Nij-Police Strikes-Causes and Prevention

U.S.
Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice
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ny
Police Strikes
Causes and Prevention
L1NIVFPSITY OF MINNESOTA
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS LIBRARY
U.S. Utr-Obl IOftY PROPERTY
U.S.G.P.O.0-295
a publication of the National Institute of Justice
Generated on 2013-02-14 05:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d02987177y Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Police Strikes
Causes and Prevention
by
William D. Gentel
Martha L. Handman
Glen R. Murphy
Project Director
Richard E Mayer
Asst. Project Director
Marita Menaker
Editor
August 1980
U.S. Department of Justice
Generated on 2013-02-14 05:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015014437183 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
Harry M. Bratt
Acting Director
This document was produced under Grant Number 76-NI-99-0097 from the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policy of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
Copyrightc 1979 by the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.
LEA A reserves the right to reproduce, publish and use all or any part of the copyrighted
material contained in this publication.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Qovernment Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Contents
Page
Preface v
Acknowledgements vii
Introduction xi
CHAPTER ONE San Francisco, California
August 18-21, 1975
Introduction 1
Events Leading to the Strike 3
Events During the Strike 14
Events Following the Strike 28
CHAPTER TWO Tucson, Arizona
September 22-28, 1975
Introduction 45
CONTENTS
CHAPTER THREE Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
October 23-26, 1975
Introduction 85
CHAPTER FOUR Las Graces, New Mexico
February 3-March 5, 1976
Introduction 112
CHAPTER FIVE Youngstown, Ohio
September 28-October 2, 1976
Introduction 141
CHAPTER SIX Summary and Recommendations
Introduction 161
Strike Causes 162
The Municipal Financial Crisis 162
Money 164
Job Dissatisfaction 168
Poor Communications Between Union Leaders
and City Officials 170
Ineffective Negotiations 173
Inexperienced Negotiators 179
Timing 182
Ineffective Impasse Mechanisms 184
Contents
Politics 187
Role of the Chief 189
Bargaining Unit 193
Union Politics 196
Police-Fire Alliances 197
Previous Job Actions 198
Media 200
Triggering Device 201
Length 202
Participation 202
Police Protection 203
Role of the Chief 206
Union Behavior 207
Injunctions 208
Disciplinary Action 209
Negotiations 210
Impasse Resolution 213
Politics 214
Reactions of Other Labor Unions 215
Impact on Crime 217
How the Strikes Ended 218
Aftermath 218
Economic Result of the Strike 218
Animosity After the Strike 220
Disciplinary Action 220
Elections 222
Community Reaction 224
Conclusion 225
Summary of Strike Causes 226
Summary of Recommendations 229
Comparison of Major Strike Events and Conditions 238
Selected Bibliography 251
Preface
The premeditated disruption on the part of police labor
organizations in the delivery of police services has become a
problem of national scope. Work stoppages in the public safety
area present affected communities with a myriad of concerns,
ranging from public apprehension of unchecked crime to the
procurement of alternative law enforcement services for the
duration of a strike. Unfortunately, as has been the case in many
of the incidents reviewed by the IACP, these disruptions, iden-
tified variously as strikes, job actions, blue flu, as well as other
appellations, almost always cause lasting problems to both the
public employer and the striking employees. Why then are we
witnessing the continuation of this mutually unsatisfying
phenomenon?
In an attempt to answer this question and to identify causal
factors common to several recent police strikes, the IACP, under
the auspices of a grant from the National Institute of Law En-
forcement and Criminal Justice of the Law Enforcement As-
sistance Administration, undertook a study of five such strikes.
The results of our efforts will provide law enforcement prac-
titioners on both sides of "the table" with critical information,
thus enabling them to make informed decisions in areas now
identified as potentially "strike-causative." Additionally, I feel
that the study will be useful in preparing contingency plans for
those communities in which an immediate strike threat exists.
Finally, I know I echo the sentiments of many police ex-
ecutives and labor leaders in expressing my hope that our efforts
PREFACE
may somehow contribute to the elimination of the strike as a
vehicle for resolving labor-management conflicts in the public
safety sector.
Glen D. King
Executive Director
VI
Acknowledgements
IACP wishes to acknowledge the assistance and cooperation
of the many people and organizations who made this project pos-
sible.
We are, of course, grateful to the Law Enforcement As-
sistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), for providing the funding for
the project.
We also want to thank the cities of Las Cruces, New Mexico;
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; San Francisco, California; Tucson,
Arizona; and Youngstown, Ohio; as well as their police depart-
ments and employee organizations for their cooperation in con-
ducting this study.
The project staff was fortunate to have the assistance of a
dedicated advisory board which not only gave its talents and
energy, but also provided constructive input and guidance at all
stages of the project. Members of the advisory board were:
Richard Ayres, Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy
Quantico, Virginia
Robert Gordon, Secretary-Treasurer
International Conference of Police Associations
Washington, D.C.
William B. Kolender, Chief of Police
San Diego Police Department
San Diego, California
Sgt. Harold Melnick, President
Sergeants Benevolent Association
New York, New York
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
William B. McClaran, Chief of Police
Portland Police Department
Portland, Maine
We are indebted to the many people, too numerous to men-
tion individually, who provided information about the strikes.
We do, however, want to acknowledge the special assistance and
cooperation of the following people:
In Las Cruces: Mayor Albert Johnson, Public Safety Direc-
tor A. F. "Tony" Gomez, Chief of Police Ron Axtell, City At-
torney Frank Chavez, Personnel Director Frank Robertson, Jerry
Ferris, Richard Van Alstein, and George Cherpelis.
In Oklahoma City: Mayor Patience Latting, Chief of Police
Tom Heggy, James Parsons, Sergeant Richard Boyd, Charles
Owens, and Commissioner Roger Webb.
In San Francisco: Chief of Police Charles Gain, Sergeant
Gerald Crowley, James Ferguson, Michael O'Toole, Lieutenant
Richard Trueb, Denise McKevit, and George Rycik.
In Tucson: Mayor Lewis Murphy, Chief of Police William
Gilkinson, City Manager Joel Valdez, Larry Brooks, John
Brethour, Harry DeBold, Peter Economidis, and Susan Mandel.
In Youngstown: Mayor Jack Hunter, Chief of Police Donald
Baker, James Corbett, Richard Brinko, and Leonard Williams.
Special thanks go to Richard Ayres for his help and support
in conducting this study. We are also grateful to the NILECJ
project monitor, William E. Saulsbury, for his guidance at many
critical points during the project. We also appreciate the input
and assistance of David J. Farmer, Director of the Police Divi-
sion of NILECJ.
Throughout the project, the following members of the LACP
Bureau of Governmental Relations and Legal Counsel staff
worked to produce this document:
Richard F. Mayer, Assistant Director, Jane Andrews, Rita
Dawson, Anastasia Faulkner, Janet Kilpatrick, Joanne M.
Lishman, Marita Menaker, Phillip Ochs, Karin Ruatto, and
Michel Silver.
The IACP particularly wants to express its appreciation to
the two authors who were directly responsible for the project and
V111
Acknowledgements
its development: William D. Gentel, who served for four years
with the IACP as a senior staff analyst and is currently President
of Tricon, Ltd., International Consultants for Public Safety
Systems, Silver Spring, Maryland, and Martha Handman who
served with the association as a supervising attorney for four and
one-half years and is presently a Vice President of Tricon, Ltd.
Glen D. King
Executive Director
Introduction
The increased number of police strikes during the past few
years has been of great concern within law enforcement.
Nevertheless, there has been little effective study of this subject
and adequate guidance has not been available to those who ac-
tively seek to reduce the likelihood of a strike. The need to bridge
this information gap prompted the IACP to conduct research on
police strikes.
In late 1976, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice, awarded a grant to the IACP to study police strikes. The
major objectives of the study were to identify the causes of police
strikes and to make recommendations for their prevention.
At the outset, an advisory board was established to provide
the project staff with expert guidance in conducting the project.
Each of the five members of the board was highly respected in his
field of expertise. Together, the board members represented a
broad spectrum of police management, police unions and
academia. The board met four times during the project to review
progress and provide feedback. These meetings provided
valuable and constructive input which enhanced the overall pro-
ject effort.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In order to identify systematically the factors which cause
police strikes, it was necessary to establish a research design
INTRODUCTION
which would provide a functional data gathering construct. It
was determined that a case study approach was the most ap-
propriate method of describing and analyzing the events leading
to the strikes, as well as those which occurred during and after
the strikes. The following sequence of research steps was devised
and executed in developing the case studies.
Site Selection
A number of criteria were established for selecting the
strikes to be studied. Due to the difficulty of obtaining informa-
tion about events long past, it was initially decided to limit the
study to strikes which had occurred in the previous two years.
The other criteria used were: the size of the police department;
the geographic location; the major issue in the strike; duration of
the strike; and whether employees other than police were in-
volved in the strike.
With assistance from the United States Department of
Labor, the project staff compiled a list of police strikes which
had occurred in 1975 and 1976. At the first advisory board
meeting the list was carefully evaluated and the following five
sites were selected: San Francisco, California; Tucson, Arizona;
Las Cruces, New Mexico; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and
Youngstown, Ohio. The police departments in each of these
cities were then contacted and they agreed to participate in the
study.
Literature Review
An initial project task was to review available literature
regarding police strikes in general as well as information relating
to each of the five strikes included in the project. The materials
reviewed included standard labor relations texts and periodicals,
law reviews, union publications, newspapers and magazine arti-
cles. Materials generated by the literature search were compiled
into a bibliography for inclusion in the final project report.
Preliminary Site Visits
Prior to the actual data collection, preliminary site visits
were made to each of the five sites. The purpose of these visits
Introduction
was to meet with key people who had been directly involved in
the strikes (e.g. the chief of police, mayor, city manager, person-
nel director and union president) to get an overview of the events
of the strike and gather documents and other pertinent
background material. After each preliminary site visit, the infor-
mation gathered was reviewed and analyzed. People who had
played a key role in each of the strikes were identified. In addi-
tion, a chronology of events before, during, and after the strikes
was developed to serve as an interview guide during the data
gathering phase of the study.
Sample and Data Collection
Data pertaining to each of the five strikes was obtained
primarily through structured personal interviews of strike par-
ticipants. Data was gathered in each site from the following three
perspectives: the city government, the police administration,
and the union. This approach allowed independent views of each
of several issues, giving a more sound basis for interpreting the
overall data.
In each strike site, interviews were conducted with a wide
range of individuals such as: the mayor, the city manager,
members of the city council, personnel director, city attorney,
chief of police, police command personnel, police union leaders,
leaders of other unions, members of the police department who
struck, members of the police department who joined the strike
after it began, members who struck but returned to work prior to
the end of the strike and representatives of community organiza-
tions. Only three people refused to be interviewed. Attempts
were made to locate and interview key participants who were no
longer in office or residing in the area. Three of these individuals
could not be reached: Joseph Alioto, the former mayor of San
Francisco, Howard McMahan, the former city manager of
Oklahoma City, and David Falk, the former personnel director of
Oklahoma City.
Besides seeking to interview specific individuals, the project
staff attempted to inform city officials, members of the police
departments and union members that they were interested in in-
terviewing anyone who thought they had information that would
INTRODUCTION
be useful in developing an accurate account of the strike. In each
city a few individuals contacted the project staff and offered to
provide pertinent information. In all, 317 interviews were con-
ducted.
Most interviews with city and police officials were con-
ducted in their offices. In contrast, most union leaders and union
members were interviewed in motel rooms because some of them
were reluctant to be seen talking to the interviewers. Many
agreed to be interviewed only if their names were not used. Fre-
quently, the interviewees provided information on the condition
that it not be attributed to them. Sometimes they asked that the
information not be included in the project report, but felt that it
was important for the project staff to be aware of it. All requests
for confidentiality were honored.
Report Preparation
When the data collection for each site was completed, a case
study was developed which described the events leading to the
strike, during the strike and following the strike. Emphasis was
placed on describing the events in as much detail as possible to
show the factors which contributed directly or indirectly to the
strike and the events which followed. The five case studies are
presented in Chapters 1 through 5. The information obtained at
each strike site was also categorized and analyzed for the purpose
of identifying the causes of the strikes and recommending ways
to eliminate these conditions. These findings and recommenda-
tions are found in the Summary and Recommendations chapter.
San Francisco, California
August 18-21, 1975
INTRODUCTION
In August 1975, San Francisco police went on strike for the
first time in the history of the city. Before the strike, San Fran-
cisco was considered a strong union town where labor had a lot of
political clout. For years the city was run by politicians who were
supported by, and in turn supported, organized labor. But the
police strike set in motion a chain of events that not only cost
labor much of its power, but also changed the nature of San
Francisco politics.
In 1975, San Francisco was the nation's fifteenth largest
city.1 It was governed by a strong mayor-council system. The 11-
member board of supervisors was the city's legislative body.
Mayor Joseph Alioto, the city's chief executive, was in the last
year of his second term and was barred by law from serving
another term. Supervisors Dianne Feinstein and John Bar-
bagelata were running for mayor, and six other supervisors were
seeking reelection.
A lot of patronage was at stake in the mayor's race, for the
mayor had unrestricted authority to appoint and remove people
from most of the city's boards and commissions which oversaw
the business of various city departments and appointed depart-
ment administrators. Because the mayor had unbridled
authority to appoint commissions, it was actually he who
selected the department heads who were then quickly approved
by the commissions. Through the police commission, the mayor
could not only choose the chief, but could also dictate who would
2 POLICE STRIKES, Causes and Prevention
fill command jobs such as deputy chief; director of traffic; chief
of inspectors (detectives); supervising captain of districts;
department secretary; captain of inspectors; captain of traffic;
director, bureau of personnel; and director, bureau of criminal
information. In addition, the chief had the authority to choose
assistant inspectors and inspectors.2 Traditionally they were
known as the "juice boys," and were greatly resented by uni-
formed officers who worked in the department's nine district sta-
tions. Many officers felt that the department was a political tool,
and that assignments, transfers and even shifts were determined
by "who you knew."
Most of the 1,800 members of the police department
belonged to the San Francisco Police Officers' Association
(POA), which had been recognized by the city as the official
representative of the department's sworn personnel. The POA
was founded in the early 1940s, and for over 20 years functioned
primarily as a social organization. Its leadership was dominated
by inspectors and command officers. In the late 1960s, however,
a group of dissident uniformed officers known as the "Blue
Coats" challenged the old leaders for control of the POA. A bitter
fight for control ensued, and it created wounds that lasted for
years. By 1970 the Blue Coats had taken over, and had begun to
steer the organization toward labor involvement. In 1972,
Sergeant Gerald Crowley became president of the POA, a posi-
tion he still holds as of this writing. Three years later, in the
spring of 1975, he was nearly unseated by a popular officer who
challenged him for the presidency. Crowley won the election by
only 35 votes.
A second employee organization, Officers for Justice (OFJ),
was formed in 1968 by minority police officers who believed that
the POA was not representing their interests. In 1973, OFJ and
other minority and women's organizations filed suit in federal
court charging the police department with discrimination in hir-
ing and promotion. The court imposed quotas for entry level and
sergeant positions. Hiring was halted for 20 months as the city
contested the decision. Promotions continued to be made, but
only on a temporary basis. In May 1975, the judge removed his
earlier quota on hiring minorities because the city had developed
a valid exam, but he ordered the department to fill 60 of its 160
vacancies with women and put them on patrol for a two-year ex-
periment. POA leaders felt that the city had handled the suit in
a "lackluster way," and they intervened in the case.3 The POA
San Francisco, California 3
spent about $150,000 in the fight, "which an embittered rank
and file and its leadership" believed was due to the city's failure
to act "more forthrightly" in the suit. The long litigation divided
police labor and management and resulted in increased
"distrust, hostility, and animosity." Its effect on the POA was
entirely different; it helped unify the members who became more
cohesive than ever.4
The POA's efforts to function as a labor organization were
hampered by the fact that neither the city nor the state had a
collective bargaining law for public employees. The state's meet
and confer law, the Meyers Melias Brown Act, required public
employers to meet with the majority employee organization and
confer with it on wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment, but the employer had no obligation to implement
any union suggestions. The union and the employer could,
however, approve a memorandum of understanding, which
would then be binding. The act provided that public agencies
could adopt reasonable rules and regulations for implementing
the act, but they were not required to do so. In 1973, San Fran-
cisco adopted an Employee Relations Ordinance, but police and
firefighters were excluded from its coverage by their own choice.
Despite the lack of a mandatory bargaining forum, the two
groups had in the past met informally with the city and worked
out memorandums of understanding. In 1974, the city and the
POA agreed to meet and confer in good faith on all matters
relating to the employment conditions of the department's sworn
personnel, except wages and employment conditions specifically
governed by the city charter. The agreement also provided for no
strikes and limited binding arbitration. The POA agreed to
"forego the power to strike in full or by slowdown or medical ex-
cuses during the term of this agreement in consideration for the
agreement of the parties to pioneer in San Francisco the develop-
ment of an impartial approach to the settlement of differences
between the parties through arbitration."5
EVENTS LEADING TO THE STRIKE
When the police and firefighters went on strike in 1975, the
major issue was the city's failure to adhere to its traditional prac-
tice of setting police salaries. For 23 years, San Francisco police
officers had been given the maximum salary increase permitted
by the city charter. Each year, in August, the board of super-
visors set base pay for city police based on the wages paid to
police in California cities with a population of 100,000 or more.
Under the charter wage formula, the new pay rate could not ex-
ceed the highest wages for similar jobs in these cities. The super-
visors, however, had always set pay rates equal to the highest
wages paid in these cities. In some years this meant large pay in-
creases, while in others only a small raise.6 Each year, regardless
of the size of the increase, the police accepted the use of the
formula.
In the spring of 1975, rumors began to circulate that the
board was not going to give the maximum increase allowed by
the charter wage formula. In March, the board rejected the San
Francisco Civil Service Commission's recommendations that
deputy sheriffs get a 12 percent pay raise, and decided on a smal-
ler amount. In response, the angry deputies voted 92 to 2 to strike
and the board quickly worked out a compromise with them. In
April, the POA reported unconfirmed rumors from City Hall that
there would be no pay raise for police even if one were justified by
the civil service commission's wage survey of other California
cities, which was to be released on August 1.7 By June, talk of the
strike surfaced in response to continuing rumors that the board
would break precedent and give less than the maximum salary
increase. The POA pointed out:
The current strike and walkout by physicians (sur-
geons and anesthesiologists) in northern California
has demonstrated the principle that even the most
prestigious of professions can and will withdraw its
labor when the remuneration for its work efforts is
severely threatened.
While San Francisco has never had a police strike, the
issue of wages certainly could trigger one.
As August approaches, tensions will begin to form.
When the August survey is published, manifest anx-
iety will prevail. When the public hearings are held in
the supervisor's chambers, caution and stalking will
be observed. When the Board votes and the mayor
signs, peace and tranquility or . . ."
San Francisco police officers expected that the August wage
survey would show that their salaries were about 13 percent
below those in the highest paid department in the state. Since
the cost of living had risen 12.4 percent during the previous year,
they felt a 13 percent raise was reasonable.9 They also believed
that high salary compensated for the lack of fringe benefits (such
as night differential, time and one-half for overtime, educational
incentive pay, longevity pay, dental plans, insurance payments,
hazard pay, marksmanship, prescription drug plans, eye care,
etc.) enjoyed by numerous jurisdictions in the August survey (see
Tables I-III). These types of benefits could be obtained only
through voter approval of amendments to the city charter.
Another source of frustration for San Francisco police was
the fact that city workers in more than 35 other occupations were
paid more than police and enjoyed benefits such as overtime pay
which the police did not receive.10 The annual salary of a
patrolman was approximately $16,700, and a lieutenant was paid
about $19,400. City laborers received almost $17,400; gardeners
$18,800; painters $21,200; electricians $21,700; carpenters
$21,900; pickup truck drivers $22,000; plumbers $24,200; and
plumbers' foremen $26,600."
By late spring, only police, firefighters', and transit workers'
wages were unresolved for fiscal 1975-76. In April, the board of
supervisors had given other city employees an average raise of
6.42 percent, ranging from 4 percent for some clerical employees
to 12 percent for some craft workers. To a large extent, these
raises were dictated by charter wage formulas. One formula re-
quired the city to pay craft workers the prevailing wage for com-
parable jobs in private industry.12 Another formula allowed the
city to pay municipal transit workers (muni-drivers) a maximum
wage equal to the average of the two highest pay scales in the na-
tion. Traditionally, the board of supervisors had given the max-
imum amount. Only the wages of miscellaneous employees
(white-collar workers) were subject to the board's complete dis-
cretion. Firefighters were tied to wage parity with the police.
By late July there was still no formal word from the board of
supervisors regarding the police pay raise. However, on July 31 at
a candidates' night sponsored by the POA and International As-
sociation of Firefighters Local 789, six incumbent supervisors
told the audience of 1,500 police and firefighters that they
would not commit themselves to the customary wage formula
because of the city's economic condition. None of the candidates
POLICE STRIKES, Causes and Prevention
TABLE I"
CALIFORNIA CITIES WITH LONGEVITY &
EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS
POLICE
City Longevity Educational
Berkeley X X
Long Beach X
Los Angeles 1/ X
Oakland X X
Riverside X
Sacramento X X
San Diego X
San Jose X
1/ Los AngelesMonthly Longevity Compensation for Police and Fire.
Years of Service Completed Monthly Differential
10 years and less than 15 $41.76
15 years and less than 20 83.52
20 years and over 128.76
TABLE II14
CALIFORNIA CITY CONTRIBUTIONS
HEALTH & WELFARE & DENTAL
POLICE & FIRE 1974-1975
Health & Welfare
(Monthly)
City 1974-75 Dental
Santa Ana $55.00 $12.00
Oakland 48.00 6.40
Long Beach 45.80 4.50
San Jose 41.90 8.65
Los Angeles 49.50
Fresno 37.78
Sacramento 34.00
Riverside 30.00
San Francisco 23.16 (24.71) 1/
San Diego 21.43
1/ Increased in 1975
San Francisco, California
TABLE III"
OVERTIME PRACTICES CALIFORNIA CITIES
POLICE & FIRE
Los Angeles Time and One-Half
San Jose Time and One-Half
Long Beach Time and One-Half
Berkeley Time and One-Half
Sacramento Time and One-Half
Santa Ana Time and One-Half
Riverside Time and One-Half
(taken only as compensatory time)
Oakland Straight Time
Fresno Straight Time
San Diego Straight Time
San Francisco Straight Time
indicated support for a 13 percent increase. Through subsequent
meetings with individual supervisors, leaders of the POA and
Local 798 realized that the board was firmly committed to keep-
ing down the costs of police-fire salary increases, which meant
giving less than the maximum allowed by the formula. It was
rumored that the board had already decided on a 6.5 percent
raise.
To the board, a 6.5 percent increase for police and
firefighters seemed reasonable, particularly in light of the city's
financial condition and the pension benefits which the POA and
Local 798 had recently obtained. The supervisors were afraid
that San Francisco might wind up in the same financial plight as
New York City, which was on the verge of bankruptcy. In
January 1975, they were notified that if they did not curtail city
spending, an additional $98 million in property taxes would be
required for fiscal 1975-76.16 A substantial increase in police and
firefighters' pension benefits, narrowly passed by the voters in
November 1974, was expected to cost the city about $14 million
even if the police and firefighters did not get any raise. The new
benefits, effective July 1, 1975, increased the city's contribution
from 32 cents to 57 cents for each dollar of pay to active police of-
ficers; the city's contribution for firefighters increased from 32
cents to 45 cents for each dollar.17 Retired police officers and
firefighters would receive 50 cents for every dollar that active of-
ficers got.
In 1975, property taxes became a major concern in San
Francisco, as city residents became angry over large increases in
their tax assessments, which they began to receive in July. On
the average, property assessments increased by about 30 percent.
In response to the widespread public dissatisfaction, the super-
visors promised to ease the impact of the higher assessments by
cutting the tax rate.18 Each 1 percent raise given police and
firefighters would cost an extra $1 million in property taxes or
nearly five cents on the tax rate.19 Most city police officers would
not be burdened by the property taxes, since almost 60 percent of
them lived outside the city.
The board felt that there were additional economic justifica-
tions for a 6.5 percent increase. Supervisors noted that during
the previous five years, the police had received raises totaling 35
percent while the cost of living had increased 33 percent. They
also felt that 6.5 percent was fair because it was the same
amount the 10,000 miscellaneous employees had received.
Political as well as economic considerations influenced the
supervisors' position. The supervisors feared the impact that the
public dissatisfaction over property taxes would have in the
November election, and felt it would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to persuade the voters that large raises for public employees
were justified.
In late June, the board of supervisors authorized Roy
Wesley, the city's employee relations director, to function as its
management representative and to enter along with the police
commission and chiefs representatives into meet and confer dis-
cussions with the POA concerning police salary and benefits.
The police commission declined to participate because its
members felt that it would be inappropriate to become involved
in setting police salaries, since under the charter that was a func-
tion of the civil service commission and the board of supervisors.
The police commission recommended that the board follow its
customary procedure and set police salaries at the maximum
rate authorized by the charter.
On August 4, the civil service commission submitted to the
board of supervisors a wage survey which certified that San
Francisco police officers were eligible for a 13.05 percent pay in-
crease to give them parity with Los Angeles officers, who were
the highest paid in the state (See Table IV). Hearings on the pay
raise were scheduled for August 7, 1975, before the board's
legislative and personnel committee. Traditionally, this hearing
had been the only formal meeting on salaries between employee
organizations and the board. At the hearing the two supervisors
present announced that the full board had instructed the com-
mittee to listen to the employee groups, but not to make any
recommendations regarding salaries for police, firefighters or
muni-drivers. They urged the employee groups to deal with the
city negotiating team headed by the employee relations director.
An economist hired by the POA and firefighters then addressed
the committee about the feasibility and fairness of a 13 percent
increase in light of other employee wages and increases in the
cost of living. The POA also gave the supervisors a 53-page
report, prepared by the economist, which supported the con-
tinued use of the formula. Police and firefighters later com-
plained that the committee members had been inattentive and
indifferent to their presentation and did not read the report.
The final decision on the pay raise was scheduled by the
board of supervisors for a public meeting on August 18. Prior to
TABLE IV20
SALARY SURVEY DATA
AUGUST 1, 1975
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CITY
MAXIMUM SALARY
Los Angeles
$1568
Oakland
$1487
Long Beach
$1426
Berkeley
$1425
Pasadena
$1406
San Jose
$1401
San Francisco
$1387
San Bernardino
$1358
Garden Grove
$1332
Glendale
$1328
Huntington Beach
$1318
Anaheim
$1305
Santa Ana
$1301
San Diego
$1274
Torrance
$1249
Fremont
$1236
Riverside
$1226
Stockton
$1148
NO. OF POSITIONS
1975
532
475
30
105
457
1000
122
103
113
10
POLICE STRIKES, Causes and Prevention
this meeting, leaders of the POA and Firefighters Local 798 tried
unsuccessfully to meet with the full board, but were able to meet
with several of the supervisors individually. The meetings were
not encouraging, for the board seemed set on a 6.5 percent raise.
Supervisor John Barbagelata, a candidate for mayor, publicly
criticized these private meetings and refused to take part in
them. He felt that the supervisors ought to set police and fire pay
rates "officially and as a bodynot as a bunch of individual
politicians negotiating to see how much our votes are worth."21
In anticipation of the August 18 meeting of the board of
supervisors, the POA distributed about 1,800 questionnaires to
its members asking them to choose one of four actions if the
board refused to meet their wage demands (see page 11). The
four choices were: 1) a strike that shut down all police services;
2) a selective strike with police providing emergency service;
3) a mass sick-in; or 4) nothing. To insure that officers were com-
mitted to whichever course of action they chose, the POA re-
quired that all survey forms be signed before being returned. A
secondary purpose was to prevent ballot box stuffing.
The possibility of a strike was discussed at POA
membership meetings held on August 14. A meeting was held at
the end of each watch in order to accommodate all three shifts,
and several hundred officers attended the three meetings. After
the meetings the surveys were tallied, but the exact results were
never announced, although POA leaders claimed they showed
overwhelming support for a strike. About 1,400 surveys were
returned. However, there is considerable discrepancy regarding
the outcome. Some POA officials claim that 90 percent sup-
ported a strike with no emergency services, while others claim
that only 25 percent did so. However, there is general agreement
that the majority of those voting favored some kind of job action.
After learning of the POA's survey, Police Chief Donald Scott
polled the department's commanders to determine the number
of officers who would be available for duty if a strike occurred.
The commanders indicated that in the event of a strike, only a
small percentage of their officers would walk out.
Mayor Alioto reacted to the threat of a police strike by
threatening to fire any strikers:
Any policeman who strikes here will be fired. There
isn't going to be a strike without stiff and fast action
against the POA and any striking members . . . The
SURVEY MUST BE RETURNED NO LATER THAN
1200 HOURS THURSDAY AUGUST 14
CONFIDENTIAL POSITION SURVEY
1975-76 $1387. $1566. $1750. $1841.
The August Civil Service Commission Survey showed Los
Angeles Police as the top Department at $1568. This is 13.05%
more than the current fourth year Patrolman receives.
Indications are the Board of Supervisors will vote for less
than 13.05%. If this occurs what would you be willing to do!
1) strike (no services provided)
2) strike (emergency services provided)
3) blue flu
4) nothing
(Signature) (Bureau, Station)
(Tabulated only if signed) Labor Relations Committee
Destroyed immediately after
tabulation
SURVEY MUST BE RETURNED NO LATER THAN
1200 HOURS THURSDAY AUGUST 14
supervisors have a right to act on the economic mat-
ters without this kind of pressure. It ought not to be
influenced by the threat of an illegal action such as a
strike . . . There's no strike against the public safety,
legally.22
The mayor added that he would offer to mediate the dispute
between the police and the supervisors, but said that he could
not step in until the supervisors had made their decision.
During the next few days, there was no indication that the
board of supervisors was willing to move from its position,
despite the threat of a police strike. Supervisor Robert
Mendelsohn, the chairman of the board's budget committee,
told reporters that "virtually the entire board is united on the
concept of giving an increase which is satisfactory to the tax-
payer."23 Though he felt sympathetic to the police and fire posi-
tions, he felt that the board could not do any more than it had
done already.
As the August 18 meeting of the board of supervisors ap-
proached, the POA continued its strike preparations. Strike
headquarters were set up at a local motel, strike literature was
printed, and a cadre of picket captains was selected for control
purposes. Gerald Crowley asserted that POA members were
prepared to walk off the job immediately if the supervisors failed
to meet police pay demands. "If the supervisors turn down our
raise at 2:02 p.m., we'll go out at 2:03 p.m."24 He felt that since
POA members had already indicated their feelings, no further
membership meetings would be necessary before a strike.
Muni-drivers and firefighters were also making strike
preparations. On Sunday, August 17, muni-drivers, in a
reportedly unanimous voice vote, authorized a strike unless the
board of supervisors approved raises certified by the civil service
commission. The commission had certified cost-of-living in-
creases as well as a 2.3 percent raise. In the past, muni-drivers
had been paid in parity with the top scale nationwide, but now
the supervisors sought to break that precedent by stressing that
the parity formula was a maximum, not a minimum. Lawrence
Martin, head of the Transport Workers Local 250-A, which
represented the drivers, said that he had discussed the pos-
sibility of a strike with the San Francisco Labor Council and "we
have been assured that we can get strike sanction whenever we
ask for it."25 Meanwhile, the firefighters had scheduled a strike
vote for Tuesday and Wednesday (August 19 and 20) and
planned to appear before the labor council on Wednesday to seek
strike sanction.
Once again, board president Dianne Feinstein urged the
POA, firefighters and muni-drivers to meet with the city's
negotiating team, but the POA and firefighters continued to
refuse and to demand direct dealings with the supervisors.
Crowley called the negotiating team "high paid messengers,"
and insisted on meeting with the board.26 Muni representatives
had been negotiating with the city negotiating team, but stopped
because they were dissatisfied with the lack of progress in
reaching an agreement.
In an attempt to avert a strike, Mayor Alioto met with
various city officials to discuss budget cutting options. While he
refused either to support or oppose the POA's demands for a
13.05 percent raise, he said that the board of supervisors might
be justified in giving less than the maximum. He noted, "The
police may have some beef . . . but as far as I am concerned, this
is the year of the taxpayer."27 He repeated his threat to fire any
police officer or firefighter who went on strike.
On Monday, August 18, the day the board was scheduled to
vote on the pay raises, the mayor predicted that the police would
not go on strike, but that if they did the city could "win." "I want
everyone to know we are not quaking in our boots around here
because of a possible strike. We can win a strike. You can assure
the people of San Francisco they will be safe in their homes."28
He also stated his belief that the pay dispute could be
negotiated, and he urged the board of supervisors not to take a
"ceremonial" position and refuse to talk. Again he warned that
striking police and firefighters would be fired and insisted that
they did not have the right to strike. He said that the muni-
drivers, however, did have the right to strike since unlike the
police and firefighters, they would not be endangering the public
safety. The mayor made it clear that he would not ask the gover-
nor to call out the National Guard to help patrol San Francisco
streets. "We can maintain order in this town and we are not talk-
ing about bringing in the National Guard. We are not going to
use amateurs ... It may well be that the police can bring us to
our knees. Well, if they can, we had better find out about it. That
comes close to being a police state."29
In the meantime, Chief Scott began to consider plans for pro-
tecting the city in the event of a strike. According to a department
spokesman, the chief had already worked out a contingency
vote for Tuesday and Wednesday (August 19 and 20) and
planned to appear before the labor council on Wednesday to seek
strike sanction.
Once again, board president Dianne Feinstein urged the
POA, firefighters and muni-drivers to meet with the city's
negotiating team, but the POA and firefighters continued to
refuse and to demand direct dealings with the supervisors.
Crowley called the negotiating team "high paid messengers,"
and insisted on meeting with the board.26 Muni representatives
had been negotiating with the city negotiating team, but stopped
because they were dissatisfied with the lack of progress in
reaching an agreement.
In an attempt to avert a strike, Mayor Alioto met with
various city officials to discuss budget cutting options. While he
refused either to support or oppose the POA's demands for a
13.05 percent raise, he said that the board of supervisors might
be justified in giving less than the maximum. He noted, "The
police may have some beef. . . but as far as I am concerned, this
is the year of the taxpayer."27 He repeated his threat to fire any
police officer or firefighter who went on strike.
On Monday, August 18, the day the board was scheduled to
vote on the pay raises, the mayor predicted that the police would
not go on strike, but that if they did the city could "win." "I want
everyone to know we are not quaking in our boots around here
because of a possible strike. We can win a strike. You can assure
the people of San Francisco they will be safe in their homes."28
He also stated his belief that the pay dispute could be
negotiated, and he urged the board of supervisors not to take a
"ceremonial" position and refuse to talk. Again he warned that
striking police and firefighters would be fired and insisted that
they did not have the right to strike. He said that the muni-
drivers, however, did have the right to strike since unlike the
police and firefighters, they would not be endangering the public
safety. The mayor made it clear that he would not ask the gover-
nor to call out the National Guard to help patrol San Francisco
streets. "We can maintain order in this town and we are not talk-
ing about bringing in the National Guard. We are not going to
use amateurs ... It may well be that the police can bring us to
our knees. Well, if they can, we had better find out about it. That
comes close to being a police state."29
In the meantime, Chief Scott began to consider plans for pro-
tecting the city in the event of a strike. According to a department
spokesman, the chief had already worked out a contingency
plan to supply emergency police services.30 However, a for-
mal contingency plan was never actually developed because
Scott thought a strike was unlikely. Nevertheless, he told the
public that the department was making plans for whatever even-
tually might occur and that the people would be provided with
police service. "I don't see any problem at this point," he said.31
The meeting of the board of supervisors was called to order
shortly after 2 p.m. on Monday afternoon. More than 200 off-
duty police officers packed the chamber, while another 200 out-
side the chamber listened to the proceedings on-the public ad-
dress system. Throughout the city, officers on duty in district
stations and patrol cars tuned in a live radio broadcast of the
meeting.
Early in the proceedings, the board averted a showdown
with the muni-drivers when it voted unanimously to postpone
consideration of their salary increases until the next week. After
considering several other matters, the board turned to the issue
of salary increases for police and firefighters. It announced that
in a closed door caucus earlier that afternoon, it had decided to
limit the pay raise to 6.5 percent. Without debate, the board
then voted 10 to 0, with one abstention to grant the 6.5 percent.32
Many officers in the chamber shouted their disapproval of the
board's decision. Others groaned or stamped their feet. Crowley
strode to the speaker's rostrum and asked to address the board.
Since unanimous consent of the board was required to recognize
a speaker, board president Feinstein asked if any of the members
would make a motion to allow him to speak. No one did. She
then told Crowley that she was "sorry" but he could not speak.
He muttered something under his breath and left the chamber
followed by the crowd of off-duty officers.33 There were shouts of
"hit the bricks," "strike" and "shut it down" as the officers
poured out of the chamber and headed for strike headquarters
where they received last minute instructions and picket signs
which had been prepared in advance. Within a few minutes, they
were on their way to their assigned locations to picket.
EVENTS DURING THE STRIKE
Monday, August 18
The effects of the strike were immediate, as officers quickly
walked off the job and formed picket lines at the nine district
stations, leaving less than 10 percent of the normal complement
to man the districts. The extent of the strike surprised Chief
Scott, who had believed his commanders' assurances that if a
strike occurred, it would not be widespread. In response to the
strike, he issued General Order 92, the closest thing the depart-
ment had to a contingency plan. Division commanders were
authorized to extend the workday; days off were cancelled; and
those on sick leave were required to submit a physician's cer-
tificate for each day's absence. All vacations that had not yet
begun were cancelled, but personnel already on vacation were
not recalled. Despite the threat of a strike, the usual number of
police personnel (250) were on vacation the day the strike
started. Among those on leave were several high ranking of-
ficials, some of whom allegedly started their vacations as the
strike began.
Because so few police officers were on duty at the district
stations, the chief ordered that only major crimes such as rape,
robbery, murder and serious assaults would be answered.
Citizens were asked to go to the district stations to report minor
complaints. Rush hour towaways in the downtown area were
suspended.
The department had 719 supervisory personnel available for
street duty, including 334 captains, lieutenants and sergeants,
and 285 inspectors, but it was believed that many of them sym-
pathized with the strike and would not report for work. All police
units not directly involved in patrolling the streets and answer-
ing emergency requests for assistance were ordered to suspend
their operations and reassign their personnel who reported for
duty to the district stations. Inspectors were also assigned to the
field, but many who reported for work would not leave the Hall of
Justice. Though a small contingent of inspectors was dispatched
throughout the city in unmarked cars, some of them deliberately
ignored calls for service in a demonstration of support for the
strike. All told, about 45 officers were on patrol duty, manning
about 20 cars. Normally, there would have been about 300 of-
ficers and 100 cars in the streets.34 A few units in the department
were, however, working with a full complement. The 27 officers
who worked in the city prison and the 25 in communications were
given permission by the POA to cross the picket lines, due to the
critical nature of the services they performed. All probationers
were exempt from the strike because they could be fired without
a hearing. The mayor's three police guards who doubled as
drivers were also given permission to work.35
Despite the serious manpower shortage, Chief Scott assured
the mayor that "there is no reason for panic."36 The many
citizens who called the department were told not to be overly
concerned, but to be a little bit more cautious, more aware of
what they're doing, and not to be out late at night by themselves.
"If they don't really need to go out at night, we'd just as soon
have them stay at home," said a department spokesman.37
Crowley defended the strike and denounced "the supreme
arrogance and arbitrary behavior of the supervisors [which] have
placed the people of San Francisco in jeopardy." He claimed
that the "crowning insult" was that the supervisors "refused to
negotiate and that the police were not allowed to speaknot
meeting with ushas caused the most tragic day in San Fran-
cisco. The people are not safe in their homes, and that is the
responsibility of the supervisors." He also said that the strikers
would provide emergency services, but only if the mayor and
supervisors would immediately begin negotiations with the
POA.38
Morale appeared high among the strikers as they picketed
the nine district stations. In some places firefighters walked the
picket lines alongside striking police officers. Strikers were confi-
dent they would not be fired, as the mayor had threatened,
because the processes of firing them and hiring and training
replacements would be too lengthy. The pickets were well
organized. Officers picketed their own district stations during
the hours they were scheduled to work. Within the first few hours
of the strike, copies of the following strike rules were distributed:
RULES OF STRIKE
Security: Each picket Captain must arrange for
security for his men. Assign one or two men to remain
aloof from the majority to be watchful of attack or
other incident (physical injury).
Movement: Ask the pickets to walk around in a cir-
cle, not just stand in bunches.
Breaks: Allow breaks of course, but near the area
you are responsible for. Don't let more than two
pickets leave at one time, 30 minutes should be suf-
ficient.
Alcohol: Please no alcohol intake while on picket
duty.
Police Cars: Don't get into oral arguments with on-
duty police personnel. The strike is 95% effective. The
remaining 5% cannot provide all of the necessary ser-
vices required. Treat these people indifferently.
Maybe they will join us tomorrow on the picket lines.
Swearing, etc. at them does not aid our cause. We will
win with or without them.
The Bureau: Narcotics & BSS are out. On Tuesday
at 8:30 AM the Bureau will have a meeting at the
Flower Mart. They will be asked to either:
1) Join the strike on the lines or
2) Report off as they will not cross the picket lines.
Actions 1 or 2 will aid our strike and further reduce
those services normally available.
NO VIOLENCE: We don't need it. Flattened tires,
broken windows, or slashed tires, etc. will not help us.
Any of these actions or worse will cause the public to
become unsympathetic with our strike.
Please observe all ofthese rules and use GOOD COM-
MON SENSE.
POA Strike Committee
Scattered incidents of violence on the picket lines marred
the otherwise calm atmosphere that prevailed throughout the
city on the first night of the strike. Two picketing officers were
slightly injured when they were hit by a car outside a district sta-
tion. Another officer was assaulted by a man wielding a baseball
bat. In the most serious incident, snipers fired on police pickets
outside a district station. The picketing officers returned the fire
and arrested three suspects. To prevent further assaults, the
strikers posted guards carrying shotguns and shot out street
lights. They shouted to approaching cars "Kill them lights before
we kill them for you."39
Tuesday, August 19
Picketing continued Tuesday morning, even though the city
had obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining members
of the POA from striking and picketing. In signing the order, the
judge overrode the POA's contention that "the strike was a
political matter and the court should not intercede,"40 and noted
that there were several appellate court decisions holding that
strikes by public employees are illegal. The judge scheduled a
hearing for September 2, to determine whether to issue a
preliminary injunction against the strike. Gerald Crowley, who
was usually surrounded by armed bodyguards, was never served
with a copy of the court order. Ironically, it was usually the
police who delivered and enforced such court orders.
As the city attempted to get the striking police officers back
to work, firefighters began voting on whether to strike. Fifteen
firefighters who worked at the San Francisco International Air-
port called in sick, signalling their union's intention to strike on
Wednesday. Their action almost caused the airport to shut
down, but officials were able to bring in substitutes and opera-
tions continued. Transit workers, meanwhile, had set 12:01 a.m.
Friday as a strike deadline.
Throughout the day, Mayor Alioto attempted to get negotia-
tions started between the supervisors and the POA. The first of
several meetings began late that morning when the mayor met
briefly with the deputy mayor, the employee relations director,
the city's chief administrative officer, and four supervisors. A
second meeting was held in midafternoon between the mayor,
five supervisors, the employee relations director, the POA
negotiating committee, the POA president and the chief of
police. No agreement was reached. After hearing Chief Scott's
report on the department's manpower situation, several super-
visors requested that the strikers provide emergency services.
They also wanted the strikers to disarm. Crowley refused both
requests. There was also a deadlock over the issue of wages; the
supervisors expressed their intent to stand by their 6.5 percent
offer; the POA held firm to its 13.05 percent demand. The
meeting adjourned with both sides pessimistic about the pos-
sibility of a settlement.
Late in the afternoon, the board of supervisors met in ex-
ecutive session with the mayor to try to work out a compromise.
The mayor had already agreed, at the supervisors' request, to try
to mediate the dispute. He told the board that he thought the
POA would lower its 13.05 percent wage demand if the board
would raise its 6.5 percent offer. The supervisors responded by
authorizing Alioto to offer the POA a one-year pact, with 6.5 per-
cent for 11 months and 9 percent for the final month. Negotia-
tions were scheduled to resume late that night a' a local hotel.
Neither the supervisors nor the POA knew that the mayor had
asked the city attorney whether he could use his emergency
powers to suspend the city charter and execute a contract with
the transit workers, the police and the firefighters. The city at-
torney told him he could.41 The next day, Alioto asked for and
received written confirmation of this information.
In a 6 p.m. television and radio broadcast, the mayor told
the public that although the strike was a "very serious situation"
essential police services would "continue to be performed and
there is no existing present danger .... The police commission is
determined that unless the men are back to work tomorrow
morning, we are going to start dismissal proceedings against all
of them."" He also threatened to have strike leaders arrested if
they continued to ignore the court order to return to work, but he
did not elaborate on who would make the arrests.
On his way to the hotel where negotiations were to resume,
the mayor, accompanied by a large group of reporters, aides and
bodyguards, walked through the seamy Tenderloin district to
demonstrate that the streets were safe, despite the strike. For the
last time, he repeated his threat to fire the strikers. After an un-
productive meeting with the supervisors back at the hotel, the
mayor met with three local labor leaders, Jack Goldberger, the
head of the Teamsters, Joe Mazzola, business manager of the
plumbers' union, and Jack Crowley, head of the San Francisco
Labor Council.43 He asked them for help in ending the strike, and
they agreed to sit in on future bargaining sessions. Negotiations
resumed at 11:00 p.m. with the mayor and the labor leaders on
one side of the bargaining table and the POA negotiating team
on the other. The meeting was abruptly interrupted an hour and
a half later when the deputy mayor rushed into the room to tell
Alioto that his house had been bombed. The mayor quickly left
for home, and negotiations were suspended until Wednesday
afternoon. No one was injured in the blast, and damage was
relatively minor. A sign left on the front lawn read "Don't
threaten us." The POA disclaimed any involvement with the
bombing, and Alioto said he did not believe that the police or the
strike had anything to do with it.
Other sporadic incidents of violence occurred Tuesday
night, including vandalism to police cars and equipment.
Strikers were blamed for slashing tires, jamming steering and
ignition systems and smashing windows. By the end of the
strike, over $3,000 worth of damage to department property was
attributed to the strikers, and the POA was subsequently billed
for this damage. Many private vehicles belonging to officers who
did not strike were also vandalized. Crime seemed to escalate
dramatically as numerous business establishments were hit by
robbers, vandals and looters, but it was impossible to tell just
how much crime had increased. A department official told
reporters "we're in far worse shape than we can imagine. The
trouble is, you can't tell how bad it is, because no reports are be-
ing taken, and there are no officers to take reports. . . . Crime is
up. It's up and there's no question about it.""
According to department records, 26.2 percent of the depart-
ment's 1,825 sworn personnel worked on Tuesday, while 51.5 per-
cent were on strike.45 Of the 478 officers on duty, only 289 were
available for patrol. When the busy 4 p.m. shift started, the
department was able to put about 94 officers and 47 patrol cars
on the street, about half the normal complement. Criminal in-
vestigations came to a halt, since all inspectors had been as-
signed to patrol duty. Fifty of the department's 70 meter maids
failed to report for duty, which enabled motorists to ignore park-
ing meters and towaway zones.46
Wednesday, August 20
By Wednesday morning, it was evident to top officials in the
police department that they could no longer cope with the strike.
The chief, two police commissioners and three captains met in
midmorning to evaluate the strike situation, and decided that if
the POA did not provide emergency services, the department
could not guarantee the safety of the people of San Francisco.
They agreed to recommend to the mayor that he declare a state
of emergency and call in outside law enforcement assistance to
help patrol the streets. Later that morning, Chief Scott and one
of the captains met with Gerald Crowley to discuss whether the
POA would provide emergency services. The chief presented the
police commission's proposal for minimum service, and the POA
countered with its own proposal. The POA offered to man three
police cars (2 officers per car) per district station (9 stations) per
shift (3 eight-hour shifts), but only under two conditions: first,
the POA through Crowley would appoint from its members the
supervisors who would supervise these 162 officers; and second,
all personnel (inspectors and other Hall of Justice personnel)
who had been assigned patrol duties during the strike were to be
taken off the streets. The proposal was unacceptable to Chief
Scott because it would have transferred control of the police
department to Crowley. After the meeting, further negotiations
were conducted by telephone between department officials and
Crowley, and when no agreement was reached, the POA in-
dicated it would continue the negotiations with the mayor.
Mayor Alioto was informed of the status of the negotiations
at a midafternoon meeting with Chief Scott, two police commis-
sioners and three captains. The commissioners and the chief told
the mayor that "they were finding it impossible to provide
emergency services and were operating on an hour-to-hour basis.
Personnel who were working a 12-hour day could not continue to
do so without losing their effectiveness. Also, there were indica-
tions that the criminal element in San Francisco was becoming
aware that they could probably operate with impunity on San
Francisco streets."47 The commissioners and the chief also in-
formed the mayor that a state of emergency existed and if no
adequate emergency assistance were provided by the POA, out-
side assistance would be necessary. Subsequent negotiations
between Mayor Alioto and Gerald Crowley about emergency ser-
vices also reached an impasse, and the POA withdrew its offer to
provide emergency services. There was considerable speculation
that the POA withdrew its offer because of the members' hostile
reaction to the plan. During the day, strikers learned that the
POA leaders might agree to provide emergency services con-
sisting of a few officers to patrol each district. Most of the
strikers adamantly opposed the plan and were furious that their
leaders had even considered it.
Though the department and the POA were unable to agree
on emergency services, they were able to arrange access to the
Hall of Justice garage. The picket captains agreed not to block
the garage, and the department agreed that sworn personnel who
required vehicles would have to come to the Hall of Justice to ob-
tain them. The picket captains would not allow any cadets to
drive police vehicles from the garage for the use of sworn person-
nel in the field.
Chief Scott was too busy Wednesday trying to provide the
city with adequate police protection to carry out the threatened
firing of strikers. He said the mayor had "over simplified the fir-
ing procedures. Each man has to be served individually. We have
too much to do just to handle emergencies to worry about filing
any suspension papers until after this thing is over."48
The threat of a firefighters' strike increased Wednesday
morning, when the firefighters voted overwhelmingly to strike.49
The walkout was scheduled to begin at 6 p.m. The firefighters
and muni-drivers had obtained strike sanction from the San
Francisco Labor Council that morning.
Early in the afternoon, Mayor Alioto announced that the
threatened strike by muni-drivers had been averted and that
muni-drivers had agreed to a 6.5 percent increase. Less than two
hours after the mayor's announcement, the supervisors approved
the settlement which would cost the city $3.75 million. The
board had been holding out for a $3 million increase, but agreed
to the union demands under pressure of the police strike and the
impending firefighters' strike. For the first time, however, muni-
drivers did not receive the maximum raise allowed by their pay
formula. The head of the union told reporters that the settlement
would not have been possible without Alioto, who had been ac-
tively mediating the dispute for two days. Actually, the final
details of the agreement had been worked out by the head of the
civil service commission who assisted in the negotiations at the
mayor's request.
In midafternoon, Alioto met with the police and fire
negotiating teams. Once again Jack Crowley, Mazzola and
Goldberger attended the negotiating session. The mayor
reportedly made a minor concession; a 13 percent increase for the
first month of the budget year and a 6.5 percent increase for the
rest of the year. The police and firefighters stuck to their 13.05
percent demand and quickly rejected the offer.50 According to
one account of the meeting, neither the police nor firefighters
"knew how to carry on collective bargaining." Gerald Crowley
began "throwing too much weight around" and was "verbally
slapped into line" by Goldberger, who told him that ifjhe wanted
the Teamsters' support "he had better start acting like a labor
man."51 At one point someone threatened to send the POA's at-
torney back to Los Angeles in a pine box. The labor leaders were
anxious to end the strike that night because the firefighters plan-
ned to set up picket lines throughout the city the next morning,
and the labor leaders did not want the city shut down. Teamsters
were already honoring police picket lines and refusing to deliver
supplies to the Hall of Justice cafeteria which was running out of
supplies. The labor leaders were also concerned about the lack of
police and fire protection in the city. It was "intimated" that
organized labor would withdraw its support of the striking police
and firefighters if the strike continued and they did not provide
emergency services.
While Mayor Alioto was negotiating with the police and
firefighters, the supervisors, in an ordinance subject to the
mayor's approval, declared a "state of emergency" and re-
quested him to ask the governor to send in at least 200 state
highway patrol officers to help preserve law and order. They
promised to repay the state for "any extraordinary service"
provided. The supervisors said they would rescind the ordinance
if the strikers would go back to work for a seven-day "cooling off
period, during which negotiations would continue. "We are ask-
ing in a very nice way," said supervisor John Barbagelata "to
come home and serve the people of San Francisco. If they ac; to-
day all will be forgiven and their reputations will be main-
tained."52 However, in a move that indicated their intentions if
the strike continued, the supervisors waived the deadline for put-
ting charter amendments on the November ballot. This action
cleared the way for a ballot proposal that would rescind the
charter provision allowing San Francisco police salaries to equal
the highest in the state. "In all my five years on the Board,"
Feinstein commented, "I've never seen so much unanimity on a
labor issue as there exists on this board today."53
Mayor Alioto refused to sign the emergency ordinance and
declared that he had no intention of calling in outside police. "In
the middle of negotiations, it doesn't make any sense to have a
police to police confrontation," he explained.54 An aide to Gover-
nor Edmund Brown, Jr., said that the highway patrol would not
be ordered into the city unless it were requested by the mayor.
The mayor also opposed calling in National Guard troops
because they lacked law enforcement professionalism. He said
that he would not consider asking the governor to send in the
guard unless there were riots in the streets and widespread
bloodshed.55
Although the firefighters were not scheduled to strike until 6
p.m., during the afternoon they set up pickets at the airport
firehouse and refused to man emergency equipment in an effort
to shut down the nation's fifth busiest airport. Nevertheless, the
airport remained open with about 40 hastily trained airport and
airline volunteers manning the emergency posts. The volunteers
passed a Federal Aviation Administration competence test, and
the FAA allowed operations to continue. The one professional
firefighter on duty at the airport said he had plenty of volunteers,
but doubted that they knew what to do.56 The control tower,
meanwhile, began to radio all incoming pilots and alert them to
the situation in case they wanted to land elsewhere.57
At 6 p.m. city firefighters struck. About 90 percent of the
1,775 firefighters walked off the job. Of 49 engine (pumper) com-
panies, 11 were in service; only 3 of the 18 truck (ladder) com-
panies were available.58 By 10 p.m. there were only 18 officers
and 46 firemen on duty throughout the city. While top officials in
the department stayed on the job, there was little doubt that
they were sympathetic to the strikers. "A guy sweeping the
streets makes as much as a captain in the department," said the
deputy fire chief. "A guy operating a lawn mower at the golf
course makes $22,000 and those guys aren't thrown into any tight
spots. We've got guys driving heavy equipment, great big rigs
and they don't make what city truck drivers make."59 In
midafternoon, Mayor Alioto announced contingency plans that
included the possibility of stationing 12 state division of forestry
pumpers with 75 men in the city, as well as implementation of
intercity mutual assistance agreements in case of a major
emergency. The contingency plans, however, were never put into
effect. That night, the few firefighters who were working
answered 37 fires. Due to a lack of manpower, many alarms were
checked out by station chiefs in radio cars or by telephone. False
alarms increased by 300 percent.60 Striking firefighters, who were
monitoring department radios and carrying equipment in their
cars, on their own initiative helped put out several fires that
broke out during the night.
Negotiations continued Wednesday night as Alioto shuttled
between the supervisors, the strike leaders and the labor leaders.
The meetings with the supervisors were marked by sharp dis-
agreements and acrimonious exchanges between the mayor and
the supervisors. Alioto later described the supervisors as
"hysterical" and "in no position to negotiate with anybody."61
Their major disagreement with the mayor concerned whether to
declare a state of emergency and ask the governor to send in 200
highway patrol officers. Alioto steadfastly refused and left to
resume negotiations with the strike leaders. Then, without in-
forming the mayor, the irate supervisors sent a telegram to the
governor asking him to send the highway patrol to the city. The
supervisors were openly angry with Alioto for refusing to join in
their appeal to the governor for help; board president Dianne
Feinstein said she was "so angry I can't speak."62 The supervisors
were also harshly critical of the mayor's role in the negotiations
and claimed that during the day he had shifted without their ap-
proval from mediator to a negotiator. "Today the mayor has
been negotiating on his own account all day ..." said Tony
Francois. "We never asked him to negotiate, and he's not
negotiating on behalf of the board .... We wish him well, but
we're about to go home."63 And home they went. "As far as we're
concerned," said Feinstein, "until the public safety needs of this
city are met, there are no further negotiations planned."64 When
Alioto was informed of the supervisors' action, he angrily told
reporters, "that's one hell of a way to solve a problem; firing off a
telegram and then go home."65 Negotiations between the mayor
and the strike leaders continued into the early morning hours.
New litigation involving the strike was begun on Wednes-
day. At the request of the American Civil Liberties Union Foun-
dation, a superior court judge issued a temporary restraining
order directing Chief Scott to disarm the strikers and to enforce
laws which banned carrying a concealed weapon or carrying a
loaded weapon in a public place. The department's legal officer
accepted a copy of the order on behalf of the chief and said it
would be studied before any action was taken. The captain at
each district station was, however, notified that no city-owned
weapons were to be removed from the stations without the chiefs
express permission. The foundation brought the suit after Scott
failed to respond to its letter asking him to collect all city-owned
weapons which were in the hands of the strikers, to confiscate
privately owned weapons carried in violation of law, and to
promulgate regulations prohibiting the use of firearms by off-
duty police officers. In its lawsuit, the foundation argued that
state laws exempting police officers from gun control regulations
did not apply to persons who were not acting as police officers
and who were beyond the command and authority of the chief. It
further noted "Were it not police on the line, no police force in
the nation would tolerate the indiscriminate use of firearms in a
labor dispute. The use of such firearms creates a danger to police
on duty, to striking police, to those who might disagree with the
police and possibly provoke them to fire, and mqst importantly,
to innocent bystanders." <,,
In another suit filed in federal court on Wednesday, a group
of citizens sought to force Alioto to seek outside "police-type" as-
sistance. This class action was brought by seven residents in-
cluding a candidate for the board of supervisors. The judge took
the matter under advisement. The case was subsequently dis-
missed after the strike was settled.
In other court related action, a process server was forcibly
removed by several strikers from a hotel room where he was try-
ing to serve Gerald Crowley with a copy of the temporary
restraining order issued Tuesday. Afterwards, both the mayor
and the city attorney advised him to forget about serving the
order for the time being.
Thursday, August 21
After hours of negotiation, Alioto and the leaders of the
striking police and firefighters finally reached an agreement.
Alioto had told the strike leaders that the city had $9.5 million
that the police and firefighters could split any way they wanted.
The settlement they worked out would cost the city $9.5 million
and add about six cents to the city's property tax rate.66 It in-
volved a 6.5 percent raise for the single day of July 1, 1975, to in-
crease the pensions of police officers and firefighters whose
retirement dated from that day. Salaries would then revert to the
former levels until October 15, when wages would go up 13.05
percent, the amount originally demanded by the police and
firefighters. A second part of the agreement gave the strikers
"total amnesty." Because the 13.05 percent raise was not
retroactive to the start of the fiscal year (July 1,1975), it actually
amounted to a 9.5 percent increase for the year. POA leaders felt
that the 13.05 percent figure was symbolic; it had been the rally-
ing point of the strike. They therefore believed that any settle-
ment had to include that figure or the membership would
perceive the agreement as a defeat.
At 2:45 a.m. Alioto announced to the press that a proposed
settlement had been reached, and shortly afterwards walked
along Broadway to demonstrate again that the city was safe. The
supervisors learned of the settlement from reporters or on the
morning newscasts. Although police and firefighters began their
ratification votes at 10 a.m., the supervisors were not officially
informed of the terms of the tentative agreement until Alioto met
with them at 11:30. The supervisors were outraged by the settle-
ment. They felt that the mayor had usurped their authority
when he negotiated the pact and was now pressuring them to ac-
cept it whether or not they liked it. They were also angered by
the way they learned of the settlement. "He had the dime to call
the media, but he didn't have the dime to call members of the
Board of Supervisors," complained Supervisor John Molinari.67
By noon, both the police and firefighters had overwhelming-
ly approved the settlement, and agreed to go back to work. In
separate meetings, the police voted 800 to 50 in favor of the pact,
and the firefighters approved it by a vote of 890 to 12. Neither
group, however, would go back to work until the city formally ac-
cepted the agreement. Alioto had informed their leaders that if
the supervisors rejected the agrement, he would invoke his
emergency powers and impose a settlement.
The board of supervisors met in public session at 2:30 p.m.
to vote on ratification of the strike settlement. Hundreds of
citizens including striking police and firefighters packed the or-
nate chamber. The meeting was brief (17 minutes) but
emotional. Once again, there was no debate since the supervisors
had already decided the matter in a closed session. Almost im-
mediately, the board rejected the mayor's settlement by a 9 to 0
vote, and demanded that the strikers return to work before
negotiations could continue.68 Many in the audience applauded
the board's action, while strikers in the room booed. When board
president Dianne Feinstein warned "We must have order in this
chamber or you must leave," there were taunts of "call a cop."69
The supervisors' vote was followed by a barage of criticism
directed at the mayor and the striking police and firefighters.
Supervisor Robert Gonzales declared "We do not wish to
negotiate with a bunch of outlaws,"70 in apparent reference to
police defiance of the court order. John Barbagelata echoed these
remarks when he said, "It is a sad day for San Francisco when
the mayor is becoming the first dictator in the United States . . .
These men out there on the street violating the law are
hypocrites . . . They have taken a sworn oath to uphold their
duty to the people . . . This is a matter of principle. It's not a
matter of money. Money was never the real issue ... It boiled
down to a question of whether the unions or the city's elected
representatives are going to run San Francisco."71 Dainne Fein-
stein spoke of "the deep issue of morality arid principle," and ex-
pressed concern about reports of drinking on the picket lines, of-
ficers being beaten up, and vandalism.72 .
Striking police and firefighters were informed of the board's
action and instructed not to go back to work until the issue was
finally settled. Meanwhile, picketing continued.
Forty-five minutes after the supervisors' vote, Alioto an-
nounced that he would proclaim a state of emergency and grant
police and firefighters the pay raise that the supervisors had just
rejected. He said that he objected to "offensive and insolent
rhetoric . . . that aggravates an already volcanic situation . . .
Not to make the settlement in this explosive situation is pure fol-
ly. Someone has to act with reasoned restraint."73 Even before
the mayor signed the proclamation, the fire chief broadcast word
to the striking firefighters to go back to work. Shortly before 5:00
p.m., Alioto, with Gerald Crowley and firefighters' president
James Ferguson at his side, signed the declaration. Chief Scott
broadcast an announcement that all normal watches were to be
resumed at 5:00 p.m. Throughout the city, pickets put aside
their signs and returned to work. The strike was over.
EVENTS FOLLOWING THE STRIKE
Reaction to the strike settlement was swift and harsh. The
irate supervisors quickly condemned the mayor's action and
pointed out that the day before he declared an emergency he had
insisted that there was no emergency. Quentine Kopp accused
him of "putting the legislative branch out of business because he
didn't like what it was doing."74 Robert Gonzales was "very dis-
appointed in the Mayor for giving in to a bunch of thugs and
thieves who would in effect rob the public treasury of $9.5 mil-
lion."75 Leaders of San Francisco neighborhood groups
denounced the mayor and the strikers with terms such as "ab-
solute sellout," "ripoff," and "blackmail."76 A spokesman for one
group predicted "the sense of outrage and betrayal is running so
deep I think it will bring to the fore a reform movement that will
be a direct confrontation between the citizens who live here and
the public safety unions ... In talking to community people, I
sense a real mood that this city is ours, by God, and we're going
to prove it."77
Denunciation of the mayor and the strikers echoed throughout
the nation. From coast to coast, editorials accused the mayor of
surrendering,78 selling out,79 and caving in to the lawbreaking
strikers.80 They said this action had set a dangerous precedent
which "undermined public safety in all American cities"81 by en-
couraging other city unions to strike if their demands were not
met.
The day after the strike ended, the supervisors struck back
at the police and firefighters by introducing a series of charter
amendments for the November ballot which would strip both
groups of special pay formulas and benefits. One amendment
provided that any police officer or firefighter who took part in a
strike would be subject to automatic dismissal. Another changed
the traditional pay formula allowing police salaries to equal the
highest in the state. The new formula tied their salaries to the
average wages paid their counterparts in California cities of
350,000 or more. A third amendment replaced the firefighters'
work schedule (of 24 hours on duty followed by 48 hours off) with
a more restrictive schedule which granted fewer days off and was
thus less conducive to moonlighting. A fourth amendment
repealed the retirement benefits for police and firefighters which
had been approved the year before. The proposed reduction
would apply only to those hired after July 1, 1976. Still another
amendment was aimed at the mayor. It restricted his emergency
powers under the charter by requiring the concurrence of the
board of supervisors before he could take any action in an
emergency.
Other actions against the police and firefighters were also
considered. The board directed the city attorney to prepare
legislation to rescind the part of the memorandum of under-
standing between the POA and the city which allowed the presi-
dent of the POA to be assigned full-time to POA duties while
receiving city pay. The civil service commission was requested to
initiate measures to eliminate cash payments for unused sick
leave upon retirement. This practice had enabled city employees
to receive as much as six months' full pay when they retired.
Dianne Feinstein sent a letter, approved by the entire board, to
Chief Scott asking him to investigate an incident in which strik-
ing police officers allegedly harassed a meter maid, tore up her
ticket book, and assaulted several witnesses because the meter
maid was ticketing the strikers' illegally parked cars. The super-
visors also called for a civil grand jury investigation into allega-
tions of misconduct and vandalism by strikers. With regard to
the strike settlement, the board made it clear that it intended to
make up the $2.6 million difference between its 6.5 percent offer
and the settlement amount by making cuts hi the police and fire
departments' budgets. The supervisors also declined to approve
the 6.5 percent raise in case the mayor's settlement were to be
overturned by the courts.
Alioto promptly vetoed the board's attempt to extend the
deadline for putting the charter amendments on the November
ballot. In a strongly worded veto message, he told the board to
"cool it and quit playing politics with the safety of our people."82
He said that he assumed the need for "personal catharsis" would
lead the supervisors to override his veto, and he urged them to
acknowledge that they had "a secret agreement to act in unison
so that no one of you will either suffer or gain politically" in the
November election.83 The supervisors emphatically denied that
they had any such agreement. Alioto continued his criticism of
the board as part of a campaign to rally public opinion behind
himself and against the supervisors. He said that "a hysterical
near-vigilante mood directed against uniformed police and
firemen" had emerged as a result of the strike. "Punitive
measures, such as we now see being prepared against police and
firemen are products of unreasoning rage and frustration. This
should not be the public mood in a time that demands reason."84
In an attempt to correct public misunderstanding of the strike
settlement, Alioto repeatedly explained that he had not
capitulated to the unions' demands; that because the wage in-
crease was not effective until October 15, the raise actually
amounted to 9.5 percent, not 13.05 percent. He stressed that the
$9.5 million settlement did better than "split the difference"
between the $6.8 million the board offered and the $13.6 million
the police and firefighters demanded.85
Alioto's efforts to win public opinion did not sway the board.
As expected, the board quickly overrode his vetoes and cleared
the way to put the proposed charter amendments on the ballot.
The four amendments which were finally placed on the ballot
were: Proposition N which limited the mayor's emergency
powers; Proposition O which required the automatic dismissal of
striking police or firefighters; Proposition P which changed the
pay formula for police and firefighters to the average salary paid
in the five largest California cities; and Proposition Q which
changed firefighters' working hours from nine 24-hour shifts a
month to 18 14-hour shifts a month. Supervisors claimed that
the proposed charter amendments were not vindictive, but were
old issues which had been frequently discussed in board debates
in previous years. In the past, they had been considered "un-
touchables" because union political powers made them virtually
impossible to change.86 However, the strike had altered public
opinion to the extent that these changes were not only possible,
but also politically expedient.
To counter the propositions sponsored by the board of super-
visors, the mayor offered two alternative propositions which were
supported by the POA, the firefighters' union, and other labor
groups. Proposition R established collective bargaining and
binding arbitration on the issue of police and firefighters' wages,
but provided that their compensation could not exceed the
highest rate paid in other major California cities. The proposi-
tion also declared that strikes by police and firefighters were il-
legal and required that strikers be fired. Proposition S was a
declaration of policy that San Francisco favored paying its police
and firefighters as much as their counterparts in the five largest
cities in the state
It was quickly apparent that the upcoming election would be
a test of voter reaction to the strike. The strike became a major
issue as the eight supervisors running for office campaigned on
the ballot measures and kept the strike debate alive. Candidates
for mayor and supervisor spouted antiemployee rhetoric and
promises of government economy. However, the unusual
solidarity of the board on the strike issues began to break up, as
the candidates for mayor (including two supervisors) argued
about how the strike should have been handled. The first signs of
dissension appeared when Dianne Feinstein criticized Chief
Scott for failing to disarm the strikers as they picketed. "The
Chief of Police, accompanied by an officer or two, should have
gone to each station, walked down the picket line and collected
the weapons. If any striker refused to surrender his weapon he
should have been disciplined," she said.87 John Barbagelata
defended the chief and said it was "naive and foolish" to think
that he could have walked down the picket lines collecting
weapons.88
By wide margins, voters approved all four propositions
placed on the ballot by the board of supervisors as a result of the
strike and turned down the two propositions sponsored by the
mayor and supported by the police and firefighters.89 A proposi-
tion which repealed the liberal pay formula for the city's 5,000
craft workers was also passed by a large margin. As a result, craft
workers' wages would no longer be linked directly to private sec-
tor wage scales in San Francisco. Although this proposition had
been placed on the ballot long before the police and fire strike,
the antilabor sentiment generated by the strike most likely in-
fluenced the vote to repeal the craft pay formula.
Other election results were also indicative of strong anti-
labor feelings. All six supervisors who were running for reelection
were returned to office. The outcome of the mayor's race was a
surprise. A runoff between two liberal Democrats, Supervisor
Dianne Feinstein and State Senator George Moscone, had been
expected. Moscone got the most votes (31 percent), but conser-
vative Republican John Barbagelata came in second (19 per-
cent), while Feinstein came third. In the December runoff elec-
tion, Moscone narrowly defeated Barbagelata by 4,315 votes out
of 198,741. Moscone had been expected to win by a much larger
margin, and the close result was largely attributed to public
reaction to New York City's financial crisis and concern for fiscal
restraint.
Police and firefighters reacted bitterly to the passage of the
charter amendments. Many felt that the city had "turned its
back" on them, and some talked of looking for new jobs in "a city
where I'm wanted."90 The day after the election, police officers
began a ticket blitz, and the number of parking and traffic cita-
tions issued increased dramatically during the next few days.91
The supervising captain of patrol expressed outrage at the "petty
and vindictive" action and stated that the deparment would not
tolerate "this type of personal motivation for the issuance of
tickets . . . ,"92 but the department never put "direct pressure"
on the officers to slow their ticket-writing.93 The POA newspaper
reminded officers that thousands of San Francisco voters had
supported the police and firefighters in the election and that the
ticket speedup was not likely to "win friends and influence
people."94 Nevertheless, the ticket blitz continued for several
days.
It was expected that the passage of Proposition P, which
changed the police wage formula, would result in a pay cut for
police and firefighters in July 1976. The new formula required
that their wages equal the average paid to their counterparts in
the five largest California cities. In order to keep the police and
firefighters at the pay level they had attained through the strike
settlement, the average in the five cities would have had to rise
by 9 percent by August 1976.95 It was clear at the time Proposi-
tion P was submitted to the voters that it might mean a pay cut.
The Voter Information Handbook distributed before the election
contained a statement by the city controller that adoption of
Proposition P would decrease the cost of government by approx-
imately $11,194,521 a year, which was equivalent to 35 cents in
the tax rate. Yet, after the election, several supervisors expressed
surprise at the prospect of a pay cut, and denied that they had
intended to reduce police and firefighters' wages. To rectify the
situation, the board, on March 8,1976, voted to put a new police-
fire pay proposition in the June ballot which would guarantee
that current police and firefighters would not have their wages
cut because of Proposition P. The new amendment also es-
tablished a formula for setting recruits' pay. Under that formula,
the $50 pay spread between a recruit and a fourth-year
patrolman would increase to $280.
Because of the possibility of a pay cut, there was a large in-
crease in the number of retirement applications from police and
firefighters who wanted their retirement pay based on their cur-
rent wages instead of a lower rate that might be set in July 1976.
The fire chief predicted that at least 350 veteran firefighters
would retire by June 30 because they feared pay cuts.96 Within
eight days after the election, 45 firefighters and four police of-
ficers had filed for retirement.97 In a normal week, only three ap-
plications were usually received. The possibility of mass retire-
ments created another problem for the city since city employees
were paid for up to six months of accumulated sick leave when
they retired. The board of supervisors discussed revoking the
lump sum payments which would cost the city between $3.5 and
$7 million. The payments, however, were left intact when retire-
ment applications leveled off, as employees waited to see how the
board would resolve the issue of possible pay cuts. In the end, the
much-discussed pay cuts never materialized because the voters
passed the board-sponsored proposition' which protected police
and firefighters from wage reductions as a result of Propositon P.
The passage of Proposition B, which eliminated the pay for-
mula for craft workers, gave the supervisors the opportunity to
end the cash payments craft workers had been receiving for
fringe benefits paid in the private sector. The fringe benefit cuts
which were made in March 1976 reduced craft workers' pay as
much as $3,000 a year. The outraged craft workers struck in
retaliation. At first, transit workers honored the picket lines, but
the remaining 80 percent of the city work force including the
police and firefighters continued to work.98 The walkout ended
after 38 days when the city and the unions agreed to form a fact-
finding committee to recommend wage scales and working
conditions for the 1,700 craft workers. The antilabor backlash
and public indignation generated by the strike widened the es-
trangement between labor and the city's political leadership.
Reaction to the police and firefighters' strike was not con-
fined to the election and its aftermath. The POA suffered several
setbacks as a result of the walkout. The most serious was the
city's termination of its memorandum of understanding with the
association. Shortly after the November election, the board of
supervisors voted to rescind the city's labor agreements with the
POA and the firefighters' union. The agreements, signed in April
1974, provided among other things that the heads of the two
groups could work full-time on union activities while receiving
city pay. The agreements also included promises by the police
and firefighters not to strike. The supervisors maintained that
they were justified in rescinding the agreements because the
police and firefighters had violated the no-strike provisions.
Mayor Alioto vetoed the supervisors' action, saying that the
decision to end the agreements "appeared to be vindictive." He
urged the board to get on with "the less glamorous business of
building bridges of understanding to our policemen and
firemen,"99 and said he could see "no gain in continuing the civil
war between the supervisors and the police and fire
departments."100 As expected, the board overrode the mayor's
veto.
The most immediate result of ending the agreements was
that Gerald Crowley and James Ferguson were returned to active
duty. A month earlier, the police commission had rescinded its
approval of the agreement with the POA and ordered Crowley to
resume his full-time duties as a police sergeant. Crowley
protested that the action was punishment for his leadership of
the strike. The commission denied this charge and claimed that
there was a critical manpower shortage in the department caused
by budget cuts. Instead of reporting for duty as scheduled on Oc-
tober 16, 1975, Crowley took a month's vacation. When his vaca-
tion ended, he had his leave extended to December 16, 1975.
Meanwhile, the POA filed a lawsuit seeking to reinstate the
agreement and block Crowley's reassignment to police duty, and
the POA's directors decided that the POA rather than the police
department should pay his salary. On December 8, Crowley told
a press conference that he would return to active duty the next
week as scheduled. He explained that a 1971 memorandum of
understanding between the POA and the commission, which was
still in effect, allowed the commission to return the association
president to regular duty "in the event of an emergency." He
said he agreed with the commission that an emergency existed
because of the shortage of personnel and violence on city buses,
and that therefore he would accede to the commission's order.101
The next week, Crowley reported to work in uniform for the first
time in two years.
The POA suffered an additional setback when approximate-
ly 100 officers,102 most of them inspectors, resigned from the as-
sociation apparently because of dissatisfaction over the
"unprofessionalism" of the strike. Many others reportedly
remained in the POA only to retain their life insurance benefits
in the POA group policy.103 The secretary of the POA, who was
disillusioned with the way the association was being run, also
submitted his resignation and called on Crowley and treasurer
Jack Ballantine to do likewise. He indicated that his resignation
was prompted by the decision of the POA board to pay Crowley's
salary so that he would not have to return to active duty.104
The resignations were indicative of the rift that existed in
the police department in the wake of the strike. The long-
standing antipathy between the department's uniformed and
nonuniformed branches deepened when all but 15 percent of the
inspectors remained on duty during the strike. The strikers had
expected many more of the inspectors to join in the walkout, and
felt "betrayed" when they did not.105 Those who worked during
the strike were angered by the harassment they received from
striking officers. In many cases, when inspectors responded to
crime emergencies, they were confronted by striking policemen
who jeered them and slashed or deflated the tires of their cars. It
was estimated that more than 100 tires on the inspectors' private
cars were slashed; and in some instances windows were broken
and upholstery slashed.106
The bitterness and hostility were expected to continue after
the strike had ended. Numerous rank-and-file patrolmen in-
dicated that those who stayed on the job could expect retaliation
in the upcoming weeks. A member of the POA's board of direc-
tors said, "Police have to stick together. When some members
break ranks, you would have to assume there will be retaliation."
He said he was not encouraging retaliation "but if there is any, I
wouldn't be surprised."107 Many officers expressed the belief that
retaliation would be limited to slow or noncooperation in routine
cases and would not extend to instances where an officer might
be in physical danger.
While the strikers were not particularly angry at police
management, some nonstrikers were. They criticized top depart-
ment officials for failing to demonstrate proper leadership before
and during the strike, and suggested that many of these officials
sympathized with the strikers for a variety of reasons, including
the fact that they would benefit from any wage increase won by
the strikers.
There were calls for unity in the badly divided department.
The POA urged strikers and nonstrikers to resolve their dif-
ferences in order to concentrate on defeating the propositions
sponsored by the supervisors in the November election. It
warned that the strike had "opened wounds within the depart-
ment that should now be closed for the sake of the common good.
What happens in the November election will affect every
member of the department."108
Chief Scott also took steps to bring about a smooth resump-
tion of normal operations. He formed a committee called the
Coalition whose members represented a complete cross section of
the department. The Coalition had two major goals: first, to
facilitate the flow of correct information to all department
members, as well as feedback from all areas of the department;
and second, to attempt to present the public with an accurate
and positive image of the department and its members. The
POA supported the Coalition as "a major stride toward better
understanding within the department, which is bound to
improve both our effectiveness and the image we present to
others."109 After a few months, however, interest in the Coalition
waned, and the committee became defunct.
Healing the wounds caused by the strike was one of several
major issues confronting the police department in the fall of
1975. Many of the problems including increased crime, man-
power shortages, and low morale continued into the next year
and were inherited by a new chief, Charles Gain, who was ap-
pointed in January 1976. The department's efforts to stem a
sharp increase in crime were hampered by a serious manpower
shortage."0 Less than a month after the strike, the board of
supervisors voted to eliminate 37 vacant jobs in the police
department and 16 in the fire department. By making these cuts
the board expected to save nearly $2.7 million in property taxes
which would "nearly make up the $2.8 million strike settlement
thrust on us by the Mayor."111 A week later, Chief Scott transfer-
red 67 officers from the Hall of Justice to the district stations in
order to increase the number of officers on street patrol. He in-
dicated that the moves were part of a plan to combat the increase
in robberies and burglaries while adjusting to the personnel cut-
backs ordered by the board of supervisors. "We are scraping the
barrel/' he said.112
Despite these efforts, the upward spiral of crime extended
well into 1976. In the first five months of the year, the crime rate
was 32.6 percent higher than in the same period in 1975. The con-
troversy over increasing crime and police budget cuts also con-
tinued. In the summer of 1976, a civil grand jury, which was in-
vestigating the police department, accused officers of staging a
slowdown in making arrests because of low morale in the depart-
ment. Gerald Crowley denied that there was a slowdown and
claimed that a shortage of police manpower was largely responsi-
ble for the decrease in the number of arrests. He said that during
the previous year, 200 jobs had been cut out of the budget which
reduced the force's authorized strength from 1,970 to 1,770.113
The manpower issue was finally resolved in late 1976 when the
city approved a program that would use federal money to put 300
additional officers on the street.
The strike by police and firefighters generated several law-
suits. A taxpayer's suit filed the day after the strike ended sought
to block payment of the wage increases. The complaint charged
that Mayor Alioto had abused his discretion when he imposed
the strike settlement over the objection of the supervisors. On
the advice of the city attorney, the city withheld payment of the
new wage benefits while the suit was pending. The case was
finally resolved in the fall of 1976 when the California Court of
Appeals ruled that the city had to honor the strike settlement
and pay the increase,114 and the parties to the case agreed that
the decision would not be appealed. The case was unusual in
that it involved five main parties with the POA and firefighters'
union on the same side as the city attorney. They were opposed
by the taxpayer and the board of supervisors which had retained
special counsel.
The POA won a second major legal battle in 1976 when the
California Court of Appeals ruled that the 1974 Memorandum of
Understanding between the city and the POA was binding and
that the conditions of the 1975 agreement settling the strike were
also valid.115 The decision meant that the city had to assign the
POA president to full-time association duties in conformity with
the 1974 agreement.
The city lost another legal fight when it sought a permanent
injunction declaring police strikes illegal and barring future
strikes by San Francisco police. In December 1975, a superior
court judge refused to issue a permanent injunction. He said that
because there were no "impending strikes" any order he issued
would just "get lost in the files" and serve no real purpose."6
The city, however, was able to obtain comtempt citations
against Gerald Crowley and three picket captains for violating
the temporary restraining order issued against the strike. At the
contempt hearing the judge fined the POA and Crowley $1,000
each, after both pleaded guilty to the contempt charges. He
found the three picket captains innocent, saying that there was
"reasonable doubt" as to their actions.
In the spring of 1976, the POA filed suit seeking t6 enjoin
Chief Gain from requiring officers to take a "no strike" oath. The
chief had hoped that the oath would deter police officers from
joining the city craft workers' strike which was then in progress.
The necessity for the oath was questioned since the department
already had a general order prohibiting strikes, which was
promulgated a few weeks after the police strike, and the city
charter provided for the automatic dismissal of any striking
police officer. The court held that the oath was unconstitutional
and enjoined the chief from administering it. The ruling was
later upheld by the state supreme court.
In July 1976, the civil grand jury issued a report on the
police department, which reviewed the events of the strike and
its aftermath. The report termed 1975 a "disastrous year for
police community relations," because of the police strike, Chief
Gain's lack of support from the members of the department, and
considerable acrimony between the POA and the bureau of in-
spectors. The grand jury was highly critical of Gerald Crowley's
role in the strike. It concluded that:
The responsibility for the decision to strike, as well as
the supervision of strike negotiations, rests squarely
on the shoulders of the president of the Police Of-
ficers' Association. . . . Sergeant Crowley's action in
calling for the strike before receiving the informal
sanction of the San Francisco Labor Council
evidenced a certain willfulness that characterized
many of his actions during the course of the strike. For
example, he refused to permit secret balloting of
police officers on the question of whether to strike,
thereby rendering the results of these polls suspect.
For this reason, the vote appeared to be less a reflec-
tion of true rank and file sentiment than the result of
group pressure. We note that the Fire Department
permitted the secret balloting of its members. Also,
the specter of a police "bodyguard" thwarting the at-
tempts of the City Attorney's representative to serve
an order of the Superior Court upon Sergeant Crowley
could only cause the citizens to question the dedica-
tion of these individuals to the rule of law. These
actionsand we emphasize that they were the actions
of a fewbrought disgrace upon the entire Depart-
ment.
Though the grand jury acknowledged that Crowley had
apologized to the citizens of San Francisco,117 it was disturbed
that there had been no settlement for the acts of vandalism
which allegedly were caused by striking police officers.118
The grand jury found it regrettable that the "ill considered
actions" of the POA president tended to cloud "the very real is-
sue that was at the basis of the strikenamely, that the wage
setting mechanism traditionally employed by the board of super-
visors but rejected on this occasion left nothing in its place for
the resolution of the wage issue." Their report recommended
that immediate consideration be given to the implementation of
a collective bargaining arrangement that would allow the police
to negotiate the terms of their wages and working conditions.
The grand jury was concerned "that lacking a method by which
the police can express their legitimate demands, there will be a
retreat towards militancy which may take the form of an affilia-
tion with a national union."
The report concluded with a plea for the mayor, the board of
supervisors, the chief of police, as well as representatives of all
police organizations to submit proposals for resolving labor dis-
putes. The grand jury emphasized:
Nothing is gained by recourse to so-called "get tough"
ballot measures which are punitive in nature since
they do not bring about an intelligent resolution of
basic conflicts. Rather, they legislate rigidity into a
system when what is needed is flexibility. Both the
citizens of San Francisco and the Police Department
are entitled to a mechanism which will insure the
resolution of labor conflicts without the necessity of
resorting to strikes.
The impact of the strike continued long past the election,
the enactment of the charter amendments, and the end of the
litigation. San Francisco politics changed dramatically as a
result of events set in motion by the strike, and labor has not yet
recouped the power it lost. Efforts to establish collective bargain-
ing for public employees were rejected in favor of rigid wage for-
mulas. The bitterness between the board of supervisors and the
POA is still quite evident. The supervisors' antagonism is largely
directed toward Gerald Crowley and the POA leadership, rather
than toward the police in general. The police, however, still
greatly resent the supervisors for the antilabor actions they took
following the strike. Moreover, they feel that the strike did not
resolve the dissatisfaction in the department, but instead
created a new set of problems which overshadow the old ones.
NOTES
1. San Francisco had a population of about 671,000, and it oc-
cupied a 50 square mile area.
2. The San Francisco Policeman, Vol. 6, No. 9, September 1975,
reprinted from the San Francisco Examiner. The San Francisco
Policeman is the official publication of the San Francisco Police Of-
ficers' Association.
3. Bopp, Chignell and Maddox. "The San Francisco Police Strike
of 1975: A Case Study," Journal of Police Science and Administration,
Vol. 5, No. 1, 1977, p. 34.
4. Ibid.
5. The agreement provided that all unresolved issues between the
city and the POA relating to working conditions, including grievances
but excluding disciplinary proceedings could be submitted to binding
arbitration upon request of either party. A short time after the agree-
ment was approved, the city attorney declared that the arbitration
provision could not be implemented because the board of supervisors
could not lawfully delegate its discretionary power to a third party. In
accordance with the opinion, city officials refused to go to arbitration.
6. Wage increases for San Francisco Police Officers 1970-74.
Per Month
Year Class Salary Percent
Julyl, 1970 to June 30,1971 Q2-Police Officer 4th yr. $1,025.00 4.27
July 1, 1971 to June 30,1972 1,161.00 13.27
July 1, 1972 to June 30,1973 1,170.00 .078
July 1, 1973 to June 30,1974 1,254.00 7.18
July 1, 1974 to June 30,1975 1,387.00 10.61
7. The San Francisco Policeman, Vol. 6, No. 2, April 1975.
8. The San Francisco Policeman, Vol. 6, No. 6, June 1975.
9. Ibid.
10. San Francisco Examiner, August 19, 1975.
11. San Francisco Chronicle, August 20, 1975.
12. Craft workers gradually obtained salaries much higher than
other municipal employees because fringe benefits such as holiday pay
and shift differential were much higher in the private sector. These
higher benefits were intended to compensate for the days private craft
employees lost because of bad weather. Through litigation, city at-
torney's opinions and civil service rulings, these benefits were translated
into cash and added to city craft workers' paychecks.
13. The San Francisco Policeman, Vol. 6, No. 8, August 1975.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. The San Francisco Policeman, September 1975, reprinted from
the San Francisco Examiner.
17. San Francisco Chronicle, June 13, 1975.
18. The 1975 tax rate was $12.75 per $100 of assessed valuation.
20. The San Francisco Policeman, Vol. 6, No. 8, August 1975.
23. San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle, August 17, 1975.
26. San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle, August 17, 1975.
27. Ibid.
31. San Francisco Chronicle & Examiner, August 17, 1975.
32. Supervisor Al Nelder abstained because he was a former chief
of police.
36. Los Angeles Times, August 19, 1975.
39. Ibid.
41. According to the city attorney, the legal basis for such action
was a 1946 court decision involving the mayor's restoration of seniority
rights and salaries of Market Street Railway employees which had been
lost when the city took over the transit system. Mullins v. Henderson, 75
C.A. 2d 117 (1946).
42. Tom Emch and Gerald Adams, "Four Days in August,"
California Living, October 12, 1975, p. 12.
43. Jack Crowley was not related to Gerald Crowley.
45. Most of the remaining 408 (22.4 percent) were on various types
of leave, including vacation, sick leave and military leave.
47. Letter sent by Chief Scott to the San Francisco Police Commis-
sion, September 12, 1975.
48. Washington Post, August 21, 1975.
49. Nine hundred firefighters voted to strike while 54 voted for a
sick-in, 30 for a slowdown and 12 to accept the city's wage offer.
50. Bopp, Chignell and Maddox, p. 39.
51. Emch and Adams, "Four Days in August," p. 14.
53. Ibid.
57. New York Times, August 21, 1975.
59. Ibid.
64. Oakland, California Tribune, August 21, 1975.
68. Former Chief of Police Al Nelder once again abstained from
voting.
71. Washington Post, August 22, 1975; Los Angeles Times, August
22, 1975; San Francisco Chronicle, August 22, 1975.
75. Ibid.
76. San Francisco Chronicle, August 23, 197t.
77. Ibid.
79. Portland, Oregon Oregonian, August 23, 1975.
80. Washington Star, August 24, 1975.
81. Portland, Oregon Oregonian, August 23, 1975.
85. The city controller subsequently provided more accurate
figures on the cost of the settlement. The settlement actually amounted
to an 8.72 percent increase and cost $8,800,936, which was $4.5 million
below the strikers' original demands. San Francisco Examiner,
September 4, 1975.
89. As of this writing, the firefighters' working hours have not been
changed, because the firefighters filed suit claiming that the city could
not alter their hours unilaterally. The case is now pending in the Califor-
nia Supreme Court.
90. San Francisco Chronicle, November 5, 1975.
91. Between Thursday morning and Sunday night, uniformed
patrol officers issued 3,920 citations. Usually they issued about 365 a
day. San Francisco Chronicle, November 11, 1975.
94. The San Francisco Policeman, Vol. 6, No. 11, November 1975.
96. Ibid.
98. Some of the unions which did not strike had already accepted
generous wage settlements offered by the supervisors who foresaw a
strike and were determined to divide the unions. Two key unions, the
Teamsters and the sanitary engineers, had received increases of more
than 20 percent, although the civil service commission had recom-
mended that neither get a raise.
100. San Francisco Examiner, November 12, 1975.
101. San Francisco Chronicle, December 9, 1975.
104. The POA secretary claimed that paying the president's salary
would cost the POA at least $40,000 a year, including $21,000 for his
sergeant's salary, $11,000 towards his pension and $4,800 he was draw-
ing from the POA as salary. San Francisco Examiner, October 19, 1975.
108. The San Francisco Policeman, Vol. 6, No. 10, October 1975.
109. The San Francisco Policeman, Vol. 6, No. 11, November 1975.
110. The rate of serious crime jumped 24 percent in August 1975 over
the rate in August 1974. In September, crime increased 35 percent over
the 1975 crime rate for the same period. In November it had increased 27
percent over the same period in 1975.
111. San Francisco Chronicle, September 9, 1975.
112. San Francisco Examiner, September 16, 1975.
113. San Francisco Examiner, July 31, 1976.
114. Verreos v. The City and County of San Francisco, 63 Cal.App.
3d 86 (1976).
115. Crowley v. City and County of San Francisco, 64 Cal.App. 3d
450 (1976). The state supreme court also upheld a lower court ruling
that the city's termination of its memorandum of understanding with
the firefighters was illegal.
116. San Francisco Chronicle, December 9, 1975.
117. The POA president denies that he apologized for the strike, and
insists that he was explaining why it occurred.
118. Although the department billed the POA for $3,038.55 for
damage to department property during the strike, the POA never paid
the bill.
Tucson, Arizona
September 22-28, 1975
INTRODUCTION
Problems which led to the 1975 strike by Tucson police and
firefighters originated a decade earlier. The main source of trou-
ble was the way the city determined employee wages. Employees
felt that the city would wait until long past the need for a wage
increase had developed and then spend six months to a year sur-
veying the pay plans in other cities which were "comparable" to
Tucson, before finally granting a wage increase.1 According to
employees, these cities were not comparable to Tucson in pop-
ulation, size or cost of living, but were chosen because they would
justify the city's predetermined decision on what the wage ad-
justments would be.2
In August 1969, a crisis developed when the city denied
raises to city employees, and, in response, almost 75 percent of
the 350-member Tucson Police Department signed a resignation
letter, giving the city 24 hours to respond to their demands for a
30 percent pay increase. In an emergency meeting, police and
city officials resolved the dispute a few minutes before the
resignations were to take effect. A new wage survey was con-
ducted, and as a result city employees received wage increases of
up to 25 percent. To pay for the increases, as well as future in-
creases, the city council proposed, and the police and firefighters
campaigned for, a 1 percent increase in the city sales tax, which
was approved by the voters in the next election. Police and
firefighters believed that the money generated by the tax would
be earmarked for wage increases for public safety employees.
45
A second crisis erupted in 1971 over salaries for firefighters.
In early 1971, the Tucson Civil Service Commission recom-
mended a 10 percent pay increase for all 2,500 city employees.
This recommendation was based on a six-month study of salaries
in cities of comparable size to Tucson. Tucson firefighters,
however, refused to accept the statistics cited in the commis-
sion's study because they were not up-to-date and because the
study did not include cities that were recommended in 1969 by
the International City Managers Association for comparison
with Tucson police and firefighters' salaries. The firefighters
then prepared their own list of western cities comparable in size
to Tucson and presented the civil service commission with an up-
to-date salary comparison which showed that Tucson salaries
were considerably lower than salaries in most other cities in the
survey. The commission responded by ignoring the firefighters'
survey.3
Like the firefighters' efforts, police attempts to get the com-
mission to take a closer look at salaries for public safety
employees were rebuffed. On two occasions, in January and
again in April, police representatives appeared before the com-
mission with their own data and requested that the commission
make an honest survey based on realistic comparisons.4
Pursuant to city ordinance, the mayor and council could
either accept or reject, but not alter, the salary recommendations
made by the civil service commission. In April, due to lack of
funds, the mayor and council approved a 5 percent increase for
all city employees retroactive to April 1, to be followed by
another 5 percent at an unspecified time when funds were
available, probably in January 1972. While firefighters had been
attempting to obtain a 25 percent increase, they indicated that
10 percent would be acceptable for the time being. However,
they considered the 5 percent to be little more than a token. In
mid-May, the Tucson Firefighters' Association (International
Association of Firefighters, (IAFF), Local 479) demanded an
answer by June 1 to their request for an additional 15 percent
salary increase above the 10 percent promised. They claimed
that the additional 15 percent was needed to bring their wages up
to the average of similar western cities. Legally the mayor and
council could not alter employee salaries until the civil service
commission studied the pay situation and recommended a
change. The civil service commission, however, responded to the
firefighters' demands by saying that it had no meetings
Tucson, Arizona 47
scheduled until July. On June 7, the city council voted to ask the
civil service commission to revise the earlier survey of police and
fire pay scales in other cities. It rejected Mayor James Corbett's
suggestion that the commission review the wages of all 2,500 city
employees. Once again, the civil service commission indicated
that it probably would not consider the matter of public safety
wages prior to its regular meeting on July 14.
Because of the city's inaction, over half of the firefighters
scheduled to go on duty called in sick shortly before the 8 a.m.
shift change on June 10. By design, the blue flu lasted only 24
hours, and only half of the personnel from each station reported
to work, ensuring that all stations were manned and that the city
was protected. Due to the blue flu, the city had to call in 35 off-
duty personnel, who had to be paid overtime at a cost of about
$174 an hour or $4,000 for the 24-hour period.5 The blue flu
brought the pay issue to a head, and on June 21, the mayor and
council voted unanimously to give all city employees the second
half of the 10 percent increase, effective July 1. The president of
the firefighters' association said that his group would view the 5
percent raise as a positive sign that the city was considering the
firefighters' requests for more money.6
In November 1971, Tucson voters approved a charter
amendment which established a new system for settling disputes
between city employees and the city administration concerning
employee wages. The amendment, which provided for advisory
arbitration of wage disputes, had been proposed by the Fraternal
Order of Police (FOP) and the Tucson Firefighters' Association,
and was supported by the local newspapers. Under this new
system, the civil service commission was required to make an an-
nual recommendation on employee wages to the mayor and city
council by the first Monday in December. Within 10 days of
receiving the recommendation, the mayor was required to hold
public hearings to discuss the proposed pay plan. If employees or
their representatives disagreed with the plan, the mayor and
council had to meet with them in good faith to resolve the dis-
pute. In the event that the dispute was not resolved within 15
days, the mayor was to appoint an advisory arbitration commit-
tee consisting of a member of the city council, a representative of
the employee group that raised the dispute, and a third member
chosen by the first two. If these two could not agree on a third
member within three days, they were to select him from a list of
five qualified persons furnished by the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service. The cost of arbitration was to be shared
equally by the city and the employee group. Recommendations
by the advisory arbitration committee to the mayor and council
were due in writing by April 1. The mayor and council would
then make the final decision on employee wages for the coming
fiscal year. In doing so, they could consider, adopt or modify, in
whole or in part, the recommendations of the arbitration com-
mittee and the civil service commission.
This new procedure for determining the annual wage plan
proved to be ineffective. In practice, the meetings between the
mayor and council and employee representatives to resolve wage
disputes consisted of brief formal presentations by the employee
groups. A representative from each group was given about an
hour to address the mayor and council and answer their ques-
tions. Little or no discussion took place, and agreement was rare-
ly reached. From 1972 to 1975, the FOP and the IAFF each went
to arbitration three times over a wage dispute with the city. The
city approved the arbitrator's recommendations twice, exceeded
them once, and rejected them three times (see Table I).7 Still
another problem was the fact that the city never met the time
limits specified in the charter, which hampered efforts to finalize
the annual budget by the beginning of each fiscal year on July 1.
In 1974, the arbitrator in the dispute involving the IAFF
pointed out the need to establish a list of comparable cities to use
in annual wage comparisons to prevent the city from choosing
cities which would justify its position. A list of nine cities was in-
corporated into a 1974 contract between the city and the IAFF,8
which also gave the IAFF the exclusive right to represent its
members below the rank of battalion chief in negotiations with
the city.9 It was intended that police and firefighters' salaries in
Tucson would equal the average of the police and firefighters'
salaries in those cities. In 1974, Tucson used the nine cities in its
wage survey but refused to implement a plan proposed by the ar-
bitrator which allowed the city three years to bring its
firefighters up to the average wage in the nine cities.
The city policy that all employees be given the same salary
increase regardless of who went to arbitration was an additional
source of frustration for police and firefighters. They felt that
every year either the FOP, the IAFF, or both, led the fight for
improved wages by going to arbitration, and that other city
workers were simply riding their coattails.
Tucson, Arizona
49
Table I
Tucson Arbitration 1972-1975
DISPUTING
DATE PARTY AWARD
7/72 Fraternal One step increase be
Order of granted to all Police
Police Personnel.
8/72 I.A.F.F. 5% increase be granted
Local 479 to all Fire personnel.
(Annual cost$170,586)
3/73 City No specific monetary
Attorneys award
4/73 Fraternal 5% increase effective
Order of 1/74 be granted to
Police Police employees
1/74 Police 5% increase effective 7/74
Records be granted to Police
Clerks Records Clerk I's & U's
4/74 Golf 5% increase effective
Starters 7/74 be granted to
Golf Starters I's &n's
5/74 Operations 5% increase effective
Dept. 7/74 be granted to
Oper. Frmn., Elec.
Supv. & Elec. Tech. I's
3/74 I.A.F.F. No increase for fire-
Local 479 fighters; various increases
be granted effective 7/74
to Fire Captains through
Asst. Fire Chiefs
(Cost$32,000)
5/75 I.A.F.F. No salary increase
Local 479
6/75 Fraternal 5% increase effective
Order of 1/76 to be granted
Police
6/75 Personnel Employee Benefits
Dept. Supervisor and Employee
Development Officer to
be granted one range
(5%) increase
6/75 AFSCME, 4% across-the-board
Local 449 increase be granted 7/75
MAYOR ft COUNCIL
RESPONSE
2 1/2% increase given to
all employees. (Annual
cost$710,472)
21/2% increase given to
all employees. (Annual
cost $710,472)
No additional
increase given
Approved for all employees
(Cost$900,000)
Approved
(Cost$13,620)
Approved
(Cost$3,288)
Approved
(Cost$18,000)
5% increase granted to
Fire Captains through
Asst. Fire Chiefs
(Cost$72,000)
No salary increase
Salary issue will be
readdressed in 1/76
The third major crisis involving wages for public safety
employees began in December 1974 when the- civil service com-
mission recommended a $50 per month across-the-board raise for
all city employees. Because of the condition of the national
economy, the firefighters accepted the recommendation. The
FOP, however, rejected it, saying it was insufficient in light of
the 12.1 percent increase in the cost of living since their last
raise. They alleged, moreover, that even with the raise, their
salaries would be below the average wage in the nine survey
cities.10 Mayor Lewis Murphy and the council also rejected the
$50 a month recommendation, and, instead, decided there would
be no raises that year because the city could not afford them.
Both the FOP and IAFF went to arbitration. The FOP asked
for a 20 percent raise with 15 percent in July 1975 and the rest in
January 1976, but the arbitrator recommended only 5 percent to
be effective January 1, 1976." The IAFF asked for raises ranging
from 15 to 18 percent, but the arbitrator reluctantly recom-
mended no increase because of the city's inability to pay.12 City
officials estimated that the raises requested by the police would
cost $2.2 million, and those requested by the firefighters would
cost an additional $1.29 million.13 In late June 1975, the city
council voted to deny raises to all city employees but to consider
a 5 percent raise in January, if the money became available.
The council's decision infuriated the police and firefighters.
They felt they had followed the system and exhausted all
avenues of redress. As one FOP leader subsequently explained,
"we had gone through every procedure we knew how to go
through and came up with nothing." Their frustration grew as
the city repeatedly denied that there was money for a pay raise
and refused to listen to them. One major point of contention was
the money generated by the 1 percent increase in the city sales
tax which the voters had approved in 1969, largely through the
efforts of the police and firefighters who believed that the
revenues would be used solely to give them wage increases. City
officials, however, maintained that the money could not be ear-
marked in this way, and used the money for raises for all city
employees.
Shortly after the council denied the pay raises, leaders of the
Tucson, Arizona 51
FOP and IAFF began meeting informally to determine if and
how the two groups could work together to obtain a salary in-
crease. They believed that they had gotten a runaround from the
city and that an alliance of the two groups would give them ad-
ded strength. Initially, the FOP wanted to remain separate from
the firefighters because the charter of the national FOP
prohibited affiliation with a union. Eventually, however, the
police agreed to join with the firefighters to form the Tucson
Police and Firefighters Association (PFA). It was anticipated
that the collective efforts of both organizations would produce
the impact necessary to move the city council. FOP leaders later
agreed that a major factor which influenced them to merge with
the firefighters was that the police believed the firefighters' as-
sociation was better organized. To the police, the firefighters ap-
peared to be a much stronger group. Their organization was
much tighter, they had much more support from supervisory and
command personnel, and they had expert help available from
their national union, the International Association of
Firefighters.
On the evening of September 8, about 700 members of the
FOP and firefighters' association held a joint meeting which was
chaired by the executive boards of both groups.14 After explain-
ing what efforts they had made to get a pay increase, the leaders
asked for recommendations from the floor. According to one of
the leaders, "all hell broke loose," when someone suggested a
strike. By and large the police were opposed to a strike and
favored less drastic measures, while the firefighters were more
militant. At times, the meeting tended to get out of hand, as the
police and firefighters cheered, jeered, booed and called each
other names because of their opposing views. The secretary of the
national FOP, who had come at the request of local FOP Pres-
ident Larry Brooks, told the group that the national bylaws
prohibited strikes, but that they were free to do what they
wanted.15 While public relations campaigns, mass resignations,
slowdowns, speedups, and blue flu were also discussed, the police
seemed most willing to support a blue flu. The meeting ended
with a secret ballot in which 90 percent voted to form the PFA
and to give an eight-member executive board power to negotiate
and to call a job action. FOP members of the executive board
were the FOP president and vice president and two members of
its wage and hour committee. The firefighters' association was
represented by its president, vice president, and two past presi-
dents.
After the meeting, the eight-member executive board met
and decided to call for a meeting with the mayor and council.
They also decided to call a limited, carefully controlled blue flu if
the mayor and council failed to negotiate, in order to
demonstrate the PFA's unity and strength. A secondary purpose
of the job action was to appease the more militant members of
the PFA.
In order to communicate quickly and effectively with the as-
sociation members, the executive board organized a communica-
tions system run by a telephone committee. According to one
member of the executive board, the committee was structured
like a terrorist cell. Each member had his own limited area of
responsibility and did not know who else was on the committee.
On Wednesday, September 10, two days after the PFA
was formed, the PFA executive board requested and was granted
a meeting with the mayor and the city council for the following
day. However, on Thursday, the meeting was postponed at the
request of the PFA's attorney, who needed time to determine
what specific requests he would present to city officials.16 By Fri-
day afternoon, the PFA executive board decided to request a 30
percent salary increase and emphasized that anything less would
be unacceptable. In addition to the 30 percent, the association
asked for periodic cost-of-living adjustments. Negotiations with
the mayor and city council were scheduled to begin Monday,
September 15. The PFA pointed out that it was not setting any
time limits on the negotiations as long as they proceeded in good
faith.
At a city staff meeting on Friday, Thomas Price, the director
of the operations department, the city's largest department, re-
quested that the city council include all city employees in any
salary increases under consideration. Price said, "We're not go-
ing to sit still and let others go ahead of us and leave us behind.
We have no problem with the police and firemen getting a raise,
but it's going to have to be on a damn equal basis or we're going
to have to know the reason why." This position was supported by
some of the other department heads in attendance.17
Prior to the Monday meeting of the Tucson City Council,
four of the six council members were surveyed concerning their
views on the PFA's demands. Generally, they appeared to be
sympathetic, but felt that raises were doubtful because of an
Tucson, Arizona 53
unyielding city budget. Some members were concerned with the
needs of all city employees and indicated they would not favor
giving the police and firefighters a raise without giving one to
other city employees. One member said that a 30 percent wage
increase was completely out of reason. Another expressed con-
cern at the way the city council had brought new programs into
the city's budget without considering the need to increase
employees' wages, particularly those of public safety employees.
Mayor Murphy declined to comment on the raise request until
he met with the police and firefighters.18
On Monday, September 15, prior to the scheduled meeting
between the PFA executive board and the mayor and city coun-
cil, Mayor Murphy announced that he would not meet with the
board in executive session because he believed closed negotia-
tions were both "illegal and immoral." He maintained that
closed negotiations would violate Arizona's open meeting law.19
Moreover, he felt it was the moral responsibility of public of-
ficials to act openly. He was running for reelection and had stres-
sed in his campaign that his administration had brought city
government out from behind closed doors and before the public.
While the open meeting law required that city council meetings
be public, one of the exceptions allowed the council to meet in
executive session to discuss employee salaries.20 Although the six
members of the council approved a closed door session, the
mayor would not concede. The PFA executive board, in turn,
said it would not meet with any group except the full council plus
the mayor. Several months after the strike by police and
firefighters, Mayor Murphy admitted he "must have been mis-
taken" about the provisions of the open meeting law.
To counter the mayor's hard line stance, the PFA initiated a
partial blue flu at 4 p.m. September 15. Association members
were notified by the telephone committee whether they were to
report for work. More than half of the police and firefighters
scheduled for duty that evening called in sick. City officials did
not know that the PFA had decided to limit the blue flu to one
day. In response to the sick-in, the police department put ad-
ministrative, operations and service personnel on patrol duty.
The fire department closed 13 of its 24 stations and reduced the
staff at the 11 other stations. City Manager Joel Valdez reported
that South Tucson and Davis Montham Air Force Base had
agreed to help with fire protection, and Governor Paul Castro
indicated that, if necessary, he would order the National Guard
to protect the city.
Late Tuesday morning (September 16), the PFA executive
board advised police and firefighters to report for work at 2 p.m.
The announcement came after the mayor and council agreed to
meet behind closed doors with the PFA negotiators, provided the
meeting was tape-recorded for use by the public. The PFA ex-
ecutive board readily agreed. During the hour-long meeting, the
council agreed to request that the civil service commission hold
hearings on police and firefighters' raises "as soon as is humanly
possible," preferably within 15 days. The council also agreed
that employees who stayed off the job would not be disciplined.
The 22-hour sick-in ended at 2 p.m. when police and firefighters
began returning to work.
The news media's response to the blue flu was swift. Almost
all the media gave the blue flu broad coverage, and many
editorials followed, all deploring the job action, with themes such
as "ransom" and "blackmail" by "outlaw officers."21 Only one
radio station and one television station sided with the PFA. The
rest of the media, including both newspapers and the other
television and radio stations, rallied to the city's support.
By coincidence, the blue flu occurred the day before the
city's primary election in which Councilmen Emmett
McLoughlin and Richard Kennedy lost to their party opponents.
The fact that these two "lame duck" councilmen continued to
serve until December 1, 1975, would later have substantial
ramifications.
Shortly after the blue flu, a story circulated throughout the
police and fire departments that Mayor Murphy had proclaimed
that he was the "Blue Tiger" and would "cure the blue flu" if
there were another job action. This alleged comment infuriated
the police and firefighters. The mayor, however, insists that he
did not call himself the Blue Tiger, but instead promised to be a
"tiger" for the rest of his campaign when he was accused of being
a "do nothing" mayor. He claims that his remark did not refer to
employee problems.
Pursuant to the city council's request, the civil service com-
mission was to begin reviewing police and firefighters' salary de-
mands on Wednesday, September 17, and then hold a hearing on
the issue within two weeks. Under the city charter, the mayor
and council could not make any mid-year changes in the annual
pay plan until after the civil service commission had made a
Tucson, Arizona 55
recommendation on the matter. Moreover, the city code
provided that the commission's recommendation had to be ac-
cepted or rejected in its entirety. The council had also directed
the city staff to look into possible sources of funding for a pay
raise since a study by the city manager had shown that under the
present budget, every $1 million in raises would require the layoff
of 80 city employees. New revenue sources under consideration
included a commuter tax, a use tax, and increases in the
property tax22 and sales tax.23 Preparation of a paper on the city's
financial capablility for wage increases was being conducted by
the city finance director, the budget director, the assistant city
manager, the director of operations, and one member of the city
council.
Opposition to the council's decision to review police and
firefighters' salaries focused on the fact that all city employees
were not included in the pay review. The call for an exclusive
police-firefighters' pay review quickly brought sharp comment
from the heads of the city's Metropolitan Utilities Management
Agency and the department of operations, who felt that their
employees should also be considered. Similarly, council
members Barbara Weyman and Robert Cauthorn protested the
decision saying that the civil service commission salary review
should be for all employees.24 Councilman Ruben Romero
promised that all city employees would get the same raise as
police and firefighters. Additional opposition to the limited pay
review came from Jim Fitzpatrick, business manager of the 240-
member local AFSCME, who promised to press to have the
salary demands of his members heard. "We don't want anyone to
receive a pay raise unless every city employee gets one. We don't
feel the police and firemen are so almighty that they deserve a
raise more than any other city employee. We feel our jobs are just
as important and critical to the communityand just as deserv-
ing of a pay raiseas any fireman and policeman." He claimed
that he had been "thrown out" when he attempted to attend
Tuesday's closed meeting between the council and the PFA ex-
ecutive board."
When the city civil service commission met on September
17, it decided not to consider the matter of raises for police and
firefighters for six weeks, when it would hold a hearing to review
the wages of all city employees. Mayor Murphy appeared before
the commission at its regular meeting and, in accordance with
the terms of the agreement with the PFA executive board, asked
the commission to review police and firefighters' salaries as soon
as possible. In his formal request, he noted the possibility of a
review of all salaries and told the commissioners, "It's my legal
understanding that the prerogative of the Commission is that
you will not submit to the mandates, dictates or orders of any
governing body . . . the plan you submit is yours."26 Five city
department heads also came to the meeting to argue that their
employees should be included in any salary increases. They
stressed that their employees generally had lower wages and
retirement plans than the police and firefighters. While they in-
dicated that a wage increase limited to police and firefighters
would create serious problems, they said that they did not an-
ticipate strikes by their employees.
The date set for the review of all city wages was October 28,
although earlier the commission and city staff members had
scheduled a December 1 review of salaries as specified in the city
charter. According to the city personnel director, preparation for
the December review could be speeded up, but would be com-
pleted no earlier than October 28.27 In setting a hearing date, the
commission ignored an offer by the PFA to help the city staff
gather information for a review of police and fire salaries for an
earlier separate hearing.-" Commission Chairman Schuyler
Lininger said that the PFA's request for an earlier hearing was
"unfair to other city employees and we won't do it."29 The at-
torney for the PFA said that he had no objection to the commis-
sion's studying the wages of all city employees but that the hear-
ing on salary increases for police and firefighters should be held
within 15 days. Representatives of the police-fire association
were angered by the delay, but decided not to repeat the blue flu.
They did not rule out, however, that they might change their
minds."' The commission's decision to review all salaries ap-
peared in line with the private views of the council. While the
council had agreed to request a hearing on police and firefighters'
wages only, at least five of the council members indicated they
would not vote for a wage increase that did not include all city
employees.31
With the latest setback, the frustration and anger of the
police and firefighters reached a critical level. The executive
board called meetings for Thursday night and Friday morning
(September 18 and 19) to discuss the civil service commission's
decision to postpone consideration of raises for six weeks. At
the meetings, emotions ran high. While some police officers
Tucson, Arizona 57
attempted to talk down a strike, it was clear that the overwhelm-
ing majority of those present favored a walkout. Several times
the meeting was interrupted by cheers, applause and calls for a
strike. The PFA's attorney advised the group that a strike was
not illegal because there wasno state law against it. He ex-
plained, however, that they could expect the city to ask for an in-
junction, which he would fight in court. Also attending the
meeting was a vice president of the IAFF from Oakland, Califor-
nia, who had been summoned by the firefighters' local to advise
them and help negotiate with the city. He advised against a
strike, but was unable to suggest a viable alternative. In a secret
ballot, 621 (89 percent) of the 693 PFA members who cast ballots
voted to give the executive board the authority to call any job ac-
tion, including a strike. In an effort to pressure the mayor and
council to negotiate in earnest, the PFA announced the results of
the vote.
FOP leaders met with Police Chief William Gilkinson Fri-
day morning to brief him on the events of the previous few days.
At the chiefs request, the meeting was recorded. The FOP
leaders told him that their members were disgruntled because no
progress had been made on the wage issue and that they had
given the PFA executive board a mandate to call whatever action
it deemed necessary, including a strike. They asked the chief to
exert pressure on city officials to approve their pay request.
Gilkinson advised them that he understood their situation and
was sympathetic to their cause, but that his first obligation was
to provide the community with police services. He warned them
against any job action, particularly a strike, and said that if they
took such action he could not prevent their suspension or ter-
mination. During the meeting he called the city manager's office
and made an appointment for the FOP leaders to meet with the
city manager later in the morning. When Gilkinson called to see
if Valdez was ready for the meeting, he was told that the
manager had gone to lunch. The meeting was not rescheduled.
Gilkinson's attempts to set up meetings between PFA leaders
and individual council members were also largely unsuccessful.
PFA leaders believed that the mayor and council were not keep-
ing him informed, since he was usually unaware of what had
transpired at their meetings.
Mayor Murphy agreed to meet with the PFA negotiating
team on Friday afternoon, September 19. The meeting lasted
two minutes and ended in a stand-off when the mayor refused to
talk in private and the PFA negotiators refused to talk in public.
When the PFA's attorney asked "the Council to begin negotia-
tions immediately in executive session," the mayor replied that
it was not possible because, due to provisions in the city charter,
"the entire subject matter now lies in the hands of Civil Service
Commission."32 About two weeks later, the mayor acknowledged
that he did not know that the council, by majority vote, could
have easily changed the city code to facilitate direct council
negotiations with the PFA." While the city charter required that
any changes in the city's pay plan arising in the middle of the
fiscal year be made on the recommendation of the civil service
commission, the code provided that the council had to accept or
reject the recommendation in its entirety. Unless the recommen-
dation was close to what the council believed the city ought to
pay, the council would have had to reject it entirely. If the code
had been changed, the council could have started negotiations,
and the commission's hearing and recommendations would have
been a mere formality, because the real agreement would have
been worked out between the council and the PFA. The only way
the commission could have affected the pay plan would have
been to refuse to make a recommendation. According to the city
attorney, the council could do nothing legally to force the com-
mission to make a recommendation. The fact that the critical
provision was in the code and not the charter, was mentioned
briefly in a memo the council received from the city attorney's
office on September 16. However, the city attorney could not
remember if he had told the council explicitly that the provision
could be changed.u In late fall 1975, after the strike by police and
firefighters, the council did amend the code to give the council
authority to order the commission to make recommendations
regarding interim changes in the annual pay plan and to allow
the council to adopt, modify or reject the recommendations.
Following Friday's failure to get the city council to
negotiate, the PFA announced that it was trying to obtain the
services of a federal mediator to help resolve the dispute. Mayor
Murphy said that he would be "delighted to have one" and that
it would "show a substantial degree of responsibility on the part
of the police and fire [fighters]."3' However, the PFA leaders
maintained that despite his public statements to the contrary,
the mayor opposed mediation. In any case, the PFA's efforts to
Tucson, Arizona 59
bring in a mediator over the weekend were futile. It was not until
later, when the PFA contacted Arizona Senator Barry
Goldwater's office and asked for the senator's help, that a
mediator was found.
On Saturday, September 21, the PFA began a public rela-
tions campaign by running television and radio advertisements
appealing for public support for a pay raise. One such ad showed
the police responding to a crime while a voice said "They were
there when you needed themnow they need you."36 That same
day, Councilmen Robert Cauthorn and Ruben Romero met with
the PFA executive board for about four hours in a fruitless effort
to resolve the pay dispute.
On Sunday, September 21, the PFA sent telegrams to the
mayor and council warning them that a strike was imminent.
Be advised that the Tucson Police-Fire Association
stands ready to take ultimate job action at 6 p.m.,
Monday, September 22, 1975, unless a complete set-
tlement has been reached with the City of Tucson.
The Members of the Tucson
Police-Fire Association
A spokesman for the PFA explained that the demand for
"complete settlement does not necessarily mean 30 percent. We
are open to negotiation, we always have been. But there must be
official action by 6 p.m. or we strike."37
In response to the telegram, Mayor Murphy repeated that
under the city charter there was no legal way the council could
act without the civil service commission's review. City Manager
Valdez supported the mayor's stance and said that the mayor
and council had no power to grant pay raises without the com-
mission's recommendation. Councilman Robert Cauthorn stated
that PFA demands were outside the city's range. "We are not
even in the same ball park. Let's hope they come to their senses.
They are breaking their contract and also the lawthe City
Charter." Councilman Ruben Romero indicated that he was dis-
appointed. "I thought they would wait," he said, "but I guess
they are not willing to. I think they will get adverse reaction."
Councilwoman Barbara Weyman said she was "shocked" by the
news, and added that she had been in touch with the association
and received "no indication that this would happen."38 Mayor
Murphy declared that the city was prepared for a strike. "We're
so ready for them, you wouldn't believe it," he said.39
Two hours prior to the strike deadline, city officials called a
meeting with the PFA executive board in a last ditch effort to
avoid the impending strike. Several members of the council, the
city attorney, and the city manager were there. Though the dis-
cussion lasted about two hours, the executive board felt that the
city was stalling for time, because city officials made no new of-
fers and continued to hold to their previous position. City of-
ficials, on the other hand, believed that there was meaningful
dialogue. At a few minutes past 6 p.m., the city manager was cal-
led from the meeting to receive a telephone call. When he
returned a short time later, he announced that picket lines were
being put up around City Hall and the main fire station.
City officials were shocked by the strike. They were unaware
that the PFA members had been instructed that they were to
strike at 6 p.m. unless they received word that there was signifi-
cant dialogue at the meeting. Only a call by the executive board
would have stopped the strike. After announcing that the strike
had begun, Valdez quickly recessed the meeting and said that
due to the walkout there was no need for further discussion.
At 6 p.m. Monday, September 22, a motorcycle traffic of-
ficer transmitted the prearranged code words "Blue Tiger" over
the police radio, thus signaling the beginning of the strike by
Tucson police and firefighters. About 200 striking police and
firefighters immediately formed picket lines at the police and fire
department headquarters and at City Hall. A few minutes after
6 p.m. officers on duty drove their cars into the department
parking lot, parked them to block gasoline pumps and walked
away as pickets cheered.
Of the 510 commissioned personnel in the police depart-
ment, 389 struck, including 43 sergeants. The strike left 33
patrolmen and 59 supervisory and command personnel available
for duty assignments.40 Officers who remained on duty were
placed on 12-hour shifts, and patrol cars were manned by
sergeants, detectives, and lieutenants. Only 18 of the city's 429
firefighters remained on the job. All but two of the 18 were top
Tucson, Arizona 61
administrators with the rank of battalion chief or above. These
officials, for the most part, sympathized with the strikers, but
stayed on the job with the support of the PFA, in order to provide
the city with some fire protection. Police Chief William
Gilkinson also expressed sympathy for the strikers. He called the
strike "a very tragic occurrence" for the police and fire depart-
ments and the city and added, "I sympathize with the personnel
who feel they should have just compensation for the work they
perform, but I must recognize there's a better way of working
toward an acceptable solution."41
Not all the strikers were on the picket lines. In anticipation
of the strike, the PFA had developed a contingency plan for the
strikers to assist working police and firefighters when needed.
Strikers were stationed at the homes of officers and firefighters at
strategic locations throughout the city, where they monitored
police and fire radios. When assistance was required, they
responded to calls in their own vehicles. Striking firefighters in-
dicated that they would help only when lives were in danger. The
striking police frequently provided backups for police officers
who were reponding to calls which were potentially dangerous.
When a striking officer assisted a citizen, he would give the
citizen a card which said "You Have Been Assisted By Police
Fire Association On Strike For Equitable Wages." Although the
PFA contingency plan was reported in both Tucson newspapers
on the second day of the strike, Mayor Murphy and several other
city officials did not learn of it until after the strike.
By the time the strike began the PFA had organized its
members and assigned responsibility for various strike activities.
The IAFF hall was designated as strike headquarters. A
publicity committee handled press releases. A food committee
insured that sandwiches and soft drinks were available at the
picket lines. Intoxicating beverages were prohibited. The PFA's
rumor control center worked closely with the police department
to verify the accuracy of rumors and dispel those that were un-
true. In addition, a picketing schedule was devised. While there
was no violence on the picket lines, there was a lot of name-
calling directed at officers who crossed the lines to report for
duty. PFA leaders believe that aside from the name-calling, the
only difficulty they had controlling their members was getting
them to dress up in jackets and ties while picketing.
A few hours after the strike started, discussions between city
officials and the PFA executive board resumed. The council had
selected three of its members, who were not up for reelection in
November, to form a committee to meet with the PFA represen-
tatives. The three were Robert Cauthorn, Rudy Castro, and Bar-
bara Weyman. The council felt that if more than three of its
members attended the meetings, it would violate the state's open
meeting law. When the PFA executive board arrived at the
meeting, the members expected to be served with an injunction.
In fact, two and a half hours after the strike began, the city had
obtained a temporary restraining order which enjoined the strike
and illegal picketing. The PFA's lawyer asked the city officials to
delay serving the order until they could negotiate. He promised
that no PFA leaders would leave the meeting without giving the
city the opportunity to serve the order, and warned that they
would leave the meeting if they were served immediately. Ignor-
ing the PFA's warning, ^city officials called in a process server
who handed out the restraining order. Discussions broke off im-
mediately and the PFA executive board left.
On Tuesday (September 23), the second day of the strike,
the PFA's attorney announced that he was preparing a motion to
quash the restraining order because it was legally deficient due
to technical flaws. Meanwhile the restraining order was held in
abeyance until a hearing could be held later that afternoon.
Strikers were advised that there would be no sanctions or con-
tempt citations issued until after the motion to quash was
resolved. At the hearing, the judge quashed the restraining order
and issued a new temporary restraining order which prohibited
striking and illegal picketing. However, the judge rejected the
PFA's request to order both sides to the negotiating table,
because she believed she lacked the authority to do so. In issuing
the new restraining order, she emphasized that it applied to
every police officer and firefighter who was on strike. The judge
also scheduled a hearing for October 2, to determine whether the
new order should be made permanent. The PFA attorneys ad-
vised the members to obey the court order and explained the pos-
sible consequences of noncompliance, which included fines and
jail sentences.
At around noon, the PFA executive board met with the three
members of the council negotiating committee. According to a
PFA press release, the PFA representatives stressed that the 30
percent salary increase they requested was a negotiable starting
point. The meeting ended when the council members agreed to
study the information.
Tucson, Arizona 63
Later that evening, the PFA executive board met again with
members of the council committee. Councilman Ruben Romero
also attended. However, the talks broke down when the PFA re-
jected a new city offer of a 7 percent increase on October 1,1975,
and another 5 percent on July 1, 1976. Three of the four council
members walked out of the meeting before the PFA could pre-
sent its counterproposal, which provided for an immediate 10
percent raise for police and firefighters, 5 percent for all other
city employees, and an additional 5 percent for both groups in
July 1976. According to the PFA, its proposal would cost no more
than the city's offer, but would give police and firefighters more
money than other employees." This counter offer was then dis-
cussed with Rudy Castro, the only member of the council who
remained.
On Wednesday, September 24, the third day of the strike,
the mayor offered the striking police and firefighters amnesty
from disciplinary action if they returned to work within 24 hours.
"It is possible," he said "that those who do not return to work
will suffer ultimate disciplinary action . . . the striking officers
have 24 hours to return to work." It was generally understood
that the mayor's reference to ultimate disciplinary action meant
firings, although he did not use the word. Earlier, the mayor had
warned that the city "must be prepared to instigate a crash
training program to replace officers who did not return to
work."43 Actually the mayor did not have the authority to fire the
strikers; only the city manager had this power.
At a rally in front of City Hall, a crowd of about 300 PFA
members booed when they were told that they might be fired.
Then a member of the crowd yelled "Are we together?" and the
men rpared back "Yes!" Another one yelled, "Take one and
you'll have to take all of us." Again the men cheered." A PFA
spokesman announced that despite the mayor's threat, strikers
would not return to work until the wage issue was settled, and
that the members had unanimously agreed to suffer "any and all
consequences" resulting from the mayor's ultimatum. He added
that the PFA wanted to continue the negotiations.*6 Prospects of
resuming negotiations appeared dim though. Barbara Weyman
asserted that under no circumstances would the council
negotiators meet with the PFA again. "We've made our top offer,
all we can make. What it comes down to is greed. They just want
more than they want us to give to the other city employees."46
The governor, on the other hand, urged city officials, including
the civil service commission to resume negotiations with the
strikers. "The Mayor should urge the Civil Service Commission
to meet as soon as possible, tomorrow if possible, to begin the
talks needed to solve the situation."47 The mayor, however, had
taken the position that it was improper for city officials to
negotiate with the police and firefighters while they were on
strike, but he did express his willingness to "enter into
meaningful discussions" if they returned to work.
While negotiations remained stalled, Tucson citizens, aware
that the police department's resources were spread thinly,
seemed to reduce trivial calls for service voluntarily. Calls during
the third day of the strike were 40 percent below normal.48 The
department was screening calls and responding primarily to
situations involving danger to life or property. According to the
head of the department's research and planning division, the ef-
fect of the strike on crime would not be known until the strike
ended. The three officers in the operational analysis unit who
compiled daily crime figures were on strike.49
Meanwhile, organized labor rallied to the support of the
striking police and firefighters. The state AFL-CIO executive
board endorsed the strike and members of affiliated unions
joined the picket lines at City Hall. In addition, other private
and public sector unions expressed their support for the
strikers, and some sent financial contributions to the PFA. On
Thursday, September 25, as the strike entered its fourth day, the
president of the local Teamsters announced the Teamsters' sup-
port of the strike. A gas tanker driven by a Teamster refused to
cross picket lines at the city's fuel pumps. However, gas was
available at regular service stations.
At noon Thursday, hundreds of striking police and
firefighters marched to City Hall in a show of strength. Their
leaders deliberately assembled on the front steps to be served
with the court order. The president of the Teamsters union, who
was attending the rally, was also served, but said that he would
not abide by the order.51 When the strike continued despite the
temporary restraining order, the city attorney obtained con-
tempt citations against 12 strike leaders, including the eight
members of the PFA executive board. The 12 men were ordered
to appear before a judge on Tuesday, September 30, to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. In order
to avoid being served with the contempt citations, PFA leaders
went into hiding.
Tucson, Arizona 65
The mayor's threat to fire strikers if they failed to return to
work Thursday did not materialize. Both Chief Gilkinson and
Fire Chief L. R. Peterson, however, initiated disciplinary action
by issuing orders stating that all employees who failed to report
for their normal tours of duty would be subject to immediate dis-
ciplinary action. The strikers defied these orders as they had the
court order and the mayor's order. The city manager announced
that those who did not come to work were absent without leave
and considered suspended.
City Manager Joel Valdez released a new wage survey on
Thursday which compared employee wages in Tucson with those
in nine other western cities. The city's survey showed that police
and firefighters' salaries were between 3.2 percent and 21 percent
behind the average wages in these cities, while pay for 14 civilian
administrative positions was between 6.5 percent and 43 percent
behind.62 After comparing the average assessed valuation, (which
is the basis for collecting property taxes), and median family in-
comes in the nine cities, the city manager concluded that Tucson
did not have the taxable resources to pay salaries comparable to
the average in the comparison cities.53 The police and firefighters
disputed the city's figures claiming that they were out of date
and, in some cases, based on surveys done five years before. Ac-
cording to the PFA, police and firefighters' salaries lagged about
18 percent behind police and firefighters' wages in the other nine
cities, while other Tucson employees were paid only 9 percent
less than comparable employees in these cities.64
Efforts to end the strike intensified on Thursday as Guy
Parent, a mediator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, began meeting separately with negotiators from both
sides. Negotiations lasted over 16 hours until 2 a.m., Friday
(September 26), but no accord was reached. The personnel direc-
tor emphasized that no matter what the negotiators agreed upon,
it would be necessary to go back to the civil service commission,
which still planned to meet on October 28.M
When negotiations continued Friday (September 26) under
the auspices of the federal mediator, only Councilmen Ruben
Romero and Richard Kennedy represented the city. Mayor
Murphy and council members Weyman and Cauthorn said they
would not meet with the PFA to discuss any wage proposal
higher than the council's Tuesday night offer of 7 percent on Oc-
tober 1, 1975, and another 5 percent in July 1976. However, the
mayor admitted that some council members seemed prepared to
increase their offer.56 Meanwhile, the PFA announced thatit had
made a counterproposal to the city, which included a 13.5 per-
cent increase for patrolmen and firefighters. Like other PFA of-
fers, the plan gave police and firefighters a bigger raise than
other city employees. A PFA spokesman said that the offer,
which he claimed equaled the city's latest proposal in monetary
cost, would place salaries for all other city employees approx-
imately 5 percent above the average salaries paid for comparable
positions in cities of comparable size and tax base."
For the second day in a row, talks lasted late into the night
as Parent shuttled back and forth between the negotiators for
both sides. There was some indication of progress in midafter-
noon when the PFA agreed to reduce the number of pickets, and
the city, in turn, agreed to withhold serving the contempt cita-
tions issued the previous day. Despite the prolonged negotia-
tions, no settlement was reached, and talks were scheduled to
resume the next morning (Saturday, September 27).
Friday night was the busiest night since the strike began for
police officers who stayed on the job. While it was a typically ac-
tive Friday night with fights, traffic collisions, prowler calls and
other incidents, only about half the normal number of officers
were on patrol.58 This force was augmented by about 150 sheriffs
deputies, who when requested, responded to emergency calls
when lives or serious property damage or loss were threatened.
They did not, however, patrol city streets, but waited for calls at
the city limits. In accordance with a mutual aid pact, Chief
Gilkinson had asked the sheriff, shortly before the strike began,
to assign deputies to patrol city streets and provide emergency
services. The sheriff agreed. However, when the strike started,
the deputies' FOP informed the sheriff that they would answer
emergency calls, but would not patrol city streets. In order to
avoid a confrontation, the sheriff declined to order them to
patrol. The deputies had considered going on strike in sympathy
with the Tucson police, but the PFA had asked them to remain
on the job to provide the city with emergency protection.
Negotiations between the city and the PFA resumed on
Saturday (September 27), as Parent continued to shuttle
between the two sides. He was joined on Saturday by the district
supervisor of the mediation office for the western states. Again,
only Romero and Kennedy participated on behalf of the city.
During the negotiations, the PFA submitted to the city a
proposal for ending the dispute entitled "Memorandum of
Tucson, Arizona 67
Understanding" (MOU). The title and format had been copied
by one of the PFA's lawyers from the Oakland, California,
firefighters' agreement. In response to this proposal, the two
councilmen submitted a counterproposal which was also called
an MOU. This counterproposal was approved by the PFA
negotiating team, but had to be ratified by the membership and
the city council. The PFA was scheduled to meet at 6 a.m. on
Sunday (September 28), and the council at 9 a.m.
The terms of the councilmen's MOU provided:
A 7.5 percent immediate pay increase for all city
employees who were in "administrative" positions. In the
fire department, the raise applied to the rank of captain
and above, and in the police department, to sergeants and
above.
A 5 percent immediate pay increase for all other city
employees. In the police and fire departments, this ap-
plied to all ranks below sergeant and captain, respective-
ly.
In July 1976, all employees would receive a cost-of-living
increase not to exceed 8 percent for the period from March
1975 to March 1976.
A pay differential of 20 cents an hour for hazardous duty.
All police ranks would be subject to this differential ex-
cept police captains, majors and the chief, and all
firefighters except assistant chief and above.
A $50 a month uniform and clothing maintenance al-
lowance for all sworn personnel.
A 1 percent increase in longevity pay for police and
firefighters with two to five years of service.
The city would not take any disciplinary action what-
soever against PFA employees as a result of the strike.
The total package amounted to a 22 percent increase. Ac-
cording to PFA negotiators, city officials were not aware that the
PFA's bottom line from the outset of negotiations was 18 per-
cent. They claim that city officials never asked them what their
bottom line was. City officials, however, deny this claim.
Early Sunday morning (September 28) members of the PFA
approved the MOU in a unanimous voice vote. At 9 a.m. the
mayor and council met in executive session to discuss the
proposed agreement. They instructed the city manager to see if
the PFA would accept three additional provisions relating to loss
of pay, letters of reprimand, and continuation of pending court
action. After meeting with the city manager and federal
mediator, the PFA agreed that strikers would not be paid for
time scheduled but not worked as a result of the strike, and that
the city could place a letter of reprimand in the strikers' person-
nel files for one year.59 The city agreed to drop all pending legal
action against the strikers. These additional provisions were in-
corporated into the MOU.
At 5 p.m., the mayor and council met in a special session.
The MOU as modified was presented and discussed. Ruben
Romero pointed out that the council would not act on the salary
increases until the civil service commission had completed its
report on the compensation plan. However, he added that, if
necessary, the raises in the MOU would be made retroactive.
Other council members wanted to make it clear that the provi-
sions of the MOU were to apply to all Tucson employees. The
cost for all city workers was estimated to be $3,601,961 for the
1975-76 fiscal year. Mayor Murphy announced that he intended
to vote against approval of the proposed agreement. He said that
his "No" vote was cast as a community protest against the
implications of this action. He did not fault the council, in-
dividually or collectively, for casting a vote under intolerable
pressure. Rather, he faulted the police and fire strikers who,
through fear, "have brought the people of the community to their
knees." He declared "This is Tucson's darkest day. I weep for all
of us." In a roll call vote, the council approved the MOU by 4 to
3. The mayor and council members Weyman and McLoughlin
voted against the agreement, while Cauthorn, Kennedy, Castro
and Romero voted for it.
The city's fire stations were back in full operation within 40
minutes of the vote, and police had a full contingent of officers
back on the street by 10:30 p.m. The end of the strike was an-
nounced on emergency radio with the message "The Tiger is
dead."60
Although the strike had ended, its impact continued to be
felt. For months, a series of events related to the strike continued
Tucson, Arizona 69
to be front page news in Tucson. While the situation began to
stabilize almost immediately, subsequent events again inflamed
emotions. Court action, civil service reform, changes in the city
charter, and reduction in the level of fire protection all became
hotly contested issues. However, the most serious event was the
city's failure to honor the Memorandum of Understanding with
the PFA.
On Tuesday, September 30, two days after the strike ended,
the superior court judge who issued the contempt citations
against the leaders of the PFA, chastised them for "knowingly
and willfully violating a lawful restraining order of the court,"
before she dismissed contempt citations.61 She also criticized city
officials for not properly filing and prosecuting the contempt
citations after they were ignored by the strikers.
After trying for several days to find ways to pay for the
raises, the city manager, Joel Valdez, announced on Wednesday,
October 1, that the pay package would mean layoffs of city
employees. He ordered all city departments to come up with
ways to reduce their operating budgets (excluding salaries) by 5
percent and raised the possibility of freezing all personnel vacan-
cies. He indicated that since cutbacks alone would not be suf-
ficient to pay for the raises, the city would probably have to raise
taxes.
A week later, the city's financial dilemma worsened when
the sheriffs office announced that it would cost the city about
$30,000 to pay deputies overtime for aiding the city during the
strike. At the start of the strike, the county board of supervisors
had sent city officials a telegram telling them that the county ex-
pected to be reimbursed. Some city officials, however, said they
would refuse to pay the bill because there was a mutual aid
agreement between the city and county which authorized
mutual law enforcement assistance between the two agencies.
The agreement did not specify whether the agency requesting as-
sistance had to reimburse the agency providing the assistance.62
A week after the city refused to pay the county, it was an-
nounced that 41 high-ranking police and fire officials (excluding
Chiefs Gilkinson and Petersen) who normally were prohibited
from collecting overtime would split more than $50,000 overtime
pay for staying on the job during the strike. The city manager
stated he had waived the directive that stipulated city
employees at this level were ineligible for overtime because "the
strike was in contradiction to regular procedures," and he
believed the men deserved the pay.63 Lower-ranking police and
fire personnel who stayed on the job during the six-day strike
received overtime pay as usual, but, in most cases, they collected
far less than their superior officers.
The first indication that the city would renege on the
Memorandum of Understanding came on October 13, when the
city council decided to postpone further action on salary in-
creases until after December 1 when winners of the November
election would take office. The delay was proposed by Mayor
Murphy and supported by council members Weyman, Cauthorn
and McLoughlin. After the election the council would have at
least two new members since incumbents Kennedy and
McLoughlin had been defeated in the primary election. In addi-
tion, Mayor Murphy and Councilman Romero were seeking
reelection. A move by the mayor to hold a public referendum on
the salary increase was voted down by the council.
The legality of the council's decision to postpone the pay
raises was challenged by the PFA. PFA spokesmen indicated
that as far as the PFA was concerned, the city had already agreed
to the wage package, and the PFA had a legal document to prove
it. They were strong in their position that if the city did not stand
by the agreement, the PFA was ready to go to court.
The civil service commission, which had to make a pay
recommendation to the council, had scheduled a hearing on the
salary increase for October 28. However, in a meeting on October
13, the commission decided that it would not deal with the ques-
tion of immediate pay raises. The city personnel director said
that only pay raises for the next fiscal year (beginning July 1,
1976) would be considered at the meeting. He stated the commis-
sion was awaiting additional information about salaries in other
cities before scheduling a hearing that would result in a recom-
mendation of an immediate pay increase.
In the meantime, city employees began circulating a peti-
tion asking the civil service commission to recommend against
the wage package. The petition called the package inequitable
because supervisory employees would get increases of 7.5 per-
cent, while lower level employees would receive only 5 percent.
The petition also opposed reduction in city services and layoffs
as means to fund the pay raises. By the end of the month when
the petitions were presented to the commission, over one-fifth of
the city's 4,000 employees had signed them.
Just prior to the November 4 election, Mayor Murphy
Tucson, Arizona 71
predicted a "new ball game" when the council convened after the
election. He said that the salary increases would not necessarily
be based on the "tentative memorandum of agreement." While
he could not predict exactly what the settlement would be, he ex-
pected it to be between the "5 to 7'/2 to 8% range."64
The strike and the resulting agreement between the city and
the PF^A were among several major issues in the election.
Although various candidates traded accusations about the way
the strike had been handled, most criticism centered around the
candidates for mayor. Mayor Murphy believed that his oppo-
nent, James Corbett, had encouraged the police and firefighters
to strike by promising them raises if he were elected.66 After the
strike, Corbett refused to say how he would vote on the strike set-
tlement, yet to many his bias in favor of the strikers was evident.
Moreover, he strongly supported compulsory binding arbitration
as an alternative to strikes, a position which the PFA advocated,
and which Mayor Murphy vehemently opposed as an abrogation
of legislative responsibility. Local Democrats repeatedly charged
that Murphy's "hard-line" stance during the strike had been
politically motivated, and they criticized him for making the
strike the single issue of his campaign. Ruben Romero, who had
helped engineer the Memorandum of Understanding, accused
the mayor of a "complete lack of leadership" during the strike.
"[He] was not involved in any way with the settlement except to
stand in opposition to anything presented to him. He was not in-
volved in one single negotiating session."66
On election day, November 4, 1975, Tucson voters reelected
Mayor ^Murphy by a large margin.67 Voter turnout was heavy.68
Romero, the only incumbent member of the council who was
running for reelection also retained his seat. The new council was
scheduled; to take office on December 1. New members Margot
Garcia and Douglas Kennedy were opposed to the strike settle-
ment.
In mid-November, the city council removed a major impedi-
ment to effective wage negotiations when it amended the city
code to allow the council to adopt, reject or modify the civil ser-
vice commission's recommendations regarding interim changes
in the annual compensation plan. No longer would the council be
forced to accept or reject the recommendations in their entirety.
However, the city charter still provided that the council could
not grant an interim pay raise without getting a recommendation
from the commission.
Once again, the civil service commission became a stum-
bling block when, at its meeting on December 1, it refused to make
a recommendation for an interim pay raise for city employees,
including police and firefighters. The commission canceled a
public hearing scheduled for December 14, at which the wage
settlement was to be considered. In a report to the council, the
commission sharply criticized the wage increase and benefits
tentatively approved by the council, and said: "Due to the ex-
treme financial conditions of the Tucson community, no amend-
ments to the [current pay schedule] are contemplated and
therefore the Civil Service Commission will make no recommen-
dations."69 However, the commission did recommend a 4 percent
across-the-board increase for all city employees to be effective
July 1, 1976. This increase, along with recommended changes in
job classifications were expected to cost the city $2.2 million in
the next fiscal year, while the settlement negotiated with the
PFA, if given to all city employees, was estimated to cost $12.1
million through June 1977.70
In order to bypass the commission's refusal to make a
recommendation regarding an interim pay increase, the new city
council again amended the city code on December 8 to allow the
mayor and council to order the commission to formulate recom-
mendations within a specific time period. The commission's
failure to hold hearings and make recommendations within the
time specified would constitute a recommendation that the pay
plan not be amended. The mayor and council could then treat
the lack of a recommendation as they chose. After amending the
code, the council ordered the commission to come up with a
recommendation within 10 days. As ordered, the commission
held public hearings, but still refused to recommend any interim
amendment to the annual pay plan.
Despite the commission, the city council, on December 30,
approved a 5 percent pay raise retroactive to September 28,1975,
for all city employees. However, it took no action on raises being
considered for July 1976. The council also failed to act on Chief
Gilkinson's request that it abolish the existing wage parity
between police and firefighters and approve a 10 percent increase
for patrolmen and 15 percent for higher-ranking officers. To sup-
port his request, the chief cited figures compiled by the FOP
which showed that salaries of Tucson patrolmen were 16 percent
lower than those paid patrolmen in nine major western cities.71
He believed that the differential in police-firefighter pay was
Tucson, Arizona 73
justified because police duties are more demanding, since police
officers spend more of their time unsupervised and exercise more
discretion. He felt this situation was compounded at the com-
mand level. Before the 5 percent retroactive raise was approved,
the chief appeared before the council to plead for higher wages
for his officers, and to stress the need for increases in the higher
ranks to eliminate the compression of salaries between the lower
and higher ranks. He explained that since higher-ranking officers
were not eligible for overtime pay, lower ranking officers made
more money than some of their superiors. He told the council,
"This strongly increasing salary compression appears to be the
result of the council's attitude that a living wage is a desirable
goal, but that anything beyond that is unwarranted, regardless
of the responsibilities of the position." He noted that the ad-
ministrators bear the responsibility for planning and delivering
police service, and that the city had turned to them during the
strike. But, he added, there was an "ever increasing opinion
among members of the police administration that city govern-
ment just does not care about them. Such a belief cannot but
have a negative effect upon the attitude of these employees to
their job."72
According to city budget officials, the 5 percent raise
retroactive to September 28, 1975, would cost $1.8 million
through June 1976. They also estimated that if an additional 5
percent raise were granted in July 1976, it would cost $4.95 mil-
lion more for the 1976-77 fiscal year. However, they expected
that cutbacks planned by the city manager plus available money
carried over from the last fiscal year could pay for the 1975-76
raise and leave $3.2 million to carry into fiscal 1976-77.73 The
council was scheduled to start work early in January 1976 on
ways to finance pay increases for 1976-77. The city manager had
recommended three new taxes and an increase in business
license fees as means of raising the money.
In late January 1976, the council finally acceded to Gilkin-
son's request and voted to raise the salaries of police sergeants,
lieutenants, and captains 5 percent above those of their fire
department counterparts, beginning in July 1976.74 However, the
council refused to extend the raise to Gilkinson and two majors
in the department. It also refused to approve the chiefs request
for an additional 5 percent for the entire police department. The
council's action on this and other disputes involving the 1976-77
pay plan was taken in a meeting that was closed to the press and
public.75 City officials were preparing to send letters announcing
the council's decisions to the employees involved until a reporter
asked about possible violations of the state's open meeting law.
On the advice of the city attorney, city officials decided not to
mail the letters for a few days when the council could vote again
on the disputes in an open, formal session. The council took its
final action on the 1976-77 pay plan on June 21, 1976, when it
granted a 5 percent across-the-board increase to all city
employees.
The city's failure to implement the MOU evoked strong
criticism from the PFA which threatened to sue the city for
reneging on the agreement. The threat became reality on
January 5, 1976, a week after the council approved the 5 percent
retroactive raise, when the PFA filed suit against the city in
Pima County Superior Court claiming that the city had
breached its contract with the PFA and failed to pay wages and
salaries as specified in the MOU. The PFA asked that the city be
ordered to comply with the MOU and in the alternative, to pay
damages for breaching the agreement.
In its answer to the PFA's complaint, the city contended
that the MOU did not constitute an enforceable contract
because implementation of the MOU required legislative action
in the form of ordinances, and the mayor and council had no
power to contract away their legislative authority. The city also
argued that because Arizona had no public sector bargaining
legislation, the mayor and council had no authority to enter into
collective bargaining and other forms of labor contracts with city
employees or their unions: "[I]n spite of what one may think
about the niceties of the situation, the MOU is not a binding con-
tract, cannot serve as a legal impetus to compel the mayor and
council to legislate, nor as the basis for an award of damages, and
in short, is not legally worth the paper it is written on."76 The
PFA, on the other hand, claimed that when the mayor and coun-
cil ratified the MOU on September 28, 1975, they adopted a
legislative enactment which fully complied with all requirements
of law, putting the MOU into effect.
On November 24, 1976, the superior court judge granted the
city's motion for summary judgment. In granting the motion, the
judge ruled that the MOU was void as a matter of law, because
the mayor and council had no power to enter into it. He found
that the MOU was a collective bargaining agreement and that in
the absence of legislative authority, a governmental body could
Tucson, Arizona 75
not enter into such a binding collective bargaining agreement.
On January 17, 1977, the judge denied the PFA's motion for
reconsideration. Three days later, the PFA appealed the decision
to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which upheld the lower court's
decision. The PFA then appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court,
which refused to review the case.
In early December 1975, a threatening confrontation began
to take place between the city and the firefighters, which led the
firefighters to believe that the city was retaliating for the strike.
Various council members made public statements that "maybe
the fire department was too good for the city" and could stand
some reduction.77 They discussed reducing the department by 20
to 30 percent, while retaining the same level of service. To sup-
port this position, Councilman Robert Cauthorn conducted a
study of the fire department to determine the cost of reducing
fire protection in terms of increased insurance premiums to
private property owners.78 The firefighters viewed the proposed
cuts as reprisals for their participation in the strike. Other ac-
tions taken by the city reinforced their belief that reprisals were
taking place. Shortly after the strike, the city implemented a hir-
ing freeze which resulted in the loss of 42 positions in the fire
department. These positions would have expanded the depart-
ment to correspond with an annexation and increases in pecula-
tion. The city council also directed the city manager to stop the
purchase of $300,000 worth of new fire apparatus. In addition,
the city scrapped its first solar project, a new solar powered fire
station to be built with the assistance of federal funds.
To some extent, the firefighters were correct in their assess-
ment of the city's motives. Some city officials blamed the
firefighters for the strike and believed that the police would not
have struck had they not been influenced by the more militant
firefighters. These officials were determined to destroy the al-
liance between the two groups. Their strategy was to provoke the
firefighters while treating the police more favorably, e.g., by
breaking parity.
In early February 1976, the city commissioned a survey of
the fire department to be conducted by an independent con-
sulting firm at a cost of $24,500. Although the city decided to
contract with the firm for the study in December 1975, this deci-
sion was kept secret until the survey team arrived in Tucson. On
February 3, 1976, the news media was informed of the survey.
When reporters contacted three city council members for
additional information pertaining to the study, all stated they
knew nothing about it. The mayor was "unavailable for com-
ment." The following day the city manager made a public state-
ment that he had contracted for the survey and that no cuts in
fire department services were anticipated. The mayor, in a later
statement, claimed that the survey was a method of obtaining
objective data on the effectiveness of the Tucson Fire Depart-
ment, and if money could be saved it would be. Many firefighters
believed that the survey was another attempt at reprisal for the
strike, and that city officials deliberately obscured its real pur-
pose with an atmosphere of secrecy and misleading statements.
Actually, a major factor which led to the study was the fire
chiefs repeated refusal to comply with a request from the city
manager's office for a reduction contingency plan. During the
1974-75 budget preparations, the city manager, through an of-
ficial directive, requested that each department head prepare a
contingency plan which would permit reduction in unnecessary
program costs and, if necessary, personnel during the fiscal year.
All department heads responded with the exception of Chief
Petersen, who refused to provide the requested contingency plan.
Because of his refusal, 42 new personnel positions were cut as a
means of reducing costs. During the development of the 1975-76
budget, department heads were for the second year requested to
submit an updated contingency plan. Again, the fire chief
refused to comply. Because of the lack of adequate feedback
from the fire department, the city contracted for a survey which
would provide a contingency plan for cutbacks, as well as an as-
sessment of the actual working conditions and needs of the fire
department.
A general lack of awareness on the part of the firefighters
about the basic reason for the city's decision to have a survey
conducted contributed to the growing animosity between the city
and the firefighters. The situation was aggravated after the sur-
vey was completed when the city failed to release its results im-
mediately. According to city officials, the reason the survey
results were not immediately released was that, in the interim,
the fire chief was forced into retirement and the city was
searching for a new chief. Because the city had experienced a
strike and the results of the survey indicated problems in the fire
department, city officials did not want to release the survey until
a new chief was selected. As soon as the new chief was chosen,
the survey results were released.
Tucson, Arizona 77
The survey recommended a reduction in fire protection in
the city of Tucson. Specific recommendations included the clos-
ing of three fire stations, and reduction in the firefighting force
from the then present 414 members to 309.79 Firefighters believed
that if these recommendations were implemented they would
critically reduce emergency firefighting services in Tucson and
erode the system to a point of total inadequacy.
A few weeks after the strike, the city council began con-
sideration of several changes in the city charter which were
aimed at preventing future strikes. The PFA believed these
proposed amendments were vindictive, retaliatory measures
against the strikers. The first attempt to call for a referendum
failed when the council, on October 13, 1975, defeated by 5 to 2,
an attempt by Mayor Murphy to have a public vote in December
on an amendment to the city charter prohibiting strikes by city
employees and requiring automatic dismissal of strikers.
However, the council left open the possibility of such a vote in
the spring of 1976. Early in January 1976, the council tentatively
voted to place the amendment on the April ballot. On January
26, which was the deadline for the council to approve the final
wording of the amendment, council members Margot Garcia and
Douglas Kennedy asked that the no-strike provision be taken
from the ballot to be studied further by a citizens committee, but
the move failed by a 4 to 2 vote.
The proposed strike prohibition brought a strong reaction
from the PFA which believed that the amendment was political-
ly motivated. The amendment provided that any employee who
participated in any form of "concerted work interruption" would
be immediately terminated and prohibited from reemployment
by the city for a period of five years, upon a finding and declara-
tion by the mayor and council that such action constituted a
peril to public safety, health and welfare. In short, if the council
declared an emergency, strikers would be automatically ter-
minated.
In a public position statement to the mayor and council, the
PFA said that the proposal perpetuated the concept among
employees that they were second-class citizens in the Tucson
community who did not share the major emphasis of the labor
movement throughout its history, i.e., that security is a
paramount consideration and that employees should not be sub-
ject to the arbitrary act of their employers when devoting their
best efforts in pursuit of their employer's goals. The city of
Tucson had often stated, the PFA pointed out, the concept that
" 'a better understanding between employer and employee
should be promoted and maintained in order to provide for the
harmonious and peaceful relationship between the city and its
employees.' The proposed amendment reduces such a concept to
an absurdity, contributes nothing toward the establishment of a
harmonious and peaceful relationship and will contribute to the
establishment of distrust."80
Two other proposed amendments approved for the April
ballot directly affected police and firefighters. One amendment
gave the city manager the power to negotiate with employees
over wages, with the final outcome determined by the council.
The second allowed the civil service commission to consider
other factors in addition to seniority in making rules relating to
layoffs.
The PFA saw the first of these two amendments as an effort
to remove the existing advisory arbitration procedure from the
city charter. This, the PFA believed, would leave no provision for
constructive input from an impartial third party during negotia-
tions on the annual position-compensation plan. Under the
proposed changes the position-compensation plan would be for-
mulated by the civil service commission without any negotiation
with employees. Then the plan could be disputed by employees
by submitting written notices to the city manager's office after
which a "good faith" effort to resolve the dispute would be made.
The plan would then go to the mayor and council who could ac-
cept, reject or modify the position-compensation plan as they
saw fit. The PFA reacted strongly to the proposed amendment,
saying that this procedure not only eliminated any impartial
recommendations, but provided absolutely no method by which
to resolve an impasse in negotiations between employees and
management. The PFA pointed out that there was past evidence
that the mayor and council had not followed guidelines for
negotiations as set forth in the city charter, nor made attempts to
resolve differences through "good faith" negotiations.
The PFA's response to the proposed amendment regarding
seniority was equally strong, for it felt that the amendment
would effectively destroy the seniority rights of employees in
layoffs. The PFA believed that job security was one of the most
attractive advantages of public employment and that destroying
seniority rights of individual employees would reduce job
security and make public employment less attractive. The PFA
Tucson, Arizona 79
also pointed out that approval of this amendment would be par-
ticularly damaging to police and fire personnel because once they
reach their early thirties, their training and experience are vir-
tually unmarketable in any other position. Very few, if any,
police and fire departments in the nation, the PFA noted, will
hire anyone over the age of 31 years; a police officer or firefighter
who is laid off would have to begin a new career, which would
create a hardship on a person who has established a home and
family. Under the existing seniority rules, the last hired were the
first fired, which according to the PFA would protect the city
from loss of invaluable experience in the event of necessary
layoffs. Under the proposed charter change on seniority, a police
officer or firefighter could be laid off with less than one year to
retirement and be ineligible for reemployment in order to com-
plete his required length of service for retirement. As a result, an
employee would have no retirement because Tucson's police and
firefighters did not pay social security.
On election day, April 6, 1976, Tucson voters approved only
the amendment which provided that strikes by city employees
were illegal and that any city employee engaging in a strike
would be terminated and ineligible for employment with the city
for a five-year period. The other two proposed amendments were
defeated.
A year and a half after the strike, Tucson police and
firefighters remained bitter over the city's failure to honor the
Memorandum of Understanding. The attempts to change the
city charter, and the fire department survey, which were viewed
as retaliatory measures by the police and firefighters, reinforced
this bitterness. The resentment between strikers and nonstrikers
which surfaced immediately after the strike had to a large extent
diminished, although some officers still refused to speak to
others because they did not participate in the strike.
Most of those involved in the strike felt that another strike
was unlikely, at least within the next few years. Mayor Murphy
believed that the charter amendment providing for the termina-
tion of strikers would be an effective deterrent. Other city of-
ficials cited the public's strong reaction against the strikers and
the PFA's failure to have the MOU upheld in the courts. While
police and firefighters also generally agreed that a strike was not
likely in the near future, several felt that if one did occur, it
would be violent. As one 16-year veteran firefighter said "There's
an awful lot of real bitter men. We got the shaft. Next time there
may be violence." A police officer echoed these sentiments when
he explained, "We went on strike because we had gotten our
teeth kicked in and the door shut in our faces and were told there
was no further to go. They didn't give us anything plus they said
'go away.' . . . We learned the best way to get cops back to work
is to get someone killed. The best way to get firemen back to
work is to burn buildings. Strikes can't be professional. You have
to hurt someone."
NOTES
1. The cities used in Tucson's Pay Plan Survey from 1967-1971
were: 1967Albuquerque, Austin, Colorado Springs, Denver, El Paso,
Ft. Worth, Fresno, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Reno, Salt Lake City, San An-
tonio, San Diego, Stockton, Wichita, San Jose; 1969Albuquerque,
Austin, Colorado Springs, Ft. Worth, Fresno, Las Vegas, Salt Lake City,
San Antonio, San Diego, San Jose, Stockton, Wichita; 1971
Muskegee, Oklahoma City, Colorado Springs, Denver, Pueblo,
Maricopa County, Phoenix, Tucson, Ogden, Seattle, Tacoma, Portland,
Alameda County, Fresno County, Kern County, Los Angeles, San Fer-
nando County, San Diego County, San Mateo County, Berkeley,
Oakland, Sacramento, Pasadena, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose,
East Bay M.U.D., Honolulu, Santa Clara.
2. "Cost of Living Indicator," American Chamber of Commerce
Research Association, 1972 included in A History of Frustration 1965-
1976, Police Fire Association, Tucson, Arizona, 1976.
3. Tucson Daily Citizen, May 25, 1971.
4. Arizona Daily Star, April 26, 1971.
5. Tucson Daily Citizen, June 11, 1971.
6. Tucson Daily Citizen, June 22, 1971.
7. A History of Frustration.
8. The nine cities were Albuquerque, Denver, El Paso, Las
Vegas, Phoenix, San Diego, Sacramento, Portland, Seattle. The list of
cities was not incorporated into the police contract, although the city
agreed to use them in the annual wage comparison.
9. In 1970 the city and the FOP had signed their first three-year
contract covering hours and fringe benefits. In 1973, they signed a se-
cond contract which lasted until 1977. The FOP was recognized as the
representative of all sworn personnel below the rank of lieutenant.
10. Of the nine cities surveyed that year, Tucson placed next to
last, followed only by El Paso, Texas.
11. The raises the FOP requested would have boosted a begin-
ning officer's salary from $876 to $1,014 a month in July and to $1,065 in
January.
Tucson, Arizona 81
12. Firefighters were asking that their starting pay be increased
from $834 to $920 a month.
13. Arizona Daily Star, September 9, 1975.
14. The next morning a meeting was held for those who were un-
able to attend the evening meeting because they were working.
15. The FOP had actually asked the president of the national
FOP to come and assist them, but the secretary came in his place. The
local leaders had hoped that the presence of the national president
would demonstrate the national organization's support for their posi-
tion.
19. Arizona Rev. Stat. Sec. 38.431.
20. Arizona Rev. Stat. Sec. 38.431.03A(4) allows executive ses-
sions for the purpose of "discussions or consultations with represen-
tatives or employee organizations regarding the salaries, salary
schedules or compensation paid in the form of fringe benefits of
employees in order to review it [sic] position and instruct its designated
representatives.''
21. Tucson Daily Citizen, September 17, 1975.
22. Under the city charter, the property tax rate could not exceed
$1.75 per $100 of assessed valuation. In 1975, however, the tax rate was
$1.25, and it could not be increased until the 1976-77 fiscal year because
the $1.25 rate had already been formally adopted.
23. City Manager Joel Valdez suggested extending the city's 2
percent sales tax to labor charges included in repair bills, contract labor,
and to personnel and professional services. He also proposed removing
the sales tax exemption granted to foreign nationals.
27. Ibid.
28. The commission's reasons for delaying the review of police
and firefighters' salaries are not entirely clear, since Chairman Schulyer
Lininger refused to be interviewed during the development of the case
study. Many police and firefighters, however, attribute the commis-
sion's action to a longstanding political alliance between Mayor Murphy
and Lininger.
31. Ibid.
32. Arizona Daily Star, October 4, 1975.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. In addition, there were 29 authorized absences in the police
department at the time of the strike.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
50. According to the PFA, the following unions supported the
strikers: Southern Arizona Building and Construction Trades Council,
Local No. 1Tucson (Bricklayers), Southern Arizona District Council
(Carpenters), Local No. 857Tucson (Carpenters), Local No. 570
Tucson (Electricians), TucsonDennis Wilson (Ironworkers Local No.
75), Local No. 479Tucson (Laborers), Local No. 394Tucson
(Lathers), Local No. 1182Tucson (Millwrights), Local No. 596
Tucson (Painters), Local No. 741Tucson (Plumbers & Steam Fitters),
Local No. 222Tucson (Roofers), Local No. 426Tucson (Sheet Metal
Workers), Local No. 181Tucson (Tile Setters Helpers).
52. The nine cities surveyed were Albuquerque, Denver, El Paso,
Phoenix, San Diego, Sacramento, Seattle, Portland and Las Vegas.
Arizona Daily Star, September 26, 1975.
55. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
59. Because the city later reneged on the MOU, the letters of
reprimand were never placed in the strikers' files.
61. Tucson Daily Citizen, October 1, 1975.
62. According to the sheriffs office, deputies handled 168 city
calls, either by phone or entering the city and making reports. The inci-
dents involved ranged from bomb threats and attempted rape to "hip-
pies in pool." Tucson Daily Citizen, October 8, 1975.
63. Tucson Daily Citizen, October 14, 1975.
Tucson, Arizona 83
65. Corbett was the former mayor who had averted the
threatened mass resignation in 1969.
67. The mayor received 52.6 percent of the vote and his closest
opponent 40.3 percent.
68. 59.3 percent of the registered voters voted in the election.
69. Arizona Daily Star, December 2, 1975.
70. Ibid.
71. The nine cities were Sacramento, San Diego, Seattle, Las
Vegas, Phoenix, Portland, Albuquerque, Denver and El Paso.
73. Ibid.
74. The 5 percent raise was expected to cost the city $125,000 a
year.
75. Arizona Daily Star, January 28, 1976.
76. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (August 5,
1976), Tucson Police and Firefighters' Association v. City of Tucson et
al.
78. The study quoted a set of estimates of how much fire in-
surance costs would change if Tucson's fire insurance rating were
changed. Firefighters rebutted these findings by saying that such
"estimates" of fire insurance costs were not directly governed by fire in-
surance ratings but by an interdependent number of items, one of which
is fire insurance ratings.
79. Firefighters pointed out that this recommendation would
reduce the manning level to 88 members per 100,000 population, which
was one half the average manning in comparable cities. Other recom-
mendations included amending the building code to require sprinkler
systems in new and existing large buildings; charging fees for inspection
on new construction; establishing a joint public-private paramedic
program; and eliminating unnecessary training drills. The insurance
service office had recommended a few months earlier that the training
program be expanded.
80. PFA Position Statement Regarding Charter Revisions to
Mayor and City Council, January 5, 1976, p. 5.
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
October 23-26, 1975
INTRODUCTION
When Oklahoma City police walked off the job in October
1975, it was the third time in eight years that they resorted to a
job action to get a raise. Long-standing frustration over low pay
first came to a head in July 1967 when city police staged a ticket
slowdown to call attention to their need for more money.1 Par-
ticipation was spotty, and the slowdown lasted less than a week;
officers claimed they were threatened with dismissal or transfer
if they continued to refuse to write tickets.2 After the slowdown,
the chief attempted to get them a raise, but even he was unsuc-
cessful. Police officers then tried a different strategy. In late
1967, a group of them organized a local chapter of the Fraternal
Order of Police (FOP) and quickly focused its attention on
improving police salaries.3 Within a month, 423 of the city's 447
police officers had joined the FOP. By late 1968, the FOP was ac-
tively seeking a permanent solution to the wage problem by
pushing for an election to amend the city charter to set a
minimum wage for police. The proposed amendment required an
annual survey of police wages in 30 cities of comparable size and
the adjustment of Oklahoma City police wages to equal the
average pay in these cities. While the FOP was gathering names
on the initiative petition, the city gave all city employees a 5 per-
cent increase. In the spring of 1969, the FOP dropped its support
for the petition when a citizens advisory group recommended the
85
annual review of police pay scales and the city manager sup-
ported the recommendation.
In 1971, the Oklahoma legislature enacted the Firefighters'
and Policemens' Arbitration Law giving police and firefighters
the right to organize and bargain collectively.4 Oklahoma City
police officers chose the FOP as their bargaining agent, and
negotiations with the city began. The first contract between the
city and the FOP, which was signed in February 1972, did not
cover wages, but negotiations on this subject continued.5 The
city's failure to act on police pay requests resulted in a second
ticket strike in July 1972. Oklahoma City police had not had a
raise since January 1971, and their starting salary of $537 was
one of the lowest base wages for police officers in western cities of
comparable size. This time the job action was supported by
almost all field officers. They were confident that neither the city
nor the department would take action against them. Most said
that they were not afraid to tell their commanders that they
would refuse to write tickets. "We're professionals now," said
one organizer. "That's what they keep telling us in the college
classes we go to between off-duty jobs. So why shouldn't we ask
to be paid like professionals? I just don't feel like getting killed
for $537 a month."6 Although FOP leaders sympathized with the
reasons for the slowdown, they officially opposed the job action,
because organized work stoppages by public employee bargain-
ing groups were prohibited by state law. They continued
negotiating with the city on police salaries and in December 1972
won an increase, retroactive to July 1972, which raised base pay
to $645. Another increase in July 1973 brought base pay to $675.
Despite these raises, the police still believed they were greatly
underpaid.
Poor pay was not the only cause of police dissatisfaction. In
1974, a professor at Oklahoma City University conducted a study
of the city police department to determine if there was a
relationship between certain personality variables, job environ-
ment and employee health.7 He found that poor supervisory
practices were the basic cause for discontent. Officers com-
plained of "lack of concern for employees by supervisors, politics
and inferior managers." They felt that their supervisors did not
communicate with them relative to the elements affecting their
job. The study also revealed widespread belief that the
promotional system was unfair and not based on ability. During
the previous two years, there had been very few promotions due
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 87
to a reduced attrition rate and a freeze on hiring imposed in early
1974.
The hiring freeze also created a serious manpower problem
for the department. In July 1973, the department reached its all-
time manpower peak of 647 commissioned officers. By October
1975, there were less than 600. A study conducted by the depart-
ment in May 1975 showed that an additional 200 officers were
needed to police the city's 640 square miles and more than
380,000 persons. According to the FBI, the minimum police-
population ratio to ensure adequate police protection was 2.5 of-
ficers per 1,000 inhabitants. In Oklahoma City the ratio was
about 1.4 to 1,000. Officers complained about the lack of ade-
quate manpower, but the situation continued to get worse. Some
officers patrolled districts up to 100 square miles in area.8
Average response time was 17 to 19 minutes.9 Investigations also
suffered because overloaded detectives were unable to conduct
thorough investigations of all their cases. The chief repeatedly
asserted that the department needed a minimum of 800 officers,
and more realistically 1,000, to do the job.10
In 1974, Ralph Pearce, a "militant officer with fresh, new
ideas" assumed the presidency of the FOP after narrowly
defeating the more moderate past president in the annual FOP
election. That year for the first time the city's three employee
bargaining groups, the FOP, the Oklahoma City Firefighters As-
sociation (International Association of Firefighters Local 1524),
and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME), decided to negotiate together to
strengthen their position in bargaining with the city. The city
claimed the budget was tight and offered a $41.60 a month
across-the-board raise for all city employees, full payment of
health insurance premiums for employees, but only partial pay-
ment (up to $4.19) for dependent coverage. City officials insisted
that it was the most the city could offer because of a financial
crisis. AFSCME was first to agree to the city's offer, and the
firefighters followed, but the FOP rejected it by a vote of 187 to
141 and continued to ask for a 10 percent cost-of-living increase
(which would have meant a minimum raise of $67.50 a month
per officer) and full payment of health insurance premiums for
officers and their dependents. FOP leaders scheduled a second
vote on the city's offer after city officials told them that if the
FOP failed to ratify it, the police would be operating without a
contract and all their existing benefits would cease. Personnel
Director David Falk also reportedly promised that the FOP
would get a substantial wage increase in 1975 if it accepted the
present offer. On the second vote, the FOP ratified the contract.
A few days later, the city council approved "substantial"
pay increases totaling $331,000 for top city officials, including a
$250 a month raise for the city manager, raises ranging from $400
to $600 a month for city attorneys and raises as high as $400 a
month for some department heads.11 Pearce denounced the raises
as a "betrayal" of rank-and-file city workers. "All year long
they've been telling us they were out of money. Now they do
this," he said. "It's obvious who most of the people are who got
the raises. It's the political bunch over there. . . . The city
employees make this city operate, not the park and recreation
director. It's time they recognized police officers as professionals.
This is nothing but a snub."12 Falk defended the raises, saying
that negotiators for the three city employee unions had agreed at
the start of negotiations that $331,000 of the $2,480,000 available
for raises would be set aside for management. He was supported
by the heads of the firefighters' association and AFSCME, who
said that they had been told throughout negotiations that the
city would use $331,000 for management raises.
A week after the 1974 pay increases were settled, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld a utility rate increase enacted
by the city in 1971. The ruling was expected to free about $3 mil-
lion in contested funds which had been placed in escrow while
the litigation was pending. All three city employee unions quick-
ly notified the city that they wanted to reopen salary negotia-
tions because of the availability of the new money. The city
refused, and the employees received no additional raises.
The 1974 negotiations hurt police morale and faith in the
negotiation process. Pearce did not run for reelection in
December 1974, and a more moderate group took over the
leadership again. By early spring, however, Pearce and two other
officers were trying to replace the FOP with the Teamsters Union
as the official bargaining agent for the police. They gathered
signatures from more than 30 percent of the department, thus
forcing an election to determine whether the FOP or the
Teamsters would represent the city's police officers.
The Teamsters issue caused sharp conflicts in the FOP,
which was already divided into moderate and militant factions.
Chief I. G. Purser recognized that there might be labor trouble
and began to develop a contingency plan to cover any type of
police job action. City officials were openly apprehensive about
the possibility of the police department being unionized by the
Teamsters. Mayor Patience Latting stated "It may well cause
difficulties. The use of union strategies, such as work slowdowns
or strikes, could work to the detriment of that arm of government
and interfere with their duties/'13 Newspaper editorials also ex-
pressed concern about the Teamsters movement and warned
police officers against turning over control of local affairs to a
powerful national union.
On May 23, 1975, police officers chose the FOP over the
Teamsters as their official bargaining agent by a vote of 346 to
186. About 86 percent of the city's police officers voted in the
election. The vote was generally considered more anti-Teamster
than pro-FOP. Officers were reportedly turned off by the reputa-
tion and image of the Teamsters union. Even though the FOP
won by a large margin, the Teamsters challenge put great pres-
sure on the FOP to get a good contract that year. A Teamsters
supporter explained, "If they [the FOP] don't get a good contract
this year, the Teamsters will be back next year. They have to
produce or die this year. It's like one of the officers put on his bal-
lot: 'The FOP. We'll give them one more year'."14 FOP leaders
were well aware of the pressure. They realized "if we lost in 1975,
the Teamsters would be in the next year. We had to show them
something. We had to get up and fight."
Negotiations for the 1975-76 fiscal year had actually begun
almost two months before the Teamsters election. The first
bargaining session was held on April 3, 1975, although city and
FOP representatives had met on March 13 to establish ground
rules for the negotiations. Even at these early meetings on
ground rules, the two sides were unable to reach complete agree-
ment. One major problem was press releases. The city preferred
joint press releases, but the FOP reserved the right to use the
press as it desired. A second area of disagreement concerned the
size of the bargaining teams.The city wanted to keep them small,
but the FOP would not agree. The FOP bargaining committee
had 15 members, all handpicked by FOP leaders because of their
extensive knowledge in various technical areas. Many had ad-
vanced degrees; some worked in the police department's plan-
ning and research section. The FOP president, vice president,
and attorney all served on the committee. It was chaired by
Richard Boyd, the president of the state FOP, who was an
Oklahoma City police sergeant. The bargaining committee was
better prepared for negotiations than ever before. According to
one member, they "went out and shook the bushes and got the
background material" they needed. The city's negotiating team
was much smaller, and according to FOP leaders, inexperienced
in bargaining. The team was headed by the city personnel direc-
tor; other members were the assistant personnel director and
representatives from the budget office and the city attorney's of-
fice.
At first, the city and FOP negotiating teams met weekly,
but made little progress. The FOP initially demanded a 20 per-
cent pay hike but despite FOP protests, the city refused to dis-
cuss salary and insisted on settling the terminology of the non-
monetary items first, even when the FOP pointed out that there
was already substantial agreement on these items. The city
finally agreed to talk about money at the fifth negotiating ses-
sion. A week later, negotiations broke off for a month. Some city
officials pointed to the inability and inexperience of the FOP
leadership and their bargaining team as the reason for the
stalemate. Others, including some members of the city council,
subsequently blamed the personnel director for failing to bargain
in good faith, and the city manager for supporting him and not
adequately informing the council about the status of negotia-
tions. The personnel director was also the main target of FOP
criticism. The difficulties between them were nothing new.
Almost immediately after Falk was hired in February 1974, he
became involved in the police negotiations. The resentment and
bitterness toward him that developed in 1974 continued into the
1975 negotiations, and the sessions were hostile. At one point, he
was allegedly threatened by members of the police bargaining
team. An attorney who was present at the time reportedly said "I
don't believe what I'm hearing. They [the FOP] just told Falk he
better guard his house."15 To some extent the antagonism was
due to a personality conflict between Falk and FOP leadersrBut
there was also widespread resentment of some of the programs he
had implemented, particularly a task analysis. As a result of this
program, several major city departments were reorganized and
more than 300 jobs were cut from the city payroll. In the police
department, manpower had dropped from its peak of 647 in the
summer of 1973 to an authorized strength of 622 in early 1975.
However, due to attrition and the city hiring freeze, the depart-
ment had only 616 commissioned officers, and could not fill the
six vacant positions. In order to put more officers on the street,
the department began to civilianize many headquarters jobs, a
move which many officers viewed as a threat to their job
security.
After a one-month lapse, negotiations resumed on June 5,
1975, but the two sides remained far from agreement as the ex-
piration date of the current contract (June 30, 1975) drew nearer.
Unable to make headway with the city negotiating team, the
FOP negotiators met with city manager Howard McMahan on
June 13, 1975. They were "tired of talking with the horse's ass"
and "wanted to talk to the horse's mouth." The meeting with
McMahan was not very fruitful and the FOP leaders left angry
over the failure to make any progress with the city. By the next
day, the city's third ticket slowdown was well underway as of-
ficers tried to pressure city officials to make concessions.
FOP leaders denied there was a slowdown, since state law
prohibited organized work stoppages by public employee
bargaining groups. When Richard Boyd, chairman of the FOP
bargaining committee was asked about the slowdown, he said
"I've heard that rumor. Maybe they're just not seeing any
violations."16 It was reported that the chief and assistant chief
were "known to strongly sympathize with the officers," although
they could not openly support work slowdowns without being
fired.17 Participation in the slowdown was limited to the patrol
division. Patrol officers were writing an average of seven tickets a
day, compared to the usual 133. Traffic officers, however, con-
tinued to write their normal 265 tickets a day. Some officers
threatened to escalate the job action by stopping neighborhood
patrols or walking off the job if the city did not offer a higher
raise before their contract expired.
While the ticket slowdown continued, the FOP and city
bargaining teams resumed negotiations. Although the two sides
could not agree on money, they did settle many of the non-
monetary items. On June 20, FOP leaders submitted the city's
last offer to their members, who rejected it by a vote of 409 to 22.
In the balloting, officers were able to indicate which parts of the
offer they disliked. Their major complaint was salary, although
they also objected to provisions on health insurance and uniform
allowance. The city had offered an across-the-board raise of
about $70 a month. The FOP was asking for $108, but President
Jim Parsons indicated they would accept a minimum of $100 per
month.18
Anticipating that the members would reject the city's offer,
FOP leaders had begun lobbying city council members to call for
arbitration. They realized that their members would not accept a
negotiated settlement, and that the independent judgment of a
neutral arbitrator was needed. Under Oklahoma law, public
employee unions were bound by the arbitrator's decision, but
cities were not. FOP leaders, therefore, felt that if the city called
for arbitration, it would have a moral obligation to be bound by
the outcome. Parsons questioned why city officials seemed to
fear arbitration if their offer was as "generous" as they said it
was.
On June 24, 1975, the council voted unanimously to request
advisory arbitration under three conditions proposed by the
FOP: first, all issues were arbitrable issues; second, the existing
contract would be extended through arbitration, although the ef-
fective date of the new contract would be an arbitrable issue; and
third, the FOP would guarantee that there would be no job ac-
tions during arbitration. The ticket slowdown ended when the
council approved the arbitration request. In making the motion
for arbitration, one councilman noted that each citizen paid only
$22 a year for police services, while it cost the department about
$50 to answer each call.
Early in July, the firefighters' association informed the city
that it, too, wished to proceed to arbitration. Both sides selected
their representatives on the arbitration panel, but later resumed
negotiations. They reached an agreement in late August.
AFSCME had already settled in early July. Neither contract was
retroactive to July 1, the beginning of the fiscal year.
Over two months elapsed before the police arbitration hear-
ings began. In the interim, the FOP chose a past president of the
national FOP as its representative on the arbitration panel. The
city picked a former Tulsa city attorney who had represented
that city in three arbitrations. The neutral chairman of the pan-
el, an attorney from Oklahoma City, was selected by these two
from a list of nine names submitted by the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service.
The arbitration hearings were held on September 5, 6, and 7,
1975. Prior to the hearing, the city and the FOP had agreed that
the panel would hear evidence on the following items: compensa-
tion including base pay, educational incentive pay and longevity
pay; retroactivity of the pay award to July 1, 1975; overtime and
court payments; insurance for dependents; uniform allowance;
and nonmonetary items, including the elimination of lieutenants
from the bargaining unit. The city offered testimony from the
mayor, the personnel director, the assistant police chief, a city
budget officer, and a city management analyst. The FOP's
witnesses included the assistant chief of police, three university
professors and several police officers. Each side was confident it
had put on a better case and would win.
On October 9, 1975, the arbitration panel issued its recom-
mendations, which were almost entirely in favor of the FOP. The
majority of the panel recommended a 10 percent pay increase
retroactive to August 1, 1975,19 as well as the retention or enlarge-
ment of virtually all existing benefits. Its findings and recom-
mendations stated:
. . . except for an advantage in longevity pay the
Oklahoma City officer is substantially behind his
brother officer in every comparable size city in
Oklahoma, as well as the bordering states. The dif-
ference becomes more substantial as the distance
away from Oklahoma increases. When the Board fol-
lows the provision of the arbitration statute, as it
must, and a similar comparison is made to the wages
and fringe benefits received by skilled employees of
the building trades and industry in the local operating
area, an even greater disparity exists, and this too is
against the police officer . . .
Because of the circumstances described herein a
majority of the members of the Board are of the opi-
nion that were they to recommend that the City's last
basic wage offer to the officers also be the Board's
recommendation, such would, under these facts, con-
stitute an abandonment of their statutory duty
because the net effect of such a recommendation
would be a denial that the Oklahoma City police of-
ficers receive substantially less than do their counter-
parts in Tulsa, Fort Worth, Albuquerque, Wichita,
and a host of other cities throughout the United
States. Moreover, such would also ignore the clear
fact that every skilled employee of the building trades
and industry in the local operating area is now receiv-
ing and will continue to receive substantially higher
wages than the Oklahoma City officer will be receiv-
ing if these recommendations are followed and the in-
creases given.
If the City of Oklahoma officials are unable to
fund the increases recommended here, and the record
is cloudy on such a potentiality, it is their duty to an-
nounce the fiscal posture of our City; however, were
this Board to make a lesser recommendation than is
made here merely for the sake of assurance of adop-
tion by the City, the writer, as one member, believes
he would have done less than his duty because he is
persuaded the officers are entitled to more. His only
restraint in not bringing the Oklahoma City officers
wages up to at least the level of their brother officers
in Tulsa is brought about by the City's emphatic
denial that it has the necessary funds to pay more
than its original offer.
The arbitrators noted that the city had repeatedly denied
that it had enough money to pay the police more than its
previous offer, but they also pointed out that Tulsa was "receiv-
ing the economic benefit from a two percent City sales tax."
Oklahoma City had only a 1 percent sales tax.
The arbitrators' recommendations stunned city officials. At
first, members of the council were uncertain whether they would
follow them, because they believed that the city did not have the
money to fund the raises and that paying them might require the
layoff of 350 city employees. Several council members
emphatically denied that the city had a moral obligation to ac-
cept the recommendations. Mayor Latting said that the council
would not take action until the next week when a report was due
on how city income had matched projections for the first three
months of the fiscal year. Much later, after the strike, some
members of the council acknowledged that it had been a mistake
to request arbitration. They blamed the city manager for not
adequately informing them about the status of negotiations and
for assuring them that they would win in arbitration. One coun-
cilman also admitted that at the time he did not know how much
money the city could afford to spend on police raises, and that
he, therefore, relied on the city manager's advice that the ar-
bitrators' recommendations were wrong. "I voted out of ig-
norance," he said. "I operated like a blind fool."
Police officers were "very angry and upset" at council
members' reactions to the arbitrators' decision. The FOP held
two meetings to discuss what to do if the council rejected the
recommendations. The general consensus was that they would
initiate a job action by not answering police radios. They did,
however, intend to respond to calls for service. Parsons warned
the city that there was "a real good possibility" FOP members
would vote for a strike, work slowdown or a blue flu if they did
not receive the 10 percent raise. He said he expected the council's
decision before the expiration date of the current contract. "Our
74-75 contract runs out on October 21. We're giving them plenty
of time. We're not rushing them."20 At least two members of the
council publicly advocated the dismissal of any striking officers,
but the threats had little effect as militance over the pay issue
grew. "The city says they'll abide by the decision only if it's
favorable to them. That's highhanded double talk, like we've
been used-to for years. Lots of men who never mentioned the
word strike are now talking about organizing and leading it if
they back up and give us the shaft,"21 one officer said. Another
expressed similar feelings: "This city has neglected the services
the citizens of this town want the most and now they are going to
have to face the music."22
A few days before the council was scheduled to vote on
police salaries, it became apparent that it would reject the 10
percent pay hike recommended by the arbitration panel. At a
meeting on Sunday, October 19, 1975, council members con-
tinued to claim that the city could not afford the 10 percent in-
crease, because of disappointing income from the city sales tax
and fears that federal revenue sharing would not be continued.
Several councilmen asserted that they were not morally bound
by the arbitrators' decision, but that they were demonstrating
their "good faith" by working overtime to resolve the disputes.
They criticized the arbitrators' recommendation, saying that the
arbitrators did not take into account the city's ability to pay.23
They were also concerned that if they gave the police a 10 per-
cent raise, they might have to give it to all city employees. Any
doubts the FOP had about the council's intentions were removed
when a council committee rejected a proposal made by Chief
Purser that 18 vacant police positions be left unfilled, and that
salary and benefit funds allocated to them be given to current of-
ficers. The council was scheduled to vote on the pay raise at its
regular meeting on Tuesday, October 21. In anticipation of the
outcome, the FOP scheduled meetings after the council meeting
to decide a course of action.
As expected, on Tuesday, the council unanimously rejected
the 10 percent raise recommended by the arbitrators, and in-
stead voted to raise police salaries by 7.5 percent, the same
amount the FOP had rejected in June.24 The council also deleted
the rank of senior patrolman from the police pay scale and froze
the salaries of officers holding this rank until the pay scale for
patrolmen caught up with their salaries.26 With additional
benefits approved by the council, the total package amounted to
an 8.3 percent increase.26 For 42 percent of the officers below the
rank of captain, the 7.5 percent increase meant a total raise of
12.5 percent in 1975. These officers were already expecting an
automatic 5 percent annual merit increase, which was given to
officers whose base pay was below the highest base salary
authorized for their rank. Management employees did not
receive merit raises unless specifically authorized by their super-
visors.
Following the council meeting, the police held a brief
meeting at the FOP lodge and decided to meet twice a day to
stay abreast of any new developments. At 3 p.m. they launched a
work slowdown as planned, and threatened to walk off the job en
masse if any officer were suspended for participating in it. The
slowdown consisted of not writing traffic tickets and not
acknowledging radio calls. Officers did not answer the dis-
patchers, but did follow their instructions by going to scenes of
crimes and calls for assistance. However, some nonpriority calls,
i.e., where there was no serious threat to life or property, were ig-
nored. In the police communications center, dispatchers had no
way of knowing which cars, if any, were responding to the calls.
Jim Parsons warned that the slowdown "might last until next
year."27
Although Chief Purser officially opposed the slowdown, he
expressed sympathy for the officers, and said, "I have a great
deal of confidence in our officers. I also have an awareness of
their problems. I feel the officers are very deserving of the money
the arbiters agreed upon, and I feel that because they were
deserving that it is unfortunate that the City Council could not
find enough money to grant the raise to both the officers and
other city employees. Our officers do not want to strike, but they
have relayed to the administration of this department that they
feel they have no alternative but to take some type of job ac-
tion."28 Despite his sympathy for the officers, the chief an-
nounced that any officer found to be taking part in the slowdown
would be suspended by his supervisor for that day. He placed all
command officers above the rank of lieutenant on 12-hour shifts.
Lieutenants and sergeants were in the FOP bargaining unit.
The slowdown and radio silence continued throughout
Wednesday, October 22. Lieutenants and sergeants were advised
that if they knew of a specific case in which an officer failed to
respond to a call for police service, and did not take disciplinary
action, they would be suspended along with the officer involved.
Many supervisors, nevertheless, either openly or covertly sup-
ported the slowdown. "I can't suspend a man for something I
don't see him do and I'm not out looking," explained a patrol
sergeant.29 One administrator said he did not expect any suspen-
sions because "it's so damn hard to prove, the way they're going
about it. If I give somebody a direct order and he doesn't follow
it, well then I've got him. But if he doesn't answer the radio to get
the order, what can I do?"30
City officials, meanwhile, kept a low profile in order to avoid
inflaming the situation. They felt that by staying as quiet as pos-
sible, the dissident police officers would have the burden of
sustaining the job action.
The strategy seemed to work. By Thursday, October 23,
1975, the slowdown was losing momentum and FOP leaders were
considering a plan to get someone fired in order to bolster sup-
port. They never had to put the plan into effect, however,
because a rumor that a lieutenant was being fired for refusing to
order his men to end the slowdown swept through the depart-
ment. The rumor started on Thursday when a major called
several supervisors, including the lieutenant, into his office and
threatened that someone would be fired unless the slowdown
stopped. When the meeting ended, someone asked the lieutenant
what had happened, and he replied that he guessed he would be
fired. That afternoon at an FOP meeting emotions reached a
fever pitch over the rumored firing. A detective gave an impas-
sioned speech exhorting the police to action. He told them that
they had taken enough abuse from the city and that it was time
to do something. Amid a lot of commotion there was a voice vote
to march to City Hall. At 3:55 p.m. Parsons called the chiefs
office and said that he had "lost control" and "couldn't handle
it," and that the officers would probably take some kind of ac-
tion by 4:30 p.m.
Over 200 officers streamed out of the FOP lodge to begin the
five-block march to City Hall. Many of the officers did not know
why they were going there. The vote at the FOP meeting had
been very confused. Some thought they had voted to strike;
others thought they had voted to demonstrate their solidarity to
the city council. Some could not hear what the vote was about. "I
don't know what we're marching for. Somebody just said we're
going to City Hall," one officer said. "They've suspended an of-
ficer," said another. "We're going over there to quit too."
"Nobody's been suspended yet. We're going over to demand that
they give us a nine percent raise and fire Dave Falk," said still
another. "I heard they've suspended Parsons. We're going to
back him up" was another comment.31
At 4:15 p.m. an unauthorized radio dispatch was transmit-
ted to all on-duty police officers advising them to report to City
Hall. As officers in patrol cars passed the marchers they were
urged to "park it. Get over here. We're going to City Hall."32 By
4:20, most on-duty officers had arrived at City Hall, where they
parked and locked their vehicles and joined the off-duty officers
who had walked from the FOP lodge. They proceeded to the city
manager's office where council members were gathering for an
emergency finance committee meeting. Parsons told the city
manager that they wanted the raise recommended by the ar-
bitrators. McMahan refused. Parsons then told him he had not
worked for five days and asked to be suspended. Again, the city
manager refused. "Oh hell, then I'll suspend myself," said
Parsons, as he threw his badge on the table at which the mayor,
the city manager, and the council members were seated. Im-
mediately, dozens of other officers in the room flung down their
badges in front of the surprised city officials. Those outside the
room waited their turn, and within a few hours most of the
department's 594 officers had filed into the meeting room and
tossed their badges on the table as officers outside the building
cheered. Many veteran officers placed long careers on the line as
they threw in their badges. They included: every member of the
detective division's robbery homicide detail, which was
traditionally the most prestigious group in the department; at
least 15 men with less than one year until retirement, when they
could leave with a pension; several recently promoted
probationary supervisors who could be reduced to their previous
rank; detectives from the elite organized crime unit; two of the
patrol division's shift commanders and almost half of its
sergeants.33 One officer who had been shot a few weeks earlier
while trying to make an arrest was carried in on a stretcher to
turn in his badge. Another came in with a broken arm, and still
another on crutches.34
The badge turn-in was spontaneous. Many officers ex-
plained that years of pent-up anger and distrust caused by al-
leged City Hall neglect of the police department had boiled over
in an emotional sudden explosion. "It had to come sometime,"
said a lieutenant who had turned in his badge. "For 15 years I've
heard the city say, wait 'til next year and you'll get a better deal,
and all we ever got was the shaft." Many officers acknowledged
that their critics would accuse them of shirking their respon-
sibility to the public. "That's true," one officer admitted. "We
are guilty. But the city is just as guilty for treating us the way
they have for years. It took something like this to make the
public finally realize that things are wrong in this town."36
While officers were turning in their badges, Chief Purser
notified the highway patrol and nearby county sheriffs to provide
emergency assistance. Within an hour, 17 sheriffs deputies and
100 state troopers were in the city. Mayor Latting assured the
public that "the safety of the people of Oklahoma City will be
carried out."36 Earlier in the week, the chief had received as-
surances from the sheriffs in nearby counties that they would
provide deputies to help patrol the city in case of a strike. He also
contacted Commissioner Roger Webb of the highway patrol to
ask for the patrol's assistance. Webb quickly agreed, and the
chief and two majors met with the patrol command staff to
develop a contingency plan. The plan provided that highway
patrol headquarters would handpick 140 veteran officers to be
sent to Oklahoma City. The patrol limited the number of person-
nel it provided to 140 to forestall accusations that it was over-
reacting to the strike and leaving the rest of the state un-
protected. Many of the troopers were pulled from special units
such as motor vehicle inspection and safety education which
were not involved in traffic enforcement. While in Oklahoma
City, the troopers were under the command of a captain, three
lieutenants and seven sergeants. Their command center was
highway patrol headquarters.
Commissioner Webb decided that he would send troopers to
the city even if the FOP asked him not to. Although he was not
certain how the troopers would respond to such a request, he felt
that in the final analysis they would follow orders. The issue
never arose, however, because the FOP never asked the highway
patrol to stay out of the city.
In accordance with the department's contingency plan, all
the state troopers were assigned to patrol duty. They were
divided into three shifts. Each trooper was given a city map and
assigned an Oklahoma City patrol car and patrol district. There
were some initial problems when some of the cars were not im-
mediately available, because patrol officers had parked them on
various downtown streets and joined the march to City Hall.
Many of the officers also locked the cars and took the keys. Once
the car situation was resolved, the troopers' main problem was
unfamiliarity with Oklahoma City streets. They repeatedly had
to ask directions to calls over the police radio, and a few got lost.
This problem was later alleviated, to some extent, when striking
police officers rode with the troopers to give them directions. At
first, the troopers also had some difficulty adjusting to
Oklahoma City's communications equipment and radio codes,
but they soon became familiar with them.
Other parts of the department's contingency plan were also
implemented. Sheriffs deputies helped patrol the streets and
handled investigations usually conducted by detectives. Techni-
cians for investigations were provided by the sheriffs and the
state bureau of investigation. Private security guards were hired
to protect police headquarters. The department also notified off-
duty and vacationing officers to return to work, but most
responded by going to City Hall to turn in their badges. An
emergency priority system for dispatching calls was put into ef-
fect. Violent crimes and emergency calls for assistance received
top priority. Calls that were considered minor and not in need of
police response could be disregarded. The chief asked citizens in-
volved in noninjury traffic accidents to exchange information
and arrange for wreckers themselves.
In all, 551 of Oklahoma City's 594 police officers went on
strike. Most of the 43 who worked were command officers. Only
16 patrol officers remained on duty, and some of them worked
with the FOP's approval because of special individual circum-
stances. At first, all the airport police walked off the job, but the
FOP instructed the sergeants to go back to work because they did
not want to close the airport.37
At a brief meeting of the city council Thursday night, Chief
Purser gave a verbal status report assuring that the public was
"adequately" protected. He told the council that with the out-
side assistance, there were more police cars on the street than
was normal for a Thursday night. The council did not discuss the
situation and took no action. The meeting lasted three and one-
half minutes.
After turning in their badges, striking police officers met for
a strategy session in a movie theater across the street from City
Hall. They were given a set of "action guidelines" and a state-
ment of their case against the city, entitled "A Case of Bad
Faith." The guidelines stated:
There will be no demonstration lines around the
police station.
All officers who wish to wear a uniform around the
[FOP lodge] hall or theater will place a flower in their
holster.
No weapons will be carried.
No information to news media except through FOP
spokesman.
If any man sees a felony being committed he will act
in the capacity of a good citizen, make the arrest, and
call headquarters.
There will be no use of malt or alcoholic beverages
during this time.
Keep out of trouble and keep the citizens behind us.
Do not embarrass the FOP or yourself.
Let wives answer the phone and take messages.
Extra jobs requiring uniforms and weapons should not
be worked for the time being.
Our most important job is to stay unified until a solu-
tion is reached.18
There was no picketing because FOP leaders wanted to avoid
confrontations with citizens and the highway patrol. They were
also afraid that picket lines might keep other city employees
from going to work, and they did not want the job action to
spread beyond the police department. Still, the leaders were
determined "to keep everyone together." They were afraid that
they would lose their members' support "if everyone went home
to watch television." Since there were no picket lines, they kept
members occupied by scheduling numerous activities and
meetings at the theater.
Neither the city nor the FOP would say when negotiations
would resume. The city manager expressed the city's willingness
to talk, but FOP leaders decided to wait a day to see if the coun-
cil wanted to negotiate.
City officials and the FOP were careful not to call the badge
turn-in a strike. Oklahoma law prohibited police strikes and
made violations of this provision a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine of $10 to $100 for each day.39 FOP officials called their action
"mass resignation" and "voluntary termination." The city
manager said that the officers who did not report for duty were
on leave without pay for payroll purposes. When he was asked
when a job action becomes a strike, he replied, "I think it would
take someone who knows more about the law than I do."40 City
officials were, in fact, uncertain about the status of the officers
who had turned in their badges. The city's legal staff was unable
to state unequivocably whether the officers had resigned or were
participating in an illegal strike. The city manager did arrange,
however, to run half-page advertisements in all daily Oklahoma
City newspapers on Saturday, seeking applicants to replace the
striking city police officers.
The first night of the strike was relatively quiet. Police man-
power was at its normal level as about 60 outside law enforce-
ment officers worked throughout the night. There were two
armed robberies and a less than normal amount of traffic acci-
dents, assaults, and other incidents. During the peak hours of
10:30 p.m. to 4:00 a.m., only nine people were arrested compared
to the usual average of 40 to 50. A department official speculated
that some incidents may not have been reported because of the
department's request that the public call the police only when
absolutely necessary. He also attributed the slow activity to the
fact that the troopers and deputies were being asked to respond
to emergency calls only, while most other calls (e.g., burglaries,
vandalism and disturbances) were not broadcast. "Mainly that's
because 99 percent of them out there don't know how to handle
that kind of call," he explained.41
Friday, October 24, 1975, was payday for all city employees,
and city officials attempted to use the paychecks to force striking
police officers to resign or go back to work. Officers were asked to
sign either of two letters when they picked up their paychecks.
One letter was a termination letter, stating that the officer was
ending his employment. The other letter stated that the officer
was still employed by the city and would abide by its personnel
policies and the state law banning strikes. The city manager
threatened to fire any officer who failed to sign either letter or
who signed the loyalty statement and then failed to report for
duty. None of the officers, however, signed either letter on the
advice of the FOP attorney. Later that day McMahan withdrew
his threat saying that the city had "shifted just a little bit" on
the suspension ultimatum.42
Officials of the Oklahoma City Firefighters' Association ex-
pressed their "sympathy and strong support" for the striking
police on Friday, but asserted that there would be no strike or
slowdown by firefighters. In a formal statement, the firefighters'
president said that the "arbitration award was a fair and just
award" and that the city should abide by it. A union spokesman
added that city officials had not requested firefighters to perform
police duties, but if they did, the firefighters would refuse. The
union's statement was prompted by threats of rank-and-file
firefighters to turn in their union cards if the union leadership
did not speak out on the police strike.43 Many firefighters
reportedly wanted to join the police walkout, but they were dis-
suaded by FOP leaders who told them they did not want their
help. They felt that in the past, the firefighters had ridden on
their coattails and had "sold out" to the city.
Negotiations resumed on Saturday morning (October 26,
1975) with the city manager and city attorney representing the
city and Parsons, the FOP attorney and one other member of the
bargaining team representing the FOP. By this time the FOP
had dropped its earlier demand that the city fire Falk. At one
point the city manager had reportedly offered to fire him if he
could also fire Richard Boyd, chairman of the FOP bargaining
committee.
At the Saturday morning session, the city made its first com-
promise offer since the start of the strike. The offer reportedly
included a 10 percent raise in base pay, but it was coupled
with a reduction in longevity pay and educational benefits. The
FOP members rejected it and voted to stay off the job until the
city made a better offer. Parsons said that although the offer was
unacceptable, it did demonstrate that "progress has been made"
and that an atmosphere of cooperation was present on both
sides." McMahan did not comment on the rejection vote except
to encourage the officers to return to their jobs immediately.
Negotiations were to resume Saturday afternoon.
Meanwhile, pressure to reach a settlement mounted. City
personnel policy required that anyone absent without leave for
more than three days be automatically fired. There was no need
for city officials to threaten to invoke this provision; strikers
would be automatically terminated after three days. Both city
officials and FOP leaders were aware of the policy and anxious to
avoid its implementation. Most strikers, on the other hand, did
not realize they were so close to being fired.
Negotiations continued throughout Sunday. Late in the day
McMahan, Parsons and the attorneys for both sides worked out a
compromise settlement. At 8:45 p.m. police officers voted to ac-
cept the settlement and immediately began pouring into police
headquarters where they were welcomed by a poster signed by
Chief Purser. It read "Badges on the third floor, welcome back."
The chief and the assistant chief greeted each officer at the door
to the classroom where the badges were spread out on long
tables. By 9:25, the station was packed with men and women, ac-
companied by their spouses and children, waiting to pick up
their badges.
Oklahoma City officers took over from the highway patrol
officers at the regular shift change at 11 p.m. on Sunday. At 8:15
a.m., Monday, only about 50 badges remained unclaimed, and
Purser said that they probably belonged to officers assigned to
duty later in the day.
In announcing the strike settlement, the city manager would
not speculate on whether the city council would approve it.
However, he did say that he had frequently consulted with coun-
cil members during the previous few days. According to the
mayor, the negotiators had not polled the council to determine
whether it would ratify the settlement. "I assume that if the
police decide to go back on the street that's their decision" she
said, adding that the council "isn't bound by their actions. . . .
When negotiation teams consider proposals, they can't be on
anything other than a tentative basis."45 She stated that the
council had no plans to meet on Sunday and assumed that it
would consider the settlement at its regular meeting on Tuesday,
October 28, 1975.46
The settlement gave all officers except cadets (trainees) a 9
percent raise, but cut educational incentive pay by one third.
The city abandoned its quarter-master system in which officers
were issued uniforms and accessories up to a cost of $110 a year.
Instead they were to be given $120 outright to purchase their own
uniforms. The settlement was to be retroactive to August 1,1975.
It also provided that the contract could be renegotiated if the
city got any new revenue such as through an additional sales tax.
All officers who participated in the strike were docked five days'
paythree days for the time lost in the walkout and an ad-
ditional two days as a punitive measure. In effect, the settlement
was a break-even compromise since the raises were offset by
reductions in educational incentive pay and the loss of five days'
pay. The FOP, however, made up the wages lost during the strike
to officers who requested it because of financial hardship. These
payments cost the FOP $15,000.
The city manager released figures showing that the cost of
the settlement did not exceed the city's original pay offer of
$481,700. When the total cost of police officers' benefits was
reduced by the savings in educational incentive pay and docked
pay, the net cost of the settlement was $481,348. Basically, the
settlement amounted to a redistribution of the money the city
had already set aside for police salaries. However, the 9 percent
raise gave the police a higher pay base for the 1976 negotiations.
On Monday, October 27, 1975, some members of the council
expressed their surprise and anger at the settlement. One
denounced the city's "capitulation" to police demands, while
others raised legal questions about the settlement.47 The city
manager's standing with the council had been hurt, and at least
one councilman was reportedly ready to fire McMahan if it came
to a vote. However, such a vote was considered unlikely, and
never did occur. Despite some council members' displeasure with
the settlement and the way negotiations were handled, the coun-
cil was expected to approve the pact.
On Tuesday, October 28, 1975, the council approved the set-
tlement by a 6 to 3 vote, after some members delivered blistering
attacks on the FOP. Because the actual contract was not ready
in time for the meeting, the council instead approved a resolu-
tion adopting the settlement and rescinding the pay hikes it had
approved the week before. The three councilmen who opposed
the settlement warned that the council was condoning illegal
strikes by public employees. One declared:
If strikes can intimidate us, so can the threat of
strikes. The city's ability to bargain is thus damaged.
And if the firemen should strike, will the striking
policemen arrest them? And if the garbage collectors
strike, who will arrest them? If our law officers break
the law, our entire legal structure suffers for it. The
rule of law becomes the rule of men. . . . The strike
broke the law. It was a violation by those first sworn to
uphold the law, and they should not profit from it.46
Another councilman called the strike "capitulation" and
called for appropriate disciplinary action in place of the settle-
ment.
If we accept this contract, our only protection
from the intimidation of future strikes may be to say,
"We're gonna be tough next time," but who is going to
believe us. What are we saying to them (the
firefighters and AFSCME) and their leadership if we
accept this contract? Are we saying that they were
fools to abide by the law and to exercise moderation?
Are we saying that the police have done better by us-
ing the intimidation of an unlawful work action?49
On November 11, 1975, there were news reports that some
members of the council would suggest that the council grant the
police the benefits contained in the settlement but not approve
the FOP contract. In response, Parsons renewed an earlier threat
to initiate recall petitions against any council member who voted
against the contract. The next day, November 12, 1975, the
council deferred action on the contract for a week. The contract
was finally approved on November 8, 1975, by a 5 to 4 vote.
Immediately after the strike, there was a great deal of bit-
terness between the FOP and city officials. Gradually, as the bit-
terness diminished, the two sides developed a better relationship
than had existed prior to the strike. Personnel changes were in
part responsible for the new rapport. Both McMahan and Falk
resigned in the spring of 1976 and their successors and the FOP
quickly established a harmonious relationship. But probably
more important was the fact that the aftereffects of the strike
were limited. There was no litigation arising from the strike, no
disciplinary action other than the loss of two days' pay, no elec-
tions in which the strike was an issue, and no confrontations
between the strikers and the public. By the time 1976 negotia-
tions got underway, there was little mention of the strike in the
press.
Although the strike settlement alleviated the salary problem
to some extent, other issues remained unresolved. Two years
after the strike, poor supervisory practices and inadequate man-
power were still common complaints. The initial animosity
between strikers and those who had not participated in the walk-
out had abated but not disappeared. "We all remember" said
one striker, "who walked out and who didn't."
NOTES
1. A 1967 survey of police salaries in 30 similar-sized cities
(250,000-300,000 population) prepared by tha Oklahoma City Police
Department, revealed that overall, Oklahoma City ranked last.
Patrolmen's salaries were listed as the lowest among the 30 cities, and
detectives' salaries as next to last. A rookie patrolman received $425 a
month and could reach a maximum of $475.
2. Oklahoma Journal, July 2, 1972.
3. A previous attempt by Oklahoma City police officers to
organize failed in the early 1950s when the eight organizers were fired
from the police department.
4. 11 Ok.Stat.Ann. Sec. 481.1 et seq.
5. Between 1967 and 1971, base pay for police officers rose from
$425 to $537 a month. Although the police got a raise every year, the size
of each increase varied. In 1968 base pay rose from $425 to $480; in 1969
to $500; in 1970 to $525; and in 1971 to $537.
7. Zausmer, Fred., and Heggy, Tom L. "Bullets and/or
Management," Public Safety Labor Reporter, (May 1976), p. Articles 5-
28.
8. Oklahoma Journal, May 17, 1976.
9. The International Association of Chiefs of Police recom-
mended a response time of five minutes. Daily Oklahoman, January 9,
1976.
10. Oklahoma Journal, May 17, 1976.
11. The raises amounted to an average of $60 a month for the 550
management employees, compared to an average of $70 per month in-
crease in salaries and benefits received by the 3,100 employees
represented by the FOP, the firefighters' association and AFSCME.
Daily Oklahoman, July 13, 1974.
13. Daily Oklahoman, March 25, 1975.
14. Daily Oklahoman, May 24, 1975.
15. Oklahoma City Times, October 24, 1975.
16. Oklahoma Journal, June 14, 1975.
17. Ibid.
18. Daily Oklahoman, June 21, 1975.
19. The monthly raises would range from $74 for starting officers
to a top scale of $113 for senior lieutenants. Average raises amounted to
about $85. The city had offered $67 a month. The 10 percent raises were
expected to cost the city $678,000 a year while the city's offer would cost
$470,000.
20. Oklahoma Journal, October 12, 1975.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Daily Oklahoman, October 20, 1975.
24. The 7.5 percent raise would have added the following average
amounts to annual police salaries: police officers $900; detectives $750;
senior patrolmen $650; sergeants $800; and lieutenants $700. Oklahoma
City Times, October 21, 1975.
25. At the time there were 50 senior patrolmen in the depart-
ment.
32. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
37. Although airport police were not part of the city police
department, they were members of the FOP.
39. The State Firefighters' and Policemen's Arbitration Law
provided that it was "unlawful for any collective bargaining represen-
tative or member of a paid fire department or police department to
strike or engage in any work stoppage." Violators were subject to fines of
not less than $10 nor more than $100 for each day of violation. Convic-
tion constituted grounds for immediate dismissal from public employ-
ment. 11 Okla.Stat.Sec. 548.14.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Sunday Oklahoman, October 26, 1975.
46. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
Las Graces, New Mexico
February 3-March 5, 1976
... I care about this community and the people
in it. That was one of the biggest reasons for my being
a police officer here. And that was one of the bigger
reasons for me going out on strike. It was as much for
the community as for myself and my fellow officers. It
wasn't a matter of money with me. I didn't need a pay
raise. I didn't feel like I was being paid as much as I
should be paid for my qualifications. I felt that I was
being overlooked, and everybody in the police depart-
ment was being overlooked. But that wasn't my
reason for going out on strike. It wasn't pay. I was
making enough to get by. I was paying my bills. My
reason for going out on strike, and I think most of the
people who were involved in the strike, their reason for
going out was the fact that they were just plain
overlooked and never listened to.
There was a grievance procedure on paper in the
city's personnel ordinance and that's all. They hadn't
even elected a grievance committee in a year and a
half. Nobody had ever had any results from that or-
dinance. The only grievance procedures they had was
you go to your sergeant with a grievance and he says
you're not going to get any results out of this, just shut
up and go back and do your job. And the overall
attitudeand I was here for six years and I think I can
say this with some degree of qualificationthe at-
titude seemed to be, in city hallor at least this is
what came down through the administration to the
ill
ranksthe attitude seemed to be, "Keep your mouth
shut and don't make any waves or we'll fire you and
hire somebody else at less pay, save the taxpayers
money so they can go pave another street that they
just paved last month." It seemed ridiculous to me.
And that's why we went out on strike. We wanted to
get it smoothed out. We felt like collective bargaining
and having a say-so in our own plight would help us.
And it must have been something that was pretty
serious throughout the entire city work force;
otherwise the fire department and the municipal
employees wouldn't have walked out right behind us.
You know as well as I do what the effect waswe were
two weeks into the strike before the people at city hall
even admitted that they had a problemto me it was
a matter, maybe, that they were just too proud to say
that they had made a mistake and it was time to
change the priorities and start looking after their peo-
ple. That's why I stood behind the administration un-
til the night I went out on strike, and that's when I
went out and worked for the strike.
I sought support from the community; I sought
support from the business community. I tried to get us
all the support I could. I worked hard for the strike, for
us, and for the community.1
INTRODUCTION
When Las Cruces municipal employees brought their dis-
satisfaction over poor working conditions to the attention of city
officials in early 1975, no one, least of all the employees
themselves, anticipated that within a year the dissatisfaction
would lead to the longest police strike in the United States. Las
Cruces hardly seemed a likely place for a police strike. It was a
quiet, prosperous city of about 44,000 people, and the second
largest city in the state of New Mexico. Labor strife was virtually
nonexistent. Only a small percentage of the private sector labor
force belonged to unions. Public employees were also un-
organized, although most of the police belonged to the Fraternal
Order of Police (FOP) which functioned as a social organization.
Las Cruces, New Mexico 113
The firefighters had formed the Las Cruces Firefighters' Associa-
tion, Local 2362 of the International Association of Firefighters
(IAFF), but it, too, did not function as a labor organization. Part
of the reason was that neither the state nor the city had legisla-
tion authorizing collective bargaining by public employees. The
New Mexico Supreme Court, however, had ruled that bargaining
was permissible to the extent that civil service laws did not
preempt the subject matter of negotiations.*
Concern about the possibility of a police strike in Las Cruces
surfaced briefly in the summer of 1975, after Albuquerque police
went on strike.3 Newspapers surveyed Las Cruces officers and
reported that they had widely divergent feelings about police
strikes. Then interest in the subject quickly faded. No one paid
attention to police comments like "maybe it's time police got
more militant" about their working conditions, and that a
drastic action like the Albuquerque strike might be what was
needed "to wake up" top city officials and the public to the
economic plight of the police.4
Nineteen seventy-six was election year in Las Cruces. The
March election promised to be an interesting one with three seats
on the commission at stake. Politics in Las Cruces during the
previous few years had been lively. The city had a commission-
manager form of government, with the commission selecting one
of its five members as mayor (commission chairman). In 1974,
Carlos Blanco defeated incumbent Mayor T. J. Graham for a
seat on the commission, and a battle over the chairmanship en-
sued. There were 23 rounds of balloting spread over two meetings
before Robert Munson finally beat Blanco for the post. The bit-
terness engendered by the contest was to last even after the two
were no longer on the commission. Attention again focused on
politics in the spring of 1975 when voters in the city's low and
middle Jncome eastside, angry over the issue of community
development, forced the recall of Commissioner Tommy
Thompson, who was Mayor Munson's strongest supporter on the
commission. The mayor and Commissioner Albert Johnson nar-
rowly escaped recall, but they faced a reelection challenge in
March 1976. The third commissioner whose term would expire in
1976 was James Taylor, who had replaced Thompson. However,
he indicated that he would not seek reelection.
Faced with issues such as community development, future
growth and expansion of the city, increased demands for service,
as well as recall and reelection, the commission did little to
resolve the growing employee dissatisfaction which began to sur-
face in early 1975.
Employee dissatisfaction first appeared when the Las
Cruces Firefighters' Association asked for recognition as the
bargaining agent for the city's firefighters. For several months,
the firefighters' association unsuccessfully attempted to per-
suade the city to respond to its grievances. The leaders of the as-
sociation met with the mayor and individual city commissioners.
They also appeared officially before the city commission.
Generally, their dissatisfaction centered around the lack of an ef-
fective grievance procedure, the incompetence of supervisory
and management personnel, the department's failure to profes-
sionalize, and insufficient training. An area of secondary concern
was low pay and inadequate fringe benefits. On two occasions
during this period, the local firefighters' association requested
that the city commission recognize it as the bargaining agent for
the firefighters. Both requests were denied. The second of the
two requests for recognition came in November 1975, at which
time the city commission told the firefighters' association that it
would look into drafting an ordinance establishing the necessary
procedures for recognition. Although the commission's action ap-
peared reasonable, it was actually a delaying tactic, because city
officials had no intention of recognizing the firefighters' associa-
tion.
Like the firefighters, police officers were dissatisfied with
their working conditions. Their problems, which were similar to
those of the firefighters, included but were not limited to
management's failure to professionally develop the department,
lack of a functional disciplinary system and inequity of dis-
ciplinary action, supervisors' failure to give credit for a job well
done, favoritism in personnel decisions, the ineffectiveness of a
grievance procedure that existed on paper only, ineffective chan-
nels of communication within the department at both the super-
visory and management levels, alleged corruption within the
department, inadequate in-service training, and a high attri-
tion rate.5 Pay and fringe benefits were a major but secondary
consideration.6 There was also considerable resentment of a pro-
gram to demilitarize the department, which was instituted by
Mayor Munson. The dissatisfaction first surfaced in the fall of
1975 when a number of detectives discussed organizing to air
their grievances and improve the working conditions in the
department. They hoped to get someone in city government to
listen to their concerns.
Since most members of the Las Cruces Police Department
already belonged to the FOP, its president recommended that
the FOP represent the officers' interests. He contacted the
national FOP and requested assistance. The national replied
that it would be some time before the appropriate committee
would be able to consider their request, and that the local FOP
would have to pay for someone from the national to come to as-
sist them. The national also pointed out that the local should
have sent its request through channels to the president of the
state FOP, instead of sending it directly to the national organiza-
tion. The Las Cruces officers were disappointed by the reply, but
not discouraged. Continuing their efforts to organize, they
founded the Las Cruces Police Employees Association (LCPEA)
in November 1975, elected officers, and began a campaign to
bring the problems in the department to the attention of the
public by establishing a speaker's bureau to discuss police-
related issues before civic, educational and political groups. The
association also appointed three special committees to study the
retirement plan, the insurance plan and legislation. Membership
in the association was open to all department employees, not just
commissioned officers. In less than two weeks, the association
claimed that 58 of the 80 officers in the department had joined.
Shortly after the LCPEA was organized, Robert Gordon, the
secretary-treasurer of the International Conference of Police As-
sociations (ICPA),7 and an Albuquerque detective who was an
ICPA vice president, were invited to speak at an LCPEA meeting.
These officials outlined the resources ICPA had to offer, as well
as the strategies which could be used to obtain better working
conditions and increased pay and fringe benefits. They also dis-
cussed the 1975 police strike in Albuquerque, and indicated that
ICPA had never lost a strike. After the meeting, the LCPEA
voted unanimously not to affiliate with ICPA. The members felt
that they understood the local issues better than outsiders did
and could communicate them to the city in a professional man-
ner without outside help. During the next few weeks, members of
LCPEA worked diligently toward their goal of informing the
public about the problems in the police department. The leaders
also approached Chief of Police A. F. "Tony" Gomez on several
occasions to discuss the issues at hand, and the chief indicated
that he would bring these problems to the attention of city of-
ficials. After a few weeks passed and nothing had happened,
LCPEA President Richard Van Alstine and Vice President
Richard Erdie, with Gomez's help, obtained an appointment to
see the city manager in early December to discuss the problems
in the police department.
The meeting with the city manager, Harold Yungmeyer, did
not go well.8 Van Alstine and Erdie left the meeting feeling that
city officials had no intention of seriously considering their
grievances. This belief was fostered by Yungmeyer's attitude
throughout the meeting. He seemed irritated at their presence
and indifferent to their problems. He indicated that it was un-
likely that the city would deal with the LCPEA and told them
that if they did not like the way things were run in Las Cruces,
they could leave. Much of the discussion focused on money. At
one point, Yungmeyer threw the city budget on his desk and said
that the budget was inflexible, and the city could not afford more
than the 5 percent increase scheduled for 1976. From the
LCPEA's standpoint, the most unfortunate aspect of the
meeting was the city manager's failure to realize that pertinent
issues were working conditions rather than salaries. Van Alstine
and Erdie may have contributed to this misunderstanding by
coming to the meeting without a written list of grievances and by
allowing the discussion to shift from working conditions to
salaries and fringe benefits.
Word of the city manager's uncooperative stance spread
rapidly throughout the police department. The association
believed that the city was not going to respond to its grievances
and that outside assistance was required to make the city
seriously consider the issues. Yungmeyer's failure to perceive the
real issues was typical of city officials as a whole. With few ex-
ceptions, they were not aware of the serious conditions that ex-
isted in the police department and even believed, for the most
part, that morale was good.
A few days after the meeting with Yungmeyer, the LCPEA
membership met and reconsidered affiliation with ICPA in order
to obtain assistance in dealing with the city. By a unanimous
vote, the LCPEA moved to affiliate with ICPA. At the same
time, the association changed its name to the Las Cruces Police
Officers Association (LCPOA) to comply with the ICPA require-
ment that members must be sworn officers. The civilian police
employees were, however, permitted to remain in the LCPOA.
In early January, Van Alstine announced that the ICPA
would assist the association in obtaining recognition from the
city commission as the police department's bargaining agent. He
stressed that the group was trying to resolve the issues "in an
orderly and responsible manner."9 But he also emphasized that
many police officers had lost confidence in the city government
because of its refusal to act on department complaints or to sit
down and bargain. "[W]e've got our backs against the wall," he
explained. "If the commissioners won't listen to us, we don't
know what else to do. We've gone all the way down the line trying
to work within the system."10
On January 13, 1976, ICPA Secretary-Treasurer Robert
Gordon sent a letter to the city manager and city commissioners
requesting that he and Van Alstine meet with the commission to
discuss salaries, fringe benefits, and recognition of the LCPOA as
the bargaining agent for its members. The letters addressed to
the city commissioners were sent to the city manager to be
forwarded to the individual commissioners. Some of the commis-
sioners, however, never received the letters. Yungmeyer's reply
to the letter stated only that these issues would be placed on the
agenda for the next commission meeting. Between January 13,
1976, when Gordon sent the letter, and February 2, 1976, when
the city commission met, there were no discussions, meetings, or
negotiations between the LCPOA and city officials. The city
commission was unprepared to discuss recognition at the
meeting. Commissioner Marianne Thaeler did not even know
that the police had organized.
On the night of the city commission meeting, the small
meeting room was packed with over 200 police officers, their
families, supporters and the news media. As time passed and
other matters were considered, someone from the audience stood
up and said that everyone knew why they were there, and that
the commission should get to the issue at hand, namely recogni-
tion of the LCPOA. The commission then turned to recognition.
The first speaker was Van Alstine who advised the commis-
sion that his organization was at the meeting for the purpose of
seeking recognition. He then introduced Robert Gordon, who ex-
plained what ICPA was, as well as various aspects of collective
bargaining and recognition. Mayor Munson responded by saying
that this was the first time the commission had been approached
by the LCPOA either formally or informally concerning recogni-
tion. Various citizens and police officers then addressed the city
commission in support of immediate recognition of the LCPOA.
Association Vice President Rick Erdie told the commission that
he and Van Alstine had spoken to the city manager, but "quite
frankly he didn't leave us any hope. Money is a big issue, but it is
not the only issue. This is our community. We are not going to
hurt it if we can help it, but we need help and we feel recognition
is the best way to get it."11 Nevertheless, the issue of salary was
raised then and dominated the rest of the meeting. The commis-
sioners pointed to the city's decreasing revenue and its limited
power to raise taxes, while the police and their supporters
stressed how low their wages were.12 No one discussed working
conditions in the police department. The discussion about sal-
aries left some of the commissioners feeling offended and intimi-
dated. As tension mounted, the commission voted unanimously
to draft an ordinance setting up the procedures for recognition.
There was no motion or vote on recognition of the LCPOA.
By the time the meeting ended, tension and emotion had
reached a critical level among the police and their supporters.
This atmosphere was largely precipitated by the attitude of the
commission and the city manager throughout the proceeding. To
the officers, the city manager seemed totally disinterested and
contemptuous. At one point, he turned his chair around and
faced the wall. No one believed that the commission really in-
tended to draft a recognition ordinance because the firefighters
had received the same empty commitment a few months earlier
when they attempted to obtain recognition. Moreover, the city
attorney admitted at the meeting that he had three model
recognition ordinances in hand, but was told by the city manager
to keep quiet. The tense situation was also exacerbated by some
of the remarks made by officers and their supporters. One officer,
for instance, threatened to ignore any calls for police assistance
from one commissiorfer. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mayor
Munson told Gordon "You are an expert. You have done a
beautiful job as an outsider. You have succeeded in polarizing
both sides." "You are not going to have a police force tomorrow
morning," replied Gordon, as he led the police out of the com-
mission chambers.13
Immediately after the meeting ended, the members of the
LCPOA along with their families and supporters went to the
FOP lodge to discuss the outcome. Emotions were still very high;
the officers were outraged at the way they had been treated by
the commission. From the start, discussion centered around a
strike. Although other job actions such as a sick-in, slowdown
and speedup were briefly discussed, the members believed that
these were not viable alternatives and that only a strike would
make the city recognize the association. The association's at-
torney stated that there were no statutes in New Mexico govern-
ing police strikes. Since the members were never told that they
could not strike, many of them assumed that a strike was not il-
legal. Many who attended the meeting felt that although Gordon
did not suggest that they strike, he clearly implied that a strike
was the most feasible course of action. For example, he never ad-
vised the association not to strike, and, at one point, he predicted
that a strike would force the city administration to deal with the
association after two days. There was no question in anyone's
mind that the commission's decision to draft an ordinance was
just a stalling tactic, the same tactic that had been used success-
fully with the firefighters. A motion to strike was made and
seconded, and a roll-call vote followed. A few members ab-
stained, but all who voted, voted to strike.
Shortly before midnight, members of the press, who had
been waiting outside the police association meeting, were called
in and advised that the strike would begin at midnight. The dis-
patcher at police headquarters was called and told there was a
strike and. that the graveyard shift would not report for duty.
When officers on duty were notified of the strike, they returned
to the station and walked off the job. Some of them, however, of-
fered to wait until an appropriate number of supervisory person-
nel could assume patrol responsibilities.
Most of the city's police officers and their wives spent the
first night of the strike at the FOP lodge. Almost immediately
after the strike vote, they began to organize, with Gordon advis-
ing them on how to conduct a peaceful strike. He warned them,
for example, against carrying weapons or drinking alcoholic
beverages while on the picket lines. Committees were formed;
picket signs prepared, and strike rules established. The FOP
lodge was designated strike headquarters. The bar there would
be closed until after picket lines were withdrawn each day.
Strikers and their families would take turns working in the
kitchen at the lodge where everyone was fed in shifts. Each day
the strikers would hold two meetings, one in the morning and one
in the evening.
On the first day of the strike (Tuesday, February 3), 69 of
the department's 109 personnel were on strike, including 51 of-
ficers, 1 sergeant, and 17 civilians.14 All supervisory personnel ex-
cept one sergeant reported for duty, because the chief had
threatened to fire any supervisors who struck. Only four
patrolmen, however, stayed on the job. Working hours of non-
strikers were extended to 12-hour shifts, and the state police and
sheriffs department were notified that their help might be re-
quired. These agencies readily agreed to provide any necessary
assistance. Because the dispatchers were on strike, and no one
knew how to operate the communications center, the depart-
ment had to borrow a dispatcher from the sheriffs department.
According to Van Alstine, the LCPOA was prepared for a
lengthy strike. He told reporters, "We are going to stay out as
long as it takes. Not only to win recognition but also to negotiate
a workable contract. We realize that our jobs can be terminated.
But we've gone this far, and we're not about to turn back. We
believe that we have public support."15
The strike spread to the fire department when all firefighters
who were to report for duty at 8 a.m. Tuesday called in sick. As a
result of this action, two fire substations were closed. At 11 a.m.
the firefighters' association met and those present voted un-
animously to strike; 47 firefighters, including 3 lieutenants from
the 64-man department walked off the job. Three fire stations
were abandoned to be manned by 17 personnel, 12 of whom were
fire cadets just three weeks into a fire academy. The firefighters
did not go on strike in sympathy for the police; their action was
completely independent of the police strike, although the two
groups shared strike headquarters at the FOP lodge, and agreed
that neither would settle independently of the other. The
firefighters' president Jimmy Gomez stated that they went on
strike "because we see we stand to benefit from it too, and they
need our support just like we need theirs . . . there's been enough
stalling and running around."16
At 8 a.m. the police formed picket lines in front of the police
department and the municipal building. In order to keep the
demonstration orderly, the association established firm rules
against carrying firearms while picketing and against blocking
entryways. As the picketing continued, city youths drove to city
hall where they blatantly violated traffic laws before the indif-
ferent strikers. Morale on the picket lines was high. Strikers were
enthusiastic, but also serious as they explained to reporters the
difficulties they had supporting their families on their low
salaries. Several strikers blasted the city commission's plan to
consider raising the commissioner's compensation from $10 per
meeting to $4,800 a year, a move advocated primarily by Com-
missioner Marianne Thaeler.17
The strike caught the city by surprise. Neither the city
manager nor city commissioners believed that a strike was likely.
Although a number of city officials including Chief Gomez, City
Manager Yungmeyer, Mayor Munson, and at least one commis-
sioner had been advised that serious problems existed in the
department, they did not realize that the dissatisfaction was of
such proportion that it would ultimately lead to a strike.
For the first few days, the mayor did not feel "particularly
pressured to do anything about the strike," and decided to "wait
and see what develop[ed]."18 He indicated that city officials had
no intention of calling a special meeting of the commission to
deal with the strike.19 He did, however, ask the citizens "to take
extra care in things like driving and activities in the home that
could start fires, because this is a time when we all have to pitch
in and help and take care of each other a little."20
The city's first official response to the strike was to issue a
memo to all police personnel announcing that the department's
sick leave policy would be strictly enforced.21 A second memo,
which was directed to all police and fire personnel, warned that
all personnel who were absent without authorization would be
placed on the inactive payroll, on leave-without-pay status, and
that continued unauthorized absence from duty would subject
employees to disciplinary action.
Aside from issuing the two memos, the city made no at-
tempt for several days to end the strike. Instead, city officials
decided to wait until the strikers had been absent without leave
for five consecutive days, at which time the city could
automatically terminate them pursuant to city personnel policy.
Some commissioners believed that the failure to end the strike
prior to the automatic terminations would provide a convenient
opportunity to reduce the number of police officers, weed out the
less competent and the troublemakers, and use the financial sav-
ings to attract and retain younger and more professional of-
ficers." The city made no attempt to initiate negotiations or any
discussion with the strikers, and failed to respond to any of the
strikers' proposals, even when they "kind of lowered" their
proposals by asking that the city recognize the unions and es-
tablish guidelines for contract talks. Previously they had been
asking for recognition and a contract. Van Alstine stated that
though the unions had tried to get talks underway, the commis-
sioners apparently thought it was "business as usual."
The city also refused the LCPOA's request that a federal
mediator be asked to help resolve the dispute. An official with
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in Albuquerque
had offered his services if his assistance were requested, but the
city commission rejected mediation because it believed it would
be tantamount to recognition of the LCPOA. The mayor an-
nounced that the commissioners, who had been contacted by
telephone "did not feel that a meeting was necessary at this time
to discuss a response" to the mediation proposal, but that the
commissioners were "exploring" the possibility of using a local
mediator.23 The LCPOA rejected the commission's suggestion
that a panel of local citizens be asked to mediate. Van Alstine
maintained that a local panel of unprofessional people would not
work, and they needed to bring in some outside professional help,
such as a federal mediator.
There were indications that Robert Gordon's presence might
be blocking talks betweeen the city and the strikers. To-critics,
he was an "outside troublemaker." The commissioners described
themselves as "irked" and "turned off by his presentation at
the February 2 commission meeting, and believed that he had in-
cited the police to strike. Commissioner James Tayior called
Gordon's remarks "harsh." Commissioner Marianne Thaeler
said the strike was "totally unfair. ... I don't think it was the
proper action for the police department to take at this time. I'm
sorry that a man from New York could come in and disrupt this
city so." Mayor Munson called Gordon a "sharp guy" and added
"our police are^getting in over their heads. This whole field of
organized labor is something these guys haven't got much ex-
perience with. The union sent in a sharp guy and he stampeded
the troops." The major compared the situation to "a dirty book
going through a girls' seminaryit causes a wave of immediate
hysteria. ... I don't want to burn any bridges. I think we have a
good police force. They know they're good, and they know they're
worth more than we can afford to pay them. I only wish we could
pay them what they deserve." Another commissioner suggested
that two or possibly three commissioners who were prepared to
favor recognition had been turned off by Gordon's presentation
which had "managed to hit a sore spot with just about
everyone."24 Because of the commissioners' attitudes towards
him, Gordon offered to remove himself from the strike if the com-
missioners would negotiate with the striking police, but the city
did not respond to his offer.
City officials' negative attitudes towards Gordon were more
than a personality conflict or a local reaction to an outsider.
Several city officials, including commissioners and top ad-
ministrators, believed the strike was part of a concerted effort by
national labor unions to organize public employees in New Mex-
ico. Gordon's presence, along with that of a national official from
the IAFF who had come to Las Cruces to assist the striking
firefighters, reinforced this belief.
As the standoff continued, the city manager instructed the
city personnel department to automatically terminate for cause
any employee who exceeded five consecutive days of un-
authorized absence. The strikers received a notice to this effect
with their Friday paychecks. Any striker who was fired pursuant
to this policy could, however, apply for reemployment as a new
employee. The mayor said that the city would not be vindictive
and would rehire ex-employees, but that there might be some
personnel cuts.
By Saturday (February 7,1975), the strike was five days old,
and there still had been no formal face-to-face discussions
between the strike leaders and city officials. Commissioner
Carlos Blanco tried to get the commission to meet on Saturday to
talk to association leaders, but when he arrived at City Hall he
found that the building was locked and that the meeting had not
been officially announced. The only other commissioner to show
up was Mayor Munson, and the meeting was cancelled. The
mayor said the other commissioners, who had been polled Friday
night at Blanco's request "had been unable to get together and
frankly did not desire to do it."26
At noon the same day, there was a brief support rally for the
strikers on the steps of the municipal building, attended by
about 250 people. Then police and firefighters led a march to
Mayor Munson's house, where the mayor met with them. Once
again the strikers asked him to convene the city commission and
start negotiations for a strike settlement. The mayor told them
he could not promise anything and that the commission would
not make a decision on the issue of recognition as long as they
remained on strike.
The first meeting between strike leaders and city commis-
sioners was held Sunday night (February 8) at a local restaurant.
The mayor and several commissioners attended on behalf of the
city. Leaders of the police and fire associations represented the
strikers. The meeting was unofficial because the city attorney
had warned the commissioners that the state's open meeting law
required that all formal meetings of three or more commissioners
had to be public and announced.26 The next morning (February
9), each side called a press conference to explain what had tran-
spired at the meeting. Mayor Munson said he had offered to poll
the commission and to recommend "acknowledgement that the
police and fire associations exist and have affiliated with
national organizations," if the strikers would agree to return to
work. The offer included a "no reprisals" promise and a commis-
sion commitment "to proceed immediately to work on an or-
dinance which would provide the mechanism for recognition and
negotiations, while at the same time, protecting the rights of all
employees." The mayor also reiterated the likelihood that the
commission would reduce the size of the police department dur-
ing the rehiring process, and added that the "no reprisals" seg-
ment of his offer would not remain open past that morning, Van
Alstine and Gomez said they rejected this proposal because the
city failed to include a 30- to 60-day limit on enacting the or-
dinance, and failed to recognize the two associations. "Saying we
exist is far short of recognition as a bargaining agent. . . . We
feel that this is an attempt on the part of the commissioners to
cloud the issue and confuse the public."27 Commissioner Blanco
was also critical of the offer and called it "double talk." "We
were not saying anything except that the Commission was being
asked to say they were aware of the existence of a union, and I
think that's pretty obvious."28 He said he saw no alternative to
recognition. <*~
Because the strike continued, the city carried out its threat
and terminated all striking police and firefighters on Monday,
pursuant to the automatic termination procedures for absence
without leave. The personnel director sent the strikers letters in-
forming them of the termination and giving them until February
18 to turn in all uniforms, identification cards, badges, keys and
other city property. Once again Commissioner Blanco criticized
the city's action. He felt that the commissioners and strikers
should sit down together and talk in person and that the city
manager should be instructed not to terminate the strikers. "If
we have valid negotiations going on," he asked, "why go through
that trouble?"29
Late Monday afternoon, the mayor appeared before the
strikers at the FOP lodge to explain his view of the strike and
answer questions.30 He restated the commission's stand and
criticized police efforts to organize. He compared the ICPA
representative to an encyclopedia salesman, "Right now, you feel
great about that encyclopedia. But will you continue to feel good
about it. Are unions the wave of the future or the last slosh of the
past." He said the strike, along with the aggressive presentation
by the ICPA secretary-treasurer at the commission meeting,
"drove us into acting like old-fashioned 1930's style manage-
ment. Sure we can be driven there; but I don't want to be there."
He called the strike "an ultimatum. It's probably your ultimate
tool, but you used it up all at once."31 The strikers listened silent-
ly to the mayor, but were not persuaded by his arguments.
The city's labor problems intensified on Tuesday (February
10) when 41 percent of its 240 blue-collar employees struck after
the city turned down their request for union recognition. Due to
the strike, trash collection and routine utility services were
suspended. Like the firefighters' walkout, the blue-collar
workers' strike was an independent action, not coordinated with
the police strike. With this additional walkout, just over half of
the city's 580-person work force was on strike. In response to the
walkout, the mayor announced that all striking blue-collar
workers would be terminated if they did not return to work by
Tuesday, February 17. The blue-collar employees had organized
soon after the start of the police strike. That strike was barely
two days old when the Brotherhood of Railroad and Airline
Clerks and the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) began efforts to organize all
city employees not affiliated with either the police or firefighters'
associations. Within a week, a majority of the employees had
chosen AFSCME which then demanded recognition.
Realizing that they lacked the expertise to deal effectively
with the city's labor problems, the commission sought pro-
fessional assistance by hiring the Albuquerque law firm of
Campbell, Cherpelis and Pica which specialized in labor law.
After assessing the situation, George Cherpelis advised the com-
missioners that the way they handled the strike would have long-
term ramifications for the city. He told them "The ultimate solu-
tion to your problem lies not only in the legal aspects, but in the
practical aspects. You're going to be running this city a long
time, and the people you've gotten all stirred up are not going to
move away so the solution has to deal with how to put this city
back together and continue trying to make it a decent place to
live."32 He indicated that the city was in a "no-man's land"
because there was no state statute on collective bargaining.
"There being no public act, there are no rules," he said.33
Cherpelis's assessment of the city's personnel practices was
equally candid. He criticized the personnel ordinance as very
broad, covering "damn near everything," and called the city
grievance procedure a "monstrosity." "Communication," he told
the commissioners, "was very poor up and down, not just down,
between employees and supervisors. Grievances, real or
imagined, it does not matter. Either one can precipitate
problems. If the city decides to start replacing its fired personnel,
striking employees will probably resort to violence, but I could
not predict to what extent."34
Meanwhile, because he was not making any headway deal-
ing directly with the city, Jimmy Gomez, the president of the
firefighters' association, asked the director of a federal jobs
program in Las Cruces to mediate the dispute. Mayor Munson
and Van Alstine agreed to let him try to work out a settlement.
By Tuesday (February 10), he had worked out a proposed settle-
ment which called for the establishment of a "mutual
negotiating unit" which would develop an ordinance covering all
aspects of personnel management and include provisions for
bargaining privileges. The ordinance was to be enacted within 90
days. The mutual negotiating unit would be composed of three
commissioners, one representative of each of the striking unions,
a legal representative for each side, and one outside represen-
tative from the community or the American Arbitration Associa-
tion. In the meantime, the strikers would return to their jobs,
promising no reprisals against other city employees or the com-
mission. In turn, the city would permit the strikers to return at
their former ranks and pay grades without any reprisals. The
proposal also called for the commission to recognize the existing
employee groups as unions, and place collective bargaining in
abeyance until the ordinance was passed.34
At a special meeting on Thursday (February 12), the com-
mission rejected the proposed settlement. The debate revealed
that a majority of the commission was opposed to the settlement
and, instead, wanted its legal staff to try to obtain more
favorable terms for the city.36 They instructed Cherpelis to
negotiate with employee representatives and return to the com-
mission with a report by noon Saturday (February 14). The com-
mission was scheduled to respond to the report on Saturday
night. Prior to authorizing further negotiations, the commission
voted down by 3 to 2 a motion supported by Commissioners
Albert Johnson and Marianne Thaeler, which would "deny
recognition to all unions here or that may come forth as collective
bargaining agents" until an ordinance could be drafted.
The strikers broke off negotiations with the city the next day
(Friday, February 13) because the city demanded that any set-
tlement include the demotion of a police sergeant and three fire
lieutenants who had joined the walkout. The commission, city
manager, and chief of police insisted on downgrading in rank all
supervisory personnel who struck, because they were concerned
about "disorderly conduct" and other problems between super-
visors who stayed on the job and those who would be reinstated
without loss of position.37 The key to the dispute was whether or
not the police sergeant and three fire lieutenants were part of the
supervisory personnel in their respective departments. The as-
sociation leaders declared that they were not, while the city
maintained that they were and that their reinstatement would
be disruptive to command efficiency and morale in their respec-
tive agencies.
The breakdown left some doubt about the future of the
special commission meeting scheduled for 7 p.m. Saturday,
which most observers felt would be a decisive point in the strike.
The strikers realized that if no settlement were reached by
Saturday, their hopes would depend on the outcome of the
March 2 municipal elections, in which three positions on the
commission were at stake. The LCPOA announced the formation
of a "political action committee" to search out and elect pro-
union candidates.
The commission meeting Saturday night lasted 15 minutes.
City officials decided to halt strike activities and return the city
to normal by instituting legal action and replacing all strikers. A
position statement read by the mayor and unanimously endorsed
by the commissioners, outlined an 11-point plan for dealing with
the "illegal, unwarranted, and irresponsible" strike and restoring
city services. The major features of the plan were:
(1) The city rejected the recognition demands of the three
unions and "the concept of preparing a collective
bargaining ordinance."
(2) The city manager was to review all city wage and
salary structures and reevaluate all present manning
requirements "with an eye toward reducing or
eliminating nonessential and low priority jobs and ser-
vices." Any savings realized in personnel reductions
were to be used "to improve the existing wage and
salary levels and employee benefits as quickly as these
savings may be determined."
(3) The city was to begin advertising to fill vacancies
created by the strike. Any striking employees who
were rehired would be treated as new employees "but
without retaliation for their having participated in
this illegal strike." Any former supervisors who were
rehired would not be reinstated to their former super-
visory positions. Hiring was to begin Tuesday,
February 17.
(4) The city staff was instructed to review the existing
personnel ordinance and policy manual and submit
recommendations for making it "more responsive to
the needs of employees and . . . more easily ad-
ministered by the city with particular attention to
providing better upward communications between
employees and management, and a simpler, more ef-
fective grievance procedure."
(5) The city attorney and the special counsel were to com-
mence immediately all necessary legal actions to
preserve the interest of the city, including injunctions,
damage actions and any other available relief.
In a last minute addition to the plan, the commission said it
would "continue to be receptive to any proposals by strikers or
their representatives which are directed toward a resolution of
the problem."
Following the meeting, Rick Van Alstine addressed a packed
house at the FOP lodge, and initiated a mass badge turn-in. "We
pretty well know what the city commission thinks of us," he said,
as he threw his badge on a nearby table. About 45 striking police
officers followed suit, as did Jimmy Gomez and some of his fel-
low firefighters. The officers had requested that former police
chief Ben Silva come to the lodge to accept the badges, but he
did not come, and they were collected by Chief Gomez who had
also been asked to attend the meeting.
As the strike was about to enter its third week (February 14),
the city sought to halt strike activities by filing for an injunction
in New Mexico District Court seeking damages from the strikers,
guaranteeing access of employees and other individuals to city
buildings, and preventing union leaders from striking or en-
couraging others to strike. In its complaint, the city alleged
among other things that the strike had "created an emergency of
such a grave and serious nature" that an injunction was re-
quired. The hearing on the injunction began on Tuesday
(February 17), but was continued to Thursday (February 19) to
allow the city time to line up witnesses. In the interim, the LC-
POA discharged its attorneys because it was dissatisfied with
their performance and replaced them with a local attorney who
had no labor relations experience.
At the hearing on Thursday, approximately 40 persons were
sworn in as witnesses and advised not to discuss the case. The
first witness was Mayor Munson, who testified that the city's
capacity to deliver essential police and fire services had been
"severely reduced" by the strike. However, under cross-
examination, he acknowledged that police patrols were on the
street, while fire protection was being provided by a "skeleton
crew." Union attorneys were able to show that Munson did not
have direct personal knowledge that several persons named in
the city's complaint had been involved in any illegal strike ac-
tivities. The mayor was also questioned closely regarding the fac-
tors that had been considered in determining that the strike had
cost the city $236,000. When pressed by defense attorneys about
whether the city might actually save money because the strikers'
salaries were not being paid, he said he anticipated there might
be "some" reduction.38 In the midst of the mayor's testimony,
the hearing was recessed until Monday because the mayor had a
"pressing engagement."39 He was scheduled to officiate at a
parade.
Despite the pending litigation, union leaders continued to
make overtures for additional direct contact with city officials.
In a letter sent to the city commission, the strikers said they
wanted to "sit down together" with the commission and/or its
representatives to try to resolve the dispute, but the commission
did not respond to the request. The strikers even attempted to
enlist the governor's help in ending the strike. They sent him a
telegram saying: "We implore you in the interest of public safety
to strongly urge the city to join with us in calling in a federal
mediator to end the problem with an outside arbitrator." The
governor rejected this request, saying that the matter was a local
one which should be handled locally and that intervention in this
instance, would set a precedent "for me to intervene in every
local problem that took place in every community."40
The process of hiring employees to fill the more than 200
vacancies created by firing the strikers began on February 17,
and proceeded at a slow pace. After three days, only 6 employees,
3 firefighters and 3 sanitation workers had been hired. Vacan-
cies were posted on city bulletin boards and advertised in the
local newspaper. The city personnel director anticipated that at
the rate the rehiring was proceeding, it could take about 60 days
before the city would be back to full strength in all departments.
Top priority was being given to hiring refuse collectors, meter
readers, gas technicians and police dispatchers.
By Monday, February 23, 1976, the strike had lasted almost
three weeks. Two striking police officers, including the president
of the FOP, left the picket lines and returned to work. Testimony
at the hearing on the injunction resumed. During a break in the
proceedings, the city's attorneys and the union leaders worked
out an agreement to end the strike, under which the strikers gave
up most of their demands including recognition. The proposal in-
cluded rehirings, amnesty, an interim grievance committee to
function until the new commission was installed March 15, and a
review of the city's personnel manual. Striking supervisors were
to be temporarily demoted for up to 90 days at the pleasure of the
chief. There was no commitment regarding future commission
recognition of the unions. A few hours after the proposed settle-
ment was reached, however, the city's attorneys contacted as-
sociation leaders to tell them that the commissioners had re-
jected the settlement.
Why the commission rejected the settlement is not clear. At
a press conference the next day, the attorney for the LCPOA
charged that the city had made, and then backed out of, an offer
that the association leaders had accepted. He said that the as-
sociation had been led to believe that the offer had originated
with the mayor. The attorneys for the city replied that they had
repeatedly emphasized to the unions that they would try to sell
the proposed settlement to the commission, but that there were
no guarantees the commission would accept it. Mayor Munson
denied that he had originated the offer. Some of those involved
in the discussions maintained that the labor attorneys had ex-
ceeded their authority in making the offer. Others claimed that
the mayor had authorized the offer, but that after the strikers ac-
cepted it, other commissioners refused to support it, because
they were afraid he would have an advantage in the upcoming
election if he were credited with ending the strike. According to
still another version of events, the commissioners rejected the
settlement because they viewed it as a capitulation and saw no
need to make any concessions to the strikers.
On Tuesday, February 24, another striking police officer
returned to duty. All three officers, as well as three striking
firefighters who returned to work, were required to go through
the regular city hiring procedure, but were reinstated to positions
one step below their previous positions in the department.
On Wednesday morning (February 25) Mayor Munson an-
nounced at a press conference that the strike was over and that
services had been essentially restored. The announcement led to
an immediate and sharp exchange of words with strike leaders.
When he was reminded that picketing was continuing outside
City Hall, the mayor explained that the city considered the
strike over. Robert Gordon retorted that as far as the unions were
concerned, the strike was far from over. In a prepared statement,
the mayor also announced a 15 percent personnel cutback in the
police department, 20 percent reductions in the sanitation,
public works and utilities departments, and a realignment of the
management structure of the fire department. He claimed that
the cutbacks were necessitated by the legislature's defeat of a
special grant to municipalities and the commission's desire to in-
crease salaries of city employees. The city manager agreed that
cuts in the number of personnel were the only way the city could
develop a budget within the financial limits anticipated for the
1976-77 fiscal year. He cited loss of the state grant and revenue
sharing shortfall as major reasons for the city's financial
problems.41
The reaction of the other commissioners to the mayor's
statement was split. Two commissioners, Albert Johnson and
Marianne Thaeler, appeared to support the announcement.
"The only thing wrong with it might be that it wasn't issued a
week earlier," said Ms. Thaeler. "It's good and it's true, and
although I might quibble about some of the numbers, I don't
believe in keeping people in the dark."" In contrast, Commis-
sioner Carlos Blanco called it "a political maneuver, and in very
bad taste. I didn't agree with him. I didn't know anything about
it." He also criticized the way the settlement offer had been re-
jected earlier that week. "The idea that he polls the commission,
but we don't have a meeting with everybody present is very mis-
leading." he said.43 Commissioner James Taylor noted that he
too had not had any advance notice of the mayor's announce-
ment, and would have preferred an arrangement with no cut-
backs.
A few minutes before the mayor proclaimed that the strike
was over, the city withdrew its request for an injunction, because
city officials felt that services could be restored despite the
picketing. However, the city's damage suit against the strikers
was continued. The attorney for the LCPOA withdrew his re-
quest for an injunction prohibiting the city from hiring replace-
ments for former police officers. He also withdrew his earlier re-
quest that Commissioner Marianne Thaeler be held in contempt
of court for discussing strike issues in a letter to the editor which
was published in the local newspaper. He had charged that her
letter violated the court's instructions that all persons who were
sworn as witnesses were not to discuss the case while it was
pending.
With the election less than a week away, both the association
and the city abandoned efforts to reach a settlement. An-
ticipating that the election would bring about an end to the
strike, the chief of police on February 29 established a special
committee called the Board of Supervisors to determine which of
the strikers should be rehired. He expected that all strikers
would apply for reemployment and therefore formed the board in
order to expedite the rehiring process. He indicated that he
would accept its recommendation as to who should be
reemployed. The board, which consisted of all 16 police super-
visors, first met on February 29." By March 2 it had rejected 28
former employees for rehiring.45 The board considered each
striker individually. Each person was supposed to be judged on
his or her past performance, and not on strike activities. There is
strong evidence, however, that in some cases personalities and
participation in the strike were major factors in the board's deci-
sions. While the board determined by majority vote whether to
hire each person, the amount of consideration given each case
varied. For example, there was a general feeling on the board
that rehiring the strike leaders might have a disruptive influence
on the department, and as a result, some of the strike leaders
were given brief consideration. Although Chief Gomez admitted
that the strike was on the minds of the board members, he
claimed that it was not the dominant consideration. "The strike
is an obvious factor," he said, "but I hope it's not the overriding
factor."4*
With both sides expecting the election to resolve the strike,
it was no surprise that the walkouts dominated the campaign.
From the outset of the strike, recognition and collective bargain-
ing had been major campaign issues. Once the strikers were ter-
minated, their reinstatement became another hotly contested is-
sue. Although three seats on the commission were at stake, only
two incumbents, Munson and Johnson, were seeking reelection.
Commissioner James Taylor had chosen not to run. Of the 12
candidates, four announced their support of the unions, and
four, including Munson and Johnson, openly opposed collective
bargaining. The unions endorsed two candidates, Ben Romero,
who was running against Johnson, and Oscar Rios, who was seek-
ing the seat being vacated by Taylor. Only a few strikers,
however, were actively involved in telephone, leaflet, and door-
to-door campaigns the unions organized on their behalf. Many of
the others had lost interest during the long strike or were busy
working at new jobs.
The heavy voter turnout on election day (March 2,1976) set
an all-time record, indicating the active public concern about
the strike issues.47 Yet the outcome was not clearly prounion or
antiunion. At best, only two members of the new commission
could be considered union supporters. Both candidates endorsed
by the strikers were defeated; only one candidate who had sup-
ported the unions was elected. Incumbent Albert Johnson won
reelection to his third four-year term by 227 votes over union-
backed Ben Romero.48 Former Mayor T. J. Graham, who strong-
ly opposed collective bargaining, beat union candidate Oscar
Rios by 389 votes, and received a thousand more votes than any
other candidate had ever received in Las Cruces.49 Prounion
candidate Ronald Hudson was elected by a 599 vote margin over
his closest opponent, and by 896 votes over Mayor Munson who
ran third in that race.60 Although Hudson had voiced support for
the unions, he did not seek their endorsement because he
thought it might cost him votes.
After the election, the LCPOA was uncertain about what ac-
tion it would take next. Its leaders had hoped that the members
of the new commission would give some indication of their posi-
tion regarding the strike. They believed that the commissioners
were authorized to discuss the matter prior to their first official
meeting, and reach a decision, either officially or unofficially,
concerning the walkout and related issues. The new commission,
however, took no such action, and it was soon clear that it would
not be disposed toward recognizing the LCPOA or meeting its
other demands, including the reinstatement of all the strikers.
Although there was no official announcement by either the as-
sociation or the city administration, everyone knew that the
strike was over. Robert Gordon left Las Cruces the day after the
election because of the hopelessness of the situation. Two days
after the election, picket lines were suspended and strikers began
filling out application forms for reemployment.
As the city prepared for the resumption of a full work force,
both the association and the city expressed their intention to put
the walkout behind them and to endeavor to avoid harassment
and hard feelings. LCPOA Vice President Rick Erdie said the
group would continue to monitor city policymaking and try to
gain better working conditions and benefits for all city
employees. "In a way, maybe we lost," he said. "Some of our
people are not going to be rehired. And we did not gain union
recognition, which was one of the main issues. But we believed
we accomplished something, too. The city is in the process of
drafting a new grievance procedure. And there is talk of pay
raises prior to the new fiscal year."51
On Friday, March 5, Van Alstine and Erdie brought city
employment application forms to the FOP lodge and distributed
them to persons who wished to file them. They were not aware
that the police department had already determined who would
and would not be rehired. Of the 52 officers who struck, 47 ap-
plied for reemployment. Thirteen of the 17 civilian strikers who
had worked for the police department also applied.
On March 11, one day before the deadline for filing applica-
tions for the vacancies caused by the strike, the city sent letters
to 28 former police employees who had applied for reemploy-
ment, informing them that they were not being rehired.62 All the
LCPOA officers except the sergeant-at-arms were rejected. The
association leaders charged that they were not rehired because
politics and personalities had influenced the Board of Super-
visors' decisions, and because of their active role in the associa-
tion prior to and during the strike. They also claimed that their
records were generally better than those of many of the officers
who were rehired. The situation was aggravated by the fact that
Chief Gomez had told them unofficially that he would be willing
to take them back, and had stated publicly that he was willing to
consider the application of any former employee. City hiring con-
tinued throughout the month. By March 22, there were still 10
vacancies in the police department, and out-of-town applicants
were being considered for the positions.63
As a result of the strike, several legal actions were instituted
by the city and the strikers.In a precedent-setting case in New
Mexico, strikers claimed that they were entitled to unemploy-
ment compensation. Municipal, county and state government
workers had been covered by unemployment insurance since
January 1975, and this was the first case heard under this new
provision of the unemployment laws. While the city had no
direct monetary interest in the case, it did participate in the
proceedings before the Employment Security Commission. The
commission decided that the strike was not a lawful act, and that
the strikers were to be disqualified from benefits for a four-week
period.
A second case was a mandamus action brought in March by
the police and fire associations to compel the city to comply with
certain provisions of the city personnel ordinance. In dispute was
a section establishing a grievance procedure, and a "consult and
confer" section. The suit was dismissed a month later when the
commission repealed certain portions of the personnel ordinance
and enacted new sections including a grievance procedure. The
city's $236,000 damage suit was also dropped in the spring, when
city officials realized that they would not be able to prove
damages.
On May 25, 10 former police employees, including Van
Alstine, filed suit in state court against the city, the city
manager, the police chief, and the personnel director, contending
that city officials had conspired to blacklist them from employ-
ment, harassed them in the injunction suit, improperly refused
to rehire them because of their union activities and violated their
constitutional rights.54 The 10 former employees sought to be
rehired with back wages and full rights and benefits. In addition
they asked for over $10,000 apiece in damages. In their answer on
June 21, city officials denied any wrongdoing and countersued
the 10 former officers for $100,000 alleging malicious prosecution,
but the claim was subsequently dismissed. The suit finally ter-
minated in January 1977, when the judge granted the city of-
ficials' motion for summary judgment, and due to lack of funds,
the former police officers did not appeal the decision.
As a result of the strike, the LCPOA ceased as an active
organization. Though it still exists on paper, it is no longer func-
tional, and there are no plans to revive it. Although most of the
association's officers were not rehired by the police department,
they still remain in office.
Crime statistics compiled and released by the police depart-
ment after the strike indicate that the crime rate was apparently
unaffected by the strike. Strikers, however, charged that crime
rose dramatically and that the true figures were being concealed
from the public. Statistics released by the police department for
February 1976, show that 236 major crimes took place, compared
to 228 during February 1975, and 282 in January 1976. Any
change in frequencies in other pertinent categories was slight.
The chief stated that the real law enforcement problem during
the strike was the inability of the limited on-duty force to follow
through with investigations after responding to a call for service
involving a crime.55
Although most persons involved with the strike agree that
neither side won, there were a few positive developments
resulting from the strike, primarily in the area of fringe benefits.
For example, the department adopted a new hospitalization plan
that provided better coverage at nearly the same cost as the old
plan. In addition, the city increased its matching contribution to
the retirement system as had been requested by the strikers.
Each individual who walked out and was later rehired had
his or her pay grade lowered one step. However, in March, short-
ly after the strike, city employees received a 5 percent pay
increase which placed the reemployed strikers back at their
prestrike pay level. Again, in July 1976, city employees received
another 10 percent pay increase, which gave the strikers a 10 per-
cent overall increase for the year, and nonstrikers a 15 percent in-
crease.
It is impossible to conclude the description of the events fol-
lowing the strike because the impact of the strike is continuing.
Most city officials never understood what caused the strike.
Many blamed the influence of outside union officials. Others
thought the reason was money. Only a few realized the extent of
police dissatisfaction over poor working conditions, and their
frustration in trying to get the city to listen to them. Despite
some improvements in the working conditions of Las Cruces
police officers, many of the original conditions which prompted
the organization of the LCPOA and led to the strike still exist.
Officers still feel that there is a lack of communication between
subordinates and supervisory management personnel, that
favoritism plays a large role in personnel decisionmaking and
that there is no recognition for a job well done. These attitudes
regarding the relationship between supervisors and subordinates
are aggravated by tensions that have surfaced between those who
struck and those who remained on the job. Uneasiness, frustra-
tion, and hostility, the outgrowth of the strike, are still evident
throughout the department. All indications are that they will re-
main for some time.
NOTES
1. Remarks of a former Las Cruces police officer who was fired
by the city for participating in the 1976 Las Cruces police strike.
2. IBEWv. Town of Farmington, 405 P.2d 233 (N.M. 1965). In a
1969 opinion the state attorney general also said that there was an
implied legislative authority for a municipality to enter into a collective
bargaining contract with its employees, but that a municipality was
prohibited from entering into any such agreement on matters covered by
a merit system enacted by ordinance. Attorney General's Opinion No.
69-73. In 1971, the attorney general reiterated that municipal employees
have collective bargaining rights and added that cities have the
authority to deduct union dues if an employee requests the deductions
in writing. Attorney General's Opinion No. 71-96.
3. Albuquerque police went on strike on July 12, 1975. The
strike ended after 10 days when the union voted to accept an 8 percent
pay raise and 3 percent in fringe benefits. All of the officers who struck
were reinstated, but seven sergeants who joined the walkout were placed
on probation for 120 days with the rank of patrolman.
4. Las Cruces Sun News, July 20, 1975.
5. It was not uncommon for officers to use the department as a
training ground and then move on to better paying jobs with other law
enforcement agencies. Officers claimed that during the past few years,
the department had lost 27 of 87 officers to higher paying jobs.
6. While Las Cruces was the second largest city in the state, it
ranked last among the 12 largest cities in starting pay for police. For ex-
ample, officers in Las Cruces started at $535 per month, while monthly
starting salary in Santa Fe was $650; in Truth or Consequences $580; in
Albuquerque $757; Los Alamos $736; and Carlsbad $643. Dissatisfaction
over fringe benefits was centered around what employees thought were
inadequate hospitalization and retirement plans.
7. The International Conference of Police Associations, founded
in 1953, is a federation of local, county, and state police associations
with a total membership of about 220,000 police officers. The purpose of
the ICPA is to improve the working conditions, retirement systems and
training programs of law enforcement officers, and promote the profes-
sionalization of the police service. In addition, ICPA assists members
with federal, state or provincial legislation affecting law enforcement
and presses for the enactment of collective bargaining.
8. This account of the meeting was provided by Van Alstine.
Yungmeyer has no recollection of its substance.
9. Las Cruces Sun News, January 2, 1976.
10. Ibid.
11. El Paso Herald Post, February 3, 1976.
12. The 1974-75 city revenues to the general fund were reported
at $5,570,745; the 1975-76 budget anticipated revenues of $5,080,892.
The city was unable to raise taxes because tax rates, which were set by
the state legislature, were already at their maximum level. Las Cruces
Sun News, February 4, 1976. Moreover, all city budgeting was being
done on the premise that federal revenue sharing would end in 1976.
14. At the time of the strike, the department had 79 sworn and 30
civilian personnel.
15. Las Cruces Sun News, February 3, 1976.
16. El Paso Times, February 4, 1976.
17. On March 1, the day before election day, the commission un-
animously rejected the proposed pay increase.
21. The city's sick leave policy provided in part: "Any employee
who is absent due to illness for three consecutive work days, shall
present a statement from a licensed physician attesting to the employ-
ee's ability to resume his normal duties, or stating limitations to perfor-
mance of regular duties. Employees who utilize sick leave for purposes
other than illness shall be subject to disciplinary action."
26. N.M. Stat. Ann. 5-6-23 to 5-6-26.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Commissioner Marianne Thaeler said she turned down an in-
vitation to address the strikers because "I would not expose myself to
their vulgarities."
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
39. The Roundup, February 20, 1976.
43. Ibid.
44. The one striking sergeant who had been fired was not on the
board.
45. One of the 28 was not a striker. He had resigned from the
department prior to the strike.
46. Las Cruces Sun News, March 17, 1976.
47. A record 55.5 percent of the city's registered voters par-
ticipated in the election.
48. Johnson received 4,028 votes and Romero 3,801.
49. Graham received 4,285 votes and Rios 3,896.
50. Hudson received 3,379 votes, Dennis Stevens 2,780, and
Munson 2,483.
52. Those rejected included 20 officers and 8 support personnel;
24 officers and 5 civilians were accepted. Nine strikers did not apply for
reemployment, 1 declined the city's job offer, and 3 were still under con-
sideration.
54. Several former firefighters who had not been rehired filed a
similar suit. They lost in the trial court and subsequently appealed. The
case was dismissed after they failed to file their appellate brief on time.
55. The crimes included 2 armed robberies (although striking
police claimed there had been 7), 1 strong-armed robbery, 4 aggravated
assaults, 26 commercial and 27 residential burglaries. One case of arson
was reported during the walkout.
Youngstown, Ohio
September 28-October 2,1976
INTRODUCTION
In September 1976, Youngstown, Ohio, police and
firefighters went on strike for the second time in less than 10
years. Strikes were not uncommon in Youngstown. Since the late
19th century, Youngstown had been one of the nation's major
steel centers. In the late 1920s, steel workers there began organiz-
ing to win better pay and benefits, and their attempts were often
accompanied by strikes and violence. Although the violence
abated, strikes did not. For years, labor strife continued to be
commonplace in industrial Youngstown. From 1972 through
1975, for instance, there were 131 strikes involving 58,700 workers
in the Youngstown area.1
The public sector was not immune. In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, Youngstown experienced strikes by several public
employee groups including police, firefighters, nurses and
teachers. Public employees were well organized, despite the fact
that Ohio had no public employee bargaining law. However, a
line of state court decisions recognized the right of public
employees to bargain collectively.2 There were eight public
employee unions in Youngstown. Police were represented by the
Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) Lodge 28, to which most
members of the department, including the chief, belonged. The
Youngstown Firefighters' Association (International Association
of Firefighters (IAFF) Local 312) was the bargaining agent for
the firefighters.
Ul
The first walkout by Youngstown police and firefighters oc-
curred in September 1967. Although it was not called a strike,
nearly all the city's police officers and firefighters stayed off the
job for five days to attend "professional seminars." The walkout
was the culmination of their efforts to obtain wage and benefit
increases and to air grievances about poor working conditions.
For nine months the police and firefighters, who had joined
to form the Youngstown Safety Forces, had tried unsuccessfully
to get the city to discuss salaries and fringe benefits. They were
seeking a $25 a month raise to bring their wages in line with the
average paid in major Ohio cities,3 as well as benefits such as
paid holidays, longevity, and time-and-a half for overtime. City
officials refused to approve a raise or increased benefits, claiming
that no money was available. While the safety forces agreed that
the city had no money, they maintained that the city had ar
obligation to find some. Attempts to get the city to improve
working conditions also failed when city officials ignored a list of
14 complaints which the safety forces had presented in January
1967. The major complaints concerned methods of transfer, poor
internal communications, and the lack of a grievance procedure.
On the afternoon of September 6, 1967, the executive board
of the safety forces met to discuss alternative courses of action.
By a unanimous vote they decided to stay off the job and hold
around-the-clock professional seminars beginning September
12. The board opted for professional seminars in lieu of a strike in
an attempt to circumvent Ohio's Ferguson Act,4 which prohibits
public employees from striking and authorizes their termination
if they do strike. At a stormy meeting of the safety forces that
night, police and firefighters voted 125 to 53 to begin the
seminars immediately instead of waiting until the 12th. The
doors were locked and the seminars began. The seminars in-
cluded sessions on subjects such as the use of firearms,
firefighting techniques, law and court procedure. Outside lec-
turers were invited to discuss an array of pertinent topics.
By the first morning of the walkout, it was apparent that the
safety forces' action was spreading. The police department was
able to put a near-normal complement on the streets, but patrol
cars had to be manned by members of the department's specialty
divisions. By noon, 10 of the city's 15 fire stations had closed.
Youngstown, Ohio 143
Eventually, over 500 police and firefighters stayed off the job.
Only 13 firefighters, mostly probationers and battalion chiefs,
were left to run the fire department. Police services were being
handled by probationers, vice officers, juvenile officers, lieuten-
ants and captains.
On Saturday, September 9, the fourth day of the strike, a
county common pleas court judge granted the city's request for
an injunction ordering the safety forces to return to work im-
mediately. However, he also ordered the city to bargain in good
faith, but to invoke the Ferguson Act if no settlement were
reached by Monday morning (September 11).
The dispute ended after four days when the safety forces ac-
cepted the city's offer of an immediate $26 a month increase. The
city also agreed to pay an additional $74 a month if the voters ap-
proved a one-half percent increase in the city income tax at a
special election in December. Police and firefighters campaigned
actively for the tax increase with the understanding that the
revenues generated by it would be designated for employee
wages. Subsequently, however, some city officials claimed that
the tax was to be used primarily for capital improvements, with
the balance for wages.
The terms of the settlement were set forth in a three-year
agreement between the city and the safety forces, which was
ratified in March 1968, and signed on May 1, 1968. The agree-
ment provided for specified raises on January 1, 1968, and
January 1, 1970. In addition, there was a July 1, 1970, wage
reopener. The agreement also included fringe benefits and a
long-sought grievance procedure, but few of the other complaints
of police and firefighters were resolved. Although the safety
forces had negotiated the wage settlement with the city, the in-
crease was given to all city workers.6
After the settlement, there was animosity and bitterness in
the police department between those who had participated in the
walkout and those who had worked. These feelings were ag-
gravated by the fact that many of those who had worked held the
choice positions in the department and retained them after the
walkout. Although the intensity of these feelings diminished over
the years, there was still resentment from the first walkout at the
time of the 1976 strike.
Discontent in the police department surfaced repeatedly
during the three years prior to the 1976 strike. Complaints about
police operations came from the community and from within the
department. In response to citizen complaints about police
abuses, the mayor appointed a Citizens Advisory Committee to
investigate complaints concerning matters such as citizen com-
plaint procedures, racial discrimination, lack of human relations
training, and brutality. The committee's report, issued in March
1975, made several recommendations for correcting serious
deficiencies in the Youngstown Police Department's relations
with the community, but little if any action was taken to imple-
ment the recommendations.
In the fall of 1975, the city council formed a special commit-
tee to investigate the administration and operation of the police
department. The investigation was prompted by Chief Donald
Baker's dismissal of a probationary officer a day before the end of
his probationary period. Existing friction between the chief and
the FOP intensified when the FOP supported the officer and sub-
mitted a list of "charges and grievances" against the chief for the
council's consideration. Most of the charges concerned discipline
and morale problems in the department. The FOP claimed that
the morale problem had been brought about, in part, by the lack
of communication with the chief and by the chiefs failure to
resolve many of the grievances the FOP had presented. After
several weeks of hearings, the council determined that the
charges were unfounded, but recommended that disciplinary
and grievance procedures be reviewed to prevent a recurrence of
the FOP's accusations against the chief. Again the recommenda-
tions were ignored.
In January 1976, another city council committee was formed
to investigate accusations of police brutality stemming from an
incident in which several youths were allegedly beaten by police
officers. While testimony at the committee's hearings was in-
conclusive, the committee stirred up considerable controversy
when it considered a suggestion to form a citizen review board as
a way of smoothing relations between police and the city's
minorities.6 However, nothing ever came of the suggestion.
Racial problems also surfaced within the police department
at about the same time. In early January 1976, 13 Youngstown
policemen and three persons who had attempted to become
patrolmen filed suit against the city in the United States District
Court, charging the city with racial discrimination in hiring and
promotional practices in the police department. The complaint
alleged that only 6.8 percent of the department's 295 officers
were black, although 25.2 percent of the city's population was
black. It also pointed out that 19 of the 20 black policemen were
patrolmen, and that none of the 19 captains, 7 lieutenants, or 40
detectives were black. The plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin
the city from conducting police entry and promotional examina-
tions, from hiring and promoting police officers, and from using
federal funds for hiring and recruiting in the police department.
In March 1976, the court verbally ordered the city not to hire any
additional police officers, but in June, at the city's request, the
judge allowed the department to hire six officers, provided two of
them were black. Since the court did not issue any written orders
until November 1976, there was confusion about whether promo-
tions were also enjoined. Nevertheless, some promotions were
made.
The three-year agreement signed by the city and the safety
forces in 1968 expired at the end of 1970. Subsequently, the city
and the Fraternal Order of Police agreed to a two-year contract
covering 1971-72, and another two-year contract covering 1973-
74. Similar agreements were reached between the city, the
firefighters and other city workers. The 1973 negotiations
resulted in hard feelings between the police and firefighters.
Before the FOP had reached an agreement with the city, the
firefighters accepted the city's offer in return for parity and a
promise that they would be given anything additional that the
police received. The police were then offered the same package
that the firefighters had accepted. They accepted the wage offer
but managed to get additional fringe benefits. In most years, all
Youngstown city employees got the same wage settlement. In
1972, however, the police and firefighters received 2.5 percent
more than other city employees in longevity benefits. Within two
years, though, all city employees had obtained these benefits.
In 1974, the city offered the city unions a two-year contract
covering 1975 and 1976, with a 6 percent wage increase each year
and an April 1976 wage reopener. The unions rejected this offer
in favor of a one-year contract with a 6 percent increase. Ac-
cording to FOP leaders, Mayor Jack Hunter urged them to ac-
cept a one-year contract and indicated that they would probably
get more than 6 percent if the economy improved in 1976. The
mayor, however, denies that he made this recommendation, and
alleged that only 6.8 percent of the department's 295 officers
were black, although 25.2 percent of the city's population was
black. It also pointed out that 19 of the 20 black policemen were
patrolmen, and that none of the 19 captains, 7 lieutenants, or 40
detectives were black. The plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin
the city from conducting police entry and promotional examina-
tions, from hiring and promoting police officers, and from using
federal funds for hiring and recruiting in the police department.
In March 1976, the court verbally ordered the city not to hire any
additional police officers, but in June, at the city's request, the
judge allowed the department to hire six officers, provided two of
them were black. Since the court did not issue any written orders
until November 1976, there was confusion about whether promo-
tions were also enjoined. Nevertheless, some promotions were
made.
The three-year agreement signed by the city and the safety
forces in 1968 expired at the end of 1970. Subsequently, the city
and the Fraternal Order of Police agreed to a two-year contract
covering 1971-72, and another two-year contract covering 1973-
74. Similar agreements were reached between the city, the
firefighters and other city workers. The 1973 negotiations
resulted in hard feelings between the police and firefighters.
Before the FOP had reached an agreement with the city, the
firefighters accepted the city's offer in return for parity and a
promise that they would be given anything additional that the
police received. The police were then offered the same package
that the firefighters had accepted. They accepted the wage offer
but managed to get additional fringe benefits. In most years, all
Youngstown city employees got the same wage settlement. In
1972, however, the police and firefighters received 2.5 percent
more than other city employees in longevity benefits. Within two
years, though, all city employees had obtained these benefits.
In 1974, the city offered the city unions a two-year contract
covering 1975 and 1976, with a 6 percent wage increase each year
and an April 1976 wage reopener. The unions rejected this offer
in favor of a one-year contract with a 6 percent increase. Ac-
cording to FOP leaders, Mayor Jack Hunter urged them to ac-
cept a one-year contract and indicated that they would probably
get more than 6 percent if the economy improved in 1976. The
mayor, however, denies that he made this recommendation, and
instead claims that the rejection of the two-year pact was part of
the union's strategy to get more money.
Although this one-year contract was to expire on December
31, 1975, the unions and the city agreed to postpone negotiations
on a 1976 contract until after the November 1975 city election. In
that election, five new members of the council were elected.
Negotiations were again postponed until January when the new
council would take office, because the lame duck council
members did not want to bind the city to an agreement.
Negotiations finally began in late January 1976. The city's
chief negotiator was the assistant law director, James Corbett.
At times, the law director and the finance director or his
representative also participated in the wage talks. The FOP's
negotiating team was composed of President Richard Brinko,
and members of the Wage and Hour Committee. From the out-
set, the city claimed it had no money for a pay increase. Corbett
told the unions that if the balance in the city's general fund were
divided equally among all city employees, each would get a five
cent an hour increase. City employees were insulted by what
they perceived as a "nickel offer." Corbett, however, repeatedly
explained that the five cents was not an offer, but a statement of
what the money available at that time would mean to the
average employee at the hourly rate. The "nickel offer" triggered
a two-day strike by members of the Associated Trades and Crafts
Union, in which 81 workers in various city departments walked
off their jobs. In response to the strike, Mayor Hunter invoked
the Ferguson Act and fired the strikers. Most were reinstated
when a county court reversed their dismissals.7
Shortly after the first negotiating session, the city council
asked for a six-month moratorium on wage talks, to which the
unions soon agreed. The council had decided to prepare two
budgets for 1976, the first covering January through June and
the second, the rest of the year. The unions were asked to post-
pone negotiations until mid-May when the financial projections
for the second half of the year would be available. Any subse-
quent wage settlement was to be retroactive to January 1, 1976.
Early in May, the FOP suggested to the firefighters' associa-
tion that the two groups join forces to deal with the city in the
upcoming negotiations. A week later, their wage and hour com-
mittees met together to discuss strategy. Both groups hoped that
by working together they would put greater pressure on the city
to meet their wage demands. They felt that this strategy had
been successful in 1967 and might work again.
On May 27, the city announced at a joint session of all union
negotiators that it would not offer any wage increases that year
because of insufficient funds. Corbett told the unions that if city
workers were to receive a 6 percent increase, it would cost the
general fund alone $767,407, including fringe benefits such as
workmen's compensation and pensions. The general fund's pro-
jected balance for the end of the year was $87,778, and the com-
bined balances in all other operating funds was about $217,000.8
Following the city's announcement, 15 leaders of
Youngstown municipal employee unions met together to discuss
the city's failure to make a wage offer. Several of the leaders ex-
pressed doubts about the sincerity of city leaders and
negotiators, and indicated surprise that the city had no money
for 1976 increases, since it had offered a two-year package for
1975-76 which included a 6 percent increase for 1976. They ac-
cused the city of failing to make a sincere effort to conserve ex-
isting funds and to find new revenue sources.
A few days later on June 6, at their first joint meeting,
members of the FOP and firefighters' association voted to merge
and form the Youngstown Safety Forces, in order to give the two
organizations more bargaining power. The leadership of the new
group, which was shared by the eight members of the FOP wage
and hour committee, and the six members of the firefighters'
wage and hour committee, hoped to get the city to return to the
bargaining table and work out an agreement. At the meeting,
John T. Smith, head of the Greater Youngstown AFL-CIO Labor
Council, who had been invited by the firefighters, cautioned the
safety forces against a strike and promised to do all he could to
help them reach an equitable agreement with the city.
By July, there was still no change in the city's position, and
the safety forces were losing patience. City officials were hoping
that additional federal funds would become available which the
city could use for a pay raise. Meanwhile, the leaders of the
safety forces were being pressured by their members to call a
strike. Many police and firefighters felt that the city had already
had adequate time to make a wage offer. On July 2, the safety
forces met to discuss the possibility of going on strike during the
July 4 weekend. Once again Smith urged them not to strike and
promised to use his influence with city officials to get them to
return to the bargaining table. He claimed he had spoken to
several council members who had indicated their willingness to
negotiate. The safety forces' leaders never heard from him again
and know of nothing he did to help them. In retrospect, they
believe that he was repaying a political favor to the mayor by
holding off the strike.
Hopes for additional federal funds grew in late July when
Congress overrode the President's veto and authorized funds for
public works jobs. However, the city was not sure of how much
money, if any, it would actually receive, because it was not cer-
tain if the appropriations would match the authorization.
Nevertheless, the city did indicate that if and when the money
became available, it would be used for employee wages.
Meanwhile, the safety forces were asking for a 6 percent increase
in 1976 and 8 percent in 1977.
Originally, the police and firefighters had favored an across-
the-board raise instead of a percentage increase, a view shared
by the city's blue-collar unions, and several members of the
council who were concerned about wage inequities between high
ranking and rank-and-file employees. Mayor Hunter, however,
favored a percentage increase because he wanted to maintain the
pay distinctions between different level jobs. He felt that
employees in the most important jobs should get more money
and larger raises than other employees. At a meeting between the
mayor, the safety forces negotiators and the city's negotiating
team, Hunter tried to convince the police and firefighters to ask
for a percentage increase. The issue caused a heated argument
within the negotiating team primarily because supervisors would
benefit the most from a percentage increase. The debate was in-
tense but brief, and shortly after the meeting the safety forces
switched their position to support a percentage raise.
Dissatisfied with their prospects for a wage increase based
on public works funds, the safety forces began to focus on
revenue sharing funds. The mayor and the eight members of the
council were allocated $110,000 apiece in revenue sharing money
to spend as each saw fit. Traditionally, they had used this money
for capital improvements and social services in their respective
wards, and they had no intention of using it for employee
salaries. However, it was rumored that one councilman had told
the safety forces that they could get the revenue sharing money if
they went on strike.
In late September, leaders of the FOP met with Dennis
Haines, a well-known Ohio labor lawyer, to discuss the dif-
ficulties they had encountered in attempting to negotiate with
the city. The FOP leaders told Haines that the city had pushed
them too far, and that their members were frustrated and ready
to take some kind of action. In turn, Haines told them that a
strike was illegal and explained the provisions of the Ferguson
Act. He said that once they had decided to withhold their ser-
vices, they had to determine what form of action to take. Various
kinds of job actions were discussed, but Haines cautioned them
that no matter what they called it, it was illegal to withhold their
services. He advised the leaders not to deceive their members by
calling a strike something else in order to avoid the Ferguson Act.
When they discussed how to organize a strike, Haines warned
them that they were not prepared for one and not prepared to
buy time to plan one. Soon after the meeting, the negotiating
committee contacted a printer and had strike signs prepared.
On Thursday, September 23, Corbett called a meeting to
tell the negotiators for all the city unions about the mayor's new
proposal, but did not disclose the terms of that proposal. He did
say, however, that it was less than the 6 percent for 1976 and 8
percent for 1977 for which the unions were asking, but "still in
the ball park."9 At least four proposals were believed to be under
consideration by the city council. They were: 1) the mayor's un-
disclosed proposal; 2) the unions' 6 and 8 percent proposal; 3) a
proposal for a bonus to be spread out in several payments over a
year; and 4) a proposal calling for $988,600 in federal money to be
used for the 1976 raise with negotiations for 1977 to begin im-
mediately. Dissatisfied with the city's failure to make a concrete
proposal, the leaders of the safety forces asked to attend a
meeting between the city administration and the council
scheduled for Sunday, September 27. Rocky Russo, president of
the firefighters' association, indicated that the only way progress
could be achieved was for the council and administration to
meet, "instead of having only one man, Corbett, take messages
back and forth."10 There was some speculation that political dif-
ferences between the Republican mayor and Democratic coun-
cil" were hampering efforts to reach an agreement with the
union. Under the city charter, the mayor was required to make a
wage recommendation to the council which the council could
either accept or reject, but not modify. It was thought that the
mayor, who was running for Congress in 1976, was reluctant to
make a wage proposal unless he was assured that the council
would approve it, and that as a result, the city's negotiating
team was not given clear authority or instructions to conclude an
agreement. "What he should do," said a former FOP president,
"is to make his proposal to council, and if it rejects it, then order
Corbett to draw up a salary ordinance, and bring the ordinance
before the council. This way, we would be able to sit down and
see for ourselves just what the mayor has to offer, and later see
just who votes for it and who votes against it."12
At about 10 o'clock Sunday morning (September 27), the
council met behind closed doors with the mayor and his cabinet
to discuss the pay issue. At first the council was divided on
whether to support the mayor, and if not, what position it should
take. Then, after reviewing the city's fiscal posture and deter-
mining not to reduce payroll or cut services, the council decided
to support the mayor and remain silent about its deliberations.
Council President Emanuel Catsoules explained, "We decided
we had to support the package. We were up against the wall and
it was no time to play games. We had to show [the labor leaders]
the cohesiveness of the council and the mayor."13 Shortly after
1:30 p.m. the council, the mayor and his cabinet emerged to
meet with waiting union representatives. Corbett read the offer
the mayor and council had agreed upon. Catsoules then spoke on
behalf of the council to say that it supported the mayor's offer,
and had agreed not to discuss it. Although the angry union
leaders insulted them and "raked them over the coals," the
mayor and council remained silent while Corbett explained the
offer.14
The offer was a $720 cash bonus for each city employee, to be
paid in five quarterly payments. The money was to be given as a
bonus rather than a raise so that base pay would not be increased
over the 1975 level, and the city would not be committed to the
pay increase the next year. Union leaders were angered by the of-
fer, and claimed that the city had reversed its position by in-
sisting on a bonus in lieu of a raise. Corbett, however, denied this
charge and insisted that the city had never agreed to a raise.15
The $720 raise was not new. The figure, which first came up
in late summer, was based on the city's estimate of how much
money it would receive under the public works bill pending in
Congress. City officials maintained that although $720 had been
discussed, it had never been a firm offer.
The unions' reaction to the meeting was bitter. Don Hanni,
head of Ohio Public Workers Union Local 14, said the offer was
"[a]n insult. We were invited to the meeting. It was supposed to
be a dialogue and then they locked us out. They're still playing
games."16 Rocky Russo said that his understanding of the
package was that the city was sticking to its old offer of $988,600
over five quarters, but that the money would be deemed a bonus,
not a raise. He claimed that if the money were used as a raise,
city workers would receive an average increase of $889, but if it
were given as a bonus, they would get only $720, since fringe
benefits would have to be deducted from it.17 Other labor leaders
were equally indignant and openly discussed the possibility of a
strike. While one leader said that talk about a strike was
premature, Hanni predicted a strike by the following Monday
night if the administration did not change its position.18
Although a meeting between the administration, the coun-
cil, and the unions was scheduled for Monday afternoon
(September 28), the mayor said that the city would not change
its offer. He admitted there was a strong possibility of a strike,
but refused to say whether he would fire the strikers. Attempts to
resolve the wage dispute at the Monday meeting failed. Three
councilmen did not attend the meeting, and the others were
reluctant to change the city's latest offer without their approval.
Instead, the city asked the eight unions to come up with one joint
proposal, which the unions saw as another stall tactic.19
That night, about 300 police and firefighters met at the FOP
hall to discuss the status of the wage negotiations. Talk of strike
dominated the meeting. Many older officers who had originally
opposed a strike now spoke in favor of one. Dennis Haines ex-
plained the Ferguson Act and the risks and ramifications of going
on strike. He told them that if they struck they would have to
win a no reprisal clause prohibiting the city from taking action
against them. When asked about probationary employees, he ad-
vised that they continue to work. After Haines spoke, the two
wage committees recessed for about a half hour. When they
returned they announced that they had voted unanimously to
recommend a job action, but did not specify what kind. A motion
to strike was made from the floor, and when the joint negotiating
committee asked for a secret ballot, the members shouted that it
was not necessary, and voted to strike by a unanimous show of
hands, accompanied by loud cheers. Shortly afterwards a police
car pulled up and strike signs were unloaded from the back seat.
Within an hour of the strike vote, the safety forces set up
picket lines around the police and fire headquarters. About two
hours later, a major crisis occurred when Ernest Paul, a black
patrolman who had crossed the picket line to report for work,
drove his patrol car out of the police garage and struck four
picketing policemen. The impact threw one officer 35 feet into a
pillar across the street, another onto the hood of the patrol car,
and the other two onto the pavement. Two of the officers were
hospitalized. After striking the pickets, Paul jumped from the
patrol car, pulled his handgun and waved it in the direction of
the picketers, who were armed and closing in around him. Two
command officers came out of the station, took Paul's gun and
escorted him into the building, as the injured officers and other
pickets, all white, screamed racial slurs at him. Later that night,
Paul was arrested for felonious assault but was released in the
custody of his attorney.20
Paul was one of about 15 black officers who initially decided
not to participate in the strike. Leonard Williams, president of
the Black Knights, an organization of black officers, condemned
the strike and said that a majority of the black officers had
decided not to participate in it.21 The night the strike began, all
four black officers scheduled to report for duty did so. However,
after the incident, only six of the department's 19 black officers
continued to work. Many of the others allegedly gave in to pres-
sure and threats by striking white officers.
In the early hours of the strike, tires were slashed on police
vehicles parked near the exits in the police garage, but the
department was unable to determine who was responsible. To
prevent further vandalism of police cars, shift changes were
made in the field throughout the rest of the strike, which also
made it possible for nonstriking officers to work without having
to cross the picket lines.
By Tuesday morning (September 29), the second day of the
strike, the safety forces had set up picket lines at City Hall, the
police and fire stations, the waste treatment plant, and the
sanitation and street department buildings. Although other
municipal unions did not strike, many of their employees refused
to cross picket lines. About 900 city employees, including strik-
ing police and firefighters, stayed off the job, leaving several
departments with skeletal staffs. As a result, many city services
were seriously curtailed. No garbage collections were made, and
the streets and water departments had only emergency service.
The severe reduction in manpower in both the police and
fire departments became critical early in the strike. On Tuesday,
only 49 of the police department's sworn personnel and 13 of its
30 support personnel worked. By the third day of the strike only 8
civilians and 23 sworn personnel, including the chief, remained.
These nonstrikers were divided into two 12-hour shifts, from 6
a.m. to 6 p.m. and 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. To Chief Baker's surprise,
supervisory and command officers joined the strike. They in-
cluded 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, and 16 sergeants. The chief had
also anticipated that his own staff and those who held special ap-
pointive jobs in the department would stay on the job, as they
had in 1967, but they also struck.
The fire department, like the police department, had a
critical manpower shortage when most of the city's 260
firefighters went on strike. Only one of the city's 13 fire stations
was open, and it was manned by the fire chief, two battalion
chiefs and 12 rookies who were still on probation and therefore
exempted by the unions from striking. The city's inability to
provide adequate fire protection became readily apparent when
the eight firefighters working each shift were unable to cope with
the numerous fires that occurred throughout the city during the
strike. Many of the fires were set by arsonists. On some occa-
sions, the chief and his probationers were joined by striking
firefighters and citizens in battling the blazes. Even with this
help, however, the undermanned firefighters were unable to han-
dle one major fire, much less several occurring in rapid succes-
sion.
Although city officials, including Chief Baker, were general-
ly not surprised by the strike, they had no contingency plan for
dealing with it. The chief did not ask for help from other nearby
jurisdictions "because of my desire to keep them out of our labor
disputes," but he hoped that "they would do what they could to
help out" in an emergency.22 Mayor Hunter contacted the gover-
nor's office to apprise him of the situation, but never requested
assistance from the National Guard or the highway patrol. The
governor would not commit the guard or the patrol unless the
city invoked the Ferguson Act or obtained an injunction against
the strike and the action proved ineffective. In any case, the
mayor felt that there was no purpose to invoking the Ferguson
Act because the council would not support it, and it would create
hard feelings. Similarly, the city made no attempt to obtain an
injunction because city officials believed that on prior occasions
judges had involved themselves in negotiations and imposed set-
tlements which disregarded the city's financial situation.
On Tuesday night, negotiations between the city and the
safety forces resumed, but proved to be fruitless. Negotiations
began at 10:30 p.m. and broke off at 11:55 p.m. while each side
caucused. They resumed two hours later, but broke up again at
3:10 so the city negotiators could go back to the mayor and coun-
cil for further instructions. Safety forces' attorney Dennis Haines
said that "the prime difficulty was dealing with negotiators who
had to go back for further instructions" and that the "council
just has not made itself available to answer questions."23 He also
charged that the city had more than enough money for the pay
raise, and pointed to $1 million in federal revenue sharing money
as well as $800,000 unspent in the Park and Recreation Commis-
sion budget. He suggested that this $1.8 million be combined
with the $988,600 in expected federal public works money, which
would more than meet the unions' pay demands. City finance of-
ficials disputed the claim that $1.8 million was available. They
explained that the $800,000 in the park budget was the general
fund money appropriated to run that department in 1977. They
also pointed out that the city had already committed about $1.7
million of its $2.8 million of revenue sharing money to wages, and
that it was unwise to spend too much revenue sharing money on
wages because the federal money might not be continued.
Moreover, they believed that the city needed some of that money
for capital improvements.24
By Wednesday night (September 30), there were signs of
progress in the negotiations between the city and the safety
forces. Both sides agreed to a 6 percent raise for 1976, retroactive
to January 1, 1976, but were unable to agree on an amount for
1977. Throughout the negotiations, Corbett remained the city's
chief spokesman although the mayor sometimes joined the
negotiating sessions. The continued refusal of the mayor and
council to discuss the negotiations frustrated some of the strikers
who wanted to talk and bargain with individual council
members. Council members denied accusations that they were
being muzzled, and stressed their cooperation with the mayor.
"We have simply agreed to speak through one man," stated
councilman John Murphy. "This is a smart way to negotiate,"
said council president Emanuel Catsoules. "We can't have 9 or
10 mouths all speaking for the city of Youngstown."25 To keep the
council and the negotiators apart, Mayor Hunter had the council
meet in his first floor office while the negotiations took place in
the council's chambers several floors above. He also kept the
refrigerator in his office well stocked with soft drinks and
sandwiches, to keep the council near him and away from the
union negotiators.
The stalemate continued on Thursday (October 1), when
the safety forces rejected the city's offer of 6 percent increases for
each of the two years and insisted that they would not settle for
less than 6 percent in 1976 and 8 percent in 1977. At about 5 p.m.
the city was notified that President Ford had signed the public
works bill, which would provide the city with $988,000 in funds it
had been expecting. Late that night the council agreed to in-
crease its offer for 1977 to 6.5 percent. Police and fire negotiators
were presented with the offer and told that if they did not accept
it, the mayor would invoke the Ferguson Act and fire the strikers.
To prove that the city was not bluffing, Corbett showed the
negotiators the dismissal letters their members would get that
Friday if they did not accept the offer. The city plann 'd to in-
clude the letters with paychecks that the strikers woulo pick up
on Friday.26 By and large, city officials and safety forces' leaders
believed that Mayor Hunter intended to carry out his threat to
fire the strikers. They did not know that at the beginning of the
strike the mayor had decided to invoke the Ferguson Act if the
strike were not settled by 3 p.m. Friday afternoon. He had im-
posed this deadline in light of the usual increase in criminal ac-
tivity on the weekends.
At about this time, Dennis Haines finally made the union
negotiators understand that the city's 6 and 6.5 percent offer was
about the same as the safety forces' 6 and 8 percent demand,
because the unions had not compounded their figures when for-
mulating the wage demands. Haines explained that as a result,
the city was offering a smaller raise, but higher base pay than the
safety forces were demanding.27
Faced with the threat of dismissals, the safety forces'
negotiating team took the city's offer, and its promise of no
reprisals against the strikers, back to their members for a vote on
Friday morning. The no reprisals promise did not extend to those
who committed criminal acts during the strike. After Haines ex-
plained what had transpired during the negotiations, safety
forces' members were allowed to speak for and against accepting
the offer. Many members expressed dissatisfaction with the of-
fer. Nevertheless, the settlement was approved by a majority
show of hands. Following the vote, one member of the bargaining
team stated that they had recommended acceptance of the con-
tract only because of the mayor's threat to fire them. "There is
still a bitter taste in our mouths," he said.28
By 10 a.m. Friday (October 2), the firefighters had manned
their stations, and by early afternoon the police had also
returned to duty. Other municipal services also returned to nor-
mal as workers from six other unions who had been honoring the
picket lines went back to work.
The agreement between the city and the safety forces was
implemented in November 1976 when the council passed it as a
salary ordinance. Under the terms of the settlement, police and
firefighters' base salary for 1976 was increased by $686 from
$11,436 to $12,122. In 1977, it was increased by $788, bringing the
base salary to $12,910.29 The agreement did not cover fringe
benefits, which were to be negotiated later. However, fringe
benefits were never resolved, despite the safety forces' repeated
requests for negotiations. The city continuously delayed because
it was adamantly opposed to any increase in the cost of fringe
benefits.
The cost of the agreement was estimated at $3.1 million for
all 1,350 city employees.30 Traditionally, city employees had fol-
lowed the lead of the safety forces regarding contract pay hikes.
The mayor said that he was "absolutely optimistic" that the
other city unions would accept the wage package, and he
scheduled individual meetings with their leaders beginning on
Friday (October l).31
According to the mayor, the city hoped to pay for the wage
increase with money from the federal public works bill, income
tax receipts, and savings from layoffs and fewer hirings. He made
it clear that the settlement would not require any new taxes but
could mean layoffs in the city work force. In addition, he an-
ticipated that vacant positions would remain unfilled even
though they were funded. The number of layoffs and unfilled
vacancies that would result from the settlement was not im-
mediately determined.
Estimates of the amount of crime during the strike varied.
Civilian personnel who answered the police telephones said that
the calls did not indicate any noticeable increase in the type or
volume of crimes reported except truancy. Many store owners
called to report gangs and teenage boys entering stores and help-
ing themselves to merchandise.32 Contrary to the opinion of those
who answered the calls, the police chief believed that crime had
increased during the strike. For example, he pointed to 19
drugstore robberies from June through September, and half that
many again during the strike. He noted that on at least two occa-
sions there were five armed robberies within a two-hour period.
While it was difficult for him to determine how many calls went
unanswered, he indicated that during the five-hour period one
evening, 76 calls went unanswered.33
Two weeks after the strike ended the chief of police transfer-
red five members of his "inner circle." The men were all close to
the chief and worked directly under his supervision, but had
nevertheless joined the strike.34 The chief said he had been
"surprised, disappointed and disgusted" when they walked out.36
While the officers viewed their transfers as retaliation for their
participation in the strike, the chief denied any retaliatory
motives. His main reason for the transfers was his need to have
officers loyal to him in these key positions, and he considered
their participation in the strike disloyal.
As predicted, layoffs of city employees became a certainty in
the wake of the strike. In January 1977, four police officers and 12
firefighters were laid off, but were quickly reinstated with federal
Comprehensive Employment Training Act funds. In addition, 20
positions in the police department and 10 in the fire department
were eliminated through attrition. Overall, 57 city employees
were laid off, and vacant positions were left unfilled. Both the
FOP and the firefighters' association protested the layoffs and
personnel reductions and charged that the city had not
demonstrated the "absolute necessity" to cut the size of its
safety forces.
The strike by Youngstown police officers produced no
significant change in conditions in the police department other
than wage increases. After the strike, there was no discernible
improvement in the rank and file's morale or attitude towards
Chief Baker. Racial tensions also continued, and may have been
aggravated by the reluctance of some blacks to join the strike,
and by court actions in the discrimination suit against the
department. The court froze promotions between November
1976 and May 1977, and also imposed a racial quota on hiring.
The strike settlement was due to expire on December 31,
1977. Because Mayor Hunter was not running for reelection, the
city unions agreed to the city's request in the fall of 1977 that
they postpone negotiations on the 1978 contract until the new
mayor took office. In January 1978, the new mayor asked the
unions to postpone negotiations again to give him time to
organize his administration, and the unions agreed. The first
negotiating session was held March 1, 1978. Representatives of all
six city unions attended. The mayor asked for a 120-day post-
ponement, but this time the unions gave him only 60 days. He
suggested that in order to save time and effort, all unions
negotiate together. The unions agreed, and the city compiled two
lists of union demands. The joint list contained the demands
supported by all the unions. The special list included the in-
dividual demands of each union, which the city would negotiate
separately with the particular union. From the outset, the city
was adamant that it would give an across-the-board raise to all
employees; therefore, the unions decided on a joint wage de-
mand. Initially, they asked for a $1.25 an hour increase. The city,
in turn, offered a three-year package containing a 2 percent in-
crease in 1978, no raise in 1977, and a wage reopener in 1980. The
offer was unacceptable to the unions. Subsequently the unions
dropped their demand to 35$ an hour and the city increased its
offer slightly to 25p an hour. A stalemate developed and the un-
ions prepared to strike. Efforts to prevent a strike through last
minute negotiations failed, and on May 8, all city employee un-
ions went on strike. It was the third time in 11 years that
Youngstown police and firefighters walked off the job over a wage
dispute with the city. "You know," commented one veteran
firefighter, "it gets easier every time."
NOTES
1. Work Stoppages in 1972. U.S. Dept. of Labor/Bureau of
Labor Statistics, p. 8. Work Stoppages in 1973. U.S. Dept. of Labor/-
Bureau of Labor Statistics, p. 7. Work Stoppages in 1974. U.S. Dept. of
Labor/Bureau of Labor Statistics, p. 9. Work Stoppages in 1975. U.S.
Dept. of Labor/Bureau of Labor Statistics, p. 9.
2. See Dayton Classroom Teachers Association v. Dayton Board
of Education, 323 N.E.2d 714 (Ohio 1975) in which the Ohio Supreme
Court ruled that school boards have discretionary power to negotiate
and enter into collective bargaining agreements.
3. In late summer, a special Citizens Wage and Revenue Study
Committee, which was appointed by Mayor Anthony Flask, released a
report indicating that all city employees were being paid less than their
counterparts in other cities throughout the state. The report showed
that on the average police and firefighters were paid 12 percent lower
than the others. Youngstown Vindicator, September 10, 1967.
4. Ohio R.C. 4117.01-4117.05. The statute provides that
persons who have been terminated for striking may be reinstated but
only under the following conditions: 1) their compensation cannot ex-
ceed the amount they received immediately prior to striking; 2) their
compensation cannot be increased for one year following their reinstate-
ment; and 3) they are on probation for two years following their rein-
statement and during that time serve without tenure at the will and
pleasure of the appointing body. Ohio R.C. 4117.03.
5. Male employees received $1200 a year raise, while female
employees got only $600, because the city wanted to keep their wages in
line with salaries in the private sector.
6. Youngstown Vindicator, January 16, 1976.
7. In March 1976, the Mahoning County Court of Appeals up-
held the lower court, and ruled that the city had failed to prove in the
dismissal hearings that each individual had been on strike.
8. Youngstown Vindicator, May 28, 1976.
9. Youngstown Vindicator, September 24, 1976.
10: Ibid.
11. Seven members of the council were Democrats while the
president of the council and the mayor were Republicans.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
20. Paul was subsequently convicted of four counts of simple as-
sault and sentenced to six months in jail.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Friday was the regular payday for city employees for work
completed the previous week.
27. To illustrate using base pay, the safety forces were asking for
6 percent of $11,436 ($686) in 1976 and another 8 percent of $11,436
($914) in 1977. The city, however, was offering 6 percent of $11,436
($686) in 1976 and 6.5 percent of $12,122 ($788) in 1977. Under the safety
forces plan, base pay would have been $12,350 in 1977; under the city
plan it would have been $12,910.
28. Youngstown Vindicator, October 1, 1976.
29. Ibid.
30. Youngstown Vindicator, October 3, 1976. The city finance
department estimated that during the strike the city saved about
$72,000 in salaries because approximately 900 city workers stayed off
their jobs. Youngstown Vindicator, October 1, 1976.
34. Those transferred were: the chiefs aide to night turn
sergeant; bomb disposal technician to night turn patrol division; bomb
disposal technician to traffic division; and weapons officer to traffic
division. The transfers left the chief without his aide and chief federal
grants officer, and left the department without a bomb squad except for
the chief.
Summary and
Recommendations
INTRODUCTION
The resurgence of police strikes is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Over 50 years elapsed after the famous Boston
police strike of 1919 before there was another police strike in a
major American city. Within the next few years, a series of
strikes occurred in cities and towns throughout the country.
Among the cities which experienced strikes were San Francisco,
California; Tucson, Arizona; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Las
Cruces, New Mexico; and Youngstown, Ohio. In some ways these
strikes were dissimilar. They occurred in cities of various sizes
including the nation's fifteenth largest city. One strike lasted 32
days; another only three. Some strikers lost their jobs. Others
won raises. Some shot out street lights. Others wore flowers in
their holsters. In other respects, however, the strikes were quite
similar. This chapter examines these similarities for the purpose
of determining what causes police strikes and what happens
when they occur. When appropriate, recommendations are made
for preventing these job actions. While there is no way to
eliminate completely the possibility of police strikes, the chances
of their occurring can be minimized if the conditions which cause
them are isolated and corrected.
This chapter is divided into five parts. The first section iden-
tifies and discusses major causes of the five strikes; the second
details the most significant factors which impacted on the events
during the strikes; the third describes the salient features of the
161
strikes' aftermath. The fourth is a conclusion. Finally, the fifth
part lists the causes of the strikes and the recommendations
found throughout the chapter.
Table 1, Comparison of Major Strike Events and Condi-
tions, which appears at the end of this chapter, is intended to be
used in conjunction with this chapter. It provides a quick and
easy reference to the events described in the case studies and
summarized here.
STRIKE CAUSES
No one event caused any of the five strikes. In some cases, a
single emotional event triggered the strike, but in all, the actual
causes are complex and deep-seated. To this day, many of those
involved in the strikes, whether on the side of management or
labor, do not fully understand the causes.
Police do not strike because they are "money hungry,"
because they enjoy breaking the law, or because they want to
harm the public. They strike when they feel they have been
backed into a corner and have no other choice. The word that
best describes the strikers is "frustrated." In all five cities,
strikers expressed the same sentiment, often in the same words.
"We got the shaft." "We did everything we knew how to do
within the system." "Our backs were up against the wall." "We
took all we could. They left us with no recourse." "The city
didn't care about us. No one would even listen to us."
What happened in each of the five cities to bring the police
to the point where they felt a strike was their only viable alter-
native? Why did their frustration reach such a critical level that
they would violate the law and their oath of office by striking?
This section discusses the major causes of police strikes in
Las Cruces, Oklahoma City, San Francisco, Tucson, and
Youngstown. Because each strike was caused by a combination
of factors, no attempt has been made to list these causes in order
of importance.
The Municipal Financial Crisis
All five strikes occurred during a period of nationwide reces-
sion and inflation. Local governments were particularly hard hit
Summary and Recommendations 163
by the recession. Cities throughout the nation faced financial dif-
ficulties as their revenues failed to keep pace with the rising costs
of government. In addition, major fluctuations in revenue shar-
ing funds played havoc with orderly fiscal planning and efforts to
balance city budgets. In 1973, local governments received a 26
percent increase in revenue sharing, but in 1974 they received
only a 3 percent increase. The inflation rate, meanwhile, was 14
percent.1 Moreover, there was widespread uncertainty about
whether revenue sharing would be renewed in 1976. Adding to
the problem was the fact that many cities (e.g., San Francisco)
were prohibited from deficit budgeting by state law or city
charters.
The specter of New York City struggling to avoid
bankruptcy was the outstanding symbol of the financial crisis.
New York's troubles were largely attributed to excessive wages
and pensions paid to city employees. Other cities feared financial
collapse and vowed not to repeat New York's mistakes. Public
employees thus became a prime target of municipal budget
tightening efforts. It became commonplace for city officials to
respond to employee wage demands by pointing to New York
City and urging fiscal restraint.
It is not unusual for a city that is running out of money to
look first to its workforce as a potential source of savings. In most
cities, personnel costs are the dominant item in the city budget
and may account for as much as 85 percent of the city's operating
costs. Public employees, however, resent being blamed for
municipal financial crises. They see themselves as scapegoats,
not villians, and they become angry when cities automatically
make them the main target of municipal cost-cutting efforts.
San Francisco police and firefighters were especially furious that
they had been singled out from all municipal employees to bear
the brun| of municipal belt-tightening.
In a forerunner of the Proposition 13 tax revolt, taxpayers,
particularly homeowners and small property owners, began to
demand relief from the dramatic tax increases of the early and
mid-1970s. City officials and the media strongly urged holding
the line on employee wage increases. They warned that large
wage hikes would mean higher taxes. To some extent, they were
correct. Local governments depend to varying degrees upon
revenue produced by various taxes including property taxes, in-
come taxes and sales taxes. Blaming public employees for high
taxes, however, ignores other factors such as inequities in the tax
system and the purposes for which government money is spent.
In San Francisco, for example, where the supervisors expressed
great concern for lowering the property tax rate, there was no dis-
cussion of tax reform, despite the fact that residential and com-
mercial property taxes were assessed on the same basis, and that
downtown commerical property was chronically underassessed
because of its lower turnover rate.2 Tucson's property tax rate
was 50 cents below the maximum allowed by the city charter.
Oklahoma City had only a one cent sales tax, while many other
cities in the state, including Tulsa, had adopted a two cent tax.
It is true, of course, that there is a limit to the financial
resources of any city and that providing all the services
demanded by the public would strain government budgets. As a
result, governments must set priorities among many competing
interests. In some of the five cities, police complained that
although the city insisted it could not afford substantial raises, it
budgeted money on items such as golf courses, shopping malls,
school band uniforms and potholes, with minimal discussion
about which expenditures should take priority. Instead, the wage
issue was presented and perceived as a confrontation between
public employees and taxpayers.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
Local governments should avoid using revenue
sharing or other federal funds to pay salaries of
sworn police personnel.
Local governments should not automatically make
public employees the target of municipal cost-
cutting efforts. Instead they should carefully
review the city's needs and establish priorities in
spending the limited funds at their disposal.
City officials should not use fear of municipal
financial crisis to arouse antipublic employee sen-
timent.
Money
The dominant issue in the Oklahoma City, San Francisco,
Tucson and Youngstown strikes was money. The police were
demanding raises the cities said they could not afford. Though
other important issues were often obscured by the salary ques-
tion, money was still the most significant issue.
The police believed they were greatly underpaid both for the
job they were doing and in comparison with other police depart-
ments. Like other workers, they had to contend with dwindling
buying power brought about by inflation. Their pay was not
keeping up with the rising cost of living. At home they were get-
ting "flack and hamburger helper all the time." Many turned to
moonlighting in order to supplement their incomes.
Police officers, like everyone else, find that not only their
standard of living, but also their self-esteem is affected by how
much they earn. Since their salaries are determined by local of-
ficials representing the people, they often regard salary as a
reflection of how the public regards the service they provide.3
While an adequate salary does not necessarily guarantee an
individual's job satisfaction, it usually prevents salary-related
expressions of discontent. An inadequate salary, however, may
result in various forms of unacceptable employee behavior, from
inattention to duty, to strikes. In The Motivation to Work,
Frederick Herzberg described salary as one of the "hygiene fac-
tors" which "serve primarily to prevent job dissatisfaction, while
having little effect on positive job attitudes." Herzberg expanded
on his theory in Work and the Nature of Man, where he stated
"As an affector of job attitudes, salary has more potency as a job
dissatisfier than as a job satisfier."4
In San Francisco, Tucson, Youngstown and Oklahoma City,
the salary issue became a rallying point for dissatisfied,
frustrated officers attempting to improve their lot. Poor pay
seemed more likely to be corrected than the underlying causes of
their dissatisfaction. It was a more tangible issue than poor
supervision or favoritism. "Pay me enough and I'll put up with
the bullshit" was a common sentiment expressed by strikers.
It is ironic that even the successful pursuit of better salaries
may create increased frustration. When police dissatisfaction
with salaries becomes obvious, local governments sometimes
make token adjustments to assuage employee discontent. These
adjustments are usually in the form of blanket raises that solve
the immediate problem but do not change the inadequacies of
the salary structure. Later, new salary conflicts arise and the cy-
cle of discontent is repeated.5 This is exactly what happened in
Tucson, Youngstown and Oklahoma City.
Just how much money were the police demanding, and the
the same raise as all other city employees. The firefighters had
had the same experience. When the police and firefighters jointly
sought a speedy review of their wages in 1975, the heads of other
city departments protested the exclusive public safety pay
review. City council members spoke out strongly against giving
police and firefighters anything more than other employees got.
Most who held this view sincerely believed that it was in-
equitable to give the employees different raises. However, it was
also politically advantageous not to antagonize the other city
workers who felt they deserved as much as the police and
firefighters.
To support their salary demands, police in Oklahoma City
and Tucson conducted salary surveys of police departments in
"comparable" cities. In response, the cities prepared their own
surveys to support their positions. One major problem with the
wage surveys was determining which cities were comparable. In
both cases, the city and the union disagreed about what the
proper criteria were. Arguments also arose over what figures
should be usedwhether they should use base pay or include
longevity pay, educational incentive pay, and other benefits.
When these "extras" were considered, the computations became
very complex.
To justify their wage offers, cities would point to the
"generous" fringe benefits the police received. In San Francisco,
for example, the supervisors contended that large pension in-
creases the police had recently won compensated for a raise that
was lower than the maximum allowed by the charter. The police
responded that the pensions would not help them "put food on
the table now."
RECOMMENDA TIONS
Gains made by the police in the negotiating process
should not automatically be given to other
employees who are totally different in terms of
qualifications, work requirements and other
characteristics.
Local governments should establish a police salary
structure separate and distinct from that of any
other government agency.
Local governments should provide employee
unions with detailed information about the city's
financial condition including its revenue sources
and expenditures.
Local governments should ensure that police
wages and benefits are commensurate with the
great importance and difficulty of the task which
police perform.
Local governments should establish salary review
procedures to insure the automatic annual adjust-
ment of police salaries to reflect the prevailing
wages in the local economy and to meet the com-
petition from other employers.
Job Dissatisfaction
The rise of police militancy is often attributed to low pay
and external factors such as the civil rights movement and the
emergence of black militance, court decisions restricting police
action, campus unrest, rising crime rates, demand for civilian
review boards, and increased violence and public hostility
toward the police.6 However, conditions within the department
also contribute to a high level of dissatisfaction which may lead
to militancy. Employee job dissatisfaction was present in all five
cities prior to the strikes. The reasons for the dissatisfaction
varied. Officers in Las Cruces, San Francisco, Youngstown, and
Oklahoma City complained about problems such as poor super-
visory practices, autocratic management, ineffective grievance
procedures, favoritism in personnel decisions, inequitable dis-
cipline, poor fringe benefits, racial unrest, old equipment, and
inadequate manpower. Many felt that their administrators were
not aware of these conditions or concerned with improving them.
In Tucson, however, there were few complaints about these types
of problems. The dissatisfaction that did exist regarding working
conditions centered around problems considered almost in-
digenous to police work, including issues such as citizen com-
plaints, frequent changes in rules and regulations, mandatory
court appearances during off-duty time, court reversals, pressure
from minorities, increasing caseloads and calls for service, no
parking for private cars, no parking around the courts, and in-
creasing paperwork.
Just as important as the dissatisfaction was the feeling
among the police that they were powerless to do anything to cor-
rect their problems. In the words of the Tucson FOP president,
trying to change conditions is "long, slow, very uncertain and
frustrating." In most cases, the rank and file had little input in
the decisionmaking processes in their departments. Moreover,
they believed if they did speak out they would be labeled as
troublemakers by a semi military system that did not expect or
welcome input from employees. The major cause of the San
Francisco strike, according to the POA president, was "the
system in the police department which keeps a person from mak-
ing decisions about his own life and career. There is general
frustration with a military system that doesn't allow a guy any
latitude and give him a say. Then on top of that, the little he has
was being taken away from him."
Neither employee discontent nor the problems which caused
it received much attention prior to or during the strikes. Except
in Las Cruces, hardly anyone including the police discussed
these issues, and even there the recognition question quickly
overshadowed the issue of working conditions. In the other cities,
salary was the issue that dominated the strikes. Money was a
subject that could be easily understood and generate support. It
was also a problem that might be resolved.
Many of the conditions police complained about had existed
for years, but little had been done to improve them. Police
management was for the most pajt unaware of the extent of the
dissatisfaction. Management's failure to identify and correct the
causes of dissatisfaction was itself a cause of dissatisfaction.
Many officers believed that their administrators were out of
touch with their problems and either unwilling or unable to pur-
sue their needs with city officials. Their feelings of alienation and
isolation were reinforced when city officials refused to meet with
union leaders to try to work out their differences.
It is imperative that police administrators combat this sense
of alienation and isolation by establishing fast, easy, up and
down communications which will create a climate of trust and
credibility. An effective communications system will enable the
administrator to identify the causes of employee dissatisfaction,
and work towards eliminating them. Managers play a key role in
making the system work. All too often, though, police employees
are promoted to management positions without any training for
the job. It is unrealistic to assume that they will be good
managers if they have not been taught the roles and respon-
sibilities of management and trained in methods of identifying
and dealing with employee problems. The manager's ability to
supervise subordinate personnel fairly and consistently can have
a direct effect on their work attitudes and job satisfaction. The
able manager will detect the existence of developing problems
and deal with the conditions before they become critical.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Police administrators and managers should be
sensitive to the needs of employees and ensure that
they receive proper recognition and appreciation
for the work they do.
Police administrators should establish mech-
anisms which provide employees with the oppor-
tunity to participate in the department's decision-
making process.
Police administrators should provide supervisors
and midlevel managers with training in personnel
management and leadership.
Poor Communications Between Union Leaders
and City Officials
The story of the five strikes is in large part the story of a
communications failure between city officials and union leaders.
There was no regular dialogue between the police employee
organizations and city officials, nor did either side seem in-
terested in starting one. Moreover, city officials were appallingly
ignorant of the extent of police dissatisfation and willingness to
strike. Communications were so bad in Las Cruces that until the
night the strike began, at least one commissioner did not even
know that the police had organized, and most were not aware
that they were seeking immediate recognition. The meeting
between the city manager and the LCPEA leaders in early
December had been the only prior occasion on which city and
police association officials met to discuss problems in the police
department. However, the pertinent issues were not addressed,
and nothing was resolved. The end result of the meeting was that
the police decided they needed outside assistance in dealing with
the city, and they affiliated with ICPA. They made no further
attempts to discuss their problems with city officials until the
night they asked the city commission to grant them immediate
recognition.
In Tucson, the PFA attempted to discuss their pay situation
"with everyone we saw but were turned away." Even the police
chiefs efforts to set up meetings between PFA leaders and in-
dividual council members were largely unsuccessful. The PFA
simply could not get anyone to listen to them. As a last resort,
they telegrammed city officials their intent to strike if their de-
mands were not met, but city officials did not believe them.
In all five cities there was a strong feeling among police that
they were second class citizens who had no role in determining
the conditions of their employment. They felt they were at the
mercy of the city officials who could dictate whatever terms they
wanted. Their attempts to negotiate and to air their complaints
were rebuffed. To the police, the cities' unwillingness to deal
with them indicated contempt for them and their problems.
They felt the cities were unappreciative of the job they were do-
ing and the nature of the police function itself.
The attitudes city officials displayed toward their employees
often provoked hostility and frustration. At times they belittled
the employees and the job they did, making them feel unimpor-
tant and unnecessary. Many officials' attitudes reflected a basic
lack of understanding of the employees and their jobs. Tucson's
mayor, for example, believed that all the firefighters did when
they were not fighting fires was "sit around playing pinochle all
day." Though he never actually told the firefighters this, he
believecThe "may have given them that impression."
In Oklahoma City, poor communication between city of-
ficials and union leaders, along with longstanding problems
regarding pay, manpower and supervision, fostered an attitude
among police that city officials did not care about them. In the
four and one-half years she had been in office, the mayor had
never gone to the FOP lodge and never invited FOP leaders to
her office. The police resented her because they believed she con-
sidered herself too good to have anything to do with them. The
problem was compounded by poor communications between the
FOP and the city council and by the fact that the city personnel
director and FOP leaders did not get along. In contrast, the new
city manager who took over a few months after the strike, en-
joyed a good relationship with the FOP, at least in part because
he was accessible and visible to them. It was not unusual, for ex-
ample, for him to drop in at the FOP lodge to have a drink and
talk to whomever was there. As insignificant as that may seem, it
indicated to the members that he was interested in them.
Much of the difficulty city officials have in dealing with
police labor leaders can be attributed to their reluctance to ac-
cept the existence of public employee labor unions. Many of-
ficials, including some in cities that have collective bargaining,
view these organizations suspiciously. They feel that labor
unions mean strikes, job actions and attempts by employees to
usurp the management of their agencies. Many are personally af-
fronted when police labor groups challenge their authority or city
policies. Because they do not like dealing with the unions, they
do so only when they have to, such as at bargaining time or when
a crisis develops. Some try to avoid even that. Oklahoma City's
mayor, for instance, believed it was "inappropriate for the mayor
to have any dealings with unions unless the city manager does
something so blatant that the mayor has to step in."
Productive communication is more likely to exist if labor
and management have developed a positive rather than an-
tagonistic relationship. If they do not respect and trust each
other, in crisis they are likely to make rash emotional statements
which inflame the already tense situation, exacerbate hard feel-
ings and prevent a rational discussion of the issues. Statements
such as: "Why do we have to talk to you," "We don't need you,"
"If you don't think you make enough money here, why don't you
go live somewhere else," and "If it were up to me I'd cut your
pay" heighten police feelings of alienation and hopelessness.
Threats to fire employees if they go on strike tend to unify them
against management.
Regular informal communication can be an effective way for
labor and management to build a positive relationship. Meeting
only at bargaining time is often not enough. Regularly scheduled
meetings between the union and the city can provide an oppor-
tunity for them to exchange information and ideas and resolve
problems outside the bargaining process. Procedures for informal
communication should complement the bargaining process, not
supplant it.7
RECOMMENDA TIONS
City officials and union leaders should open and
maintain lines of communication with each other.
City officials and union leaders should meet
regularly to exchange information and ideas and to
resolve problems.
City officials and union leaders should avoid mak-
ing rash emotional statements during a labor dis-
pute.
City officials and police administrators should be
aware that threats to fire employees if they strike
tend to unify the employees against management.
Ineffective Negotiations
For various reasons, the cities and the police employee
organizations were either unwilling or unable to negotiate suc-
cessfully prior to the strikes. Only in Oklahoma City were there
any extensive negotiations before the strike, but these too were
unsuccessful.
A major impediment to negotiations in several of the cities
was the lack of an established collective bargaining structure.
One reason was the absence of public employee bargaining laws;
where there were no bargaining laws, the parties were not legally
bound to bargain. Oklahoma had a law authorizing collective
bargaining by police and firefighters, but Arizona, California,
New Mexico and Ohio did not. In Ohio and New Mexico,
however, the right of public employees to bargain collectively
had been recognized by state courts. Youngstown had been
bargaining with its employees for years, but Las Cruces had
never tried it.
Another reason there was no existing bargaining forum in
San Francisco and Tucson was that the local procedures for set-
ting wages did not provide any opportunity for negotiations. San
Francisco police had had no need to bargain over wages. For 23
years the police had received the maximum wage increase al-
lowed by the city charter. By their own choice they had been ex-
cluded from coverage under the city's employee relations or-
dinance. The obligation to meet and confer in their memoran-
dum of understanding with the city did not extend to the subject
of wages. Traditionally the only formal meeting between the
POA and the board of supervisors on the subject of wages was the
meeting of the board's legislative and personnel committee to
consider the civil service commission's pay certifications. In
1975, the committee had been instructed by the board not to
make pay recommendations. Though both sides said they
wanted to talk, there were no negotiations because the board
refused to meet with the POA, and the POA refused to meet with
the city's negotiating team.
Tucson's wage setting procedures were similar to San Fran-
cisco's in that employees were not given the opportunity to
negotiate with the city. The mayor and council were supposed to
meet with employees in good faith to resolve wage disputes. In
practice, the meetings consisted of brief formal presentations by
the employee groups. A representative from each group was
given about an hour to address the mayor and council and
answer their questions. Little or no discussion took place, and
agreement was rarely reached. As a result, from 1972 to 1975, the
FOP and the firefighters' association each went to arbitration
three times over a wage dispute with the city. In 1975, the mayor
and council rejected the arbitrators' recommendation for a 5 per-
cent raise for police, and voted not to give any raises that year.
Subsequent attempts by the police and firefighters to negotiate
with the mayor and council were futile, because the mayor in-
sisted on meeting in public, while the PFA insisted on closed ses-
sions. The mayor contended that closed meetings were "im-
moral" and violated the state's open meeting law. The PFA
pointed out that the statute exempted wage negotiations and
that public sessions would not be productive, but the mayor
would not concede. After the blue flu he finally agreed to meet
with the PFA in executive session and to request a speedy review
of police and firefighters' wages by the civil service commission.
The PFA's victory was shortlived, however, for within two days
they again reached a stalemate with the city. The mayor refused
to meet with the PFA, claiming that the matter was in the hands
of the civil service commission, since the council could not grant
a pay hike without a recommendation from the commission. The
commission, however, refused to hold a hearing on the pay
review. No one could see a way around the problem. The council
maintained it could not force the commission to act and ap-
peared unwilling to do so even if it could.
The development of workable bargaining relationships is in-
hibited when management representatives have only limited
authority to make commitments in negotiations. This problem
often arises because unions must win approval of their demands
from more than one branch of government. If the executive and
the legislative branches cannot agree on what is acceptable,
negotiators will not have the authority to conclude an agree-
ment, and union negotiators will become frustrated. There was
considerable speculation in Youngstown, for instance, that the
inability of the mayor and council to agree on a wage offer was
responsible for the city's failure to make a concrete proposal. The
local IAFF president believed the only way progress could be
made was for the city administration and council to meet,
"instead of having only one man [the chief negotiator] take mes-
sages back and forth." Union negotiators are usually quick to
realize when city negotiators lack authority to conclude an agree-
ment. In such cases they then seek to deal with the real decision-
maker. In San Francisco, for instance, the POA and IAFF
refused to negotiate with the city's bargaining team, because
they considered them to be only "high paid messengers" for the
board of supervisors.
In order to negotiate effectively, the bargaining teams must
be adequately prepared. Proper preparation requires extensive
research and data collection by labor and management to iden-
tify the issues that are likely to arise, anticipate the other side's
position, and determine their own positions. Each side must
decide in advance what is desirable, acceptable, and the bottom
line regarding each issue. They should also decide what items
they are willing to trade off to reach agreement. Without this
kind of information the negotiators will not have sufficient
authority to conclude an agreement without consulting with a
higher authority every time they make a concession.8 The case
studies indicate that the unions take preparation for bargaining
seriously and may expend considerable time, effort and money to
acquire information supporting their demands. Sometimes, as in
San Francisco and Oklahoma City, they obtain the assistance
of outside experts in gathering and analyzing the appropriate
data. The cities, however, tend to rely on their own personnel in
preparing for bargaining.
The case studies reveal a conflict between open meeting
laws and the need to conduct negotiations with some privacy.
The premise of open meeting (or sunshine) laws is simple
government ought to conduct its business in public. Public in-
volvement in labor negotiations, however, would seriously impair
the negotiations. Negotiators might be tempted to play to the
galleries. The initial demands and offers, which would be
reported by the press, might enrage both the public and union
members who do not understand the usual give and take before a
settlement is reached. As long as the legislative body must ap-
prove or reject the settlement in public session, the public will be
adequately protected from secret deals.
The basic objective of negotiations is to reach agreement. At
the outset of negotiations, the parties usually have widely
divergent positions. During bargaining, each side maneuvers to
determine what terms the other will accept and develops
strategies for achieving its own objectives. Gradually, each party
begins to modify its position, there is no point in negotiating if
either side is inflexible. When the public employer makes its
final offer at the start of negotiations, there can be no bargaining.
Similarly, the union must not be intractible in its demands.
Often the parties' ability to make concessions is impaired when
they make their demands and proposals public prior to the start
of negotiations. In San Francisco neither the POA nor the super-
visors appeared willing to make concessions. Youngstown of-
ficials also made it clear to union negotiators that the city was
going to stick to its first wage offer, even though the unions were
threatening to strike.
Police in all of the cities believed that city officials were not
bargaining in good faith. Whether the police were right is not as
important as the fact that they perceived that the cities were not
approaching negotiations with a willingness to reach agreement.
In many instances, the actions of city officials fostered this
belief. The insistence of Tucson's mayor, despite PFA protests,
that the state's open meeting law precluded closed-door negotia-
tions is a good example. It is interesting that after the strike, the
mayor, who was a lawyer, admitted that he "must have been
mistaken" about the law and acknowledged that closed negotia-
tions "might be more productive." Oklahoma City police ex-
pected a substantial pay increase in 1975 as a reward for ac-
cepting the city's 1974 wage offer. When the increase, which had
allegedly been promised by the personnel director, was not
forthcoming, the police felt betrayed. In addition, they viewed
the bargaining tactics used by the city personnel director as bad
faith bargaining and some members of the city council later
agreed. "When he explained how to handle negotiations," said
one councilman, "I was appalled." The FOP also viewed the
city's rejection of the arbitrators' recommendations as bad faith
bargaining, even though they knew that the city was not legally
bound to accept them. The Youngstown Safety Forces felt that
the city was bargaining in bad faith when it repeatedly post-
poned negotiations and refused to make a wage offer. When an
offer was finally made, it was perceived as an "insult." San Fran-
cisco police believed that if the board of supervisors had really
wanted to resolve the wage dispute, it would have met with POA
representatives instead of insisting that negotiations be handled
by the city's negotiating team.
Distrust between labor and management fosters allegations
of bad faith bargaining. If the two sides mistrust each other, they
are likely to approach bargaining as a battle which one side will
win and the other lose. Each expects to reject the other side's de-
mands as unreasonable, and the expectation tends to bring
about the expected conduct.9 In contrast, good relations promote
good negotiations which, in turn, promote good relations. 10
Much of the distrust between city officials and police unions
can be traced to the traditional deficiency of public manage-
ment/police employee relations. Because public employers failed
to anticipate and respond to the needs of police employees, many
police turned to unionization in order to obtain wages, benefits
and working conditions comparable to those of other public and
private sector employees. Through collective bargaining, police
unions sought higher wages, improved benefits, and in some
cases, a voice in department decisionmaking. Many public of-
ficials were fearful and skeptical about the process because it was
new and complicated and they had little experience with it. They
feared collective bargaining would undermine management's
power to control employees, and they doubted that their cities
would be able to raise enough revenue to pay for the agreements.
As a result, they chose to resist the unions. Unions encouraged
this attitude by initially taking tough stands against the
employers and by using aggressive and sometimes harassing tac-
tics to force the employers to give in to their demands. This early
antagonism between employers and unions often resulted in
long-lasting hostility which impaired their bargaining
relationship and their ability to work together.
Many city officials in the strike sites felt threatened by the
existence of public employee unions. Few had any firsthand
labor relations experience or even an understanding of how the
process should work. They failed to realize that labor and
management could work together to find amiable solutions to
mutual problems and instead assumed an antagonistic posture
toward the employee organizations.
Although public employees have a constitutional right to
form and join unions, in the absence of legislation public
employers have no obligation to recognize a union or bargain col-
lectively. Yet police, like other employees, have a legitimate col-
lective interest in the conditions of their employment. To imple-
ment this interest, legislation should recognize the right of the
police to organize and bargain collectively for compensation and
other economic benefits. Even a well-meaning employer who
does what he thinks is best for his employees will not obviate the
employees' desire to have their own group represent them. No
one but the employees themselves can know what they really
want. Through their organizations, employees can voice their
concerns and make suggestions, and thereby participate in es-
tablishing the conditions of their employment. Over half the
states already authorize some form of collective bargaining for
police employees. It is clear that collective bargaining is an idea
whose time has come, and it is incumbent upon mangement to
accept it and become a willing participant in it.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Labor and management should seek to resolve
their disputes through voluntary settlement in an
atmosphere of trust and cooperation.
Both labor and management must bargain in good
faith with a willingness to reach agreement.
Negotiators should be given the authority to con-
clude an agreement.
Both management and labor should be adequately
prepared for negotiations.
Labor negotiations should not be open to the public
or press. Open meeting laws should exempt labor
negotiations.
Neither labor nor management should make its
proposals public prior to the start of negotiations.
Local governments and police administrators
should recognize that police employees have the
right to form and be represented by labor organiza-
tions of their choice.
Police have a proper collective interest in the terms
and conditions of their employment. To implement
this interest, legislation should recognize the right
of police to bargain collectively.
Both labor and management should realize that
bargaining is not only an economic process, but
also a social, political and emotional one. They
should recognize that these factors may require the
other side to use certain strategies and tactics and
should guard against overreacting to them.
Inexperienced Negotiators
Selection of trained, experienced negotiators is vital to the
success of negotiations. Many strikes and labor problems result
from the inexperience of the bargaining teams. Strong, ex-
perienced bargaining teams are more likely to reach agreement
through the bargaining process and negotiate contracts which
are equitable to both sides.
Not surprisingly, there were few persons with extensive
firsthand knowledge of labor relations involved in the prestrike
discussions in the five cities. The major exception was
Youngstown where an experienced negotiator, the assistant law
director, was the head of the city's bargaining team. The safety
forces also obtained skilled assistance when they hired a well-
known Ohio labor lawyer to represent them just a few days before
the strike. Like Youngstown, Oklahoma City selected members
of the city administration for its bargaining team. The chief
negotiator was the city personnel director, but he and the FOP
bargaining team could not get along. FOP leaders blamed him
for the failure of negotiations, claiming he was inexperienced in
bargaining as well as antagonistic towards them. Some city of-
ficials, however, contended that the problem was that the FOP
bargaining team did not know how to negotiate. Tucson made the
mistake of letting members of its city council who had little or no
labor relations experience negotiate with the PFA. The PFA
bargaining team also lacked bargaining expertise. In San Fran-
cisco, the board of supervisors urged the POA to meet with the
city bargaining team headed by the employee relations director,
but the POA refused and insisted on direct negotiations with the
supervisors.
Elected officials should not take part in negotiations with
employee organizations. Most of them cannot devote sufficient
time to the negotiations. Labor relations, particularly in large
cities, is a time-consuming job, requiring the year round atten-
tion of a full-time official. The job of local legislator is frequently
a part-time position. Legislators generally have other full-time
jobs and find it difficult to spend more than a few hours a week
on their legislative duties. What time they can spare is usually
divided between several committee assignments as well as
general legislative business. Even when there is a bargaining
committee, it is unlikely that the members will have enough
time to bargain with several unions on a multitude of issues. The
time problem is aggravated when negotiations are scheduled
during the time the city budget is being developed, which is the
busiest time of year for the legislators.1 1 The Oklahoma City
councilman who admitted that he "operated like a blind fool" in
voting not to accept the arbitrators' recommendations was con-
cerned because he could not possibly stay abreast of all the many
issues confronting the council, since the council was only a part-
time job.
The desire for continuity in the composition of the bargain-
ing team also argues against having legislators as negotiators. A
legislator may acquire experience by negotiating for a year or
two, and then leave office or accept another committee assign-
ment, requiring that a new negotiator replace him.
It is generally inadvisable for municipal officials such as per-
sonnel directors, budget directors, city attorneys and depart-
ment heads to handle collective bargaining. Like local
legislators, they are likely to lack the necessary skills and ex-
perience and to find it difficult to devote enough time and atten-
tion to labor matters during contract negotiations. They have
even less time for contract administration throughout the year.
Union negotiators often are no more experienced or adept
than their management counterparts. Two major reasons for
their lack of expertise are the newness of collective bargaining in
law enforcement and the high turnover rate among union
leaders.12 For collective bargaining to function smoothly and
productively, both labor and management must come to the
bargaining table with equal expertise in the negotiating process.
Management is quick to point to the inexperience and ineptness
of union negotiators, but slow to provide them with training in
labor relations and collective bargaining skills. Most police labor
relations training has focused on management. It is equally im-
portant that labor leaders be taught negotiating skills.
The inexperienced negotiators in the case studies made in-
numerable mistakes. They did not know, for instance, when to
hold negotiations, when to suspend negotiations, what to say
during negotiations, what to tell the press, how big their bargain-
ing teams should be, and how and when to compromise. The un-
professional, emotional statements made by city negotiators in
several of the cities not only offended but deeply hurt the already
upset union negotiators.
Continuity of membership on the union and management
negotiating teams is an important factor in achieving a workable
bargaining relationship. If the negotiators change every year, es-
tablishing a relationship with the other side's negotiators, under-
standing personalities, and developing rapport must begin all
over again. If negotiators change frequently, each side should
select a spokesperson who has had experience in past negotia-
tions, and is familiar with the other side's representatives and
with the issues to be discussed at the bargaining table.13
Governments should either train their officials in labor rela-
tions and collective bargaining or obtain the services of profes-
sional negotiators. When possible, municipalities should es-
tablish labor relations units composed of trained labor relations
specialists. These units would be responsible for negotiations,
contract administration and promoting harmonious employee
relations. They would have the added advantage of ensuring con-
tinuity of the bargaining team and year-round in-house labor ex-
pertise. Smaller communities without this capability should
consider pooling resources with other nearby communities to hire
competent labor consultants or attorneys.14
Unions too should do whatever possible to ensure that ex-
perienced negotiators represent them. Electing union officers for
two-year terms and staggering their terms of office would help
provide stability and continuity on the union bargaining team.
Expert assistance and training in bargaining can often be ob-
tained from national police organizations. Union oriented labor
attorneys and consultants are also available.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
Elected officials should not participate in negotia-
tions with public employee unions.
City officials such as personnel directors, budget
directors, city attorneys and department heads
should not have sole responsibility for labor rela-
tions and contract negotiations.
Labor and management negotiators should be
trained, experienced professionals.
Cities should establish municipal labor relations
units composed of trained labor relations
specialists. These units would be responsible for
negotiations, contract administration and pro-
moting harmonious employee relations. Smaller
communities without this capability should con-
sider pooling resources with other communities to
hire competent labor consultants or attorneys.
Both city officials and union leaders should ensure
the continuity of membership on their bargaining
teams. If negotiators change frequently, each side
should select a spokesperson who has had ex-
perience in past negotiations and is familiar with
the other side's representatives and the issues to be
discussed.
Union officers should be elected for two-year
terms.
Timing
The timing of negotiations can have a critical impact on
their success. The parties should start bargaining well in ad-
vance of the expiration of the current contract and attempt to
settle the new contract before the existing one expires. If the ex-
isting contract between the city and the union has already ex-
pired, the union may seek a swift conclusion to negotiations, par-
ticularly if the retroactivity of the agreement is a negotiable is-
sue. The means the union uses to obtain a desirable agreement
may include a strike. Oklahoma City police, for example, went
on strike two days after their contract expired. On the other
hand, unlike private sector employees, police do not have a tradi-
tion of not working without a contract. Some cities have taken
advantage of this tradition and have successfully used delaying
tactics as a means of reducing employee expectations and pres-
sures. As negotiations drag on long past the contract expiration
dates, the unions sometimes lower their demands. Delay may,
however, increase employee discontent and militance. In
Youngstown, the police continued to work for nine months after
the expiration of their contract. During this time, their im-
patience and frustration grew, as the city repeatedly postponed
making a wage offer. When the offer was finally made, it was
totally unacceptable, and a strike ensued.
Contract expiration dates should be set for a time of year
that is least critical for the employer in terms of coping with a
strike. A strike during the height of the city's tourist season, for
instance, would place additional pressure on the government to
make concessions to settle the strike. It would also make the
delivery of an adequate level of police service more difficult.
Since budget-setting time is the busiest period of the year for
most local legislatures, it is also a bad time for bargaining.
Negotiations should be started long before the budget deadline
so that the costs of the new contract can be incorporated into the
new budget.
When negotiations coincide with municipal elections as they
did in Las Cruces, San Francisco and Tucson, the dangers of
political interference in the bargaining process increase. Con-
ducting negotiations near election time enhances the role of
politics in the labor relations process. Candidates may acquiesce
to union demands in return for political support. Successful can-
didates who were opposed by the unions may take an unduly
hard line against the union demands. Negotiations can easily
become a campaign issue especially if there is a strike or strike
threat near election time.
Collective bargaining agreements that are effective for a
minimum of two years can help alleviate some of the pressures
that exist when new contracts have to be negotiated every year.
In the latter case, new contract negotiations frequently begin
almost immediately after the previous year's contract is settled,
giving the parties little respite from the rigors of bargaining.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
Contract expiration dates should be set for a time
of year that is least critical for the city in terms of
coping with a strike.
Negotiations should be started long before the ex-
piration of the existing contract and the budget
deadline.
The possibility of giving incentives or bonuses for
concluding negotiations early should be explored.
Collective bargaining agreements should be effec-
tive for a minimum of two years.
Negotiations should be scheduled so as not to coin-
cide with local elections.
Local governments should not use delaying tactics
in negotiations with employee unions.
Ineffective Impasse Mechanisms
There were no effective mechanisms for resolving impasses
between labor and management in any of the five cities. The only
impasse procedure which was used prior to any of the strikes was
advisory arbitration. In both Tucson and Oklahoma City, labor
took advantage of the available procedures for advisory arbitra-
tion, and in both instances the city did not accept the ar-
bitrators' recommendations. It was the first time Oklahoma City
had gone to arbitration, and neither the FOP nor the city was ex-
perienced in the process. Under Oklahoma law, the FOP was
bound by the arbitrators' decision, but the city was not. The
FOP believed that by getting the city to request arbitration, the
city would have a moral obligation to abide by the recommenda-
tions. City officials were confident they would win. Both were
wrong. When the arbitrators ruled in favor of the FOP on almost
every issue, the shocked city council refused to accept the recom-
mendations and unilaterally decided to give the police the same
raises it had offered four months earlier. Tucson police, on the
other hand, had few illusions about the city's willingness to abide
by the arbitrators' recommendations. They had gone to arbitra-
tion three times in the previous four years, and the city had ac-
cepted the arbitrator's decision only once. Nevertheless, the FOP
wanted to work within the system and exhaust all avenues of
redress.
These two examples illustrate the danger of using advisory
arbitration as a means of impasse resolution. Even though the
union and the employer may agree in advance that the recom-
mendations are not binding, the union may view the rejection as
bad-faith bargaining, especially if the employer's good-faith
bargaining was suspect prior to arbitration.15
Established procedures for impasse resolution were clearly
needed in the five cities. In Youngstown, Las Cruces, and San
Francisco, the parties had no procedure to which they could
automatically turn when they were unable to reach an agree-
ment. Mediation was suggested but not utilized in San Fran-
cisco, where the mayor offered to mediate the dispute if the
supervisors requested him to do so, but the request never came.
Tucson police and firefighters sought the assistance of a
mediator, but were unable to obtain one before the strike.
No uniform philosophical and procedural approach to the
problem of third party impasse resolution of public employee
disputes has emerged in the United States. Among the states
which have enacted some type of impasse machinery there exist
widely differing solutions to the problem, including various
forms and combinations of mediation, advisory arbitration and
binding arbitration. The problem with focusing on impasse
procedures is that it emphasizes the negative aspects of public
employee bargaining and obscures the need to improve the
process itself.18 In the long run, the only effective dispute settle-
ment procedure is voluntary settlement by the parties
themselves. Ideally, if both parties know how to bargain and do
so in good faith, they ought to be able to reach an agreement that
is satisfactory to both sides. In reality, the antipathy between the
parties and/or their inexperience may preclude direct negotia-
tions. The case studies revealed that often the parties lacked
negotiating "know-how" and were unwilling to try to reach an
accommodation. Since impasses do occur, some mechanism
should be available for resolving them. Mediation and fact-
finding are more desirable because of their emphasis on volun-
tary settlement. On the other hand, their voluntariness is what
makes them ineffective in the absence of the right to strike.
In recognition of the fact that the right to strike is not a
feasible solution to their dispute settlement process, police and
firefighters have been in the forefront of lobbying efforts to re-
quire their government employers to submit to binding arbitra-
tion in the event of a bargaining impasse. The theory is that com-
pulsory binding arbitration, like the strike, exerts pressure on the
parties by positing a less attractive alternative than the collec-
tively bargained contract. Implicit in the argument for binding
arbitration is the recognition that neither mediation nor fact-
finding offers a totally satisfactory solution to impasse. The non-
binding nature of these two procedures has been unable to
mitigate the effect of the denial of the right to strike on the
bargaining process. Most of the power in public sector bargaining
is on the management side. Moreover, there is a general lack of
effective sanctions for employers (or unions) who do not bargain
in good faith. Therefore, denying police the right to strike
decreases the leverage they can use to assert their demands. It
may also reduce management's motivation to bargain seriously
and its inclination to modify its original position. This is exactly
what occurred prior to the strikes in Tucson, San Francisco,
Youngstown and Oklahoma City. Management decided uni-
laterally what to offer the police and gave no indication of will-
ingness to compromise. The police perceived that a strike was
the only effective means they had to compel management to
bargain in good faith.
Labor and management ought to be able to bargain in good
faith and reach an agreement. If they cannot, and voluntary im-
passe procedures are unavailable or have failed, they should be
required to submit the dispute to binding arbitration or give the
employees the right to strike. Because a police strike has the
potential of endangering the public safety, it is not an acceptable
alternative. That leaves binding arbitration. Binding arbitration
is not a perfect solution to the problem of dispute resolution, but
it does equalize the power of the parties in negotiations and
provide finality.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
Labor and management should attempt to resolve
their differences through good-faith collective
bargaining without recourse to third party in-
tervention.
Labor and management should be permitted to es-
tablish their own impasse machinery. Any
statutory impasse procedures should be applicable
only when the parties have not mutually agreed to
their own impasse machinery.
Dispute issues should be resolved by using third
party procedures including the maximum use of
mediation and the considered use of fact-finding.
Binding arbitration should be used only as a last
resort.
Management should be aware of the possible con-
sequences of agreeing to submit to advisory ar-
bitration, namely that unions tend to associate the
rejection of fact-finding recommendations with
bad-faith bargaining.
Unions should not automatically regard the
employer's rejection of fact-finding recommenda-
tions as bad-faith bargaining.
Politics
It is widely acknowledged that public sector labor relations
operate in a political environment. Public employees, especially
when joined by friends and families, can and do exercise con-
siderable political clout. It is not uncommon for unions to try to
vote uncooperative government officials out of office and replace
them with persons more amenable to union demands. Unions
can usually expect to be rewarded for their political support of
successful candidates.
Public employees have been effective in utilizing their
political skills and influence in the bargaining process because
government authority is dispersed among the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of government, as well as among
local, county, state and federal levels of government. Unions
must usually win approval of their demands from more than one
branch of government. The absence of a coordinated working
relationship between the bargaining authority for the public
employer and the appropriate legislative body, leaves the
government vulnerable to the unions' political tactics and under-
mines good bargaining relationships. The legislative end run, in
which unions use their influence to obtain from legislators
benefits which they have been unable to obtain at the bargaining
table, is a well-known tactic.
Both the San Francisco and Tucson strikes illustrate how
excessive political pressure may lead to a strike. Of all the
strikes, the one in San Francisco was the most politicalized. It
started a chain of events which brought a new cycle of politics to
San Francisco. The strike was a political bonanza for the board of
supervisors, eight of whom were candidates in the upcoming
election. Traditionally, San Francisco voters had been prolabor.
In 1975, however, the public's mood was one of fiscal conser-
vatism; taxpayers were angry over huge increases in property tax
assessments. In this climate, it was politically advantageous for
the supervisors to take a tough stance against large wage hikes
for public employees. Even before the strike, the supervisors,
who were noted for their usual discord, were suddenly united in
opposition to the police wage demands. While the supervisors
said they were sympathetic to the police and firefighters' posi-
tions, they made it clear that they would give an increase which
was "satisfactory to the taxpayer."
Tucson, too, was having municipal elections in the fall of
1975. The mayor was seeking a second term, and three seats on
the council were also at stake. Police and firefighters believed
that the mayor's refusal to negotiate in private was politically
motivated. They accused him of using them to prove to the
voters that he was not a "do nothing" mayor. The mayor denied
this charge and claimed that his opponent instigated the strike
to embarrass him. He subsequently acknowledged, however, that
he benefited politically from the strike.
In Youngstown, there was considerable speculation that the
city's delay in making a wage offer was due to political dif-
ferences between the Republican mayor and Democratic council.
Under the city charter, the mayor was required to make a wage
recommendation to the council which the council could either
accept or reject, but not modify. It was thought that the mayor,
who was running for Congress that fall, was reluctant to make a
wage proposal unless he was assured that the council would ap-
prove it, and that as a result, the city's negotiating team was not
given clear authority and instructions for concluding an agree-
ment.
Whether or not they are running for office, elected officials
should not participate in negotiations. They are particularly
vulnerable to political pressure and may make or deny conces-
sions because of fear of union or public reprisals at the polls.
Ideally, negotiators should be persons who are least likely to be
subject to political pressures. Another problem is the
legislature's lack of flexibility to change its position when issues
are modified during negotiations. Open meeting laws which
prohibit emergency or confidential meetings contribute to this
rigidity, because legislators fear that the public will perceive
them as vacillating or weak.
RECOMMENDA TION
City officials and union leaders should seek to min-
imize the injection of politics into the bargaining
process as it is counterproductive to the develop-
ment of workable bargaining relationships.
Role of the Chief
There is little mention of the police administrators in the
description of the events prior to the strikes. The chiefs were not
involved in the cities' prestrike decisionmaking nor were they
represented at the bargaining table. There is little indication
that the chiefs actively pursued the economic and job needs of
their employees or made substantial efforts to prevent the
strikes. One of the chiefs tried to set up meetings between city of-
ficials and union leaders, but his efforts were largely unsuc-
cessful.
It is not unusual for the police administrator to be left out of
the collective bargaining process. Many chiefs find it difficult to
define what their roles should be. Part of the reason is the
newness of the process itself. Another influential factor is the fact
that most administrators have risen through the ranks and may
identify and sympathize with the rank and file. Often they
belong to the same bargaining unit or employee organization. In
some cities, police administrators are excluded from the city's
bargaining team in order to insure that the city presents a united
front.'7 The administrator's traditionally weak position in the
city's political hierarchy also tends to restrict his participation in
the labor relations process. Employees may bypass him and deal
directly with the legislature because he lacks the clout to secure
their demands. Even if the chief does try to obtain personnel
benefits for his employees he may be caught in a conflict between
their legitimate needs and the policies set by city officials.
The role of the police administrator is crucial throughout the
entire collective bargaining process. Without his input, decisions
will be made on the basis of incomplete information about their
impact on the management and operation of the department.
There are two stages of the bargaining process in which the
administrator's participation is particularly vitalduring
prebargaining decisionmaking and during negotiations.
It is essential that the police administrator be involved in
the city's prebargaining decisionmaking. Prior to negotiations,
he should meet with other public officials such as the mayor or
city manager, the personnel and finance directors, and the coun-
cil or its representatives, to formulate guidelines for negotiations
and develop offers and counterproposals for the city to make at
the bargaining table. Without his involvement, important
management rights may be unwittingly lost, as city officials
"hold the line" on wages by trading off concessions affecting
departmental operations.18
It is equally important that the chief be represented at the
bargaining table. Here too, management interests must be
protected. Feedback on the progress of negotiations is also neces-
sary. Where feasible, the administrator should appoint and train
a member of his management staff to represent the department
during negotiations. Many chiefs do not have the time to be a
member of the bargaining team, nor is it in their best interests to
do so. As a negotiator, the administrator is likely to be in an
adversary relationship with his employees, which may subse-
quently impair his ability to manage the department effectively.
Designating a member of his staff to represent the department
has the added advantage of providing that individual with
valuable experience in the labor relations process. Only where
the size of the department or other considerations make it impos-
sible to delegate a representative should the administrator
himself be a member of the bargaining team. In such cases, it is
preferable for administrators to limit their participation to the
role of advisors and not act as management spokespersons.19
The police administrator's role in the labor relations process
will be more effective if he establishes a closely coordinated
relationship with the personnel director, city manager, mayor
and other officials responsible for carrying out employee rela-
tions policies. Regular meetings between these top level
managers are advisable if they are to develop a coordinated ap-
proach for dealing with the union. They should not wait until
bargaining time or the development of a labor crisis to exchange
information and ideas. Constant communications are essential.
The labor relations process involves more than contract or
wage negotiations. It involves the total relationship between
management and the work force.20 Good labor relations require
the police administrator's year-round daily attention to
promoting an atmosphere of harmonious relationships. Ad-
ministrators should develop written labor relations policies
which explain their department's relationship with its employee
unions. These policies should be designed to promote good faith
and trust between the union and management. Moreover, since
labor relations is a major management function it should be
given a visible identity within the organizational structure of the
police department. In small departments this might be ac-
complished by the chiefs adopting and implementing his own
labor relations policy, or assigning a subordinate to handle labor
relations on a part-time basis.21 hi medium to large sized depart-
ments, it would be more advisable to establish a labor relations
unit to handle the wide range of labor issues that arise, such as
grievance review and preparation, contract administration,
representation of police management at the bargaining table,
labor relations training, and liaison with city labor and personnel
representatives.22
For good labor relations to exist, there must be communica-
tion and cooperation between the police administration and the
union leaders. Union leaders should have easy access to the chief
and should not have to go through the chain of command to see
him. Through informal communication, labor and management
can often eliminate problems before they arise, or diminish their
disruptive impact on the department. They can also remove ir-
relevant issues from the bargaining process and thereby enable
negotiations to proceed more smoothly.23
Police employees, like other workers, desire equitable
economic benefits and optimum working conditions. Obviously,
the chief is in a position to request higher salaries and benefits
from the legislative body. He can also effectuate improved job
conditions. However, if the chief does not speak out for his
employees' interests, the employees will do so themselves.
Job dissatisfaction of varying degrees existed in all five cities
prior to the strikes, and undoubtedly contributed to the mood
and attitude of the officers. Yet the chiefs did little to identify
and deal with the dissatisfaction or its causes. It is questionable
whether they were even aware of the extent of employee discon-
tent.
The chiefs' failure to pursue the economic and job needs of
their employees contributed to police feelings of alienation and
isolation. Many officers believed that no one in city government,
including their own administrators, cared enough about them to
listen to their complaints and correct the deficiencies which
caused them. They frequently blamed inadequate internal com-
munications for the fact that the chief was out of touch with their
problems and needs. Poor supervisory practices and inadequate
grievance procedures were commonly cited as reasons for the
poor communications. Officers felt that their supervisors were
not keeping the command staff advised of needs and problems of
subordinates and not informing subordinates of organizational
policies.
Police administrators should establish mechanisms for the
effective exchange of information within their agencies. They
should determine what their employees want, how they feel, and
should act on this information. Fast, easy, up and down com-
munications must be available so that no one will feel left out
and ignored. Establishing an effective grievance procedure and
encouraging officers to use it can be a useful means of bringing
problems to the attention of management and providing
employees with an outlet for the expression of job dissatisfac-
tion.24
RECOMMENDA TIONS
Police administrators should act and speak as part
of management. They must recognize that they are
no longer part of the rank and file.
Police administrators should take an active role in
the labor relations process. They should be in-
volved in prebargaining decisionmaking and
should be represented at the bargaining table.
Police administrators should develop closer rela-
tions with other officials in the executive branch of
government. They should meet regularly with
these officials to formulate labor relations policies
and guidelines.
Police administrators should develop written labor
relations policies which explain the department's
relationship with its employee union. These
policies should be designed to promote good faith
and trust between the union and the administra-
tion.
Police administrators in medium to large sized
departments should establish labor relations units
to handle the wide range of labor issues that arise.
Police administrators should open and maintain
formal and informal channels of communication
with union leaders.
Police administrators should actively participate
in seeking reasonable personnel benefits for all
police employees.
Police administrators should provide an internal
two-way communication system to facilitate the ef-
fective exchange of information within their agen-
cies.
Police administrators should develop methods for
identifying and correcting the causes of employee
dissatisfaction in their agencies.
Police administrators should establish an effective
grievance procedure for all police employees.
Bargaining Unit
All five police employee organizations which went on strike
were affiliated with one of the two largest national police
organizations. In Tucson, Youngstown and Oklahoma City, the
organizations were local chapters of the Fraternal Order of Police
(FOP). Both the San Francisco POA and the Las Cruces POA
were affiliated with the International Conference of Police As-
sociations (ICPA). The Las Cruces group affiliated with ICPA
only two months before it went on strike, and only after its at-
tempt to obtain assistance from the national FOP had failed. At
the time of the strikes, neither the FOP nor the ICPA was af-
filiated with organized labor. The FOP is a national police or-
ganization with a membership of about 140,000 in about 1,300
state and local lodges. It operates on a decentralized basis, with
the locals exercising virtually autonomous power. The FOP was
founded in 1915 as a social organization, and though it still does
not consider itself a labor union, many of the locals engage in col-
lective bargaining and job actions. It is probably safe to say that
there are more labor agreements negotiated by FOP's than by
any other police labor organization.25 The ICPA has been called
an "association of associations." It is a loose confederation of
local independent police organizations. Only associations, not
individuals, are accepted as members. The ICPA presently has
about 280 affiliates with a combined membership of about
220,000. The organization has been attempting to become the
major organizer of police officers and has pressed for the enact-
ment of collective bargaining legislation throughout the country.
In 1978, the ICPA affiliated with the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO.
Affiliation with a national police organization appeared to
have little effect on whether a strike occurred. Las Graces was
the only city in which a national organization became actively
involved in the dispute prior to the strike. Contrary to what city
officials believe, the ICPA secretary-treasurer did not try to per-
suade the LCPOA to strike. Though he clearly implied that a
strike was their most feasible course of action, he never advised
them to do it. If he is at all responsible for the strike it is because
he raised police expectations that something could be done to
resolve their grievances, and "irked" and "offended" city of-
ficials who resented an outsider telling them what to do.
The composition of the police bargaining units was far more
significant than their national affiliations. Supervisory and
management personnel were more often than not included in the
same labor organization as rank-and-file' employees. The San
Francisco POA and the Youngstown FOP had been recognized as
the official representative of all sworn members of their respec-
tive departments. In Oklahoma City, the FOP was the
recognized bargaining agent for all sworn personnel up through
the rank of lieutenant. However, higher ranking officers, in-
cluding the chief, who were not represented by the FOP, still
belonged to the organization. The Tucson FOP represented all
sworn officers through the rank of sergeant. The Las Cruces POA
was open to all department personnel, including civilians.
Supervisors are the first line of management. They have a
critical position in the department because their behavior im-
pacts directly on productivity, employee relations and morale,
and because they are the communications link between their
superiors and subordinates. The next level is middle manage-
ment, whose role is to manage supervisors and control functional
areas within a police agency. Police administrators are the top
echelon of management. Their role involves planning,
policymaking, organizing and communicating, and handling
relations with other government agencies.26
The inclusion of management employees in the same
bargaining unit as rank-and-file employees reflects the failure to
define adequately the line which separates labor and manage-
ment. When they are in the same bargaining unit as their subor-
dinates, managers tend to identify more with the subordinates
than with management goals and objectives. In the event of a
strike, they are likely to sympathize with the strikers and even
join the walkout. The more members there are in the bargaining
unit, the fewer officers there will be available to work if the
bargaining unit goes on strike.
Since public managers, and especially police ad-
ministrators, have generally failed to distinguish between labor
and management in their agencies, management personnel have
often lacked appropriate incentives, benefits and motivation.
Lack of attention to the needs of these employees can result in a
steady decrease in the differential between compensation and
benefits which accrue to the rank and file and management.27 In
Tucson, for example, there was a serious problem of salary com-
pensation between the higher and lower ranks. Because higher
ranking officers were not eligible for overtime pay, lower ranking
officers made more money than some of their superiors. It is not
surprising that management personnel want to be represented by
the rank-and-file union when that union has been able to obtain
better wage increases and benefits than the legislature has given
management.28
Money and benefits may motivate managers to identify with
management for a short time. In the long run, however, they are
ineffective in fostering management consciousness. It is the
responsibility of top administrators to motivate middle
managers and supervisors to become good managers, by involv-
ing them in decisionmaking and delegating authority to them.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
Management personnel should not belong to the
same bargaining unit as the rank and file.
Collective bargaining legislation should provide a
clear definition of where supervisory status begins.
This determination should be based on function
rather than rank.
Police administrators should foster management
consciousness among managers through training,
involvement in decisionmaking, and delegation of
authority.
Local governments should establish a sufficient
salary separation between job classifications to
provide promotional incentives and to retain com-
petent managers.
Union Politics
Union leaders are subject to the same political pressures as
elected public officials. To remain in office, they must satisfy
their constituents' demands. A close contest for leadership of the
union puts enormous pressure on the winner to get more from
management. The attempt by the Teamsters to replace the FOP
as the official bargaining agent for Oklahoma City police was a
clear warning to the FOP's leaders that they had to produce a
good contract that year. Even though the Teamsters had been
soundly defeated, they were waiting in the wings to take over if
the FOP could not produce. The pressure was so great that FOP
leaders concluded that their members would not accept a
negotiated settlement and that the independent judgment of a
neutral arbitrator was needed. San Francisco's POA president
had also faced a strong challenge just a few months before the
strike. He won, but by only 35 votes. After that, there was no way
he could accept a change in the city's traditional pay practices
and survive politically.
Political pressure on union leaders is greatest if union elec-
tions and the contract expiration occur in the same year. If the
election is before negotiations, union leaders may make promises
that are difficult to live up to. Strong antimanagement state-
ments made to attract votes may cause employees to become an-
tagonistic toward management and vice versa. If the election
comes during or after the negotiations, the incumbent leaders
may make excessive demands to prove to the members that they
are being tough with management.
As the head of his organization, the police labor leader is
also in a management position. The job is a demanding one
which requires skills in management, organization and
leadership. Unfortunately, few union leaders receive any training
for the job. With training in management, organization and
leadership, the union leader will be able to run the union more
efficiently. It is also advisable (if the agency's size and manpower
needs permit it) to relieve the union president of all police duties
so that he can devote all of his time to operating the union. The
better he can manage the union, the less conflict there will be in
the department.29
RECOMMENDA TIONS
aware of the pressures placed on union leaders as a
result of a close union election or a challenge by a
rival union.
Contract negotiations should be scheduled so as
not to coincide with union elections.
Local governments should provide union leaders
with training in management, organization and
leadership.
The union president should (if the agency's size
and manpower needs permit) be relieved of all
police duties, so he can devote all of his time to
operating the union.
Police-Fire Alliances
Police and firefighters will sometimes join forces, as they did
in Youngstown and Tucson in order to put added pressure on the
city to meet their wage demands. They feel there is strength in
numbers. They become more confident that they will get what
they want. The alliance can have a significant impact on the
decision to strike. Both groups know that a city will have greater
difficulty coping with a strike by both police and firefighters
than by either group alone. They also realize that the more
strikers there are, the more difficult it will be for the city to fire
them, due to the time and expense involved in hiring and train-
ing replacements. In addition, their larger numbers increase the
likelihood that the members will follow the majority and adhere
to the recommendations of the leadership. The sheer numbers
create an emotional atmosphere conducive to spontaneous and
sometimes drastic action.
Firefighters tend to be more militant than police. They are
often better organized and more experienced than police in the
area of labor relations. Moreover, they have a strong national
organization, the International Association of Firefighters
(IAFF), which provides them with expert assistance. Being more
militant, the firefighters are apt to influence the more moderate
police to strike. In Tucson and Youngstown, the police were more
reluctant than the firefighters to strike. But in no way were they
duped or led into doing something they did not want to do. They
were as angry and frustrated as the firefighters; it just took them
a little longer to decide to strike.
RECOMMENDA TION
aware that when the police and firefighters join
forces during a labor dispute, the likelihood that
they will engage in a job action increases.
Previous Job Actions
The success of previous job actions may increase the propen-
sity of the police to strike. Tucson, Youngstown, and Oklahoma
City had all experienced prior job actions by the police, but
Youngstown was the only one where the police had actually gone
on strike. In none of the three cities were any officers fired or
otherwise disciplined for participating in the job actions. Tucson
had experienced two job actions by police, both over the issue of
wages. The first occurred in 1969, when the city narrowly averted
the mass resignation of about 75 percent of the police depart-
ment by agreeing to police wage demands just a few minutes
before the resignations became effective. A week before the 1975
strike, Tucson police and firefighters staged a limited blue flu in
which more than half the police and firefighters scheduled for
duty called in sick. The blue flu ended when city officials finally
agreed to negotiate with PFA leaders behind closed doors. There
had been an earlier blue flu by firefighters in 1971 after a series of
events which were strikingly similar to those which preceded the
1975 strike. As a result of that action, city employees won an im-
mediate pay increase. Oklahoma City had the largest number of
police job actions. Police instituted two ticket slowdowns, in
1967 and 1972, to call attention to their need for better wages.
The third ticket slowdown began in 1975, while negotiations
between the FOP and city were stalled. It ended two-and-a-half
weeks later when the city agreed to request advisory arbitration.
In October 1975 the police again began a work slowdown im-
mediately after the city council rejected the arbitrators' recom-
mendations. Two days later they were on strike.
The success of recent public safety strikes in other cities
may also have had a bearing on police willingness to strike. The
more successful strikes there are, the more legitimate the strike
may appear to police as a tactic in a labor dispute. Strikes in
Albuquerque, San Francisco, and Kansas City occurred prior to
the strikes in Las Cruces, Oklahoma City, and Youngstown.
However, it was probably the San Francisco strike that had the
greatest influence. The strike was front page news throughout
the country, and when it ended the media strongly condemned
the mayor's "capitulation" to the strikers' demands. The mes-
sage conveyed was that a strike by police and firefighters could
bring a city to its knees. The aftermath of the San Francisco
strike had a different message for city officialsnamely, that
they could stand firm against the wage demands of their
employees. The nationwide condemnation of the strike did not
go unnoticed. Neither did public support for the antilabor
measures taken by the supervisors following the strike.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
aware that the success of previous job actions or
strikes by public safety employees may increase
the propensity of the police to strike.
aware that the success of recent public safety
strikes in other cities may increase the propensity
of the police to strike.
City officials, police administrators, and union
leaders should identify and correct the conditions
which precipitate job actions in order to reduce the
potential that they will recur.
Media
While the strikes focused public attention on the problems
between the unions and management, the public got only a
superficial glimpse of the causes of the strikes. Most information
about the strikes was obtained through the news media which
tended to oversimplify the issues, highlight the differences
between the parties, and ignore the matters they have agreed up-
on. One union leader voiced the criticisms of many when he said
"The press would listen to the facts, nod their heads in under-
standing, and then ask when we are going to strike. They . . .
kept talking strike with no attempt to give the full details of the
issue." Frequently the strikes were pictured as involving nothing
more than the police union demanding wage increases which the
city thought were excessive. With few exceptions the media were
quick to condemn the strikes and those who participated in
them, and in the process the issues tended to get lost. In Las
Cruces, for example, the local newspaper reported little about
dissatisfaction over poor working conditions in the police depart-
ment, which was the major cause of the strike.
The ground rules, which contain the basic agreement about
how negotiations should be conducted, should provide that no
information about the negotiations will be released to the press
without the consent of both labor and management. Otherwise
negotiations are likely to be conducted through the media, as the
parties unilaterally issue news releases telling their version of
what transpired in negotiations. Often these statements inflame
emotions, force the parties into rigid positions and hinder efforts
to resolve the dispute.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
City officials, police administrators and union
leaders should be aware that their statements to
the press about a labor dispute may be mis-
interpreted.
The ground rules for negotiations should require
the consent of both labor and management before
any information about negotiations is released to
the press.
City officials and union leaders should emphasize
their areas of agreement and compromise, rather
than their differences when making public state-
ments about a labor dispute.
Triggering Device
The same conditions which have been described here no
doubt exist in many communities throughout the country where
police are underpaid, dissatisfied with their jobs and frustrated
in their attempts to get city officials to rectify their problems.
Yet only a few of these communities end up having strikes. What
often makes the difference between whether or not a strike occurs
is the presence of a triggering device. The triggering device is
"the straw that breaks the camel's back." It is a catalyst that
provokes already angry, frustrated officers to take drastic action
which they otherwise would probably not have taken.
The triggering device can be a statement, an action, or even
a rumor. In Las Cruces it was the indifferent attitude of city of-
ficials, and particularly the city manager, the night the LCPOA
appeared before the city commission to request recognition. In
Oklahoma City, the rumor that a lieutenant was being fired
sparked the strike. San Francisco officers suddenly walked off
the job en masse when the board of supervisors refused to let the
POA president speak after the supervisors approved the pay in-
crease opposed by the POA. The Youngstown strike was trig-
gered by the "insulting" wage offer made by the city after
months of delay. The employees were also enraged by the mayor
and council's refusal to discuss the offer, even though angry
union leaders insulted them and "raked them over the coals."
All participants in a labor dispute must recognize that any
statement or action can serve as a triggering device when emo-
tions are running high. Under normal circumstances, such ac-
tions may draw little or no attention. In the tense, emotional at-
mosphere of a labor crisis, the behavior may trigger a strike.
RECOMMENDA TION
City officials, police administrators and union
leaders should be aware that their actions or state-
ments during a labor dispute may trigger a strike.
There were many similarities between the ways the cities,
the police departments, the unions and the public behaved once
the strikes began. Several of the problems which caused the
strikes continued during the strikes and plagued efforts to end
the disputes. This section discusses the major events during the
five strikes to indicate what is likely to happen when a police
strike occurs. No recommendations are made for dealing with a
strike. However, those involved in one should be better prepared
to respond to the problems and issues it creates if they know
what to expect.
Length
With the exception of the Las Cruces strike which lasted 32
days, all the strikes lasted less than a week. Their average length
was four days. The shortest strike was in San Francisco (three
days). The Tucson strike lasted six days and the Oklahoma City
and Youngstown strikes three-and-a-half days each.
Several factors may account for the unusual length of the
Las Cruces strike. It was the only strike over recognition; all the
others concerned economic issues. It occurred in a small depart-
ment with less than 100 sworn personnel. All the supervisors but
one remained on duty, and they along with a few officers who did
not strike were able to provide the city with an adequate level of
police service. The fact that the municipal election was less than
a month away may also have prolonged the strike since both
sides expected the dispute to be resolved at the polls.
Participation
Participation in the strikes was widespread in all depart-
ments. The strikes were not the action of a few officers; at least
50 percent of the sworn personnel of each department took part
in the walkouts. (Tucson 76.2%; Oklahoma City 92.7%;
Youngstown 74.0%; Las Cruces 65.8% and San Francisco 51.5%).
In each case, the majority of the strikers were uniformed person-
nel, but they were joined by plainclothes officers, supervisors
and, in some cases, command personnel. In Las Cruces, however,
only one supervisor, a sergeant, participated in the strike, largely
because the chief threatened to fire any supervisors who struck.
The strikers and nonstrikers cannot be distinguished on the
basis of their years of service in the department. Officers who
were close to retirement and stood to lose their pensions if they
were fired readily joined the walkouts as did those who held
choice assignments in the departments. In San Francisco,
however, only 15 percent of the inspectors (detectives) struck.
Their failure to join the walkout was largely attributed to the
longstanding antipathy between the inspectors and the uni-
formed officers, and to the fact that the job of inspector was con-
sidered one of the most desirable assignments. Although they did
not join the strike, many of the inspectors who reported for work
and were assigned to the field would not leave the Hall of Justice.
Others who were dispatched throughout the city in unmarked
cars deliberately ignored calls for service in a demonstration of
support for the strike.
The unions exempted some of their members from par-
ticipating in the strikes. No one expected the probationers to
strike because they were subject to termination without a hear-
ing. Some of the Oklahoma City patrol officers who remained on
duty worked with the FOP's approval because of special in-
dividual circumstances. In addition, when all the airport police
walked off the job, FOP leaders instructed the sergeants to go
back to work because they did not want to close the airport. The
San Francisco POA exempted all probationers, personnel who
worked in communications and the jail, and the mayor's
bodyguards.
Police Protection
The police departments' responses to the strikes were
basically similar. All were confronted with the same initial
problemfinding a source of manpower to provide the city with
adequate police protection.
The chief in Oklahoma City was the only one of the police
administrators who anticipated a strike and developed a con-
tingency plan in advance. As a result, 17 sheriffs deputies and
100 state troopers were in the city within an hour of the start of
the strike. Earlier in the week, the chief had recei 'ed assurances
from the sheriffs in nearby counties that they would provide
deputies to help patrol the city in case of a strike. He had also
contacted the commisioner of the highway patrol to ask for the
patrol's assistance. The commissioner quickly agreed, and the
chief and two majors met with the patrol command staff to
develop a contingency plan. The plan provided that highway
patrol headquarters would handpick 140 veteran officers to be
sent to Oklahoma City. The patrol limited the number of person-
nel it provided to 140 to forestall accusations that it was over-
reacting to the strike and leaving the rest of the state un-
protected. Many of the troopers were pulled from special units
such as motor vehicle inspection and safety education which
were not involved in traffic enforcement. While in Oklahoma
City, the troopers were under the command of a captain, three
lieutenants and seven sergeants. Their command center was
highway patrol headquarters.
In accordance with the department's contingency plan, all
the state troopers were assigned to patrol duty. They were
divided into three shifts. Each trooper was given a city map and
assigned a specific Oklahoma City patrol car and patrol district.
There were some initial problems when some of the cars were not
immediately available, because patrol officers had parked them
on various downtown streets and joined the march to City Hall.
Many of the officers also locked their cars and took the keys.
Once the car situation was resolved, the troopers' main problem
was unfamiliarity with Oklahoma City streets. They repeatedly
had to ask directions to calls over the police radio, and a few got
lost. This problem was later alleviated, to some extent, when
striking police officers rode with the troopers to give them direc-
tions. At first, the troopers also had some difficulty adjusting to
Oklahoma City's communications equipment and radio codes,
but they soon became familiar with them.
Other parts of the department's contingency plan were also
implemented. Sheriffs deputies helped patrol the streets and
handled investigations usually conducted by detectives. Techni-
cians for investigations were provided by the sheriffs and the
State Bureau of Investigation. Private security guards were hired
to protect police headquarters. The department also notified off-
duty and vacationing officers to return to work, but most
responded by going to City Hall to turn in their badges. An
emergency priority system for dispatching calls was put into ef-
fect. Violent crimes and emergency calls for assistance received
top priority. Calls that were considered minor and unnecessary
of a police response could be disregarded. The chief asked
citizens involved in noninjury traffic accidents to exchange infor-
mation and arrange for wreckers themselves.
Except for obtaining assistance from the highway patrol and
sheriff's departments, most departments implemented
procedures similar to those used in Oklahoma City. They put all
available personnel on 12-hour shifts, cancelled vacations, as-
signed plainclothes and supervisory personnel to patrol duty, es-
tablished emergency priority systems for dispatching calls, and
asked citizens to go to the precincts to report minor complaints.
Oklahoma City was not the only department which utilized
assistance from outside law enforcement agencies. When re-
quested, sheriffs deputies in Tucson responded to emergency
calls, i.e., when lives or serious property damage or loss were
threatened. They did not, however, patrol city streets, but
waited for calls at the city limits. In Las Cruces, the chief
notified the state police and sheriffs department that their as-
sistance might be required, and these agencies readily agreed to
provide any necessary assistance. Because the dispatchers were
on strike, and no one knew how to operate the communications
center, the police department had to borrow a dispatcher from
the sheriffs department. Youngstown's chief did not ask for help
from other nearby jurisdictions because of his desire to "keep
them out of our labor disputes." The mayor, however, kept the
governor abreast of what was happening, but never requested
him to send in the highway patrol or the National Guard.
In San Francisco the mayor refused to call in outside law en-
forcement assistance despite the protests of the board of super-
visors and the chiefs assessment that a state of emergency ex-
isted. The mayor was afraid that if the highway patrol were
called in, there might be a confrontation with the strikers. With-
out informing the mayor, the supervisors sent the governor a
telegram asking him to send 200 state troopers to the city. The
governor's office indicated that the highway patrol would not be
ordered into the city unless it were requested by the mayor.
In the event of a strike, it is vital that a police department
have an adequate strike contingency plan. The purpose of the
plan is to insure that if a strike occurs, the public health, safety
and welfare of the community will be protected. The importance
of a contingency plan cannot be over-emphasized. The existence
of a well developed plan may, in itself, decrease the propensity of
an employee organization to consider a strike. It may also help
alleviate the fears of citizens and reassure them that an accep-
table level of services will be provided.
Proper strike preparation requires the cooperation of state
and local law enforcement agencies, the supervisory staff of each
agency involved, the city attorney and other local officials. Local
circumstances must be considered in each instance, and all plans
must be evaluated not only on the grounds of their effectiveness,
but also in terms of the reactions they may trigger from depart-
ment employees and from the public. In developing a plan, a
police department should bear in mind the fact that its goal is
the full resumption of services with as little disruption and bit-
terness as possible.30 For that reason, it is advisable to plan a low-
key nonconfrontative strategy for day-to-day relationships with
union members. Through such careful planning, a department
will be able to resist strike pressure and create an environment in
which a reasonable, negotiated settlement of the dispute can be
reached
A strike committee should be established to develop and ad-
minister the plan. The same committee should not only for-
mulate the plan, but also direct and coordinate activities in
preparation for and during the strike. The committee should in-
clude but not be limited to the chief of police, city personnel
director, the city attorney, police legal advisor and selected
supervisory and command personnel in the police department.
Members of the negotiating team should not be assigned to the
strike committee. However, it is essential that the negotiating
team and the strike committee maintain a close liaison.
RECOMMENDATION
Police administrators should establish manage-
ment strike committees to develop and update, ef-
fective strike contingency plans.
Role of the Chief
How to protect the public was the paramount concern of
police administrators during the strikes. The chiefs were too
busy trying to cope with the operational problems created by the
strikes to participate in negotiations. Most were working a
minimum of 12 hours a day and were frequently out in the field
assessing the situation firsthand. Meetings between the chiefs
and the city officials centered around the level of police services
being provided, the extent of crime and other logistical problems
confronting the departments. Meetings between the chiefs and
the strikers were infrequent. Neither city officials nor the chiefs
showed any inclination for the chiefs to get involved in negotia-
tions or other efforts to end the strikes. The same factors which
were responsible for the chiefs' limited roles prior to the strike
continued to restrict their involvement once the strikes began.
Union Behavior
The five strikes were generally peaceful. For the most part,
strikers were orderly, although there were some problems with
drinking on the picket lines, vandalism, and confrontations
between strikers and the public. However, these were the acts of
a few individuals and not behavior planned or condoned by the
unions. Union leaders tried to keep the strikes under control and
running smoothly by distributing strike rules, holding daily
meetings, setting up committees, and establishing picketing
schedules. The worst problems occurred in San Francisco, where
there were scattered incidents of violence on the picket lines, and
at one point, pickets exchanged gunfire with snipers. By the end
of the strike, over $3,000 worth of damage to department
property had been attributed to the strikers. They were accused
of slashing tires, jamming steering and ignition systems and
smashing windows of police cars. Many private vehicles belong-
ing to officers who did not strike were also vandalized.
Youngstown also had problems with vandalism of police vehi-
cles. In the early hours of the strike, tires were slashed in police
cars parked near the exits in the police garage, but the depart-
ment was unable to determine who was responsible.
There were no picket line problems in Oklahoma City
because the strikers did not picket in order to avoid confronta-
tions with citizens and the highway patrol. They were also afraid
that picket lines might keep other city employees from going to
work, and they did not want the strike to spread beyond the
police department.
At the outset of the strikes, morale was high and strikers
were in a festive mood. Few expected the strikes to last very long.
A strong feeling of comradarie prevailed. After a day or two, their
mood became more serious and determined, and as a group they
were more cohesive than ever.
Only Tucson strikers had a formal contingency plan to assist
working police and firefighters. Several strikers were stationed at
the homes of officers and firefighters at strategic locations
throughout the city where they monitored police and fire radios.
When assistance was required, they responded to calls in their
own vehicles. The firefighters said they would help only when
lives were in danger. The police, however, frequently provided
backups for working police officers who were responding to calls
which were potentially dangerous. Oklahoma City strikers also
helped out by riding with state troopers to give them directions.
Striking firefighters provided more assistance than the police. In
San Francisco and Youngstown, individual strikers on their own
initiative helped fight several fires that broke out during the
strikes.
Injunctions
The injunction was the major legal weapon used by the
cities against the strikers. San Francisco and Tucson obtained
injunctions against the strikers and the picketing. Las Cruces
had sought an injunction during the third week of the strike, but
dropped the request several days later because city officials
believed that services could be restored despite the picketing.
Oklahoma City officials did not seek an injunction because they
were not certain whether the officers who had turned in their
badges had resigned or were participating in an illegal strike.
Youngstown officials had a different reason for staying out of
court. They were afraid that a judge might involve himself in the
negotiations and impose a settlement which would disregard the
city's financial position.
The major problem Tucson and San Francisco officials had
with the injunctions was serving the court orders on the strikers.
San Francisco's POA president was never served, in part because
throughout the strike he was surrounded by bodyguards who
prevented the process server from getting near him. Tucson PFA
leaders assembled on the front steps of City Hall to be served
with the injunction, but went into hiding to avoid being served
with contempt citations.
The injunctions were not effective in ending the strikes or
the picketing. Although there was widespread disobedience of
the court orders, there were few attempts to enforce them.
Tucson agreed not to pursue contempt proceedings as part of the
strike settlement. In San Francisco only the POA president and
the POA were convicted of contempt.
A city should carefully weigh the advantages and disadvan-
tages of injunctions before obtaining one. The issuance of an in-
junction may sway public opinion against labor, by giving the
public the impression that the strikers are violating the law. It
can also dissipate the energies of the strike leaders by diverting
their primary attention from the strike to the battle in the
courtroom. On the other hand, an injunction or a contempt
proceeding can result in an intensification of militancy on the
part of the strikers. Jailing union leaders for contempt makes
them instant martyrs and solidifies their position with the
membership. Furthermore, negotiations cannot progress with
strike leaders in jail.
Disciplinary Action
Threats to fire the strikers were generally not effective in
getting them back to work, primarily because the strikers
thought it was unlikely that the cities would carry out the
threats. In the first place, many of those making the threats, in-
cluding the mayors in Tucson and San Francisco, did not have
the authority to fire the strikers. Moreover, amnesty agreements
are commonly part of settlements ending strikes. However, the
main reason strikers discounted the threats was because the
processes of firing them and hiring and training replacements
were too lengthy to be feasible. The larger the department, the
longer it would take. Even in Las Cruces, where the city carried
out its threat and fired them, the strikers were confident that
they would be reinstated as part of a settlement. Threats that
were not credible served to provoke more hostility and further
solidified the strikers against management.
Youngstown's threat to fire the strikers if they did not return
to work was effective because the safety forces believed it. The
threat was matter of fact, not emotional. There had been no
earlier threats or rash statements about terminations. Safety
forces' leaders were shown the dismissal letters the strikers
would get the next morning if they did not accept the city's offer.
Moreover, the mayor's willingness to invoke the Ferguson Act
had been demonstrated earlier in the year when he fired about 80
striking municipal employees.
An Oklahoma City personnel policy which required
automatic termination of employees who were absent without
leave for more than three days placed great pressure on the city
and FOP to reach agreement. No threats were made. They were
unnecessary because both sides were aware of the policy and
were anxious to avoid its implementation.
Negotiations
The same problems which hampered negotiations prior to
the strikes impeded negotiations during the strikes. Inex-
perienced negotiators, inflexibility, sunshine laws, negotiators
who lacked authority to conclude an agreement, inadequate
preparation, political pressures and lack of an established
bargaining structure all hindered attempts to negotiate settle-
ments.
In Tucson, city officials were meeting with PFA negotiators
when the strike began. When he learned that the walkout had
started, the city manager recessed the meeting and said that due
to the strike there was no need for further discussions. The mayor
refused to negotiate with the PFA until the police and
firefighters returned to work. The city council, however, ap-
pointed three of its members to form a committee to meet with
PFA representatives. The council believed that if more than
three of its members attended the meeting, it would violate the
state's open meeting law. An attempt to get negotiations started
the first night of the strike failed, when PFA negotiators walked
out of the meeting after the city served them with a temporary
restraining order. Negotiations broke down again the next day
when the council's negotiating committee refused to continue
talks after the PFA turned down the city's new wage offer. Two
days later, negotiations resumed under the auspices of a federal
mediator who shuttled between the two sides. The city was
represented by two members of the council, neither of whom was
on the negotiating committee. The city and the PFA began mak-
ing progress with the assistance of the mediator, who explained
what they were doing wrong and helped them clarify the issues.
On the seventh day of the strike, the two sides finally reached
agreement.
Las Cruces officials made no attempt for several days to
end the strike. They did not respond to the unions' repeated
attempts to get negotiations started. Instead they decided to
wait until the strikers had been absent without leave for five
consecutive days, at which time the city could automatically
terminate them. Some city commissioners believed that the fail-
ure to end the strike prior to the automatic terminations would
provide a convenient opportunity to reduce the number of police
officers, weed out the less competent and the troublemakers, and
use the financial savings to attract and retain younger and more
professional officers. The strike was nearly a week old when
strike leaders and city commissioners held their first meeting,
but they were unable to reach an agreement. The meeting was
unofficial and held at a local restaurant because the city attorney
had warned the commissioners that the state's open meeting law
required that all formal meetings of three or more commissioners
had to be public and announced. The next day, the city fired the
strikers.
As the strike entered its second week, the commissioners
realized they did not have the expertise to deal with their grow-
ing labor problems and hired a labor attorney to assist them.
Two days later they rejected a proposed settlement worked out
by a local citizen who had attempted to mediate the dispute, and
they instructed the labor attorney to negotiate with the union
representatives and report back to the commission in two days.
The strikers broke off negotiations the next day because the city
demanded that any settlement include the demotion of a police
sergeant and three fire lieutenants who had joined the walkout.
The following day, the city decided to halt strike activities and
return the city to normal by instituting legal action and replac-
ing all strikers. Despite the pending litigation, union leaders con-
tinued to make overtures for additional direct contact with city
officials, but the commission did not respond to their requests.
During a break in the legal proceedings on the twenty-first day of
the strike, the city's attorneys and the union leaders worked out
an agreement to end the strike, under which the strikers gave up
most of their demands, including recognition. The city commis-
sion, however, rejected the settlement, for reasons that are not
clear. Afterwards both the unions and the city abandoned efforts
to reach a settlement and focused on the municipal election
which was less than a week away.
The Youngstown strike began on a Monday night, and
negotiations began on Tuesday. The city's chief negotiator was
the assistant law director. A well-known Ohio labor lawyer as-
sisted the strikers. The talks lasted several hours, but broke up
when the city negotiators had to go back to the mayor and
council for further instructions. The safety forces' negotiators
complained that the city negotiators did not have the authority
to conclude an agreement. They said the "prime difficulty was
dealing with negotiators who had to go back for further instruc-
tions." By Wednesday, however, the two sides had agreed on a 6
percent raise for 1976 but were unable to agree on an amount for
1977. The continued refusal of the mayor and council to discuss
the negotiations frustrated some of the strikers who wanted to
talk and bargain with individual council members. Council
members stressed their cooperation with the mayor and their
determination to speak through only one man, the assistant law
director. The stalemate over 1977 wages continued on Thursday,
with the safety forces demanding 8 percent and the city offering 6
percent. Late that night the council agreed to increase its offer to
6.5 percent. Police and firefighters were presented with the offer
and told that if they did not accept it the mayor would invoke the
Ferguson Act and fire them. At about this time, the safety forces'
attorney finally made the union leaders understand that the
city's offer was about the same as the unions' demand, because
the unions had not compounded their figures when formulating
their demands. Faced with the threat of dismissal, the safety
forces accepted the city's offer.
In Oklahoma City, negotiations between the city and the
FOP began a day-and-a-half after the badge turn-in. The city
manager had expressed the city's willingness to talk, but FOP
leaders decided to wait a day to see if the council wanted to
negotiate. The city manager and city attorney negotiated for the
city, while the FOP president, the FOP attorney and one
member of the bargaining team represented the strikers. The
meeting produced a compromise offer by the city, but FOP
members voted to reject it. Negotiations continued as pressure to
reach a settlement mounted, since a city personnel policy re-
quired that anyone absent without leave for more than three
days would be automatically terminated. The next day the two
sides worked out a compromise settlement and the police went
back to work. At the time, city council approval of the settlement
was uncertain, but two days later the council voted to accept it.
In San Francisco, the mayor attempted to mediate the dis-
pute at the request of the board of supervisors. The day after the
strike began he tried to get negotiations started. There were
several meetings but the board and the POA could not reach
agreement. The POA rejected minor concessions made by the
supervisors, and insisted on a 13.05 percent wage increase. The
POA also rejected the supervisors' request that the strikers
provide emergency services and disarm. At the mayor's request,
three San Francisco labor leaders began sitting in on the negotia-
tions to try to help resolve the dispute. Negotiations continued
for two days, as the mayor shuttled between the strike leaders,
the supervisors and the labor leaders. On the third day of the
strike, the labor leaders began to pressure the police and
firefighters to end the strike that night. They were concerned
about the safety of the city and the firefighters' threat to put up
picket lines throughout the city the next morning. Meanwhile,
the mayor and the supervisors split over the need for outside law
enforcement assistance. Without informing the mayor, the
supervisors sent a telegram to the governor asking him to send
the highway patrol to the city, and they announced that they
would not negotiate any further "until the public safety needs of
this city are met." Then they went home. The mayor, who had
shifted from mediator to negotiator, continued the negotiations.
He told the strike leaders that the city had $9.5 million which the
police and firefighters could split any way they wanted, but that
they would not get any more than that. After hours of negotia-
tion, they finally reached agreement on a $9.5 million settle-
ment. The board rejected it, but the mayor invoked his
emergency powers and imposed it.
Impasse Resolution
Mediation was the only impasse procedure used during any
of the strikes. Moreover, there was no attempt by any of the par-
ties to submit the disputes to fact-finding or binding arbitration.
Mediation was tried in Tucson, Las Cruces, and San Francisco
with differing results. On the fourth day of the Tucson strike, a
federal mediator began meeting with city officials and the PFA.
With his help they were able to focus on the issues and work out
an agreement. At the beginning of the Las Cruces strike, the city
commissioners turned down the LCPOA's request that a federal
mediator be asked to help resolve the dispute. An official from
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in Albuquerque
had offered his services if his assistance were requested, but the
commissioners rejected mediation because they considered it
tantamount to recognition of the LCPOA. However, they in-
dicated that they might be amenable to mediation by a local
person. The POA rejected the suggestion and maintained that
professional help was needed. Nevertheless, a local citizen did
try to mediate the dispute at the request of the head of the
firefighters' association and with the consent of the mayor and
the LCPOA president. By the second week of the strike he had
worked a proposed settlement which the commission rejected
because it wanted its newly-hired labor lawyers to try to obtain
more favorable terms.
When San Francisco police began their walkout, the super-
visors accepted the mayor's earlier offer to mediate. At first he
acted as a mediator, but by the end of the second day, he had
shifted to negotiator. Three of San Francisco's top labor leaders
also sat in on the negotiations to try to help end the strike.
Politics
While politics was a major factor in causing several of the
strikes, it played an even greater role in the way the strikes were
handled. The San Francisco, Tucson and Las Cruces strikes
tended to become increasingly politicized as strikers tried to
pressure city officials to meet their demands and politicians tried
to use the strikes to their political advantage. The Las Cruces
strike illustrates what can happen when government response to
the strike is uncoordinated and motivated at least in part by con-
cerns about a forthcoming election. In contrast, officials in
Youngstown showed remarkable unity in dealing with the strike.
The mayor and council agreed in advance on a proper stance for
handling the strike. Negotiations were conducted by the city's
negotiating team, and individual council members did not at-
tempt to become heroes by working out a settlement on their
own. They even refrained from making public statements about
the strike.
In Las Cruces, city officials and strikers looked to the
municipal election to resolve the strike. A week before the elec-
tion they gave up attempts to negotiate a settlement and con-
centrated on campaigning. From the outset of the strike, recogni-
tion and collective bargaining had been major campaign issues.
Once the strikers were terminated, their reinstatement became
another hotly contested issue. Of the 12 candidates running for
three seats on the commission, four announced their support of
the unions and four, including the mayor and an incumbent
commissioner, openly opposed collective bargaining. The unions
endorsed two candidates and organized a telephone, leaflet and
door-to-door campaign on their behalf.
The San Francisco police strike was met with widespread
public disapproval. It has been argued that in this atmosphere,
the supervisors had no incentive for avoiding the strike through
negotiations or for settling it once it started, and that public opin-
ion made the supervisors politically unable to negotiate a set-
tlement.31 The argument continues that when the board broke off
negotiations until the strikers returned to work, it put the mayor
in a position where he had to negotiate a settlement which the
supervisors were then free to assail. They charged the mayor with
capitulation, when the settlement was in fact a compromise.
In an attempt to keep politics out of the bargaining, the
Tucson city council selected three of its members who were not up
for reelection that year to negotiate with the PFA. The attempt
was unsuccessful largely because negotiations quickly broke
down and the mayor and the council bargaining committee
refused to negotiate. The strike became a confrontation between
the PFA and the mayor, who was running for reelection. When
negotiations finally resumed, the city was represented by only
two members of the council who were acting on their own in-
itiative.
Police take a political risk when they go on strike. If the
public blames the police for the strike, as they did in Tucson and
San Francisco, there is a good chance that some politican will try
to capitalize on the situation. Taking a hard line against pay
hikes and striking police can be a very popular position, par-
ticularly when the public is concerned about rising taxes.
Reactions of Other Labor Unions
The response of other unions to the police strike varied from
joining the strike to doing nothing. Firefighters went on strike
while the police were out in San Francisco and Las Cruces. In
both cases, the police and firefighters' strikes were independent
of each other, although the unions did negotiate together with
the city. The fact that San Francisco firefighters did not strike
until two days after the police caused hard feelings between the
two groups. Police felt that the firefighters should have gone out
immediately instead of waiting for strike sanction from the labor
council, but firefighters maintained that the police did not un-
derstand the process. Until the firefighters struck the police
refused to let them participate in their negotiations With the city.
The Oklahoma City Firefighters' Association expressed its "sym-
pathy and strong support" for the striking police, but promised
that there would be no strike or slowdown. The union's state-
ment was prompted by threats of rank-and-file firefighters to
turn in their union cards if their leaders did not speak out on the
police strike. Many firefighters reportedly wanted to join the
police walkout, but they were dissuaded by FOP leaders who told
them that they did not want their help.
The police strikes affected other city employees besides the
firefighters. The Las Cruces police strike was barely two days old
when two different unions began efforts to organize all city
employees not affiliated with either the police or firefighters' as-
sociations. Within a week, a majority of the employees had
chosen the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees, which then demanded recognition. The city refused
and nearly half the city's blue-collar workers struck. As a result,
trash collection and routine utility services were suspended. In
Youngstown, no other unions joined the safety forces strike, but
several hundred city employees honored the picket lines and
stayed off the job, leaving many departments with skeletal
staffs. No garbage collections were made, and the streets and
water departments had only emergency service. San Francisco
transit workers were preparing to strike, but reached agreement
with the city prior to their strike deadline. In Tucson, sheriffs
deputies considered a sympathy strike, but the PFA asked them
to remain on the job in order to provide the city with emergency
protection. While the deputies responded to emergency calls,
they refused to patrol city streets.
Organized labor became actively involved in the San Fran-
cisco strike in an unusual way. At the mayor's request, the
leaders of the San Francisco Labor Council, the Teamsters union
and the plumbers' union agreed to sit in on the bargaining ses-
sions to try to help end the strike. By the third night of the strike,
the labor leaders had become concerned about the lack of police
and fire protection in the city. They "intimated" that organized
labor would withdraw its support of the strike if the strike con-
tinued and the police and firefighters did not provide emergency
services. The labor leaders were also anxious to end the strike
that night because the firefighters planned to set up picket lines
throughout the city the next morning, and the labor leaders did
not want the city shut down. Teamsters were already honoring
police picket lines and refusing to make deliveries to the Hall of
Justice cafeteria which was running out of supplies.
In Tucson, organized labor rallied to the support of the strik-
ing police and firefighters. The state AFL-CIO executive board
endorsed the strike and members of affiliated unions joined the
picket lines at City Hall. In addition, other private and public
sector unions expressed their support for the strikers, and some
sent financial contributions to the PFA. On the fourth day of the
strike, the local Teamsters union announced its support of the
strike, and a gas tanker driven by a Teamster refused to cross the
picket lines.
Impact on Crime
The impact of a police strike on crime in the community is
difficult to judge. The amount of crime cannot be accurately
determined if officers are not in the field taking reports. Despite
the strikes, all the cities but San Francisco were able to put an
adequate number of law enforcement personnel on patrol.
Investigations, however, virtually came to a standstill since
detectives who were not on strike were assigned patrol duties.
Tucson, Las Cruces and Oklahoma City reported no substantial
increase in serious crime during the strikes. There were some
reductions in less serious offenses which were attributed to
citizens voluntarily reducing minor calls for service. Estimates of
the amount of crime in Youngstown varied. Civilian personnel
who answered police telephones said that there was no noticeable
increase in the type or volume of calls. The chief, however,
believed that crime increased during the strike. He pointed to 19
store robberies from June through September and half that
many during the short duration of the strike. On at least two oc-
casions, there were five armed robberies within a two-hour
period. In addition, there were numerous fires, many of which
were set by arsonists. In San Francisco, crime seemed to escalate
dramatically as numerous business establishments were hit by
robbers, vandals and looters the second night of the strike. By
the next day the chief told the mayor that a state of emergency
existed and that "they were finding it impossible to provide
emergency services and were operating on an hour-to-hour
basis." There were also indications that "the criminal element in
San Francisco was becoming aware that they could probably
operate with impunity on San Francisco streets."
How the Strikes Ended
The strikes ended in two different ways. The Las Cruces
strike never had a definitive end. It just fizzled out after the
LCPOA failed to elect pro-union candidates to the city commis-
sion. In Tucson, Oklahoma City, Youngstown and San Francisco
the strikes ended after the unions and the cities negotiated set-
tlements. Youngstown strikers ratified the agreement reluctantly
under threat of termination. Oklahoma City strikers went back
to work before their city council accepted the agreement. Tucson
strikers, however, waited for city council's approval. In San
Francisco, the police and firefighters also ratified the settlement,
then waited to see what the board of supervisors would do. The
supervisors rejected it, and the mayor invoked his emergency
powers and imposed it. Only then did the strikers return to duty.
The Las Cruces strike was a clear cut victory for the city.
After the municipal election the strikers gave up all their de-
mands, stopped picketing and began filing applications for
reemployment. In contrast, the Tucson settlement was con-
sidered a victory for the unions, which won a substantial wage in-
crease. The settlements in San Francisco, Youngstown, and
Oklahoma City were compromises which enabled both parties to
save face. Union leaders were able to take back to their members
more than the city had been willing to give prior to the strikes,
and city officials were able to show the public that they had not
capitulated to the union demands.
AFTERMATH
The effects of the strikes continued long past the end of the
strikes and the strikers' return to work. After the strikes, the city
governments, police departments and unions confronted many of
the same problems and issues. This section discusses what tran-
spired in the five cities in the wake of the strikes. Perhaps by
learning what happened in these cities, others in the same situa-
tion will be better prepared to deal with these problems and is-
sues.
Economic Result of the Strike
In all four strikes in which money was an issue, the police
wound up with less than they had demanded, but more than the
cities had offered just prior to the strike. In Oklahoma City, the
police had asked for a 10 percent raise but the city had approved
only 7.5 percent. After a three-and-a-half day strike, they settled
on 9 percent, but the settlement basically amounted to a
redistribution of the money the city had originally set aside for
police raises, since educational incentive pay was cut by one
third. When the Youngstown strike began, the safety forces were
asking for a two-year contract with a 6 percent pay hike in the
first year and 8 percent in the second. The city was offering a one
time bonus of $720 per employee to be spread over five quarters.
The strike settlement provided for 6 percent the first year and 6.5
the second year. The 6.5 percent was about the same as the 8 per-
cent the safety forces had demanded, since they had not com-
pounded their figures when formulating their wage demands.
San Francisco police demanded the maximum increase allowed
by the charter, 13.05 percent, which would give them parity with
Los Angeles officers who were the highest paid in the state. For
the first time in 23 years, the board of supervisors approved an
amount less than the maximum, 6.5 percent. The settlement
gave a 6.5 percent raise for the single day of July 1, 1975, to in-
crease the pensions of retired police officers and firefighters
whose retirement dated from that date. Salaries then reverted to
their former levels until October 15, when they went up 13.05
percent. Because the 13.05 percent was not retroactive to the
beginning of the fiscal year (July 1,1975) it actually amounted to
an 8.72 percent increase for the year. The 13.05 percent was a sym-
bolic figure. POA leaders believed that any settlement had to in-
clude it or their members would perceive it as a defeat.
Just prior to the strike, Tucson police and firefighters
demanded a 30 percent salary increase, but emphasized that the
amount was negotiable. The city council gave them nothing. The
two-year strike settlement provided for a 5 percent raise for all
police personnel below the rank of sergeant and 7.5 percent for
sergeants and above. The total package which included a cost of
living increase in the second year, hazardous duty pay, longevity
pay, and uniform and clothing allowances, amounted to a 22 per-
cent increase. The PFA's bottom line had been 18 percent. The
city council later reneged on the agreement, but finally gave the
police a 5 percent raise retroactive to September 28, 1975. (The
fiscal year began July 1.) A month later it voted to raise the
salaries of police sergeants, lieutenants and captains 5 percent
above those of their fire department counterparts.
Although recognition, not salary, was the main issue in the
Las Cruces strike, the city commission raised police salaries by 5
percent shortly after the strike ended. Four months later the
commission approved an additional 10 percent increase.
Animosity After the Strike
Following the strikes, there was a great deal of animosity
and bitterness between strikers and nonstrikers in all five police
departments. Most of the hostility was directed toward those
who had remained on the job during the strikes. Strikers
resented the fact that while they had put their jobs on the line,
the gains they had won would also benefit those who had worked.
None of the departments had a comprehensive plan for
returning to normal operations and reducing the hostility
between strikers and nonstrikers. Some of the chiefs issued state-
ments urging everyone to put the strike behind them and resume
normal operations as quickly as possible. The chief of San Fran-
cisco formed a committee whose members represented a cross
section of the department. The purpose of the committee was to
facilitate the flow of information in the department and to pre-
sent the public with an accurate and positive image of the
department and its members. The committee met several times,
but after a few months interest in it waned, and it became
defunct.
Disciplinary Action
Except in Las Cruces where the strikers were fired, there was
little disciplinary action taken against the strikers. Youngs town
agreed to a no reprisals provision in the strike settlement.
Tucson's settlement agreement allowed the city to place a letter
of reprimand in each striker's personnel file, but this was never
done because the city reneged on the agreement and did not
implement any part of it. The San Francisco settlement gave the
strikers "total amnesty." Nevertheless the city obtained con-
tempt citations against the POA president and three picket cap-
tains for violating the temporary restraining order issued against
the strike. At the contempt hearing, the judge fined the POA and
its president $1,000 each after both pleaded guilty to the con-
tempt charges. The three picket captains were acquitted.
Oklahoma City strikers were docked 5 days' pay; 3 days for the
time lost during the strike and 2 days as a punitive measure.
Although Las Cruces fired all the strikers, it later rehired 28 of
them at one pay step below the level they had been at when they
were terminated.
In the absence of an amnesty agreement, the police ad-
ministrator faces the difficult decision of whether or not to dis-
cipline the strikers. Whatever decision he makes will have a long-
lasting effect on the operation of the agency. The administrator's
options range from strict enforcement of all legal and
departmental prohibitions to taking no disciplinary action at all.
Some administrators are reluctant to discipline strikers because
such action is likely to create animosity between the chief and
the officers, impair efficiency and morale, and hamper the
resumption of normal operations. Others decline to take dis-
ciplinary action because they sympathize with the strikers and
their reasons for walking off the job.
A number of state laws prohibiting strikes have specific
penalty provisions, but the effectiveness of these laws is not
known. It has been argued that specifying punitive action is self-
defeating because employees and their organizations may
perceive the penalties as a challenge rather than a restraint.
Prescribed penalties also deprive the employers of flexibility in
dealing with a strike.32 Flexibility has several advantages over
specified penalties. Flexibility allows the authorities to fashion
an appropriate remedy for the particular situation. They may,
for example, wish to take into account the reason for the strike,
the strikers' conduct, and the effects of penalties on the opera-
tion of the department and on future labor relations. The ad-
ministrative and operational problems involved in investigating,
charging and providing disciplinary hearings for a large number
of officers may make disciplinary action unfeasible. The fact is
that strikes do occur, even where there are prescribed penalties
against them as in Oklahoma City and Youngstown. In such
cases, management has sometimes had to ignore or evade the
penalty provisions of the law in order to settle the strike. Such
action seriously dilutes the effectiveness of the legislation. It has
also been argued that uncertainty regarding the means the
public employer will use to end the strike (e.g., discharge or
cancellation of dues checkoff) might be a possible deterrent to
strikes.33
Experience has shown that police strikes will not be
prevented by laws prohibiting them, regardless of whether they
contain specific penalty provisions. Nevertheless, the existence
of statutory prohibitions will remove uncertainty about the
legality of a strike. Some officers in San Francisco, Tucson and
Las Cruces believed that police strikes were not illegal because
there was no state statute prohibiting them.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
Police strikes should be prohibited by state or local
legislation.
Strike penalties should be flexible. If specific
penalties are included in laws or department rules
and regulations prohibiting strikes, their use
should be discretionary.
Elections
Even after the strikes were over, they remained in the news
in Tucson and San Francisco, primarily because they became
major issues in the upcoming elections.
The strike settlement became an isf ue in Tucson two weeks
after the strike ended, when the coun :il decided to postpone
further action on the pay increase until the winners of the
November election would take office. The council was assured of
having at least two new members then since two incumbents had
been defeated in the primaries. Throughout the campaign,
various candidates argued about the way the strike had been
handled and whether the city should implement the Memoran-
dum of Understanding. Most criticism centered around the can-
didates for mayor. The mayor believed his opponent had en-
couraged the police and firefighters to strike by promising them
raises if he were elected, but the challenger refused to say how he
would vote on the strike settlement. Local Democrats repeatedly
charged that the Republican mayor's hard-line stance and
refusal to negotiate during the strike had been politically
motivated, and they criticized him for making the strike the
single issue of his campaign. The mayor won the election by a
large margin. The two new members of the council had also op-
posed the strike settlement. To no one's surprise, the new council
refused to approve the strike settlement.
The strike by police and firefighters was the major issue in
the San Francisco municipal elections following the strike. Six of
the 11 supervisors were running for reelection, and two were run-
ning for mayor. After the strike, the supervisors took advantage
of strong antiemployee public sentiment by sponsoring several
charter amendments which eliminated many of the special
benefits enjoyed by public employees. The supervisors cam-
paigned on the ballot measures and kept the strike debate alive.
Candidates for mayor and supervisor spouted antiemployee
rhetoric and promises of government economy. In a clear
demonstration of antilabor sentiment, the voters reelected the
six supervisors and approved the board-sponsored charter
amendments by large margins. The .outcome of the mayor's race
was a surprise, and it indicated the strength of the public's
resentment of the strike. It had been expected that two liberal
democrats would be forced into a run-off election. As expected, a
liberal democrat got the most votes, but a conservative
republican supervisor who ran a strong antiunion campaign
came in second. In the run-off, he was narrowly defeated.
Voters in both Tucson and San Francisco approved an-
tistrike charter amendments in the wake of the strikes. The
Tucson amendment provided that any employee who par-
ticipated in any form of "concerted work interruption" would be
immediately terminated and prohibited from reemployment by
the city for a period of five years, upon a finding and declaration
by the mayor and council that such action constituted a peril to
public safety, health and welfare. In short, if the council declared
an emergency, strikers would be automatically terminated. Two
other charter amendments proposed by the council were rejected
by the voters. One would have eliminated advisory arbitration
and given the city manager the power to negotiate with
employees over wages, with the council determining the final
outcome. The second would have allowed the civil service com-
mission to consider other factors in addition to seniority in mak-
ing rules relating to layoffs.
The five charter amendments approved by San Francisco
voters required the automatic dismissal of striking police and
firefighters, limited the mayor's emergency powers, changed the
pay formula for police and firefighters to the average salary paid
in the five largest California cities, changed the firefighters'
working hours from nine 24-hour shifts a month to 18 14-hour
shifts a month, and eliminated the liberal pay formula for the
city's craft workers. The supervisors claimed that these amend-
ments were not vindictive, but were old issues which had been
frequently discussed in board debates in previous years. In the
past, they had been considered "untouchables" because union
political power made them virtually impossible to change.
However, the strike had altered public opinion to the extent that
these changes were not only possible, but politically expedient.
Community Reaction
A police strike is a critical event to the entire community.
The community's greatest and most immediate concern is
whether an adequate level of police service will be maintained
during the strike. Although recent public opinion polls indicate
that a majority of citizens believe that the police should be
prohibited from striking, it does not necessarily follow that they
will automatically blame the union when a strike occurs.
It is impossible to describe public opinion accurately in each
of the five cities. Public opinion polls on the strikes were not
available. In some of the cities, however, the public reaction to
the strike was apparent. There is no question that the San Fran-
cisco police strike had a disastrous effect on the police image in
the community. For the most part, the public viewed the wage
issue as a struggle between the taxpayer and organized city
workers in a time of fiscal crisis. Citizens who were already
angered by the increase in property tax assessments were further
enraged by the sight of armed pickets surrounding the police sta-
tions while the government struggled to provide adequate protec-
tion of lives and property. After the strike, the voters expressed
their anger at the polls by approving charter amendments which
stripped police and other public employees of many of the
benefits' they had enjoyed. More than two years after the police
strike, organized labor had still not regained the losses it incur-
red as a result of the public's adverse response to the strike.
In other cities, the public reaction to the strike was not near-
ly as severe. Voters in Tucson approved a charter amendment
prohibiting strikes and providing for the termination of strikers,
but rejected two other propositions opposed by the police and
firefighters. In Las Cruces, striking police failed in their attempt
to elect prounion candidates to the city commission. The record
voter turnout was indicative of a high level of public concern
about the strike issues.
Police strikes tend to provoke hostility toward the union in
minority communities. By alienating itself from large segments
of the community, the union impairs its ability to generate broad
community support. The general lack of rapport between police
unions and minority communities is heightened by the belief
that the police have expressed their disregard for the safety of the
community by going on strike.34 In Youngstown and San Fran-
cisco, the already strained relations between the police unions
and the organizations of minority officers were exacerbated when
the latter declined to support the strikes because of concern for
the protection of large numbers of minorities living in the cities.
CONCLUSION
A police strike is a traumatic experience for almost everyone
involved; the strikers, the city administration, the police depart-
ment, and, of course, the community. Although a few people
(perhaps ambitious politicians or union leaders) may benefit
from a strike, the overwhelming majority, including police of-
ficers and politicians, do not want one to occur. What is lost far
outweighs what is gained. Gains are usually measured in
monetary terms; for example, when the police win a raise or in-
creased fringe benefits or the city saves money during the strike.
Any other gains are relatively insignificant. Few people even
learn from their earlier mistakes. Many of the labor problems
which occurred both before and after the strikes were caused by
the same errors and misjudgments which precipitated the
strikes.
Like gains, losses are often calculated in terms of money.
The strike settlement may cost the city more than it originally
intended to spend. Raises won by strikers may not offset wages
lost during the strike. At worst, strikers may lose their jobs, .or
even go to jail for violating a court order. However, the damage
created by a strike transcends such losses. A strike opens wounds
that may take years to heal. Public support and confidence in
the police may be seriously eroded. The fellowship among police
officers is replaced by the enmity of strikers towards those who
did not strike. Relations between the police and city officials
may become acrimonious and bitter. Many officials take the
strike personally, and some seek to retaliate by cutting police
budgets and benefits. Unless the antagonism between the city
and the police is quickly checked, it can seriously harm their
future bargaining relationship. Moreover, the conditions which
led to the strike in the first place are unlikely to be remedied in a
rancorous atmosphere.
While there is no simple formula for preventing police
strikes, it is possible to identify their causes well in advance and
minimize the likelihood that they will occur. The conditions
which lead to strikes can be resolved only if there is a willingness
and commitment to deal with them on the part of both labor and
management. In many instances, the initial step requires
nothing more than a simple honest dialogue between the parties.
An atmosphere of trust and cooperation must exist if strikes are
to be prevented.
SUMMARY OF STRIKE CAUSES
Municipal Financial Crisis
Blaming public employees for the city's financial problems
New York City's near bankruptcy
High taxes; taxpayers' revolt
City's failure to establish priorities for spending its limited funds
Money
Police salaries not keeping pace with inflation
Inadequate police salary structures
Tax increases earmarked for public safety raises
Giving all city employees the same raise
Using federal funds to finance public employee raises
Job Dissatisfaction
Hostile external environment
Poor supervisory practices
Autocratic management
Ineffective grievance procedures
Favoritism in personnel decisions
Inequitable discipline
Poor fringe benefits
Racial unrest
Poor communications
Inadequate manpower
Management's failure to identify and correct the causes of
dissatisfaction
Failure to provide management training for police supervisors
and managers
Poor Communications Between City Officials and Union
Leaders
No regular dialogue between employee organizations and city
officials
City officials' failure to understand employees and the nature of
their jobs
Rash emotional statements
City officials' reluctance to accept the existence of public
employee labor unions
Antagonistic relationship between labor and management
Threats to fire strikers
Ineffective Negotiations
Lack of an established collective bargaining structure
no state laws requiring collective bargaining
no opportunity for bargaining in wage setting procedures
Inadequate preparation for bargaining
Limited authority of management negotiators
Open meeting laws
Inflexibility
Bad faith bargaining
Distrust between labor and management
Inexperienced negotiators
Timing of Negotiations
Expiration of existing contract
Expiration of budget deadline
Negotiations coincide with local elections
Ineffective Impasse Mechanisms
No established procedures for impasse resolution
Nonbinding nature of mediation and fact finding
Unions view rejection of fact-finding recommendations as bad-
faith bargaining
Politics
Bargaining occurs near local elections
Elected officials negotiating
Role of the Police Administrators
Not involved in city's prestrike decisionmaking
Not represented at the bargaining table
Failure to pursue actively the economic and job needs of their
employees
Bargaining Unit
Inclusion of supervisory and management personnel in the same
bargaining unit as rank-and-file employees
Lack of appropriate benefits, incentives and motivation for
management employees
Union Politics
A recent challenge by a rival union
A close election for leadership of the union
Union elections coincide with contract negotiations
Management's failure to train union leaders in management,
organization, leadership and labor relations
Police and Firefighters Join Forces
Previous Job Actions
Successful job actions by city's public safety employees
Recent job actions by public safety employees in other cities
Media
Spotlights differences between labor and management rather
than their areas of agreement
No State Statute Prohibiting Strikes
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Police Administrators
Police administrators should recognize that police employees
have the right to form and be represented by labor organizations
of their choice.
Police administrators should develop written labor relations
policies which explain the department's relationship with its
employee unions. These policies should be designed to promote
good faith and trust between the union and the administration.
Police administrators in medium to large sized departments
should establish labor relations units to handle the wide range of
labor issues that arise.
Police administrators should open and maintain formal and in-
formal channels of communications with union leaders.
The union president should (if the agency's size and manpower
needs permit) be relieved of all police duties so he can devote all
his time to operating the union.
Police administrators should take an active role in the labor rela-
tions process. They should be involved in prebargaining
decisionmaking and should be represented at the bargaining
table.
Police administrators should develop closer relations with other
officials in the executive branch of government. They should
meet regularly with these officials to formulate labor relations
guidelines and policies.
Police administrators should act and speak as part of manage-
ment. They must recognize that they are no longer part of the
rank and file.
Police administrators should actively participate in seeking
reasonable personnel benefits for all police employees.
Police administrators and managers should be sensitive to the
needs of their employees and ensure that they receive proper
recognition and appreciation for the work they do.
Police administrators should develop methods for identifying
and correcting the causes of employee dissatisfaction in their
agencies.
Police administrators should establish an effective grievance
procedure for all police employees.
Police administrators should develop an internal two-way com-
munications system to facilitate the effective exchange of infor-
mation within their agencies.
Police administrators should establish mechanisms which
provide employees with the opportunity to participate in the
department's decisionmaking process.
Police administrators should provide supervisors and midlevel
managers with training in personnel management and
leadership.
Management personnel should not belong to the same bargain-
ing unit as rank-and-file personnel.
Police administrators should foster management consciousness
among managers through training, involvement in decisionmak-
ing, and delegation of authority.
Strike penalties should be flexible. If specific penalties are in-
cluded in department rules and regulations prohibiting strikes,
their use should be discretionary.
Police administrators should establish management strike com-
mittees to develop and update effective strike contingency plans.
Police administrators should identify and correct the conditions
which precipitate job actions in order to reduce the potential
that they will recur.
Police administrators should be aware of the pressures placed on
union leaders as a result of a close union election or a challenge
by a rival union.
Police administrators should be aware that threats to fire
employees if they strike tend to unify the employees against
management.
Police administrators should be aware that when police and
firefighters join forces during a labor dispute, the likelihood that
Police administrators should be aware that the success of
previous job actions or strikes by public safety employees may
increase the propensity of the police to strike.
Police administrators should be aware that the success of recent
public safety strikes in other cities may increase the propensity
of the police to strike.
Police administrators should be aware that their actions or state-
ments during a labor dispute may trigger a strike.
City Officials
Local governments should recognize that police employees have
the right to form and be represented by labor organizations of
their choice.
Police have a proper collective interest in the terms and condi-
tions of their employment. To implement this interest, legisla-
tion should recognize the right of police to bargain collectively.
Labor and management should seek to resolve their disputes
through voluntary settlement in an atmosphere of trust and
cooperation.
Management must be adequately prepared for negotiations.
Negotiators should be given the authority to conclude an agree-
ment.
Management must bargain in good faith with a willingness to
reach agreement.
Local governments should not use delaying tactics in negotiating
with employee unions.
Labor negotiations should not be open to the public or press.
Open meeting laws should exempt labor negotiations.
Elected officials should not participate in negotiations with
public employee unions.
City officials such as personnel directors, budget directors, city
attorneys and department heads should not have sole respon-
sibility for labor relations and contract negotiations.
Management negotiators should be trained experienced profes-
sionals.
City officials should ensure the continuity of membership on
their bargaining teams. If negotiation change frequently, they
should select a spokesperson who has had experience in past
negotiations and is familiar with the union representatives and
the issues to be discussed.
Cities should establish municipal labor relations units composed
of trained labor relations specialists. These units would be
responsible for negotiations, contract administration and
promoting harmonious employee relations. Smaller communities
without this capability should consider pooling resources with
other nearby communities to hire competent labor consultants or
attorneys.
Management should not make its proposals public prior to the
start of negotiations.
Management should realize that bargaining is not only an
economic process, but is also a social, political and emotional
one. They should recognize that these factors may require labor
to use certain strategies and tactics and should guard against
overreacting to them.
City officials should seek to minimize the injection of politics
into the bargaining process, as it is counterproductive to the
development of workable bargaining relationships.
Contract negotiations should be scheduled so as not to coincide
with municipal elections.
with union elections.
Contract expiration dates should be set for a time of year that is
least critical for the city in terms of coping with a strike.
Negotiations should be started long before the expiration of the
existing contract and the budget deadline.
The possibility of giving incentives or bonuses for concluding
negotiations early should be explored.
Collective bargaining contracts should be effective for a
minimum of two years.
Management and labor should attempt to resolve their dif-
ferences through good faith collective bargaining without
recourse to third party intervention.
Management and labor should be permitted to establish their
own impasse machinery. Any statutory impasse procedures
should be applicable only when the parties have not mutually
agreed to their own impasse machinery.
Dispute issues should be resolved by using third party
procedures including the maximum use of mediation and the
considered use of fact finding. Binding arbitration should be
used only as a last resort.
Management should be aware of the possible consequences of
agreeing to submit to advisory arbitration, namely that unions
tend to associate the rejection of fact-finding recommendations
with bad faith bargaining.
City officials should open and maintain lines of communication
with union leaders.
City officials should meet regularly with union leaders to ex-
change information and ideas and to resolve problems.
Cities should provide union leaders with training in manage-
ment, organization and leadership.
needs permit) be relieved of all police duties, so he can devote all
Management personnel should not belong to the same bargain-
ing unit as the rank and file. Collective bargaining legislation
should provide a clear definition of where supervisory status
begins. This determination should be based on function rather
than rank.
Local governments should ensure that police wages and benefits
are commensurate with the great importance and difficulty of
the tasks which police perform.
Local governments should establish salary review procedures to
insure the automatic annual adjustment of police salaries to
reflect the prevailing wages in the local economy and to meet
the competition from other employers.
Local governments should establish a police salary structure
separate and distinct from that of any other government agency.
Gains made by the police in the negotiating process should not
automatically be given to other employees who are totally dif-
ferent in terms of qualifications, work requirements, and other
characteristics.
Local governments should establish a sufficient salary separa-
tion between job classifications to provide promotional incen-
tives and to retain competent managers.
Local governments should avoid using revenue sharing or other
federal funds to pay salaries of sworn police personnel.
City officials should be aware of the pressures placed on union
leaders as a result of a close union election or a challenge by a
rival union.
City officials should be aware that when the police and
firefighters join forces during a labor dispute, the likelihood that
City officials should be aware that the success of previous job ac-
tions or strikes by public safety employees may increase the
propensity of the police to strike.
City officials should be aware that the success of recent public
safety strikes in other cities may increase the propensity of the
police to strike.
City officials should be aware that their statements to the press
about a labor dispute may be misinterpreted.
City officials should emphasize their areas of agreement and
compromise with labor rather than emplasize their differences
when making public statements about a labor dispute.
The ground rules for negotiations should require the consent of
both labor and management before any information about
negotiations is released to the press.
City officials should be aware that their actions or statements
during a labor dispute may trigger a strike.
Local governments should provide employee unions with
detailed information about the city's financial condition in-
cluding its revenue sources and expenditures.
Local governments should not automatically make public
employees the target of municipal cost cutting efforts. Instead
they should establish priorities in expending the limited funds at
their disposal.
City officials should not use fear of municipal financial crisis to
arouse antipublic employee sentiment.
City officials should identify and correct the conditions which
precipitate job actions in order to reduce the potential that they
will recur.
City officials should avoid making rash emotional statements
during a labor crisis.
City officials should be aware that threats to fire employees if
they strike tend to unify employees against management.
Police strikes should be prohibited by state or local legislation.
Strike penalties should be flexible. If specific penalties are in-
cluded in laws prohibiting strikes, their use should be dis-
cretionary.
Unions
Union leaders should open and maintain formal and informal
channels of communication with police administrators.
Labor and management should seek to resolve their disputes
through voluntary settlement in an atmosphere of trust and
cooperation.
Labor must bargain in good faith with a willingness to reach
agreement.
Labor negotiations should not be open to the public or press.
Open meeting laws should exempt labor negotiations.
Labor should be adequately prepared for negotiations.
Union negotiators should be trained experienced professionals.
Labor should not make its proposals public prior to the start of
negotiations.
Union leaders should ensure the continuity of membership on
their bargaining teams. If negotiators change frequently they
should select a spokesperson who has had experience in past
negotiations and is familiar with management's representatives
and the issues to be discussed.
Union officers should be elected for two-year terms.
Labor should realize that bargaining is not only an economic
process, but also a social, political and emotional one. They
should recognize that these factors may require management to
use certain strategies and tactics and should guard against over-
reacting to them.
Union leaders should seek to minimize the injection of politics
into the bargaining process as it is counterproductive to the
development of workable bargaining relationships.
with local elections.
with union elections.
Negotiations should be started long before the expiration of the
existing contract and the budget deadline.
The possibility of giving incentives or bonuses for concluding
negotiations early should be explored.
Collective bargaining agreements should be effective for a
minimum of two years.
Labor and management should be permitted to establish their
own impasse machinery. Any statutory impasse procedures
should be applicable only when the parties have not mutually
agreed to their own impasse machinery.
Labor and management should attempt to resolve their dif-
ferences through good faith collective bargaining without
recourse to third party intervention.
Dispute issues should be resolved by using third party
procedures including the maximum use of mediation and the
considered use of fact finding. Binding arbitration should be
used only as a last resort.
Unions should not automatically regard the employer's rejection
of fact-finding recommendations as bad faith bargaining.
Union leaders should open and maintain lines of communication
with city officials.
Union leaders should meet regularly with city officials to ex-
change information and ideas and to resolve problems.
needs permit) be relieved of all police duties, so he can devote all
Union leaders should help identify and correct the conditions
which precipitate job actions in order to reduce the potential
that they will recur.
Union leaders should avoid making rash emotional statements
during a labor dispute.
Union leaders should be aware that their statements to the press
about a labor dispute may be misinterpreted.
Union leaders should emphasize their areas of agreement and
compromise with management rather than emphasize their dif-
ferences when making public statements about a labor dispute.
The ground rules for negotiations should require the consent of
both labor and management before any information about
negotiations is released to the press.
Union leaders should be aware that their actions or statements
during a labor dispute may trigger a strike.
s?
SABLE I
COMPARISON OF MAJOR SSRIKS
SVSNS AND CONDISIONS
Shis chart lists the major events and conditions involved in the Las Cruces, Oklahoma City, San
Francisco, Sucson and Youngstown strikes. She chart is divided into three categories: events prior to the
strikes, events during the strikes and events after the strikes. If the event or condition listed was present in
one of the cities, the corresponding block for that city has an X.
SVSNS PRIOR SO SHS SSRIKSS
Job Dissatisfaction
Salary
Poor Supervisory Practices
Racial Problems
Ineffective Grievance Procedures
Poor Fringe Benefits
Inadequate Manpower
Favoritism
Suggestion for Citizens Review Board
Poor Communications
Autocratic Management
Inequitable Discipline
Civilianization Program
San
Francisco Cruces
Tucson
Youngs-
town
Oklahoma
City
Summary and Recommendations
239
X X XX
XX
XXXXX
X XX
XX
XX
XX
XX XX
XXxx
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SVSNS PRIOR SO SHS SSRIKSS (continued)
Police and Firefighters Join Forces
Upcoming Slection
Municipal Election
Congressional Election
Sxisting Agreement Between City and Union
Collective Bargaining Agreement
Memorandum of Understanding
Recognition Agreement
Sxisting Contract Sxpired
Role of Chief of Police
Not Involved in Prebargaining Decisionmaking
Not Represented at Bargaining Table
Developed Strike Contingency Plan
Sympathetic to Employees
No Close Liaison with City Personnel
and Labor Representatives
Poor Communication Between Union Leaders
and City Officials
No Regular Dialogue Between Union and City
San Las
Francisco Cruces
Youngs- Oklahoma
Tucson town City
241
X XXXX XXXXXX
XX X XXXXX X X
XX
XX X xxxx xxxx
XX
xxxx X
X X XXX XXX
X XX
.si
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SVSNS PRIOR SO SHE SSRIKSS (continued)
Union Allegations of Bad Faith Bargaining
Delay in Making Wage Offer
"Insulting" Wage Offer
Failure to Keep Earlier Promises
Refusal to Negotiate
Rejection of Arbitrators' Recommendations
Impasse Procedures
Advisory Arbitration Used
Mediation Suggested
Prior Job Actions
Strike
Blue Flu
Slowdown
Shreats to Discipline or Fire Strikers
By Mayor
By Council Members
State Law Prohibiting Strikes
Union Strike Vote
San Las
Francisco Cruces
Tucson
Youngs- Oklahoma
town
City
XX
.s
Ml
be
be
36
XX
c !3
243
sSrO
X XX
X XX
xxxx x
"2 <
XXXX x
XXXX X
XXX XXX
XXXXX
X XXX XXX
3f
EVSNS DURING SHS SSRIKSS (continued)
City Negotiators
Legislators
Members of City Administration
Mayor
Labor Consultants/Attorneys
Union Negotiators
Labor Consultants/Attorneys
Union Leaders
Impasse Procedures
Local Mediator Used
Federal Mediator Used
Federal Mediator Requested
Role of the Chief of Police
Busy Trying to Provide Police Services
Not Involved in Negotiations
Department Reaction to Strike
Implemented Existing Contingency Plan
Outside Law Enforcement Assistance
Assistance from Sheriffs Department
Assistance from Highway Patrol
San Las Youngs- Oklahoma
Francisco Cruces Tucson town City
245
XXXX
X XX
XX
xxxx x
XX
XXX
X xxxx
X XXX
XX
XX x
XX
XXX
xxxx XX
XX
o _
1 ^
< -g &
.a |'l
2 h
rj S c C
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i y a>
SVSNS DURING THS SSRIKSS (continued)
Shreats to Fire Strikers
Made by the Mayor
Strikers Fired
City Policy on Automatic Termination
Legal Action Against Strike
City Sought Injunction
City Obtained Injunction
Court Order Served on Strike Leaders
Contempt Citations Issued
City Filed Damage Action
Temporary Restraining Order Directing Chief of
Police to Disarm Strikers
Suit to Force Mayor to Seek Outside Law
Enforcement Assistance
Municipal Slection During Strike
Strike Settlement
Included Pay Raise
Included Amnesty
Included Disciplinary Action Against Strikers
Approved by Municipal Legislature
Included All City Employees
to
247
X XX
X X XXX
XX XX
XX X XX
X XXX
it
en
no
03
<x>
CQ
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8J
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SVSNS AFSSR SHS SSRIKES (continued)
Legislation
Automatic Dismissal of Strikers
Police Pay Formula Changed
Firefighters' Working Hours Changed
Mayor's Emergency Powers Limited
Pay Formula for Craft Workers Changed
Job Actions
Strike
Ticket Blitz
Layoffs in Police Department
NOTES
1. Gary C. Mathiason, "Current Developments Affecting Labor
Relations in the Public Sector," New Trends in Public Employee
Organizing and Bargaining, (New York: Practising Law Institute, 1976),
p. 255.
2. Lawrence Swaim, Political Crisis in San Francisco, Bay Area
Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, p. 21.
3. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
& Goals, Police, (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office,
1973), p. 355.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Hervey Juris and Peter Feuille, Police Unionism (Mass-
achusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1973), p. 18.
7. Richard M. Ayres, "Police Strikes: Are We Treating the Symp-
tom Rather Than the Problem?", Collective Bargaining in the Public
Sector, eds. Richard M. Ayres and Thomas L. Wheelen (Gaithersburg:
International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1977), p. 436.
8. Wallace H. Garrett, "Preparing for Negotiations, An Over-
view," Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, eds. Richard M.
Ayres and Thomas L. Wheelen (Gaithersburg: International Association
of Chiefs of Police, 1977), pp. 654-655.
9. Richard M. Ayres, p. 435.
10. Anthony F. Ingrassia, "Preparing for Negotiations: Manage-
ment Perspective," Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, eds.
Richard M. Ayres and Thomas L. Wheelen (Gaithersburg: International
Association of Chiefs of Police, 1977), p. 663.
11. Northwestern University School of Law, "Early Public
Employee Strikes in Wisconsin: Lessons for Other States," 66
Northwestern University Law Review 669, No. 5, p. 685.
12. International Association of Chiefs of Police, Critical Issues in
Police Labor Relations (Gaithersburg: IACP, 1977), p. 7.
13. IACP, p. 46.
Employee Strikes in Wisconsin: Lessons for Other States," p. 691.
Employee Strikes in Wisconsin: Lessons for Other States," p. 678.
16. IACP, p. 14.
17. IACP, p. 26.
18. IACP, p. 27.
19. IACP, p. 28.
20. John H. Burpo, Labor Relations Guidelines for the Police Ex-
ecutive (Chicago: The Traffic Institute, Northwestern University, 1976),
p. 2.
21. Charles A. Salerno, "Overview of Police Labor Relations,"
Public Safety Labor Reporter (April 1975), pp. Features 4-41 to 4-55.
22. For further information about the structure and function of a
labor relations unit see John H. Burpo, Labor Relations Guidelines for
the Police Executive (Chicago: The Traffic Institute, Northwestern
University, 1976), pp. 6-8.
23. IACP, p. 47.
24. International Association of Chiefs of Police, "Police Labor
Relations (Part II), "Public Safety Labor Reporter (February 1973), pp.
Features 2-14.
25. Charles A. Salerno, "Overview of Police Labor Relations," pp.
Features: 4-41 to 4-55.
26. IACP, Critical Issues in Police Labor Relations p. 35.
27. IACP, Critical Issues in Police Labor Relations p. 36.
28. Ibid.
29. Richard M. Ayres, "Police Strikes: Are We Treating the Symp-
tom Rather Than the Problem," p. 437.
30. Charles C. Mulcahy, County Labor Relations Casebook
(Washington, D.C.: National Association of Counties, 1975),
p. 62.
31. Lawrence Swaim, p. 5.
32. M. W. Aussieker, Jr., "Police Collective Bargaining," Public
Employee Relations Library #18 (Chicago: Public Personnel Associa-
tion, 1969), p. 23.
33. M. W. Aussieker, Jr., "Police Collective Bargaining,"
p. 24.
34. William P. McCarthy, "Key Issues in Police Unionism:
Another Viewpoint," National Symposium on Police Labor Relations
(Gaithersburg: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1974), p.
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Nij-Police Strikes-Causes and Prevention

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U.S.

National Institute of Justice

Causes and Prevention

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS LIBRARY

U.S. Utr-Obl IOftY PROPERTY

a publication of the National Institute of Justice

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Causes and Prevention

Asst. Project Director

U.S. Department of Justice

National Institute of Justice

Generated on 2013-02-14 05:12 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015014437183 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

National Institute of Justice

Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and

Copyrightc 1979 by the

International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.

material contained in this publication.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Qovernment Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

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CHAPTER ONE San Francisco, California

August 18-21, 1975

Events Leading to the Strike 3

Events During the Strike 14

Events Following the Strike 28

CHAPTER TWO Tucson, Arizona

September 22-28, 1975

Events Leading to the Strike 50

Events During the Strike 60

Events Following the Strike 68

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CHAPTER THREE Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

October 23-26, 1975

Events Leading to the Strike 87

Events During the Strike 99

Events Following the Strike 104

CHAPTER FOUR Las Graces, New Mexico

February 3-March 5, 1976

Events Leading to the Strike 114

Events During the Strike 119

Events Following the Strike 134

CHAPTER FIVE Youngstown, Ohio

September 28-October 2, 1976

Events Leading to the Strike 142

Events During the Strike 152

Events Following the Strike 156

CHAPTER SIX Summary and Recommendations

Strike Causes 162

The Municipal Financial Crisis 162

Job Dissatisfaction 168

Poor Communications Between Union Leaders

and City Officials 170

Ineffective Negotiations 173

Inexperienced Negotiators 179

Ineffective Impasse Mechanisms 184

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Role of the Chief 189

Bargaining Unit 193

Union Politics 196

Police-Fire Alliances 197

Previous Job Actions 198

Triggering Device 201