JOSE PILAPIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. (G.R. No.

52159, December 22, 1989) FACTS: Jose Pilapil, boarded a bus owned by Alatco. During the trip, he was hit above his eye by a stone hurled by an unidentified bystander. Alatco's personnel lost no time in bringing him to a hospital, but eventually petitioner partially lost his left eyes vision and sustained a permanent scar. Pilapil lodged an action for recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur which the latter granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision. ISSUE: Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in this case? HELD: no. While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

Air France v Carrascoso Rafael Carrascoso was a civil engineer and a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958 . Carrascoso booked a flight in Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,. He was issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. On the first leg of the flight from Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in "first class". However, after ariving at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced him to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, Carrascoso had a heated discussion with the manager of Airfrance. Carrascoso was ultimately convinced to vacate his seat. After arriving in Manila he filed a case against Airfrance for breach of contract of carriage and damages. The RTC awarded him moral damages. Issues 1) whether there has been a breach of the contract of carriage (yes) 2) whether he is entitled to moral damages based on the act of the manager 1) First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein 2) yes although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Eastern and Australian Steamship Co., LTD vs. Great American Insurance Co.
Eastern and Australian Steamship Co., LTD vs. Great American Insurance Co.108 SCRA 248 Facts: On December 10, 1971, the Jackson and Spring (Sydney) Pty. Ltd. shipped from Sydney, Australia, one case of impellers for warman pump on board the SS Chitral, a vessel owned and operated in the Philippines by Eastern and Australian Steamship Co. Ltd., thru its agent FE Zuellig, Inc. under the bill of lading no. 39 for delivery to Manila in favor of the consignee Buenget Consolidated, Inc. The shipment was insured with Great Americans Insurance Co. for P35,921.81 against all risks. On December 22, 1971, the SS Chitnel arrived in Manila but failed to discharge the shipment. Demand for delivery was made by petitioner . Having failed to make the delivery, a claim was prescribed against them for the value to make the delivery, a claim was preserved against them for the value of the shipment. As a consequence of the loss of the shipment, herein defendant was compelled to pay the consignee the amount of the insurance. As subrogee, said private respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for recovery of said amount with legal interest at attorneys fees. Issue: Whether or not the stipulation limiting the carrier liability for goods lost or damaged is valid. Held: Petitioners stand that the conditioned imposed in clause 17 of the bill of lading should not be read in the light of the second paragraph of Sec 4(5) of Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) is well taken. Indeed, it would be to render ineffective the very inherent of the law setting the sum of $500 as the maximum liability of the vessel is a carrier per package. In the absence of a higher valuation of the goods as indicated in the bill of lading.