CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form

m of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE POLICE POWER POLICE POWER; THE STATE UNDER ITS POLICE POWER, MAY ALTER, MODIFY OR AMEND MININ G EXPLORATION PERMITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE GENERAL WELFARE. SOU THEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING COOP., et al. [G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marc opper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which inclu ded the Diwalwal area. On June 27, 2991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's SmallScale Mining Act. The law established a People's Small-Sca le Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary's direct sup ervision and control. Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 13 3 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case. On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Mar copper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp oration (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covere d by the permit. In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office N o. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated MPSA applica tion of petitioner and thereafter, several MAC cases were filed. On March 3, 199 5, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Pursuant to th is statute, the MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. The RPA subsequ ently took cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidated with the MAC cases. On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 w hich provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option o f direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Ar ea. On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, pr ohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC). It prayed for t he nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground th at the "direct state utilization" espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum order arbitrarily impose d the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR. ISSUE: Whether or not the "direct state utilization scheme" espoused in MO 97-03 divested petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133. HELD: NO. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state utilization" as a policy i n resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate t hat what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing e lse. Contrary to petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operat ing or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. As to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by petit ioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133 19 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et

hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! is one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting th at Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter. And until a posit ive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in the Consolidated Mines cases , EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be i mpaired by the issuance of MO 97-03. It must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total a nd absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No. 133 merely evidenc es a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the explor ation, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources ar e matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining expl oration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right wi thin the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of th e Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may al ter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general wel fare. Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constit ution and Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of th e exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral reso urces, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements wi th qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ord ered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accord ance with the constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State may n ot be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the on ly plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold r ush. EMINENT DOMAIN EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION IS DETERMINED AT THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT EXCEPT WHEN THE COURT FIXES THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AT THE DATE IT WAS TAKEN CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO [G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002] DAVIDE, JR., C .J: FACTS: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged th erein that it needed the land for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction o f a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hote l Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P 20,826,339.50. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amoun t of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the exprop riation proceedings. The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower courts decision in toto. ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of t he filing of the complaint. HELD: NO. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning fo r the

determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which express ly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Co urt of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensatio n should be determined as of the 20 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the prop erty as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an excep tion: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was tak en and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings." BILL OF RIGHTS DUE PROCESS DUE PROCESS; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS NOT PART OF THE DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION BENEDICTO and RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Bened icto and Rivera were indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 in relation to Sectio n 34 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informat ions filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases N os. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to su bmit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to reg ister with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical pe rsons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorizat ion from the Central Bank. On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all th e Informations filed against them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, absence of a preliminary investigation an d extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960. On Septe mber 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. A similar motion filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases agai nst her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the tri al court in its order dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for re consideration, but the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 19 94. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Motion to Quash for absence of a valid preliminary investigation. (2) Whether or not the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of petitio ners. HELD: (1) NO. Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by t he Constitution. It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient groun d to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and the respo ndent is probably guilty thereof. Instead, the right to a preliminary investigat ion is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived, ei ther expressly or by implication. When the records of the case were disclosed to them, in opting to enter their respective pleas to the charges, and filed vario us motions and pleadings, they are deemed to have made an express waiver of thei r right to have a preliminary investigation. (2) NO. In the instant case, it mus t be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353 retain ed the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions. Even the most cursory glance at th e repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a sav ing clause, expressly providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have n o effect on pending actions for 21

POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! violation of the latter Circular. A saving clause operates to except from the ef fect of the repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new law. In the present case, the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clea rly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punis h offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or under investigation. DUE PROCESS; THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A COMPONENT PART OF DUE P ROCESS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE. SALES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: Petitioner, the incumbent town mayor of Pagudpud, Ilo cos Norte, fatally shot the former mayor and his political rival, Atty. Rafael Benemerito, in an alleged sho otout after a heated altercation between them. After the shooting incident, peti tioner surrendered and placed himself under the custody of the municipal police. The next day, a criminal complaint for Murder against petitioner was filed. Mun icipal Judge Calvan then conducted a preliminary investigation as under the old rules, with two stages: (1) the determination of whether there is reasonable gro und to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably gu ilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or info rmation is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substa nce of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to present ev idence in his favor if he so desires. Municipal Judge then forwarded the case re cords to the Provincial Prosecutor who, instead of conducting a preliminary inve stigation of his own, merely forwarded the said records to the Ombudsman for the latter to conduct the same. The Ombudsman then directed the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit, which the latter found superfluous as he previously submi tted such to the Provincial Prosecutor. An Information for Murder was filed agai nst petitioner. This Court is tasked to resolve the issue of whether or not the proper procedure was followed and whether petitioner's constitutional rights wer e safeguarded during the preliminary investigation conducted before the filing o f an Information for Murder against him and the issuance of a warrant for his ar rest by respondent Sandiganbayan. Petitioner asserts that the Information was ha stily filed and the warrant for his arrest was improper because of an incomplete preliminary investigation. Respondents say otherwise. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judg e was proper. (2) Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was proper. HELD: (1) NO. Presidential Decree 911 (further amending Sec. 1, R.A. 5180, as amended by P.D. 77) upon which the present rule is based, removed the preliminary examin ation stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper. Now the proceedings consists of only one stage. Respondent Judge did not conduct the re quisite investigation prior to issuance of the arrest warrant. The Rules require an examination in writing under oath in the form of searching questions and ans wers. The statements of witnesses were not sworn before him but before the Provi ncial Prosecutor. The purported transcript of stenographic notes do not bear the signature of the stenographer. Moreover, he did not complete the preliminary in vestigation. He claimed to have examined only the witnesses of the complainant. He issued a Resolution and forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor wi thout giving the accused (petitioner) an opportunity to submit counter-affidavit

s and supporting documents. While it is true that the usual remedy to an irregul ar preliminary investigation is to ask for a new preliminary investigation, such normal remedy would not be adequate to free petitioner from the warrant of arre st which stemmed from that irregular investigation. The Provincial Prosecution h as no power to recall the warrant of arrest. 22 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! (2) NO. As this Court pointed out in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, "the purpose of a preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious a nd oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive tria ls. While the right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a pre liminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is n ot a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accu sed's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full m easure of his right to due process." Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determi ning whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the mer its of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of la w to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes a judicial proceeding when there is an opportunity to be heard and for the production of and weighing of ev idence, and a decision is rendered thereon. The authority of a prosecutor or inv estigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary investi gation is no less than a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. W hile the investigating officer, strictly speaking, is not a "judge" by the natur e of his functions, he is and must be considered to be a quasi-judicial officer because a preliminary investigation is considered a judicial proceeding. A preli minary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the cons titutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any mat erial damage. Indeed, since a preliminary investigation is designed to screen ca ses for trial, only evidence may be considered. While even raw information may j ustify the initiation of an investigation, the stage of preliminary investigatio n can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated war ranting the eventual prosecution of the case in court. In other words, it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making s ure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigat ion serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of t he guarantee of freedom and fair play which are the birthrights of all who live in our country. It is therefore imperative upon the fiscal or the judge, as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie cas e or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt o f the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determ ination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the con ditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degre e upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a fi nding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the cle ar dictates of reason. Measured vis-a-vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, we hol d that the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed, for the following reasons: First, the records show that the suppos ed preliminary investigation was conducted in installments by at least three (3) different investigating officers, none of whom completed the preliminary invest igation. There was not one continuous proceeding but rather a case of passing th e buck, so to speak, the last one being the Ombudsman hurriedly throwing the buc

k to the Sandiganbayan. Second, the charge against herein petitioner is Murder, a non-bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone, not to mention the fac t that the principal accused is an incumbent mayor whose imprisonment during the pendency of the case would deprive his constituents of their duly-elected munic ipal executive, should have merited a deeper; and more thorough preliminary inve stigation. The Ombudsman, however, did nothing of the sort and instead swallowed hook, line and sinker the resolution and recommendation of Graft Investigation Officer. Third, it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the Ombudsman's certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of this case much more so in the face of the latter's flawed report and one-sided factual findings. In the order of procedure for criminal cases, the task of dete rmining probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is a responsi bility which is exclusively reserved by the Constitution to judges. People v. In ting clearly delineated the features of this constitutional mandate, viz: 1.] Th e determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to 23 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; 2.] The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assi sts him in making the determination of probable cause. It is the report, the aff idavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, if any, and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and 3.] Judges and prosecutor s alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cau se for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation pr oper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be releas ed. Even if the two inquiries be made in one and the same proceeding, there shou ld be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause f or purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The prelimina ry investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe tha t the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the fu nction of the prosecutor. Stated differently, while the task of conducting a pre liminary investigation is assigned either to an inferior court magistrate or to a prosecutor, only a judge may issue a warrant of arrest. When the preliminary i nvestigation is conducted by an investigating prosecutor, in this case the Ombud sman, the determination of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor cannot serve as the sole basis for the issuance by the court of a warrant of arrest. T his is because the court with whom the information is filed is tasked to make it s own independent determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warran t of arrest. Indeed the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitu tion which requires probable cause to be personally determined by the judge, not by any other officer or person. DUE PROCESS; THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED BY THE CSC ITSELF DOES NOT ME AN THAT IT COULD NOT BE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE. CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE CO MMISSION [G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil Service C ommission that Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for Cruz af ter the latter had previously failed in the said examination three times. The CS C found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie case exists agains t you for DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTER EST OF THE SERVICE. The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material averments of the "Formal Charge." They also decla red that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. The petitioner s subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at th e same time. On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Repo rt and Recommendation" finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and orderi ng their dismissal from the government service Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Boo k V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismiss al from the office and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen agains t the government employee. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as

investigator, complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time. HELD: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considere d experts in their field, are 24 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of the records, t he Commission finds respondents guilty as charged. The photograph pasted over th e name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from the signa ture of Gilda Cruz. Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correc tly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case in stituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions o f its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subt itle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987. It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly inf ormed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that there was a denia l of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to ta ke cognizance of the case. DUE PROCESS; DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIRES THAT EVERY LITIGANT MUST BE GIVEN AN OP PORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, et al. [G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-I NP). The PCINP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. T he Bids and Awards Committee voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract was executed between PC-I NP and Tahei Co. The COA subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts indicated on the disbursement voucher and the purchase order. Conse quently, the DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against the res pondents. After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended the indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On review, the O ffice of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaints agai nst Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. Formal charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espea and San tos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal information. Flores and Tanch anco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the Office of t he Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against Flores an d Tanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudd en turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners as accused violated their right to due process. HELD: YES. It appears that the charge against respondents was previously dismiss ed. For this reason, there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted, without questioning the dismis sal of the charge against the said respondents, could not and should not be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating their r

ight to due process. Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of d ue process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them wit hout their knowledge. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be gi ven an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himsel f in person at every stage of the proceedings. 25 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! SEARCHES AND SEIZURES SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRES THAT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WARR ANT A BELIEF THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME JUST COMMITTED. SALES vs. S ANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: see page 22 ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arre st issued by the Sandiganbayan was properly issued. HELD: NO. What the Sandiganbayan should have done, faced with such a slew of con flicting evidence from the contending parties, was to take careful note of the contradict ions in the testimonies of the complainant's witnesses as well as the improbabil ities in the prosecution evidence. Certainly probable cause may not be establish ed simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has good g rounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people wo uld be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" only in the fallibl e discretion of the judge. On the contrary, the probable cause test is an object ive one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances m ust be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man t hat the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. This, as w e said is the standard. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PERSONAL DETERMINATION MERELY EMPHASIZES THE EXCLUSIVE AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ISSUING JUDGE TO SATISFY HIMSELF OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBALBE CAUSE. ATTY. EDGAR H. TALINGDAN vs. JUDGE HENEDINO P. EDUARTE [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1610, October 5, 2001] BELLOSILLO, J: FACTS: Complainant alleged that sometime in April 2000 elements o f the PNP stormed into his residence to arrest him and his client, Luzano, on the strength of a Warrant of Arrest dated 12 April 2000 issued by respondent Judge Eduarte in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 of the RTC-Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela for the supposed crime of li bel. Surprised that such a case existed against him and his client as they had n ot been previously charged, complainant filed a Very Urgent Motion to Quash and/ or Set Aside Warrant of Arrest and Direct Prosecutor's Office to Conduct Prelimi nary Investigation dated 5 May 2000 asking that the Warrant of Arrest be set asi de for being premature since they had not been previously notified of the charge against them and no preliminary investigation was ever conducted by the public prosecutor's office yet, and for being defective since the amount of bail was no t specified therein in violation of their constitutional right to bail. Responde nt Judge granted the motion and recalled the warrant of arrest in an Order dated 12 May 2000 admitting that he issued the same under the mistaken belief that a preliminary investigation had already been conducted and an information already filed in court. Complainant nonetheless filed this administrative case. ISSUE: Whether or not the judge failed to follow the required procedure and was negligent in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. 26 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit

o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: YES. Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examin ation under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may prod uce, and particularly describing . . . the persons . . . to be seized." Interpre ting the words "personal determination" we said that it does not thereby mean th at judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thIs would be to unduly laden them with pr eliminary examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of conc entrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather what is emphas ized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the pro secutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, iss ue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable caus e, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting af fidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to the ex istence of probable cause. Much more is required by the constitutional provision . Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenograp hic notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification. In the case at bench respondent Judge not only failed to follow the required pr ocedure but worse, was negligent enough not to have noticed that there was not e ven a prosecutor's certification to rely upon since no information had even been filed yet in court, and that Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 was merely docketed as such on the strength of a mere complaint filed by the private complainant Leonci o Dalin Sr. himself. Respondent Judge admitted that he signed the Warrant of Arr est against complainant and the latter's client simply because it was presented to him for signature by the Criminal Docket Clerk. There was thus a total and un warranted abdication of a judicial function. Respondent cannot exculpate himself from administrative liability by contending that the mistake was entirely attri butable to the Criminal Docket Clerk who failed to faithfully comply with her "d uty" of going over the records of criminal cases and ensuring first that an info rmation had already been filed in court before preparing the warrant of arrest. A judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification of th e investigating officer as to the existence of probable cause making him adminis tratively liable. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST IS DISCRETIONARY UPON THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE. CRUZ and MONEDERO vs. JUDGE AREOLA [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, March 6, 2002] PUNO, J: FACTS: On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigati on Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Inform ation for Estafa against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the Land Transportation Office, based on the complaint filed by herein complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found no cogent reason to reverse, modify, or alter the resoluti on of the Office of the Ombudsman and recommended that the case be set for trial . Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both respondent Judge and hi s Branch Clerk of Court with ignorance of the law. Complainants take issue of th e fact that although respondent Judge already issued a warrant of arrest, he sti ll deferred its implementation to give way to a reinvestigation of the case on m otion of the accused. They believe that there is no longer any reason why the re spondent Judge should withhold the issuance of a warrant of arrest considering t hat the Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that there exists p

robable cause to indict the accused. In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge ma nifests that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function o f a judge as he is mandated to determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant. Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand, claims t hat it is a ministerial duty on her part to release duly signed orders, resoluti ons and decisions of the presiding judge of her branch. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring the implementation s of the warrant of arrest. 27 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue e xcept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Prelimi nary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information o r it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issua nce of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is execu tive in nature. It is part of the prosecutions job. The second kind of preliminar y investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. In making th e required personal determination, a judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of reliance depend s on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the judges sound discretion . It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge t o issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally ex amined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. For the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justic e, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. It appears from the records that the challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judge were not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely exercised his sound discretion in not immediately is suing the warrant of arrest and in suspending further proceedings pending reinve stigation of the case. On her part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be f aulted for performing a ministerial function, that is, releasing Orders duly sig ned by the respondent Judge. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION DOES NOT REQUIRE PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAILS. YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: Presiding judge of the RTC of Kalookan City, issued search warrants for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. The police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) . 45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were 2 M-16 rifl es with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions, among others. Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court informations accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential De cree No. 1866. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained. At the hearin g for bail, the RTC denied petitioners motion for bail earlier filed for the ac cused are being charged of two criminal offenses and both offenses under Preside ntial Decree 1866, Sections 1 and 3 thereof prescribe the penalty of Reclusion T emporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1 2-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no person charged with a capital offense o r an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidenc e of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the cr iminal prosecution. Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders viola ted Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of t he Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discreti on when it ruled that the search and seizure orders in question were valid and the objects seized admissible in evidence.

HELD: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and le gal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is t he only practical means of enforcing the constitutional 28 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 calib er pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners. Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulte d. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The s earch was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordan ce with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege lack o f particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warra nts. That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the sa me kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specifi ty in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that th e things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leav e no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it woul d be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial sim ilarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice. The cas e of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out t hat one of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of object s to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited t o those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination of the Search Warrants shows that they were worde d in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct re lation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and ex plosives. What the warrants authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES WHEN VALID. PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL [G.R. NO. 123137, October 17, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: Appellants PO2 Albert Abriol of the Philippine National Po lice (PNP), Macario Astellero, Januario Dosdos, and PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were char ged with and convicted, of murder for having shot one Alejandro Flores, and of I llegal Possession of Firearms for the handguns that they were armed with. On app eal, one of their contentions against their conviction for murder is that the PN P cannot be presumed to have done their work regularly due to the errors and blu nders they committed in transferring the possession and custody of the physical evidence and in having failed to issue acknowledgment receipts thereof. They fur ther contend, as against their conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearms, th at the handguns and ammunition taken from them by the police officers were illeg ally seized in the absence of a warrant. ISSUES: Whether or not the handguns and ammunitions used in the killing were ill egally seized from appellants in the absence of a warrant. HELD: NO. There are eight (8) instances where a warrantless search and seizure i s valid. They are: (1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) sea rches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug la ws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or c onstructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7)

searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regul ations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations. In this case, the warrantless searc h and seizure of the subject handguns and ammunition is valid for two reasons. I t was a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal shooting , and pursuit of a fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police officers , and a more than reasonable belief on the part of the police officers that the fleeing suspects aboard said vehicle had just engaged in criminal activity. The urgent need of the police to take immediate action in the light of the foregoing exigencies clearly satisfies the requirements for warrantless arrests under the Rules of Court. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with firearms and 29 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ammunition which they were not authorized to carry, appellants were actually vio lating P.D. No. 1866, another ground for valid arrest under the Rules. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; THERE MUST BE A PRIOR JUSTIFICATION FOR AN INTRUSION IN A PPLYING THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE; SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE DURING A VALID ARREST. PEOP LE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CUBCUBIN [G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr. , PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamont e slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the road A tricycle driv er, who refused to divulge his name, told him them accused-appellant and the vic tim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told Rosal and Mal inao, Jr. that Garcellano's description fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulc e and led the policemen where accusedappellant lived. Upon arriving the police as ked permission if they could enter the house. After entering they found a bloodi ed shirt and two spent .38 caliber shells. Accused appellant was then asked to r eturn to the cafe for identification. He was positively identified by the waitre ss to be the person with whom the victim drank with. The police then went back t o his house and there found a .38 paltik pistol. An information for murder was t hen filed against accused-appellant. The trial court found him guilty and senten ced him with the capital punishment. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the arrest of the accused appellant was valid. (2) Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure. HELD: (1) NO. On the first issue, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The question, therefore, is whether there was "pro bable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to bel ieve that accused-appellant committed the crime. We hold that there was none. Th e two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that accused-appella nt had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirel y on what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP st ation in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 199 7 and reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the s aid city; by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano fitted accused-appellant, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew wher e accusedappellant lived and accompanied them to accused-appellant's house. Thus , PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to them by others. (2) NO. On the second issue, accused-appellant contends that neither he nor his son gave permission to the arresting police officers to search his house and, therefore, the "Hanes" t-shirt, the two spent slugs, and the .38 caliber r evolver allegedly found in his house are inadmissible in evidence. The prosecuti

on, on the other hand, insists that accused-appellant consented to the search of his house. 30 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! To be sure, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal r ight which may be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication can not be presumed. There must be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to rel inquish the right. As in this cases, a mere failure on the part of the accused t o object to a search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view" doctrine . As this Court held in People v. Musa: The "plain view" doctrine is usually app lied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, b ut nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the "pla in view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a p rior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to su pplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Finally, the prosecution says the search can be justif ied as incidental to a valid arrest. Even assuming the warrantless arrest to be valid, the search cannot be considered an incident thereto. A valid arrest allow s only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The rationale for such search and seizure is to prevent the person arrested either from destroying evi dence or from using the weapon against his captor. It is clear that the warrantl ess search in this case cannot be justified on this ground. For neither the t-sh irt nor the gun was within the area of accusedappellant's immediate control. In fact, according to the prosecution, the police found the gun only after going ba ck to the house of accused-appellant. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO APPLY THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. PEOP LE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPACION [G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant t hat accused-appellant was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM ) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of ac cused-appellant who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carl os City, Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said surveillance, they s aw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of the accused-appellant which they suspe cted to be marijuana plants. Despite failing to obtain a warrant, the team proce eded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of accused-appellant in t he early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the accused-appellant. What happened thereafter is subject to conflictin g accounts. The prosecution contends that the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about t he suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering from migraine The operatives the n uprooted the suspected marijuana plants. Accused-appellants version of what tra nspired is that around one-thirty in the early morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) per sons who he thought were members of the military, entered the premises then went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as the same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the others went a round the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his house and t

he premises. ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure performed at the backyard of the ac cused was valid. 31 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: NO. In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does n ot appear either that the situation falls under any of he exceptions. Consequent ly, accused-appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearl y violated. It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure f rom unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either expr essly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in allowing the m embers of the military to enter his premises and his consequent silence during t he unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary submissio n or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so whe n members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. I t is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence agains t the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating objec t. Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be appli ed: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which t he police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the e vidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be wher e they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search. Here, there was no va lid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accusedappellant's premises w ithout the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspi cion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came in " plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on Jul y 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one t o be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana pla nts inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into accusedappe llant's residence. RIGHT TO INFORMATION RIGHT TO INFORMATION; COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF THE PLUNDER CASES SHALL BE LIMITE D TO AUDIOVISUAL RECORDING FOR DOCUMENTARY PURPOSES. RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIOTV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORME R PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PH ILIPPINES [A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as o ne of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the r ight of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the on e hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if the re is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor or of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignt y, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard agai nst attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of se lfish interests. On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterate s his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground tha

t its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experien ce with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave 32 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstratio ns aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the oth er. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be serv ed through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage. ISSUE: Whether or not the cases of a former President pending before the Sandiga nbayan can be covered by live television and radio broadcast without impairing the right of the accused to a just and fair trial. HELD: NO. The Court finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision p rohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former preside nt. In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court has resolved t o order the audiovisual recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Conside ring the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordin gs will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Onl y later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. Th e master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Manageme nt and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to la w. There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings a re historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege). Second, the Estrada cases involve m atters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how t heir government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual present ation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people. They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganb ayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenogra phic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes. On t he other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will th us be distracted from the proper performance of their roles - whether as counsel , witnesses, court personnel, or judges - will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeop ardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized. T he possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided. At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial - which, it may be assumed, is t he concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trial s will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing unti l after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be avoided. Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the tria ls can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of the a ccused to a fair trial. Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, this Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought t o be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a publ ic character."

SEPARATE OPINION: VITUG, J: In addressing the present motion for reconsideration, colleagues on the Court op ine that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings for docume ntary purposes because, first, the hearings are of historic significance; second , the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fu ndamental right to know how their government works; third, the audio-visual pres entation is essential for education and civic training of the people; and fourth , such recording can be used by appellate courts in the event that the review of the proceedings, ruling, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. 33 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! The proposition has novel features; regrettably, I still find it hard to believe that the presence of the cameras inside the courtroom will not have an untoward impact on the court proceedings. No empirical data has been shown to suggest ot herwise. To the contrary, experience attests to the intimidating effect of camer as and electronic devices in courtrooms on the litigants, witnesses and jurors. In addition, the natural reticence of witnesses at the stand can even easily be exacerbated by placing them on camera in contravention of normal experience. The demeanor of the witnesses can also have an abstruse effect on the ability of th e judge to accurately assess the credibility of such witnesses. The presence of cameras, for whatever reason, may not adequately address the dangers mentioned i n the Court's decision of 29 June 2001. There are just too many imponderables. M ost importantly, it does not seem right to single out and make a spectacle of th e cases against Mr. Estrada. Dignity is a precious part of personality innate in every human being, and there can be no cogent excuse for impinging it even to t he slightest degree. It is not the problem of privacy that can cause concern mor e than the erosion of reality that cameras tend to cast. RIGHTS UNDER THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL CANNOT BE CLAIMED DURING INDENTIFICATION IN POLICE LINE-UP. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMESTUZO, et al. [G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: On February 26, 1991, four days after a reported robbery with multiple rape, a group of policemen together with accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, wen t to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City where accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a certain "Mario" and "searched the first and second floors of the building. Failing to find said Mari o, the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, "Nilol oko lang yata tayo ng taong ito" and "Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino." It was at t his juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon. Thereafter, Bagas was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused Ampatin. They were brought to th e Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed under detention together wit h the other two accused, Amestuzo and Vias. When the complainants arrived, accuse d-appellant was brought out, instructed to turn to the left and then to the righ t and he was asked to talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused A mestuzo and Vias. Accused-appellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited co mplainants to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped wh en one of the policemen intervened. Accused-appellant alleges that the trial cou rt committed a serious error when it deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer during his investigation. His singular presentation to the complainants for identification without the benefit of counsel, accusedap pellant avers, is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be a ssisted by counsel to which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested by t he police and placed on detention. He maintains that the identification was a cr itical stage of prosecution at which he was as much entitled to the aid of couns el as during the trial proper. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not appellants right to counsel was violated. (2) Whether or not t here was a valid out-of-court identification of appellant to the complainants. HELD: (1) NO. Herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when

he was presented for Identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that duri ng this identification by the 34 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confess ion from accusedappellant. In fact, records show that the police did not at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented before the complainants. The all eged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custod ial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudici al admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his c onviction. In the present case, there is no such confession or extrajudicial adm ission. (2) YES. The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly suggestive. E ven before complainants had the opportunity to view accused-appellant face-to-fa ce when he was brought out of the detention cell to be presented to them for ide ntification, the police made an announcement that he was one of the suspects in the crime and that he was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culpri ts. MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ATTACHES ONLY UPON THE START OF CRIMINAL CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. ESTELITO REMOLONA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [G.R. No. 137473, August 2, 2001] PUNO, J: FACTS: Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in Kiborosa Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, th e District Supervisor of Infanta inquired about Nerys Civil Service eligibility w ho purportedly got a rating of 81.25%. Mr. America also disclosed that he receiv ed information that Nery was campaigning for a fee of 8,000 pesos per examinee f or a passing mark in the board examination for teachers. It was eventually revea led that Nery Remolonas name did not appear in the passing and failing examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating belonged to a certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of 65%. Estelito Remolona in his written statement of facts said that he met a certain Atty. Salupadin in a bus, who offe red to help his wife obtain eligibility for a fee of 3,000 pesos. Mr. America ho wever, informed Nery that there was no vacancy when she presented her rating rep ort, so Estelito went to Lucena to complain that America asked for money in exch ange for the appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-1988, America was able to receive 6 checks at 2,600 pesos each plus bonus of Nery Remolona. Remolona ad mitted that he was responsible for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no knowledge thereof. On recommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civi l Service, the CSC found the spouses guilty of dishonesty and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. On Motion For Reconsideration, onl y Nery was exonerated and reinstated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of due process as the extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him was in blank form and that he was not assisted by counse l. HELD: NO. Right to Counsel is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case unde r custodial investigation when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a p erson has been taken in custody. The right to counsel attaches only upon the sta rt of such investigation. The exclusionary rule under Paragraph 2, Section 12 ap plies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not those made in an administrative investigation. MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DOES N

OT APPLY TO A SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT NOT ELICITED THROUGH QUESTIONING BY THE AUTH ORITIES. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALOLOY [G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002] 35 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! PER CURIAM: FACTS: At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of August 3, 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho was foun d. Autopsy reports found that Genelyn was raped before she was drowned. The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, who clai med that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek . While in the wake of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the Barangay Captain that h e only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping and throwing her body in the ravine. While in the custody of the authorities, he was asked incriminating questions by Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that Juanito was not y et in custodial investigation. Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, co upled with circumstantial evidence, the trial court found Juanito guilty of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. On appeal, Juanito maintains that the trial court violated Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution when it a dmitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Cen iza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his const itutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incr iminatory information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police i nvestigators, for as public officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While these rights may be waived, the prose cution failed to show that he effectively waived his rights through a written wa iver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial co nfession is inadmissible in evidence. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the barangay captain was admissible. (2) Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the j udge was admissible. HELD: (1) YES. As to his confession with the Baragay Captain Ceniza, it has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed t he crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Con stitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confession s. In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GEN ELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontan eous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given be fore he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection wit h the commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which could have compelled h er to testify falsely against him. (2) NO. However, there is merit in Juanitos cl aim that his constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment th e accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon s claim that no complaint has yet been filed and that neither was h e conducting a preliminary investigation deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time Juanito was already under the custody of the police au thorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then be fore Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements.

MIRANDA DOCTRINE; TWO KINDS OF INVOLUNTARY OR COERCED CONFESSIONS TREATED IN SEC TION 12 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VALLEJO [G.R. No. 144656, May 9, 2002] PER CURIAM: 36 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! FACTS: The accused appellant, Gerrico Vallejo, was sentenced to death by the RTC of Cavite City for the rape slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Cavi te on July 10, 1999. Accused-appellant now questions the validity of the method by which his bloodstained clothes were recovered. According to accused-appellant , the policemen questioned him as to the clothes he wore the day before. Thereaf ter, they took him to his house and accused-appellant accompanied them to the ba ck of the house where dirty clothes were kept. Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the oral and written confessions presented as evidence against him. He alleges that the oral confessions were inadmissible in evidence for being hea rsay, while the extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimi dation. Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan of Rosario, Cavite and to NBI Forensic Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for being violative of his constitutional rights as these were made by one alrea dy under custodial investigation to persons in authority without the presence of counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not the oral and written confessions used against the accused is inad missible. HELD: NO. Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts : "(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be wa ived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. "(2) No torture, force, v iolence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will sha ll be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or oth er similar forms of detention are prohibited. "(3) Any confession or admission o btained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence aga inst him." There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third deg ree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which ar e dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, give n without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section. Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the consequences of the statements he was to make as well as the wr itten confessions he was to execute, for he was properly informed by Atty. Leyva that it may be used against him and there was no attendance of force or any for m of coercion. Neither can he question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva wh o acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an effective counsel, a l awyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The p resence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything whic h might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to precl ude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. I ndeed, counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. MIRANDA DOCTRINE; CONFESSION TO A RADIO REPORTER IS ADMISSIBLE WHERE SAID REPORT ER WAS NOT ACTING FOR THE POLICE OR CONFESSION WAS NOT MADE OUT OF FEAR. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABULENCIA [G.R. No. 138403, August 22, 2001]

PER CURIAM: FACTS: The accused Rolly Abulencia was charged of having raped and k illed a 10 year old girl named Rebelyn Garcia. The body of Rebelyn was found lifeless and naked whil e floating in a creek in Pangasinan. The examination of the body found signs tha t she was raped and that she died of drowning. According to eye witness accounts , the accused was last person who was seen to have been with the victim before s he died. While in detention, the accused was interviewed by a radio commentator of DZWN Bombo Radio and admitted of having raped 37 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Rebelyn and that she fell off the bridge which caused her death. The interview w as taperecorded and was submitted as evidence in court. The trial court sentence the accused to a penalty of death hence this petition by the accused arguing th at there is no direct evidence linking him to the commission of the crime. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be convicted based on circumstantial evide nce and his admission in a radio interview. HELD: YES. Normally, the crime of rape whether simple, qualified or complexed wi th other crimes is committed in seclusion, thereby rendering its prosecution difficult ow ing to the absence of witnesses to its commission. The prosecution of such crime becomes even more intricate and complex if homicide is committed since the vict im herself would no longer be able to testify against the perpetrator. In most c ases, only circumstantial evidence is available to prove its commission. The abs ence of direct evidence, however, does not preclude the conviction of a person a ccused of the complex crime of rape with homicide. Circumstantial evidence can b e as potent as direct evidence to sustain a conviction provided that there is a concurrence of all the requisites prescribed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revis ed Rules on Evidence. Likewise, the Court held that an accused can be convicted based on circumstantial evidence if the circumstances proven constitute an unbro ken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accuse d, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The totality of all the circumstances obtaining, taken together with the condition of Rebelyn's body wh en found, eloquently indicate that the appellant sexually assaulted her before d rowning her to death. It bears stressing that appellant admitted having raped Re belyn when he was interviewed by Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of Bombo Ra dio. Mojares' testimony lends support to the courts conclusion. We have held that "a confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that sai d reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under c ircumstances where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear." MIRANDA DOCTRINE; ADMISSIBLE. EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS, WHEN PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PRINCIPE [G.R. No. 135862, May 2, 2002] PER CURIAM: FACTS: Rafael Principe was accused of the rape slaying of one Arlene Ipurong who was then 6 years of age. An investigation was conducted by the police in the evening of A ugust 9, 1998. Several witnesses pointed to accused-appellant as the person who was last seen with the victim Arlene. Accused-appellant was subsequently taken i nto custody by the police. On August 17, 1998, accused-appellant was interrogate d by the police, to whom, after reading his rights in Tagalog and in the presenc e of accused-appellant s father and of his counsel Atty. Cesar Villar, he admitt ed hitting Arlene with a large rock until she was unconscious and subsequently r aping her. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court failed to ascertain w hether accusedappellant was fully apprised of the legal consequences of his plea

, considering that he finished only up to the sixth grade of the elementary scho ol. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the trial court complied with the requirement of inquiring on the voluntariness of the plea. (2) Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused is admissible. HELD: (1) NO. When an accused enters a plea of guilt to a capital offense, Section 3 o f Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that it is the duty of th e trial court to observe the following rules: (1) it must conduct a searching in quiry into the voluntariness and full 38 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (2) it must require the prosecuti on to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) it must ask the accused if he desires to present evi dence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. This is because a plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequ ences of the plea. In this case, the trial court failed to comply fully with the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appella nt's plea was voluntary and done with full comprehension of the consequences the reof. Thus, in determining whether accused-appellant was aware of the full conse quences of his plea of guilt, the trial court simply asked him whether he knew t hat he "may" be sentenced to death, implying that it was possible that the death penalty might not be imposed on him. A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient. (2) YES. With respect to accused-appel lant's extrajudicial confession, the Constitution, R.A. No. 7438, and case law l ay down four fundamental requirements for the admissibility of extrajudicial con fessions in general, to wit: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) it must b e made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confess ion must be express; and (d) it must be in writing. In this case, after accusedappellant was read his rights in Tagalog, he signified his intention to confess his participation in the rape and killing of Arlene. Accused-appellant's confess ion was placed in writing and it was signed by him, his counsel, and the adminis tering officer. Hence, the said confession is admissible it being in accordance with the above requisites. RIGHT TO BAIL RIGHT TO BAIL; PRIOR TO CONVICTION BY THE TRIAL COURT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVES, BAIL SHALL BE A MATTER OF RIGHT. YOUSEF AL -GHOUL, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: see page 28 ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bail. HELD: YES. The issue on bail has been resolved in our resolution dated November 24, 1998, where this Court ruled: Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty pres cribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammun itions and explosives under which petitioners were charged, has now been reduced to prision mayor in its minimum period and prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal, respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter of right prior to their conviction by the trial court pursuant to Section 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94. RIGHT TO BAIL; WHEN BAIL SHALL BE DENIED PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PALARCA [G. R. No. 146020, May 29, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: Accused Palarca was convicted of the crime of rape by the RTC sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 39 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On appeal, appellant points out that the accusatory portion of the information f ailed to specifically allege that the rape was committed through force or intimi dation. ISSUE: Whether the evidence for the prosecution established the guilt of accused -appellant beyond reasonable doubt in order to deny the accused his right to bail. HELD: NO. Accused-appellant makes much of the finding of the investigating judge during the bail hearing that the evidence against accused-appellant was not strong. It must be stressed, however, that the assessment of the evidence presented during a ba il hearing is intended only for the purpose of granting or denying an applicatio n for the provisional release of the accused. Not being a final assessment, and merely for the purpose of determining the necessity of confinement to avoid esca pe, courts tend to be fair and liberal in their appreciation of evidence. Thus i n People v. Baldoz, et al., the Court made the following pronouncements: The asse ssment of the evidence presented during a bail hearing is intended only for the purpose of granting or denying an application for the provisional release of the accused. It is not a final assessment. Before conviction, every one accused is entitled to bail, except when the offense charged is punishable by reclusion per petua, life imprisonment or death; and the evidence of guilt is strong. The denia l of this fundamental right is justified only if there is a great probability of escape. Confinement prior to conviction is warranted, in order to assure the pr esence of the accused at the trial. Thus, the natural tendency of the courts has always been towards a fair and liberal appreciation of the evidence in the dete rmination of the degree of proof and in the presumption of guilt necessary to wa rrant a deprivation of that right. Such appreciation is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge from making a final assessment of the evidenc e before him after full trial. It is not an uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RATIONALE BEHIND THE RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED O F THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MONTERON [G.R. No. 130709, March 6, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: Accused-appellant was formally charged with rape, he entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. After trial, the lower court convicted him of the crime of rape . Accused-appellant contends that the RTC of Davao has committed an error in not acquitting him of the crime charged in the Information. He argues that his nega tive plea to the information filed against him, his filing of the notice of appe al, and his denial of the rape charges against him during trial, indicate his in nocence. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the accused-appellant is correct. HELD: NO. Constitutional due process demands that the accused in a criminal case shoul d be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The rationale be hind this constitutional guarantee are: First, to furnish the accused with the d escription of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; sec ond, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal, for protection against a f urther prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the fac ts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support

a conviction, if one should be had. The purpose of arraignment is to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nat ure of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him why the pros ecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him. Consequently, when the accuse dappellant entered a negative plea during his arraignment, the same was not bind ing on the court 40 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! as an indication of his innocence. Rather, it is a general denial of the charges impugned against him and an exercise of his right to be heard of his plea. Neit her is the accused-appellants filing of a notice of appeal indicative of his inno cence. On the contrary, accused-appellants appeal was necessitated by the judgmen t of conviction rendered against him by the trial court. While the accused-appel lant is guilty of rape, the same was committed only in its attempted stage. This and the fact that the accused-appellant was still a minor when the crime was co mmitted warrant the modification of the decision of the RTC of Davao. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED CARRIES WITH IT THE OBLIGATION T O EFFECTIVELY CONVEY TO THE ACCUSED INFORMATION TO ENABLE HIM TO PREPARE HIS DEF ENSE. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALCALDE [G.R. Nos. 139225-28, May 29, 2002] DAVIDE, JR., C.J: FACTS: On 24 September 1997, the Office of the Provincial Pros ecutor of Laguna filed before the trial court two informations for parricide and two informations for frustrat ed parricide. Upon his arraignment on 22 October 1997, ARNEL, who was assisted b y a counsel de parte, refused to speak. Pursuant to Section 1(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty in each of the cases. On the same occasion, the defense waived pre-trial. The cases wer e then consolidated and jointly tried. After the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, the defense filed a motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted. On 27 April 1998, the defense, through counsel de parte, filed a demurrer to evidence based on the following gr ounds: (a) The accused has not been adequately informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him during the arraignment; (b) Not an iota of incriminato ry evidence, direct or circumstantial, has been adduced and presented by the pro secution during the trial; and (c) The constitutional presumption of innocence o f the accused has not been overcome by any evidence or contrary presumption. In support thereof, the defense alleged that ARNEL was afflicted with psychosis and could not comprehend, and that despite his strange behavior characterized by hi s deafening silence, motionless appearance, and single direction blank stare the trial court insisted on his arraignment. Thus, accused was not adequately appri sed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Moreover, no concrete evidence pointing to ARNEL as the culprit was presented by the prosecution. Hen ce, the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused prevails. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused has been adequately informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him during the arraignment. HELD: NO. The physical and outward manifestations of ARNEL at the time of his ar raignment, which were brought to the attention of the trial court, indicated substantial de monstration of a mental disorder that rendered ARNEL unfit to be arraigned or tr ied in the four criminal cases at bar. The trial court failed to exercise utmost circumspection in assuming that ARNEL was in full possession of his mental facu lties and understood the proceedings against him. The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill o f Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense. A t the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to j ustify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied th at the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gi

ves. Under the circumstances in these cases, the trial court gravely failed in t his regard. Solemn and inflexible is the constitutional behest that no person sh all be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Absolut e heedfulness of this constitutional 41 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! injunction is most pronounced in criminal cases where the accused is in the grav est jeopardy of losing his life. It constantly behooves every court to proceed w ith utmost care in each of such cases before it, and nothing can be more demandi ng of judges in that respect than when the possible punishment would be in its s everest form like death a penalty that, once carried out, is irreversible and ir reparable. In light of the foregoing fatal infirmities committed by the trial co urt, as well as by the defense counsel, we have no other alternative except to s et aside the joint decision in question and remand the cases to the trial court for further proceedings to allow the defense to present evidence to prove that A RNEL was either unfit for arraignment and trial or was insane at the time the cr imes charged were committed. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; THE RECITAL OF THE ESSENTIALS OF A CRIME DELINEATES THE N ATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST AN ACCUSED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNAS [G.R. Nos. 133583-85, February 20, 2002] PANGANIBAN, J: FACTS: For automatic review are decisions promulgated by the Regi onal Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur finding appellant Roberto Bernas y Nacario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape of her two minor daughters. When first arraigned on the charges, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, pleade d not guilty. When the case was submitted for decision, the prosecution moved to reopen the case to present the Birth Certificate of the victims as well as the Marriage contract of the parents. This motion was granted over the objection of the defense counsel. Before the prosecution presented its evidence, appellant, t hrough his counsel, moved for the change of his former plea of not guilty to tha t of guilty, a Motion which the RTC granted. Appellant was thus rearraigned and pleaded guilty to the charges. The defense waived its right to present evidence and submitted them for decision based on the evidence presented by the prosecuti on. The RTC then rendered the assailed decisions. ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper. HELD: NO. The Co nstitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. Th is right finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of t he Rules of Court. Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an Information. The facts stated in the body of the Information determine the crime that the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried. This recital of the essentials of a crime delineates the nature and cause of accusation against an accused. Other than the allegation of carnal knowledge, no other element of rape as defined by law is alleged in the Information. Since the Information fail s to allege the essential elements of qualified rape, appellant should not have been convicted of that crime. Otherwise, his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him would be violated. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; R.A. NO. 7080 WAS CRAFTED TO AVOID THE FOLLY OF FILING MU LTIPLE INFORMATIONS. JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. [GR No. 148965, February 26, 2002] PUNO, J: FACTS: In November 2000, as an offshoot against Joseph E. Estrada, then President of the Philippines, five former President and members of his family, his ators were filed with the Office of 42 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander of the impeachment proceedings criminal complaints against the associates, friends and conspir Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je

nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! the Ombudsman. On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal information against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the information was for the crime of Plunder under RA 7080 and among the res pondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558. On April 24, 2001, petition er filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend the Amended Information on the ground that t he Anti-Plunder Law, RA 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying peti tioners Motion to Quash and Suspend. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Anti-Plunder Law, RA 7080, is constitutional. (2) Whether or not Jinggoy Estrada can be prosecuted for plunder under RA 7080 even if he h as been charged only on one count with what would constitute acts of plunder und er paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. HELD: (1) YES. Petitioners contention that RA 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to hi m is principally perched on the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute plunder. Petitioners pr emise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will s how that it is divided into three parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jinggoy Est rada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the sec ond paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committin g the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) des cribe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items 1-6 of RA 7080. Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alle ged in sub paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which is of receiving or coll ecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amo unt of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percenta ge, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit xxx In this sub paragraph (a), peti tioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling. Contrary to petitioners post ure, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling on several instances. The phrase on several instances means the petitioner committe d the predicate acts in a series. To insist that the amended Information charged the petitioner with only one act or offense despite the phrase several instances is to indulge in a twisted, nay, pretzel interpretation. Respondent Ombudsman cann ot be faulted for including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four separate Informations. A study of the history of RA 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The said law was precisely e nacted to address this procedural problem. (2) YES. There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the nationa l economy is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a com monality to help the former president amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten we alth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money f rom illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a certain portion of the tobacco excise tax, that ach accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Bel le Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly en

riched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate directly or indirectly, i n the amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of illgotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATION C ONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION. 43 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PALARCA [G. R. No. 146020, May 29, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: see page 39 ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant m ay be validly convicted under the information charging him with rape. HELD: YES. While generally an accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information, this rule is not without exception. The right to assail the sufficiency of the information or the admission of evidence may be waived by the accusedappellant. In People v. Lopez, we held that an info rmation which lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the d eficiency was cured by competent evidence presented therein. Thus, [F]ailure to o bject was thus a waiver of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. It is competent for a person to waive a right guar anteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action which would be invalid if t aken against his will. This Court has, on more than one occasion, recognized waiv ers of constitutional rights, e.g., the right against unreasonable searches and seizures; the right to counsel and to remain silent; the right to be heard; and the right to bail. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; A COUNSEL DE OFFICIO MUST BE GIVEN A REASONABLE TIME TO C ONSULT WITH THE ACCUSED AS TO HIS PLEA BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT. P EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BASCUGUIN [G.R. No. 144404, September 24, 2001] BUENA, J: FACTS: Bascuguin, herein accused-appellant, was charged with the crime of rape with homicide before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas. At his arraignment, he appeared wi thout the assistance of counsel. The trial court assigned a counsel de officio. He pleaded guilty to the crime charged. A series of questions were propounded by the trial court to test accusedappellant's voluntariness and comprehension of t he consequences of his plea. Trial on the merits was conducted thereafter to all ow the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. Tri al court rendered its decision finding Leodegario Bascuguin guilty beyond reason able doubt. The procedure observed by the trial court at the arraignment of accu sed-appellant is graphically illustrated in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes [TSN] herein quoted as follows "COURT: Ready for arraignment? You asked the acc used if he has a counsel? "CLERK OF COURT: (Note: Asking the accused) "ACCUSED: None, sir. "COURT: Atty. Macasaet, I will appoint you as counsel de officio for the accused. "ATTY. MACASAET: Yes, Your Honor. "ATTY. MACASAET: May I confer wit h the accused, Your Honor. The accused is ready for arraignment, your Honor. "CO URT: Arraigned (sic) the accused. (Note: the Clerk of Court is reading the Infor mation to the accused) "CLERK OF COURT: The accused pleaded (sic) guilty, your H onor, for the crime charged. "COURT: You ask the accused if he knows the consequ ences of his plea. "COURT: Do you know that the penalty impossible (sic) in case s of this nature is death? "ACCUSED: Yes, sir. "COURT: Do you know that in your plea of guilt you can be sentenced by the Court? "ACCUSED: Yes, sir. 44 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! "COURT: Do you admit having raped Marissa Moral? "ACCUSED: Yes, sir. "COURT: Do you admit that after raping Marissa Moral you stabbed and killed her? "ACCUSED: Yes, sir." ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional guarantees of due process of an accused were violated in the case at hand. HELD: YES. Basic is the precept that every person accused of a crime must know t he nature and cause of accusation against him. This is effected, among others, by the read ing of the information in a language understood by the person accused. Reading t he TSN, we are left to speculate on whether the information was actually read in the dialect known to accusedappellant, or whether it was translated to him or e xplained in a manner he can comprehend. What is visible to us is the cryptic rec ording of the proceedings in the court a quo. Nevertheless, the trial court's de cision declared that the information was read in Tagalog, a language known to ac cused-appellant. Granting, on presumption of correctness, that the information w as read in Tagalog as declared by the trial court, still, we cannot admit accuse d-appellant's conviction on the basis of his improvident plea of guilt. One of t he constitutional guarantees of due process is the right of an accused to be hea rd by himself and counsel. The trial court gave accused-appellant a counsel de o fficio to represent him. However, accused-appellant impugns such assignment cont ending that he was not given the opportunity to choose his own counsel. What is visible from the TSN is the fact that when the court asked accused-appellant if he has a lawyer, and upon responding that he has none, the trial court appointed a counsel de officio, as follows - COURT: Ready for arraignment? You ask(ed) th e accused if he has a counsel?; CLERK OF COURT: (Note: Asking the accused); ACCU SED: None, sir.; COURT: Atty. Macasaet, I will appoint you as counsel de officio for the accused." It appears from the records that after the appointment of a c ounsel de officio, the arraignment immediately followed. As glaringly reflected in the records, the appointed counsel de officio conferred with the accused only for a few minutes, thus - COURT: Atty. Macasaet, I will appoint you as counsel de officio for the accused; ATTY. MACASAET: Yes, Your Honor; ATTY. MACASAET: May I confer with the accused, Your Honor. The accused is ready for arraignment, yo ur Honor. " A criminal case is a serious matter that deserves serious attention especially in cases involving capital punishment. Under the present Revised Rule s of Criminal Procedure, whenever a counsel de officio is appointed by the court to defend the accused at the arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time t o consult with the accused as to his plea before proceeding with the arraignment . Counsel de officio's haste in proceeding with the arraignment falls short of t he standard mandated by the rules for an effective and adequate counseling. The limited time allotted for consultation with accused-appellant seriously casts do ubt on whether counsel de officio has indeed sufficiently explained to the accus ed-appellant the crime charged, the meaning of his plea, and its consequences. V erily, a judgment of conviction cannot stand upon an invalid arraignment. In the interest of substantial justice then, this Court has no recourse but to remand the case to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; A SEARCHING INQUIRY MUST FOCUS ON THE VOLUNTARINESS AND T HE FULL COMPREHENSION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARANZADO [G.R. Nos. 132442-44, September 24, 2001] DAVIDE, C.J: FACTS: ZENY was born on 19 November 1984 in Sto. Nino, South Cotaba to. Her parents

were BERNARDINO and Lourdes Gerongani. At about midnight of 7 March 1997, she wa s sleeping with her sisters and younger brother in their house at Poblacion, Esp eranza, Sultan Kudarat, when the knocking at the door of their room awakened her . When she opened the door, her father immediately slapped her and demanded to k now why she locked the door. Then, 45 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! BERNARDINO asked her daughter: "Can I touch your vagina?" Repulsed by the sugges tion, ZENY refused, only to find just as quickly that her father had poked a kni fe at her neck. BERNARDINO thereafter pulled ZENY's hair, forcibly held her down the floor and boxed her stomach. Recognizing the weakness of his daughter, he u ndressed her; and while choking her he imposed his lechery. He was obstinate to her daughter's pleas for mercy and compassion. He warned her not to tell anyone of the deed or he would kill her. He then stood up, dressed up and left the daug hter to her weeping. Unsatisfied with that single act of carnality, BERNARDINO r epeated the assault, twice on the honor and chastity of ZENY about midnight of 1 0 March 1997. Upon arraignment on 19 May 1997, BERNARDINO, assisted by his couns el Atty. Balo, entered a plea of not guilty in each case. On 20 October 1997, BE RNARDINO, through his counsel Atty. Balo, moved to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty in each of the three cases and to substitute the same upon re-arraig nment with pleas of guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was accorded with due process. HELD: NO. The C ourt found that the trial court failed, albeit regrettably, to observe the rigid and severe constitutional mandate on due process, more particularly the demands of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SECTION 3. Plea of gu ilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the volu ntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall requi re the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. As pointed by the OSG, the Supreme Court had already outlined how compliance with said rule, where an accused plead s guilty to a capital offense, should be attained by the trial court, thus: 1. T he court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full compre hension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must requ ire the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and pr ecise degree of his culpability, and 3. The court must ask the accused if he des ires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. The re is no debate that the trial court had persuasively observed the second comman d of the rule by directing the prosecution to adduce evidence to determine the e xact culpability of the accused, taking into account the presence of other possi ble aggravating or mitigating circumstances. On the first requirement, it bears to note that a searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guil ty can be truly said to be based on a free and informed judgment. While there ca n be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," it would be well for the court to do the following: 1. Ascertain from the accuse d himself a.) how he was brought into the custody of the law; b.) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary inve stigations; and c.) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated durin g the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibil ity that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either b y actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters. 2 . Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred w ith, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. 3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accus ed, such as his age, socioeconomic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea o f guilty. 4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of th e penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lig hter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the jud

ge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions . 46 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! 5. Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges ag ainst him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or c ause him to supply missing details of significance. First, the questions were fr amed in English. The record of such inquiry is bereft of any indication that the trial court attempted to ascertain whether BERNARDINO was well-versed in the En glish language; neither does it reveal any information about his personality pro file which could "provide contributory insights for a proper verdict in the case ." Nor does the record of the searching inquiry shed light on matters concerning his apprehension, detention and prior investigation. An examination of the reco rds, however, disclosed that BERNARDINO signed a "Waiver" whereby he waived his right to a preliminary investigation. Such waiver was attested to by the Municip al Jail Warden, but there was nothing that would indicate that he was assisted b y a competent counsel at the time. Second, while Atty. Balo manifested that afte r he conferred with BERNARDINO the latter intimated that he was ready to withdra w his former plea of guilty, it is not clear whether the former explained to the latter the implications of a plea of guilty. Third, during the searching inquir y, the trial judge and BERNARDINO kept mentioning about the "three cases filed" or "crimes charged" against the latter. BERNARDINO even hoisted, as one of the r easons why he committed the crimes, the fact that he had a very big problem beca use his house was burned. To ensure that he fully understood the nature of the c rimes filed against him to which he pleaded guilty, the court should have at lea st asked him to recount what he exactly did. RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES; THE RIGHT IS DEEMED VIOLATED ONLY WHEN THE PROCEEDINGS IS ATTENDED BY VEXATIOUS, CAPRICIOUS, AND OPPRESSIVE DELAYS. JOSE P . LOPEZ vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al. [G.R. No. 140529, September 6, 2001] GONZAGA-REYES, J: FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman narrates that the verified audit report of the COA special audit team was received on December 22, 1993, and finding the same suffi cient in form and substance was docketed as OMB Case No. 34-93-2791. On the basi s thereof, a preliminary investigation was conducted. On March 1, 1994, the resp ondents were ordered to file their counter-affidavits. On May 10, 1994, the Offi ce of the Ombudsman received the counteraffidavits of respondents. On February 2 9, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman received the reply-affidavit of COA. In a R esolution dated July 17, 1998, graft investigation officer Ladrera recommended t he filing of thirty (30) informations against petitioner. The said recommendatio n was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Gervacio on February 27, 1999, a nd by Ombudsman Desierto on April 30, 1999. The informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on May 5, 1999. In this case, the preliminary investigation was r esolved close to four (4) years from the time all the counter and reply affidavi ts were submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. After the last reply-affidavit was filed on February 28, 1995, it was only on July 17, 1998 that a resolution was issued recommending the filing of the corresponding criminal informations ag ainst the petitioner and the others. It took eight months or on February 27, 199 9 for Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. to approve the same and close to another year or on April 30, 1999 for Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to approve th e recommendation ISSUE: Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay on the part of the Ombudsman in resolving the complaint filed against the petitioner, which violated his cons titutional right to a speedy disposition of the complaint against him.

47 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: YES. Article III of the Constitution provides that: SECTION 16. All person s shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudic ial, or administrative bodies. The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all p roceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings." Hence, under the Co nstitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials w ho are tasked with the administration of justice. However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays ; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or e ven without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elap se without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the le ngth of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to asser t such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible conc ept. We find that the cases are not sufficiently complex to justify the length o f time for their resolution. Neither can the long delay in resolving the case un der preliminary investigation be justified on the basis of the number of informa tions filed before the Sandiganbayan nor of the transactions involved. Verily, t he delay in this case disregarded the Ombudsman's duty, as mandated by the Const itution and Republic Act No. 6770, to enforce the criminal liability of governme nt officers or employees in every case where the evidence warrants in order to p romote efficient service to the people. The failure of said office to resolve th e complaints that have been pending for almost four years is clearly violative o f this mandate and the rights of petitioner as a public official. In such event, petitioner is entitled to the dismissal of the cases filed against him. DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOUBLE JEOPARDY; ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR DOUBLY JEOPARDY TO ATTACH LETICIA R. MER CIALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: On August 12, 1993, criminal cases for rape with homi cide were filed against the private respondents for the death of Maritess Ricafort Merciales. During the tri al, after presenting seven witnesses, the public prosecutor filed a motion for t he discharge of accused Joselito Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as a st ate witness. However, the prosecution contended that it was not required to pres ent evidence to warrant the discharge of accused Nuada, since the latter had alr eady been admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Just ice. Consequently, the respondent judge denied the motion for discharge, for fai lure of the prosecution to present evidence as provided for by Section 9, Rule 1 19 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. On July 13, 1994, private respondent s filed a motion to set the case for hearing, invoking their constitutional righ t to speedy trial. The respondent Judge granted the motion. On the said date, th e prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, instead of presenting further evidence. The respondent Judge postponed the hearing and reset the same for Augu st 9, 1994. On August 9, 1994, the respondent Judge called for a recess so as to let the prosecution decide whether or not to present an NBI agent, who was then present, to prove the due execution of the accused Nuada's extrajudicial confes sion. However, after the recess, the public prosecutor declined to present the N

BI agent, and instead manifested that he was not presenting any further evidence . 48 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On October 21, 1994, the trial court issued the assailed Order which acquitted a ll of the accused. Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother of the victim in the said criminal cases, filed before the respondent Court of Appeals a peti tion to annul the Order of the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismis sed the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Order of the trial court is valid. HELD: NO. The trial court, notwithstanding its knowledge that the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient to convict, especially after the public prosecutor tenaciously insisted on utilizing Nuada as state witness, the trial court passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the case. The trial court was well aware of the nature of the testimonies of the seven prosecution witnesses that have so far b een presented. Given this circumstance, the trial court, motu proprio, should ha ve called additional witnesses for the purpose of questioning them himself in or der to satisfy his mind with reference to particular facts or issues involved in the case. It is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court. Indee d, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. By contending that the challenged decision is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or exces s of jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of the accused agains t double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or info rmation sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the co urt has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their cons ent. Thus, the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Any ruling is sued without jurisdiction is in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void a nd does not exist. The dismissal of the case below was invalid for lack of a fun damental prerequisite, that is, due process. DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WHEN DOUBLE JEOPARDY ATTACHES EVEN IF MOTION TO DISMISS IS MADE BY ACCUSED HIMSELF. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERRA [G.R. No. 134732, May 29, 2002] PUNO, J: FACTS: On November 14, 1988, respondent Acelo Verra was charged with th e crime of murder for killing a certain Elias Cortezo. A warrant of arrest was issued by th e Regional Trial Court against him on November 21, 1988. He remained at-large un til May 24, 1996 when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of th e court accompanied by his counsel. Immediately, arraignment proceeded during wh ich he entered a plea of "Not Guilty." On the same day, the prosecution called t o the witness stand the wife of the victim, private complainant Damiana Cortezo. She testified that: (1) she has executed an affidavit of desistance; (2) she is no longer interested in prosecuting the case; and (3) other witnesses of the sh ooting incident have turned hostile and have similarly lost concern in pursuing the same. T hereafter, the prosecution, joined by the counsel for the accused, m oved for the dismissal of the case. Thus, the court dismissed the case and the w arrant of arrest was cancelled. Subsequently, two other witnesses appeared after learning of the dismissal of the case and manifested their willingness to testi fy. On August 21, 1996, the trial court set aside the Order of Dismissal dated M ay 24, 1996. Respondent moved for its reconsideration but his motion was denied on September 26, 1996. He then instituted before the Court of Appeals a Petition

for Certiorari challenging the August 21 Order. The appellate court rendered a Decision on April 6, 1998 granting the petition. It ruled that the dismissal of the case against petitioner has attained finality, and that its revival requires the filing of a new case or information. 49 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ISSUE: Whether or not the revival of the case is violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy. HELD: YES. Under Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, "No person shall b e twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to ano ther prosecution for the same act." In a long line of decisions, we have enumera ted the following requisites for double jeopardy to attach: (1) upon a valid ind ictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid p lea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or t he case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. There are however two occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismiss the case is made by the accused himself. The first is w hen the ground is insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution, and the second i s when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the righ t to a speedy trial. In the case at bar, we find all the above-cited requisites present. First, there was a valid information, sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, filed on November 14, 1988 duly signed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal. Second, the Regional Trial Court clearly had jurisdiction to hear and try the murder charge against the respondent. Third, he was arraigned in open court on May 24, 1996 with the assistance of a counsel de officio. Fourt h, during the arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. Finally, there was a valid termination of this case on the basis of the trial judge's Order to Dismi ss the case. While it is true that the respondent joined the prosecution in pray ing for its dismissal, double jeopardy will still attach since the basis for the ruling was the insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution. In view of private complainant's desistance and her testimony that other witnesses have turned hos tile and are also no longer interested in prosecuting this case, petitioner clea rly lacks the evidence to support the charge. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT JUDICIAL SUPERVISION JUDICIAL SUPERVISION; ONLY THE SUPREME COURT CAN OVERSEE THE JUDGES' AND COURT P ERSONNEL'S COMPLIANCE WITH ALL LAWS, AND TAKE THE PROPER ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION A GAINST THEM IF THEY COMMIT ANY VIOLATION THEREOF. CAOIBES vs. OMBUDSMAN, et al. [G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001] BUENA, J: FACTS: On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding J udge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, filed before the Office of the Ombu dsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the de struction of complainant's eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. R espondent alleged therein that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floo r of the Hall of Justice, Las Pias City, he requested petitioner to return the ex ecutive table he borrowed from respondent; that petitioner did not answer so res pondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner bl urted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglass es unserviceable; and that respondent had the incident blottered with the Las Pia s Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganba yan against the petitioner. On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another Co mplaint against petitioner, this time an administrative case with the Supreme Co urt, docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ, praying for the dismissal of petition er from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. Said complaint is based on the same facts as those in the comp

laint filed earlier with the Office of the Ombudsman. 50 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In the Order 3 dated June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitio ner to file a counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Inste ad of filing a counteraffidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 an "Ex-Parte M otion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the Office of t he Ombudsman hold its investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in abeyance, and r efer the same to the Supreme Court which, through the Office of the Court Admini strator, is already investigating what transpired on May 20, 1997. Invoking Sect ion 15 of R.A. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman refuses to refrain from taking cognizance of Case No. MB-0-97-0903 in favor of this Court on the ground that, a llegedly, the accusations therein against petitioner constitute simple criminal charges falling within the parameters of its constitutional power and duty to in vestigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee wh ich appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on Case No . OMB-097-0903 pending resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ. HELD: YES. It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciar y who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Und er Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its person nel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself an d by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, inv olves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases ag ainst judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. Th is rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on t he act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matte r unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an ad ministrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative l iabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION; THE OMBUDSMAN MAY NOT INITIATE OR INVESTIGATE A CRIMINAL O R ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT BEFORE HIS OFFICE AGAINST A JUDGE, PURSUANT TO HIS PO WER TO INVESTIGATE PUBLIC OFFICERS. JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES vs. OFFICE OF THE OM BUDSMANMINDANAO, et al. [G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001] PARDO, J: FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines (represented by DPWH) filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties affected by the project before the trial co urt presided by petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes. DPWH won the expropriation c ase and as of 19 May 1994, it still owed the lot owners the following amounts: R eynaldo Lao P489,000; Tessie Amadeo P1,094,200; and Alfonso Galo P13,927,215. On 5 April 1994, the trial court granted Amadeos motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. The writ was served b y Sheriff Paralisan to the DPWH-Region IX. On 3 May 1994, Paralisan issued a Not ice of Levy addressed to the Regional Director describing the properties subject of the levy. The auction sale pushed through on 18 May 1994 with Alex Bacquial as the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued by Pa ralisan. On 19 May 1994, Bacquial and Paralisan attempted to withdraw the auctio ned properties but were prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject

DPWH properties. On 20 May 1994, Bacquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for th e issuance of a break through order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned properties. The motion was granted by petitioner on the same date. Arm ed with the court order, Bacqiual succeeded in hauling off the properties for 5 successive days until the lower court issued another order temporarily suspendin g the writ of execution earlier issued. However, on 21 June 1994, the lower cour t issued another order upholding the validity of the writ of execution. 51 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On the basis of letters from Cong. Manuel Garcia of the 2 nd District of Davao C ity and the DPWH custodian, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed peti tioner and Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an admi nistrative case against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomal ous implementation of the writ of execution. By virtue of an administrative comp laint filed by the DPWH, Paralisan was dismissed from the service by the Supreme Court on 23 August 1995. The Court further directed the Court Administrator to conduct an investigation on petitioner and to charge him if the investigation so warrants. On 15 January 1996, Dir. Antonio Valenzuela of the Office of the Ombu dsman-Mindanao recommended that petitioner be charged before the Sandiganbayan w ith violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3(e) and likewise be administratively charged b efore the Supreme Court for acts unbecoming of a judge. On 22 January 1996, Vale nzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal com plaint charging petitioner with violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3(e). On 22 Februar y 1996, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to d ismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Cour t. The motion was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a ju dge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the sa me acts before the Supreme Court. HELD: NO. R.A. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides: Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its ow n or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or em ployee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjus t, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may tak e over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the Government, the inves tigation of such cases. Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority, Exce ptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all e lective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrum entalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government, gov ernment-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over off icials who may be removed only be impeachment, or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case t o the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Cons titution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and the court personnel and take the proper admi nistrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the l and. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of pow ers. Petitioners questioned orders directing the attachment of government propert y and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well with in his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid unde r the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial a ction only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation servi

ce of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision whether final and executory or notand pronounce it erro neous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rend ering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone. 52 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! PERIODS FOR DECISION PERIODS FOR DECISION; THE LOWER COURTS HAVE THREE MONTHS WITHIN WHICH TO DECIDE CASES OR MATTERS PENDING BEFORE THEM. ELIEZER A. SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN vs. JUDGE ROBER TO S. JAVELLANA [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1601, November 13, 2001] VITUG, J: FACTS: In a complaint-affidavit, dated 17 September 1999, Eliezer A. S ibayan-Joaquin charged Judge Roberto S. Javellana, acting presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave misconduct in the perform ance of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of the law. The complaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa, docketed Criminal Case No. RTC 1150, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Tan y Salazar," filed by Sibayan-Joaquin f or and in behalf of Andersons Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San Carl os City RTC. Complainant averred that there was an undue delay in the rendition of judgment in the aforenumbered criminal case, the decision, dated 16 July 1999 , that had acquitted the accused Romeo Tan, having been rendered only on the ten th month after the case was submitted for decision. The matter was referred to t he Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation. The Investigating Jus tice ended his report to the Court by recommending respondent judge be held admi nistratively liable for failure to render judgment in Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 within the period prescribed by law (in violation of 15, ARTICLE VIII OF THE PHI LIPPINE CONSTITUTION, CANON 1, RULE 1.02, and CANON 3, RULE 3.05 OF THE Code of Judicial Conduct). ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may be held administratively liable for failure to render judgment within the period prescribe by law. HELD: YES. Section 15, Article XVIII, of the Constitution provides that lower co urts have three months within which to decide cases or matters pending before them from the date of submission of such cases or matters for decision or resolution. Canon 3 of t he Code of Judicial Conduct holds similarly by mandating that the disposition of cases must be done promptly and seasonably. Admittedly, respondent judge has ta ken ten months to finally decide Criminal Case No. RTC1150 from its submission f or decision, a period clearly beyond the ninety-day reglementary period. He coul d have asked for an extension of time to decide the case and explain why, but he did not. Any undue delay in the resolution of cases often amounts to a denial o f justice and can easily undermine the people's faith and confidence in the judi ciary. Aware of the heavy caseload of judges, the Court has continued to act wit h great understanding on requests for extension of time to decide cases. PERIODS FOR DECISION; ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR 10-94 WHICH DIRECTS ALL TRIAL JUDG ES TO MAKE A PHYSICAL INVENTORY OF THE CASES IN THEIR DOCKETS APPLIES TO THE SAN DIGANBAYAN. PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN [A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, November 28, 2001] PARDO J: FACTS: On September 27, 2000, complying with the order, Presiding Justi ce Francis E. Garchitorena submitted a report admitting a number of cases submitted for decisi on and motion for reconsideration pending resolution before its divisions. We qu ote: "Cases Submitted W/ Motions For "For Decision Reconsideration "1st Division 341 None 53 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je

nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! "2nd Division "3rd Division "4th Division "5th Division "Total 5 None 12 None 5 None 52 1 -----------------------------------------------415" On July 31, 2000, the IBP, through its National President, Arthur D. Lim, transm itted to the Court a Resolution 1 addressing the problem of delays in cases pend ing before the Sandiganbayan. On November 21, 2000, the Court resolved to direct then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo (hereafter, the OCA) "to conduct a judicial audit of the Sandiganbayan, especially on the cases subject of this ad ministrative matter, and to submit a report thereon not later than 31 December 2 000." On December 4, 2000, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena admitted that the First Division of the Sandiga nbayan has a backlog of cases; that one case alone made the backlog of the First Division so large, involving 156 cases but the same has been set for promulgati on of decision on December 8, 2000, which would reduce the backlog by at least f ifty percent (50%). ISSUES: Whether or not Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1094 is applica ble to the Sandiganbayan. HELD: YES. Administrative Circular 10-94 directs all trial judges to make a phys ical inventory of the cases in their dockets. Given the rationale behind the Administrative Cir cular, we hold that it is applicable to the Sandiganbayan with respect to cases within its original and appellate jurisdiction. We reiterate the admonition we i ssued in our resolution of October 10, 2000: "This Court has consistently impres sed upon judges (which includes justices) to decide cases promptly and expeditio usly on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. Decision-making is the primordial and most important duty of the member of the bench. Hence, judge s are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants disciplinary sanction including fine suspensio n and even dismissal. The rule particularly applies to justices of the Sandiganb ayan. Delays in the disposition of cases erode the faith and confidence of our p eople in the judiciary, lower its standards, and bring it into disrepute. Delays cannot be sanctioned or tolerated especially in the anti-graft court, the showc ase of the nation's determination to succeed in its war against graft. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT; THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COU RT OVER DECISIONS OR FINAL ORDERS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS LIMITED TO QUESTIONS O F LAW. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. [G.R. No. 135789. January 31, 2002] PARDO, J: FACTS: On May 5, 1982, Manuel G. Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. , Cesar C. Zalamea and Jose Y. Campos organized HMHMI to serve as a holding company for the shares of stocks of Hans M. Menzi, Jose Y. Campos, Cesar C. Zalamea and Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. in Bulletin Publishing Corporation and the shares of stocks o f Hans M. Menzi in other companies, including Liwayway Publishing Incorporated. On June 27, 1984, Hans M. Menzi died. On July 6, 1984, the court appointed Manue l G. Montecillo executor of the Estate of Hans M. Menzi and later the president of HMHMI. With the lone exception of Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesa r C. Zalamea and Jose Y. Campos, constitute the principal stockholders and incor porators of HMHMI. 54 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je

nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On February 12, 1987, the PCGG issued Sequestration Writ No. 87-0206 against all shares of stocks, assets, properties, records and documents of HMHMI. Forthwith , on February 13, 1987, upon the request of PCGG, Central Bank Governor Fernande z instructed commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions to withhold th e withdrawal of funds and assets by Liwayway Publishing Corporation and HMHMI. O n July 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconve yance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against the following defe ndants: Manuel G. Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea, Ferdi nand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. On October 17, 1990, the PCGG filed a Secon d Amended Complaint naming specifically the estate of Hans M. Menzi as one of th e defendants. On November 27, 1992, the estate of Hans M. Menzi, in behalf of HM HMI, filed with the Sandiganbayan a "Motion to Lift Freeze Order" dated February 12, 1987, alleging that: (1) The stocks, assets, properties, records and docume nts of HMHMI were sequestered without any judicial action having been filed agai nst it, or without impleading it as a defendant in Civil Case No. 0022; and (2) Such issuance of a writ of sequestration without filing a corresponding judicial action against HMHMI within the reglementary period established by Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution resulted in the automatic lifting of the sequestration order on August 12, 1987. On April 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan gran ted the motion. On October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On January 15, 1993, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review assailing the resolution of the Sa ndiganbayan lifting the freeze order. On July 16, 1996, the Court set aside the Sandiganbayan's resolution lifting the freeze order and remanded the case back t o the Sandiganbayan for resolution. Sandiganbayan lifted the writ of sequestrati on dated February 12, 1987, reasoning that there was no prima facie factual basi s for its issuance. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the Sand iganbayan denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in lifitng the writ of sequestrati on over the assets, shares of stock, property records and bank deposits of HMHMI. HELD: NO. It is well settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Cour t over decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth o r falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invit es calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the w itnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as w ell as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the Court's fun ction to examine and weigh all over again the evidence presented in the proceedi ngs below. At any rate, the Court agrees with respondents that the Sandiganbayan has full authority to decide on all incidents in the ill-gotten case, including the propriety of the writs of sequestration that the PCGG initially issued. Bas ed on the evidence the PCGG submitted so far to the Sandiganbayan, the late Hans M. Menzi owned the Bulletin Publishing Corporation almost one hundred (100%) pe r cent since 1957, except those Bulletin shares sold to U. S. Automotive Corpora tion in 1985, those converted to treasury shares in 1986, and those sold to the general public at public offerings. In the absence of competent evidence showing thus far that President Ferdinand E. Marcos or his cronies ever acquired Bullet in shares of the late Hans M. Menzi or HMHMI that might be subject to sequestrat

ion, the Court may not void the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in question. 55 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! JUDICIAL REVIEW JUDICIAL REVIEW; STATUTE WHEN VAGUE ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NO. 148560, November 19, 2001] BELLOSILLO, J: FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking of ficial to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashione d that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the c onstitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to su bject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, accor ding to him, it suffers from the vice of vagueness. ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder Law is vague and is therefore unconstitutional ? HELD: NO. Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the v alidity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is p resumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. Courts invariably train their si ghts on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitution al attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong p redilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forb idden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference t he judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch the legislature. Hence in de termining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental l aw, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbe arance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of i ts constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing t herefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an int erpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality. In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon we held that as long as there is s ome basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds . Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, i t must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them lia ble to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its vi olation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the pros cribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what th e assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumu lating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combinat ion of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. Petitioner, howe ver, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of t he terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series o f overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "p attern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him th e right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, he nce, violative of his fundamental right to due process. The rationalization seem s to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merel y because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides

, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legisla ture to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted i n the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words e mployed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness 56 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, c an be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words o f a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technic al or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers who a re, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phras eology in such a manner is always presumed. Under the circumstances, petitioner' s reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doc trine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the ef fect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand wh at conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that spe cie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common inte lligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties t argeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcer s unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary f lexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legi slations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless spe cify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambi guous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "sa ved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the se cond whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine c annot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for un certainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It mu st be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasona ble degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or m athematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the s tatute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, es pecially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to prov ide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of d ue process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily bro adly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'' The overbreadth and va gueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'ov erbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broa drick v Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been e ntertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate o nly spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, h ave been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought t o be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a fa cial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount suc cessfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exis

ts under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is sai d that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is cle arly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the co nduct of others.'' In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and va gueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom applicat ion of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on th e ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or o ther situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbre adth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while 57 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'' Consequently, there is no basis for p etitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the pu rported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at lengt h by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, canno t be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provisio n of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other p art. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrench ed presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being o ne of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committee s by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage. JUDICIAL REVIEW; THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECTIFYING ERRORS OF JU DGMENT. DE LEON vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 127182, December 5, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. FACTS: In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we ruled t hat private respondent's appointment on August 28, 1986, as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the Minis try of Local Government, was temporary. Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macarai g, we held that since private respondent was not a Career Executive Service (CES ) eligible, his appointment did not attain permanency because he did not possess the required CES eligibility for the CES position to which he was appointed. He nce, he can be transferred or reassigned without violating his right to security of tenure. It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al., decide d on September 26, 1990, where the nature of private respondent's appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, was firs t contested, this Court issued a Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992, holding that Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of private respondent. There was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or a t the time of appointment of petitioner. The CESO was only reconstituted by the appointment of its Board of six (6) members sometime in August 1988. There was n o CESO eligibility examination during petitioner's incumbency in the Department, as there was no CESO board. The first CESO examination was given on August 5 an d 12, 1990. The CESO eligibility was not a requirement at the time of the appoin tment of petitioner. The only eligibility required is that of a first grader and petitioner is a first grade eligible. Therefore, having met all the requirement s for the position to which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due process. Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature of his appointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in the present case considering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Co urt. ISSUE: Whether or not res judicata applies. HELD: NO. Concededly, if we follow t he conventional procedural path, i.e., the principle on conclusiveness of judgment set forth in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of th e Rules of Court, 3 would bar a re-litigation of the nature of private responden t's appointment. Indeed, once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final jud gment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest. Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its own

ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It must be stre ssed that this is not the first time in Philippine and American 58 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! jurisprudence that the principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and jurisp rudence. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CIVIL SERVICE; THE CSC HAS JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING ANOMALIES CONNECTED TO CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS. CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: see page 24 ISSUES: Whether or not the CSC had jurisdiction t o hear and decide the complaint against petitioners. HELD: YES. Petitioners' invocation of the law is misplaced. The provision is app licable to instances where administrative cases are filed against erring employees in conne ction with their duties and functions of the office. This is, however, not the s cenario contemplated in the case at bar. It must be noted that the acts complain ed of arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in the Civil Service (Subp rofessional) examination. The examinations were under the direct control and sup ervision of the Civil Service Commission. The culprits are government employees over whom the Civil Service Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. Thus, after the petitioners were duly investigated and ascertained whether they were indeed guilty of dishonesty, the penalty meted was dismissal from the office. Section 2 8, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations explicitly provid es that the CSC can rightfully take cognizance over any irregularities or anomal ies connected to the examinations, as it reads: SECTION 28. The Commission shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its officials and employees and over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities. It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly in formed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity t o defend themselves. Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that there was a deni al of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to t ake cognizance of the case. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMELEC; THE COMELEC EXERCISES SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER BOARDS OF ELECTION I NSPECTORS AND BOARDS OF CANVASSERS. O'HARA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. Nos. 148941-42, March 12, 2002] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Jovita Rodriguez were candidates fo r the position of vicegovernor, province of Rizal during the May 14, 2001 electi ons. 59 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On May 19, 2001, upon conclusion of the canvassing of the certificates of canvas s coming from the thirteen municipalities and one component city of Rizal, the P rovincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected vi ce-governor with 216,798 votes over respondent Rodriguez's 215,443 votes. On May 23, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Binangonan, Rizal filed wi th the COMELEC, a petition to correct entries in the certificate of canvass of v otes. It was alleged that there were typographical errors in the number of votes garnered by petitioner and respondent resulting in the addition of 7,000 votes to petitioner. The MBC of Binangonan submitted the affidavit of Evelyn Ramirez, the Municipal Accountant of Binangonan, Rizal, admitting that she committed the mathematical error. On May 25, 2001, respondent Rodriguez filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of the winning candidate for vice-governor of the province of Rizal, and to correct alleged manifest mathematical errors. Respondent Rodriguez asserted that after the mathematical error would have been corrected, she would obtain a plurality of 215,422 votes as against petitioner's 209,798. Petitioner filed his answer to the petition, arguing that there was no manifest error apparent in the certificate of canvass which respondent Rodrigue z and the MBC of Binangonan sought to correct. On July 25, 2001, the COMELEC iss ued a resolution in the cases, wherein it ordered that petitioners proclamation i s annulled, the PBC of Rizal to reconvene and correct the manifest mathmatical e rror in the votes, and to proclaim respondent as the duly elected Vice-Governor of Rizal. Accordingly, on July 27, 2001, the PBC of Rizal reconvened. However, p etitioner was not notified of the proceedings of the PBC of Rizal. On the same d ay, the PBC of Rizal issued another certificate of canvass of votes and proclama tion of the winning candidates for provincial officers, and on the basis thereof proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected vice-governor of Rizal. Immed iately, respondent Rodriguez took her oath of office before Judge Leila Suarez A cebo, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City. ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it annulled the pr oclamation of petitioner as vice-governor of Rizal and by ordering the PBC of Ri zal to reconvene and correct the alleged manifest mathematical error supposedly committed by the MBC of Rizal. HELD: YES. The COMELEC should have conducted further investigation or at least a technical inspection or examination of election returns to verify the existence of the all eged error before it gave credence to the statements of the MBC of Binangonan an d concluding outright that the Statement of Votes submitted by respondents were accurate. The COMELEC cannot simply rely on these Statement of Votes because the y were prepared by the same members of the MBC who claimed to have made a mistak e due to "fatigue, sleepless nights and physical exhaustion." It would have been more prudent to make a determination whether these same individuals committed a ny other mistake in the tabulation or statement of votes. Even based on the stat ements/affidavits of the MBC of Binangonan, it is apparent that the errors sough t to be corrected do not appear on the face of the certificate of canvass. As ab ove-stated, the alleged error which the COMELEC perceived to be manifest does no t fall under the definition of "manifest error" which was laid down in Chavez vs . COMELEC . . . To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certifi cates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections th ereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. The Constitution gives the Commis sion on Elections the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regula tions to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and reca

ll." The Commission indisputably exercises the power of supervision and control over boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers. The Commission must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cas t in the elections. The Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the sta tutory authority under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 to grant the Commission broad and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to ensure free, orde rly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of th e people s sacred right of suffrage. 60 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In the absence of any manifest error in the certificate of canvass sought to be corrected, the Commission should have ordered the re-canvass of the election ret urns or the re-counting of the ballots in the municipality of Binangonan in orde r to validate the claim of its MBC. If after the re-canvass of the election retu rns or the re-counting of the official ballots, the clerical error or mathematic al mistake in the addition of the votes had been established, the Commission sho uld have annulled the canvass and proclamation based on the erroneous certificat e of canvass. If the records had borne out that petitioner's proclamation was th e result of a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of v otes and did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the electorate, there c ould have been no valid proclamation to speak of. The issue would involve a preproclamation controversy. COMMISSION ON AUDIT COA; THE FACT THAT PRIVATE AUDITORS MAY AUDIT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOES NOT DIVES T COA THE POWER TO AUDIT AND EXAMINE THE SAME GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. DEVELOPMENT B ANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT [G.R. No. 88435, January 16, 2002] CARPIO, J: FACTS: In 1986, the Philippine Government, under the administration o f then President Corazon C. Aquino, obtained from the World Bank (WB) an Economic Recovery Loan ( ERL) in the amount of 310 Million US Dollars. The ERL was intended to support th e recovery of the Philippine economy, at the time suffering severely from the fi nancial crisis that hit the country during the latter part of the Marcos regime. As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine go vernment to rehabilitate the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which was then saddled with huge non-performing loans. The governments commitment was embo died in the Policy Statement of the DBP which, among others, provided that the m entioned bank will now be required to have a private external auditor. On Novemb er 28, 1986, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 1079 amending the Central Banks Manual of Regulation for Banks and other Financial Intermediaries. Thus, o n December 5, 1986, the Central Bank Governor issued Central Bank Circular No. 1 124 which substantially provides that the requirements for an annual financial au dit by an external independent auditor shall extend to specialized and unique ba nks such as the Land Bank of the Philippines and the DBP. On December 12, 1986, p ursuant to CB Circular No. 1124 and the governments commitment to the WB, DBP Cha irman Jesus Estanislao wrote the Commission on Audit (COA) seeking the approval of the DBPs engagement of a private external auditor in addition to the COA. On J anuary 20, 1987, the COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona, Jr. replied to the December 12, 1986 letter of the DBP Chairman with a statement that the COA will interpose no objection to your engagement of a private external auditor as required by th e Economic Recovery Program Loan Agrrement of 1987 provided that the terms for s aid audit are first reviewed and approved by the Commission. Cosequently, the Boa rd of Directors of the DBP approve the hiring of Joaquin Cunanan & Co. as the DB Ps private external auditor for calendar year 1986. However, a change in the lead ership of the COA reversed the course of events. On April 27, 1987, the new COA Chairman, Eufemio Doningo, wrote the CB Governor protesting the issuance of Circ ular No. 1124 which allegedly encroached upon the COAs constitutional and statuto ry power to audit government agencies. On May 13, 1987, after learning that DBP had signed a contract with above-mentioned auditing firm, the new COA Chairman w rote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident auditors were under instruction to d isallow any payment to the private auditor whose services were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary. On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the COA Chai rman a copy of the DBPs contract with Joaquin Cunanan & Co., signed four months e arlier on March 5, 1987. The DBP Chairmans covering hand-written note sought the

COAs concurrence to the contract. During the pendency of COAs concurrence to the c ontract, DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the 61 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! total amount of Php 487,321.14 despite the formers objection to the same. Thereaf ter, the COA chairman issued a memorandum disallowing the payments. On January 1 9, 1988, the DBP Chairman moved for a reconsideration of the memorandum issued b y the COA which the latter also denied ratiocinating that the said Commission ha s the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertain ing to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures of uses of funds and proper typertaining to the government. (Sec. 2, Art. IX-D, 1987 Philippine Constitution) ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit the DBP is exclusive and precludes the concurrent audit of the DBP by a private exte rnal auditor. (2) Whether or not there is a necessity of hiring a private audito r and the reasonableness of their fees. HELD: (1) NO. The resolution of the issue herein requires an interpretation of Section 2, Article IXD of the 1987 Constituition, which provides: Sec. 2 (1) The Commiss ion on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and se ttle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned and held in trust by, or pertaining to, the G overnment, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters. (2) The Commi ssion shall have the exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Art icle, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules an d regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. The bare language of Section 2 shows that the C OAs power under the first paragraph is not declared exclusive, while its authorit y under the second paragraph is declared exclusive. The framers of the Constitutio n, in deleting the word exclusive in the first paragraph, deemed that the inclusio n of such word would constitute a disincentive or obstacle to private investment . There are government institutions with private investments in them, and some o f these investors Filipinos, as well as in some cases, foreignersrequire the prese nce of private auditing firms, not exclusively but concurrently. The qualifying word exclusive in the second paragraph of Section 2 cannot be applied to the first paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A qualifying word is inten ded to refer only to the phrase to which it is immediately associated. Thus, the first paragraph of Section 2 must be read the way it appears, without the word e xclusive, signifying that non-COA auditors can also examine and audit government agencies. Besides, the framers of the Constitution intentionally omitted the wor d exclusive in the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent audi t by private external auditors. The clear and unmistakable conclusion from the r eading of the entire Section 2 is that the COAs power to examine and audit is non -exclusive. On the other hand, the COAs authority to define the scope of its audi t, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditu res is exclusive. Further, the mere fact that private auditors may audit governm ent agencies does not divest COA of its power to examine and audit the same gove rnment agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a priv ate audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its fi ndings and conclusions will still bind the government agencies and its officials . A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or asset s escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. (2) YES. The hiring of a private a uditor being an express condition for the grant of the US $ 310 Million Economic Recovery Loan, a major objective of which was DBPs rehabilitation, the same was a necessary corporate act on the part of the DBP. The national government, repre

sented by the Central Bank Governor, as well as the Ministers of Finance, Trade, and Economic Planning, had already committed to the hiring by all government ba nks for private auditors in addition to the COA. For the DBP to refuse to hire a private auditor would have aborted the vital loan and derailed the national eco nomic recovery, resulting in grave consequences to the entire nation. The hiring of a private auditor was not only necessary based 62 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! on the governments loan covenant with the World Bank, it was also necessary becau se it was mandated by Central Bank No. 1124 under pain administrative and penal sanctions. The hiring of a private auditor by the DBP being a condition of the l oan, the fees of such private auditors are in reality part of the governments cos t of borrowing from the World Bank. An annual private audit fee of about half a million pesos added to the interest on a US $310 Million loan would hardly make the cost of borrowing excessive, extravagant or unconscionable. Besides, the con dition imposed by a lender, whose money is at risk, requiring the borrower to su bmit to audit by an independent public accountant, is a reasonable and normal bu siness practice. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS SANDIGANBAYAN SANDIGANBAYAN; THE LIFTING OF THE WRITS OF SEQUESTRATION DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE SEQUESTERED PROPERTY ARE NOT ILLGOTTEN. PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. [G.R. Nos. 119609-10, September 21, 2001] PARDO, J: FACTS: On August 28, 1990, PCGG sent Corporate Secretary Victor A. Afr ica of Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc. (OWNI), a letter dated August 3, 1990, directing him to s end notices to all stockholders of record of OWNI for special stockholders meet ing. On September 17, 1990, during the special stockholders meeting of OWNI, PC GG voted all the Class "A" shares in the election of directors and elected to th e board of directors Commissioners Maceren, Parlade and Gutierrez representing t he Class "A" shares and Brooker and Miller representing Class "B" and "C" shares . None of the registered Class "A" shareholders of OWNI was present in that, spe cial stockholders meeting. PCGG sequestered the Class "A" shareholding about 60% of the outstanding capital stock, and PCGG voted all the Class "A" shares. On O ctober 9, 1990, Corporate Secretary Africa wrote the SEC questioning the electio n of PCGG nominees as directors of the OWNI board on the ground that they were n ot stockholders of OWNI. On January 27, 1991, the special stockholders meeting of OWNI took place. Stockholders owning 63,573 Class "A" shares were represented . An election of directors for Class "A" shares was held. Nieto, Jr., J. Africa and A. Africa were elected as directors for Class "A" shares for 1991 until thei r successors are elected and qualified. Class "B" and "C" shareholders did not a ttend the meeting. No new directors for them were elected. On July 29, 1991, PCG G, acting for itself and in behalf of OWNI, filed with the Sandiganbayan a compl aint for injunction with damages against V. Africa, J. Africa, Nieto, Jr. and Oc ampo. PCGG sought to enjoin the defendants from interfering with PCGG s manageme nt of OWNI and/or representing themselves as director. ISSUE: Whether or not the PCGG s takeover of OWNI is legal. HELD: NO. In PCGG v. Cojuanco, Jr., the Court ruled that who should vote the sequestered shares requires the determination of the ill-gotten character of those shares an d consequently the rightful ownership thereof. The issue was still pending in th e main case in the Sandiganbayan. This is only an incident of the main case and is limited to the stockholders meeting held on September 17, 1990. This is with out prejudice to the final disposition of the merits of the main suit. The owner ship of the shares is still under litigation. It is not known whether the shares are part of the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his "cronies." We find the writ of sequestration issued against OWNI not valid because the sui t in Civil Case No. 0009 against Nieto, Jr. and J. Africa as shareholders in OWN I is not a suit against 63 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim

ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! OWNI. This Court has held that "failure to implead these corporations as defenda nts and merely annexing a list of such corporations to the complaints is a viola tion of their right to due process for it would in effect be disregarding their distinct and separate personality without a hearing.'' Furthermore, PCGG issued the writs of sequestration on August 3, 1988, which was beyond the period set by the Constitution. Article XVIII, Section 26, of the 1987 Constitution provides: "Sec. 26.The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamati on No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth s hall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratification o f this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by the Pres ident, the Congress may extend said period. "A sequestration or freeze order sha ll be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the prop er court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the co rresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof. "T he sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial a ction or proceeding is commenced as herein provided." The sequestration orders i ssued against respondents shall be deemed automatically lifted due to the failur e of PCGG to commence the proper judicial action or to implead the respondents t herein within the period prescribed by Article XVIII, Section 26 of the 1987 Con stitution. The lifting of the writs of sequestration will not necessarily be fat al to the main case since the lifting of the subject orders does not ipso facto mean that the sequestered property are not illgotten. The effect of the lifting of the sequestration against OWNI will merely be the termination of the role of the government as conservator thereof. In other words, the PCGG may no longer ex ercise administrative or housekeeping powers and its nominees may no longer vote the sequestered shares to enable them to sit on the corporate board of the subj ect firm. SANDIGANBAYAN; WHEN FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN NOT CONCLUSIVE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT; THE ACQUISITION COST OF THE PROPERTY SHALL BE THE BASIS FOR ASCERTAINING THE VALUE THEREOF. REPUBLIC OF THE PHLILPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, e t al. [G.R. No. 102508, January 30, 2002] DAVIDE, JR., C.J: FACTS: Private respondent Jolly R. Bugarin, a government offic ial during the Marcos regime, is now being pursued by the petitioner to recover the alleged unexplained wealth amassed by the former. In a petition filed by the Republic, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), with the Sandiganbayan on Aug ust 3, 1987, it averred that respondent Bugarin acquired during his incumbency a s Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), real and personal prop erties whose aggregate fair market value at the time of their acquisition was P6 ,313,632.56. Allegedly, those properties were manifestly in excess or out of pro portion to his salaries, allowances, and other emoluments from July 1, 1967 to m arch 15, 1986 totaling P743,243.65 only. In the respondents answer, he claimed th at some of the properties enumerated were acquired by him and his wife before he became the Director of NBI. The acquisition cost of the properties he acquired during his incumbency was P2,793,141.26 only. He likewise alleged that apart fro m his salary as NBI Director for the entire period of his service, he also recei ved allowances from the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), the National Police Commiss ion, the Central Bank, and the Law Firm of San Juan, Africa, Gonzales, and San A gustin. He also derived substantial income from the investment and properties he and his wife acquired before he became the Director of NBI. Based on the findin

gs of the Sandiganbayan, the said Tribunal dismissed the petition for forfeiture on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 64 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondents professional fees outside NBI should form part of his lawful income. (2) Whether or not respondents properties are manifestly out o f proportion to his lawful income. HELD: (1) YES. The respondents professional fees outside the NBI should form part of hi s lawful income. Before resolving the issues herein involved, it must be kept in mind that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the Courts functi on to examine and weigh all over again the evidence presented in the proceedings . While the petitioner concedes that the Sandiganbayans findings of facts are con clusive upon this Court, it invokes the exception laid down in Dischoso vs. Cour t of Appeals, to wit: 1.) when the conclusion is a finding entirely grounded spe cultion, surmise, and conjecture; 2.) when the inference made is manifestly absu rd, mistaken, or impossible; 3.) .; 4.) when the judgment is premised on a misapp rehension of facts. A plain reading of the Sandiganbayans ruling exposed manifest errors prompting the Court to delve upon the factual matters of the case. Respo ndent was engaged as a consultant on handwriting, document evaluation, ballistics , fingerprinting and other specialized projects. He claimed that he rendered his services as such outside of office hours. He was given permission by his superio r to act as consultant, but he could not find among his files written permission allegedly given to him in 1967. At any rate, he did not conceal his consultancy services and the corresponding fees he received: in fact, he stated them in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities he submitted to the office of the Secretary of Justice, as well as in his ITR. Even assuming that he had no prior written a uthority to act as a consultant of private entity, respondents violation of the r ule lack of prior permission was a technical one. At most, it would subject him to administrative penalty provided in the Civil Service rules had the proper cha rge been filed against him. Such violation did not amount to a crime or graft an d corrupt practice as defined by law. Hence, we are of the opinion that his prof essional fees should be included in the computation of his lawful income. In asc ertaining the value of respondents properties and shareholdings, it is not the fa ir market value, as claimed by the petitioner that should be made the basis ther eof, rather, as correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, it is the acquisition cost thereof, since it is the actual amount of money shelled out by respondent in acq uiring them. It is the acquisition cost that must be charged against respondents lawful income and funds. Neither can we sustain petitioners bare allegation that the cost or consideration of the subject properties stated in the contracts were understated for tax evasion purposes. Absent any evidence to support it, such c laim deserves a short shrift for being merely speculative or conjectural. (2) YE S. In resolving the second issue, it would be noteworthy to have a reference on Section 2 of R. A. No. 1379 which provides that whenever any public officer or e mployee has acquired during his incumbency property which is manifestly out of p roportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawf ul income and income from legitimately acquired property, the said property shal l be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. From the summary of Bugarins assets, it can readily be seen that all of his real properties were purc hased or constructed as the case may be from 1968 to 1980. The total acquisition cost thereof was P1,705,583. With the exception of those that had been liquidat ed, those acquired from 1981 onward, and those whose year of acquisition could n ot be determined, his shareholdings in various corporations and other investment s amounted to P464,580. Hence, for the period from 1968 to 1980, he amassed weal th in the amount of P2,170,163. On the other hand, his total income from 1967 to 1980 amounted only to P766,548. Premises considered, respondents properties acqu ired from 1968 to 1980 which were out of proportion to his lawful income for the said period should be forfeited in favor of the government for failure of the r

espondent to show to the Courts satisfaction that the same were lawfully acquired . 65 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! SANDIGANBAYAN; THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL E XCEPT WHEN HE IS CHARGED AS COPRINCIPAL, ACCOMPLICE OR ACCESSORY OF A PUBLIC OFF ICER. MACALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. Nos. 140199-200, February 6,2002] PARDO, J: FACTS: Petitioner Felicito S. Macalino was the Assistant Manager of th e Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippines National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled corporation. O n September 16, 1992, the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, with the approval of the Ombudsman, filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations against the petitioner and his spouse Liwayway S. Tan charging them with estafa through falsification of official documents and frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile documents. During the initial presentation of evidence for the de fense, petitioner moved for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer because the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly Const ruction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a governme nt-owned or controlled corporation with original charter. The Sandiganbayan deni ed petitioners motion to dismiss. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner. HE LD: NO. Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated unde r the general law on corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a publ ic officer within the coverage of RA 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan h as no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisd iction over a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a c o-principal, accomplice, or accessory of a public officer who has been charged w ith a crime within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The cases cited by res pondent People of the Philippines are inapplicable because they were decided und er the provisions of the 1973 Constitution which included as public officers, of ficials and employees of corporations owned and controlled by the government thr ough organized and existing under the general corporation law. The 1987 Constitu tion excluded such corporations. The crime charged against petitioner was commit ted in 1989 and 1990. The criminal actions were instituted in 1992. It is well-s ettled that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by t he law in force at the institution of the action. OMBUDSMAN OMBUDSMAN; THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND TO PROSECUTE GRANTED BY LAW TO THE OMBUD SMAN IS PLENARY AND UNQUALIFIED. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. RUBEN ENOC, et al. [G.R. Nos. 145957-68, January 25, 2002] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: Respondents herein were employed at the Office of the Souther n Cultural Comminities (OSCC), Davao Del Sur, Provincial Office, Digos, Davao del Sur with below grade 27. They were charged with 11 counts of malversation through falsifi cation, based on the alleged purchases of medicine and food assistance for cultu ral community members, and 1 count of violation of R.A. 3019 in connection with the purchases of supplies for the OSCC without bidding/canvass. As none of the r espondents has the rank required under R.A. 8249 to be tried 66 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim

ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! for the said crimes in the Sandiganbayan, the informations were filed by the Omb udsman in RTC of Digos (Branch 19). Thereafter, the respondents moved to for the quashal of the case before the RTC averring , as in the case of Uy vs. Sandigan bayan, that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute graft cases falling with in the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The said motion was granted by the lo wer court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to prosecute and investigate c ases cognizable by the regular courts. HELD: YES. The power to investigate and prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsma n is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public office r or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The law does not make any distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held th at the clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough t o embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. The reference mad e by R.A. 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sa ndiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to cond uct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdicti on of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the i nvestigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases. Section 15 of R.A. 6770 give the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombu dsman to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government , the investigation of such cases. The grant of this authority does not necessari ly imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise of the Ombudsman of his p rimary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatib le with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses co mmitted by public officers and employees. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Offi ce of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Spec ial Prosecutor under Section 11 of R.A. 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecut or is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under t he supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to con duct preliminary investigation and to prosecute criminal cases is within the jur isdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all c omplaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil, and criminal liability in every case where the evidence w arrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the perosonnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the gover nment service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in investig ation and prosecution of certain cases. The law likewise allows him to direct th e Speciall Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of R.A. 6770. OMBUDSMAN; THE OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBJECT AN ACCUSED TO THE EXPENSE, RIGORS AND EM BARRASSMENT OF TRIAL ARBITRARILY. CABAHUG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. [G.R. NO. 132816, February 5, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: A negotiated contract was entered into by the Departm ent of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), represented by petitioner Susana B. Cabahug, by virtue of her pos

ition as Department of Education, Culture and Sports Director for Region XI, for the purchase of 46,000 units of topaz Monobloc Armchairs from Rubber worth Indu stries Corporation (RWIC), at P495 per unit. The negotiated contract was approve d by Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of the DECS. Before the consummation of t he contract, another DECS supplier, Jesusa T. dela Cruz wrote to Secretary Glori a objecting to the said contract for the reason that the chairs were 67 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! patently overpriced. The letter was referred to Antonio E.B. Nachura, DECS Under secretary for Legal Affairs, who after requiring petitioner Cabahug to comment o n said letter, resolved to give due course to the transaction. Consequently, a c omplaint was filed by dela Cruz before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, aga inst petitioner Cabahug, Secretary Gloria, and Undersecretary Nachura. The Offic e of the Ombudsman through Jovito Coresis, Jr., issued a Resolution finding prob able cause and recommending the filing of Information with the Sandiganbayan by the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the dismissal of the case against Secre tary Gloria and Undersecretary Nachura. Unaware of the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the Offi ce of the Special Prosecutor. After learning of the filing of the Information wi th the Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. Petitioner prayed that the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Office of the Specia l Prosecutor be admitted by the graft court as her Motion for Reinvestigation. T he Third Division of the Sandiganbayan granted the Motion for Reconsideration. A ccordingly, the case was evaluated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Cice ro D. Jurado, Jr., Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II assigned to review the c ase, recommended dismissal of the case, there being no showing that petitioner a cted in bad faith or with gross negligence. While Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo and his Deputy Robert E. Kallos, concurred in the findings, Ombudsman An iano Disierto did not agree. Noting that bad faith and/or gross inexcusable negl igence is deducible from the acts of the accused, Ombudsman Disierto ordered pro secution to proceed. To this petitioner filed a Motion for Re-determination of E xistence of Probable Cause. This motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan and trea ted the same as a second Motion for Reconsideration which is not allowed by the Rules of Court. Petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration arguin g therein that the said motion cannot be considered a second motion for reconsid eration since it was addressed to the court, and not anymore to the Office of th e Special Prosecutor or the Ombudsman. The motion was denied and so was the subs equent Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. HEL D: YES. While it is the function of the Ombudsman to determine whether or not th e petitioner should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial , he cannot do so arbitrarily. When at the outset the evidence cannot sustain a prima facie case or that the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient be lief as to the guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on any person the trauma of going through a trial. There is nothing in the records that show Cabahug acted in bad faith or even with gros s inexcusable negligence. In the absence of bad faith, she cannot be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended. Judicial power of review includes the determination of whether there was grave abuse of discretion amount ing to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentali ty of the government [Section 1(2) Article VIII 1987 Constitution]. Under this d efinition, the Sandiganbayan should have, considering the divergent positions in the Office of the Ombudsman, granted the motion for redetermination of probable cause after reviewing the evidence thus far submitted, and dismissed the case a gainst petitioner. Thus, respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to proceed. OMBUDSMAN; THE OMBUDSMAN CAN ONLY RECOMMEND REMOVAL OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL FOUND T O BE AT FAULT. RENATO A. TAPIADOR vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al. [G.R. No. 129124, March 15, 2002] THE

68 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! DE LEON, JR., J: FACTS: On 4 July 1994, Walter H. Beck, a U.S. citizen, lodged a complaint-affidavit with the Resident Ombudsman at the main office in Manila of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation against petitioner Renato A. Tapiador, BID Special Investigator and assigned as Technical Assistant in the office of the then Associate Commissione r Bayani M. Subido, Jr. The complaint alleged in substance that petitioner Tapia dor demanded and received from Walter Beck the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10 ,000.00) in exchange for the issuance of an alien certificate of registration (A CR) which was subsequently withheld deliberately by the petitioner despite repea ted demands by Beck, unless the latter pay an additional amount of Seven Thousan d Pesos (P7,000.00). Accompanying the complaint was the affidavit executed by a certain Purisima C. Terencio which essentially seeks to corroborate the alleged payment of the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) by Walter Beck and his wife to the petitioner in consideration for the issuance of the subject ACR. Aft er investigation, BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma found the petitioner liable for violating existing civil service rules and regulations as well as pe nal laws and thus, recommended that criminal and administrative charges be filed against the petitioner. Upon review of the case, the criminal charge was dismis sed by the Ombudsman for lack of evidence; however, the Ombudsman found the peti tioner liable for grave misconduct in the administrative aspect of the case and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the government service. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for grave misconduct in the admin istrative case against him. HELD: NO. A thorough review of the records, however, showed that the subject aff idavits of Beck and Terencio were not even identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation conducted by the BID Resident Ombudsman at the BID o ffice in Manila. Neither did they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn statements despite prior notice before the inve stigating officer who subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of the case upo n finding that the charge against the petitioner "was not supported by any evide nce". Hence, Beck's affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. On this b asis alone, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsma n should have dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner in t he first instance. Nonetheless, a perusal of the affidavit executed by Walter Be ck does not categorically state that it was petitioner Tapiador who personally d emanded from Beck the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) in consideration for the issuance of the latter's ACR. On the other hand, it appears that Walter Beck and his wife sought the assistance of Purisima Terencio sometime in the la ter part of 1992 in facilitating the issuance of his ACR and in the process, Ter encio allegedly informed the couple that Beck could be granted the same and woul d be allowed to stay in the Philippines permanently with the help of the petitio ner and a certain Mr. Angeles who was also with the BID, for a fee of Ten Thousa nd Pesos (P10,000.00). Hence, Beck and his wife did not appear to have any direc t or personal knowledge of the alleged demand of the petitioner except through t he information allegedly relayed to them by Terencio. Likewise, although Beck cl aimed to have subsequently paid Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), his affidavit i s silent as to the identity of the person who actually received the said amount from him. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of provi ng, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evide nce does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an o rdinary civil case; rather, it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind mi ght accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The complainant clearly failed t

o present the quantum of proof necessary to prove the charge in the subject admi nistrative case, that is, with substantial evidence. Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concern ed. 69 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! OMBUDSMAN; APPEALS FROM THE ORDERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN ARE COGNIZABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN [G.R. No. 149148, April 5, 2002] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: Respondent Santiago B. Villaruz was originally the administra tor of the estate of his mother Remedios Bermejo Villaruz. However, in an order issued by the trial court , he was removed as such for patent neglect of his legal duties and failure to c omply with the court orders. In his place, respondent's eldest brother, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., was appointed regular administrator and was required to file a bond. Thereafter, Nicolas filed a motion for the approval of his bond. Santiago and his brother, Jose Ma. Villaruz, opposed Nicolas' motion and prayed that Jos e Maria be instead appointed regular administrator. Attached to their opposition was a certification executed by their mother Remedios before she passed away. S ubsequently, Judge Patricio denied the oppositors' opposition, while recognizing the validity of the certification executed by Remedios BermejoVillaruz. On Octo ber 12, 1998, Judge Sergio Pestao, to whom the case was in the meantime reassigne d, approved the administrator's bond of respondent Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. Afte r receiving a copy of Judge Pestao's order, respondent Susan Mendoza-Arce, Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, prepared a Letter of Admi nistration (LOA). On December 7, 1998, administrator Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., a ccompanied by three armed security guards and respondent's Deputy Sheriff Charle s Aguiling, took possession of the entire estate of the decedent. This gave rise to the present action. In a letter-complaint to the Ombudsman, respondent Santi ago B. Villaruz alleged that petitioner committed two crimes in issuing the LOA, to wit: 1) falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised P enal Code and 2) Corrupt practice in violation of 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corr upt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019). Respondent accused petitioner of acting "with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence" by fal sely attributing to Judge Pestao the appointment of Nicolas B. Villaruz as new ad ministrator and investing him with "full authority to take possession of all pro perty/ies" of the decedent, because the fact was that it was Judge Patricio who had appointed Nicolas administrator of the estate. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari in this case should have been filed in the Court of Appeals. HELD: NO. In Tirol, Jr. v. del Rosario, it is held that although as a consequenc e of the decision in Fabian v. Desierto, appeals from the orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are now cognizable by the Court of Appeals, ne vertheless in cases in which it is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted with gra ve abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special ci vil action of certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed in the Court to set aside th e Ombudsman's order or resolution. In Kuizon v. Desierto it is again held that t he Court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. In Posadas v. Ombuds man, "the rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. Bu t as has been held, infinitely more important than conventional adherence to gen eral rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free n ot only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexat ious prosecution." Indeed, while the Court's policy is one of non-interference i n the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers with a latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause, nonetheles s exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, to wit: 1. When necessary

to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2. W hen necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression o r multiplicity of actions; 3. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; 70 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! 4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; 5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the o ffense; 8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; 9. Where t he charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance. 10. Whe n there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and motion to quash o n that ground has been denied. OMBUDSMAN; THE COURTS WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE DISCRETION OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE EXCEPT WHEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED ARE IMPAIRED. MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, et al. [G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: see page 25 ISSUE: Whether or not the case warrants t he intervention of the court. HELD: YES. It appears that the charge against resp ondents was previously dismissed. For this reason, there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted, without questioning the dismis sal of the charge against the said respondents, could not and should not be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating their r ight to due process. Ordinarily, the courts will not interfere with the discreti on of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to belie ve that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty there of and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate c ourts. However, the case at bar falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more specifically, the constitutional rights of the accused are impai red and the charges are manifestly false. In cases where the Ombudsman and the S pecial Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether or not probable cause exists, we may interfere with the findings and conclusions. The power to investigate off enses of this nature belongs to the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor. While the Ombudsman may have erred in disregarding the recommendations of the Special Prosecution Officers which appear to be substantiated by the record, he should b e allowed an opportunity to review his decision and, where necessary, correct it . Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledg e. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself in person at ever y stage of the proceedings. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 71 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES; WHERE THE CASE INVOLVES ONLY LEGAL QUESTIONS, THE LITIGA NT NEED NOT EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE SUCH JUDICIAL RELIEF CAN BE SOUGHT. CASTRO vs. SECRETARY RICARDO T. GLORIA [G.R. No. 132174, August 20, 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIEREZ, J: FACTS: Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with the Department of E ducation, Culture and Sports (DECS) a complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against petitioner Gualbe rto Castro, a teacher in Guibuangan Central School, Barili, Cebu. It was alleged that he has an illicit affair with Gutang's wife, petitioner's co-teacher at th e same school. After hearing or on August 28, 1984, the DECS Regional Office VII , through Assistant Superintendent Francisco B. Concillo, rendered a decision de claring petitioner guilty of the offense charged. He was meted the penalty of di smissal from the service. 3 The DECS Central Office affirmed Concillo's decision in an Indorsement dated March 25, 1986. After his motion for reconsideration an d subsequent appeal to the Central DECS office were denied, petitioner filed a p etition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court, imploring that judgment be r endered ordering respondent Secretary or anyone who may have assumed the duties and functions of his office (1) to reduce his penalty from dismissal to one (1) year suspension; 2) to consider the one (1) year suspension as already served co nsidering that he has been out of the service for more than ten (10) years; 3) t o reinstate him to his former position; and 4) to pay his back salaries. On Nove mber 20, 1997, the trial court rendered the herein assailed decision dismissing the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It rule d that petitioner should have appealed to the Civil Service Commission before co ming to court. Petitioner insists that, "when the question to be settled is pure ly a question of law, he may go directly to the proper court so that he can have proper redress." For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) conten ds that petitioner's adequate remedy was to appeal the decision of respondent Se cretary to the Civil Service Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the following is a question of law Is dismissal from the s ervice the proper penalty for the 1st offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct? HELD: YES. In the case at bench, petitioner no longer disputes the administrativ e finding of his guilt for the offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct. It is settled and final insofar as he is concerned. What petitioner only impugns is the correctnes s of the penalty of "dismissal from the service." He is convinced that the prope r penalty for the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is only suspe nsion from the service. Undoubtedly, the issue here is a pure question of law. W e need only to look at the applicable law or rule and we will be able to determi ne whether the penalty of dismissal is in order. As correctly pointed out by pet itioner, the proper penalty for the 1st offense of disgraceful and immoral condu ct is only suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. In fac t, this has been the consistent ruling of this Court. In Aquino v. Navarro, a se condary guidance counselor in a public high school, was merely suspended for dis graceful and immoral conduct. In Burgos v. Aquino, the Court suspended a court s tenographer for six months for maintaining illicit relations with the complainan t's husband and for perjury in not disclosing in her personal information sheet she has a daughter as a result of that relationship. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES; THE PURPOSE OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS TO GIVE THE COMELEC AN OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT THE ERROR IMPUTED TO IT. BERNARDO vs. ABA LOS

[G.R. No. 137266, December 5. 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: 72 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! FACTS: On April 21, 1998, petitioners Antonio M. Bernardo, Ernesto A. Domingo, J r. and Jesus C. Cruz filed with the COMELEC a criminal complaint against respondents Be njamin S. Abalos, Sr., Benjamin C. Abalos, Jr., Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta and Arcadio de Vera for vote buying in violation of Section 261, paragraphs (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), in relation to Section 28 of Re public Act 6646 and Section 68 of the OEC. The complaint, docketed as E.O. Case No. 98-110, alleged that: Respondents sponsored, arranged and conducted an all-ex pense-free transportation, food and drinks affair for the Mandaluyong City publi c school teachers, registered voters of said city, at the Tayabas Bay Beach Reso rt, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. delivered a speech where in he offered and promised the Mandaluyong City public school teachers and emplo yees a hazard pay of P1,000.00, and increasing their allowances from P1,500.00 to P2,000.00 for food, or with a total of P3,000.00 which they will get by the end of the month. The offers and promises to said public school teachers, who are mem bers of the Board of Election Inspectors of Mandaluyong City and registered vote rs thereat, were made a few weeks before the election to induce or unduly influe nce the said teachers and the public in general (the other guests) to vote for t he candidacy of Benjamin Benhur Abalos, Jr. On December 1, 1998, the COMELEC En Ban c issued the assailed Resolution No. 983208 dismissing the complaint "for insuff iciency of evidence to establish prima facie case." On February 09, 1999, petiti oners, without first submitting a motion for reconsideration, filed the instant petition with this Court. ISSUES: Whether petitioners failure to submit a motion for reconsideration was fa tal to his cause of action. HELD: YES. Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level. Specifically, they did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution as required by Section 1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Petitioners failure to file the required motion for reconsiderati on utterly disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended "to achieve an orderly, just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and pr oceeding brought before the Commission." Contrary to petitioners statement that a resort to a motion for reconsideration is "dilatory," it bears stressing that the purpose of the said motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. If the error is immediately corrected by way of a moti on for reconsideration, then it is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse . But if the COMELEC refuses to correct a patently erroneous act, then it commit s a grave abuse of discretion justifying a recourse by the aggrieved party to a petition for certiorari. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rul es of Civil Procedure, as amended, can only be resorted to if "there is no appea l, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Ha ving failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the challenged Re solution, petitioners instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, t hey have not raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse to this Court . JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS JUDICIAL REVIEW; FINDINGS OF FACT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY MUST BE RESPECTED BUT THE SAME SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. OFELIA D. ARTUZ vs. CO URT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 142444, September 13, 2001]

BELLOSILLO, J: FACTS: Private respondent Rene A. Bornales, Legal Aide, Regional Health Office No. VI (RHO VI),0 filed against petitioner Ofelia D. Artuz, then Legal Officer IV, RHO VI, DOH, for Estafa or Swindling through Falsification of Public Documents and/o r Falsification of Public Documents. 73 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In view perhaps of the delay, private respondent Bornales went to the Merit Syst em Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which took cogn izance of the Letter-Complaint and directed Regional Office to conduct the neces sary investigation, and to submit its report and recommendation. Thereafter, on 28 May 1993 the MSPB formally charged petitioner with Dishonesty and Falsificati on of Public Documents. In her answer dated 20 July 1993 petitioner Artuz veheme ntly denied the charges against her, contending that they were "malicious, fabri cated and pure harassment." She maintained that the charges had no factual and l egal basis as she had regularly reported to office and performed her duties as L egal Officer IV during the period in question, as shown by her Daily Time Record s (DTRs) for July and August 1991, which were duly verified by the Personnel Sec tion and finally approved by the Director of RHO VI. Moreover, she asserted that her Punch Cards for those months would tally with her DTRs and further confirm the regularity of her office attendance. According to her, their office was impl ementing the Bundy clock system, and there was no office memorandum or circular requiring the use of the Logbook. Subsequently, petitioner received copy of CSC Resolution No. 981650 finding her guilty of dishonesty and falsification of publ ic documents and imposed upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service incl uding all its accessory penalties. According to the CSC substantial evidence esta blishes the fact that respondent falsified entries in her DTRs for the months of July and August 1991 to enable her to claim her salaries in full. It is, theref ore, clear that she benefited from said deliberate acts of falsification. "In fa lsification or forgery, the person or persons who are or were in possession of, or made use of, or benefited from the forged or falsified documents are legally presumed to be forgers." ISSUE: Whether or not the Logbook is the best evidence to prove the attendance o f any employee as against the DTRs. HELD: NO. The CSC and the CA proceeded in disposing of this case on a wrong prem ise. Both assumed that the Logbook alone would be the best evidence of an employee's attendance in his office. This assumption is erroneous and baseless. Ordinarily, the Logbook is used as a mere locator for those employees who now and then are required to render service or sent on official business outside the office premi ses, or to record events or unusual happenings in the office, unless otherwise s pecified or required in an office memorandum or circular. Just to illustrate the fallacy of this assumption and the unreliability of the Logbook as piece of evi dence: RHO VI sits in Iloilo City. It comprises the Provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Guimaras, Negros Occidental and the Cities of Iloilo, Bacolod, Roxas, Si lay, etc. If an employee of RHO VI is sent on an official business to Bacolod Ci ty and takes the regular trip by boat that leaves Iloilo City at 6:00 o'clock in the morning, arriving at the pier of Bacolod City at 8:00 o'clock, he does not have to go to the regional office before departure time to sign the Logbook. Sim ilarly, when he leaves Bacolod City after office hours at 6:00 o'clock in the af ternoon and arrives in Iloilo at 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he does not have t o pass the office to sign the Logbook, as it would be impractical, unreasonable and absurd! In such case, the office can only rely on his DTR which is not only certified correct by him but also by his chief of office. Findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected and this Court should not be tasked to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body. However, it is axiomatic that such findings of fact should be supported by substantial ev idence. We are not convinced that the non-signing in the Logbook by petitioner A rtuz alone is substantial evidence considering that we have clearly shown in the above discussion that it is not "the best evidence to prove attendance of an em

ployee," unlike the questioned DTRs that were duly certified by the employee con cerned, verified by his immediate supervisor, and authenticated by the head of t he regional office. JUDICIAL REVIEW; WHERE THE LAW PROVIDES FOR AN APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE BO DIES TO THE SUPREME COURT OR COURT OF APPEALS, SUCH BODIES ARE CO-EQUAL WITH THE RTCS. PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION, et al. vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER and LIGH T CO., INC. [G.R. No. 127371, April 25, 2002] 74 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: Pursuant to a Cabinet Memorandum issued by Preside nt Aquino, respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co. (CEPALCO), grantee of a legislative franch ise to distribute electric power to the municipalities of Villanueva, Jasaan and Tagoloan, and the city of Cagayan de Oro, all of the province of Misamis Orient al, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition entitled "In Re: Pet ition for Implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector". The pet ition sought the "discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National Power Corporation (NPC) within CEPALCO's franchise area." After hearing , the ERB rendered a decision granting the petition, and declaring that the peti tioner has been proven to be capable of distributing power to its industrial con sumers and having passed the secondary considerations with a passing mark of 85 and that all direct connection of industries to NPC within the franchise area of CEPALCO is no longer necessary. Therefore, all existing NPC direct supply of po wer to industrial consumers within the franchise area of CEPALCO is hereby order ed to be discontinued. The decision became final and executory. To implement the decision, CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC), petitioner, and ad vised the latter of its desire "to have the power supply of PSC, directly taken from NPC, disconnected, cut and transferred" to CEPALCO. PSC refused CEPALCO's r equest, citing its contract for power supply with NPC effective until July 26, 1 996. To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complain t for injunction against CEPALCO with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. On April 11, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of PSC and PIA. CEPALCO filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the trial cour t in its order dated December 13, 1994. Aggrieved, CEPALCO appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted the petition and dissolved the injuncti on. ISSUE: Whether or not an injunction ordered by the trial court can lie against t he final judgment of the ERB. HELD: NO. "The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a judg ment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execu tion. No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrai n such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, whe n facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitabl e or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its executio n or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief." Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and e xecutory decision is unavailing except only after a showing that facts and circu mstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a cha nge in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated. To disturb the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments. Public interest requires that proceedings already terminated shoul d not be altered at every step, for the rule of non quieta movere prescribes tha t what had already been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of this principle does not commend itself to sound public policy. Corollarily, Section 1 0 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides that a review o f its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court. Settled is the rule th at where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bod ies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature, and logica lly, beyond the control of the latter. Hence, the trial court, being co-equal wi

th the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the latter. It bears stressing that this doctrine of non-interference of trial courts with co-equal administra tive bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of ju stice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opene d, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 75 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! DE FACTO OFFICERS DE FACTO OFFICERS; A DE FACTO OFFICER TAKES THE SALARIES AT HIS RISK. THE GENERA L MANAGER, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) and RAMON ANINO vs. JULIETA MONSERAT E [G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: Julieta Monserate, respondent, started her governm ent service in 1977 as Bookkeeper II in the Port Management Office, PPA, Iloilo City. Barely a year lat er, she was promoted to the position of Cashier II and then as Finance Officer ( SG-16) in 1980. In the early part of 1988, when the PPA underwent a reorganizati on, respondent applied for the permanent position of Manager II (SG-19) of the R esource Management Division, same office. The Comparative Data Sheet 4 accomplis hed by the PPA Reorganization Task Force showed that respondent was ranked #1 in the eligibility. On February 1, 1988, Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General Manager of the PPA, appointed respondent to the position of Manager II (Resource Managem ent Division). On even date, respondent assumed office and discharged the functi ons thereof. On July 8, 1988, the CSC, through Guillermo R. Silva (Assistant Dir ector of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA) approved her appointment. Meanwhile , on April 18, 1988, petitioner Ramon Anino, who ranked second to respondent per the Comparative Data filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board, prote sting against respondent's appointment. The PPA Appeals Board, in a Resolution d ated August 11, 1988, sustained the protest and rendered ineffective respondent' s appointment based on "(1) CSC MC No. 5, s. 1988, Par. 3; (2) CSC MC NO. 10, s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B; and (3) Civil Service Eligibility." These grounds were not explained or discussed in the Resolution. Aggrieved, respondent filed with the PPA General Manager an appeal/request for clarification dated November 2, 1988. She questioned her replacement claiming that the proceedings before the PPA Appeals Board were irregular because (1) she was not notified of the hearin g before it; (2) she was not furnished a copy of the August 11, 1988 PPA Appeals Board Resolution or a copy of the protest filed by petitioner Anino; (3) she wa s not informed of the reasons behind her replacement; and (4) their Port Manager (in Iloilo City), who was then an official member of the Board, was not include d in the said proceedings. On November 8, 1988, pending resolution of her appeal /request for clarification, respondent received a copy of PPA Special Order No. 492-88 dated October 21, 1988, also issued by General Manager Dayan. This PPA Or der officially reassigned her to the position of Administrative Officer (SG-15) which was petitioner Anino's former position and was lower than her previous pos ition as Finance Officer (SG 16) before she was appointed as Division Manager On January 16, 1989, respondent filed with the CSC an appeal formally protesting a gainst petitioner Anino's appointment and at the same time questioning the propr iety of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board. The CSC dismiss ed respondent's appeal. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court nullified the r esolutions of the Board and the Civil Service due to lack of notice and hearing and that the appointment of respondent to the position of Administrative officer constitutes a demotion which violates her rights to security of tenure. The CA ordered also ordered the reinstatement of Monserate to the position of Resource Management Division Manager. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not there was due process when respondent was replaced by petitio ner Anino. (2) Whether or not the appointment of petitioner Anino was valid. HELD: (1) NO. The grounds mentioned against respondents appointment were not supported by the evidence and were in themselves ambiguous. Respondent never had any pendi

ng criminal or administrative case at the time of her appointment as manager. Sh e was not given the chance to 76 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! defend herself or air her side of the story as she was never notified of the res olution of the PPA Appeals Board and was not furnished a copy of the resolution. What she received was the order already ordering her demotion. Therefore the re solution of the PPA Appeals Board is irregular if not null and void. (2) NO. Non etheless, he is considered a de facto officer during the period of his incumbenc y. A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly ex ercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though suc h appointment or election may be irregular. In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that a rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer) occupied the office in good faith and under color of title. A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for wh atever salary he received during the period of his wrongful tenure. The rule is that where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer, during his wrongful i ncumbency, is not entitled to the emoluments attached to the office, even if he occupied the office in good faith. This rule, however, cannot be applied squarel y on the present case in view of its peculiar circumstances. Respondent had assu med under protest the position of Administrative Officer sometime in the latter part of 1988, which position she currently holds. Since then, she has been recei ving the emoluments, salary and other compensation attached to such office. Whil e her assumption to said lower position and her acceptance of the corresponding emoluments cannot be considered as an abandonment of her claim to her rightful o ffice (Division Manager), she cannot recover full back wages for the period when she was unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to back pay different ials for the period starting from her assumption as Administrative Officer up to the time of her actual reinstatement to her rightful position as Division Manag er. Such back pay differentials pertain to the difference between the salary rat es for the positions of Manager II and Administrative Officer. The same must be paid by petitioner Anino corresponding from the time he wrongfully assumed the c ontested position up to the time of his retirement on November 30, 1997. COMMENCEMENT OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS COMMENCEMENT; A CES ELIGIBILITY IS A REQUIREMENT FOR A POSITION EMBRACED IN THE CES. DE LEON vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 127182, December 5, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we ruled t hat private respondent's appointment on August 28, 1986, as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the Minis try of Local Government, was temporary. Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macarai g, we held that since private respondent was not a Career Executive Service (CES ) eligible, his appointment did not attain permanency because he did not possess the required CES eligibility for the CES position to which he was appointed. He nce, he can be transferred or reassigned without violating his right to security of tenure. It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al., decide d on September 26, 1990, where the nature of private respondent's appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, was firs t contested, this Court issued a Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992, holding that Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of private respondent. There was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or a t the time of appointment of petitioner. The CESO was only reconstituted by the appointment of its Board of six (6) members sometime in August 1988. There was n o CESO eligibility examination during petitioner's incumbency in the Department, as there was no CESO board. The first CESO examination was given on August 5 an d 12, 1990. The CESO eligibility was not a requirement at the time of the appoin

tment of petitioner. The only eligibility required is that of a first grader and petitioner is a first grade eligible. Therefore, having met all the requirement s for the position to 77 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due process. Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature of his appointment can no longer be passed u pon and controverted in the present case considering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Court. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents possessed eligibility for a permanent appointm ent which entitles him to security of tenure. HELD: NO. A reading, however, of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was ad opted and declared part of the law of the land by Presidential Decree No. 1, dated Septemb er 24, 1972, clearly shows that a CES eligibility is indeed a requirement for a position embraced in the CES. It bears stressing that in Achacoso v. Macaraig, t he questioned appointment was made on October 16, 1987, before the CES Board was reconstituted in 1988, and before the first CESO examination was given in 1990, as in the present case. Nevertheless, the Court, in Achacoso, ruled that a CES eligibility is required for a CES position, such that an appointment of one who does not possess such eligibility shall be temporary. Evidently, a CES eligibili ty has always been one of the requirements for a position embraced in the CES. T he Court finds no reason to make an exception in the instant controversy. The fo regoing law and circular were never amended nor repealed by the Freedom Constitu tion. A CES eligibility was an existing and operative requirement at the time of private respondent's appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV. Neither w ere the said law and circular inconsistent with the Freedom Constitution as to r ender them modified or superseded. In fact, the Integrated Reorganization Plan a llows the appointment of non-CES eligibles, like private respondent, provided th ey subsequently acquire the needed eligibility. COMMENCEMENT; APPOINTMENT VS. REASSIGNMENT DR. ELEANOR A. OSEA vs. DR. CORAZON E . MALAYA [G.R. No. 139821, January 30, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: On November 20, 1997, petitioner filed Protest Case N o. 91120-004 with the Civil Service Commission. She averred that she was appointed as Officer-in-Charge, Ass istant Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by then Secretary Ricar do T. Gloria of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, upon the endors ement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur; that despite the recommen dation of Secretary Gloria, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed respondent to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur; that respondent's appointment was made without prior consultation with the Provincial School Boar d, in violation of Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Hence, petit ioner prayed that respondent's appointment be recalled and set aside for being n ull and void. In dismissing petitioner's protest, the Civil Service Commission h eld that Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 contemplates a situatio n where the Department of Education, Culture and Sports issues the appointments, whereas respondent's appointment was made by no less than the President, in the exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the designation of respondent as Sc hools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as Schools Divi sion Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments, in which case consultation with the local school board was unnecessary. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review of both the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commiss ion before the Court of Appeals, which however dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the respondent was merely reassigned to Camarines Sur and did not require the mandatory prior c onsultation with the local school board under Section 99 of RA 7160. HELD: NO. Clearly, Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to appointments made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. This is be cause at the time of the enactment of the Local Government Code, schools divisio n superintendents were 78 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! appointed by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to specific divisio n or location. In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Cir cular No. 21, Series of 1994, placing the positions of schools division superint endent and assistant schools division superintendent within the career executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive service positions was transferred from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the President. Under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as Scho ols Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment. Her designation partook of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where she p reviously exercised her functions as Officerin-Charge-Schools Division Superinte ndent, to Camarines Sur. Clearly, therefore, the requirement in Section 99 of th e Local Government Code of 1991 of prior consultation with the local school boar d, does not apply. It only refers to appointments made by the Department of Educ ation, Culture and Sports. Such is the plain meaning of the said law. Appointmen t should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment may be defined as th e selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confi rmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unl ess he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. On the ot her hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organizati onal unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a r eduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appoi ntment. In the same vein, a designation connotes merely the imposition of additi onal duties on an incumbent official. COMMENCEMENT; AN AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT IS A PERMANENT APPOINTMENT; DISAPPROVED AD INTERIM VS. BY-PASSSED AD INTERIM. MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, et al. [G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002] CARPIO, J: FACTS: On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC appointed petitioner as "Acti ng Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On F ebruary 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino S. B. Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a "Temporary" capacity. On March 22, 2001 , President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC C hairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office an d assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman; and Borra and Tuason likewise took t heir oaths of office and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The O ffice of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 20 01 the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmations. However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. This p rocess was repeated twice. On April 11, 2001, COMELEC Chairman Benipayo issued a Memorandum whereby he reaasigned petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner r equested Benipayo to reconsider her reassignment to the Law Department but to no avail. Upon denial, petitioner filed an administrative and criminal complaint w ith the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Ci rcular No. 07 and other pertinent administratve and civil service laws, rules an d regulations. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, p etitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right t o remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.

ISSUES: 79 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! (1) Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a tempo rary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. (2) Whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent a ssumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointme nt under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. (3) Whether or not Ben ipayo's removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID and he r reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having be en done without the approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body. HELD: (1) NO. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes ef fect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appoin tee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by th e Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constit ution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: "The President shall have the power to make a ppointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commissio n on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." Thus, the ad i nterim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis. Hence the ad interim appointme nts extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointm ents prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. (2) NO. Ther e is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Ap pointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a fin al decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking po wer on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its con sent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Consti tution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is fi nal and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this ins tance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the cons titutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment. An ad int erim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Com mission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment i s one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Ap pointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision b y the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointm ent as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. (3) NO. The Chair man, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own au thority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil S ervice Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law t o secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's appointment papers da ted February 2, 1999, February 15, 2000 and February 15, 2001, indisputably show that she held her Director IV position in the EID only in an acting or temporar y capacity. Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service (CES) officer, and neit her does she hold Career Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary qual ifications for holding the position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualific

ations Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission. Obviousl y, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV. 80 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! POWERS AND DUTIES OF A PUBLIC OFFICER POWERS AND DUTIES; MANDAMUS WILL LIE ONLY TO COMPEL THE PERFORMANCE OF A MINISTE RIAL DUTY BUT NOT TO FULFILL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. G & S TRANSPORT CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 120287, May 28, 2002] BELLOSILLO, J: FACTS: Petitioner G & S Transport Corporation (G & S), with the n ame and style Avis Rent-ACar, was the exclusive operator of coupon taxi services at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) under a five (5)-year contract of concession with respondent Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). Th e concession contract expired but was renewed by the parties on a monthly basis "until such time when a new concessionaire (shall have been) chosen." Under the arrangement, G & S was able to operate the coupon taxi service uninterruptedly b eyond the period of five (5) years originally awarded by MIAA. On 12 July 1994 M IAA initiated proceedings for public bidding to choose two (2) concessionaires o f the coupon taxi services at the NAIA. Five (5) firms pre-qualified to join. Co nsequently, MIAA selected 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN as the winning bidders and i ssued in their favor the respective notice of awards of the coupon taxi service concession. Petitioner G & S filed a complaint for injunction and mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against MIAA and its Gene ral Manager, 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN. The complaint sought to disqualify 2000 TRANSPORT from the award of the concession contract the bidding including petiti oner G & S and respondents 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN and it also asserted that t he concession contract should have been executed in favor of G & S. The trial co urt dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against herein respondents and that mandamus was unavailable to compe l the award of the concession contract in favor of G & S since such decision was discretionary upon the MIAA. The Court of Appeals granted the petitions for cer tiorari of 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN, set aside the order of the trial court iss uing the writ of preliminary injunction, and prohibited the trial court from "he aring and taking further cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same. The appellate court held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it issued the writ of preliminary injunction since under PD 1818 no court would hav e jurisdiction to restrain the operation of a public utility and since the selec tion of winning bidders was solely the discretion of the sponsoring government a gency. ISSUE: Whether or not a mandamus was available to compel the award of the conces sion contract in favor of the petitioner. HELD: NO. It is a settled rule that mandamus will lie only to compel the perform ance of a ministerial duty but does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual oblig ations. Only such duties as are clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by r eason of official station are to be enforced by the writ. Whether MIAA will ente r into a contract for the provision of a coupon taxi service at the internationa l airport is entirely and exclusively within its corporate discretion. It does n ot involve a duty the performance of which is enjoined by law and thus this Cour t cannot direct the exercise of this prerogative. Indeed the determination of th e winning bidders should be left to the sound judgment of the MIAA which is the agency in the best position to evaluate the proposals and to decide which bid wo uld most complement the NAIA's services. The exercise of such discretion is a po licy decision that necessitates such procedures as prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation and deliberation. This process would necessarily entail the technical expertise of MIAA which the courts do not possess in order to eval

uate the standards affecting this matter -- courts, as a rule, refuse to interfe re with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exer cise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally b etter 81 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! equipped technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal facto rs, such as government policy on the matter, are usually involved in the decisio ns. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; PUBLIC SERVICE REQUIRES UTMOST INTEGRITY AND STRIC TEST DISCIPLINE POSSIBLE OF EVERY PUBLIC SERVANT. BALTAZAR LL. FIRMALO vs. MELIN DA C. QUIRREZ [A.M. No. P-00-1401, January 29, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: On May 20, 1996, then Presiding Judge, Cezar R. Marav illa, of RTC-Branch 82 of Odiongan, issued an order reprimanding and censuring the respondent for insubord ination and gross inefficiency. The reprimand arose from the respondents failure to submit an inventory of cases and to schedule certain criminal cases in the co urt calendar. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court required the respondent to submit a wr itten explanation why no administrative sanction should be rendered against her. Several months thereafter, respondent was re-assigned to the typing of orders, decisions clearances, etc. However, she failed to perform these tasks efficientl y as shown by her works marred by omissions, spelling syntax and error. Responde nt filed her comment stating that the matter of her failure to calendar the crim inal cases was deemed closed and terminated following the submission of her expl anation. She further pointed out that the errors she committed were already corr ected and remedied. Upon submission of this case to the Office of the Court Admi nistrator (OCA) for evaluation and recommendation, the said office recommended t hat respondent be ordered to pay a fine of Php 1,000.00 with a stern warning tha t that a commission of similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty as found by the OCA. HELD: YES. I ndeed, the respondent has all but admitted the wrongdoing complained of when she stated, among others, that the exhibits submitted to your Office are Orders o f the then judges (retired and returned to regular station) typewritten by me sh owing an error in the margin. These, however, have been accordingly corrected. Whi le indeed respondent may have corrected and remedied her mistakes and shortcomings, it must be stressed that requisite competence and efficiency is not confined to those isolated instances pointed out by complainant but is a continuous obligati on demanded of her for so long as she serves in the judiciary. Sine the administ ration of justice is a sacred task, the person involved in it ought to live up t o the strictest standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness. It bears stressi ng once again that public service requires utmost integrity and the strictest di scipline possible of every public servant. A public office is a public trust tha t enjoins all public officers and employees, particularly those serving in the j udiciary to respond to the highest degree of dedication often even beyond person al interest. As held in the case Mendoza vs. Mabutas, the Court condemns and wou ld never countenance such conduct, act or omission on the part of all those invo lved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public acc ountability and diminish and even just tend to diminish the faith if the people in the Judiciary. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; THOSE INVOLVED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE CA RRY A HEAVY BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY. 82 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit

o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! TERESITA H. ZIPAGAN vs. JOVENCIO N. TATTAO [A.M. No. P-01-1512, September 24, 2001] PANGANIBAN, J: FACTS: Complainant claims that on 26 February 1998 she went to th e Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela to discuss an important of ficial matter with the presiding judge of said Court. Thereafter she talked with a certain Mrs. Albano, the officer-incharge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela regarding her consultation with the judge. It was at that juncture that respondent berated her saying [G]et out of this place, we don't rec eive orders from the Department of Justice because we are under the Supreme Cour t, you [have been] a sucker ever since the time of Judge Vera Cruz. Afterwards, r espondent slapped her right cheek and hit her right eye with a glass with water causing her to become wet. As a result of the incident she suffered injury in he r right eye. In his COMMENT dated 02 June 1998, respondent avers that on 26 Febr uary 1998, complainant entered their office and therein shouted so many utterance s which disturbed the people who [were] attending the trial of cases set for sai d date.' He told her not to shout since their office [was] not a market place bu t complainant went near him and threw the 'glass of Sprite' he was drinking (res pondent was taking his merienda that time). Thereafter, Zipagan hit him with a b allpen, wounding his right elbow in the process so he slapped her with his left hand. Still, complainant kept on attacking him and was only pacified when Utilit y Worker Gerard Vinasoy brought her out of the office. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent failed to measure up to that behavior expected of a court employee. HELD: YES. Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the conduct of e very employee of the judiciary must be at all times characterized [by] propriety 'and decorum and above all else, it must be above and beyond suspicion." We have rei terated in several cases that "the conduct and behavior of every official and em ployee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presidin g judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among ot hers, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the pub lic for the judiciary.'' Moreover, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees (RA 6713) implements the State policy of promotin g a high standard of ethical responsibility in the public service. Specifically, Section 4 of the Code requires "[p]ublic officials and employees . . . [to] res pect the rights of others, and . . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, go od morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public i nterest." Clearly, the brash and callow behavior of respondent is unbecoming a c ourt employee. Assuming that complainant was disturbing the orderly administrati on of justice with her noisy chatter, respondent should have exercised more pati ence and adopted a more prudent manner in asking her to leave the office. His ab rupt interruption of the conversation, followed by his slapping her face and hit ting her right eye has shamed not only the court he was serving, but the entire judiciary as well. Clearly, respondent has degraded the dignity of the judiciary and undermined the people's faith and confidence in it. Indeed, the Court looks with great disfavor [upon] any display of animosity by any court employee. Cour t personnel must, at all times, act with strict propriety and proper decorum so as to earn the public's regard for the judiciary. Improper behavior, particularl y during office hours, exhibits not only a paucity of professionalism at the wor kplace but also a great disrespect to the court itself. Such a demeanor is a fai

lure of circumspection demanded of every public official and employee. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; THE GROUND FOR REMOVAL OF A JUDICIAL OFFICER SHOUL D BE ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. ANG vs. JUDGE ASIS [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1590, January 15, 2002] 83 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: In a Complaint-Affidavit dated April 7, 2000 filed wi th the Office of the Court Administrator, Gina B. Ang charged Judge Enrique C. Asis, Presiding Judge of Bra nch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, with Bribery, Extortion an d Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act relative to Election Cas e No. 98-01. Sometime in October 1998, while her election protest was pending, r espondent allegedly intimated to complainant's lawyers that he will decide the c ase in complainant's favor in exchange for monetary consideration. Without her k nowledge, complainant's father delivered to respondent the total amount of P140, 000.00 on three occasions in October 1998, January 1999, and April 1999. Sometim e in December 1998, complainant was told by her lawyers that respondent had requ ested assistance in the promotion of his brother, then Examiner II at the Bureau of Customs, through complainant's cousin, Atty. Ramon Salazar, Jr., who was the Chief of Staff of the Customs Commissioner. Complainant refused but, unbeknown to her, her family immediately contacted her cousin and respondent's brother was soon promoted. Subsequently, complainant learned that respondent had requested that his son be admitted for training at the Philippine Heart Center. Complainan t refused as she might be misinterpreted as extending any assistance to responde nt in order to obtain a favorable decision. Nevertheless, she acceded to her law yer's request to bring respondent's son to Manila and even paid for the latter's plane fare and accommodation until his application was granted by the Philippin e Heart Center. In January 2000, complainant allegedly received a call from resp ondent telling her that his son needed P4,000.00 for his training. Thinking that this was a request for a loan, she agreed. Since she did not have cash at the t ime, she asked her friend to give a check to respondent's son. On March 14, 2000 , respondent rendered his decision in the election protest declaring Caridad Ato k winner in the mayoralty race. Respondent filed his Comment. He vehemently deni ed the charges of complainant and instead, he cited various citations he receive d as a member of the Judiciary of Biliran because of his integrity. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of Bribery, Extortion and Viola tion of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. HELD: NO. From the affidavit-complaint of the complainant, it will be noted that all the charges of complainant are based on informations (sic) allegedly given or passed on to h er by her lawyers. Complainant's lawyers in her electoral protest filed in the s ala of respondent Judge Asis were Attorneys Lee and Matriano. However, complaina nt did not present any of these lawyers, Attys. Lee or Matriano, to corroborate her allegations that they, Attys. Lee and Matriano, were approached by responden t "intimating" that for a consideration he will render a favorable decision for complainant in the electoral protest. The ground for the removal of a judicial o fficer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect , corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rule in regard to admissibility in evidence in criminal trials apply. In short, this Court can not give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. While this Court will never tol erate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate the norm of pub lic accountability or diminish the people's faith in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that only ser ve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice For admi nistrative liability to attach it must be established that respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some mora l obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through som e motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contempla

tes a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive o f self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damag e. 84 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In the case at bar, the record does not show that respondent judge was moved by ill-will or bad faith in rendering the adverse judgment, or that his ruling was manifestly unjust. Complainant has not, in fact, adduced any proof to show that impropriety attended the issuance of the subject decision. To reiterate, bad fai th is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; JUDGES MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE ADMINISTRATIVELY RES PONSIBLE FOR EVERY ERROR OR MISTAKE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES. GERRY JA UCIAN vs. SALVACION B. ESPINAS [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1641, May 9, 2002] PANGANIBAN, J: FACTS: Complainant, as losing mayoral candidate for the Municipal ity of Daraga, Albay, in the May 11, 1998 local elections, filed a petition, dated May 22, 1998, denominated as an 'election protest and/or revision/recounting of votes,' on the ground that fraud and anomalies were allegedly committed during the aforesaid local electio ns, both in the course of voting and during the counting and tabulation of the b allots, to his prejudice. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the r evision or recounting of the ballots in the contested 114 precincts as enumerate d in his petition, the nullification and setting aside of the proclamation of Wi lson Andes as mayor, and his own proclamation as mayor. Later, respondent judge issued the assailed Order, dated March 8, 1999 which contained a finding that 'o nly thirteen (13) ballot boxes were found well supported to warrant the approval of the relief being sought by the protestant. Complainant asserts that responde nt judge should have ordered a revision of the ballots in all the precincts alle ged in the Complaint, pursuant to Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code. To j ustify her March 8, 1999 Order directing a partial revision of the ballots, resp ondent cites The Updated Election Code of the Philippines as modified/amended. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge can be held administratively liable f or gross ignorance of the law. HELD: YES. Judges may be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law when it is shown that motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption they ignor ed, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and jurisprudence. In this case, respondent's Order on a very basic subject was patently erroneous. 16 Her failu re to observe the requirements prescribed by the Omnibus Election Code for an el ection protest is inexcusable. First, the said Code took effect on December 3, 1 985, long before the 1998 elections. Second, the evidence shows that she acted i n bad faith. Judges may not be held liable administratively responsible for ever y error or mistake in the performance of their duties; otherwise, that would mak e their position unbearable. To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistak e must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate, or in bad faith. In the absenc e of proof to the contrary, a defective or erroneous decision or order is presum ed to have been issued in good faith. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; GOOD FAITH IS ALWAYS PRESUMED UNLESS CONVINCING EV IDENCE TO THE CONTRARY IS ADDUCED. ANDRADE vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 127932, December 7, 2001] DE LEON JR, J: FACTS: On July 6, 1971, petitioner was appointed as permanent tea cher in the Division of City Schools, Manila. She was initially assigned as English teacher at the Araullo Hi gh School, Manila. On June 14, 1985, two (2) days before the opening of classes

for the school year 1985-1986, petitioner was not given any teaching load. 85 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In an indorsement dated July 30, 1985, addressed to Superintendent Coronel, priv ate respondent Wingsing cited three (3) reasons why petitioner Andrade was not g iven any teaching load: (1) drastic drop of enrollment; (2) she was declared an excess teacher; and (3) she ranked lowest in her performance rating. Hence, on A ugust 22, 1985, Superintendent Coronel informed the petitioner, through private respondent Wingsing, that the petitioner would be designated to a non-teaching p osition in the meantime that arrangements were being made for her eventual reass ignment to other schools where her services may be needed. Feeling aggrieved, pe titioner filed an action for damages with mandatory injunction against private r espondent Dominador S. Wingsing, English Department Head Virginia E. Fermin and Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Arturo F. Coronel before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City. Petitioner contends that public respondent Court of Appeals erred in applying the Orcino Doctrine and that Sec. 31 of P.D. No. 8 07, otherwise known as the Civil Service Commission, Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 4670, ot herwise known as The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers and R.A. No. 2260, a s amended should be the applicable laws. Petitioner asserts that private respond ent Wingsing failed to comply with the said laws considering that no performance evaluation plan which can be the basis for personal action was ever presented i n evidence to justify the latter's actions. What was shown were performance rati ng sheets and the Certification on the Audit of Teachers, allegedly prepared by petitioner's coteachers and personnel from the Office of the Research and Evalua tion Services, which petitioner Andrade did not conform to nor sign. Petitioner also doubts the veracity of private respondent Wingsing's claim that there was a reduction of classes for the school year 1985-1986 as reason for her being decl ared as an excess teacher since Araullo High School even hired three (3) more ne w teachers that school year. To underscore her claim that she had been singled o ut, petitioner asserts that, contrary to the declaration of respondent Wingsing, there was no other person declared as an excess teacher in Araullo High School for that school year. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is liable for damages. HELD: NO. "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good fa ith." The elements of abuse of one's rights under the said Article 19 (New Civil Code) are the following: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exerc ised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. I n this regard, it appeared that the complaint of petitioner Andrade failed to me et the second and third requirements. Wingsing was not at all dictated by whim o r fancy, nor of spite against the petitioner but was rather guided by the follow ing factors: qualification to teach, seniority, teaching performance and attitud e towards the school community. For two (2) consecutive years petitioner receive d an unsatisfactory rating, the lowest, from two (2) English Department Heads, n amely: Herminia Valdez and Virginia Fermin. Petitioner knew about her poor ratin g, but she refused to acknowledge it. She did not question nor contest the same. Contrary to the claim of petitioner, there were no new teachers hired that scho ol year in Araullo High School; rather, existing substitute teachers were merely given permanent designation or assigned new subjects, significantly, prior to t he teachers' audit or to the declaration of excess teachers on July 27, 1985. En trenched is the rule that bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negl igence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doi ng of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. In the case at bar, we find that there was no "dishonest purpose," or "some moral obliquity," or "conscious doing of a wron g," or "breach of a known duty," or "some motive or interest or ill will" that c an be attributed to the private respondent. It appeared that efforts to accommod ate petitioner were made as she was offered to handle two (2) non-teaching jobs,

that is, to handle Developmental Reading lessons and be an assistant Librarian, pending her reassignment or transfer to another work station, but she refused. The same would not have been proposed if the intention of private respondent wer e to cause undue hardship on the petitioner. Good faith is always presumed unles s convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced. It is incumbent upon the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently prove such allegation. Absent enough proof t hereof, the presumption of good faith prevails. In the case at bar, the burden o f proving alleged bad faith therefore was with petitioner but she failed to disc harge such onus probandi. 86 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Without a clear and persuasive evidence of bad faith, the presumption of good fa ith in favor of private respondent stands. As explained by payroll clerk Aida So liman, petitioner's name was not deleted from the regular monthly payroll but me rely transferred to the last page of the roll since she failed to submit her For m 48 or Daily Time Record (DTR) sheet on time. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; WITHDRAWAL OF A COMPLAINT OR SUBSEQUENT DESISTANCE BY THE COMPLAINANT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE DOES NOT NECESSARILY WARRANT ITS D ISMISSAL. ISAGANI RIZON vs. JUDGE OSCAR E. ZERNA [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1575, September 17, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: Complainant Rizon filed an election protest before the RTC pr esided by respondent Judge Zerna. Complainant contested the election of protestee Ong for the positio n of Mayor of the Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte, the latter having been proclaimed as winner in the May 11, 1998 elections. On November 22, 1998, the p arties submitted the case for decision but the case had remained undecided withi n three (3) months after its submission. On February 26, 1998 complainant filed a "Motion to Render Early Decision," which according to complainant, fell on "de af ears." Complainant thus filed an affidavit-complaint before this Court chargi ng respondent with "willful, deliberate, and malicious delay in rendering the de cision." Upon evaluation of the complaint and respondent Judge's comment thereto , the OCA submitted a report to this Court finding the judge guilty of gross ine fficiency, the delay in the disposition of the case being inexcusable. The repor t stated, among other things, that: Judge Zerna has a history of delay in decidin g cases, he failed to render decision within the ninety (90) day period and to a ccordingly render decision in twenty two (22) criminal cases, seventeen (17) civ il cases, five (5) criminal and nine (9) civil cases appealed from the lower cou rts, and other pending matters in four (4) cases; to take appropriate action for the early resolution of twenty eight (28) other cases; to take further action o n thirty two (32) others which he failed to act on or set in the court calendar after the lapse of considerable length of time; and to act on twenty three (23) other cases that could already be archived. Pending resolution of this case, comp lainant filed before the Supreme Court an Affidavit of Desistance, stating that "after careful deliberation," he found that the case "does not merit further pro secution." Complainant informed the Court that he is "no longer interested in pu rsuing the complaint." ISSUE: Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance filed by the complainant can a bsolve the respondent from liability. HELD: NO. Complainant's desistance cannot absolve respondent from liability. In Enojas, Jr. vs. Gacott, Jr., we said: To begin with, withdrawal of a complaint or subsequent desistance by the complainant in an administrative case does not necessarily war rant its dismissal. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be detesta ble. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power. The Court does not dismiss administ rative cases against members of the Bench merely on the basis of withdrawal of t he charges. Desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to investigat e and decide the complaint against the respondent. To be sure, public interest i s at stake in the conduct and actuation of officials and employees of the judici ary. And the program and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of just ice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangem

ents between the parties. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; IN THE ABSENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, ANDMINISTR ATIVE LIABILITY COULD NOT BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY. 87 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ANTONIO G. PRINCIPE vs. FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB), OFFICE OF T HE OMBUDSMAN [G.R. No. 145973, January 23, 2002] PARDO, J: FACTS: On February 19, 1991, then City Mayor of Antipolo City, Daniel S. Garcia, endorsed the Philjas Corporation to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for the creation, development and sale of lots of the Cherry Hills Subdivision (CHS ) located in the abovementioned city. Thereafter, Philjas was issued different p ermits and documents for purposes of proceeding with the project. Eventually, a Small Scale Mining Permit (SSMP) was issued to Philjas to extract and remove 10, 000 cu. Meters of filling materials from the area where the proposed subdivision is to be constructed. However, another respondent (in the CA case) informed Phi ljas that CHS is within the EIS System and as such must secure ECC from the DENR . Subsequently, Philjas applied for an ECC permit. Upon the recommendation of on e of the subordinates of herein petitioner, the latter approved Philjass applicat ion for an ECC permit. The petitioner approved the same based from the Inspectio n Report conducted by petitioners subordinates. The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding the petitioner Principe administratively liable for Gross Neglect of Du ty and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from office. The CA affirmed th e Ombudsmans decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman may dismiss petitioner from the service on an admin istrative charge for gross neglect of duty, initiated, investigated and decided by the Ombudsman himself without substantial evidence to support his findings of gross neglect of duty because the duty to monitor and inspect the project was n ot vested in the petitioner. HELD: NO. DAO 38-1990 specifically points out the functions of the office attach ed to the petitioner and nowhere in it can be found the latters responsibility of monitorin g housing and land development projects. The Ombudsman, without taking into cons ideration the lawfully mandated duties and functions attached to petitioners posi tion, immediately concluded that as the signing and approving authority of the E CC issued to Philjas, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to conduct actual mon itoring and enforce strict compliance with the terms of the ECC. Hence, how coul d petitioner be guilty of neglecting a duty, which is not even his to begin with ? Administrative liability could not be based on the fact that petitioner was th e person who signed and approved the ECC, without proof of actual act or omissio n constituting neglect of duty. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross neglect of petitioner, administrative liability could not be based on the princi ple of command responsibility. The negligence of the petitioners subordinates is not tantamount to his own negligence. It was not within the mandated responsibil ities of petitioner to conduct actual monitoring of projects. The principles gov erning public officers under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 clearly pro vide that a head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liab le for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his s ubordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSES DO NOT PRESCRIBE. FLORIA v s. SUNGA [A.M. NO. CA-01-10-P 1, November 14, 2001]

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration for an admini strative case filed against Alda Floria by her fellow employees in the Court of Appeals, which was previously dismissed by this Court. Said Floria was complained for immorality for having an illicit r elationship with a married man, for falsification for tampering her childrens bir th certificates with a legitimate status, and for misrepresentation by claiming that she earned a Masterals Degree. The prior case was 88 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! dismissed on the ground that the illicit relationship was ongoing and the presen ce of ill motive on the part of the complainants. ISSUE: Does the fact that the offense was no longer existing exculpate a person from an administrative complaint? HELD: NO. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. It bears stressing that it i s not in accordance with the norms of morality for a woman, even if single, to maintain a n illicit relationship with a married man. Even if such relationship had ended, the stigma of immorality still attaches to the parties, especially the woman. Th is is specially so when the persons concerned are public employees who are suppo sed to maintain a high standard of morality in order to live up to their role as models in society. The fact that the illicit relationship has ceased will only mitigate her culpability. This Court demands that every employee of the judiciar y must adhere to the exacting standards of honesty, integrity, morality, and dec ency in his professional and personal conduct, thus: "Every employee of the judi ciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any publi c servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only i n the performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealing s with other people, to preserve the court's good name and standing. It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, o fficial and otherwise, of the personnel who worked thereat, from the judge to th e lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the e xacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private cond uct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; NO ONE CAN BE SAID TO HAVE ANY VESTED RIGHT IN AN OFF ICE OR ITS SALARY; EXCEPTION. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: On 30 June 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquin o issued Executive Order (EO) No. 1273 establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the structural organization of the Department of Finance. It was made as the agency of primary responsibility for anti smuggling operations in all la nd areas and inland waters and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. On 7 January 2000, motivated by the fact that the desig nated functions of the EIIB are also being performed by the other existing agenc ies of the government and that there is a need to constantly monitor the overlappi ng functions among these agencies, former President Joseph Estrada issued EO No.1 911 ordering the deactivation of EIIB and the transfer of its functions to the B ureau of Customs and the National Bureau of Investigation. On 29 March 2000, for mer President Estrada issued EO No. 2232 providing that all EIIB personnel occup ying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from the service effe ctive 30 April 2000, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to aboliti on, redundancy, merger, division or consolidation of positions. Petitioners, who for themselves and in behalf of others with whom they share a common or general interest, filed the instant petition seeking the nullification of EO Nos. 1911 and 2232 based on the grounds presented as issues below. ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed EOs violate the right to security of tenure. HELD: NO. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an off ice within the

competence of a legitimate body done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Va lid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. 89 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In Dario v. Mison, it was ruled that reorganizations in this jurisdiction have be en regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to e xist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition, which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for the political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, other wise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition do ne is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a c hange of nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an of fice or its salary. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; DISTINCTION AMONG EMPLOYEES MUST BE BASED ON SUBSTANT IAL DISTINCTIONS. CRUZ, et, al. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT [G.R. No. 134740, October 23, 2001] PARDO, J: FACTS: Since 1963, the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA), a govern ment owned corporation, adopted various resolutions granting the payment of social ameliora tion benefits (SAB) to all its employees, sourced from corporate funds. In May 1 994, the Resident Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) in the SRA, Juanita V illarosa examined the accounts of the SRA. Pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. 6758, which provides that such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kin d, being received by the incumbents only as of 1 July 1989, not integrated into the standardized rates shall continue to be authorized, Villarosa questioned the legality of the payment of the SAB to all employees of the SRA. In a letter date d 26 September 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) ruled that th e grant of the SAB had no legal basis and was in violation of R.A. 6758. Accordi ngly, the auditor suspended the payment of SAB to SRA employees. The SRA Adminis trator filed a letter with the COA requesting the lifting of the suspension. In the meantime, the affected SRA employees appealed to the Office of the President for the continued grant of SAB. The COA denied the request for the lifting of s uspension of payment of SAB, claiming that upon the effectivity of R.A. 6758 (on 1 July 1989), the grant of the SAB was no longer allowed unless there was a pri or authority from the DBM or Office of the President or a legislative issuance. On 11 May 1996, the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben T orres, issued a 1st Indorsement, granting post facto approval/ratification of th e SAB to SRA employees. On the basis thereof, SRA filed a motion for reconsidera tion with the COA for the lifting of the suspension of payment of SAB to its emp loyees. COA allowed the payment of SAB to SRA employees but only to those hired before 31 October 1989. Other employees remained not entitled to said benefits. ISSUE: Whether or not COA gravely abused its discretion in denying SAB to SRA em ployees hired before 31 October 1989. HELD: YES. The classification of COA as to who were entitled to the SAB and excl uding therefrom those employees hired after 31 October 1989, has no legal basis. The d ate of hiring of an employee cannot be considered as a substantial distinction. The employees, based on the title or position they were holding, were exposed to the same type of work, regardless of the date they were hired. The date of hiri

ng is not among the factors that shall be taken into consideration in fixing com pensation or granting of benefits. R.A. 6758, Section 2 provides, thus: Sec. 2. S tatement of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equ al pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substant ive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements o f the positions. xxx Evidently, any distinction among employees must be based on substantial differences, that is, level or rank, degree of 90 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! difficulty and amount of work. To discriminate against some employees on the bas is solely of the date of hiring is to run against the progressive and social pol icy of the law. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; THOSE WHO SIT AS ALTERNATES FOR DEPARTMENT SECRETARIE S ARE LIKEWISE PROHIBITED FROM RECEIVING ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION. DELA CRUZ, et al. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT [G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: On September 19, 1997, the COA issued Memorandum N o. 97-038 directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and government-o wned and controlled corporations which have effected payment of any form of addi tional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and a ssistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positi ons, to (a) immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation o r remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials, and (b) effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Ban c Decision in the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secr etary and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc, et al. vs. Secretary of Agr arian Reform, et al., promulgated on February 22, 1991. The COA Memorandum furth er stated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which became final and executory on August 19, 1991, declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar a s it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other offices , in addition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor. Pe titioners, through then Chairman Dionisio C. Dela Serna of the NHA Board of Dire ctors, appealed from the Notice of Disallowance to the Commission on Audit based on the following grounds: 1. The Decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Liberti es Union and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. was clarified in the Res olution of the Court En Banc on August 1, 1991, in that the constitutional ban a gainst dual or multiple positions applies only to the members of the Cabinet, th eir deputies or assistants. It does not cover other appointive officials with eq uivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant Secretary; and 2. Th e NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries a nd that they occupy positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners, as mere alternates are entitled to their repr esentation allowances. HELD: NO. Presidential Decree No. 757 is the law "Creating the National Housing Authority and dissolving the existing housing agencies, defining its powers and functions, providing funds therefor, and for other purposes." Section 7 thereof provides: SECTION 7. Board of Directors. The Authority shall be governed by a Board of Dir ectors, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall be composed of the Sec retary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the Director-General o f the National Economic and Development Authority, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Industry, the Executive Secretary and the General Manager of the Authority. From among the members, the President will app oint a chairman. The members of the Board may have their respective alternates w ho shall be the officials next in rank to them and whose acts shall be considere d the acts of their principals with the right to receive their benefit: Provided , that in the absence of the Chairman, the Board shall elect a temporary presidi ng officer. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employme nt under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be const

rued as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is t hat these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. 91 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! It may be conceded that the directors concerned occupy positions lower than Assi stant Secretary which may exempt them from the prohibition (under) the doctrine enunciated in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, supra. However, the ir positions are merely derivative; they derive their authority as agents of the authority they are representing; their power and authority is sourced from the power and authority of the cabinet members they are sitting for. Sans the cabine t members, they are non-entities, without power and without personality to act i n any manner with respect to the official transactions of the NHA. The agent or representative can only validly act and receive benefits for such action if the principal authority he is representing can legally do so for the agent can only do so much as his principal can do. The agent can never be larger than the princ ipal. If the principal is absolutely barred from holding any position in and abs olutely prohibited from receiving any remuneration from the NHA or any governmen t agency, for that matter, so must the agent be. Indeed, the water cannot rise a bove its source. Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-officio membe rs of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving "extra (additional) compensat ion, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, o r some other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alter nates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; SECURITY OF TENURE DEPENDS UPON THE NATURE OF THE APP OINTMENT WHICH IN TURN DEPENDS UPON THE POSSESSION OF THE REQUISITE ELIGIBILITY. MA. CHONA M. DIMAYUGA vs. MARIANO E. BENEDICTO II [G.R. No. 144153, January 16, 2002] DE LEON, JR., J: FACTS: On October 26, 1992, then Secretary of Public Works and Highways Jose P. Dimayuga issued a permanent appointment in favor of petitioner Chona M. Dimayuga as Executive Director II of the Toll Regulatory Board (Board, for brevity). As its highest-ranking working official, the petitioner exercised supervision and c ontrol over the boards three divisions. She also oversaw the Boards Build-OperateTransfer (BOT) projects. At the time, the position of Executive Director II was not deemed part of the Career Executive Service (CES), that is until June 4, 199 3, when it was included therein. On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission i ssued Memorandum Circular No. 21, providing among others, that incumbents of posi tions which are declared to be CES positions are for the first time pursuant to this resolution who hold permanent appointment thereto shall remain under perman ent status in their respective positions. However, upon promotion or transfer to other CES positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary status in said p ositions until they qualify. Petitioner alleges that she had been a subject of se veral administrative and criminal complaints which were all designed to coerce h er removal. As a consequence of such complaints, DPWH Secretary Vigilar issued a first 90-day suspension order which was followed by another 90-day suspension i ssued this time by Executive Secretary Alexander Aguirre. After the expiration o f the last suspension order, petitioner was directed by DPWH Secretary Vigilar t o the Legal Service Department to assist in the implementation of P.D. 1096 (Nat ional Building Code of the Philippines). As a gesture of protest to such order o f the Secretary, the petitioner filed a leave of absence rather than assume a po sition which she considered as a demotion. On September 28, 1998, while she was on leave, petitioner received a letter from Secretary Vigilar informing her that President Estrada had appointed Mariano Benedicto II as the new Executive Direc tor II of the Board. As a consequence thereof, petitioner filed a petition for q uo warranto before the Court of Appeals which the latter tribunal dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent inclusion of the petitioners position under

the CES would automatically qualify the latter for the said position even in the absence of the required eligibility. HELD: NO. The mere fact that a position belongs to a Career Service does not aut omatically confer security of tenure o its occupant even if he does not possess the require d qualifications. 92 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn d epend on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or , only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting c apacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be so regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. In the doct rinal case of Cuevas vs. Bacal, the Court emphasized two (2) salient points, to wit: First, in order to qualify an appointment as permanent, the appointee must possess the rank appropriate to the position. Failure in this respect will rende r the appointment merely temporary. Second, security of tenure in the Career Exe cutive Service (CES) is thus acquired with respect to rank and not to position. The guaranty of security of tenure to the members of the CES does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointeda concept which is applica ble only to first and second level employees in the civil servicebut to the rank to which they are appointed by the President. The Court reiterates the above poi nts if only to serve as a contradistinction to petitioners arguments. If a career executive officers security of tenure pertains only to his rank and not to his p osition, with greater reason then that petitioner herein, who is not even a CESO eligible, has no security of tenure with regard to the position of Executive Di rector II of the Toll Regulatory Board which was earlier classified on June 4, 1 993 as part of the CES or prior to the issuance of the CSC Memo. Circ. No. 21 da ted May 31, 1994. Lastly, and as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor-General, non-eligibles holding permanent appointments to CES positions were never meant to remain immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would b e a premium vesting them with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege even their eligible counterpart do not enjoy. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; THE EXERCISE OF MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE BY THE GOVERNM ENT CORPORATIONS IS LIMITED BY THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF LAW. BAYBAY WATER DI STRICT vs. COMMISSSION ON AUDIT [G.R. No. 147248-49, January 23, 2002] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: In 1996, the Resident Auditor of the BWD conducted an audit o f its 1994 accounts. In the course of the audit, the auditor disallowed payments of per diems in excess of those authorized by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) and P.D. 198, RATA (representation and transportation allowance, etc. Respondents were se rved with notices of such disallowance. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not members of the Board of Directors of water districts are enti tled to receive benefits in addition to those authorized to be paid pursuant to their charter and the guidelines of the LWUA. (2) Whether or not the disallowanc e of duplication of claims of transportation allowance of various BWD employees, as well as the grant of RATA, rice allowance, and excessive per diems to member s of the board of directors of BWD, would impair vested rights, violate any rule against diminution of benefits, and undermine the management prerogatives of wa ter districts. (3) Whether or not the BWD officers and employees are entitled to receive benefits in excess of that authorized by the law. HELD: (1) NO. Petitioners invoke the ruling of this Court in the cases of Kneebone vs. NLRC, Vengco vs. Trajano and Philippine Duplicators, Inc. vs. NLRC, to support their contention that the prohibition against the payment of compensation other than per diems does not include the payment of allowances and other benefits. Th ese cases are, however, not applicable. They refer to exclusion made by this Cou

rt of allowances and other benefits from the salaries of employees in the privat e sector, not to the compensation of members of the board of directors of water districts, whose rights to compensation, as already stated, are governed by P.D. No. 198. Under 93 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Section 13 of this decree, per diem is precisely intended to be the compensation of the members of the board of directors of water districts. Indeed, words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary and commonly-accepted meaning, due regard being given to the context in which the words and phrases a re used. By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the same paragraph, providing No director shall receive other compensation than the am ount provided for per diems, the law quite clearly indicates that directors of w ater districts are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form. R.A. 6758, Section 4, spec ifically provides that the Salary Standardization Law applies to positions, appoi ntive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and go vernment financial institutions. The positions in this category are assigned Sal ary Grade 1 to Salary Grade 10. It is obvious that the Salary Standardization La w does not apply to petitioners because directors of water districts are in fact limited to policy-making and are prohibited from the management of the district s. (2) NO. Petitioners contend that even before this Court declared in Davao Cit y Water District vs. Civil Service Commission that water districts are governmen t-owned and controlled corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the COA, wate r districts had already been granting additional benefits to members of the boar d of directors with the approval of the LWUA, and to their officers and employee s and that they continued doing so after the promulgation of the decision in tha t case. This contention cannot be warranted. The erroneous application and enfor cement of the law by public officers does not estop the government from making t he subsequent correction of such errors. More specifically, where there is an ex press provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain benefits, the law must b e enforced even if it prejudices certain parties due to an error committed by pu blic officials in granting the benefits. As already stated, P.D. no. 198 express ly prohibits the grant of compensation other than the payment of per diems as de termined by the LWUA pursuant to P. D. no. 198, to directors of water districts. Practice without more, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any ve sted right if it is contrary to law. The same rule applies to the officers and e mployees of the BWD. R.A. no. 6686, which then applied, provides that all govern ment personnel are entitled to a Christmas Bonus of one month basic salary and a dditional cash gift of one thousand pesos. The cash gift granted to the BWD mana ger for the year 1994 amounted to P1,500. The resident auditor, therefore, prope rly disallowed the 500 thereof as this amount was in excess of the authorized by law. (3) NO. With respect to the officers and employees of BWD, it has been hel d that the terms and conditions of employment of government employees are govern ed by law. Thus, the exercise of management prerogative by government corporatio ns are limited by the provisions of the laws applicable to them. The cash gift g ranted to the general manager as part of his Christmas bonus was in excess of th at authorized by R. A. no. 6686. It cannot be justified by the exercise of manag ement prerogative as it is contrary to law. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; TRANSFERS OF OFFICERS AGAINST THEIR WILL AMOUNT TO RE MOVAL ONLY IF THEY ARE APPOINTED TO PARTICULAR STATIONS. CRISTINA JENNY CARIO vs. EXEC. DIR. DAVID DAOAS [G.R. No. 144493, April 9, 2002] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: On 16 August 1995, Cristina Jenny Cario was appointed Accounta nt III in the Office of the Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC), now known as the National Commissio n for Indigenous People. On 05 November 1996, Cario was reassigned by Atty. David Daoas, ONCC Executive Director, to the position of Technical Assistant of the S

ocio-Economic Division of the ONCC. Cario alleged that her reassignment was an of fshoot of her refusal to sign a Disbursement Voucher for the travel expenses to Indonesia of ONCC Regional Director Rosalina Bistoyong. She further alleged that the position was non-existent. 94 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On 14 March 1997, Cario received a faxed memorandum from Bistoyong directing her to report to the ONCC Region II office. Thereafter, Cario filed an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct, Oppression and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against Bistoyong. Bistoyong allegedly asked Cario a numb er of times to withdraw the case in exchange for reinstatement to her former pos ition. Cario refused whereupon Bistoyong threatened to reassign her to the ONCC R egion II in Cagayan or in Manila. On 14 April 1997, Atty. Daoas issued a memoran dum to petitioner, reprimanding her for her failure to report at the Region II o ffice, and stating that she was considered Absent Without Leave (AWOL) since 17 March 1997. Still, Cario continued to report for work in Region I everyday despit e the fact that she was not given any assignment. On 11 September 1997, the Civi l Service Commission issued Resolution No. 97-3754 dismissing the appeal of Atty . Daoas and Bistoyong and ordering them to return Cario to Region I. Cario reporte d back to work only to be informed, through a memorandum, that the CSC resolutio n was rendered moot and academic by her having been dropped from the rolls. On 1 1 March 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No. 98-0488 dismissing Cario's appeal and affirming her dropping from the rolls. From this Carino appealed to the Court o f Appeals, which denied her petition for lack of merit. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the termination was valid. (2) Whether or not the reassignmen t order of the petitioner that is null and void, being violative of the Constitu tional right to security of tenure, imposes upon her the obligation to comply wi th it before it is declared illegal? HELD: (1) NO. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, the validity of the reassig nment of petitioner was already settled by the pronouncement of the Civil Servic e Commission that such reassignment was not valid and that she could not be tran sferred to another region without her consent. It is true that the transfer or d etail of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing authori ty and that it can be done as the exigencies of the public service may require. As such, this Court in a number of cases allowed the reassignment of personnel b ut in such instances, they were not appointed to a specific station or particula r unit or agency. The rule proscribes transfers without consent of officers appo inted not merely assigned to a particular station, such as in the case of herein petitioner who was appointed as Accountant III in Region I. Hence, she could no t be reassigned to another station or region without her consent. Otherwise, the unconsented transfer would amount to a removal. (2) NO. Petitioner is thus just ified in not heeding her reassignment order because her basis was not her "firm belief" that her transfer was illegal, but the legal opinion of a regional offic e of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner could not therefore be considered AWOL because she was in fact reporting for work in Region I until 29 April 1997 when Bistoyong issued a memorandum ordering her to refrain from reporting for wo rk therein. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; A PUBLIC OFFICIAL MAY BE TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED TO OTHE R DUTIES FOR THE GOOD OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE EVEN OVER HIS OBJECTION. REMEDIOS PA STOR vs. CITY OF PASIG, et al. [G.R. No. 146873, May 9, 2002] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: Petitioner Remedios Pastor is ity (now City) of Pasig. In 1992, she was reassigned to the Office of the investigation of reports against her concerning ments by her. In 1995, after three years with no Budget Officer of the Municipal Municipal Administrator pending the issuance of Advice of Allot case filed against her, she ask

ed for reinstatement to her former position but she was instead reassigned to an other unit of the now city government. Upon her complaint, the Civil Service Com mission ordered her reinstatement as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. Howeve r, on appeal of the city government, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). 95 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be reinstated to her original position as B udget Officer. HELD: YES. We agree with the CSC that petitioner should now be re turned to her original position for her indefinite detail to other positions would amount to her remova l without cause from the position to which she has been permanently appointed. T he CSC held that, while petitioner's reassignment was originally made in the exi gency of the service without reduction in her rank, status, or salary, responden t City Mayor failed to advance "sufficient reason" to warrant petitioner's conti nuous reassignment for more than three years which "appears too long for one to conduct the study assigned to her." There is no question that we recognize the v alidity and indispensable necessity of the well established rule that for the go od of public service and whenever public interest demands, a public official may be temporarily assigned or detailed to other duties even over his objection wit hout necessarily violating his fundamental and legal rights to security of tenur e in the civil service. But as we have already stated, "such cannot be undertake n when the transfer of the employee is with a view to his removal" and "if the t ransfer is resorted to as a scheme to lure the employee away from his permanent position" because "such attitude is improper as it would in effect result in a c ircumvention of the prohibition which safeguards the tenure of office of those w ho are in the civil service." TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS TERMINATION; EXCEPT WHERE THE OFFICE WAS CREATED BY THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF, IT MAY BE ABOLISHED BY THE SAME LEGISLATURE THAT BROUGHT IT INTO EXISTENCE; EXCEPTI ON. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 142801-802, July 1 0, 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: see page 89 ISSUE: Whether or not the Pre sident has the authority to abolish EIIB. HELD: YES. The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create included the power to destroy. A public office is either created by t he Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the offi ce was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legis lature that brought it into existence. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the Pre sidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particu lar office or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry our reorga nization measures. Under Section 31, Book III, of EO No. 292 (Administrative Cod e of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office an in or der to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing aut hority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President . For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencie s to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre, it was ruled that re organization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or ab olition thereof by reason economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence it is subject to the Presidents continuing authori ty to reorganize. TERMINATION; NATURE OF ABANDONMENT. 96 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim

ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! LACSASA M. ADIONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 136480, December 4, 2001] PARDO, J: FACTS: On December 6, 1994, Mayor Sultan Serad A. Batua issued a perma nent appointment to Nasiba A. Nuska to the position of Municipal Local Civil Registra r. The same appointment was duly approved by the Civil Service Commission Office , Marawi City on December 9, 1994. The new mayor, Lacsasa M. Adiong issued a mem orandum informing all municipal employees of the termination of their appointmen t and directing them to clear themselves from money and property accountabilitie s. On July 1, 1995, another memorandum clarified this by specifying that the mas s termination of services applied only to temporary or casual workers and requir ing those holding approved permanent appointments to submit copies of their appo intments. Due to respondent Nuska's failure to submit a copy of her appointment coupled with her failure to make a courtesy call on the petitioner as the new ma yor, he terminated her services and appointed a certain Nanayaon Samporna in her stead. On August 27, 1995, respondent Nuska wrote Mayor Adiong requesting for h er reinstatement and payment of salaries covering the period July 1,1995 to Augu st 31, 1995. Mayor Adiong failed to act on the request. Hence, on March 11, 1996 , respondent Nuska appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The latter is sued a resolution declaring the termination of Nuskas employment to be invalid an d ordering her immediate reinstatement. On March 17, 1997, petitioner Mayor Adio ng filed a motion for reconsideration. On December 11, 1997, the CSC denied the motion. Mayor Adiong filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The CA dismissed the pet ition and affirmed the resolution of CSC. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Nuskas termination of employment was valid. HELD : NO. The Constitution provides that: "No person shall be deprived of life, libe rty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal pr otection of the laws." It further mandates that: "No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed are suspended except for cause provided by law." In this case, respondent Nuska had a permanent appointment to the position of mu nicipal civil registrar of Ditsaan Ramain, Lanao del Sur. She thus enjoyed secur ity of tenure as guaranteed by law. As an employee in the civil service and as a civil service eligible, respondent Nuska entitled to the benefits, rights and p rivileges extended to those belonging to the classified service. She could not b e removed or dismissed from the service without just cause and without observing the requirements of due process. The reasons advanced by petitioner why respond ent Nuska s employment was terminated were the following: failure to make a cour tesy call, failure to submit her appointment papers, and failure to report to wo rk which was tantamount to abandonment. The failure to make a courtesy call to o ne s superior is not an offense, much less a ground to terminate a person s empl oyment. Respondent Nuska s failure to submit her appointment papers is not a cau se for her outright dismissal. It was not shown that respondent Nuska was inform ed of the July 1, 1995 memorandum requiring those with permanent appointments to submit their papers. At the very least, petitioner could have reminded her to s ubmit the documents without terminating her employment immediately. On the alleg ed abandonment by respondent Nuska of her position, the same is without any basi s. It is significant to note that Nuska, in her letter dated 27 August 1995, inf ormed Mayor Adiong that she did not resign and that the termination of her servi ces was not in accordance with existing Civil Service rules and regulations. She requested that she be reinstated to her lawful position and her back salaries b e paid accordingly. The foregoing explains that although Nuska was physically ab sent in the office premises, all the while, she had the intention to return to w

ork. Hence, she could not be deemed to have abandoned or relinquished her right to the position under an appointment with permanent employment status. A person holding a public office may abandon such office by non-user or acquiescence. Non -user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office. However, nonperformance of the duties of an office does not constitute abandonme nt where such nonperformance results from temporary disability or from involunta ry failure perform. 97 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge, for instance, after a summary removal, an unreasonable del ay by an officer illegally removed in taking steps to vindicate his rights may c onstitute an abandonment of the office. If a person was still willing to return to work despite his physical absence, it would not constitute as abandonment. ELECTION LAW PROCEDURE IN ELECTION CASES FILING FEES; ERRORS IN THE PAYMENT OF FILING FEES IS NO LONGER EXCUSABLE. VILLOT A vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [G.R. No. 146724, August 10, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: In the May 12, 1997 barangay elections, petitioner wa s proclaimed as the Punong Barangay of Barangay 752, Zone 81, District V, over his opponent, herein private respondent. Consequently, the latter filed an election protest against petition er with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24. On December 29, 1999, the court, after due hearing rendered decision declaring private respondent as the duly elected Punong Barangay. On March 2, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and simultaneously paid with the cashier of Metropolitan Trial Court the amount of P150.00 as appeal fee and another P20.00 as legal research fee, or a total of P170.00. On March 9, 2000, or nine (9) days after petitioner's receipt of the decision of the trial court, he again paid with the Cash Division of the COMELEC the sum of P520.00 as appeal fee and legal research fee. Private respond ent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lac k or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's appeal and in denying his moti on for reconsideration. HELD: NO. In the case at bar, although petitioner filed his notice of appeal within th e reglementary period, however, he erroneously paid the required appeal fees wit h the cashier of the Metropolitan Trial Court and not with the Cash Division of the COMELEC, as required in Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40, of the COMELEC Rules of P rocedure. After he realized his mistake, petitioner paid again with the Cash Div ision of the COMELEC the total amount of P520.00 only on March 9, 2000 or four ( 4) days beyond the five (5) day reglementary period to appeal. Verily, the prese nt controversy is no different from the case of Rodillas v. COMELEC, et al., whe re the necessary appeal fees were likewise paid out of time. The Court held ther ein that: The mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It should be a ccompanied by the payment of the correct amount of appeal fee. The payment of th e full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of a n appeal (Dorego v. Perez; Bello v. Fernandez). In both original and appellate c ase, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees as held in Acda v. Minister of Labor. The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an e ssential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law. In Soller v. COMELEC, et al., reit erating the cases of Loyola v. COMELEC, et al., and Miranda v. Castillo, et al., the Court stressed the caveat that errors in the payment of filing fees in elec tion cases is no longer excusable. Thus, on the matter of non-payment or incompl

ete 98 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! payment of filing fees we opined that: "the Court would no longer tolerate any m istake in the payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25, 1997." DISPOSITION OF CASES; THE PERIOD PROVIDED BY ELECTION LAWS IN THE DISPOSITION OF CASES MUST BE OBSERVED FAITHFULLY BECAUSE AN ELECTION CASE, UNLIKE ORDINARY ACT IONS, INVOLVES PUBLIC INTEREST. ISAGANI RIZON vs. JUDGE OSCAR E. ZERNA [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1575, September 17, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: see page 86 ISSUE: Whether or not the delay in the dispositio n of cases, in the case at hand is inexcusable. HELD: YES. Section 258 of the Om nibus Election Code provides: SECTION 258. Preferential disposition of contests in courts. - The courts, in th eir respective cases, shall give preference to election contests over all other cases, except those of habeas corpus, and shall without delay, hear and, within thirty days from the date of their submission for decision, but in every case wi thin six months after filing, decide the same. Judge Zerna did not contest the a llegation of delay. He however ascribed it to the process of going over each of the questioned ballot. This is a flimsy excuse considering that the thirty-day p eriod provided him under Sec. 258 of the Omnibus Election Code is more than suff icient to examine a little over a hundred questioned ballots, and that he could have asked the Court for an extension of time to render decision if he was havin g problems with the "examination" of the contested ballots such that he could no t be able to decide the case on time. As the Court have held in Espaola vs. Panay (248 SCRA 684) asking for an extension of time to dispose a case is to avoid or dispel any suspicion that something sinister or corrupt is going on. In Bolalin vs. Occiano, it was held that: The period provided by [election] law[s] [in the disposition of cases] must be observed faithfully because an election case, unli ke ordinary actions, involves public interest. Time is of the essence in its dis position since the uncertainty as to who is the real choice of the people for th e position must soonest be dispelled. It is neither fair nor just that one whose right to the office is in doubt should remain in that office for an uncertain p eriod Moreover, records of the OCA disclose that respondent had a "propensity [for ] delay in the disposition of his cases." The Court also concurs with this ratio nalization, and metes upon respondent a fine of P5,000.00, with a warning that s imilar acts shall be dealt with more severely. DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES DISQUALIFICATION; VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 CONSTITUTES MORAL TURPITUD E AND CONVICTION THEREFOR DISQUALIFIES A PERSON FROM RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE. VILLABER vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: Villaber was a candidate for the congressional sea t in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. His rival filed a petition to disqualify him and to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that Villaber had b een previously convicted for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and the crime invo lves moral turpitude; hence under Section 12 of the 99 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. Villaber was subsequently disqualified by the COMELEC resting its decision on the case o f People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Hence this petition by Villaber, contending that v iolation of B.P. 22 does not involve moral turpitude and that People vs. Tuanda is not applicable since he is not a lawyer. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be disqualified on the ground that viola tion of BP 22 constitutes moral turpitude. HELD: YES. As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or deprav ity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in gene ral, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man a nd woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.'' In In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everyth ing which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals." We, however, cl arified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that "not every criminal act i nvolves moral turpitude," and that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine." We further pronounced therein that: "in Int ernational Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the Court adm itted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. T here are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude, and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultim ately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surroun ding the violation of the statute." We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre t hat the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violatio n of the statute. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone. The elements o f the offense against BP 22 are: 1) The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value; 2) The accused knows at the time of the issua nce that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee ban k for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and 3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit , or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, witho ut any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. The presence of the secon d element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relat es to and affects the good moral character of a person" The case did not make a d istinction, hence it applies to petitioner. DISQUALIFICATION; THE TERM LIMIT FOR ELECTIVE OFFICIALS REFERS TO THE RIGHT TO B E ELECTED AND THE RIGHT TO SERVE IN THE SAME ELECTIVE POSITION. ADORMEO vs. COMM ISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent, who was then the incumb ent mayor, were the only candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In th e election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May

12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Elect ion Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certifica te of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground t hat the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutiv e terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992; (2) in the election of May 1995; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election. Pet itioner contended 100 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! that Talaga's candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which provides. On March 9, 2001, private respondent r esponded that he was not elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive terms. Because of his defeat in the 1998 election b y Tagarao, the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and thus h is mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each. On April 2 0, 2001, the COMELEC, through the First Division, found private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the position of city mayor on the ground that h e had already served three (3) consecutive terms, and his Certificate of Candida cy was ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled. On April 27, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that "three (3) consecutive term s" means continuous service for nine (9) years and that the two (2) years servic e from 1998 to 2000 by Tagarao prevented him from having three consecutive years of service. He further alleged that the recall election was not a regular elect ion, but a separate special election specifically to remove incompetent local of ficials. On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of private responden t Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. It reversed the First Division's ruling and held that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his service a s Mayor of Lucena City. On May 19, 2001, after canvassing, private respondent wa s proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City. ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discre tion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. qualified to run for Mayor in Lucena City for the May 14, 2 001 elections. HELD: NO. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequentl y, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for t he same number of times before the disqualification can apply. The Court held th at the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a ) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in th e same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive t erms. Accordingly, COMELEC's ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a priv ate citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. Neither can respondent's victory in the recall election be deeme d a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as "voluntary renuncia tion" for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, the Court held that the s econd sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an int erruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was electe d." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to ci rcumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the s ame time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full servi ce of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conve rsely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the ful l term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of ex ecution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from of

fice is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did no t fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. DISQUALIFICATION; BEFORE A COMELEC RESOLUTION OF A DISQUALIFICATION CASE BECOMES FINAL AND EXECUTORY, THE BEI HAS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY TO COUNT AND TALLY THE VO TES IN FAVOR OF THE CANDIDATE UNDER INVESTIGATION. PAPANDAYAN, JR. vs. COMMISSIO N ON ELECTIONS [G.R. No. 147909, April 16, 2002] 101 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! MENDOZA, J: FACTS: In the May 14, 2001 elections, three candidates ran for the p osition of Mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr., respondent Fahida P. Balt, who was the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and Maiko Hassa n Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner in SPC Case No. 01-114 of the COMELEC, alleging that petitioner was not a resident of Baran gay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur. In support of her allegation, respondent submitted the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, of Barangay Chairman Hadji Bashir Ayonga and two membe rs of the Sangguniang Barangay of Tangcal, Tubaran, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saado ri Buat, stating that petitioner never resided in Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran. Res pondent also submitted a similar affidavit, dated February 17, 2001, of Samorana o Sarip, a member of the Sangguniang Barangay of Tangcal. She averred that petit ioner did not state in his Voter Registration Record, accomplished on May 8, 199 9, the number of years and months he had been a resident of the Municipality of Tubaran. Hadji Ayonga and Samoranao Sarip later filed their Affidavits of Desist ance retracting their earlier statements. In its resolution, dated May 8, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-114 declared petitioner to be disqua lified and ordered his name to be stricken off the list of candidates and all vo tes cast in his favor not to be counted but considered as stray votes. On May 14 , 2001, elections were held in Tubaran. Petitioner was among those voted by the electorate for the position of municipal mayor. Meanwhile, on May 19, 2001, peti tioner filed a petition with the COMELEC (First Division) in SPC No. 01-039 seek ing the issuance of an order directing the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of Tubaran to count and tally the ballots cast in his favor during the May 14, 200 1 elections pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116. The said resolution provide s that if the disqualification case has not become final and executory on the da y of the election, the BEI shall tally and count the votes of the candidate decl ared disqualified On the other hand, respondent filed a pre-proclamation case (S PC No. 01-259) in the COMELEC. On May 29, 2001, the First Division of the COMELE C (in SPC No. 01-039) issued an order suspending the proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Tubaran pending the resolution of this present peti tion. However, despite the said order (in SPC No. 01-039), the Municipal Board o f Canvassers of Tubaran proceeded with the proclamation of petitioner on June 3, 2001. Upon motion of respondent, therefore, the COMELEC (First Division), in an order, dated June 25, 2001, set aside the proclamation of petitioner, without p rejudice to the filing of the appropriate charges against the members of the Boa rd responsible for the proclamation. Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issued a re solution, dated January 30, 2002, sustaining the annulment of the proclamation o f petitioner and dismissing SPC No. 01-039 for being moot and academic. It appea rs that, as a consequence thereof, the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Tubaran assumed t he position of mayor pursuant to the COMELEC en banc resolution dated June 30, 2 002. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Board of Election Inspectors is precluded from counting a nd tallying the votes cast in petitioners favor. (2) Whether or not the factual f indings of the COMELEC declaring petitioner as disqualified should be upheld. HELD: (1) NO. The resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc was not yet f inal and executory when the elections were held on May 14, 2001. Consequently, t he Board of Election Inspectors of Tubaran, in the exercise of its ministerial d uty, had to count the votes cast in his favor. At the time the elections were he ld in May 14, 2001, the assailed resolution, dated May 12, 2001, had not yet bec ome final and executory. Hence, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) was duty

bound to tally and count the votes cast in favor of petitioner. (2) NO, even tho ugh if the question of whether or not petitioner is a resident of Tubaran is a f actual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and determined by the and tha t the COMELECs findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given fin ality, the evidence is insufficient to sustain its resolution. The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General that petitioner has duly proven that, althoug h he was formerly a resident of the Municipality of Bayang, 102 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! he later transferred residence to Tangcal in the Municipality of Tubaran as show n by his actual and physical presence therein for ten years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections. The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida Guina Dimaporo got married in 1990, they resided in Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, th ere was manifest intention on the part of petitioner to reside in Tubaran, which he deemed to be the place of his conjugal abode with his wife. The fact that he and his wife transferred residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that petitioner was relinquishing his former place of residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran to be his place of domicile. Although petitioner worked as a private sec retary of the mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after work. Furt her, the evidence shows that in the May 11, 1998 election, petitioner was regist ered as a voter in Tubaran and that in fact he filed his certificate of candidac y although he later withdrew the same. In the May 8, 1999 registration of voters , he was again registered as a voter in Precinct No. 28-A of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran. PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY; THE FACT THAT A CANDIDATE PROCLAIMED HAS ASSUMED O FFICE DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE COMELEC OF ITS AUTHORITY TO ANNUL ANY CANVASS AND ILL EGAL PROCLAMATION. AMPATUAN, et al. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. No. 149803, January 31, 2002] PARDO, J: FACTS: Petitioners and respondents were candidates for the provincial elective positions in the province of Maguindanao in the May 14, 2001 election. Petitioner Ampatuan an d respondent Candao contended for the position of governor. The slate of Ampatua n emerged as winners as per election returns. On May 23, 2001, respondents filed a petition with the Comelec for the annulment of election results and/or declar ation of failure of elections in several municipalities in the province of Magui ndanao. They claimed that the ballots were filled-up en masse by a few persons t he night before election day, and in some precincts, the ballot boxes, official ballots and other election paraphernalia were not delivered at all. On May 25, 2 001, the Comelec issued an order suspending the proclamation of the winning cand idates for congressman of the second district, governor, vice-governor and board members of Maguindanao. It was however lifted by Comelec on June 14, 2001 in re sponse to the petition filed by the petitioners on May 30, 2001.Consequently, th e Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioners winners. On June 16, 200 1, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition to set aside the Comelec order dated June 14, 2001, and preliminary injunction to suspend the effects of the proclamation of the petitioners. Meantime, petitioners assumed their respect ive offices on June 30, 2001. On July 17, 2001, the Court resolved to deny respo ndents' petition. Petitioners' assumption into office notwithstanding, on July 2 6, 2001, the Comelec ordered the consolidation of respondents' petition for decl aration of failure of elections with SPA Nos. 01-244, 01-332, 01-360, 01-388 and 01-390. The COMELEC further ordered a random technical examination on four to s even precincts per municipality on the thumb-marks and signatures of the voters who voted and affixed in their voter's registration records, and forthwith direc ted the production of relevant election documents in these municipalities. On Au gust 28, 2001, the Comelec issued another order directing the continuation of th e hearing and disposition of the consolidated SPAs on the failure of elections a nd other incidents related thereto. It likewise ordered the continuation of the technical examination of election documents as authorized in the July 26, 2001 o rder. On September 26, 2001, petitioners filed the present petition. They claime d that by virtue of their proclamation pursuant to the June 14, 2001 order issue d by the Comelec, the proper remedy available to respondents was not a petition for declaration of failure of elections but an election protest. The former is h

eard summarily while the latter involves a full-blown trial. 103 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Petitioners argued that the manner by which the technical examination is to be c onducted would defeat the summary nature of a petition for declaration of failur e of elections. On October 22, 2001, the Comelec issued an order suspending the implementation of the two (2) assailed orders. However, on November 13, 2001, th e Comelec issued another order lifting the suspension. On November 20, 2001, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order. ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Elections was divested of its jurisdiction to h ear and decide respondents' petition for declaration of failure of elections after petit ioners had been proclaimed. HELD: NO. Petitioners submit that by virtue of their proclamation as winners, th e only remedy left for private respondents is to file an election protest, in which cas e, original jurisdiction lies with the regular courts. In Loong v. Commission on Elections, the court ruled that "a preproclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results, or failure of elections." These two remedies were more specifically distinguished in this wise: "While, however, the Comelec is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behin d them and investigate election irregularities, the Comelec is duty bound to inv estigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence, and other analogous causes i n actions for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of ele ctions, as the Omnibus Election Code denominates the same. Thus, the Comelec, in the case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of election documents and compa re and analyze voters' signatures and thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean." The fact that a ca ndidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the Comelec of its author ity to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation. Respondents' allegation of ma ssive fraud and terrorism that attended the May 14, 2001 election in the affecte d municipalities cannot be taken lightly as to warrant the dismissal of their pe tition by the Comelec on the simple pretext that petitioners had been proclaimed winners. Elucidating on the concept of failure of election, the Court held that : " . . . before Comelec can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a fai lure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken pla ce in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was vot ing, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and second, the v otes cast would affect the result of the election. In Loong vs. Commission on El ections, this Court added that the cause of such failure of election should have been any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other a nalogous cases." PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY; AN INCOMPLETE CANVASS IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT BE MAD E THE BASIS OF A PROCLAMATION. UTTO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. No. 150111, January 31, 2002] PARDO, J: FACTS: Petitioner Abdulkarim D. Utto and respondent Datu Almansa B. An gas were candidates for the position of the mayor of the municipality of Sultan sa Barong is, Maguindanao in the May 14, 2001 election. The original municipal board of ca nvassers was composed of Nena Alid as chairman, and Maceda Lidasan Abo and Noron Gonina, as members. During the canvassing on May 16, 2001, election returns in Precinct Nos. 15A, 25A/26A, 66A, and 68A/69A were presented. On May 18, 2001, re spondent filed a petition to inhibit Alid and Abo, which resulted in the suspens

ion of the canvassing. Alid and Abo inhibited themselves from the proceedings. O n May 24, 2001, Bai Haidy D. Mamalinta took over as chairperson, with Roihaida K halid and Noron Gonina, as members of the municipal board of canvassers. The can vassing was again suspended when both Khalid and Gonina also inhibited themselve s from participating in the proceedings. 104 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On May 27, 2001, the provincial election supervisor designated Rufden Mangelen a nd Tamano Diolanen as members of the municipal board of canvassers. In the morni ng of May 31, 2001, the municipal board of canvassers convened with chairperson Mamalinta and member Asuncion Corazon Reneido present. The other member, Mowakir am Samuang was absent. Before the start of the canvass, chairperson Mamalinta di stributed to the parties present a report on the status of canvassing. Out of th e 98 precincts, the municipal board of canvassers issued four (4) separate rulin gs excluding the above-cited five (5) election returns. At this point, responden t orally manifested his intention to appeal the ruling, and simultaneously filed a verified notice of appeal, which Bai Haidy D. Mamalinta (chairperson of the m unicipal board of canvassers) refused to accept. Meanwhile, despite respondent's manifestation, the municipal board of canvassers proceeded with the proclamatio n of the candidates for municipal offices. The board proclaimed petitioner as th e duly elected mayor of the municipality. On June 1, 2001, Corazon Reniedo sent a letter to Atty. Wynne Asdala, acting provincial election supervisor of Maguind anao irrevocably resigning as member of the municipal board of canvassers of Sul tan sa Barongis, Maguindanao in connection with the canvass of the election retu rns because she was being pressured to proclaim mayoralty candidate Abdulkarim U tto in gross violation of Section 20, Republic Act No. 7166 and Section 38 (9), Comelec Resolution No. 3848. Based on the canvass of 93 election returns, petiti oner obtained a margin of 149 votes over respondent. The total number of registe red voters from the five excluded election returns is 944. On June 7, 2001, resp ondent filed with Comelec a motion to annul pendente lite petitioner's proclamat ion contending that such proclamation violated Section 20 (i), Republic Act No. 7166. 15. In spite of the law's mandate to suspend the canvassing and await the decision of the Comelec on the appeal, the municipal board of canvassers proceed ed with the proclamation. On June 14, 2001, petitioner, with vice-mayoralty cand idate and Sangguniang Bayan candidates who were proclaimed by the municipal boar d of canvassers on May 31, 2001 filed with Comelec motions for intervention cont ending that their proclamation would not be affected by the five (5) election re turns. On June 23, 2001, Comelec sent petitioner via telegram summons with notic e of hearing attaching thereto a copy of respondent's verified appeal. When the case was called for hearing on June 29, 2001, before the Comelec, First Division , only counsel for respondent and intervenor vice-mayor appeared. Petitioner was notified via telegram of the resetting of the hearing. On June 30, 2001, Comele c (First Division) promulgated a resolution ordering the inclusion of the uncanv assed election returns, and setting aside petitioner's proclamation. The Comelec (First Division) found petitioner's proclamation to be illegal. Meanwhile, peti tioner took his oath at noon of the same day and immediately assumed office as m ayor of the municipality of Sultan sa Barongis, Maguindanao. On July 5, 2001, pe titioner filed with Comelec, First Division, a motion to reconsider the resoluti on of June 30, 2001, assailing it as contrary to law and the evidence and issued without affording him notice and opportunity to be heard as he was not impleade d as a party to the petition. Petitioner prayed that the inclusion of the uncanv assed return be set aside and the case remanded to the Comelec (First Division) for the amendment of the petition to include all indispensable parties. Petition er claims that respondent by "skillful strategy" made it appear that he (petitio ner) was a party in the appeal proceedings by filing a motion to annul proclamat ion in the same proceedings and naming him party respondent without obtaining pr ior leave of the Comelec. ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation of petitioner was legal. HELD: NO. Assumi ng arguendo that petitioner was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard, the petition would still be denied. The twin-requirement of notice and he aring in annulment of proclamation is not applicable because of the illegality o f petitioner's proclamation. Section 38 (9), Comelec Resolution No. 3848 45 prov

ided the procedure in the disposition of contested election returns and certific ate of canvass. The Comelec precludes the board of canvassers from proclaiming a ny candidate as winner, except upon its authorization after it has ruled on the appeal of the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation thereof 105 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. This provision is mandatory and requires strict obs ervance. Within the reglementary period for filing an appeal, respondent went to the Comelec. Pursuant to Section 20 (i), Republic Act No. 7166, the municipal b oard of canvassers may not proclaim any candidate without waiting for the author ization of the Comelec. Considering that petitioner had a very small margin of 1 49 votes over respondent, and there were 944 registered voters from the five exc luded election returns, the results of the municipal election would be undoubted ly adversely affected by the contested returns. The proclamation thus made is vo id ab initio. It is now settled that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal a nd cannot be the basis of a proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and none is omitte d. When the municipal board of canvassers disregarded the five (5) election retu rns, it in effect disenfranchised the voters of the excluded precincts. Time and again, the Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that Comelec is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation illegally made. The fact that a candidate illegally proclaimed has assumed office is not a bar to the exercise of such power. It is also true that after proclamation, the remedy of a party ag grieved in an election is an election protest. This is on the assumption, howeve r, that there has been a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and vo id, the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive Comelec of th e power to declare such proclamation a nullity. PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY; IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY MANIFEST ERROR IN THE CERTIF ICATE OF CANVASS SOUGHT TO BE CORRECTED, THE COMELEC SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE REC ANVASS OR RE-COUNTING. O'HARA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. Nos. 148941-42, March 12, 2002] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: see page 59 ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it annulled the pr oclamation of petitioner as vice-governor of Rizal and by ordering the PBC of Ri zal to reconvene and correct the alleged manifest mathematical error supposedly committed by the MBC of Rizal. HELD: YES. The COMELEC should have conducted further investigation or at least a technical inspection or examination of election returns to verify the existence of the all eged error before it gave credence to the statements of the MBC of Binangonan an d concluding outright that the Statement of Votes submitted by respondents were accurate. The COMELEC cannot simply rely on these Statement of Votes because the y were prepared by the same members of the MBC who claimed to have made a mistak e due to "fatigue, sleepless nights and physical exhaustion." It would have been more prudent to make a determination whether these same individuals committed a ny other mistake in the tabulation or statement of votes. Even based on the stat ements/affidavits of the MBC of Binangonan, it is apparent that the errors sough t to be corrected do not appear on the face of the certificate of canvass. As ab ove-stated, the alleged error which the COMELEC perceived to be manifest does no t fall under the definition of "manifest error" which was laid down in Chavez vs . COMELEC . . . To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certifi cates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections th ereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. The Constitution gives the Commis sion on Elections the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regula tions to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and reca ll." The Commission indisputably exercises the power of supervision and control over boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers. The Commission must

do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cas t in the elections. The Constitution 106 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! upgraded to a constitutional status the statutory authority under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 to grant the Commission broad and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible el ections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage. In the absence of any manifest error in the certificate of canvass sought to be corrected, the Commission should have ordered the re-canvass of the election ret urns or the re-counting of the ballots in the municipality of Binangonan in orde r to validate the claim of its MBC. If after the re-canvass of the election retu rns or the re-counting of the official ballots, the clerical error or mathematic al mistake in the addition of the votes had been established, the Commission sho uld have annulled the canvass and proclamation based on the erroneous certificat e of canvass. If the records had borne out that petitioner's proclamation was th e result of a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of v otes and did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the electorate, there c ould have been no valid proclamation to speak of. The issue would involve a preproclamation controversy. ELECTION CONTESTS ELECTION CONTESTS; PRE-CONDITIONS FOR DECLARING A FAILURE OF ELECTION. CAWASA vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. No. 150469, May 30, 2002] CARPIO, J: FACTS: Petitioner Jun Cawasa and private respondent Adbulmalik Manamp aran were among the candidates for mayor in the Municipality of Nunungan, Lanao del Norte. Out o f the 40 precincts in Nunungan, only 36 functioned, as there was a failure of el ection in the remaining 4 precincts. Special elections were set considering that that the number of registered voters in the remaining 4 precincts would affect the election results. Comelec, en banc, however took cognizance of the petition of private respondent for the annulment of election results for the following re asons: a) The case pending before the second division of the Comelec is a pre-pr oclamation controversy, while the case pending before the Comelec en banc is a c ase for annulment of election results. b) Comelec found that the special electio ns were not held in the designated polling places in Nunungan but were transferr ed to the different municipalities without any authority from the Comelec, in vi olation of the due process requisites. Moreover, nothing in the records could sh ow that notice was given to the political candidates and to the registered voter s affected by the special elections of the said transfer of polling places. c) T he Comelec found that members of the Philippine Army 26th Infantry Battalion ser ved as election inspectors without authority from Comelec. ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec en banc resolution was issued without jurisdic tion and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. HELD: NO. The transfer was made not only in blatant disregard of the Comelec res olution specifying the polling places but also provisions of the Election Code (Sections 153 and 154). As clearly provided by the law, the location of polling places sh all be the same as that of the preceding regular election. However, charges may be initiated by written petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct o r agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the Comelec after n otice and hearing. But ultimately, it is the Comelec which determines whether a change is necessary after notice and hearing. The Comelec has unequivocally stat ed that nothing in the records showed that notice was given to the political can didates and registered voters affected by the transfer. There is no cogent reaso

n for us to disturb the findings of the Comelec on this matter. Indeed, the fact ual findings of the Comelec supported by the substantial, evidence shall be fina l and non-reviewable. 107 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Next, the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI is another gra ve irregularity that attended the special elections. There was absolutely no leg al basis for the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI. (Sec O EC Sections 164, 165, 166, 170, and Sec. 13 of RA No. 6646). Prayers to annul el ection results, as in the instant case, and a prayer to declare failure of elect ions based on allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence or analogous cases, are actually of the same nature and the Election Code denominates them similarly. Th e Comelec may exercise the power to annul election results or declare a failure of election motu propio, or upon a verified petition. The hearing of the case sh all be summary in nature. A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reassurable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the cont roversy and to present evidence on which a fair decision can be based. In fine, a trial is not at all indispensable to satisfy the demands of due process. The p re-conditions for declaring a failure of election are: 1) That no voting has bee n held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence, terroris m, fraud or other analogous cases; and 2) That the votes not cast therein are su fficient to affect the results of the elections. The concurrence of these two ci rcumstances justifies the calling of special elections. Here, the Comelec found that the special elections were vitiated by fraud due to the illegal transfer of the polling places and the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI. Inevitably, the Comelec could not ascertain who voted during the special el ections. The circumstances were such that the entire electoral process was not w orthy of faith and credit, hence, in practical effect, no election was held. LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS LOCAL AUTONOMY LOCAL AUTONOMY; LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS CANNOT ENACT ORDINANCES THAT GO AGAINST T HE LAWS DULY ENACTED BY CONGRESS. LINA vs. PAO [G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appoint ed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the o peration of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinanc e passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508 which declared its policy against the operation of lotto within the province. A s a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint f or declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restr aining order. On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, pr omulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508. Petitioners contend that the assailed resolu tion is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is l ikewise a valid exercise of the provincial government's police power under the G eneral Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Governm ent Code of 1991. They also maintain that respondent's lotto operation is illega l because no prior consultations and approval by the local government were sough t before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. ISSUES: 108 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et

hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! (1) Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lag una and the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid. (2) Whether prio r consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lot to system can be operated in a given local government unit. HELD: (1) YES. The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to is sue a mayor's permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private res pondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance, how ever, merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not selfexecut ing. As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lo tto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government's autonomy t o air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's. Howe ver, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local government s may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. G iven this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. Th e game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government t hrough an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Lo cal councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by C ongress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the p rincipal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to s uggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. (2) NO. As for the second issue, we hold that petiti oners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160, otherw ise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country. From a careful reading of said provisio ns, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program n or a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PC SO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Gover nment Code. CREATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CREATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; THE CREATION OF A NEW LGU THROUGH A DIVISION OR MERGER OF EXISTING LGUs IS RECOGNIZED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. CAWALING vs. C OMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [G.R. NO. 146319, October 26, 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: By virtue of Republic Act 8806, the City of Sorsog on was created by merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon. A plebiscite w as conducted which was approved by the majority of the votes cast, and ratified the Act. Petitioner as a taxpayer, now assails the validity of the said Act on t he ground that it violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 i n relation with Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which requires th at only a municipality or cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city. He is thus assailing its mode of creation and that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 880

6 has done. Petitioner further assails the validity of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City asserting t hat the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 109 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! should be conducted within 120 days from the "approval" of said Act per express provision of its Section 54. The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former P resident Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebi scite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period a fter the approval of the Act; as the 120-day period expired without a plebiscite conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000. In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16, 2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act as under its Section 65, the Act shall take effect upon i ts publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the law is constitutional. (2) Whether or not the said law vi olates the provisions of the Local Government Code and Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. (3) Whether or not the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC is valid. HELD: (1) YES. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Th is presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins u pon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for e ach other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legis lature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in ac cord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portio ns thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivoca l breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In oth er words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt i s to sustain. (2) NO. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be c onverted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes b y which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay i n accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the C ode distinctly provides: "SECTION 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not r educe the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provid ed, further, That the income classification of the original local government uni t or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. . . . ." Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code. (3) YES. The law was first published i n the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on Septemb er 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not fr om the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been publ ished. Since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing t he landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera, it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS POWERS OF LGUs; THE ALLOCATION OF THE SPECIAL EDUCATION FUND FOR THE ESTABLISHME NT AND MAINTENANCE OF EXTENSION CLASSES LOGICALLY IMPLIES THE HIRING AND COMPENS ATION OF TEACHERS BUT NOT THE GRANTING OF SCHOLARSHIPS. 110 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! COA of the PROVINCE of CEBU vs. PROVINCE of CEBU [G.R. No. 141386, November 29, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as c hairman of the local school board, under Section 98 of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom teache rs who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that woul d accommodate students in the public schools. In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, for the period Januar y to June 1998, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes were charged ag ainst the provincial Special Education Fund (SEF). Likewise charged to the SEF w ere the college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for th e salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provinci al SEF. Faced with the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA, the province of Cebu, represented by its governor, filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court. Invoking the legal maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius ," petitioner alleges that since salaries, personnel-related benefits and schola rship grants are not among those authorized as lawful expenditures of the SEF un der the Local Government Code, they should be deemed excluded therefrom. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed by local chief executives in connection with the establishmen t and maintenance of extension classes may be charged to the Special Education F und (SEF) of the local government unit concerned. (2) Whether or not the expense s for college scholarship grants may be charged to the Special Education Fund (S EF) of the local government unit concerned. HELD: (1) YES. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute. In thi s connection, the following portions of the deliberations of the Senate on the s econd reading of the Local Government Code on July 30, 1990 are significant: Sena tor Pimentel: Mr. President, pursuant to the wording of the proposed transfer of this elementary school system to local government units, what are specifically covered here are merely the construction, repair, and maintenance of elementary school buildings and other structures connected with public elementary school ed ucation, payment of salaries, emoluments, allowances et cetera, procurement of b ooks, other teaching materials and equipment needed for the proper implementatio n of the program. There is nothing here that will indicate that the local govern ment will have any right to alter the curriculum. Undoubtedly, the aforecited exc hange of views clearly demonstrates that the legislature intended the SEF to ans wer for the compensation of teachers handling extension classes Even under the d octrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishmen t and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services. Every statu te is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be neces sary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and su bsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of t hese teachers are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenan ce of extension classes. (2) NO. With respect, however, to college scholarship g rants, a reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that

said grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated. It should be noted that Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local Gov ernment Code substantially reproduced Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447. But, unlike p ayment of salaries of teachers which falls within the ambit of "establishment an d maintenance of extension classes" and "operation and maintenance of public sch ools," the "granting of 111 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! government scholarship to poor but deserving students" was omitted in Sections 1 00 (c) and 272 of the Local Government Code. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus e st. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such grant of scholarship where the legislature has omitted it. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW TREATIES TREATIES; THE PARIS CONVENTION RESPECTS THE RIGHTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES TO ADOPT LEGISLATIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT ABUSES WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM THE EXERCISE OF E XCLUSIVE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THE PATENT. SMITH KLINE & FRENCH LABORATORIES vs. C OURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 121267, October 23, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: Petitioner is the assignee of Letters Patent No. 12207 coveri ng the pharmaceutical product Cimetidine, which relates to derivatives of heterocyclicthio or lower al koxy or amino lower alkyl thiourea, ureas or guanadines issued by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT). Private respondent filed wi th the BPTTT a petition for compulsory license to manufacture and produce its ow n brand of medicines using Cimetidine. Petitioner opposed the petition for compu lsory license, arguing that the private respondent had no cause of action and fa iled to allege how it intended to work the patented product. After both parties were heard, the BPTTT rendered a decision directing the issuance of a compulsory license to private respondent to use, manufacture and sell in the Philippines i ts own brand of pharmaceutical products containing. Petitioner thereafter filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the decision of the BPTTT, ar guing that said decision is an invalid exercise of police power and is violative of international law. Petitioner states that the grant of a compulsory license to private respondent is an invalid exercise of police power since it was not sh own that there is an overwhelming public necessity for such grant, considering t hat petitioner is able to provide an adequate supply of Cimetidine to satisfy th e needs of the Philippine market. It argues further that the provisions of the P atent Law on compulsory licensing contravene the Convention of Paris for the Pro tection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention), which allegedly permits the g ranting of a compulsory license over a patented product only to prevent abuses w hich might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the pat ent, or on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working of the patented product, within four years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years from the date of grant of the patent, whichever expires last. Petit ioner opines that the inclusion of grounds for the grant of a compulsory license in Section 34 of the Patent Law other than those provided under the Paris Conve ntion constitutes a violation of the Philippines' obligation to adhere to the pr ovisions of said treaty. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the said grant of compulsory license was an invalid exercise of police power. (2) Whether or not the grant violated the international law, pa rticularly the Paris Convention. HELD: (1) NO. The grant of the compulsory license satisfies the requirements of the pr ovisions of Section 34 of the Patent Law. More than ten years have passed since the patent for Cimetidine was issued to petitioner and its predecessors-in-inter est, and the compulsory license applied for by private respondent is for the use , manufacture and sale of a medicinal product. Furthermore, both the appellate c ourt and the BPTTT found that private respondent had the capability to work Cime

tidine or to make use thereof in the manufacture of a useful product. 112 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! (2) NO. Petitioner's contention that Section 34 of the Patent Law contravenes th e Paris Convention because the former provides for grounds for the grant of a co mpulsory license in addition to those found in the latter, is likewise incorrect . Article 5, Section A(2) of the Paris Convention states: Each country of the un ion shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work. S ection A(2) of Article 5 of the Paris Conventional unequivocally and explicitly respects the right of member countries to adopt legislative measures to provide for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses which might result from t he exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent. An example provided of possible abuses is "failure to work;" however, as such, is merely supplied b y way of an example, it is plain that the treaty does not preclude the inclusion of other forms of categories of abuses. TREATIES; THE VFA GIVES LEGITIMACY TO THE BALIKATAN EXERCISES; THERE IS NO TREAT Y ALLOWING US TROOPS TO ENGAGE IN COMBAT IN THE PHILIPPINES. LIM vs. HONORABLE E XECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002] DE LEON, JR., J: FACTS: Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exerc ises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and America n troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arth ur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibit ion, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise and seeking the issua nce of a writ of prohibition/injunction to prevent US troops from participating in areas of armed conflict on the ground that such is in gross violation of the Constitution. They argue that: I. The Philippines and the United States signed t he Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in 1951 to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the Constitutional Processes of each country only in the case of a n armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country against one of them. By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the Abu Sayyaf bandit s in Basilan constitute an external armed force that has subjected the Philippin es to an armed external attack to warrant US military assistance under the MDT o f 1951. II. Neither does the VFA of 1999 authorize American soldiers to engage i n combat operations in Philippine territory, not even to fire beck if fired upon. They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both partylist organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002. L im and Ersando filed suit in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers . SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver that certain members of their or ganization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affec ted by the operations being conducted in Mindanao. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Balikatan activities are covered under the Visiting Forces Agreement and are therefore valid. (2) Whether or not the American soldiers are authorized to engage in combat in the Philippines. 113 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et

hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: (1) YES. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent ba sis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The express ion is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the ap proval of the Philippine government. After studied reflection, it appeared farfe tched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word "activities" arose from accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parti es a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojou rn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the j oint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to a ssist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects suc h as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the l ike. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exe rcises. It is only logical to assume that "Balikatan 02-1," a "mutual antiterror ism advising, assisting and training exercise," falls under the umbrella of sanc tioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject o f the instant petition, are indeed authorized. (2) NO. There is no treaty or agr eement allowing US troops to engage in combat in the Philippines. Paragraph 8 of section I of the VFA stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense. Neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troop s to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and internat ional agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the contex t of the 1987 Constitution. The present Constitution contains key provisions use ful in determining the extent to which foreign military troops are allowed in Ph ilippine territory. Thus, in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, i t is provided that: xxx xxx xxx SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an inst rument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of internati onal law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equa lity, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. xxx xxx xxx SEC . 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territo rial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination. SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a pol icy of freedom from nuclear weapons in the country. xxx xxx xxx The aforequoted provisions betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the co untry, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed ent ry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception. 114 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.