Miguel Rubia vs. NLRC, et. al., G.R. No.

178621, July 26, 2010 FACTS: THE petitioner was a general manager of respondent Community Water and Sanitation Services Cooperative (COWASSCO), primarily engaged in water and sanitation service for the municipality of Argao, Cebu. On Sept. 8, 2000, COWASSCO terminated his services on the ground of loss of trust and confidence for mismanagement of operations relating to the non-monitoring and noncompliance with the correct dosage of chlorine in the water system. In his complaint for illegal dismissal, petitioner shifted the blame to the chlorinator and master plumber who were directly responsible over the chlorination but were not even summoned and investigated. Did this contention find merit? Ruling: No. As the general manager, petitioner is tasked to perform key functions such as the monitoring of COWASSCOs day-to-day operation. Therefore, any lapse brought to the companys attention must be directly addressed by the manager. For breach of trust to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, it must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse. Petitioner did not deny that he was remiss in his duties, particularly in monitoring the application of the correct dosage of chlorine in the water system. What he did was to shift the blame to his subordinates, the chlorinator and master plumber. During the investigation, however, it appears that petitioner did not even bother to impose disciplinary action against these erring employees. As manager, petitioner should have paid close attention to the persistent problem of chlorination, given the fact that the Sangguniang Bayan had repeatedly called his attention on the matter. Petitioners failure to closely monitor the contamination of water supply, his repeated failure to appear before the Sangguniang Bayan to explain his lapses, and his overall indifference in performing the task assigned to him as general manager clearly demonstrate a willful breach of trust.

Oriental Ship Management Co., Inc. vs. Romy B. Bastol, G.R. No. 186289, June 29, 2010

FACTS: THE verification in the Position Paper and the Manifestation/Compliance filed by respondent Romy Bastol before the labor arbiter was signed only by his counsel. Petitioner Oriental Ship Management Co., Inc. argued that the lack of proper verification has rendered the pleadings without legal effect as unsigned pleadings. Was there merit to the argument?

Ruling: No. Anent the issue of verification, we have scrutinized both the Position Paper and the Manifestation/Compliance filed by Bastol and we fail to see any violation thereof. First, there is no law or rule requiring verification for the Manifestation/Compliance. Second, the counsels verification in Bastols Position Paper substantially complies with the rule on verification. The second paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides: A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. On the other hand, the actual verification of counsel in Bastols Position Paper states: That I am the counsel of record for the complainant in the above-entitled case; that I caused the preparation of the foregoing Position Paper; that I have read and understood the contents thereof; and that I confirm that all the allegations therein contained are true and correct based on recorded evidence. Appended to the position paper were Bastols contract of employment, counsels letter to OSCI, and various medical certifications issued by several doctors with similar findings and diagnosis of Bastols heart ailment. Evidently, the verification is proper as based on, and evidenced, by the appended documents, which were not disputed save the contents of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Vicaldo.

Mindanao Times Corp. vs. Mitchel R. Confesor, G.R. No. 183417, Feb. 5, 2010 FACTS: PETITIONER Mindanao Times Corp. appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) the decision of the labor arbiter awarding P71,909.77 to respondent Mitchel R. Confesor. In compliance with the bond requirement, it deposited the amount of P71,909.77 with United Coconut Planters Bank and with the NLRC the passbook covering the deposit, along with a Deed of Assignment it executed, assigning the proceeds of the deposit in favor of respondent and authorizing the NLRC to release the same in the event that the labor arbiters decision becomes final and executory. Did petitioner comply with the appeal bond requirement? Ruling: No. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that an appeal by the employer to the NLRC from a judgment of a labor arbiter that involves a monetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC, in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. Section 4 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC echoes the provision. Clearly, an appeal from a judgment as that involved in the present case is perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. Cash, means a sum of money; cash bail (the sense in which the term cash bond is used) is a sum of money posted by a criminal defendant to ensure his presence in court, used in place of a surety bond and real estate.

In the present case, the Deed of Assignment, as well as the passbook, which petitioner submitted to the NLRC is neither a cash nor a surety bond. Petitioners appeal to the NLRC was thus not duly perfected, thereby rendering the labor arbiters decision final and executory.

Gregorio V. Tongko vs. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (Phils.), Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 167622, June 29, 2010, En Banc Resolution FACTS: PETITIONER Gregorio V. Tongko entered into a Career Agents Agreement with respondent The Manufacturer Life Insurance Co. (Philippines), Inc. (Manulife). As an agent, his duties consisted of, among others, canvassing for applications for group policies and other products of the company. Subsequently, Tongko was named unit manager, branch manager, and regional sales manager. But when he failed to comply with policies of Manulife, his Agency Agreement was terminated. Has the labor arbiter jurisdiction over his complaint for illegal dismissal? Ruling: No. Given the anemic state of the evidence, particularly on the requisite confluence of the factors that would show an employer-employee relationship, the court cannot conclusively find that the relationship exists in the present case, even if such relationship only refers to Tongkos additional functions. While a rough deduction can be made, the answer will not be fully supported by the substantial evidence needed. Under this legal situation, the only conclusion that can be made is that the absence of evidence showing Manulifes control over Tongkos contractual duties points to the absence of any employer-employee relationship between Tongko and Manulife. In the context of the established evidence, Tongko remained an agent all along; although his subsequent duties made him a lead agent with leadership role, he was nevertheless only an agent whose basic contract yields no evidence of means-and-manner control. In light of these conclusions, the sufficiency of Tongkos failure to comply with the guidelines of de Dios letter, as a ground for termination of Tongkos agency, is a matter that the labor tribunals cannot rule upon in the absence of an employer-employee relationship. Jurisdiction over the matter belongs to the courts applying the laws of insurance, agency and contracts.

New Puerto Commercial, et. al. vs. Rodel Lopez, et. al., G.R. No. 169999, July 26, 2010 FACTS: IN A complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims filed by respondents against petitioner New Puerto Commercial, the Court of Appeals (CA) found the dismissal was for just cause but respondents were denied procedural due process. It held that the formal investigation of respondents for misappropriation of company funds was a mere afterthought,

because it was conducted after petitioner had notice of the complaint filed before the labor office. Hence, it awarded nominal damages of P30,000.00. Was the award justified? Ruling: No. The surrounding circumstances of this case adequately explain why the requirements of procedural due process were satisfied only after the filing of the labor complaint. Sometime in the third week of October 2000, petitioners received information that respondents were not remitting their sales collections to the company. Petitioners initiated an investigation by sending one of their trusted salesmen, Bagasala, to the route being serviced by respondents. To prevent a possible cover-up, respondents were temporarily reassigned to a new route to service. Subsequently, respondents stopped reporting for work (from Oct. 22, 2000 for respondent Lopez and Oct. 28, 2000 for respondent Gavan) after they got wind of the fact that they were being investigated for misappropriation of their sales collection. On Nov. 3, 2000, respondents filed the subject illegal dismissal case to preempt the outcome of the ongoing investigation. On Nov. 18, 2000, Bagasala returned from his monthlong investigation in the far-flung areas previously serviced by respondents and reported that respondents indeed failed to remit P2,257.03 in sales collections. As a result, on Nov. 28, 2000, termination proceedings were commenced against respondents by sending notices to explain with a notice of hearing scheduled on Dec. 2, 2000. Respondents failed to give their side despite receipt of said notices. Petitioners sent another set of notices to respondents on Dec. 7, 2000 to attend a hearing on Dec. 15, 2000 but respondents again refused to attend. Thus, on Dec. 18, 2000, petitioners served notices of termination on respondents for gross misconduct in misappropriating their sales collections and absence without leave for more than a month. As can be seen, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it cannot be concluded that the sending of the notices and setting of hearings were a mere afterthought because petitioners were still awaiting the report from Bagasala when respondents preempted the results of the ongoing investigation by filing the subject labor complaint. For this reason, there was sufficient compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing even if the notices were sent and the hearing conducted after the filing of the labor complaint. Thus, the award of nominal damages by the appellate court is improper.

Manolo A. Peaflor vs. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation, et. al., G.R. No. 177114, April 13, 2010 FACTS: PETITIONER Manalo Peaflor was hired as probationary HRD Manager of respondent Outdoor Clothing on Sept. 2, 1999. On March 13, 2000, more than six months thereafter, he learned that respondents president, Nathaniel Syfu, appointed Edwin Buenaobra to his position. Claiming he was discriminated against at work, Peaflor tendered an irrevocable resignation effective March 15, 2000. Subsequently, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging he had been constructively dismissed. Did the complaint prosper? Ruling: Yes. While the letter states that Peaflors resignation was irrevocable, it does not necessarily signify that it was also voluntarily executed. Precisely because of the attendant

hostile and discriminatory working environment, Peaflor decided to permanently sever his ties with Outdoor Clothing. This falls squarely within the concept of constructive dismissal that jurisprudence defines, among others, as involuntarily resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. It arises when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer exists and has become unbearable to the employee. The gauge for constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employees position would feel compelled to give up his employment under the prevailing circumstances. With the appointment of Buenaobra to the position he then still occupied, Peaflor felt that he was being eased out and this perception made him decide to leave the company. The fact of filing a resignation letter alone does not shift the burden of proving that the employees dismissal was for a just and valid cause from the employer to the employee. In Mora v. Avesco, G.R. No. 177414, Nov. 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 226, we ruled that should the employer interpose the defense of resignation, it is still incumbent upon the employer to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. To our mind, Outdoor Clothing did not discharge this burden by belatedly presenting the three memoranda it relied on. If these memoranda were authentic, they would have shown that Peaflors resignation preceded the appointment of Buenaobra. Thus, they would be evidence supporting the claim of voluntariness of Peaflors resignation and should have been presented early. Any lawyer or layman by simple logic can be expected to know this. Outdoor Clothing, however, raised them only before the NLRC when they had lost the case before the labor arbiter and now attributed the failure to its former counsel.

Maribago Blue Water Beach Resort, Inc. vs. Nito Dual, G.R. No. 180660, July 20, 2010 FACTS; RESPONDENT Nito Dual was an outlet cashier of petitioner Maribago Blue Water Beach Resort, Inc. On Jan. 9, 2005, a group of Japanese guests ordered, were served and paid for 12 set dinners. The receipt later issued by Dual shows that only P3,036.00 for 6 sets of dinner was remitted by him. Consequently, he was dismissed from the service. Dual argued that the order slip received by him was already altered; that he was able to confirm the cancellation of some orders and that waiter Mission gave him P3,100 as payment and he returned P64 as change. Was his dismissal based on a valid ground? Ruling: Yes. In this case, we are in agreement that petitioners evidence proved that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and of stealing money entrusted to him as cashier. Instead of reporting P10,100 as payment by the guests for their dinner, respondent cashier only reported P3,036 as shown by the receipt which he admitted to have issued. The receipt which bears his name Nito was printed at 22:40 (10:40 p.m.) or 1 hour and 40 minutes after the guests had left at 9:00 p.m. Two other receipts were issued for the same amount at 22:39:55 and 22:40:01. Moreover, respondents claim that he received P3,100 only and gave Mission P64 as change is not shown by the receipt that he issued. The issued receipt does not show that change was given. In addition, the amount indicated in the receipt does not coincide with

Duals contention that only four dishes were cancelled and two dishes were given free of charge. If such were the case, then the amount charged to the guests should have been for eight sets of dinner and not six sets. As established during the clarificatory hearing, 12 sets of dinner were served to guests and two dinner sets were given to the tour guides free of charge. It is clearly indicated in the altered order slip that six out of the 12 sets of dinner were canceled. The allegation of Dual that six dinner sets were indeed canceled as evidenced by the dishes he allegedly saw in the utensil station is negated by the testimonies of the kitchen staff (Chef Armand Galica, Butcher Alegrado and dessert-in-charge John Marollano) that 12 set meals were served and consumed. These testimonies coincide with the claim of waiters Hiyas and Mission that 14 sets of dinner were served. The serving of food eliminates the argument of cancellation.

Alex Gurango vs. Best Chemicals and Plastics, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 174593, Aug. 25, 2010 FACTS: PETITIONER Alex Gurango worked as boiler operator in respondent Best Chemicals and Plastics, Inc. (BCPI). In a memorandum of May 2, 2003, BCPI prohibited its employees from bringing personal items to their work area. Erring employees would be suspended for six days. At 4:00 a.m. of May 5, 2003, while Gurango was on his way out of his work area, he was detected by security guard Romeo Albao to have in his pocket a camera without film. Albao pulled Gurango, grabbed his pocket and tried to confiscate the camera, to which the latter physically resisted. Consequently, Gurango was dismissed from the service for engaging in a fistfight and violating company policy. Was the dismissal justified? Ruling: No. In the present case, aside from Albaos statement, BCPI did not present any evidence to show that Gurango engaged in a fistfight. Moreover, there is no showing that Gurangos actions were performed with wrongful intent. In order to constitute serious misconduct that will warrant the dismissal of an employee under paragraph (a) of Article 282 of the Labor Code, it is not sufficient that the act or conduct complained of has violated some established rules or policies. It is equally important and required that the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent. The surrounding circumstances show that Gurango did not engage in a fistfight: 1) in his 9 May 2003 letter to BCPI, Juanitas corroborated Gurangos version of the facts; 2) nobody corroborated Albaos version of the facts; 3) in his medical report, Dr. Aguinaldo found that Gurango suffered physical injuries; 4) Gurango filed with the MCTC a complaint against Albao and two others for slight physical injury; 5) the labor arbiter found Gurangos statement credible and unblemished; 6) the Labor Arbiter found Albaos statement contradictory; 7) the labor arbiter stated, I am convinced Albao lied in his statement; 8) the NLRC found that Gurango did not start a fight; 9) the NLRC found Albaos statement unbelievable and exaggerated; and 10) the Court of Appeals reversal of the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is baseless.

Solidbank Corp. vs. NLRC, et. al., G.R. No. 165951, March 30, 2010

FACTS: SOMETIME in May 2000, petitioner Solidbank Corp. decided to cease its commercial banking operations. It granted its employees separation pay equivalent to 150 percent of gross monthly pay per year of service and cash equivalent of earned and accrued vacation and sick leaves. Upon receipt of their benefits, the employees, including respondents, individually signed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. In a complaint for illegal dismissal and other money claims subsequently filed by respondents, the Court of Appeals (CA) shared the view of the labor arbiter that respondents should be awarded one months salary as financial assistance. Did the CA err?

Ruling: Yes Looking now at Article 283, this court holds that the same was drafted by the legislature, taking the best interest of laborers in mind. It is clear that the causes of the termination of an employee under Article 283 are due to circumstances beyond their control, such as when management decides to reduce personnel based on valid grounds, or when the employer decides to cease operations. Thus, the bias towards labor is very apparent, as the employer is statutorily required to pay separation pay, the amount of which is also statutorily prescribed. While the CA should not be faulted for sympathizing with the plight of respondents as they suddenly lost their means of livelihood, this court holds that it is precisely because of the sudden loss of employment one that is beyond the control of labor that the law statutorily grants separation pay and dictates how the same should be computed. Thus, any business establishment that decides to cease its operations has the burden of complying with the law. This Court should refrain from adding more than what the law requires, as the same is within the realm of the legislature. It bears to stress, however, that petitioner may, as it has done, grant on a voluntary and ex gratia basis, any amount more than what is required by the law, but to insist that more financial assistance be given is certainly something that this Court cannot countenance, as the same serves to penalize petitioner, which has already given more than what the law requires. Moreover, any award of additional financial assistance to respondents would put them at an advantage and in a better position than the rest of their co-employees who similarly lost their employment because of petitioners decision to cease its operations.

Elsa S. Malig-on vs. Equitable General Services, Inc. G.R. No. 185269, June 29, 2010 FACTS: PETITIONER Elsa Malig-on was hired on March 4, 1996 as janitress of respondent Equitable General Services, Inc. On Feb. 15, 2002, her immediate supervisor told her the company would be assigning her to another client but never did despite constant follow-ups. Eight months later or on Oct. 5, 2002, respondent told Malig-on that she had to a file a resignation letter before it would reassign her. She complied but respondent reneged on its undertaking. Consequently, Malig-on filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent. Did the complainant prosper?

Ruling: Yes. The company evidently placed Malig-on on floating status after being relieved as janitress in a clients workplace. But, as the court has repeatedly ruled, such act of offdetailing Malig-on was not the equivalent of dismissal so long as her floating status did not continue beyond a reasonable time. But, when it ran up to more than six months, the company may be considered to have constructively dismissed her from work, that is, as of Aug. 16, 2002. Thus, her purported resignation on Oct. 15, 2002 could not have been legally possible. The company of course claims that it gave Malig-on notices on Aug. 23, 2002 and Sept. 2, 2002, asking her to explain her failure to report for work and informing her that the company would treat such failure as lack of interest in it, respectively. But these notices cannot possibly take the place of the notices required by law. They came more than six months after the company placed her on floating status and, consequently, the company gave her those notices after it had constructively dismissed her from work.