Action fceport, ' W , JJMA Operation; X O

(Cbat'd,).

. 3 It was believed ttyat no great amounfc of resistance remained in front, of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines, though i t received heavy, fire from ... the high ground to i t s left in the 5th Marine Division zone.of action* The de cision was made to change the direction,of attack by assigning a new boundary ,' "between Regiment s in order to attack in flank the enemy defensive area In front of the 9th Marines* M, 1500 a coordinated attack was launched to the southeast with the!iaain effort on the l e f t , employing the same formation. The 1st Bn, 21st Marines was released to the complete control of the 21st Marines and moved into .position in rear of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines to launch an>attack to-tne southeast with the mission of seizing Hill $&% {TA 219-V). The Zi Bn* 21st. Marines was to continue the advance.to the northeast to ,the O+y line, Cos and t of the 3& Bn, 9th Marines had at'this time been relieved by elements of the 5th Marine Division* Co K was attached to the 1st Bh, 21 st Marines, and Co & waa attached to the 2d Bn, 21st Marines, which was greatly depleted as a result of heavy casualties. ' The d 9th' Marines- attacked 'with the 1st and 2dBns. abreast, 1st on the right. The 3 Bn, 21st Marines remained in 9th Marines reserve with,the.proviso that i t was not to be committed without divisi<v authority* The attack was preceded by a five* minute preparation " y artilier^ and naval gunfire. The 1st. Bn, 21st Marines made b rapid progress i n i t i a l l y but was finally halted by heavy fire from the high ground tp i t s front The 2d Bn, 21st.Marines seized the high ground in T 218MD A but was unable to advance further because of. heavy flanking fire which came from the high ground in the 5th Marine Division zone of action. 0&& platoon 0^ tanks pf the 21st Marines, from positions in the vicinity of , MQTOlilia. Village, effective ly supported the attack of the 1st Bn, 21st Marines "by placing direct fire on enemy targets in front of that battalion. The 9th Marines was again unable to advance* Tanks were being used singly *&& in small groups in the broken terrain to i t s front by\the, 9th Marines and though they knocked out a number of enemy emplacements aad some guns, they were-unable to breach this enemy position suffi* ciently to permit advance by'the infantry, A. number of, enemy antitank guns were* . located in this position ?nd several,were sited to deliver converging fixe on CiU3^$ (TA 201rB)% A number of our tanks were knocked out before this position V/P.S finally reduced, Tor, a. detailed report,of tank bpe^tions, see SInclosure H, . Action Iteport, 3d Tank Battalion.' At 1800 the situation was as shown 6& Enclosure B (13), Situation at;18OO^ 3 .March. k' March * I4. The Cqrjts ^attack was set for 0S15 this date, si on orders called for the 34 Bn, 21st" Marines to be released to the 2lst Mariifes and to moVe prior to daylight to be passed through the 1st Bn# 21st Marines and continue the, attack to the southeast to eeise Hill 362 (TA 219-tf), At apprdxi** maiely OO an estimated 200 eneny troops made an infiltration attempt'in the gecp 3O between the 2d Bnt! 9th tiirines and the 1st Bn, 21st! Marines at the "eastern end of Airfield Ho. 3, After a sharp fight, the b^unt of which was borne Tiy the left company of the 2d Bn*- 9th Marines, the enemy was^ repulsed with heavy, ca^ue-lties* The 2d Bnt 9th Marines'suffered numerous casualties also. Heports indicated^some enemy.troops id&A succeeded in infiltrating our lines and were seen moving along ' the airfield* Patrols were sent forward to the .airfield and in rear of the 1st and 2d Bns, 9th Marines by ,the 3d Bn, 21st Marines, The Jd Bn, 21st Marines . Which was under orders to commence moving at O OC, v;as ordered to remain in place ^j) &&& continue patrolling until ?.fter daylight when the situation could,be clari fied* Patrols of the,Jd $n, 21st Marines killed two,or three enemy troops by day light and the situation was found to be satisfactory* " '.
1
..

'

<t.

'

2* Permission was, secured;from Corna to delay the attack of the' division until the 3d ^n t;i 2lst Marines wae in^positij

Action Report, I O J1MA. Operation* W

(Cont!d).

Brij 21st Marines comn)enced movement at O6^5 at which time i t reverted to the 21st Marines, AT circuitous route was talcen to avoid enemy fire \&ich was heavy in the forward area. 3fren so, in crossing the. area -northwest and north of ^Airfield ^To* 3, the 'battalion was taken under fir of enemy mortars and small arms and considerably delayed, finally arriving in position at tlOO. Visibility' was ex tremely poor which Relayed and hindered preparations for the passage of lines. At 11^0 the division attack was launched following the same scheme of maneuver as oh the previous, day* with the exception' that the 3d Sn, 21st Marines % s m passed through the 1st Bn, 21st Marines* A twenty-minute preparation by the division a r t i l l e r y with thirty minutes on deeper targets by. direct support destroy ers was fired, and was followed by a rolling barrage lifting one hundred yards ' every seven minutes for 200 yards> The> 9th Marines, vras again unable to dent theenemy position to i t s front. Strong resistance was met by the 21st Marines, :* .'" including direct fire from a r t i l l e r y pieces which were difficult to locate,-and l i t t l e progress was made. The 2d Bn, 31st Marines, s t i l l unable to advance because of hostile flanking f i r e from the high ground to i t s left in the 5*h V Marine Division ^one of actiqny also suffered numerous casualties from a hostile field piece firing direct fire in enfilade of -its l i n e f r o m a position in the vicinity of 219-K or .*;"IV Efforts, to definitely locate and knock this piece out with a r t i l l e r y fire had been unsuccessful* Belief- of the 3d Bn, 9*h Marines by units of. the 5th Marine Division was completed in the morning and Co I was assembled in rear ~pf the line,. , The battalion; less Op K, attached to the 1st Bn, 21st Marines, was moved into position southwest of M T H A village in OO M . ' " division reserve. The 1st Bn, 21st b r i n e s , after being,passed through, by the '-.' 3d Bnt ,21st Marines, was withdrawn'to the vicinity of RJ-33O (tfA 21&-H) where Co If was released to control of the 3d Bn, 9th Marines in i t s reserve position, Co B.was attached to the 2d Bn, 21st Jferines, The 1st Bn, 21st Iferines,(less Co B) was assigned as regimental reserve^ the battalion headquarters and Co A moving into position in the area 199~S T, and Y. Co C remained in the vicinity of BJ~ ' 330 and was employed to cover the gap between the 9^h and 21st Marines when lines were consolidated for the night. The 3d Reconnaissance Co was attached to the 21st Marines at 1^5 and moved to the vicinity of TA 217-V, 200-B. At 1S00 the"situa tion was as shown on ; 2hclosure B .(l^) v Situation ati 1S00, h March; ... 5 March~ Inaccordance with Corps- order, no attacks were to; be launched on this date and'one,battalion of, each regiment was 'to be rested, and reorganized prepared to assume an assault role on the following day. Lines held by two battalions in each regiment, Go B, lst.Bn, 21st Marines, vras detached \ from the 2d Bn, 21st Marines and' together with Co C,. rejoined the l s l Bn, 2,1st Marines in TAs vl99-*S, T, and T where the'battalion was reeguipped and replacements provided* Steps h'ad already been taken to provide rep lac ern on ts. and equipment to the 34 Bfrt: 9th Marines, in ; division reserve. M t t l c Gneriiy activity took place during .the day.. Artilleay an^ naval guns fired^harassing fires, thro ugheut the day, and one a i r s t r i k e was coMucted in the Hill.362 area (o?A;219^U). . 6 March,-, Corps orders for tEis date called for an attack in : echelon,by the 3d Marine Division. At 0^00 ,the 2d Bn^ 21kst Marines, ,v;hose further advance depended directly on progregs made by the 5th Ma^rine Division, vfas to attack vrith that division. At OjOO the remainder of the division was to attack in conjunction with the 1+th Marino Division on the right. ' TTith th" exception that the 2d :Bait 21st Marines (3d Ben Co now attached) was to attack an hour earlier than the remainder of the division, there was no change in the scheme of maneuver previously employed. The 3d Bn, 9th Marines vras attache3j||D| Ui|L21st Marines at

Action Steport, I O JIMA Operation* W

<Cont*dK

0600 and moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of BJT-330 ( ^ 218-H). As prescribed by Corps, a ten minute preparation from O75O to 0800 was fired in support of the attack of the 2d'Bn, 21st Marines by'three battalions of the 12th Marines, threis battalions of the l&th Marines and one battalion of Corps artillery* In support of the attack at 0900, tjiree battalions of the 12th Marines and one battalion of Corps Artillery fired a preparation from 08^5 to O85O and from 0g^5 to 0900 and. followed with a rolling barrage lifting. 100 yards every seven minutes for 300 yardsi Ninety minutes of naval gunfire was also put down in support of the attack* The preparation in front of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines was ineffective as the advance was stopped, immediately by heavy hostile mortar and small arms fire from the high ground in the 5 th Marine Division ssone of action, despite the preparation then being fired in that area. At 0900 the 3d Bn, 21st Marines and 9th Marines launched their attack but were able to make only slight gains against email arms, mortar, artillery, and *ntit#nk gun fire. The initial attack having bogged downr another, coordinated attack was launched'at 1^0 with
the 2ist Marines passing the 1st Bn, 21st Marines, which had been released to
'their control, through the Jd Bn, 2lst Marines, This attack was preceded by
a two minute preparation which lifted 100 yards and fired for five minutes* , $he
1st Bn, 21st Marines slowly advanced atyou^ 200 yards against heavy enemy fire
while the 9th Marines made negligible gains* After being disengaged by the ad vance of the 1st Bnt21st Marines, the 3d 2feif'21& Marines reverted to jiivision
reserve in an assembly area west of M TY 1A village. At 1S00 when lines were
Q 0 A4 . ordered consolidated for the night, the situation was as shown on Enclosure B
(15), Situation at 1800, 6 March,
':: 7 March ^ The division continued the, at tack with a pre-dawn attack at O^QQ, K change in boundary or formation was prescribed and the 21st Marines, b making the main effort, were assigned the objective of selling Hill 362 ($A 219 UK The '9'th Marines were ordered to advance 200. yards during darkness, as a divert sionary measure, prepared to continue the attack at daylight to the seacoast* 3vey precaution was taken to preserve secrecy# A request, approved toy Coi$s was made %o cease all "illumination just prior to the attack* tfo preparation was to be fired* The division artillery fired-harassing*'fires throughout the night using white phosphorous, a concentration of white phosphorous'being placed around Hill 362 (TA 219 tJ) five minutes prior to the attack* No mention, of a night attack was permitted on radios* Troops were ordered to move as noiselessly as possible and no firing was to take place until the attack was definitely discovered. The 21st Marines attacked with, one battalion, passing the 3d Bn, 9th Marines through the 1st Bn, 21st Marines* The 2d Bn, 21 st Marines were ordered to hold their position and attack in conjunction with the 5th Marine Division during daylight* The 9th Marines (less 3d Bn) attacked with the 1st mid 2d Bns abreast, 1st on the right. The 3d Bn, 21st Marines refined in division reserve. One tank company remained attached to each regiment* The weather was overcast with jtight rain at the, time the attack was launched* The'attack achieved complete surprise, no^ a shot Toeing fired until i t became light, which was about O63O under the prevailing weather conditions* While i t was s t i l l dark the 9th Marines reported they had advanced 200 yards without detection and Were ordered .to advance another 100 yards. The 21st Marines reportedfthe % Bn, 9th Marines on the move with no enemy reaction. At the first light of day the attack of the 9th Marines was detected and the 2d Bn, which was inside the envoy position Was .taken under fire from the fronts flanks, and rear. The 1st Bn had curled i t s right flank around the enemy position and was receiving fire:from the front on the right but i t s left company WAS in the same situatioif m tf2^2 Bn, In the

Action Heport, IWO JIHA. Operation.

(Cont'd)*

21st Marinas zone of action* the 3d B # 9th Marines caught the enemy asleep
in his emplacements and took a heavy toll witft. flame thrower arid automatic
Veppons* The enemy was set "back on his heels in this area And the 3^ jBn?
jth Marines made a slow but steady advance through his position toward Hill.
'$Z% reporting seizure of the hill as of 133O# The 9th Marines suffered immerous casualties and were unable to advance beyond their daylight positions*
"he 1st and 2d Bns, 9th Marines were well depleted by this time and at 1015 s :
the boundary between regiments was changed to pinch out the 9th Marines, The
j'd Bn, 9th Marines encountered strong enemyv re si stance around the top of Hill
;<62. Mopping up operations were Continued around Hill 362 during the remainder
of the afternoon. Efforts of the 3& 3n,- 9th Marines to make contact with the
: iid-Bnt ^th Marines with its reserve company to relieve enemy pressure on, that
"battalion failed. This company struck the right flank of the enemy pocket in
front of the 9th Marines, met stiff resistance and was unable to advance* ^ .
;
]}anks were sent in to assist the 2d Bnf 9th Marines and succeeded in easing . the.pressure* The 2d Bn, 21st Marines made no progress, sin<ie the 5th Marine
Divisipn had failed in its attack to clear the high ground commanding the zone
of action of the 2d Bn, 2lst Marines. This battalion reported it believed no
hostile troops to be in its zone of action* but that further advance took it
down on an open flat shelf overlooking the beacli which was completely commanded
.by the high ground in the 5th Marine Division sbne-'of actiont and every
attemptedvadvance was taken under fire by the enemy on that high ground* Until
the 5th Marine Divisions seized this high ground, further advance by the 2d
Bn, 2lst Marines would be impracticable. At 1700 the situation was as shown
on Enclosure B (16), Situation at 17 00 # 7 March* The'boundary between regiments
was shifted at 17^5 r aigkt defense "and the 9th Marines assumed control
of the right sector with ail three battalions of the 9th Marines* Co B* 21st
Marines remained attached to the 3& Bn, 9th Marines, See Enclosure (17) #
Situation at 17^5 1 March. The 21st Marines pud 3d Bn, 9th Marines tied .
i.
their lines in at the boundary prior to dark.. g March ~ The division continued the attack at 0750. A new
boundary between regiments was assigned for the attack which was to be made
,with regiments abreast, 9th Marines on the right. Co B, 21st Marines remained
attached to. the 9th Marines, each'regiment had one tank company attached,
and the 3& Reconnaissance Co remained attached to the 21st Marines, This
company was now in a reserve position in the vicinity o BJ-33Q (TA 218-tH).
^he attack was preceded by a ten-minute preparation by the division artillery,
reinforced by Corps artillery, which was followed by a rolling barrage.lifting
100 yards every" seven minutes for 200 yards. Direct support destroyers fired
a preparation from O73O to QgOO* The 21st Marines continued the,attack with
the 1st and.2d Bns, 21st Marines abreast, 1st on the right. The 2d Bn, 21st
Marines was ordered to regulate its advance on that of the 5th Marine Division.
Little advance was made by the 21st Marines which was held up by .flanking "fire
delivered:rom the 5th Marine Division and 9th Marines zones of action
whenever an' attempt was made to move down to the cliff overlooking the beach.
Little resistance was believed to be in their front. The 9th Marines attacked
passing the 3d Bn f 21st Marines, which had been attached to them, through
the right of the 1st Bn, 9th Marines, and continuing the attack to the beach
with the 3d Bn f 9th Marines. The 2d Bn, 9th Marines and Co C, the left
company of the 1st Bn, 9th Marines had been closely engaged with the enemy
since the night attack, and were engaged in mopping up the enemy still remaining
in their ,rear, Co C could riot be disengaged and the Is1

. ' "', " . " . 1 5 * *

Action.Report* IttO JIM& Operation.

(Cont^d)

Co G,-was withdrawn into division reserve west "of ^ T y M . village, fhe 3d O OA A Bn, th Marines advanced some fco yards "beyond Hill 362 toward the beach opposed " y "bitter out disorganized Resistance* An air strike Was conducted b " y this battalion against eneihy>A and mortar positions in.2?A 219 B and W b : .2he 3& Bn# 21st Marine-s attacked to flank the pocket wMch had been holding up the 9th Marines with direction of attack generally north, "but made no progress, f fhe action in the 9th ^r'^lnes zone of action,,Was of the Indian 'fighting type t from sandstone butte tp e^ndstone "butt, The hostile, -resistance in the area of the pocket was located in v caves and emplacements in the sandstone and included antitank guns and well concealed, dug-in tanks, ,;Ugllfc and medium, mounting yjxm ah&kim ma* At 1600, the. situation was as shown on JJnclosure . 3 (18)\: Situation atigOQ, $ March. 5he lined of the 21st Marines attd 3d 3h, 9tn Marines^wer6 tied in at the boundary for the night, but no contact existed between the 3d Bnf 9th MarineB and either the 24 Bn* 9*k Marines or
3& Bn, 21st Marines* ".'.'
;

''

: > . .

'.,:.....

/...

9 March - The division continued the attack at 0700 enploying the same scheme of ioianeuver, A ten-minute artillery preparatiott was placed^ ^ ^ in the zoaie of action of the 9th Marinea prior to the attack, Ulhe 3d Bn$: ; 9th Maxines continued to advance toward the beach against sporadic .but stubborn' enemy reaistance and by 1700 had penetrated to the beach area, !Phi s battalion called,o^e air strike on the area 5A 2l9-^S whi,ch had X>$@n. a troublesome spo^ ? for the past two days* She 2d 3n, $tk Marines, with effective assistance from tantkrs, continued to mop up eneny elements in i t s immediate vioinity* Puring the morning, Co 0, 1st 3n#/$tji Marinee was. disengaged and rejoined i t s battalion in division reserve* The 3d Bht 21st Marines, employing tanks, attacked the enemy pocket to its-.froat but^raade ho progress* pnlvr one tank, at a tine could be employed in this terrain* The enemy destroyed one of our tanks by firing a i r bursts oVer the t^nfc; to disperWe the infantry, and coirer* ing by smoke the approach to the tank of a demolition detachment which knocked out the tank with a demolition change and a Molotov cocktail. Be si at ance in this pocket was passive but extremely tenacious*^ The 1st Bn, 21st Marines advanced to the edge of the c l i f f overlooking the beach'.against negligible re fii stance andN sent patrol $ down on the beach to the'water line where no resistance was endou^itered, 3Pire, however, was received in the beach area from the ,5th Marine Division one of action and the battalion raatntai-ned i t s position on the c l i f f . The 2d Bn, 21st Marines advanced i t s right f^tank to tie-in, with the 1st Bn, 21st Marines. A destroyer'was efijployed during the day, with the Division IJaval Gunfire OiffiCerv aboard, to fire on caves and enemy position's located in the beach area. Thi^'was believed to have been quite effective. Infantry battalions were now definitely beginning to feel the presence of. tho large number of replacements, manifested by a sharp drop in , combat efficiency. These men were found to be willing but very poorly trained, especially in basic individual conduct, "the faulty lieamwork, resulting from lack of small unit training, was also a definite hindrance tp the operation of the infantry battalions. Many needless casualties occurred in these replacements because of & lack of knowledge of the proper use of cover and concealment. At 1800 the situation wasi ae shown oh Enelosure B (19), Situation at ISOO, $ March* 1^ Marc^- The attack was continued at 0800 of maneuver* Koartillery, or naval gunfire preparations w

Q
Action Steport, I O JXlfftPfcatioa. W (Contd).

9th Marines pushed down to the beach and turned southward to sweep to the . divi si on right boundary. Thi a battalion was hindered during the, day by ' hostiji small arms firs delivered from the high ground to i t s flenk and rear. The 3d Bn, 21st Marines'continued.its attack against the enemy pocket to i t s front using tanks, but made l i t t l e progress* Difficulty was experienced in getting replacements to work properly with tanks* The 24 Bn 9th Marines continued to mop up enemy elements In i t s immediate Vicinity and l i t t l e advance was made. This battalion was now badly depleted. The ^Ist Marines changed direction and started a sweep toward the north* The 1st Bn, s21st Marines, by patrols, had established that no e&&tay were in the beach area and* advanced generally north with their right -flank on the cliff overlooking the beach. The 2d Bn, 21st Marines was s t i l l unable to advance i t s left flank because of hostile fire from the 5th Marine Division zone of action, although i t kept i t s right flank in contact with the 1st Bn, 21st Marines* At 1500 the 21st Marines reported a l l organized resistance eliminated in the zone of action of the 1st Bn, 21st Marines and patrols were dispatched by that battalion through i t s zone of action in rear of the line to mop-up any remaining enemy elements* Just prior to noon information'was received from Corps that the ^th Marine division was advancing rapidly toward the coast line and had Reported their left; flank fOQ yards in advance of the 3& Marine Divi sion* s' right flank* Permission was secured to move the division reserve battalion, the 1st Bn, 9th Marines to an assembly area i n rear of the left flank of the ^th Marino division for a flanking attack through the gp to the northeast to effect a'Juncture with the 3& Bn, 9th Marines, thereby localising remaining enetay resistance in the 9th Marines zone of action. The 1st Bn, 9th b r i n e s was moved out early in tne afternoon and arrangements were made with the 23d Marines to have them guided into an assembly area in rear of the left flank of the kih. Marine Division* On arrival of the battalion In i t s assembly area for the attack, i t WAS found that 'the &ap was only about 200 yards and the 1 tyth Marine Division left flank was not as far forward as i t had reported and much further to the right, being actually some four or five hundred yards from the boundary between divisions. The 1st Bn, 9th Marines launched i t s attack, however, in a column of companies at 1535* The battalion made l i t t l e advance, being'taken under enemy small arms fire from positions on the ridge generally in TAs 201-J and 202-2. During the entire advance down'the northeastern slopes to the coastline, the Uth Marine Division consistently erroneously reported the location of I t s left flank, invariably placing i t forward, and usually further to the l e f t , of i t s actual location. As the advance progressed, the ^th Marine Division gradually puljed i t s left flank away from the division boundary with the result that a considerable part of the operations of the 9th Marines were carried on in the ifth Marine Division zone of action* The" 2d Bn, 9th.Marines was disengaged daring the afternoon end by 1800 had closed O O AA il in i t a assembly area in division reserve %&' the vicinity of M T K ^ villago Steps were immediately taken to provide this battalion with replacements and, equipment. At 1900. the situation was as shown in Enclosure B (20), Situation at 1800, \Q March. , ' 11 March * Ooerations begun on 10 March were continued at O739 The 1st Bn, 9*h Marines> now moving with two companies abreast made excellent progress and with i t s l e f t flank contacted the right flank of the 3d Bn* 9th Marines in T 202-A at 1200. The 1st Bn, fJWferinea\ then sending A i t s tesetve company to the right to sweep ilong t h e ' U ^

Action Report. IWO JTHft. Operation, (Con^d).

'

, ' ' \

left ^f, the 3d Bn* 9th Marines in T A 202-rB at l$00* Enemy resistance, con sisting of a few riflemen and machine guns, was, encountered" on the rlSge in
TA 2Q2-G and H After making contact, these two battalions-changed direction
to the west and advanced abreast up the high ground mopping up scattered enemy
elements* The 3& Bn*. 21st Marines continued mopping up operations on the enemy
pocket to its front* Although the &nemy was now contained "by only one
battalion on one side of this pocket, he made.no effort to leave it to conduct
offensive operations, or withdraw but conducted a.bitter defense in place
which resulted in little or'no progress being made by the J&. Bn, 21st Marines.
A sled-mounted 72tt rocket launcher, towed by a tank, was attached to the 3d
Bn, 21st Marines. Ten barrages were fired into the enemy pocket with un determined results^. The danger Radius of the rockets was greater than fhe
range at which they were fired, but nil men were kept under cover, and no
casualties to our own personnel were suffered* The 21st Marines conducted
mopping up operations in rear of its lines in its zone of action; Further
progress to- the north toward the division left boundary was impracticable-until
the 5tH Marine Division was able to gain control of all the high ground over looking the beach area in the 21st Marines zone of action. Units of the 5th
Marine Division had been brought around in the rear of the left flank of the
2d Bn, 21st Marines in order to maneuver against eneniy positions located in
their zone of action* The left elements of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines-had b,een
passed through and relieved and the right of the 5th Marine Division actually
extended inio the 3d Marine Division zone of action. At .1030 the" 2d Bn* 21st
Marines Was withdrawn to a position just northwest of MOTOYJiMA village. This
battalion was extremely depleted at this tine and no opportunity'had been
afforded to provide it with replacements. The 1st Bn* 21st Marines extended
to the left and tied in with the $th Marine Division. This "battalion had.
cleared out a small pocket of resistance to its front in some coast defense
emplacements, and had blown up the emplacements* Although no resistance was
now remaining in the division zone of action, the 1st Bn, 21st Marines reclined
in position to protect the right flank of. the 5^ n Marine Division, The 2d,
3df and tai Bns, 12th Marines reinforced fires of the 13th Marines during the
day. Ho artillery was fired in the division^zone of action. At 1800 the situa tion was. as shown on Enclosure B (21), Situation at 1S00, 11 March*
12 March ~ At 0700 nopping up operations were continued in the
9th Marines gone of action. The 1st and 3d Bns 9th Marines continued their
advance to the west until stubborn resistance was encountered near the crest
of the ridge overlooking the sea coast. This resistance was mostly in front
of the 1st Bn, 9th Marinos Little advance was made during the remainder
of the, day. The contour of the enemy* pocket which had held up the 9th Marines
was now apparent. The 3d Bn, 21st Marines continued its mopping up operations
and though some caves md emplacements were knocked out. no great advance WP.S
made. This enemy pocket was located'on a slope below the crestline to the
east and the one to the south and was coanmnded by ground occupied by our
troops* However the terrain of the pocket was extremely .broken* consisting
of numerous sandstone buttes and there were many caves ?nd well Concealed
emplacements in the*erea. Hostile positions could not be identified until our
troops were practically on top of them* #or a detailed sketch of the defen sive organization of this pocketr see Enclosure A (k) t Sketch, 3*inal
Defenses 126th Tank Regiment* On the left of the division^Jn accordance
with Corps order, the 1st Bn 21st Marines extended its f j y ^

Action Eeport* *W0 jpSKPIratIon*

(Contd).

\
Marine Division zone of action along the top of the cliff overlooking the "beach
in .rear of the right of the%%h Marine Division in order to protect the right
flank of that division. Ho artillery was fired in the division zone of action.
The 12th Marines again reinforcedNthe" fires, of the 13th Marines in support of
the attack of the 5t n Marine Division* At, 1800 the situation was as shown-on
. , Enclosure B (22), Situation at 1800, 12 March. t 13 March.- Mopping up operations were continued at 073 The;
3d Bn, 21st Marines was withdrawn and reverted to the 21st Marinas in a "bivouac
area west of MOT0YAMA village. The 1st and 3d Bns, 9th Marines continued the
attack against ^the enemy po.cket from the east. $anks were used and some
hostile emplacements were knocked out and caves closed, but little advance
wp.s made. The 1st Bn, 21st .Marines continued to protect the right flank of
the 5th Marine Division* The 3& Reconnaissance Go, attached to the 21st
Marines, reverted to division control in the vicinity of the division command
post, A destroyer, with the Asst Division ftaval Gunfire Officer aboard,
was employed .during, t&e day in firing: at enemy caves and. emplacements in the
cliffs overlooking the beach area, in the northern part of the 5th Marine
Division-zone of action in order to support the 1st Bn, 21st Marines in pro-, :
tecting the right flank; of that division* The 12th Marines continued to
reinforce the fires of the 13th Marines. The situation at 1800 was as, shown on
Snel&sure B (23), Situation at'1800, 13 March. .
lh March - Mopping up operations continued at O63O, The 3&
Bn, 9th Marines was ordered to take up a position on Hill 362. (TA-21$MJ) and
patrol to the beach area in the 9th Marines* zone of action leaving the 1st
Bn, 9th Marines to reduce the enemy pocket.. The 1st Bn, 9th Marines, using
tanks and flamethrower tanks, reduced the si'se of the pocket somewhat* At
I53O this "battalion was relieved by, the 2d Bn, 9th Marines and moved into a
bivouac area in the vicinity -of MQTOYAMiL village* The 2d Bn, 21st Marine* was
ordered to move forward in the afternoon and establish a reserve line in rear
,4 of the right of the 1st Bn, 21st Marines in the vicinity of KT 323 ( T 21S-X).
This was -completed at 1915* ^&e 1st-'Bn, 21st Marines continued its mission
of expending to the northwest behind the right flank of the 5*h Marine Division
in. order to protect the right vflank of that division. The 3& Bn, 21st Marines
was designated as Corps reserve. The situation at 1800 was as. shown on
Enclosure B {Zk) /Situation at 1600, lk March.
lg> March ~ Mopping up operations were continued at 073$.*
2d.Bn, 9th Marines using tanks and flamethrower tanks considerably reduced the
size of the enemy pocket. The 3& Bn, 9th Marines continued.patrol.operations
and mopping up of scattered enemy remnants.. The. 1st Bn, 21st Marines continued
to follow the advance of the 5th Marine Division. The situation at 1000 was
as shown on Enclosure B (25)t, Situation at 1800, 15 March. '"*''
16 March . By Corps order, the division left-boundary was changed
to give the. northern part of the 5^k Marine Division zone of action to the 3d
Marine Division, At 0715'elements of the. 5th Marine Division in the 3d Division
zone of action were relieved by the 1st .and 2(3. .Bns, 21st Marines, 1st Bn on
the right* preparatory t.o an attack by the, 21st Marines to clear the division
zone of action of enemy resistance. The 3& Btt, 21st Marines was noved to'a
position in regimental reserve in the vicinity of BJ 322 (TA 218-1). The $th
Marines.were ordered to hold one battalion in readinesslJfifci3&ak(on one hour's .

Action Heport, IWO < M Operation. H A

(Cont'd)*

notice to support the attack. The 3& BJI, 9th Marines was designated. Th attack was launched at 0815 after a twenty-minute preparation by the division artillery.which was lifted 100 yards at CS15 and continued for another ten ninutes. for. situation at. 03X5,; see'Enclosure 3 (26), Situation at 0S15, 16 March. The 1st and 2d 3ns advanced, steadily against scattered enemy resistance and "by I33O had reached the coastline and seized KITANO Point. Mopping up operations continued throughout the .division zone of action during the day and by l$5 the 2d Bh, 9th Marines, had eliminated the, enemy pocket o f resistance in TA 201-D. At 1800 the situation was as shown on Enclosure. B (27), Situation at 1800, l'S March, At the close of operations "Corps declared a l l organized resistance on IWOJIMA, to have been eliminated.

IT.
A. *
chart below: .

. CASUALTIES,

Administration.
1.- Casualties suffered by this division were as shown on the

QHGJyrizAiiojsr

KILLED "OFF

W0UKD2ID

MISStHG -

TOTAL CASUALTIES

ML

ow

03!F 13S^ 127S

SBflr".

OH1

- !KX

9 t h Marines . 21st Marines 12th Marines Hqs Bn 3d k 3 a 3d Ser Bn. 3d MT Bn *" * 3 d Med Bn 3d Sngr Bn 3d P i on Bn TOTAL 2IVISIOU A!EPACH1D milTS 3d JASCo "'

21

>7S
2SS 12

57
1^ 1 8
2

1
0

17
2 .0 0

13 "- 79 71 1
0
- 1

1S75
1567

100

0
1

. 16 \
1 8 2

112

s
19"0

kl 67
5 :

0.'

51

107

0
0 0

1
0 0 0

. Q

k .

0,
10

. 0
0

-o
0
2 1

0 ,
0 0

^7
80

0 0

57
8

. 9
2 S27

2 1

0
0

6
3032

0
1

H O

139

16

180

3^75

k 3
,0
. 0

.5
0 0 0
N

,22

5
0

26 16 -. 6i

3d Var. 3Dog P l a t 2Sth Repl B r a f t 3^th Repl D r a f t TOTAL AJMkhffBD '

AGGfiSGATl TOTAL

0
0 0 0

13

0 0 0
0

0
0 0 0

6
.,7
1*8
. 30SQ

0 0

7
55

ko

.83^

5" iW

16

Action-Report*, IWO JIMA. Operation, g

:

(Cont'd).

Methods used to maintain high morale throughout the operation*

a. The Division CP was established ashore at 1500, 24

February 1945 (D plus 5 ) . , ,
, b. On 25 February (D plus 6) books (Pocket'Readers) were
distributed by the Division Chaplain. Books were'obtained from ships which
carried troops from Rear Area*
c* On 25 February (D plus 6), and daily thereafter, the
Division Hews Sheet Was published for all units of this Division* A distribution
s
to units down to the platoon-was effected, d* At 1020 on 25.February (D plus 6) the American Red.'
Cross Field Director reported to G-l and was directed by the GKL to move American
Red Gross supplies to Company A' , Jd Med 3n (vicinity of Div GP). Distribution
of supplies was made to all troops with special attention to casualties remaining
on the island. The American Bled Cross rendered invaluable service in furnishing
casualties with much needed personal comfort articles. ' '
e. On 25 February (D plus 6) the first religious services
were conducted wherever conditions permitted, Services were>held on Sundays and
throughout the week in all units of this Division. Unit Chaplains-conducted
individual religious services over their dead* f* On 26 February (D plus 7) the Division 3urial and (Graves
Registration Officer landed and began evacuationand burial( of our dead,
g. At Il45, rMarch (D plus 10) a mail plane (Curtis
Commando) was sighted. It dropped bags of mail on MOTOYAMA Airfield 2To. 1 while
that airfield was under construction. Mail \*as.dispatched from Rear Schelon to
Forward Area on a daily schedule and all troops received mail as it arrived. . The v
prompt delivery of mail was an important morale factor and did much for the
troops of this Division, .
h. 0nx 6 March '(Dplus 15) a Division/Library, under the
control of the Division Chaplain* was established in the vicinity of the Division
C3? Numerous" copies of "Yank11, ^Leatherneck" and "Time" magazines were distribute
to troops on 7 March and frequently thereafter*
1. troops of this,Division* natural hot water shower preference to front line
. c a m p a i g n . '

On 14 March (D plus 23) hot showers were available for

The i?ivision Engineers established and, maintained the
.at the Division Water Point* A schedule which gave
troops was established and maintained throughout the

. ' .. ' ' ".-.. ' . . ' \". .

j. On 14 March (D plus 23), fresh eggs* beef, apples., oranges

potatoes* onions,'lard, turnips and carrots were furnished troops on the front
lines*: More fresh eggs, pork, chicken and other fresh foods were distributed to
the troops on March 15, l6 t 17 13 a^<i21.
k. On 15 March (D plus 24) sel

IIHI:I AWII-UII

Action Report, IWO JIMA. Operation.

(Cont f d)
/ & . .

Office and immediately thereafter a schedule of from two (2) to four(k)

shows daily was maintained. Six of the latest l&nm films were flown to forward
Area for, this purpose.
' ' '

'

'-

'

1. O l6 March (3) plus 2-5) the A M Office made a d i s t r i n & bution of one (l) candy bar and one (l) can of "beer per person. A total of twofe) candy bars and two (2) cans, of beer were, distributed 'during, active operations. Arrangements for a i r transport of these supplies were approved by the Commanding General* who authorized the expenditure of A M funds for this purpose* S . ' . ' m. officially declared
O 16 March (D plus 25)' the Island of I O JIMA was
n W

n O 20 March (D plus 29) the A 6 Office distributed

n & stationery, candles, and athletic gear (softball and volleyball equipment) to
troops of this Division* Candles permitted troops to write letters and read
during hours of darkness* '
o* The Division Band gave frequent concerts for front line troops immediately following the cessation of hostilities* This included a swing session which, gave the troops a great l i f t and.much pleasure* * . p* Frequent v i s i t s during combat by the Commanding General
and other Division staff officers to front line troops did much to bolster their
morale*
3. System of handling replacements during the operation*

a. This report i s divided into three phases, (l) Pre liminary or Preparatory phase, (2) Operations Phase and (3) He commendations.
(1) Preliminary Phase: This is a*brief resume of the administrative preparations prior to embarkation* On 29 December/ 19^,the 2#th and 3*fth Keplacement Drafts were attached to the 3 Pioneer Battalion for purposes & , of administrative supervision, supply and training* The combined total of personnel in these two grafts was 115 officers and 2575 enlisted. These re placements were to be kept intact and were to be organized, trained and used as part of the 3d Marine Division Shore Party. O 1 January, 19^5 a classification officer was n assigned to the Pioneer Battalion to review the classification cards, ascertain special skills, prepare specialty rosters, and to assist *in the ultimate alloca tion of these replacements to the various-units of the Division when the draft w r disbanded. . ' ' I . Only one. dr^ft had a regular admini strative group attached* The other draJt made up an administrative section from personnel in thc 4raft, All administration was under "the supervision of the Pioneer Battalion. Within each draft the administrative section \*ate divided into a reer and forward section* The Rear Echelon was made up of two officers and S enlisted to handle all property, records, change sheets and reports from the Forward Area* The

Action Beport, IW JIMA. Operation* ' O

(Contld)

Porward Schelon was made up of tk.officers and 3 enlisted " e who were to aid in mn disbanding the drafts in- the field, distribute mail and send reports to the Bear Echelon* . , , ' ' About 10 -January the S~l, .Pioneer Battalion "broke down the "replacement personnel into nine. Battalion, Landing Team Shore Parties and from that date on the draft personnel were trained'in those groups with the variotf Regimental Combat Team Shore Parties. They were embarked and functioned during the operation .under this organization*
. ' ' ' . ' ' . '

: During the straining period prior to embarkation, a casualty reporting system was drawn up to conform to the Division Casualty Reporting System. Certain problems arvose in connection with the drafts since thej were so ^short of H O and the men and officers had not worked together for long. ^ C a I t was decided to place the responsibility for reporting all casualties on each officer in .charge of a Shore Party detail and to have reports sent through Pioneer Battalion communication channels to the Pioneer S~l for further reporting to Division. ' , prior to embarkation, personnel* 3?our basic records were developed or maintained

(a), % A alphabetical roster' of a l l replacement n The replacement drafts*debarkation rosters were used for this purpose,

(b) A specialty roster grouping and listing by name a l l men qualified1^ for each military specialty. Basics, likewise, were-groupe according to usable civilian skills or by aptitudes. Por example,' in accordance with the known, desire of the 12th. Marines, men with high, mechanical aptitude test scores and extensive mathematics, background were earmarked for artillery. , (c) An assignment, notice for each officer and enlisted man, prepared; in twp identical sections. (d) personnel* \ A report by military specialty of unassigned . ^

Operations Phase: The personnel used consisted of two classification officers, three enlisted classification specialists,, one clerks-typist, an officer in charge of the assembly area from replacement dr^ft and several guides from the replacement"draftsv ,., In" addition the S-l^of the 3d Pioneer Battalion was always available and frequently assisted in such,matters as eixpecjating the release of p-ersonnel from the Shore Party,* The records maintained weres * " ' - ! ' (a) (b) (c) A log. pf directives. ' . / . .

The military specialty roster. A report of assi

Action Report, I WO JIMA Operati pn,

(Cont'd)*
(I1) Unit to which assigned*
(21) Unit from which assigned*
These cumulative totals were reported to

M L as of 1B00 daily.
...-. (d) A report, of unassigned.personnel, This" report was submitted to the Division Adjutant as of 11300 daily. Replacements were ordered by directive from ACofS, GHU The directive specified the number of personnel to be trans ferred, the units to which the personnel,were to-be assigned and the required time of'arrival of ;the replacements. When practical, the specification serial numbers were included in the directive, . '
1

" ' *: , . , The Classification Officer selected the.', types of personnel to b'e assigned. The types were s located on the specialty roster* The'3-1 of the 3<* Pioneer Battalion was advised as to the Shore Party details in which the needed personnel were located. The S-l provided the information as to which details could most .Readily provide the required number. The assignment notices for those to be assigned were. completed, entry was ma.de- in the withdrawal log and the assignment notice was, divided. One half of the notice then itfas used in this sequence for assembling the personnel, completing the inventory and reporting 1 records, writing the special orders by the Division Adjutant and finally the. return tt> the,Classification Officer for filing. Simultaneously the other half was used for assembling the casualty data sheets, identifying and establishing the qualification of the personnel reporting to the regiments and on down to the \ battalions and, finally, if the Replacement became a casualty, the notice went with the appropriate information to the Division Adjutant who sent i t to the Rear Echelons of the Division and .replacement draft for completing, the personnel records. ,' " . . . ' . 2277 officers and enlisted personnel were O assigned at- I W JIMA* I t i s believed that the keynote to the-, ' assignment procedure i s the preparatory work done. It. made* the selecting from the specialty rosters and-the entries on the assignment notices tiie only paper work necessary prior to the- assembling and dispatching ;of-personnel. I t also . provided the receiving unit $ with a transinittal record that enabled them to dis tribute personnel to lower echelons without .additional paper work. This pro cedure i s adaptable tt> the assignment of individual replacements irtiether or not the Shore Party i a composed of regimental personnel or replacement drafts, personnel* , * - . . ' Personnel were assigned in accordance with their military qualifications to the extent tha,t military specialists were avail able in the replacement drafts.

Action Report, IWO JlMA Operation, (3)

(Contf&) <.]''.'

Recommendations:

(a) I t i B ' recommended that the establishment of an assembly or stand-by pool be made at the earliest practicable time# If the personnel which can be relieved of Shore Party duties i s bivouacked in a eontrolled area the assembling and dispatching time i s greatly reduced and i t i s ' believed, Shore Party Operation i* handicapped to a lesser degree* At I W JIMA, O after an.assembly area was, established one detail of 39 ^ea Was d i s p a t c h e d ^ minutes after the receipt of the directive* . . % ' (b) I t i s recommended that closer control be maintained over records of the replacement drafts* Considerable difficulty was caused by the .laxity with which Shore Party Detail rosters and casualty data sheets were handled. Rosters of personnel coming ashore xirere not retained by the officer or ICO in charge of the detail* Approximately 4$0 casualty data sheets had to be retyped by clerks under the direction of the classification officer*. ' . . . (c) I t i s recommended that personnel going forward frQm the Shore Party be dispatched in groups not to exceed 50 ia number* I t was found that from the standpoints of beach congestion and the- receiving u n i t s ' ability to absorb personnel the number should not exceed 50 VQT half
hour* . . ' . ' ' . . . '

* . ,. . ' (d) . It, i s recommended that replacement draft personnel upon being attached to the Division be assigned to Shore Party details only after a classification officer has made his recommendations as to the,details to which the personnel should go. The specialists likely to be needed f i r s t as replacements should be placed- in beach or dump unloading details* Those most likely to be used last should be placed in ship platoons* . , k*
i

Graves Registration.

"

, a. The Division Graves Registration Section landed on I O W JIMii. beginning on'D plus 7 when the OinP and a small detail were ordered ashore to make a reconnaissance.in order to establish the Division Cemetery* v A site was selected on D plus 7 adjacent to the already established *fth Marine Division Cemetery in the vicinity, of Beach, Y LJ W 2. Surveying and bulldozing began on E 3Q the morning of D plus 8 and the f i r s t 3d- Marine Division dead were interred on the morning of D pus 9* , ' ' ' " b - Establishing the Cemetery in close proximity to that of, the ij-th Marine Division aided this"Division to a great extent when unloading was slowed due to heavy surf and unfavorable beach, conditions. The Graves -Registra tion section equipment did not land u n t i l the evening of D plus 10 The OinC and a l l hands attached to #ie ^th Marine Division Graves Registration Section were extremely cooperative in lending tools and other implements necessary for cemetery work* " . . , c* The site selected for the Cemetery was east of Beach 2 on a gentle slope. Conditions were veryti&MhS&LtkJhlFJQgJ^~first, few

Action Report, IW JIMA Operation. O

(Cont'd).

days due to enemy mortar and artillery fire* Many Japanese land pines were dis covered ancl Division engineer personnel swept the area. Because of the nature of the soil (loose volcanic ash) graves were dug to a.depth of approximately . eight feet to allow for a drift caused by wind. '. d. . Collecting points were established 'by; Division Units and the Division Graves Section collecting parties made a tour of each point twice daily in order to expedite removal of the dead* These "bodies were "brought to the cemetery where they were placed in the processing area,* The first step, at. this point, was to check each body for identification (tags, wallet, name in clothing or any other available means)1 thereafter personnel removed, personal belongings^ corpsmen fingerprinted the body and as a last step the body was tagged arid sprayed prior to burial. The "body thereupon, was wrappeU in a poncho, "blanket or shelter half, depending upon what was available, and carried to the next vacant grave* ' . e. Personal belongings for each individual were secured in a "ditty bag% after proper inventory, and forwarded to the organization concerned The Division Personal Effects Officer made his headquarters with the Graves Registration Officer and maintained Very close liaison with that officer through out; ;' \ . . * . f, . The division Burial and Graves Registration Officer furnished the ACofS, G-l with a daily burial report which became the Division Daily Burial Bulletin, This Burial Bulletin was given wide distribution and was used by subordinate commands as a check-off* Many personnel originally listed as." missing in action were picked-up through the Burial. Bulletin. This Division inter changed bulletins with the 4th and 5*h Marine-Divisions and a coi-iplete . and up to date burial file of all island burials, was maintained, * g. - During the campaign the 3d Marine Division buried the following, personnel; . , MISTED. . B*
i

' . UMHOM ' 1^

hi . ' .,

909

. .,

Intelligence.

Total Inten-ed "-

1.- \Type of maps and photos furnished during operation; their adequacy and completeness? .. , Photos requested during the operation were generally furnished in quantities requested. Poor processing in certain cases reduced the effective ness of some sorties received. .. '' .
e

2. Effectiveness of procedure set up for the recovery of captured enemy documents and material; . 1 * a The enemy, particularly naval units, were definitely security conscious as was verified by P W reports end O

Action Report, IWO JIMA Operation,

(Cont'd)*

withstanding, the number of documents turned in and the information gained from
them was highly gratifying* The cooperation of all troops in picking up end
turning in documents was outstanding. Documents were in all cases gatheredf
by troops and intelligence personnel in forward and rear areas and forwarded,
via intelligence channels, to Division Headquarters. Documents of immediate /
tactical value to this or adjacent divisions, or which contained order of "battle
information, were immediately translated and the information disseminated to the
interested parties*. Due to military necessity, imuraerable caves were sealed,
"before a search could "be made of the interiors for intelligence material; and it
is considered that much valuable intelligence material, which may be found
eventually as caves are opened, was thus lost initially to the assault forces*
. ' b Overrun and captured eneny material was recovered by the
Divi sion Salvage Section' operating under G-4# &-2 coop erated by notifyiiig G*k
of the locations of enemy material as reported. Items of special intelligence
value were reported by G-2 directly to JIQPOA representatives for salvage \and
recovery. Salvage of special intelligence items was also handled in many cases
directly by G-2 employing G-2 Scout Observer personnel for the work.
3* personnel:. , Effectiveness and-qualifications of Japanese language;
^ _ V
a. Officers permanently attached:

...-. Of Jthe officers permanently attached to the Division,

seven were in headquarters coinpahy "and six irere temporarily attached to the
infantry regiments, two to each regimental headquarters. All officers, were
graduates of theHavy Japanese Language School and were qualified both for work
in translation and interrogation. In addition, two officers in the headquarters
section specialized in enemy order of battle, 3?he four officers teiqporarily
attached to the infantry regiments which landed, supervised the collection and
preliminary screening of all documents turned in by the respective unit a. This
work was carried out very satisfactorily. In addition they interrogated all
prisoners brought in from the battalions on matters of tactical interest to their
units, and forwarded these prisoners to division with a>minimum of delay.
b* Officers temporarily attached;

There were five officers temporarily attached to the

division from JIGPOA, Pour of these were Uaval Its, (jg) and .one was axi Army
2'd Lt. Three'of the naval officers were well qualified in translation and were
of great help to the section in the screening and translation of documentary
material* >The other naval officer* specialisjed in interrogation and,proved
highly efficient in this field* Jhe Army officer attached assisted in both
translation and interrogation*1 He also was of great assistance in supervising
the use of oral propaganda designed to persuade enemy troops to come out of hidin{
in the, numerous caves on the island and give themselves up to our forces* In
several cases this involved considerable personal riskv ^11 attached officers
assisted in the interrogation of prisoners when large numbers were brought in
and had to be cleexed that day. This work was satisfactory in all cases*