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The foregoing scenarios were part of the script. With the obvious connivance of the police, they put the pressure on the complainant by demanding, allegedly for and in consideration of his release, the amount aforestated. Under the circumstances, with the threat of adverse publicity and imprisonment, it was easy to work on him. To show that they commiserated with him, they made it appear that they advanced the money to the police. We are, however, convinced that the accused-appellants never advanced the money. That is why they stuck to the complainant like "a leech," as vividly described by the trial court, after he was
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scalawags in our law enforcement agencies who may use their uniforms and their lawfully issued weapons as convenient shields or instruments for the perpetration of their evil deeds. Accordingly, We direct the Philippine National Police to conduct a thorough investigation, if none has been done so far, into the involvement of the five policemen of the Southern Police District and, should the evidence warrant, file the appropriate criminal and administrative cases against them. As regards Mr. Mitamura, if he is still in the Philippines, efforts must be exerted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, in coordination with the National Bureau of Investigation, to have him investigated and prosecuted, should the evidence warrant. No alien should be allowed to abuse Philippine hospitality and make our country a happy hunting ground for his criminal activities. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. In G.R. No. 74630, AFFIRMING, subject to the above provision of Section 19(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 86-45055, and 2. In G.R. No. 75576, DENYING, for lack of merit, the motion to reconsider the resolution of 20 January 1987. Costs against appellants. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 86454 October 18, 1990 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARMEN LIM @ "MAMENG LIM", defendant-appellant. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 46, the dispositive portion of which reads: xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Carmen Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 22) The information filed against the accused and John Doe reads: xxx xxx xxx That on or about July 1, 1986, in the afternoon thereof, at Zurbito Street, Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused who are private persons conspired and mutually helped each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Aida and Avelyn both minors and surnamed Villanueva; separating them from their parental care; Aida Villanueva was detained for about twenty (20) days in the house of Carmen Lim alias "Mameng" while Avelyn
The doctrine in the Akiran case is applicable here. Thus, even if the theory of Tomio is correct, it was not necessary for him and his co-accused Nakajima to deprive the complainant of his liberty to compel him to pay the alleged loan. We thus hold that upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the guilt of the accused for the crime charged was proven beyond reasonable doubt and the trial court committed no error in convicting them accordingly. In view, however, of Section 19(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which abolishes the death penalty and provides that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua, the penalty imposed by the trial court is deemed reduced to reclusion perpetua. In the light of the foregoing, the motion of appellants dated 16 March 1987 to reconsider Our resolution of 29 January 1987 in G.R. No. 75576 must also be Denied for lack of merit. This should not, however, end the story of Mr. Nagao. As adverted to earlier, other parties, namely, Mr. Mitamura, a Japanese national, and the five policemen from the Southern Police District, could be deeply involved in the conspiracy to kidnap him for ransom. Our examination of the records fails to show that Mr. Mitamura and the policemen were investigated or prosecuted in connection with this case. This Court would be remiss in its duty if it were to close its eyes on this matter, more specifically on the alleged involvement of the policemen. Policemen are supposed to enforce the law, protect the people, and maintain peace and order. At the people's expense, they don the uniform of authority and are allowed to carry the instruments of legal violence. As such, they are bound to faithfully adhere to the Constitutional directive to be at all times accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 54 When they fail in that sacred duty and become the lawbreakers, they have no business staying a minute longer in their offices and wearing their uniforms. They deserve nothing but the severest criminal and administrative penalties the law provides. The people's taxes should never be used to maintain and support
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ANTONIO A. LAMERA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DAVIDE, JR., J.: At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal. 1 chanrobles virtual law library As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code reading as follows: That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, being then the driver and person in charge of an Owner Jeep Toyota bearing Plate No. NCC-313 UV Pilipinas '85, and without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precautions to avoid damage to property and injuries to persond (sic), did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and opefate (sic) said Owner Jeep in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, as a result of which said motor vehicle being then driven and operated by him, hit and bumped a tricycle SUZUki (sic) bearing Plate No. NA-6575 MC Pilipinas '85, driven by Ernesto Reyes y Esguerra and owned by Ernesto Antonel, thereby causing damage to the Suzuki tricycle in the amount of P7,845.00; and due to the impact the driver and the passengers of a (sic) tricycle Suzuki, sustained physical injuries which required medical attendance as stated opposite their respective names to wit: chanrobles virtual law library 1. Ernesto Reyes - More than thirty (30) days chanrobles virtual law library 2. Paulino Gonzal - More than thirty (30) days chanrobles virtual law library 3. Patricio Quitalig - Less than nine (9) days chanrobles virtual law library and incapacitated them from performing their customary labor for the same period of time. which was filed on 10 September 1985 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 64294 and assigned to Branch 68 thereof; and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim reading as follows: That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, being the driver
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of an owner-type jeep with Plate No. NCC-313 UV Pil. '85 which hit and bumped a motorized tricycle with Plate No. NA-6575-MC '85 driven by Ernesto Reyes and as a consequence of which Paulino Gonzal and Ernesto Reyes sustained physical injuries and lost consciousness, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abandoned (sic) them and failed (sic) to help or render assistance to them, without justifiable reason. which was filed on 14 November 1985 with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 71) and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2793.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On 29 June 1987 the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig rendered its decision in Criminal Case No. 2793 finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila which docketed the appeal as Criminal Case No. 70648.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. He entered a plea of not guilty. 2 chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner's appeal, Criminal Case No. 70648, was decided on 31 July 1989. The court affirmed with modification the decision appealed from. The modification consisted merely in the reduction of the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) to two (2) months. 3 chanrobles virtual law library Still unsatisfied with the new verdict, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals on 31 August 1989 a petition for its review, docketed as C.A.-G.R. CR No. 07351, assigning therein the following alleged errors: I chanrobles virtual law library THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, THAT "THE TRICYCLE DRIVEN BY ERNESTO REYES WAS BUMPED BY THE JEEP DRIVEN BY THE PETITIONER." II chanrobles virtual law library THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG. METRO MANILA, THAT THE PETITIONER, "LOSING PRESENCE OF MIND AS THE BLOODY SCENARIO WOULD INDUCE IN THE AVERAGE MOTORIST, HE (SIC) OPTED, PERHAPS INSTINCTIVELY TO HIDE IDENTITY, APPREHENSIVE MAY BE OVER THE ENORMITY OF HIS MISDEMEANOR AND THUS
DECIDED (SIC) TO WITHHOLD ASSISTANCE TO HIS FALLEN VICTIMS." III chanrobles virtual law library THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN DECLARING THAT, "AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES, IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISMISS THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF SAID COURT GIVING CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES" FOR NOT BEING (SIC) SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND CLEARLY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. IV chanrobles virtual law library THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ABANDONMENT UNDER ART. 275, PAR. 2, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF ARRESTO MAYOR AND TO PAY THE COSTS. V chanrobles virtual law library THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING NULL AND VOID ALL THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG AND ALL THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT. 4 chanrobles virtual law library The Court of Appeals found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in its Decision promulgated on 9 November 1989. 5 Pertinently, it ruled: We cannot sustain the contention of the petitioner that par. 2 of Art. 275 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to him since the evidence allegedly shows that it was Ernesto Reyes, the tricycle driver, who negligently caused the accident. Petitioner misses the import of the provision. The provision punishes the failure to help or render assistance to another whom the offender accidentally wounded or injured. Accidental means that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen (Moreno, Phil. Law Dictionary, 1972 ed., p. 7 citing De La Cruz v. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., 17 SCRA 559). Consequently, it is enough to show that petitioner accidentally injured the passengers of the tricycle and failed to help or render them assistance. There is no need to prove that petitioner was negligent and that it was his negligence that caused the injury. If the factor of criminal negligence is involved, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code will come into play. The last paragraph of Art. 365 provides that "the penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured party such help as may be in his bands to give." Petitioner was charged under par. 2 of Art. 275 not under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. His motion to reconsider the above decision wherein he strongly urged for reconsideration because:
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xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library . . . We find it hard to visualize that the accused may be penalized twice for an "accident" and another for "recklessness", both of which arose from the same act. We submit that there could not be a valid charge under Article 275, when, as in the case at bar, there is already a pending charge for reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. It is our view that the charge under Article 275 presupposes that there is no other charge for reckless imprudence. having been denied in the Resolution of 17 May 1990, 6 petitioner filed the instant petition. 7 chanrobles virtual law library Before Us he raises this sole issue: Could there be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as basis for prosecution. "2. Anyone who shall fail to help another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured" when, he was previously charged with "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries" under Article 265 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code? 8 chanrobles virtual law library He maintains the negative view and supports it with the argument that "[f]or the same act, that is, the vehicular collision, one could not be indicted in two separate informations at the same time based on "accident" and "recklessness', for there is a world of difference between "reckless imprudence" and "accidentally'." As expanded by him: . . . since petitioner is facing a criminal charge for reckless imprudence pending before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila . . . which offense carries heavier penalties under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged under Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment . . . for having allegedly failed "to help or render assistance to another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured". 9 chanrobles virtual law library In Our resolution of 1 August 1990 We required respondents to comment on the petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In its Comment filed on 10 September 1990, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, putting the issue squarely, thus: . . . whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code. answers it in the negative because said Articles penalize different and distinct offenses. The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In Our resolution of 13 March 1991 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. Petitioner submitted his on 22 April 1991 10while the People moved that its Comment be considered as its memorandum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner is actually invoking his right against double jeopardy. He, however, failed to directly and categorically state it in his petition or deliberately obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant absurdity of the two informations. The reason seems obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the three courts below. In any case, to do so would have been a futile exercise. When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. 2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before the Regional Trial Court. As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the former was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in the latter took place only on 27 April 1989. Among the conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must have been arraigned in the previous case. 11In People vs. Bocar, supra., We ruled: Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Moreover, he is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez, 12We held: It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewhere, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. 13 chanrobles virtual law library In People vs. Bacolod, supra., from the act of firing a shot from a sub-machine gun which caused public panic among the people present and physical injuries to one, informations for physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious public disturbance were filed. Accused pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he sought to dismiss the second on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled: The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Since the informations were for separate offenses - the first against a person and the second against public peace and order -
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one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The first, Criminal Case No. 64294, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second, Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo. 14 chanrobles virtual law library Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither an offense by itself nor an element of the offense therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the penalty by one degree. The last paragraph of the Article specifically provides: The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in hand to give. Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the information. The information against petitioner in this case does not so allege.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Upon the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to another whom one has accidentally wounded or injured is an offense under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same code which reads: The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon: xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured. The foregoing distinctions satisfy the guidelines We made in People vs. Relova, et al., 15wherein We held: It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a registration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first
offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or procedural obstacle barred the filing of the two informations against petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is DENIED without pronouncements as to costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
GRAVE THREATS
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529 March 28, 1969
ROSAURO REYES, Petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. MAKALINTAL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a the municipal court of Cavite City, convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation, and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594), to four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in the second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prison correccional and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in both cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the
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demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted to blow off steam." chanrobles virtual law library At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the demonstration he became apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to led behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral defamation, respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as follows; The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined by Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows: chanrobles virtual law library That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally threaten to kill, one Agustin Hallare. Contrary to law. Cavite City, July 24, 1961. DEOGRACIAS City Fiscal S. SOLIS
BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ Special Counsel chanrobles virtual law library The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: chanrobles virtual law library That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any justifiable motive but with the intention to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant, in the presence of and within hearing of several persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to the undersigned complainant the following insulting and serious defamatory remarks, to wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated into English are as follows: "Agustin, Your mother is a whore." Contrary to law. Cavite City, July 25, 1961. (SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE Complainant chanrobles virtual law library Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines. (SGD.) BUEN Special Counsel N. GUTIERREZ
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had already been arraigned on the original information and that the amendment "would affect materially the interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial proceeded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the accused brought this appeal by certiorari.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower court allowing the substantial amendment of the information for grave threats after petitioner had been arraigned on the original information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of grave threats without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both offenses when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in convicting
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petitioner of grave threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the offense of light threats only; and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to establish that of simple slander only.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has pleaded the information may be amended as to all matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the court when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the word "orally" was effected in order to make the information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial court committed a reversible error in proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea to the amended information. Considering, however, that the amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, and in convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence adduced and considered by the court indicates the commission of light threats only.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with
threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect." 2 Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said: The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats. The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs against petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Santos, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur. Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part. G.R. No. 171511 March 4, 2009
31
RONNIE CALUAG, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner,
Upon arraignment, Caluag and Sentillas pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial ensued. The prosecution presented the two private complainants, the spouses Nestor and Julia Denido, as witnesses. Their version of the facts are as follows: In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 oclock8 in the afternoon, Nestor learned that two of his guests from an earlier drinking spree were mauled. At that time, Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at the store owned by the son of Sentillas. When Nestor inquired from several people including his own son Raymond what happened, Caluag butted in and replied, "Bakit kasama ka ba roon?," and immediately boxed him without warning. Nestor retaliated but he was overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband. Although she tried to pacify them, they did not listen to her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At around 6:00 p.m., Nestor told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay authorities.9 Later, at around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen were on their way to their barangay hall, she encountered Caluag, who blocked her way at the alley near her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun, poked it at her forehead, and said "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"10 Despite this fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to the barangay hall where she reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities.11 For its part, the defense presented the accused Caluag and Sentillas; and the barbecue vendor Pablo Barrameda, Jr. as witnesses. According to them, in the afternoon of March 19, 2000 at around 6 oclock in the evening, Caluag was on his way home with his three-year old son when Nestor, drunk and unruly, blocked his way and asked him, "Pare, galit ka ba sa akin?" He answered in the negative but Nestor persisted in his questioning and would not allow him to pass through. Annoyed, he told Nestor, "Hindi nga! Ang kulit kulit mo!" Nestor then boxed him on his face which caused him to fall down. Caluag first assured himself of the safety of his son and then punched Nestor back. As people around pacified them, he was led to the store owned by the son of Sentillas. Nestor pursued him and punched him again. As he retaliated, some bystanders separated them. Nestor then shouted, "Putang ina mo, Pare! Gago ka! Gago ka! Marami ka ng taong niloko!" Thereafter, an unidentified man from the crowd armed with a knife went towards Nestor but Sentillas timely interceded and pacified the man. Sentillas never boxed Nestor. Caluag also denied poking a gun at Julia.12 In a Joint Decision dated January 28, 2004, the MeTC found Caluag and Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries, and Caluag guilty of grave threats. The MeTC relied on Nestors testimony. It noted that Nestor did not deny that he was drunk at the time of the incident while Caluag admitted that he got annoyed by Nestors attitude. The MeTC concluded that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their tempers due to Nestors unruly behavior. On the other hand, the MeTC noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gunpoking incident to the barangay. While she had intended to report the mauling of her husband, as he instructed her, what she
For review on certiorari are the dated December 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 and its Resolution2 dated February 15, 2006, denying reconsideration. The appellate court had affirmed the Decision3 dated August 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 198, in Criminal Case No. 04-0183-84, which affirmed the Joint Decision4 dated January 28, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 79, in Criminal Cases Nos. 47358 and 47381 finding petitioner Ronnie Caluag and Jesus Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries and Ronnie Caluag guilty of grave threats. The factual antecedents of this case are as follows: On May 18 and 23, 2000, two separate Informations5 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 47381 and 47358, respectively, were filed against Caluag and Sentillas. The Information in Criminal Case No. 47381 charged Caluag and Sentillas with slight physical injuries committed as follows: That on or about the 19th day of March, 2000, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of NESTOR PURCEL DENIDO, by then and there mauling him, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which required medical attendance for less than nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time. CONTRARY TO LAW.6 The Information in Criminal Case No. 47358 charged Caluag with grave threats committed as follows: That on or about the 19th day of March 2000, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by personal resentment which he entertained against one JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten said JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO with the infliction on her person of a harm amounting to a crime, by then and there poking his gun at her forehead and uttering the following words in tagalog, to wit: "Saan ka pupunta gusto mo ito?" thereby causing said complainant to be threatened. CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Decision1
32
reported instead was what happened to her. With such straightforward and seemingly natural course of events, the MeTC was convinced that the negative assertions of Caluag and Sentillas cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The decretal portion of the joint decision reads: WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds and declares accused RONNIE CALUAG AND JESUS S[E]NTILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Slight Physical Injuries under Criminal Case No. 47381, and sentences them to pay [a] fine of P200.00 each. The two (2) accused are also censured to be more complaisant and well-bred in dealing with people. The Court also finds accused RONNIE CALUAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Grave Threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, under Criminal Case No. 47358, and sentences him to suffer two (2) months imprisonment [and to] pay [a] fine of P200.00. Criminal Case No. 47382, as earlier explained, is ordered dismissed being merely a duplication of Criminal Case No. 47358. SO ORDERED.13 Caluag and Sentillas appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the joint decision of the MeTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC on December 9, 2005. The appellate court noted that the MeTC gave credence to the testimonies of Nestor and Julia because they were in accord with the natural course of things. Likewise, petitioners negative assertions cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The appellate court disregarded the purported inconsistencies in the testimonies of Nestor and Julia since these refer to collateral matters and not to the essential details of the incident.1avvphi1 Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to this Court on the ground that the Court of Appeals: I. MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION; II. ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE [MeTC] WHICH MADE INFERENCES OR CONCLUSIONS IN ITS JOINT DECISION THAT ARE MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE AND WHICH ARE GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR CONJECTURES OR ARE BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; III.
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER HEREIN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.14 Simply, the issue is: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain petitioners conviction of slight physical injuries and of grave threats? Petitioner contends that he was able to present Barrameda, an independent and impartial witness, who supported his version of events and debunked those of Nestor and Julia. Contrary to the findings of the lower courts that petitioner offered mere denials, Barramedas testimony is actually a positive statement that should have been given full credit. Petitioner also argues that although the lower courts acknowledged that Nestor was drunk and troublesome at the time of the incident, they chose to believe his testimony rather than petitioners. Petitioner adds that there is no basis for the lower courts to conclude that he lost his temper because of Nestors unruly behavior. Petitioner maintains that just because Julia immediately reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay, this did not necessarily mean that it actually happened. Petitioner also argues that assuming that he did poke a gun at Julia, the crime committed was other light threats as defined under Article 285, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.15 For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the MeTC did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The MeTC found that the positive assertions of Nestor and Julia, their straightforward manner of testifying, and the seemingly natural course of events, constituted the more plausible and credible version. The MeTC also noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities immediately after it happened. The OSG also agrees with the MeTC that petitioner lost his temper, given the unruly behavior of Nestor. We find the petition with insufficient merit and accordingly sustain petitioners conviction. At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner raises questions of fact. Certainly, such matters mainly require a calibration of the evidence or a determination of the credibility of the witnesses presented by the parties and the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.16 The well-entrenched rule is that only errors of law and not of fact are reviewable by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 under which this petition is filed. It is not the Courts function under Rule 45 to review, examine and evaluate or weigh once again the probative value of the evidence presented.17 Moreover, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court. It is not the function of this Court to weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the Court of Appeals for these are deemed final and conclusive and may no longer be reviewed on appeal.18
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A departure from the general rule, however, may be warranted where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on record. Nevertheless, we find that there is no ground to apply the exception in the instant case because the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals are in full accord with those of the MeTC and the RTC. This Court will not assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to the appeal particularly where, as in this case, the findings of the MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.19 Even if the Court relaxes the abovecited general rule and resolves the petition on the merits, we still find no reversible error in the appellate courts ruling. As the lower courts and the Court of Appeals correctly stated, the testimonies of Nestor and Julia were more in accord with the natural course of things. There could be no doubt that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their temper as Caluag himself admitted that he got annoyed by Nestors unruly behavior. Likewise, the gun-poking incident also happened since Julia did not waste time in reporting it to the barangay authorities. Instead of reporting the mauling of her husband, she reported what happened to her in her hurry, excitement and confusion. Indeed, the positive declarations of Nestor and Julia that petitioner committed the acts complained of undermined his negative assertions. The fact that Barrameda testified in petitioners behalf cannot be given more weight than the straightforward and credible statements of Nestor and Julia. Indeed, we find they had no reason to concoct stories to pin down petitioner on any criminal act, hence their testimonies deserve full faith and credit. The MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals uniformly found petitioner guilty of grave threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer two months of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P200. We find no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the MeTC and RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats (Article 282), light threats (Article 283) and other light threats (Article 285). These provisions state: Art. 282. Grave threats. Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer: 1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed. If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not have been made subject to a condition. Art. 283. Light threats. Any threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be punished by arresto mayor. Art. 285. Other light threats. The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon: 1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense. 2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some harm not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts show that he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat, provided that the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within the provisions of Article 282 of this Code. 3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting a felony. In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no condition. The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her house to go to the barangay hall to report the mauling of her husband which she witnessed earlier at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon. On her way there, petitioner confronted her and pointed a gun to her forehead, while at the same time saying "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"20 Considering what transpired earlier between petitioner and Julias husband, petitioners act of pointing a gun at Julias forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the context of the surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not go against the threat to kill or to inflict serious injury evinced by petitioners accompanying act. Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a condition. Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states, "shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel", since it presupposes that the threat to commit a wrong will not constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave threats on one hand, and light and other light threats on the other.
34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The Decision dated December 9, 2005 and the Resolution dated February 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2257, alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business. Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were charged with the offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet. As already noted, the said court exonerated the two policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime charged as principal by inducement. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court. Hence, the present recourse. Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority. We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit: t.hqw ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition. The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance per-se. Thus: t.hqw Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor of the defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a menace to the health of the general public passing through the street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well
GRAVE COERCION
G.R. No. L-62050 November 25, 1983 JOSE "PEPITO" TIMONER, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IV DIVISION, respondents. ESCOLIN, J.:+.wph!1 Petition for review of the affirmance in toto by the Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, of the judgment of conviction handed down by the then Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, in Criminal Case No. 4281, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose Timoner, finding petitioner guilty of the crime of grave coercion, as follows: t.hqw WHEREFORE this Court finds the accused JOSE 'PEPITO' TIMONER guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Coercion as penalized under Art. 286 in the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences the said accused pursuant to the provision of Rule 64, Par. 3, to suffer SIX MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT OF ARRESTO MAYOR IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD, to pay a fine of P300.00 and to pay the offended party in the amount of P5,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary liability in case of insolvency. The other accused SAMUEL MORENA and ERNESTO QUIBRAL are hereby ordered ACQUITTED. The salient facts are not disputed. At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and
35
as the unsightly and ugly structures in the said place. Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license, permit or toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and living quarters for a number of years does not lend legality to an act which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons and the general public which posed a danger to the people in general passing and using that place, for in addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights the fact that it is in a public place and annoying to all who come within its sphere [Baltazar vs. Carolina Midland, Ry, Co., 54 S.C. 242, 32 SB 258, cited in 11 Tolentino's Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 375; Kapisanan Lingkod ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Lacson, CA-G.R. No. 27260R, March 25, 1964; 61 O.G. 2487]. xxx xxx xxx ... IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares that the structures subject of this complaint as well as those occupied by the impleaded defendants are nuisances per se and therefore orders the defendants to demolish the stall and vacate the premises immediately ... But even without this judicial pronouncement, petitioner could not have been faulted for having fenced off said barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article 699 of the Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance without judicial proceedings. t.hqw ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are: [l] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or [2] A civil action; or [3] Abatement, without judicial proceedings. In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability. Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something against his will, either it be right or wrong." 1 The three elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and [3] that the person who restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the
restraint was not made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right. 2 The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 19534-CR, is hereby set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.1wph1.t G.R. No. 90423 September 6, 1991 FRANCIS LEE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PELAGIA PANLINO DE CHIN, respondents. Arturo S. Santos for petitioner.
MEDIALDEA, J.:p This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 29, 1989 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 129 at Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and reinstated as well as affirmed in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2, same city. The RTC decision found the petitioner guilty of the crime of light coercion, the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified. The accused Francis Lee is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of light coercion, as penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of TWENTY (20) DAYS of ARRESTO MENOR and to pay one-third (1/3) of the costs. (p. 40, Rollo) On the other hand, the MTC decision convicted the petitioner of the offense of grave coercion, the pertinent portion of the same is hereby quoted as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Francis Lee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Grave Coercion, as charged, defined and penalized under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of THREE (3) MONTHS, of arresto mayor, medium, and to pay a fine of P250.00, with cost. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the offended party, Pelagia Paulino de Chin, by way of civil liability the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P2,000.00 as exemplary damages.
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... (p. 33, Rollo) The facts as stated by the respondent Court of Appeals are undisputed, thus: At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 20, 1984, the complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin, 23 years old, was fetched from her house at 112 BLISS Site, 8th Avenue, Caloocan City by Atanacio Lumba, a bank employee, upon the instruction of the petitioner Branch Manager Francis Lee of Pacific Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as bank). Upon arriving at the office of Pacific Banking Corporation located at Caloocan City, petitioner Francis Lee did not attend to her immediately. After an hour later, the petitioner confronted the complainant about a forged Midland National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794, which the latter allegedly deposited in the account of Honorio Carpio. During the said confrontation, the petitioner Francis Lee was shouting at her with piercing looks and threatened to file charges against her unless and until she returned all the money equivalent of the subject cashier check. Accordingly, the complainant was caused to sign a prepared withdrawal slip, and later, an affidavit prepared by the bank's lawyer, where she was made to admit that she had swindled the bank and had return the money equivalent of the spurious check. During her stay at the said bank, the complainant, who was five (5) months in the family way, was watched by the bank's employees and security guards. It was about six o'clock in the afternoon of the same day when the complainant was able to leave the bank premises. Upon the other hand, the petitioner, 37 years old, presented his version, basically a denial of the charges, to wit: he was the Branch Bank Manager of Pacific Banking Corporation. After having been informed that Midland National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794 was dishonored for being spurious, he examined the relevant bank records and discovered that complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin was instrumental in inducing their bank to accept the subject dollar check and was also the one who withdrew the proceeds thereof, by utilizing a withdrawal slip purportedly signed by Honorio Carpio. Petitioner, thru Atanacio Lumba, invited the complainant to his office. Responding to his invitation, the complainant arrived at the bank before noon of June 20, 1984, but was not attended to immediately as the petitioner had to attend to other bank clients. The complainant was merely informed about the subject fake dollar check that was deposited with said bank upon her assurance that it was genuine. The complainant was not compelled into signing the withdrawal slip, but she acted freely and voluntarily in executing her affidavit and in returning the money equivalent of the subject check. There was nothing unusual during her lengthy stay in the bank. (pp. 44-45, Rollo) The sole issue posed in this petition is whether or not the acts of petitioner in simply "shouting at the complainant with piercing
looks" and "threats to file charges against her" are sufficient to convict him of the crime of grave coercion (p. 6, Rollo). Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides: ART. 286. Grave coercions. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong. If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to prevent him from so doing, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed. Considering that the present case does not involve violence but intimidation, the provisions of Article 1335 of the New Civil Code on intimidation are relevant. It states: Art. 1335. ... There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. A threat to enforce once's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent. As a general rule, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals command utmost respect. However, such findings are disregarded if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted that, if considered, would affect the result of the case (see San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 84401, May 15, 1991). While the appellate court emphasized the pregnancy and feminine gender of the complainant, it overlooked other significant personal circumstances which are material in determining the presence of coercion in this case. The records show that complainant is a highly educated person who is familiar with banking procedures. She is a graduate of Business Administration major in Banking and Finance from NCBA. She also finished one semester of MA in graduate school. In 1983, complainant worked with the Insular Bank of Asia and America as a bank teller (TSN, November 20, 1984, pp. 5-7; Records, pp. 96-98).
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Likewise, it appears that complainant actively participated in the deposit and withdrawal of the proceeds of the controversial check. We find that she told Honorio Carpio (Carpio, for short), a relative and payee of the check; to open a savings account with the Pacific Banking Corporation (Bank, for short) and accompanied him; that subsequently, she presented a Midland National Bank Cashier's check payable to Carpio in the sum of $5,200.00 to Mr. Lamberto R. Cruz (Cruz, for short), PRO Manager, Foreign Department; that she claimed that she was requested by her uncle to deposit the check for collection; that she was a bank depositor and she "knew somebody downstairs"; that she assured Cruz that the check would be honored between banks (TSN, April 15, 1985, pp. 89-92; Records, 180-183); that on June 11, 1984, the bank, after the usual clearing period, sent out a notice to Carpio that the proceeds of the check were already credited to his account but the same was returned to the bank because the address was false or not true; that the total amount of the check in pesos was P92,557.44; that the total deposit of Carpio was P92,607.44, his initial deposit of P50.00 being added to the amount of the check; that on the same day, complainant personally inquired from the bank whether the proceeds of the check have already been credited to Carpio's account (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 163, records, p. 163); that upon an affirmative answer, the bank records show that on that day, the complainant withdrew the sum of P12,607.00 thru a withdrawal slip purportedly signed by Carpio; that in the interim, Carpio allegedly left abroad (Annex C, p. 17, Records); that on June 13, 1984, she withdrew the sum of P80,000.44 from Carpio's account by means of a withdrawal slip allegedly signed by Carpio and then, she closed his account; that out of the said amount, she redeposited the sum of P50,000.00 to her own savings account and received in cash the remaining balance of P30,000.44; and on June 15 and 18, 1984, complainant withdrew the amounts of P2,000.00 and P18,000.00, respectively from her savings account (Exh. "3", Records, p. 15, in relation to TSN, October 8, 1985, pp. 194-195, Records, pp. 286-287). In the light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner's demand that the private respondent return the proceeds of the check accompanied by a threat to file criminal charges was not improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to sue. In the case of Berg v. National City Bank of New York (102 Phil. 309, 316), We ruled that: ... It is a practice followed not only by banks but even by individuals to demand payment of their accounts with the threat that upon failure to do so an action would be instituted in court. Such a threat is proper within the realm of the law as a means to enforce collection. Such a threat cannot constitute duress even if the claim proves to be unfounded so long as the creditor believes that it was his right to do so. The Solicitor General argues that the complainant was intimidated and compelled into disclosing her time deposit, signing the typewritten withdrawal slip and the affidavit by the petitioner's threat to detain her at the bank. At this point, there is a need to make a distinction between a case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and against his good sense and judgment and where he gives no consent at all, as
where he acts against his will under a pressure he cannot resist. Thus, in Vales v. Villa (35 Phil. 769, 789), We ruled: ... It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law. But when his sense, judgment, and his will rebel and he refuses absolutely to act as requested, but is nevertheless overcome by force or intimidation to such an extent that he becomes a mere automaton and acts mechanically only, a new element enters, namely, a disappearance of the personality of the actor. He ceases to exist as an independent entity with faculties and judgment, and in his place is substituted another the one exercising the force or making use of the intimidation. While his hand signs, the will which moves it is another's. While a contract is made, it has, in reality and in law, only one party to it; and, there being only one party, the one using the force or the intimidation, it is unenforceable for lack of a second party. From these considerations it is clear that every case of alleged intimidation must be examined to determine within which class it falls. If it is within the first class it is not duress in law, if it falls in the second, it is. The circumstances of this case reveal that the complainant, despite her protestations, indeed voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, consented to do all the aforesaid acts. Bearing in mind her involvement in the deposit and encashment of the check, the complainant admitted to being nervous upon being informed that the check was spurious (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 15; Record, p. 106) We find that complainant's lengthy stay at the bank was not due to the petitioner's threat. It was rather due to her desire to prove her innocence. Her testimony on this point is a revelation: Atty. Dizon: (counsel for petitioner) You are always talking of signing the withdrawal slip by force, is it not that earlier you admitted that no actual force was employed upon you in connection with the signing of this document and the force that you are claiming was the alleged shouting against you coupled with the statement that you could not leave? A Yes, sir. Q When Mr. Lee was requiring you to sign the withdrawal slip did it not occur to you to leave the bank? Atty. Pangilinan:
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The question has already been answered she said she cannot leave because she is being threatened. Atty. Dizon: That was during the time when she first met Mr. Lee. Court: Witness may answer. A When I was about to sign the withdrawal slip I inquired from him If I signed it I can leave already but he insisted that I should not leave, Sir. Q When he told you that did it not occur to you to stand up and go out of the bank? A No, Sir. Q Why? A He was insisting that I return the amount I have withdrawn especially on June 18 when I withdrew P18,000.00, Sir. COURT: The question is why did you not leave and disregarded him? A Because I cannot just leave him that way, Your Honor. Atty. Dizon: Why? What was the reason that you cannot leave him? A Because he is insisting that the responsibility of one person be my responsibility and at that time I was feeling nervous and he did not tell me to stand up and leave, Sir. (ibid, pp. 18-20, Records, pp. 109-111) In her insistence to clear up her name, it is not farfetched for Us to think that the complainant voluntarily but grudgingly returned the money to show good faith. Thus, it was she who informed the petitioner about the existence of the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate (Exh. "A", pp. 4-5, Records). The allegation that she did so because of petitioner's threats came from the complainant herself. She has not been able to present any other witness to buttress her claim. Further, We find that contrary to complainant's allegations in her affidavit (ibid, p. 5) it was not the petitioner who suggested the encashment of the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate but her sister; and that again, it was not the petitioner who agreed to the sister's suggestion but Cruz, the PRO Manager, Foreign Department of the bank (TSN, January 8, 1985, pp. 40-41, Records, pp. 131-132).
Moreover, while complainant claimed that her freedom of movement was restrained, she, however, was able to move about freely unguarded from the office of the petitioner situated at the ground floor to the office of Cruz at the mezzanine floor where her sister found her (ibid, pp. 39- 40, Records, pp. 130-131). Undoubtedly, during that time, there were many bank clients who transacted business with the bank (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 21; Records, p. 112). The bank security guards then were at their posts. Complainant herself admitted that they manifested no overt acts to prevent her from leaving despite the alleged loud threats of the petitioner (ibid, pp. 20- 21, Records, pp. 111-112) which could be heard considering that the door to petitioner's office was kept open (TSN, October 8, 1985, p. 184, Records, p. 276). Given such atmosphere, the complainant still did not leave the bank. The respondent court cited the prepared typewritten withdrawal slip and the non-presentation of the complainant's passbook as indicators of her involuntary acts. We disagree. The petitioner testified that the general rule was that the bank requires the presentation of the passbook whenever withdrawals are made. However, there was an exception to this rule, i.e. when the depositor is a regular customer in depositing or withdrawing money in the bank (TSN, October 8, 1985, pp. 189-190, Records, pp. 281-282). The prosecution failed to submit evidence to rebut his contentions. Besides, the trial court's conclusion that the withdrawal slip was typewritten was without basis considering that the complainant merely averred that the withdrawal slip was already prepared when she signed it (Exh. "A", Records, p. 4). We also take exception to the following ruling of the appellate court: It must be noted that the position of a bank manager is one of prestige and dignity and when the said bank was cheated or swindled it certainly reflects on the capability and efficiency of the manager and one can just imagine the kind of mental attitude and feeling of anger the latter would have towards the alleged swindler. Shouting, raising of voice and dagger looks are common characteristics of an angry man and that was what accused Lee exhibited to a fragile weaker sex and pregnant offended party. It would be natural to get angry with someone who had victimized you. Naturalness, however is not always righteous. It is like taking the law into your hands and that was what the accused Lee did. (CA Decision, pp. 11-12, Rollo, pp. 5253) This pronouncement creates an impression that the petitioner had made a personal case out of the situation. However, the evidence does not support this view. We find that at the time the check was deposited and encashed, the petitioner was then on leave (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 156; Records, p. 248). Under this circumstance, it is not fair to consider the bank's mistake in accepting and paying the check as the petitioner's mistake which could militate against his efficiency. The petitioner attributed the mistake in the payment of the forged check to the usual risks in banking business. He stated:
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Atty. Pangilinan, Private prosecutor (authorized by the Fiscal to prosecute the case in the latter's stead) Q So you no longer consider him (Carpio) as entitled in (sic) the proceeds of the chek (sic) and therefore at that point of (sic) time you will now concede that the payment made by you to him was a big mistake? A When we were asking for the respondent and we were locating Honorio Carpio and we cannot locate him, I consider that a mistake, Sir. Q It was a big mistake as a matter of fact? A When it comes to the falling of the business considering the big amount I would say big mistake but only a mistake, it was a usual risk in banking business, Sir. Q But of course Mr. Lee, being a mistake that mistake will harm and tense your personality as a Bank Manager? A It is up to our Manager to decide but when it comes to other transactions I am handling Three Million plus and considering that check I don't think with all modesty it will affect me, Sir. Q But you are called upon to try to recover any money which was in your judgment was unlawfully taken from you by anybody A When it comes to procedure I don't think it was unlawfully taken, as a matter of fact it was our bank who credited this account, Sir. Q So it is your bounded (sic) duty to recover money which was paid to someonelse (sic) which payment is not due to him, am I correct? A It is the duty of our lawyer to recover it, Sir. Q Is it not a fact that your lawyer is only your agent? Atty. Dizon: I think we are going too far, it has nothing to do with the particular incident subject matter of the criminal offense. Court: I see the point of the defense but the witness is very intelligent, I can see the point of counsel, because in order not to effect his integrity he resorted to this, for example in case of a bank employee who stole P500.00 and the other one is P200.00, it could have the same mistake which is supposed to be admonished by removal. You answer.
A Yes that is the same case whether it is small or big but when it comes to the Manager the Head Office is very understanding when it comes to bogus checks and of course my work is a supervisory. Sir. (ibid, pp. 170-171; Records, pp. 263-264) The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the fact that the complainant refused to sign the promissory note in spite of the alleged threats of the petitioner (TSN, January 8, 1985, p. 48; Records, p. 139). American authorities have declared that "(t)he force which is claimed to have compelled criminal conduct against the will of the actor must be immediate and continuous and threaten grave danger to his person during all of the time the act is being committed. That is, it must be a dangerous force threatened 'in praesenti.' It must be a force threatening great bodily harm that remains constant in controlling the will of the unwilling participant while the act is being performed and from which he cannot then withdraw in safety." (State v. Hood, 165 NE 2d, 28, 31-32, Emphasis ours). The complainant proferred excuses for her action. For one, she claimed that her sister's presence helped her recover her composure (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 29, Records, p. 120). We are not persuaded. If indeed she had recovered her composure because of her sister's presence, she could have just left the premises in a huff without encashing the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate or if they (complainant and sister) were already at the RCBC, they could have desisted from encashing the check and then could have left for home notwithstanding the alleged presence of Mr. Lumba who was no longer in his own bank but among the RCBC clients or she could have refused to sign the affidavit which was handed to her first before the promissory note. Yet, she did neither of these logical possibilities. Secondly, she averred that she refused to sign the promissory note because she was able to read its contents unlike the affidavit and she realized that she would have a great responsibility to return the amount taken by Carpio (ibid, pp. 27-28, Records, pp. 118-119). Such an excuse is flimsy and weak. It is strange that complainant's sister, who was with her, failed to corroborate her statement that she was denied the opportunity to read the affidavit. Her bare assertion simply confirms the voluntariness of her actions. All her disputed acts were geared towards proving her good faith. Complainant was willing to return the sum of P48,000.00 she took since it was only up to this amount where her involvement lies. However, as soon as she realized that she would have the enormous task of reimbursing the bank the balance of the proceeds of the forged check allegedly taken by Carpio, she refused to cooperate any further. Notwithstanding the alleged threats of petitioner, she did not budge. Thus, We find it as a logical consequence that she merely asked for the receipt of the P18,000.00 she deposited rather than the cancellation of her earlier withdrawal. On this point, complainant claimed that after her refusal to sign the document, she no longer insisted on the return of the money because she felt that it was the only way she could leave the bank premises (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 31, Records, p. 120). This pretense, however, was belied by her subsequent actuations. We find that she and her sister left the
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bank unescorted to eat their snack; that they were required by the petitioner to come back; and that they decided not to eat but instead went home (TSN, November 20, 1984, pp. 31-32, Records, pp. 122-123 and January 8, 1965, pp. 49-50, Records, pp. 140-141). With such behavior, We are at a loss to understand how coercion could attach in this case. Obviously, the complainant has not been cowed into submission. Against this backdrop, We hold that coercion did not exist in this case. Consequently, the petitioner should be acquitted. ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a new one hereby entered ACQUITTING the accused of the crime of grave coercion. SO ORDERED.
place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel. Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa, tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plan, by reminding them of the fact that it was Holy Week and that it was highly improper to construct a fence at that time of the evening. A verbal altercation ensued. When the people attending the pabasa in the chapel and those who were eating in the yard thereof noticed what was happening, they became excited and left the place hurriedly and in such confusion that dishes and saucers were broken and benches toppled over. The pabasa was discontinued and it was not resumed until after an investigation conducted by the chief of police on the following morning, which investigation led to the filing of the complaint appearing on pages 1 and 2 of the record. Many years ago the Clemente family by informal donation gave the land on which the old chapel was erected. When it was destroyed, the present chapel was erected, and there is now a dispute as to whether the new chapel is not now impinging on the land that belongs to the Clemente family. The appellants are partisans of he Clemente family. It is to be noted that article 133 of the Revises Penal Code punishes acts "notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful." The construction of a fence, even though irritating and vexatious under the circumstances to those present, is not such an act as can be designated as "notoriously offensive to the faithful", as normally such an act would be a matter of complete indifference to those not present, no matter how religious a turn of mind they might be. The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony of a religious character under the old Penal Code was denounced by article 571 and was punished by arrest from one to ten days and a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas. But this article was omitted from the Revised Penal Code and the offense, if any was committed by the appellants, is denounced in article 287 as an "unjust vexation" and punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both. It is urged upon us that the act of building a fence was innocent and was simply to protect private property rights. The fact that this argument is a pretense only is clearly shown by the circumstances under which the fence was constructed, namely, late at night and in such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who had gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is further shown by the fact that many of the appellants saw fit to introduce as their defense a false alibi. Appellants are therefore acquitted of a violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code but found guilty of a violation of article 287 of the Revised Penal Code and are sentenced each to a fine of P75 with subsidiary confinement in case of insolvency, together with the costs in both instances. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, Vickers, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
UNJUST VEXATION
G.R. No. L-40577 August 23, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PROCOPIO REYES, POLICARPIO NACANA, FLORENTINO CLEMENTE, HERMOGENES MALLARI, MARCELINO MALLARI, CASTOR ALIPIO, and RUFINO MATIAS, defendants-appellants. HULL, J.: Appellants were convicted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac of a violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: ART. 133. Offending the religious feelings.The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious ceremony, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. In the barrio of Macalong, municipality of La Paz, Province of Tarlac, there is a chapel where it is customary to hold what is known in local parlance as a pabasa. As stated by the lower court, "the term pabasa is applied to the act of the people, professing the Roman Catholic faith," of assembling, during Lent, "at a certain designated place, for the purpose of reading and the life, passion and death of Jesus Christ. A book known as the 'Vida, Pasion y Muerte de Jesucristo', which contains a fun account in verse of the life, passion and death of Jesus Christ, is used in this celebration." The pabasa in Macalong used to begin on Palm Sunday and continue day and night, without any interruption whatsoever, until Good Friday. As usual, refreshment and food were served in the yard adjoining the chapel, and the expenses incidental thereto were defrayed by different persons. While the pabasa was going on the evening of April 10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the defendants Procopio Reyes, Policarpio Nacana, Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes Mallari, Marcelino Mallari, Castor Alipio, and Rufino Matias arrived at the
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