DIRECT ASSAULT Direct Assault; elements.

Direct assault is defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. It is an offense against public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. The instant case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault. Its elements are: 1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance; 2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent; 3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties; 4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties; and 5. That there is no public uprising. Lydia Gelig vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010.

respondent in her comment admitted that she had an illicit relation with complainants husband but the illicit relation allegedly happened prior to her employment in the judiciary. She claimed that that the affair occurred in 1979 and their love child was born on March 1980 and that she joined the judiciary only on 1981. She further claimed that she had severed her relation with Atty. Burgos arising from their disagreement over support. In the complainants reply, she claimed that the respondents and her husbands relationship still continues. Issues: - Whether the respondent should be suspended for immorality; and - Whether the defense of the respondent is truthful or makes her liable for perjury Held: Respondent Josefina Aquino was suspended for six months for immorality and was found guilty of perjury. The office of the Court Administrator found that indeed the respondent committed an immoral act while in the government service regardless of whether it was committed when employed in the judiciary. Whether the immoral relation still subsists is no longer material. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the OCA, further the evidence proved that on some pleadings by Atty, Burgos and typed by the respondent; bear the initials of both Atty.Burgos and the respondent. The defense of the respondent that their relationship has ended was not proved due to these circumstances. The records also reveled that in some of the documents submitted by the respondent; she did not revealed about her child. Under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, perjury is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. Her deliberate omission to disclose her child without a valid justification makes her liable for perjury. CRIMES AGAINST MORALS IMMORAL DOCTRINES FERNANDO vs. CA

FALSIFICATION

PERJURY BURGOS vs. AQUINO Facts: In this administrative matter, the complainant Virginia Burgos charged the respondent of immorality for maintaining illicit relations with complainants husband which eventually begot them a child, named Jocelyn Burgos. The

Facts: This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated March 21, 2003 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25796, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 99-176582. The RTC convicted Gaudencio E. Fernando and Rudy Estorninos for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 960 and 969, and sentenced each to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional, and to pay the fine of P6,000 and cost of suit. Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region (PNP-CIDG NCR) conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). On May 5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued Search Warrant No. 99-1216 for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren Tingchuy. The warrant ordered the search of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair at 564 Quezon Blvd., corner Zigay Street, Quiapo, Manila, and the seizure of the following items: a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene pictures; b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene pictures; c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude obscene pictures; and d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows. Issue: Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners conviction for violation of Art. 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Held:

Notably, the subject premises of the search warrant was the Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair, named after petitioner Fernando.33 The mayors permit was under his name. Even his bail bond shows that Hhe lives in the same place.34 Moreover, the mayors permit dated August 8, 1996, shows that he is the owner/operator of the store.35 While the mayors permit had already expired, it does not negate the fact that Fernando owned and operated the establishment. It would be absurd to make his failure to renew his business permit and illegal operation a shield from prosecution of an unlawful act. Furthermore, when he preferred not to present contrary evidence, the things which he possessed were presumptively his. Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling and exhibiting the obscene materials. Prosecution witness Police Inspector Tababan, who led the PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the search, identified him as the store attendant upon whom the search warrant was served. Tababan had no motive for testifying falsely against Estorninos and we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. Lastly, this Court accords great respect to and treats with finality the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of witnesses, absent any palpable error or arbitrariness in their findings. In our view, no reversible error was committed by the appellate court as well as the trial court in finding the herein petitioners guilty as charged. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 21, 2003 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2003, of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 99-176582 are hereby AFFIRMED.