reason in why we categorize is to reduce the complexity of the social world such that our limited cognitive systems are not overloadedwith information.Categorizationis functionalbut comes at the cost of simplificationand distortion.The social identity tradition, and self-categorization theory in particular(Oakes, Haslam, & Turner,1994; Turneret al., 1987; Turneret al., 1994), are fundamentallyopposed

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to such an approach.Categorizationin general and salience in particularare not distortionsof social reality.Rather,they reflect social reality.To put it more techof nically, one of the key determinants category salience is the "fit"between categories and the organizationof stimuli in the world. The concept of "fit"relates categories to the preexisting organizationof the social world. It looks backwardfrom perceptionto structureand insists that our are understandings functionalinsofar as they allow us to find our way throughthe world as it is structured.But the world is not homogeneous. Different contexts are differentiallystructured,and this means that our categories of understanding are similarly malleable. Categorizationis not inflexible but "contextuallyvalid." To take but one example: In a world of nations, we are likely to conceptualize ourselves and others in national terms, even down to the fact that when we talk of "the weather"we mean the weatherin our nation (Billig, 1996). However, the example of nationhoodpoints to anotherway of conceptualizthe relationshipbetween categories and social reality.Nationalistmovements ing (which promoted a conception of the world in terms of nationhood) were, of course, fundamentallyimportantin creating nation-states.In this sense, categorization was not the reflection of an old world but a means of creating a new world. The gaze is not backwardbut forward.To use a well-worn philosophical distinction, categorization is as much about becoming as about being. Tajfel (1970) noted that category definitionsare "oftenendowed with the magic of selffulfilling prophecies"(p. 130). He furthernoted that, once the focus is as much on the creation of future realities as the descriptionof present reality, then "the issue of the 'core of truth' loses much of its true-false simplicity" (p. 130). Categorizationshould be assessed not only as being right or wrong but equally as being effective or ineffective. The importanceof relating categorizationto the making of the future is not simply to do with epistemological arguments.It also places a renewed emphasis on the agency of the humansubject.No longer are we passive processorsof contextualinformation.Ouridentitiesare no longer impressedupon us from an external reality. Identities may be better seen as projects, and those with different projects will propose different versions of their own identity and that of others. Indeed, if the social identity traditionis correct-if social identities are the psychological constructs that render collective action possible, and if the natureof those identities determines whether and how we act collectively-then it is through the active process of constructing social identities that the collective movements that shape our world will come about (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, 1996b, 2001a; Reicher, Hopkins, & Condor, 1997a, 1997b). In this sense, those who seek to influence their peers and those who aspire to direct the masses need to become entrepreneurs identity before they can become leaders of people of 1996; Reicher, Stott, Drury,& Hopkins, 2001). Certainly,the introduc(Reicher, tion of the future-and hence the introduction of agency-provides a basis through which the social identity traditioncan address the flexibility of social

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action not only between but also within contexts. Flexibility is a function of varyingsocial categoriesand is achieved throughdifferingcategoryconstructions. Thus far, I have dealt with only one aspect of the categorizationprocess, and hence with only one dimensionof flexibility:the question of which categories we use to define ourselves out of a potentiallyunlimitedplethoraof possibilities. The second dimension has to do with the issue of comparison.Even if we define ourselves in terms of a given category membership,the behavioralconsequences of that membershipwill be dependenton the relationshipswithin which that category is nested. This, of course, is one of the key insights of the social identitytradition and one of the principalfoci of researchon self-categorizationprocesses. The notions of "fit" and of contextually valid perception apply not only to the question of which categories we use (salience), but also to the specific meanings associated with those categories (stereotyping).One of the more radicalimplications of self-categorizationtheory is precisely that stereotypes are not rigid and fixed (as is assumed in so much of social psychology), but instead are remarkably malleable and sensitive to context. Haslam in particularhas shown that, depending on whom we compare ourselves with (and when), there can be wide of variabilityin our understanding who we are, where we stand, and what qualities define us (Haslam & Turner, 1992; Haslam, Turner,Oakes, McGarty, & Hayes, 1992; Oakes et al., 1994). In terms of the specific issue of dominance,this would suggest that our orientations will vary as a function of whom we compare ourselves with and our power relations with that group. Rather than being dominant or submissive in general terms, we may be highly oriented to dominance in one relationshipand much less so in another.Thereis systematicexperimentalevidence to supportthis proposition(Schmitt, Branscombe,& Kappen, 1998); however, it is also a familiar feature of the larger social landscape. Israel, condemned by many for its use of militarymight againstthe Palestinianuprising,respondsby stressingits beleagueredposition in comparisonto the Arab world and, even more acutely,invokes the Holocaust in order to present the Jewish people as an oppressed group involved in legitimate self-defense ratherthan as an oppressorgroup.Conversely, groups such as the Poles, accused of oppressingand being complicit in the slaughter of Jews, respond by stressing their powerlessness and their oppression at the hands of Nazi invaders. What these examples make clear is that, for choice of comparisongroup as for choice of self-categories, one cannot take things as self-evident or as an automatic consequence of contextual realities. Rather,the issue of what is an appropriate comparison group is a matter of argument-something that involves a rhetoricaldimension and is used strategically.We invoke certain others both to mobilize the ingroup ("Look how weak we are compared to them; we must empower ourselves")and to mitigate against challenges by others ("How can we be to blame since we are victims, not perpetrators"). This applies not only to whom we invoke as the outgroup,but also to how we portraythatoutgroup.Dalby

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(1990), for instance, showed how the portrayalof Soviet strengthduringthe Cold War era was more tied to the exigencies of domestic American politics, the demandsof armaments industries,and the need to appearpatrioticand strongthan to actualvariationsin Soviet militarycapability.More generally,Campbell(1992) and arguedthat the ways in which "outsiders" "aliens"are identified,the ways in which they are constituted as a threat, and the policies that are devised to deal with them are primarilylinked to issues of national identity. In an echo of my he temporalargument, stressedthat"statesare (andhave to be) always in a process of becoming" (p. 11). That process of becoming is achieved throughthe invocation of appropriatealiens: "The constant articulationof danger throughforeign policy is thus not a threatto a state's identity or existence; it is its condition of possibility" (p. 12). Thus, even given a specific category and even given a specific comparison group,the natureof groupidentityand of collective action can still vary as a function of how the outgroupis defined and hence how the ingroupstands in relation to that outgroup.In other words, the definitionof the ingroup can be and indeed often is achieved throughdefining the characteristics the outgroup.This takes of us directly to the thirddimensionof collective variation,which has to do with the natureof group beliefs, values, and norms. One way of defining these may be to do so indirectly through the way in which the outgroupis characterized.However, it is not the only way. As I have stressed above, one of the basic tenets of the social identity traditionis that identities are culturalconstructs.They define the individualbut are not simply defined by individuals.Yet we must beware of an abstractednotion of culturethat places it in a realm beyond the day-to-day activities of human subjects. People may be completed in culture,but they also invoke, interpret,and apply culturein a continuous process of appropriation change. In this sense, culturemay be better and seen as a "reserve"(see Reszler, 1992) thatwe drawupon in the process of sensemaking ratherthan as a rigid determinantof our social being. Equally, when it comes to identity,our understanding who we are may well draw upon cultural of resources, but these set the terms of debate ratherthan exclude acts of construction. Indeed,everywherewe look, the meaningof identityforms a focus of furious controversies. Perhapsthe major strategy throughwhich those we have termed "entrepreneurs of identity" seek to shape collective action is to define the meanings of of groupidentitysuch thattheirproposalscan be seen as the implementation group norms. Thus, in studies of schismatic processes, we find that each side presents its own position as reflectingthe essence of groupidentitybut interpretsthe position of its opponent as representingits negation (Reicher & Sani, 1998; Sani & Reicher, 1998, 1999). In studies of Scottish politicians and partyactivists, we find all proclaiming their profound national identification, but then proceeding to define what it means to be Scottish in radicallydifferentways thatjust happento coincide with party policy. For Labour, Scots are inherently collectivistic and

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hence supportive of enhanced welfare provision. For Conservatives, Scots are and hence supportive of rolling inherently anti-authorityand anti-bureaucratic back state intervention(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a; Reicher et al., 1997b). These debates concerningthe meaning of group identity extend to all issues, including the question of how dominantor submissive the Scots are as a people. Consider the following claims, the first by an activist of the independencesupporting Scottish National party (SNP), the second by an activist of the arch-unionistConservativeparty (both extractsfrom Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a, p. 105): "The Scot would hate to be wrong. That's why he sometimes doesn't offer opinions when asked. In case thereis somethingrisible in the opinions. So he keeps his mouth shut and looks at less inhibitedpeople, like the English, who will give opinions on any damn thing it seems to him and don't care whetherthey're right or wrong." "Non-Scots will accuse us of being girners and moaners and groaners, really what I thinkthey are saying is, they are commentingon the Scots' naturaldesire to express themselves and to express himself in the knowledge thathe may hold a view differingfrom those held by otherpeople." So, for the one, the Scots are akin to the poet Burns' "wee timorous beastie," whereasfor the other,they are loud and assertive-more lion thanmouse. So who is right and who is wrong? How can such contradictoryviews coexist? By now it should be clear that the impasse lies more with the natureof the question than in the answers that are given. These definitions of identity are projects, not descriptions.They are intendedto mobilize people to create social reality.On one hand, the notion that Scots cannot articulate(let alone live by) their views as long as they are silenced by the English underpins the need for an independent Scotland. On the other hand, the notion that the Scots' view is always heard underpinsa defense of the Union as good for Scotland. Here, more than ever, it is clear that identities are orientedto the futureand not simply tied to the present.Moreover,insofar as there are always many possible futures as opposed to a singular present, then likewise there will always be the possibility of multiple versions of identity. However, the corollary of this is thatsuccess in realizingone projectover anotherdependson imposingone version of identity over all other versions. That is, the very contingency of identity requiresthat it be presentedas noncontingent,as self-evident, as not one version among many but as the only possible version. There are many ways by which this may be done. In part, at least, it has to do with matchingthe structureof experience-especially the organizationof collective rituals-to the category constructions that are proposed (see Falasca-Zamponi,1997; Ozouf, 1988). A successful social movement is one that squares the circle of convincing people of the viability of a world that does not yet exist by reproducingthe terms of that world in

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its own internal practices. Nonetheless, one must not underestimatethe importance and the autonomyof the rhetoricalprocess itself-what Billig (1987) termed "witcraft"-in establishing the "authenticity" incontrovertibility category and of constructions.This can be done in various ways, including the use of historical examples, national icons and symbols, institutionalforms, landscape, and even climate to give substance to one's account of national identity. Witness, for instance, the way in which anotherSNP activist buttressesthe image of the shy and retiringScot with several of these factors,but particularly timeless harshthe ness of northernclimes (from Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a, p. 113): "Because of the topography,because of the geography,because of the Defensive history,the Scottish characteris a kind of defensive character. against the weather,defensive against difficult conditions in agriculture. I am thinkingback hundredsof years." The fact that identity is essentially variablebut is everywherepresentedin essentialized form is thereforeno contradiction.Once again, the appearanceof contradiction is the resultof approachingsocial categoriesin perceptualterms.Once the categorizationprocess is linked to the organizationof action, these features can be seen as necessarily interlinked.Or, to invoke the terms used above to frame the challenge thatconfrontsus as social psychologists, "thereality of inconstancy and the denial of this reality"(Wallerstein,1991, p. 77) in terms of the categories of peoplehood derives from the way in which self-categories render collective action possible. As noted above, the social identity traditionplaces this relationship at the center of social psychology. As I have arguedhere, the variousdimensions of social identificationprocesses shape the scope, the focus, and the content of collective action. Thus, to argue that a particularpopulation group will have is any specific behavioralcharacteristic to presupposethe terms of identity.To be more precise, such argumentsbeg questions concerning the category memberships through which people define themselves, the intergrouprelations within which people nest their own groups, how the outgroupis defined (and its implications for the position of the ingroup), and the meanings associated with the ingroup-the understandingsand the priorities that determine who "we" are, whatever "we" that happens to be. The issues become yet more acute when it comes to the matterof relations between groups.To arguethatthereare specific forms of relationsbetween groups is not only to presupposehow we categorize ourselves, with whom we compare ourselves, how we characterize the outgroup, and how we characterize the ingroup;it is also to presupposehow we understandthe way in which the outgroup impinges on matters that are importantto us in terms of our own group identity (see Branscombe,Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 1999; Dixon & Reicher, 1997; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a) and how we feel empoweredto act againstthe other should it be constitutedas a problem.Thus, whom we see as self and other, when we see the otheras ally or foe, what we deem as acceptableorjust in dealing

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with the foe, and what we see as possible in dealing with the foe must all be seen as relatedto processes of identity definitionratherthan taken as givens. Only by addressingthose processes can we understandwhen intergrouprelations lead to conflict and the forms taken by that conflict. Self-categorizationtheory has laid particular emphasis on the ways in which differences in the categories throughwhich we segment the world, the groups to which we compare ourselves, and the beliefs throughwhich we define ourselves are all tied to the organizationof social context. It thereforeserves to demonstrate and explain how our identities and our actions vary across contexts. I have also drawnon anotherstrandof the social identity traditionthat stresses how category definitions are oriented to making (and not only perceiving) contexts. This is in no way contradictoryto self-categorizationtheory. Indeed, what is importantis to understandthe interrelationship between the ways in which categories create context and the ways in which categories are created by context, ratherthan to counterpose the two (see Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a). More important,the core of my argumentthroughoutthis paperhas been that the social identity traditionforces us to addressthe relationshipbetween categorical processes and context. The problem arises when appropriationsof the theory of ignore this relationship.By contrast,it is by enriching our understanding the category-contextlink that the traditionwill be developed. For the present purposes, however, the importantpoint is that the notion of categories as orientedto the futureratherthan tied to the presentonly serves to place furtheremphasis on (and furthergroundsfor explaining) the variabilityof self-categories and collective actions. As I have repeatedlystressed, we should not see variationbetween contexts as implying homogeneity within contexts. Wherever we happen to be at present, we will use different versions of identities to try and get to different destinations. Conclusion In one of the foundationaltexts of modem cognitive science, Anderson(1976) wrote: "I propose that we take 'understanding natureof human intelligence' the to mean possession of a theorythatwill enable us to improvehumanintelligence" (p. 16). His proposition can be seen as a reversal of the well-known Lewinian claim that there is nothing as practicalas a good theory:There is nothing as good as a practical theory. What I hope to have established is the practicalityof the social identity approach,especially in termsof the interestsand concernsof political psychology. From a political perspective, with its broader focus and wider historical sweep, it is much easier to see that what we take for granted in a given place within a given historical era may seem not only contingent but almost bizarre when viewed from the outside. One hundredtwenty-eightgradationsof race might have seemed naturalin the slave society of San Domingo (James, 1981), but they

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seem highly contingenttoday. But from a political perspective, the shifts in peoplehood categories are not merely something to be observed and commentedon; they are the very stuff of politics. Politics is about the creationof constituencies, the mobilization of social forces, the making of peoplehood. To merge Marxist termswith our own, it is aboutthe transformation categoriesin themselves into of categories for themselves. What the social identity perspectiveoffers, then, is an of understanding how shifts in categorizationcome aboutand how they arerelated to collective action. In a sense, it providesthe link thatcompletes the circle of the sciences of human action. It is one thing to provide a sophisticatedunderstanding of structuralforms and cultural/ideologicalproducts.But how do these then translateinto forms of behaviorthat either reproduceor challenge existing social forms?Withoutknowing the answerto this question,the most sophisticatedsocial analyses are lost, eitherby taking refuge in vague appealsto subjectivefactors or else by ignoring the problem entirely and assuming that people have no autonomy, no agency, and are simply ciphers of social forms. Theoriesthatpresupposecertaincategoriesand categoryrelationsas the basis of humanaction are quite literallyuseless. Because they take the sociological category (or category in itself) to be the conscious basis of action (or category for from one to the other. itself), they cannot address the process of transformation thereforecannotaddressthe key questionsconcerningvariationsin the form They of political action. Let me be more explicit. My concern with theories such as social dominancetheoryand systemjustificationtheoryis thatthey providea very static if not one-sided view of the world. It is true that we have just lived through a century of many horrorsthat continue to haunt us today. Oppression,domination, and tyranny are all too common. However, equally we live in a world of resistance and countermobilization. Tyrannyis always balanced by revolt, even in the most extreme circumstances.Thus, first of all, we must eschew theories that naturalizedominationto the exclusion of tyranny.Second, we must address the processes by which the balance between the two is alteredand by which survival and acquiescenceturnto active action for change. Neither social dominance theory nor system justificationtheory meets these twin criteria. Perhapsthe most remarkablething about Tajfel's work is that, having lived as a Jew in the shadow of the Holocaust through the Second World War, he managedto producea theory that did not succumbto despairnor accept and theorize the inevitabilityof inhumanity.His focus was on resistanceand change, not in order to claim that change is a more likely outcome than continued domination, but (in the same spirit as Anderson) to facilitate the occurrenceof change. Likewise, I have stressed the element of agency in shaping and reshapingidentity, not because I think that the role of category definitions in reshaping social relations predominatesover the role of social relations in constrainingcategory definitions,but because I want to emphasize humanresponsibilityin creatingthe social world. If categoriesrelateto social forms, then takingcategoriesfor granted removes our choice over the type of world we live in. The reificationof social

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categories is the royal road to tyranny (Reicher, 1996). A healthy democracy depends on a continuous questioning of the terms of identity. This raises one final concern. Psychological theory is not only a commentary on the world and how we behave within it; it is also partof our world and serves to shape our own self-understandings. Those models that serve to reify social categories in theory may also help to reify categories in practice.They tell us that there is only one basis of defining ourselves, only one way of perceiving others, and only one form of intergroup relations.The consequence of telling us thatparticularforms of dominationare inevitable could be to rendersuch dominationall the more likely and to make counterdominationstrategies all the more futile. Whateverthe moral purposesof the authors,as Barker(1981) has arguedin relation to sociobiology, "is" all too easily becomes "ought." But there is a problemin my argument.Having earliercriticized theories for being useless, I have now criticizedthe same theoriesfor being all too useful. The problem stems from ignoring the question that is necessarily raised by talk of functionality:usefulfor whom?It may well be true that reified accounts of social action are of little use to those who have an interestin understanding producor ing change. By contrast,they are all too helpful to those who wish to keep the social world as it is. To be more accurate, then, my concern with theories that posit the inevitabilityof unequalsocial relationsis not that they are true, but that they might become so. AUTHOR'S ADDRESS Correspondenceconcerning this article should be sent to Stephen Reicher, School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland. E-mail: sdr@st-andrews.ac.uk REFERENCES
Anderson,J. (1976). Language, memoryand thought.Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Barker,M. (1981). The new racism. London:Junction. Barrows, S. (1981). Distorting mirrors.New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Bartlett,F. C. (1932). Remembering.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and thinking.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Billig, M. (1996). Banal nationalism.London: Sage. behaviour.European Billig, M., & Tajfel,H. (1973). Social categorisationand similarityin intergroup Journal of Social Psychology, 3, 27-52. Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Branscombe,N. R., Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1999). The context and content of social identity threats.In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds.), Social identity: Context,commitment,content (pp. 35-58). Oxford:Blackwell.

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