FM 3-05.

60
(FM 1-108)

ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
AVIATION OPERATIONS

October 2000
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Distribution authorized to U. S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or
operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by
other means. This determination was made on 5 December 2003. Other requests for this document
must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and
School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-PO, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE:
Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

 *FM 3-05.60
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-05.60 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 16 October 2000

Army Special Operations Forces

Aviation Operations

Contents
Page

PREFACE .................................................................................................................. iii

Chapter 1. ARSOA MISSION, OPERATION, AND ORGANIZATION .....................................1-1
Mission .....................................................................................................................1-1
Mission-Essential and Battle Tasks .........................................................................1-1
Supporting Tasks .....................................................................................................1-2
Employment Considerations ....................................................................................1-2
Characteristics of ARSOA Forces............................................................................1-3
Organization .............................................................................................................1-5

Chapter 2. ARSOA MISSIONS AND COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES ...........................................2-1

Principles of War......................................................................................................2-1
Army Special Operations Imperatives......................................................................2-3
ARSOA Principles ....................................................................................................2-6
Operational Considerations......................................................................................2-7

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U. S. Government agencies and their contractors to

protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 5 December 2003. Other requests for this
document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and
School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-PO, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction
of the document.

* This publication supersedes FM 1-108, 3 November 1993.

i
FM 3-05.60

Page

ARSOA Support to ARSOF Missions and Collateral Activities................................ 2-8

Tactical Application................................................................................................ 2-19
Evasion and Recovery........................................................................................... 2-19
Combat Search and Rescue ................................................................................. 2-20
Maritime Operations .............................................................................................. 2-21

Chapter 3. ARSOA MISSION PLANNING PROCESS ............................................................. 3-1

ARSOA Participation During the Entire Planning Process ...................................... 3-1
Mission Planning...................................................................................................... 3-4
War Game Process ................................................................................................. 3-9
Communications.................................................................................................... 3-10

Chapter 4. COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT ..................................................................... 4-1

Fire Support ............................................................................................................. 4-1
SEAD and Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses ............................................ 4-4
Air Defense .............................................................................................................. 4-4
Attack Helicopters.................................................................................................... 4-5
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare......................................................................... 4-5
Weather Support ..................................................................................................... 4-7
External Communications Support .......................................................................... 4-7
Engineer Support..................................................................................................... 4-7
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Support ............................................................. 4-8

Chapter 5. ARSOA LOGISTICS SUPPORT ............................................................................. 5-1

ARSOF Logistics Environment ................................................................................ 5-1
Preparation Modes .................................................................................................. 5-2
Planning Considerations.......................................................................................... 5-6
Field Services Support............................................................................................. 5-7
Forward Arming and Refueling Point Operations .................................................... 5-9
Resupply Procedures for Developed and Undeveloped Theaters......................... 5-10

Appendix A. INTELLIGENCE ......................................................................................................A-1

Appendix B. AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES.....................................................................................B-1
Appendix C. OPERATIONS ........................................................................................................ C-1
Appendix D. LOGISTICS ............................................................................................................ D-1
GLOSSARY.................................................................................................Glossary-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................... Bibliography-1
INDEX............................................................................................................... Index-1

ii
 Preface
Field Manual (FM) 3-05.60 describes the mission tasks, capabilities, limitations,
command and control (C2) relationships, employment principles, and operational
considerations of Army special operations aviation (ARSOA). The manual
establishes doctrine for operational employment of aviation combat support (CS),
combat service support (CSS), and command and support relationships. The
manual identifies requirements of ARSOA in different levels of conflict and
duration of operations. It further delineates unique capabilities, limitations, and
requirements when supporting a standing joint special operations task force
(JSOTF) or a commander in chief (CINC) during a regional contingency.
This manual explains short- and long-term employment and execution concepts
for ARSOA, including support requirements and relationships. The manual
provides doctrinal guidance to the ARSOA commander for the employment of
ARSOA in support of special operations (SO). The employment guidance
considerations and the command and support responsibilities apply to the special
operations forces (SOF) commander and his staff, as well as the conventional
commander and his staff.
The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and
recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-JAA,
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not
refer exclusively to men.

iii
 Chapter 1

ARSOA Mission, Operation,

and Organization
Unconventional Warfare and special operations are as old as war
itself. Throughout history, success by a small force against a strategic
or operational objective usually has called for units with combinations
of special equipment, training, people, or tactics that go beyond those
found in conventional units. These characteristics have allowed such
units to be employed in unusual ways, for which the enemy often was
unprepared.
Lieutenant General Schoomaker
United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 1998

ARSOA is an integral part of SO. ARSOA units can operate as part of an

Army special operations task force (ARSOTF) or a JSOTF. They give the
ground commander a means to infiltrate, resupply, and extract SOF. To
employ ARSOA properly, commanders must understand the characteristics
of SO in general and ARSOA in particular.

MISSION
1-1. The mission of ARSOA is to plan, conduct, and support SO by
clandestinely penetrating nonhostile, hostile, or denied airspace. ARSOA
conducts air operations in any operational environment across the spectrum
of conflict. ARSOA supports SOF conducting joint, combined, interagency,
and liaison and coordination activities in regional crises and major conflicts,
or as directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA). As part of the
United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), ARSOA
organizes, equips, trains, validates, sustains, and employs assigned aviation
units for USASOC missions.

MISSION-ESSENTIAL AND BATTLE TASKS

1-2. The mission-essential and battle tasks for ARSOA are to—
• Infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate United States (U.S.) SOF and other
selected personnel.
• Insert and extract SOF land and maritime assault vehicles and vessels.
• Conduct direct action (DA) or close air support (CAS) using organic
attack helicopters to provide aerial firepower and terminal guidance for
precision munitions, unilaterally or with other SOF.
• Provide forward air control for U.S. and multinational CAS and
indirect fires in support of SOF.

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FM 3-05.60

• Conduct special reconnaissance missions in support of SOF.

• Conduct electronic, photographic, and visual reconnaissance in support
of SOF.
• Conduct limited electronic warfare (EW) in support of SO.
• Recover personnel or sensitive materiel in support of SOF.
• Conduct assisted evasion and recovery (E&R) when dedicated combat
search and rescue (CSAR) assets are unavailable in support of SO.
• Conduct CSAR as a part of the SOF component apportioned to the joint
search and rescue center (JSRC) when the mission requires ARSOA
capabilities above and beyond conventional theater CSAR assets.
• Perform emergency air evacuation of SOF personnel during the
conduct of SO.
• Conduct strategic self-deployment of all aerial refuel-capable
helicopters.
• Conduct SO joint maritime operations.
• Conduct SO water insertion and recovery operations.
• Support and facilitate ground and aerial command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) operations for SOF.
• Provide the C2 element, when augmented with required United States
Air Force (USAF) assets (military occupational specialties [MOSs] and
communications equipment), for SO aviation assets and attached
conventional aviation assets supporting SOF.
• Provide liaison officers (LNOs) or subject matter experts (SMEs) as
required or until aircrew manning is detrimental to the mission.
• Perform aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) and aviation intermediate
maintenance (AVIM) for all organic aircraft.

SUPPORTING TASKS
1-3. Supporting tasks for ARSOA are to—
• Design, integrate, and maintain aviation systems and support
equipment unique to SO aircraft and mission capability.
• Establish and maintain a program to recruit, select, and train Army
and other personnel for attachment to ARSOA units.
• Establish and maintain liaison positions with other SOF to plan and
coordinate activities.

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
1-4. ARSOA provides SOF the capability to penetrate hostile or denied
territory and to accomplish SO missions and collateral activities. ARSOA
units have specialized aircraft with sophisticated state-of-the-art special
mission equipment. ARSOA aircrews undergo intense training in the tactical
employment of the aircraft and the execution of SO aviation tasks. ARSOA
should arrive in the theater of operation with other SOF before hostilities and
should be a part of high payoff SO and collateral missions that support the

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 FM 3-05.60

theater commander’s campaign plan. ARSOA should exploit the darkness,

adverse weather conditions, and extended range and navigation systems to
penetrate hostile territory from unexpected avenues of approach in the
execution of special mission tasks.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ARSOA FORCES

1-5. The unique capabilities of ARSOA are a function of the quality, training,
and education of its soldiers, as well as the mission profiles those soldiers
must execute. The competitive ARSOA selection process, coupled with
technological training and education, produces an ARSOA soldier who is
adaptable, mature, innovative, culturally aware, self-assured, and self-
reliant. Policy decision makers, therefore, use ARSOA as a strategic and
operational economy of force to expand the range of available options.
1-6. ARSOA forces are specially organized, trained, and equipped military
forces. They conduct SO to achieve military, political, economic, or
informational objectives by generally unconventional means in hostile,
denied, or politically sensitive areas. Decision makers may choose the ARSOA
option because it provides the broadest range of capabilities that have direct
applicability in an increasing number of environments.
1-7. Politico-military requirements frequently cast ARSOA into clandestine
or low-visibility environments that require oversight at the national level.
ARSOA operations differ from conventional force operations by their degree
of acceptable physical and political risk, their modes of employment, and
their operational techniques. ARSOA allows the unified commander or the
joint force commander (JFC) to perform critical small-unit missions that
directly strike or engage the aim or objective of the operational mission.
1-8. Early use of Army special operations forces (ARSOF) in an operation
may prevent or contain conflict and may conserve national resources. When
conflict is imminent, ARSOA may support a variety of prehostility missions to
signal determination, to demonstrate support to allies, and to begin the
complicated processes of positioning forces for combat and of preparing the
operations area or battlespace.
1-9. During conflict, ARSOF may be most effective in conducting strategic
and operational economy-of-force operations, generating military or
diplomatic advantages disproportionate to the resources they represent. With
support from ARSOA, SOF can locate, seize, or destroy strategic and
operational targets and obtain critical intelligence. They can analyze an
enemy’s defenses and diminish his morale. They can disorganize, disrupt, and
demoralize his troops. They can also divert important resources.
1-10. ARSOF expand the options of the NCA, particularly in crises and
contingencies (terrorism, insurgency, subversion, and sabotage) that fall
between wholly diplomatic initiatives and the overt use of large conventional
forces. The use of ARSOF enables decision makers to prevent a conflict or to
limit its scope. Decision makers can, therefore, better control committed U.S.
forces and resources. ARSOA in support of SOF may be the best choice for
actions requiring a rapid response or a surgically precise, focused use of force.

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FM 3-05.60

1-11. ARSOA training is one of the most rigorous, technical forms of training
in the world. It produces some of the most professional and highly trained
soldiers who demonstrate superior performance in small groups or as part of
an integrated U.S. response with other military forces, as well as non-
Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian agencies. Selected small, self-
contained units can work swiftly and quietly without the noticeable presence
of conventional forces. Even under the most austere conditions, they are able
to operate without the infrastructure often needed by a larger force. They can
penetrate enemy territory by various means, sustain themselves in the
denied area, and execute various missions.
1-12. To make sure missions selected for ARSOA are compatible with
ARSOF capabilities, commanders must be familiar with the following SO
characteristics:
• ARSOA personnel undergo careful selection processes or mission-
specific training beyond basic military skills to achieve entry-level SO
skills. These programs make unlikely any rapid replacement or
generation of personnel or capabilities.
• Mature, experienced personnel compose ARSOA. Many maintain a
high level of competency in more than one military specialty.
• Some ARSOA elements are regionally oriented for employment. Cross-
cultural communications training is a routine part of the regional
training of those elements.
• ARSOA conducts specific tactical operations by small units with unique
talents that directly strike or engage strategic and operational aims or
objectives.
• Planning for SO may begin at the unified, joint, or interagency levels
for execution that requires extensive, rigorous rehearsal.
• SO are frequently clandestine or low-visibility operations, or they may
be a part of overt operations. They can be covert but as such require a
declaration of war or a specific finding executed by the NCA. ARSOF
can deploy at relatively low cost with a low profile that is less intrusive
than that of larger conventional forces.
• ARSOA units often conduct SO at great distance from operational
bases. They employ sophisticated communications systems and means
of insertion, support, and extraction to penetrate and return from
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.
• SO occur throughout full spectrum operations—offense, defense,
stability operations, and support operations.
• SO influence the will of foreign leadership to create conditions
favorable to U.S. strategic aims and objectives.
• ARSOA are often high-risk operations that have limited windows of
execution and require first-time success.
• Employment of SO may require patient, long-term commitment and
support to achieve U.S. national goals in an operational area.
• ARSOA requires theater- and, frequently, national-level intelligence
support.

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 FM 3-05.60

• Selected SO require a detailed knowledge of the cultural nuances and

languages of a country or region where employed.
• SO are inherently joint and sometimes multinational, requiring
interagency and international coordination. The contribution of ARSOF
to national security is greatest when ARSOF are fully integrated into
the JFC’s plan at the earliest stages of planning.
• ARSOA can be task-organized quickly and deployed rapidly to provide
tailored responses to many different situations.
• ARSOA can gain access to hostile and denied areas.
• ARSOA can live in austere, harsh environments without extensive
support for short periods of time. For long-duration operations, ARSOA
require support from theater Army.
• ARSOA can survey and assess local situations and report these
assessments rapidly.

ORGANIZATION
1-13. The ARSOA regiment (Figure 1-1, page 1-6) consists of a headquarters
and headquarters company (HHC), an assault battalion, an aviation support
battalion (with three forward-deployed companies), and an aviation battalion.
The forward-deployed companies are under the administrative control
(ADCON) of the ARSOA regiment. Additionally, table of distribution and
allowances (TDA) documents authorize a special operations aviation training
company (SOATC) and a systems integration and maintenance office (SIMO).
1-14. The ARSOA regiment has SO rotary-wing aircraft, including the
AH/MH-6J Cayuse, the MH-60L/K Blackhawk, and the MH-47D/E Chinook.
ARSOA units can plan, conduct, and support SO missions for the ARSOF
commander or for the theater special operations command (SOC). ARSOA can
be task-organized based on expected missions, the requirements of the units
they will support, the environmental conditions in the theater of operations,
and sustainment requirements. ARSOA task-organizes around one of the
special operations aviation (SOA) battalions. With proper personnel and
equipment augmentation, the ARSOA battalion commander and his staff
could also serve as a joint special operations air component commander
(JSOACC). When two or more battalions are required in the theater, the
regimental commander could serve as the JSOACC.

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FM 3-05.60

Figure 1-1. ARSOA Organization

1-6
 Chapter 2

ARSOA Missions and Collateral Activities

It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war . . . the chief factor
in achieving triumph is what has been done in the way of thorough
preparation and training before the beginning of wars.
President Theodore Roosevelt
Graduation Address, U.S. Naval Academy, June 1902

ARSOA abides by ARSOF truths (Figure 2-1), the principles of war, and
Army SO imperatives. All have unique implications to ARSOA’s concept
of operations in the battlespace and are manifested in ARSOA’s
operational considerations. Each SO mission and collateral activity
requires special capabilities from ARSOA. Mission planning for SO is a
detailed process conducted directly with the supported unit. ARSOA has
assets that maintain cultural, regional, and language orientation.

• Humans are more important than hardware.

• Quality is better than quantity.

• ARSOF cannot be mass produced.

• Competent ARSOF cannot be quickly created after emergencies arise.

Figure 2-1. ARSOF Truths

PRINCIPLES OF WAR
2-1. The principles of war apply equally to SO. SOF commanders, however,
apply them from a different perspective than do conventional force
commanders. This perspective comes from the nature of the forces and the
methods of application. Normally, SOF carry few weapons and have limited
fire support. They maintain a high degree of mobility and remain undetected
as long as possible. ARSOA commanders must understand the effects of their
operational environment and force capabilities as they apply the principles of
war. With each principle, the ARSOA commanders must consider various
components.

OBJECTIVE
2-2. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and
attainable objective. SOF objectives may be political, economic, psychological,

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FM 3-05.60

or military. During war, SO usually focus on enemy weaknesses other forces

cannot exploit. ARSOA must have a clearly defined objective that promotes
the supported commander’s intent.

OFFENSIVE
2-3. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. SO are inherently offensive
actions. ARSOA, like all aviation, is offensive in nature as well. It allows the
supported commander to conduct operations in any direction on the
battlefield, unencumbered by terrain or obstacles.

MASS
2-4. Concentrate the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive
time and place. The employment of SOF is not in the conventional sense.
Even more so than conventional forces, SOF must avoid attrition or force-on-
force battles. They must subtly and indirectly concentrate their combat power
at decisive times and places. ARSOA efforts must not be against attractive
targets that may be operationally or strategically irrelevant. Extensive SO
planning and rehearsal are necessary to achieve temporary superiority of
force or, conversely, to avoid enemy engagement. Concentration of force relies
as much on the quality and focus of tactics, timing, and weaponry as it does
on numerical strength. ARSOA delivers the supported force to the precise
place at the precise time.

ECONOMY OF FORCE
2-5. Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. When
employed as a part of SOF, ARSOA is an economy-of-force measure that
allows the concentration of other forces elsewhere. The role of many SO is to
divert hostile forces into secondary theaters. This practice prevents a
concentration of hostile forces against the friendly main effort. ARSOA gives
the commander a means to employ a specialized force in the right location to
maximize the effect.

MANEUVER
2-6. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage using the flexible
application of combat power. During SO, maneuver implies the ability to
infiltrate and exfiltrate denied areas to exploit enemy weaknesses. When
employed by ARSOA, maneuver is the ability to concentrate (infiltrate) the
supported commander’s elements, to strike the enemy where and when
the enemy is most vulnerable, and to disperse (exfiltrate) to avoid the
enemy’s strengths.

UNITY OF COMMAND
2-7. For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. When
ARSOA is a part of SOF, the organization is joint, with uncluttered chains of
command that reduce layered headquarters elements.

SECURITY
2-8. Never let the enemy gain an unexpected advantage. Security is paramount
to SO and often dominates all other considerations. Compartmented planning is

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 FM 3-05.60

typical for SO, and planning staffs are normally small. Within a
compartmented activity, however, individuals must share information.
2-9. To enhance security and achieve surprise, individuals must follow
intelligence, counterintelligence, EW, and cover and deception procedures
when planning and executing SO. To provide security for the plan and to
preserve the security for other planned operations, ground and air planners
must go into isolation.
2-10. To allow ARSOA crews to conduct follow-on missions in the same
areas, however, planners should rotate crews to perform these missions if
possible. To enhance operational security, ground forces normally discuss
only the portion of the ground tactical plan that involves the ARSOA crews
and the immediate actions on the objective. When planning and coordinating
air operations, planners should discuss E&R plans and CSAR procedures for
downed aircrew as well. This practice provides mutual protection for all SOF
personnel in the event of capture.

SURPRISE
2-11. Strike the enemy at a time and place or in a manner for which he is
unprepared. Achieving surprise is usually a precondition for success in SO and
the major principle of war provided to a ground force commander through
ARSOA assets. ARSOA enables the commander to strike the enemy indirectly
and unexpectedly. It also allows the supported commander to take imaginative,
bold, and audacious action and to apply his combat power with precision.

SIMPLICITY
2-12. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure a
thorough understanding. By nature, ARSOA missions are complicated and
multifaceted. Plans require and depend on precise timing and accuracy. SO
often use sophisticated, unorthodox methods and equipment requiring
specifically selected and trained SO aviators. Although the missions are
complex, detailed planning, in-depth briefings, and rehearsals help simplify
the mission and prepare the aircrews for every possible contingency.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS IMPERATIVES

2-13. The application of Army SO imperatives and the principles of war
characterize successful SO. Although the imperatives may not apply to all
types of ARSOF, SOF commanders must include the applicable imperative
into their mission planning and execution.

UNDERSTAND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

2-14. Although ARSOA assets cannot dominate the environment, they can
help the ARSOF commander influence it by providing assets for him to gain a
better understanding of the theater, including civilian influence as well as the
friendly and enemy capabilities. SOF must know who the friendly and hostile
decision makers are, their objectives and strategies, and the way they
interact. Commanders must make sure the friendly decision makers
understand the implication and impact of mission requirements. An improper
decision can commit or expend SOF on targets of little importance in the

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overall plan. ARSOA commanders must remain flexible and adapt their
operations to changing situations. By expecting these changes, they can
exploit fleeting opportunities.

RECOGNIZE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

2-15. Many SO are conducted to advance critical political objectives. ARSOA
must understand that their actions can have international consequences.
Rules of engagement (ROE) provide a framework that considers political
implications; however, they cannot anticipate every situation. ARSOF must
understand the intent of the ROE and act accordingly, despite any military
disadvantage that may result. The advancement of the political objective may
take precedence over the military disadvantages. The ARSOA commander
must fully understand the intent of the ROE and act accordingly.

FACILITATE INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES

2-16. ARSOA support and complement U.S. and multinational civilian
programs driven by nonmilitary considerations. ARSOA also can operate in the
ambiguous and complex political environments found in coalition operations or
alliances formed to avert situations that would lead to human tragedy.

ENGAGE THE THREAT DISCRIMINATELY

2-17. ARSOA commanders have limited resources that are not easily
replaced, and their missions often have sensitive political implications. They
must, therefore, analyze the risk and advise the supported commander of the
risk to the force and to the ARSOA assets. Together, the ARSOA commander
and the supported commander carefully select when, where, and how to use
ARSOA to achieve the desired results with the least risk.

CONSIDER LONG-TERM EFFECTS

2-18. ARSOA commanders must avoid strategic failure and achieve tactical
success. ARSOA commanders must not risk the success of national and
theater long-term objectives in their desire for immediate or short-term
effects. Plans and procedures must be consistent with accomplishing the
national or theater priorities. Commanders must consider the prudent use of
force in view of these priorities.

ENSURE LEGITIMACY AND CREDIBILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

2-19. Significant legal and policy considerations apply to many SO activities.
Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal
and international support. The United States cannot sustain its assistance to
a foreign power without this legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy is broader
than the strict legal definition contained in international law. The concept
also includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government or resistance
organization. The people of the nation and the international community
determine its legitimacy based on collective perception of the credibility of its
cause and methods. Without legitimacy and credibility, SO will not gain the
support of foreign indigenous elements, the U.S. population, or the
international community. ARSOA legal advisors must review all sensitive
aspects of SO mission planning and execution.

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ANTICIPATE AND CONTROL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS

2-20. All SO have potential psychological effects. Some SO, however, have a
specific mission to produce such effects. ARSOA commanders must
understand Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and be able to support the
integration of PSYOP.

APPLY CAPABILITIES INDIRECTLY

2-21. The primary role of ARSOA in multinational operations is to assist the
ARSOF commander in advising and training indigenous military and
paramilitary forces. The supported non-U.S. forces then serve as force
multipliers in the pursuit of U.S. national security objectives with minimum
U.S. visibility, risk, and cost. The long-term self-sufficiency of the foreign
force must assume primary authority and accept responsibility for the success
or failure of the mission. All U.S. efforts must reinforce and enhance the
effectiveness, legitimacy, and credibility of the supported foreign government
or group.

DEVELOP MULTIPLE OPTIONS

2-22. ARSOF must maintain their operational flexibility by developing a
broad range of options. The key to operational flexibility includes—
• Developing contingency plans that anticipate problems during critical
events.
• Using a deliberate, interactive planning and rehearsal process.
• Having the same people plan, rehearse with ground forces, and execute
the mission. (These types of actions on the objective become a common
point of departure, not inflexible blueprints.)
2-23. Under these circumstances, the operators understand all the critical
elements of the plan, as well as alternate courses of action (COAs), reasons
for discarding alternate COAs, and unstated assumptions underlying
unexpected difficulties.

ENSURE LONG-TERM SUSTAINMENT

2-24. Resourcing of ARSOA assets varies with each mission. ARSOA must
demonstrate continuity of effort when dealing with political, economic,
informational, and military programs. They must not begin programs that
are beyond the economic, technological, or cultural capabilities of the host
nation (HN) to maintain without U.S. assistance. Such efforts are
counterproductive. ARSOA policy, strategy, and programs must therefore be
durable, consistent, and sustainable.

PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE

2-25. ARSOA has neither the combat power nor the reinforcement and
support of conventional forces to deal with unexpected enemy actions. The
success of ARSOA in support of SO missions often depends on detailed, near-
real-time, all-source intelligence (Appendix A) that focuses on specific mission
requirements. Timely national and theater intelligence is particularly
important to SOF. ARSOA intelligence preparation is critical to mission
success and imposes great demands on the capabilities of supporting

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intelligence organizations. ARSOA commanders must clearly identify and

prioritize their intelligence requirements.

BALANCE SECURITY AND SYNCHRONIZATION

2-26. Security concerns control SO. Excessive compartmentalization can,
however, exclude key personnel from the planning process. ARSOA
commanders must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and
execution. While insufficient security can compromise a mission, excessive
security can jeopardize the coordination of plans.

ARSOA PRINCIPLES
2-27. SO principles are an important part of SO mission planning. Principles
for ARSOA are as follows:
• Integrate supporting ARSOA assets from mission analysis to COA
development, through mission accomplishment.
• Increase ARSOA effectiveness by using the tactical and logistic
capabilities of other Services and nations.
• Use near-real-time and all-source intelligence products during mission
planning, rehearsal, and execution.
• Negate hostile acquisition means and weapons systems before and
during the mission.
• Employ the element of surprise by—
ΠConducting operations at night and during periods of low ambient
light.
ΠUsing deception and operations security (OPSEC) measures.
ΠUsing terrain-following techniques.
ΠUsing the range capability of the aircraft to fly indirect approaches.
ΠControlling or reducing electronic emissions during the mission.
2-28. During extended operations—
• Change tactics and procedures regularly to avoid becoming predictable.
• Anticipate enemy actions.
• Concentrate combat power on enemy vulnerabilities.
• Stay flexible.
• Designate the main effort clearly.
• Move SOF throughout the depth of the operational area as the tactical
situation changes.
• Concentrate SOF at the critical time by using precision timing and
navigation.
• Displace forward elements frequently for security.
• Maintain the ability to operate continuously.
• Understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders.

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OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-29. Several considerations affect aviation support to SOF and must be a
part of all mission planning. Some may benefit the mission but most have an
adverse effect.

WEATHER
2-30. Weather affects friendly and enemy capabilities. ARSOA has the
unique capability to take advantage of adverse weather and to operate during
periods of zero illumination, reduced ceilings, and other limiting
meteorological conditions. The effects of the weather must be a part of
mission planning. Strong winds affect ground speed. Limited visibility or low
cloud ceilings provide some concealment for air operations and aid in
achieving surprise. These same conditions, however, restrict supporting high-
performance aircraft operations, such as tactical air, CAS, airlift, and aerial
refueling. Employment of aviation in these environments involves several
terrain considerations.

TERRAIN
2-31. Freedom of maneuver over terrain is an inherent characteristic of
aviation. This environmental flexibility provides a rapid means to overcome
the difficulties of movement and support of ground forces. Several factors
must be considered when employing aviation in these environments.

Mountains
2-32. High altitudes and high temperatures limit lift capabilities, useful
loads, and normal cruise speed. Weather conditions change rapidly. Limited
safe landing areas are available.

Arctic Areas
2-33. Cold temperatures increase lift capabilities and useful loads, but
snow and ice can adversely affect the aircraft’s performance. Blowing snow
limits visibility, especially during takeoff and landing. Extremely cold
temperatures have an adverse effect on aircraft components. Weather
conditions change rapidly.

Jungles
2-34. Dense jungles limit the range and effects of weapons. Hot, humid air
decreases aircraft lift, thus reducing the useful load. Problems with aircraft
corrosion increase, thereby increasing maintenance requirements. Safe
landing areas are scarce.

Deserts
2-35. High daytime temperatures decrease aircraft lift, thus reducing useful
loads. Sand and dust increase maintenance requirements. Flat, featureless
terrain increases the enemy’s long-range observation and complicates
navigation. Sandstorms and other phenomena develop quickly. Weather
support must be timely.

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Urban Areas
2-36. Aircraft are at high risk from small arms fire, complicated by the
proximity of noncombatants. Blowing debris increases foreign object damage
and can make landing areas unusable. High levels of artificial illumination
reduce night vision goggles (NVG) perception. If, however, lights are too
bright for NVG operation, unaided vision is probably sufficient. Tower and
wire hazards increase, thereby causing limited flight routes. Fire control
measures must relate to easily distinguishable features to control fratricide.
Observation, detection, and weapons engagement of aircraft from numerous
locations are critical considerations. Linear corridors, which are characteristic
of urban areas, limit fields of fire. Identifying targets, landing zones (LZs),
and pickup zones (PZs) is difficult.

Maritime
2-37. Air operations from naval vessels require extensive coordination with
naval air operations to synchronize the location, sequence, and timing of
departing or returning flights and long-range over-water and over-the-
horizon operations. Operating from naval vessels magnifies complications
from adverse weather conditions. Increased airframe corrosion from salt
water exposure requires fresh water source for aircraft washing.

ARSOA SUPPORT TO ARSOF MISSIONS

AND COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES
2-38. ARSOA possesses unique capabilities to support United States Special
Operations Command’s (USSOCOM’s) roles, missions, and functions as
directed by Congress in Title 10 U.S. Code 164 and Title 10 U.S. Code 167.
ARSOA plans, conducts, and supports SO in stability operations, support
operations, and war. ARSOA missions are normally joint or interagency in
nature. When planning operations, ARSOA commanders adhere to planning
fundamentals (discussed in FM 100-5, Operations), the Army universal task
list (AUTL), and the universal joint task list (UJTL). Mission priorities vary
from theater to theater. ARSOA missions are dynamic because they are
directly affected by politico-military considerations. A change in national
security strategy or policy may add, delete, or radically alter the nature of an
ARSOA mission. Although each mission is treated separately, all missions are
interrelated and interdependent.
2-39. The NCA or a JFC may task an ARSOF element to perform missions for
which it is the best suited among available forces or perhaps the only force
available. When ARSOA is assigned a mission by the controlling headquarters
(JSOACC), the ARSOA provides the tasking commander an estimate of its
capabilities, limitations, and risks associated with employment in
nontraditional missions. With additional training, ARSOA elements can
execute nonstandard or nondoctrinal missions with the same skills and
expertise demanded of their primary missions. In an ideal world, ARSOA would
be used only in operations for which they are specially trained and equipped. In
reality, circumstances often dictate the use of ARSOA for other missions.
2-40. ARSOA performs various missions and collateral activities (Figure 2-2,
page 2-9). ARSOA missions affect the way ARSOA is organized, trained, and

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equipped. In contrast, ARSOA collateral activities are capabilities ARSOA can

readily perform because of ARSOA’s primary missions. The primary missions of
ARSOA are enduring, and they infrequently change. ARSOA collateral activities,
however, more readily shift because of the changing international environment.

Missions Collateral Activities

• Unconventional Warfare • Coalition Support

• Foreign Internal Defense • Combat Search and Rescue
• Psychological Operations • Counterdrug Activities
• Civil Affairs • Countermine Activities
• Information Operations • Humanitarian Assistance
• Direct Action • Security Assistance
• Special Reconnaissance • Special Activities
• Combatting Terrorism
• Counterproliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction

Figure 2-2. ARSOF Missions and Collateral Activities

2-41. ARSOA missions and collateral activities fall into two categories: direct
and indirect. Direct contact with the adversary applies military resources to
accomplish a task without relying on indigenous or surrogate forces not under
direct U.S. control. Indirect contact with the adversary applies military
resources to train, advise, or assist interagency activities, nations important
to U.S. interests, or indigenous or surrogate forces pursuing objectives that
further U.S. interests. The categorization of ARSOA missions and collateral
activities as direct or indirect is useful when discussing the general
characteristics of these forces and when evaluating how various doctrinal
principles apply to them. These categories are not mutually exclusive.
2-42. Certain ARSOA missions and collateral activities may be executed as
sensitive special operations (SSOPS). These operations require national
oversight and interagency coordination because of their low visibility and
clandestine or (under special circumstances) covert methods. These techniques
are used to ensure secrecy or concealment. All SSOPS are conducted in pursuit
of national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. SSOPS are
characterized as politically or militarily sensitive and are of a high-risk nature.
The activities of SO-related intelligence elements, when deployed through joint
staff operations channels, are also defined as SSOPS.
2-43. ARSOA can support SOF in all of the core missions and collateral
activities. ARSOA conducts these missions predominantly in a joint

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FM 3-05.60

environment and may support the U.S. military conventional forces,

multinational forces, or other agencies and special activities.

ARSOF CORE MISSIONS

2-44. ARSOA participation in each ARSOF core mission and collateral
activity varies. In a DA role, ARSOA’s primary contributions are to infiltrate
SOF directly onto the objective or into a secure LZ where SOF can move to
their target. With armed helicopters, ARSOA units provide CAS or conduct
deep, unilateral, DA SO missions. They can support DA SO units as small as
split SF teams and as large as a Ranger battalion. ARSOA can also conduct
complex battalion-level air assault raids. They also support command,
control, and communications, and intelligence (C3I), deception, and show-of-
force operations. ARSOA infiltrates, provides CAS and airborne C2, and
exfiltrates supported SOF. Normal ARSOA support for special reconnaissance
(SR) operations is through infiltration, resupply, or exfiltration of SOF teams
that perform these missions. Support for counterproliferation (CP)
encompasses the same operational techniques used for DA, combatting
terrorism (CBT), and SR, including any required transportation of seized
equipment or materiel. ARSOA support to SOF conducting unconventional
warfare (UW), Civil Affairs (CA), PSYOP, information operations (IO), and
foreign internal defense (FID) is normally limited to a supporting role and
can be accomplished by conventional or HN aircraft. If, however, the threat
dictates, ARSOA can provide long-range, precise navigation insertion
and extraction.

Unconventional Warfare
2-45. UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations,
normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or
surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in
varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other
direct offensive, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the
indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and E&R.
2-46. Winning the conventional land battle “remains the absolute priority,”
despite an acknowledgment that potential adversaries are likely to follow
unconventional strategies (terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare) when
faced with a complex, adaptive army. Military operations conducted in
enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory make up UW
that includes guerrilla warfare and support to an insurgency. Indigenous
personnel carry out UW. External forces may support or direct these forces in
varying degrees in full spectrum operations. The focus of UW is primarily on
the success of existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, or other resistance
movements. The United States may engage in UW in three ways: as part of a
major theater war (MTW) or lesser regional contingency, in support of a
citizen or partisan defense intended as a deterrent, and as an effort to
support an insurgency. Special Forces (SF) provide advice and support as
training and assistance to UW organizations. Experiences in Afghanistan and
Nicaragua prove that support for an insurgency can be an effective way of
putting indirect pressure on adversaries. The costs versus the benefits of

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using UW against states that support insurgencies against the United States
and its allies must be carefully considered before employment.
2-47. During war, properly integrated and synchronized UW can extend the
depth of the conventional forces’ full spectrum operations. It gives the JFC
the windows of opportunity to seize the initiative through offensive action.
During UW, ARSOA supports the supported commander by conducting air
movement of supported SOF teams, indigenous forces, and supplies. These
air movements require ARSOA to conduct covert or clandestine penetration,
precision navigation, and long-range infiltration and exfiltration. ARSOA is
not for use in routine administrative and logistic air movements. It can,
however, extract U.S. and allied personnel recovered by the unconventional
assisted recovery mechanism (UARM).

Foreign Internal Defense

2-48. FID is participation or training by ARSOF in any of the action
programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID operations develop political,
economic, psychological, and military infrastructures of friendly governments
to prevent or defeat an insurgency. Like UW, FID is an umbrella concept that
covers a broad range of activities. Its primary intent is always to help the
legitimate host government address internal threats and their underlying
causes. FID is not restricted to times of conflict. It also can take place in the
form of training exercises and other activities that show U.S. resolve to and
for the region. These exercises train the HN to deal with potential internal
threats. Because the U.S. Government does not normally commit its forces to
combat against foreign insurgents, FID usually consists of indirect assistance,
such as participation in combined exercises and training programs or limited
direct assistance without U.S. participation in combat operations. These
actions support the HN in establishing internal defense and development
(IDAD) programs.
2-49. ARSOA assists FID operations by providing aviation assets to
supported multinational SOF requiring ARSOA skills and equipment. It
normally assists only in the movement of HN SOF to conduct surgical
operations, such as precision application of fire with no collateral damage. In
a FID environment, general aviation operations are inappropriate ARSOA
missions.
2-50. ARSOA may conduct or support tactical operations in support of FID
operations. The objective of tactical operations in FID is to provide a secure
environment in which balanced development can occur. Tactical operations
should not be independent military operations aimed solely at destroying
insurgent combat forces and their base areas. Tactical operations should be
part of a synchronized effort to achieve the national strategic objectives of
the HN.

Psychological Operations
2-51. PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,

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FM 3-05.60

groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce

foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.
2-52. In full spectrum operations, PSYOP take on an added significance.
Modern conflict is often a protracted politico-military struggle between
political systems. It often encompasses all spheres of national activity—
political, military, economic, social, and cultural. In protracted operations,
noncombat activities can be as decisive as combat operations are in
conventional warfare. Sometimes failure to achieve PSYOP objectives can
mean defeat, regardless of the outcome of military operations.
2-53. In modern conflict, emphasis on the psychological or informational
objective places PSYOP in a unique position. During stability operations and
support operations, PSYOP can be used unilaterally or with economic, social,
and political activities to limit or preclude the use of military force. In some
cases, the military objective may be relevant only in terms of the
psychological effect. History has shown that conflict is a battle of wills where
the intangible nature of morale and willpower can be defeated more in
psychological than physical terms.
2-54. Conventional assets or Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF)
normally support overt PSYOP, aerial broadcast, and leaflet delivery. ARSOA,
however, normally supports clandestine PSYOP missions. The use of ARSOA is
advisable when broadcast and leaflet delivery requires penetration of
nonpermissive airspace to reach the PSYOP target audience. ARSOA may be
able to perform overt PSYOP missions if it is the only aviation asset available.

Civil Affairs
2-55. CA are activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or
exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both government
and nongovernment, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile
area of operations to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational
objectives. CA may include performance by military forces of activities and
functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may
occur before, during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if
directed, in the absence of other military operations.
2-56. ARSOA can provide freedom of maneuver for CA operations and CA
coordination within the host country. Generally, ARSOA has limited use in
CA. Normally, it only supports CA in support of an SF unit in a FID or UW
mission. As in PSYOP, the best use of ARSOA is in covert or clandestine
missions when hostile nations landlock the target audience or target country
and the penetration of nonpermissive airspace is necessary.

Information Operations
2-57. IO are actions taken to affect adversary information and information
systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. IO
include interacting with the global information environment and exploiting or
denying an adversary’s information and decision capabilities. Activities that
support IO include acquiring, using, protecting, managing, exploiting, and
denying information and information systems.

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 FM 3-05.60

2-58. ARSOA conducts IO across the range of Army operations, from passive
defense to PSYOP to precision strike operations against key information
nodes. The goal of ARSOA within IO is to achieve information dominance at
the right time, at the right place, and with the right weapons or resources.
C2 measures gain and maintain information dominance.
2-59. Command and control warfare (C2W) is defined as the integrated use
of OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, EW, and physical destruction,
mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence,
degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities while protecting friendly C2
capabilities against such actions. C2W applies across the operational
continuum and all levels of conflict. C2W is further divided into command
and control-attack (C2-attack), and command and control-protect (C2-protect)
functions. The goal of C2-attack is to gain control over the adversary’s C2
function, both in terms of flow of information and level of situational
awareness. During C2-attack, ARSOA through DA, can strike at the
adversary’s capabilities at all echelons, targeting personnel, equipment,
communications, and facilities in an effort to disrupt or shape an adversary’s
C2. With effective C2-attack, ARSOF can either prevent an adversary from
exercising effective C2 or leverage it to friendly advantage. SF, CA, and
PSYOP can play a key role in C2-attack planning and operations with the
creation and maintenance of regional databases on historical and cultural
influences. SF, through SR, also can play a key role in intelligence
preparation of the battlespace (IPB), and battle damage assessments
(BDAs)—both soft and hard kill.
2-60. The goal of C2-protect is to maintain effective C2 of friendly forces by
negating or turning to a friendly advantage the adversary’s efforts to
influence, degrade, or destroy friendly C2 systems. C2-protect is divided into
active and passive measures and seeks to limit the vulnerability of forces
(personnel, equipment, and information) to hostile action. C2-protect includes
countering an adversary’s propaganda to prevent it from affecting friendly
operations, options, public opinion, and the morale of friendly troops.
2-61. PSYOP are an essential tool in both C2-attack and C2-protect
operations. In C2-attack, PSYOP can drive a wedge between the adversary’s
leadership and its populace to undermine the adversary leadership’s
confidence and effectiveness. Through the proliferation of discrete messages,
demonstrations, and surrender appeals to adversary C4I collectors, PSYOP
forces magnify the image of U.S. superiority. In C2-protect, the main
objective of PSYOP is to minimize the effects of an adversary’s hostile
propaganda and disinformation campaigns against U.S. forces. PSYOP units
must work closely with other C2W elements and public affairs (PA) and civil-
military operations (CMO) strategists to maximize the advantage of IO.
2-62. CA forces support IO and facilitate military operations by applying
their skills and experience in public administration, economics, public
facilities, linguistics, cultural affairs, and civil information. Daily interfacing
of CA with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), humanitarian relief
organizations, local authorities, civilian populace, and military allows CA to
passively gain information relevant to the commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIR). When properly integrated, CA elements have an

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FM 3-05.60

intricate and important role in providing information for the operational

planning cycle.
2-63. ARSOA use PA to inform soldiers about where they fit in, what is
expected of them, and how they help accomplish the mission, in addition to
providing information to the external media regarding ongoing operations.
This information also helps soldiers combat the effects of enemy propaganda
or misinformation. ARSOA, through the public affairs officer (PAO), can
initiate, direct, and emphasize internal information topics and programs that
disseminate clear and objective messages about U.S. military operations.
ARSOA commanders ensure that PA activities are synchronized with all
operations and missions promoting early coordination of PA, CMO, and
PSYOP functions during the planning process. For more information on IO,
see FM 100-6, Information Operations.
2-64. ARSOA assists in defensive measures to protect C2 platforms, using
passive sensors and hardened communications sites. ARSOA may provide a
platform for offensive measures to be inserted into the battlespace.

Direct Action
2-65. DA are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions
by SOF to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated
personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, ARSOA may
employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other
munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime
platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct
independent sabotage; and conduct antiship operations.
2-66. Normally limited in scope and duration, DA operations usually
incorporate an immediate withdrawal from the planned objective area. They
are designed to achieve specific, well-defined, and often time-sensitive results
of strategic and operational critical significance.
2-67. DA operations may be conducted independently or as part of larger
conventional or unconventional operations or campaigns. Although normally
considered close-combat type operations, DA operations also include sniping
and other standoff attacks by fire delivered or directed by SOF. Standoff
attacks are preferred when the target can be damaged or destroyed without
close combat. SOF employ close combat tactics and techniques when the
mission requires precise or discriminate use of force or the recovery or
capture of personnel or material.
2-68. DA recovery missions are designed to locate, recover, and restore to
friendly control selected personnel or materiel that are isolated and
threatened in sensitive, denied, or contested areas. DA recovery missions
usually result from situations that involve political sensitivity or military
criticality of the personnel or materiel being recovered from remote or hostile
environments. These situations may arise from a political change, combat
actions, chance happening, or mechanical mishap. DA recovery operations
differ from CSAR by use of—
• Dedicated ground combat elements.
• Unconventional techniques.

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• Predominantly clandestine search procedures.

• The likelihood of indigenous assistance.
2-69. DA operations may be unilateral or combined actions but are still short-
duration, discrete actions. ARSOA chain of command executes DA operations
to achieve the theater CINC’s objectives. Unlike UW operations, they do not
involve the support of an indigenous or surrogate chain of command to
achieve objectives of mutual interest.
2-70. In a DA role, ARSOA’s primary contribution is assisting SOF
infiltration. With organic armed helicopters, ARSOA units can also conduct
deep, unilateral DA SO missions independently. ARSOA can support
terminal guidance operations (TGO) or conduct TGO unilaterally. It can
support DA SO units as small as three- to five-man teams and as large as a
Ranger battalion. ARSOA air assault operations support DA missions that
include raids, ambushes, and seizure of key facilities. They also support
interdiction of major lines of communications, deception schemes, and
shows-of-force.

Special Reconnaissance
2-71. SR activities are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by
SOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods,
information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual
or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological,
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SR includes
target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.
2-72. SR complements national and theater intelligence collection assets and
systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, time-sensitive information of
strategic or operational significance. It may complement other collection
methods constrained by human intelligence (HUMINT) activity that places
U.S. or U.S.- controlled “eyes on target,” when authorized, in hostile, denied,
or politically sensitive territory. Normal ARSOA support for SR operations is
through infiltration, resupply, or exfiltration of SOF teams that perform
these missions. ARSOA can also perform some SR missions independently
and report strategic intelligence on enemy locations, intentions, and actions.

Combatting Terrorism
2-73. CBT activities are actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures
taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism
(offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken
to oppose terrorism throughout the entire spectrum. HN responsibilities,
Department of Justice and Department of State lead agency authority, legal
and political restrictions, and appropriate DOD directives limit SOF
involvement in CBT.
2-74. CBT involves offensive measures SOF agencies take to prevent, deter,
and respond to terrorism. SOF apply specialized capabilities to preclude,
preempt, and resolve terrorist incidents. The U.S. Department of Justice and
the Department of State are the lead agency authorities. ARSOA’s support of
a hostage rescue, the recovery of sensitive materiel, or an attack on the
terrorist infrastructure is similar in nature to a DA mission. ARSOA provides

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FM 3-05.60

CAS, provides airborne C2, and extracts supported SOF. Most CBT activities
are classified.

Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

2-75. CP activities are actions taken to seize, destroy, render safe, capture,
or recover weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The major objectives of DOD
CP policy are to prevent the acquisition of WMD and missile capabilities, roll
back proliferation where it has occurred, deter the use of WMD and their
delivery systems, and adapt U.S. military forces and planning to operate
against the threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems.
2-76. Specific CP and CPWMD activities conducted by ARSOF are classified.
See Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES
2-77. ARSOA can provide limited support to ARSOF collateral activities. CS,
CMO, humanitarian assistance (HA), and security assistance (SA) would
normally be provided general support (GS). Counterdrug (CD) and special
activities may require insertions and extractions, airborne C2, or air
movement of seized materiel. The most significant of the collateral activities,
CSAR can require the largest commitment of assets. Although not routinely
organized or trained to conduct CSAR, ARSOA has the inherent capability to
perform the mission. Each Service is required to provide CSAR for its own
operations and be prepared to support the joint force as required. SOF can
provide the ARSOF commander or theater SOC a CSAR capability that is
timely and flexible. ARSOA can also provide the joint force commander an
interim but limited JSRC capability during the initial stages of an operation.
ARSOA is a highly trained force that is best used for SO requiring the unique
capabilities of the aircraft (Appendix B) and its personnel. ARSOA supports
ARSOF collateral activities as follows:

Coalition Support
2-78. Coalition support by liaison elements improves the interaction of
coalition partners and U.S. military forces, particularly in coalition warfare.
It includes training coalition partners on tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP), providing communications to integrate them into the coalition
command and intelligence structure, and establishing liaisons to coordinate
for CS and CSS. Liaison elements often give the JFC an accurate evaluation
of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating
JFC C2. Coalition support improves the interaction of coalition partners. SOF
have unique capabilities for this mission because of their geographic
orientation and language skills. ARSOA normally does not support coalition
forces unless for a specific mission or capability.

Combat Search and Rescue

2-79. CSAR is a specific task performed by rescue forces to recover distressed
personnel during wartime or contingency operations. Personnel recovery (PR)
is the umbrella term for operations that focus on the task of recovering
captured, missing, or isolated personnel from denied or hostile territory. PR
includes, but is not limited to, search and rescue (SAR); CSAR; survival,

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evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE); theater SAR; E&R; and the
coordination of negotiated and forcible recovery options.
2-80. Each Service is responsible for providing forces capable of performing
CSAR in support of its own operations and in support of the JFC. The ability
of ARSOA to penetrate air defense systems and to conduct joint air, ground,
or sea operations deep within hostile or denied territory at night or in adverse
weather inherently makes ARSOA highly suitable for CSAR. Considering
these capabilities, ARSOA may be tasked to perform CSAR for other
components, or for the joint force as a whole, until they are able to establish
their own capabilities. The JFC must realize that diversion of ARSOA assets
to CSAR reduces their capability to perform their primary mission. In the 31
instances during Operation DESERT STORM where CSAR operations were
not conducted, the initial risk assessment (a requirement for CSAR
operations) convinced commanders that the risks outweighed the benefits. In
these cases, the individual evaders independently made their way back to
friendly control or to a point where CSAR or unconventional assisted recovery
(UAR) could be accomplished. During a UAR, UW forces, dedicated SOF
recovery teams, and UARMs direct the evader’s recovery. A UARM is an
entity, group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held or hostile areas
that operate to receive, support, move, and exfiltrate distressed military
personnel or other selected individuals to friendly control. They are specially
trained SOF and indigenous forces or other clandestine organizations, with
unique capabilities to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return
evaders and other distressed personnel to friendly control.

Counterdrug Activities
2-81. CD activities are active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter
the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Most ARSOF CD activities
are closely related to FID missions. Using their skills in cross-cultural
communications, ARSOF train and support HN CD forces on critical skills
required to conduct small-unit CD operations. ARSOA CD activities overseas
support the geographic combatant commander’s regional CD campaign plan or
the U.S. ambassador’s country-specific CD plans. CD operations are measures
to disrupt, interdict, track, or destroy illicit drug activities. The levels of
violence by the drug infrastructure may dictate the increased use of military
and paramilitary forces in CD operations. A 1981 amendment to the Posse
Comitatus (18 U.S. Code 1385) authorizes specific DOD assistance in drug
interdiction. The primary role in this interagency activity is to support U.S. and
HN CD efforts abroad. ARSOA support for CD is similar to the SR mission.

Countermine Activities
2-82. Countermine (CM) activities attempt to reduce or eliminate the threat
to noncombatants and friendly military forces posed by mines, booby traps,
and other explosive devices. CM activities include mine awareness,
identification and teaching of demining techniques, and minefield breaching
operations. It does not include actual demining and minefield breaching
operations. ARSOF, using their language skills and organic engineering and
demolitions capabilities, along with conventional forces support, train HN
forces in locating, recognizing, and safely disposing of mines and other

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destructive devices from a specific area. ARSOF also may assist in managing
an HN’s or a multinational CM program. PSYOP and CA teams help local
governments develop and execute public education programs to reduce risks
to noncombatants through public awareness of the problem. ARSOA supports
only unique CM missions, such as providing reconnaissance for and
destroying anti-shipping mines in sea-lanes.

Humanitarian Assistance
2-83. HA consists of programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of
natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human
pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life
or that can result in great damage to, or loss of, property. HA provided by
U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance is designed to
supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies
(NGOs) that may have the primary responsibility for providing HA. ARSOF
are well suited to perform HA activities in remote regions because of their
rapid deployability, regional orientation, organic communications, and ability
to sustain operations under adverse environmental conditions. SF and CA
can assess the needs of an area quickly. They then communicate their
assessment to a JFC or an ambassador to help design a plan to alleviate
suffering. CA and PSYOP forces are particularly important in organizing the
civilian infrastructure, in coordinating NGO activities, and in encouraging
popular support of humanitarian efforts. Participation in HA requires
significant interagency coordination. ARSOA supports HA only if the
requirement is valid and GS is unavailable.

Security Assistance
2-84. SA consists of a group of programs authorized by the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as
amended, and other related statutes by which the United States provides
defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by
grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and
objectives. The primary ARSOF role in SA is to provide mobile training teams
(MTTs) and other forms of mobile training assistance. Public law prohibits
personnel who provide SA services, including mobile training assistance, from
performing combatant duties. SF, with CA and PSYOP attachments, are
particularly effective in SA because they use the same regional orientation,
communications, mobility, and other skills required for FID and UW
missions. SA is a particularly valued activity because ARSOF train
themselves in skills useful in stability operations and support operations
while they train or otherwise assist foreign military forces. ARSOA normally
does not participate in SA.

Special Activities
2-85. Special activities fall under Executive Order 12333 and require a
Presidential finding and Congressional oversight. ARSOA conduct special
activities abroad that support national foreign policy objectives; however,
these activities are conducted in such a manner that U.S. Government
participation is neither apparent nor acknowledged publicly. Whether
supporting or conducting a special activity, SOF may perform any of their

2-18
 FM 3-05.60

primary wartime missions, subject to the limitations imposed on special

activities. Such activities are highly compartmentalized and centrally
managed and controlled. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) and the
nature of the special activities determine ARSOA’s involvement.

TACTICAL APPLICATION
2-86. ARSOA tactics focus on surprise, mass, maneuver, and simplicity.
Mission execution should be during the hours of darkness, as risks increase
during daylight operations. Low-level terrain flight altitudes during low-
ambient light or limited visibility provide the element of surprise. Training in
night formation flight and precision navigation enables the massing of
combat power at the precise time and place. The use of indirect routes
exploits the increased range capability of the aircraft and is a measure to
avoid known enemy locations or indigenous personnel. This capability allows
ARSOA to maneuver over the battlespace. Simplicity is only possible because
of the equipment employed by ARSOA. All ARSOA aircraft are capable of
precision navigation, long-range secure communications, long-range flight
performance, and increased weapons lethality.

EVASION AND RECOVERY

2-87. E&R includes the full spectrum of coordinated actions by evaders,
recovery forces, and operational recovery planners to effect the successful
return to friendly control of personnel isolated in hostile territory.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for
developing joint E&R TTP; publications; equipment; and specialized E&R
aids and tools. They also provide functional survival and E&R training
expertise to the Services and combatant commanders. USSOCOM is
responsible for performing individual training of potentially isolated
personnel and for developing and procuring equipment. Combatant
commanders develop plans and requirements to locate, support, recover, and
repatriate isolated personnel.
2-88. The Joint Operations Center (JOC) coordinates and synchronizes the
overall E&R plan. The JSOTF headquarters (HQ) coordinates directly with
the JOC. The ARSOA operations and training officer (S3) coordinates the
planning process and makes sure the controlling command plan incorporates
the requirements of the air element. The role of the ARSOA intelligence and
training officer (S2) is to acquire the necessary publications and products to
support the E&R plan.
2-89. The E&R plan must be simple, well coordinated, and disseminated as
early as possible in the planning process. Simplicity will make the plan easy
to memorize and execute during periods of mission urgency. Early
dissemination allows all personnel to study the plan, memorize it, and
anticipate the actions of others. A critical piece to the E&R plan is the evasion

2-19
FM 3-05.60

plan of action (EPA). As a minimum, the EPA should contain the following
information:

• Identification of each crew or team member (name and rank), the

mission number, the aircraft or team call sign or identifier, the crew or
team position, the type of aircraft, and the call sign suffix.
• Planned route of flight for both ingress and egress, including in-flight
emergency plans for each phase of the mission.
• Immediate evasion actions and intentions for the first 48 hours, if
uninjured. For example—
ΠHide near aircraft or parachute landing site or area of separation
from team.
ΠEvade alone or link up with crew or team (rally points).
ΠDetermine travel plans (distance, duration or time, speed, and
other details).
ΠDetermine intended actions or length of stay at initial hiding
location.
ΠIdentify person in charge on the ground.
ΠDetermine plan for handling sensitive items.
• Immediate evasion actions or intentions if crew or team members are
injured. The plan should include hiding intentions, evasion intentions,
travel intentions, and intended actions at hiding locations.
• Extended evasion actions or intentions after 48 hours. Include
destination (selected area for evasion [SAFE], mountain range, coast,
border, forward edge of the battle area [FEBA]); travel routes, plans,
and techniques; actions or intentions at potential contact or recovery
locations; and recovery or contact point signals, signs, or procedures.
2-90. Appropriate support personnel should complete the following
information and attach it to the EPA:
• Color or letter of the day, month, or quarter; base time; base heading;
base altitude; base number; code word; and other similar information,
as applicable.
• Available communications and signaling devices; type and quantity of
radios; quantity of batteries; and type and quantity of flares, beacons,
mirrors, strobe lights, and other items.
• Primary communication schedule, procedures, and frequencies (first 48
hours and after 48 hours).
• Backup communication schedule, procedures, and frequencies.

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

2-91. CSAR is a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the
recovery of distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations.
Each Service and USSOCOM is responsible for performing CSAR in support
of its own operations. JFCs have primary authority and responsibility for

2-20
 FM 3-05.60

CSAR in support of U.S. forces within their areas of responsibility (AORs).

Additionally, the JFC should establish a JSRC to—
• Monitor recovery efforts.
• Plan, coordinate, and execute joint SAR and CSAR operations.
• Integrate CSAR operations with other evasion, escape, and recovery
operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force.
2-92. Component commanders should establish a rescue coordination center
(RCC) to coordinate all component CSAR activities, including coordination
with the JSRC and other component RCCs as appropriate. If a component
commander does not establish an RCC, those CSAR activities and
responsibilities normally assigned to the RCC should be under another
component staff organization, normally the operations section. For example,
the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) normally
designates each SOF component to carry out these responsibilities.
2-93. Component commanders should make sure all subordinate units
properly prepare and maintain isolated personnel reports (ISOPREPs),
including fingerprinting, for personnel whose duties may place them in
danger of isolation. Department of Defense (DD) Form 1833 should be the
primary means of authenticating isolated personnel. Component RCCs
should make sure ISOPREPs are readily available to the JSRC or other
higher authority upon request.
2-94. The ARSOA does not normally dedicate aircraft to perform CSAR.
During mission planning, planners develop an internal CSAR plan. During
mission execution, SOA provides aircraft to perform internal CSAR as
required.
2-95. When SOA performs CSAR for a high priority evader, mission planners
develop a mission similar to a DA mission, complete with rehearsal. When
time does not allow for the ARSOA military decision-making process
(MDMP), ARSOA mission planners use the crisis-action planning process.
2-96. On rare occasions, SOA must provide aircraft for the JSRC because it
is the only asset in the theater that can perform the mission. CSAR is not a
primary mission of SOA.

MARITIME OPERATIONS
2-97. ARSOA is inherently capable of providing viable maritime operations
in a joint or unilateral environment. The U.S. Navy Service Component staff
for maritime operations is thoroughly familiar with aviation procedures and
coordination requirements. Elements of ARSOA are proficient in maritime
operations. Aircraft, systems, and equipment comply with the current
materiel requirements of joint procedures and regulations. ARSOA can
perform assault missions with internal and external loads to support land or
water-surface operations.

2-21
 Chapter 3

ARSOA Mission Planning Process

If officers desire to have control over their command, they must remain
habitually with them, industriously attend to their instruction and
comfort, and in battle lead them well.
Stonewall Jackson
Winchester, Virginia, 1861

The first step in defining the ARSOA mission planning process is to

identify the C2 structure. ARSOA operates under varied C2
relationships. Operating under varied relationships requires a clear,
responsive, unified, and well-defined C2 structure. The command
structure enhances mission response time and OPSEC to avoid excessive
C2 layering. The relationship must—
• Provide a clear, unambiguous chain of command.
• Provide staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support the
operations.
• Ensure ARSOA personnel participate during the entire planning process.
Personnel conducting the mission must be thoroughly familiar with all
operational and support requirements to match the capabilities of the
employed force.

ARSOA PARTICIPATION DURING THE ENTIRE PLANNING PROCESS

3-1. C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by the designated commander
assigned the forces to accomplish the mission. Figure 3-1, page 3-2, shows a
typical C2 structure. ARSOA normally interacts with the JSOTF, the joint
special operations air component (JSOAC), the special operations liaison
element (SOLE), and the Army and Navy ground force elements.

JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMANDER

3-2. The JFSOCC normally delegates C2 of ARSOA to the JSOACC or gives
operational control (OPCON) to the SOF ground commander. The JSOTF
commander is the theater JFSOCC. In stability operations and support
operations, the JSOTF commander reports directly to the geographic combatant
commander. In war, he reports directly to the joint task force (JTF)
commander. The JSOTF commander is the principal SO advisor in theater. All
SOF normally fall under his control. The JSOTF commander may organize the
JSOTF HQ as necessary to carry out all assigned duties and responsibilities.
The commander may retain command of the ARSOA task force on an equal
level with the conventional force commanders.

3-1
FM 3-05.60

Figure 3-1. Command and Control Structure

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER

3-3. The JSOTF commander may designate a subordinate commander as a
JSOACC to coordinate the efforts of assigned aviation assets (Figure 3-2,
page 3-3). If more than one aviation unit or Service is present, a JSOACC
unifies the C2 of aviation assets under a single air manager. The JSOACC
provides the command the most efficient use of aviation assets to mission
requirements. The responsibilities of a JSOACC in a JSOTF are the same as
the responsibilities he has working for a JFSOCC. The JSOACC is typically
the SOC Service commander who has the preponderance of the aviation
forces or is the most capable of conducting, commanding, and controlling
operations within a given environment. The JSOACC is the single
spokesperson for all SOF aviation. He is responsible for planning and
executing joint air operations and for deconflicting and coordinating SOA
with conventional air operations by direct coordination with the joint force air
component commander (JFACC). The JSOAC works closely with the SOLE to
ensure the receipt and disposition of all requirements sent to the JFACC. The
JSOACC apportions ARSOA to SOF missions as required to support JFSOCC
missions. The apportionment and use of assets are more efficient in
supporting missions, and they reduce mission conflicts due to competing
demands. ARSOA normally works closely with the JSOAC intelligence
directorate (J2) and the JSOAC operations directorate (J3) but may also
have requirements for manning the JSOAC based on METT-TC for a
particular theater.

3-2
 FM 3-05.60

Figure 3-2. Typical JSOACC Command Relationships

SPECIAL OPERATIONS LIAISON ELEMENT

3-4. The SOLE team (Figure 3-3, page 3-4) provides SOF liaison to the
JFACC and reports directly to the JSOTF. The SOLE is a joint SOF
organization that includes SOF aircrews, intelligence, airspace, logistics,
special tactics teams (combat control and pararescue teams), Army SF, and
Navy sea-air-land (SEAL) teams. It ensures that all SOF targets, teams, and
air missions are deconflicted, properly integrated, and coordinated at all
planning and execution phases. Specific functions include air tasking order
(ATO) and airspace control order (ACO) development, real-time mission
support within the JFACC, operations and intelligence support for targeting,
combat airspace control for prevention of fratricide, coordination with special
plans and functions, and coordination with the JSRC. The SOLE coordinates
and synchronizes SOF air and surface operations with conventional air
operations. The SOLE must consider airborne fire support and
reconnaissance C2 aircraft, aerial refueling, and deconfliction of deep
battlefield operations. The SOLE also assists the JFACC in deconfliction of
the joint special operations area (JSOA). ARSOA primarily interacts with the
SOLE through the JSOAC, which ensures that ARSOA operations are
deconflicted and supported with unconventional assets as required.

3-3
FM 3-05.60

Figure 3-3. Typical SOLE Organization

MISSION PLANNING
3-5. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, explains the Army
MDMP in depth. The MDMP is the foundation for planning in a time-
constrained environment. The products created during the full MDMP are for
use during subsequent planning sessions when time may be unavailable for
thorough planning and existing METT-TC factors are substantially
unchanged. The desired outcome of an effective mission planning process is
the synchronization of total combat power in the battlespace.

PROCESS
3-6. The JSOTF uses the 96-hour special operations mission planning
process (Figure 3-4, page 3-5). This process complements the C2 structure.
The 96-hour time line is a base time line for mission support, but METT-TC
can increase or reduce the time line as required. The time line generates from
the earliest anticipated launch time (EALT), which is the JFSOCC’s best
estimate for mission execution. The JSOAC must keep the JSOTF informed
of ARSOA’s asset availability, as limited aviation platforms may affect
JSOTF’s operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and hinder mission execution. The
JFSOCC sends the tasking order to the joint air operations center (JAOC)
and simultaneously to the ground force element and ARSOA 96 hours before
the EALT.
3-7. ARSOA begins mission planning based on the EALT but determines the
actual launch time to meet the time-on-target after METT-TC analysis. An
important aviation link in this process is airspace coordination handled by
the JSOACC and the JFACC through the SOLE. The JSOACC, the single air
manager for SOF aviation, deconflicts JSOTF fixed-wing and rotary-wing
missions. The JFACC, located at the JFC or other assigned location,
deconflicts theater assets and produces allocation requests, ATOs, and ACOs
or other assigned duties.

3-4
 FM 3-05.60

Figure 3-4. The 96-Hour SO Mission-Planning Process

3-8. The 96-hour mission flow defines the JSOTF planning sequence and
provides limits and boundaries to the mission process. ARSOA integrates the
supported SOF ground commander’s plan into the mission planning process.
The ARSOA representative to this process is the aviation LNO attached to
the planning staff. The JFSOCC representation to the process is the SOLE.
The JFSOCC provides the SOLE to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SOF
air and surface operations with conventional air operations. ARSOA receives
the information copy of the tasking order (TASKORD) approximately the
same time as the planning staff receives the support request (SPTREQ).
ARSOA conducts parallel planning, allowing the LNO to receive initial
guidance from the aviation commander and to input those limitations and
constraints into the planning staff ’s COA development. LNO and SOLE
input at this stage is critical in ensuring the feasibility of aviation
survivability and support for the ground force commander’s COA. This early
input reduces planning time through elimination of impracticable aviation
COAs. The LNO participates in the war games with the planning staff to
determine decision points and abort criteria critical to mission success. The
SOLE ensures all support criteria for the mission are provided to the JFACC.
Throughout the entire process, the LNO and SOLE keep higher HQ and the
ARSOA operations officer informed of the mission’s direction and the CCIR
and intent.
3-9. The LNO participates in the operation order (OPORD) brief to the
supported ground force commander. (See Appendix C.) The ground force
commander coordinates with the LNO to brief the preliminary ground plan
and rehearsal plan. This first meeting with the ground force element is
usually 8 to 12 hours after the ground force commander’s mission brief.

3-5
FM 3-05.60

During this period, the ground force element conducts its mission planning
and completes a detailed aviation mission checklist. The checklist discusses
infiltration, exfiltration, contingencies, communications, and other
requirements.
3-10. The LNO takes the preliminary tactical plan, the rehearsal plan, and
the completed checklist to the aviation operations officer for analysis. The
LNO then disseminates the information to the air mission commander and
the flight leader. If the rehearsal is complicated, the flight leader takes that
responsibility from the LNO and conducts the rehearsal with the ground force
element to develop the plan. The next meeting is not later than the ground
force element’s back brief to the ground force commander. The flight leader
finalizes the tactical plan, the E&R plan, the communications plan, and any
other contingencies that may need adjustment after the rehearsals. The LNO
and flight leader disseminate threat and mission updates from the ground
force element until mission launch. The air mission commander (AMC), the
flight leader, and the ground force commander perform simulation to
examine the threat and to develop appropriate contingencies for flying given
routes, using special operations forces planning and rehearsal system
(SOFPARS). The planning and rehearsal information support (PARIS)
provides information to SOFPARS during rehearsal and simulation.
3-11. ARSOA performs a tailored MDMP that parallels the ground force
commander’s planning process. Several factors favor the MDMP. The primary
ARSOA mission is to nurture ARSOA’s relationship with the ground force
and to support the force with as many assets as the mission requires. This
type of support forces ARSOA to react and adjust to the ground commander’s
tactical plan, thus limiting the ARSOA COAs and planning time.
3-12. Throughout mission planning, SOA must remain flexible and
adaptable to the ground force commander’s intent. Without the ground plan,
ARSOA COAs are limited to asset availability, forward arming and refueling
point (FARP) capability, and scheme of maneuver. ARSOA can develop and
request suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and fire support through
the SOLE, but the ground force commander must integrate those requests
into the tactical plan. ARSOA war games the entire tactical plan and finalizes
full-mission profile rehearsals only after the ground force commander
approves the ground force element’s plan. SR and FID missions may not
require complex analysis and only static rehearsals (rock and contingency
drills), as these missions usually require only infiltration and exfiltration
operations. DA missions are, however, normally intricate operations that
require detailed war-gaming and flying rehearsals. Synchronizing the
planning, focusing the key players, conducting rehearsals, and performing
precombat checks and inspections are critical to the ARSOA mission-planning
process and to mission success.
3-13. Figures 3-5 through 3-7, pages 3-7 and 3-8, illustrate the sequence of
ARSOA mission planning, including the tasks performed by each mission
element. The mission-planning time line begins 106 hours before take-off and
progresses to mission take-off (H-hour).

3-6
 FM 3-05.60

Figure 3-5. Time-Line Phase, 106 Hours to 72 Hours

Figure 3-6. Time-Line Phase, 72 Hours to 48 Hours

3-7
FM 3-05.60

Figure 3-7. Time-Line Phase, 48 Hours to Take-Off (H-Hour)

REHEARSALS
3-14. The rehearsal is a major step in the ARSOA MDMP model. It allows all
soldiers to visualize the events and contingencies required for successful
accomplishment of the mission. Conducting the rehearsal presents two
significant challenges: time available and selection of the rehearsal
facilitator. ARSOA rehearsal must integrate into the supported ground force
commander’s MDMP sequence, as well as the overall mission plan. The
rehearsal facilitator must be intimately familiar with the plan and have
sufficient time to prepare adequately for the rehearsal. An LNO, a ground
force commander, an air mission commander, or an ARSOA full-mission-
qualified aviator may fill this role. The person chosen must understand the
plan and have the time to rehearse the mission properly. The rehearsal
serves several purposes:
• It allows the key players an opportunity to visualize the key events of
the plan and identified contingencies.
• It provides a forum for key players to analyze and make adjustments to
the plan.
• It reinforces and confirms the final version of the mission plan
discussed in the war game and briefed in the air mission brief.
3-15. When time permits, ARSOA executes a combined arms rehearsal, with
ground force representation. If a ground force representative is unavailable,
an ARSOA officer should serve as the ground force advocate in the rehearsal.
Based on the limited time normally available for rehearsals, ARSOA
normally uses the sketch map or terrain model technique or the rock drill.

3-8
 FM 3-05.60

The sketch or model replicates the terrain of the area of operations and
should reflect the route, objective, and key terrain necessary for the mission.
Detailed terrain models, sketches, or maps and diagrams of appropriate key
terrain may be used. The techniques chosen must ensure the air and ground
forces gain a better understanding of the plan while the force remains
postured to preserve combat power.
3-16. Planning and preparation are critical to the success of the rehearsal.
The essential elements of the preparation are the rehearsal plan, the script,
and ground rules. The disciplined execution of the mission plan ensures that
the rehearsal reflects the plan clearly, simply, directly, and completely.

Rehearsal Plan
3-17. Identification of major events to be rehearsed and the time available is
critical to the rehearsal plan. The facilitator must be familiar with key events
of the concept of the operation, scheme of maneuver, and contingencies to
build the rehearsal plan. The rehearsal plan should address the agenda, the
response sequence (who is talking), and actions checklist (friendly and
enemy), and the sequence of events. The amount of time available determines
the level of detail and resolution of the rehearsal. At a minimum, the actions
on the objective must be rehearsed. As the amount of time available
increases, other key events should be rehearsed. An ideal rehearsal includes
the full-mission profile, from start to finish, and all first-level contingencies.
Participants of the rehearsal are the AMC, all aircrews, and representatives
from each staff section. The AMC approves the key events for the rehearsal.

Script
3-18. The script provides structure, focus, and discipline to the rehearsal.
Mission walk-through should occur twice during the rehearsal. During the
first iteration, the walk-through should not include contingencies. The second
iteration includes all planned contingencies.

Ground Rules
3-19. The S2 briefs deployments of the enemy during each phase and
addresses the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs. The S2 makes
sure the plan is suitable and feasible against the enemy’s most dangerous
response. The ground force representative or LNO briefs the ground force
disposition and scheme of maneuver during the appropriate phase. The AMC
determines when the rehearsal meets the standards and is complete.

WAR GAME PROCESS

3-20. The scope of the ARSOA war game is more limited than the war game
of ground force counterparts, but it is no less important. As a supporting unit,
ARSOA assists the ground force commander in developing and analyzing his
COAs. ARSOA then fully develops the aviation concept of the COA selected
by the ground force commander.
3-21. The war game is a critical step in refining and developing the aviation
plan to support the ground force commander adequately. The ARSOA
challenge is to make the war game fit into the parallel planning process.

3-9
FM 3-05.60

ARSOA may need to conduct its own war game before the ground force
commander’s COA decision; however, the purpose of the ARSOA war game
process is to refine and develop the aviation concept of the ground force
commander’s COA fully. During the war game, the commander or AMC can
make decisions, assess risk, and provide guidance to keep the plan and
planning process focused. The process also allows the AMC, flight leaders,
and staff to—
• Visualize the plan from the same form of reference.
• Identify and discuss contingencies.
• Determine decision points and discuss preconditions and associated
CCIR necessary in making feasible, acceptable, and suitable decisions.
• Anticipate battlespace events.
• Synchronize the fight and necessary resources.
• Determine the C2 plan for each phase of the operation.
• Identify hazards, assess risk, and implement control measures.
• Refine the bump plan.

COMMUNICATIONS
3-22. ARSOA communications must support covert air-to-air and air-to-
ground aircraft communications for C2, mission deconfliction, and mission
support to SOF units. Figure 3-8 depicts the C2 networks necessary to
support the ARSOA C2 structure. The location of the JSOACC depends on
the command relationship between the supporting and supported units.

Figure 3-8. ARSOA C2 Communications Connectivity

3-10
 FM 3-05.60

3-23. ARSOA aircraft employ multiband satellite communications (SATCOM),

single-channel ultrahigh frequency (UHF) SATCOM, high-frequency (HF) burst
and data, and amplitude-modulated (AM) or frequency-modulated (FM) line
of sight radios that are interoperable with supported SOF units. ARSOA does
not have organic SATCOM assets—it requires augmentation. Figure 3-9
illustrates ARSOA command, control, communications, and computers (C4)
systems connectivity.

Figure 3-9. ARSOA C4 Systems Connectivity

3-11
 Chapter 4

Combat and Combat Support

The onus of supply rests equally on the giver and the taker.
General S. Patton, 1947

ARSOA requires CS from either SO or other capable units (theater,

Service, joint, or combined forces). This chapter discusses ARSOA CS
requirements, the use of other CS units, and CS request procedures.

FIRE SUPPORT
4-1. Fire support is often critical to mission success. The nature of the
ARSOA mission requires fire support to be timely and target critical. It must
not, however, prematurely reveal the objective of the mission; therefore,
emphasis is on OPSEC.
4-2. For ARSOA-supported missions, the supported unit originates most fire
support requests. The ARSOA commander requires the fire support request
and status to be included in SOA mission planning. The fire support
coordinator for the entire SO mission, including the ARSOA portion, is the
mission planning agent (MPA). Fire support requests go to the JSOTF or SOC
J3 as appropriate. When working for the joint force land component
commander (JFLCC), SOF coordinates with the land component commander’s
(LCC’s) G3 and fire support element (FSE) for fire and air support. When
they operate as a separate component, the commander, joint special
operations task force (COMJSOTF) obtains and deconflicts air and fire
support through the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) process.

FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS

4-3. Fire support assets may be available to ARSOA, including field artillery,
the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), naval surface fire support
(NSFS), and tactical air support.

Field Artillery
4-4. SOF have no organic field artillery. Field artillery units may have a
mission of direct support (DS) to SOF for an operation. These DS field
artillery units focus their positioning and fire planning to meet the needs of
the SOF. Field artillery units, with a mission of GS or GS reinforcing, may
provide fire support to SOF. These field artillery units support the force as a
whole and are generally not as responsive as DS units. Requests for field
artillery support go to the SOC through normal channels, down to the
supporting field artillery unit. The nature of ARSOA missions results in most
missions being flown beyond the range of friendly field artillery. This
extended range makes field artillery support most useful for covering ingress

4-1
FM 3-05.60

and egress and for local SEAD. The support may be solely for the ARSOA
mission, or it may be a combined effort with other fire missions. It may also
be a diversion to preserve the clandestine characteristics of the ARSOA
mission.

Army Tactical Missile System

4-5. With a range of 165 kilometers, the ATACMS is the best ground-
launched fire support system for ARSOA deep missions. Because ARSOA
normally operates deep in enemy territory, ATACMS is a viable support asset
if it is both in theater and available to SOF. Limited assets and control at
corps level, however, dictate the need for early, detailed support requests
to ensure—
• Allocation of munitions.
• Designation of launchers.
• Identification of request procedures.
• Establishment of sensor-to-shooter relationships.

Naval Surface Fire Support

4-6. When operations occur near a coastline, NSFS to ARSOA is the same as
field artillery support. Like field artillery, the request for NSFS is at the joint
level through the SOC J3. Coordination and use of NSFS are similar to field
artillery and tactical air (TACAIR).

Tactical Air Support

4-7. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps can provide TACAIR support.
TACAIR has the range and firepower to support ARSOA missions anywhere
in the theater. Requests for TACAIR support go through command channels
to the JFACC. The JFACC makes sure the air component commander (ACC)
satisfies all TACAIR requirements. The single-air-manager concept is a
proven concept, universal to all theaters. The JFACC provides effective
procedures, the organization, and the resources to manage aircraft in the
theater. The SOC, JSOACC, or SOLE coordinates requests for TACAIR with
the JFACC. If the JFACC cannot support the SOC because of higher priority
requests and the SOC views its needs as critical, the commander, joint task
force (CJTF), through the JTCB (if established), reviews and establishes
priorities. TACAIR, when available, can support SEAD, interdiction, or CAS.
Planning for TACAIR includes detailed timing and definition of either the
target or the mission requirements. Requests for preplanned missions should
occur 72 hours in advance for inclusion in the ATO process. Exact target
coordinates, however, are unnecessary until immediately before the
launching of the mission. If precision-guided munitions are the best ordnance
for ARSOA support requirements, they should be a part of the initial request.
Comments should also include whether the target designation is by TACAIR,
ARSOA, other SOF, or other agencies. The controlling agency normally
approves requests for immediate support if aircraft is available with the
appropriate ordnance.
4-8. U.S. Army aviation can provide additional aerial fire support to ARSOA
beyond its own capabilities. Early aviation liaison with representatives from

4-2
 FM 3-05.60

supporting attack helicopter or air cavalry elements is necessary to enhance

the understanding of ARSOA missions and tactics, to ensure the transfer of
vital information, and to enhance mutual trust.
4-9. U.S. Army aviation support to ARSOA may include aerial
demonstrations, feints, or raids. Demonstrations and feints may divert the
enemy’s attention while ARSOA penetrates the forward line of own troops
(FLOT) at another location and upon return from the mission. Raids may
require massed aerial fire support to ARSOA when dictated by mission
requirements. Examples of external aerial fire support missions and
targeting include neutralization or destruction of reaction forces in the
vicinity of the objective or target, C3I and air defense artillery (ADA)
facilities and installations, and vehicle targets.

AIR INTERDICTION
4-10. Air interdiction operations are conducted to destroy, neutralize, or
delay the enemy’s military potential, thereby reducing the need for detailed
integration of fire and movement of friendly forces. Close coordination with
the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) and the tactical air control
system (TACS) is necessary to emphasize the nature and need of any SO
request for TACAIR. The JTCB and the TACS obtain and deconflict air and
fire support through the JTF’s established targeting process. If interdiction
taskings affect ARSOA missions or requests, the JTCB must be aware of
these taskings to prevent fratricide. Deconfliction of air interdiction
operations is performed through the JSOACC to the JFACC directly or
through the SOLE. If provided, the SOLE is the COMJSOTF’s primary link
to the JFACC’s targeting cell.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

4-11. CAS includes air action by fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft against
hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces. It requires detailed
integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.
CAS can be a preplanned effort or an immediate action. Although exact
targets and coordinates are unnecessary, requests for preplanned CAS should
occur 72 hours in advance. On-call CAS tasks aircraft to support a specific
operation within a defined period with requested ordnance. The request
normally does not specify the exact target location. If an immediate need for
TACAIR becomes apparent, a call to a controlling agency—such as the air
support operations center (ASOC), the airborne battlefield command and
control center (ABCCC), or the Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS)—normally determines if TACAIR assets are available. The agency
may immediately divert assets to support ARSOA requirements. When
TACAIR is diverted for immediate CAS, the requester must control the
aircraft in the target area.

RECONNAISSANCE
4-12. Immediate reconnaissance is normally unavailable. The procedures for
requesting the support, however, are the same as those for CAS.

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FM 3-05.60

SEAD AND JOINT SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES

4-13. SEAD and joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) may be
necessary to penetrate and exit enemy territory during the conduct of ARSOA
missions. Careful planning by both is necessary to prevent disclosure of the
targeted areas. Enemy reaction usually occurs to increased activity in
operational areas. Ideally, SEAD support for other operations or with other
activities should be the primary method of support for ARSOA. J-SEAD and
SEAD activities can also distract enemy defenses from the actual planned
routes or sequence of ARSOA operations.

PLANNING
4-14. Like TACAIR, requests for SEAD go through the theater JFACC.
SEAD planning occurs at the JAOC level. All requests for SEAD support
should go to the JAOC. Although local SEAD often supports high-priority
missions, SEAD planning is normally on a theater or area basis rather than a
single-mission basis. Tasking SEAD assets to fill the ARSOA SEAD requests
is, therefore, normally a part of a comprehensive GS package. To compete for
scarce assets, SEAD requirements must be on time within the theater’s
ATO cycle.

COORDINATION
4-15. SEAD is temporary. It does not have long-term effects unless it is part
of a major extended SEAD operation. Although dedicated SEAD support for
some ARSOA missions may be necessary, the timing of SEAD must take
advantage of the initial impact yet not jeopardize the ARSOA mission. The
SEAD request must specifically state the greatest need for SEAD, including
where and when. Normally, full coverage of an operation is impossible
because of limited, dedicated SEAD assets. SEAD support may also be split,
such as between TACAIR and artillery, and be for different areas or targets
or at a different time.

ASSETS AND TECHNIQUES

4-16. SEAD may be by fires or electronic means and by airborne or surface-
based systems. For example, artillery can silence some defenses, and airborne
jammers can degrade acquisition systems. Combining these assets increases
the total effect of SEAD support. Normally, SEAD is part of an overall
operation, which includes other TACAIR and ground activities. SEAD
support may not be obvious unless the supported unit knows that SEAD is
taking place. Limited numbers of lethal and nonlethal SEAD systems may
restrict the availability of SEAD, particularly under quick-reaction
requirements. In general, operations should include the employment of SEAD
or J-SEAD on all known targets.

AIR DEFENSE
4-17. Although ARSOA does not have organic ADA assets, air defense may
be available from several sources. Elements of the divisional forward area air
defense (FAAD) battalions or the corps Patriot battalions may, for example,
provide air defense support. Depending on the theater, echelons-above-corps
(EAC) Patriot units may provide incidental ADA coverage as well. Because of

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 FM 3-05.60

its range, the Patriot provides coverage well beyond the FLOT and engages
hostile aircraft and missiles attempting to penetrate the forward area. Patriot
units can support corps and EAC units.
4-18. Without proper coordination and integration in the modern battlespace,
the potential exists for conflict between aviation and air defense operations.
ADA units must neutralize hostile aircraft and missiles in the same airspace
where friendly aviation units conduct operations. To coordinate each other’s
efforts, the units observe the following three control statuses of air defense
weapons:
• WEAPONS HOLD: Do not fire except in self-defense or in response to a
formal order.
• WEAPONS TIGHT: Engage aircraft only if positively identified as
hostile in accordance with (IAW) published hostile criteria.
• WEAPONS FREE: Engage aircraft if not positively identified as
friendly.
4-19. To reduce the risk of fratricide, units must coordinate with the area air
defense commander (AADC) for routes through borders, FLOTs, or defense
zones before mission execution. Similarly, units must request any dedicated
air defense requirements or combat air patrol (CAP) over enemy territory
before mission execution. Like SEAD, CAP attracts the attention of the
enemy. To prevent compromising ARSOA activities, units must, therefore,
use CAP judiciously. CAP may serve as a barrier between enemy air bases
and the ARSOA mission or route area, as a moving CAP near the route or
task force, or as a sweep ahead of ARSOA aircraft. In any case, close
coordination with the supporting unit is an absolute necessity.

ATTACK HELICOPTERS
4-20. The accuracy and lethality of attack helicopters make them useful in
supporting egress or ingress operations. The limited availability of attack
helicopters (as a theater asset) and their versatility place them in great
demand. The ARSOA commander must, therefore, state his intent, submit
early requests, plan for the use of these helicopters, and specify the desired
mission results. Staging the ARSOA mission from the same base as the
attack helicopters allows face-to-face briefings, which in turn improve mission
coordination. Staging from the same base also reduces the operational
visibility of ARSOA operations.

INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

4-21. To operate deep within enemy territory successfully, ARSOA units
must avoid enemy detection. They must give particular attention to avoiding
enemy acquisition systems. Current intelligence on the location, status, and
operating modes and frequencies of enemy acquisition and tracking systems
is essential. ARSOA uses intelligence information to plan routes and to
determine the needs and settings of aircraft survivability equipment (ASE). It
also uses the information to determine the type of non-SO support it requires.
ARSOA mission planners use combat information and intelligence to plot
infiltration and exfiltration routes and to recommend LZs. ARSOA has access

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FM 3-05.60

to Air Force special operations weather teams (SOWTs) to support battalion

and task force deployments.
4-22. The SOC J2 is the primary agency for tasking and disseminating
intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) information to support ARSOA. The
MPA is the main focus for requesting and disseminating mission-specific
information requirements (IRs). The supported unit, such as an SF
detachment, usually coordinates IRs for the mission and passes them to the
MPA, who forwards them to the SOC J2. The SOC J2 then sends the ARSOA-
specific IRs to the JSOACC. The JSOACC J2 then determines if SO, Army, or
Air Force intelligence sources can best fill the need. Cross-coordination of IRs
at all times and levels during mission planning is necessary to prevent the
duplication of IRs and to ensure the availability of essential intelligence to
the planners.
4-23. The SO IEW system is the Special Operations Command, Research,
Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES). ARSOA has no
connection to any other intelligence net, and current table of organization
and equipment (TOE) limitations do not allow ARSOA task forces to deploy a
SOCRATES. ARSOA, therefore, must rely on either SF-, ARSOF-, or AFSOF-
deployed SOCRATES for access to intelligence products and reports.
Collocating the ARSOA task force with the Special Forces group (SFG),
AFSOF, or JSOACC, allows access to a SOCRATES and to the intelligence
data needed for mission planning. ARSOA units should automatically submit
their standing IRs to the JSOACC or the JSOC J2 for early resolution.

INTELLIGENCE
4-24. Although ARSOA units gather certain operational intelligence as part
of their overall mission, they have no dedicated organic intelligence-gathering
capability. The ARSOA task force S2 does not process intelligence—it is a
forwarding office only. The lack of any deployable connection to an operations
and intelligence net also reduces the ability to enter mission debriefings into
the intelligence nets.
4-25. Route selection partially depends on known enemy air defense
locations. A target information broadcast system or another system collects
this information. The detect-and-destroy radius of known enemy positions
allows the system to select routes that avoid these positions. Normally, these
systems are unavailable at the Air Force special operations component
(AFSOC); however, access to them is necessary during the planning phase.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE
4-26. ARSOA relies upon a combination of organic ASE and CS systems to
defeat enemy ground and air defenses. Ideally, SEAD and other activities,
such as ground and airborne jammer support, decrease the need for ARSOA
to use active ASE. The use of organic equipment to defeat enemy tracking
systems and missiles is, however, necessary. Coordination with supporting
units and intelligence agencies provides the data necessary for mission
planning. ARSOA planners should tailor route selection, ASE settings and
equipment, and tactics to the expected threats.

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 FM 3-05.60

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
4-27. ARSOA has no organic deployable counterintelligence (CI) assets.
SOC, JSOTF, or another appropriate higher echelon must accomplish
coordination and support for ARSOA CI needs.

WEATHER SUPPORT
4-28. ARSOA has an Air Force weather team assigned that supports
battalion task force deployments. The support permits face-to-face weather
briefings for flight crews. It also gives the flight crews access to Air Weather
Service products. If the weather team is not in place, ARSOA task forces
normally receive weather support from AFSOF, SOC, or a SOWT attached to
an SFG. ARSOA requires light data, sea condition data, and weather
forecasts from deep within enemy territory up to 72 hours before mission
execution. Accurate and current weather forecasting, including satellite
weather forecasting products and interpretation, is necessary for mission
planning to support route selection, equipment requirements, fuel needs, and
combat support.

EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT

4-29. ARSOA task forces have no deployable switchboard or mobile
subscriber equipment. They require additional state-of-the-art HF equipment
and peripherals to integrate with theater C2 nets. They normally receive
message traffic through a collocated unit, another supporting unit, or radio
facsimile. Full communications with other theater and service HQ require
support from either a signal battalion, an SFG, a Joint Communications
Support Element (JCSE), a SOC, a JSOTF, or other units.

ENGINEER SUPPORT
4-30. Corps and division engineer units may support ARSOA. When
available, engineer units conduct a variety of missions to support ARSOA.

MOBILITY
4-31. Engineer reconnaissance teams may assist in reconnaissance missions
to locate possible sites for FARPs, LZs, or forward operational bases (FOBs).
Engineers provide current mine threat overlays that may impact on ground
operations. They clear obstacles and possible booby traps.

COUNTERMOBILITY
4-32. Engineers support countermobility by providing hasty protective row
minefield training and by installing obstacles to disrupt, turn, fix, and block
enemy forces.

SURVIVABILITY
4-33. Engineers construct berms and trenches to protect holding areas and
FARPs. They help construct wire obstacles around the perimeter. They also
help in training camouflage techniques.

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FM 3-05.60

GENERAL ENGINEERING
4-34. Engineers perform tasks to ensure the continuous supply of CS and
CSS assets forward, including replacement of tactical bridges, support
facilities, and area damage control. Tasks also include constructing,
maintaining, and repairing combat roads and trails, main supply routes, and
lines of communication.

TOPOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING
4-35. Engineers provide terrain data in support of air and ground
operations. Terrain data help identify possible air corridors, FARP
operations, potential LZs and PZs, and terrain that can mask movement.

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL SUPPORT

4-36. ARSOA has no organic capability to provide thorough
decontamination. It can, however, conduct limited, hasty decontamination.
The greatest nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) threat is crossing the
FLOT, the location of the highest concentration of troops. The MPA must be
very mindful of known or suspected NBC-contaminated areas and must avoid
them. ARSOA must coordinate with the corps NBC decontamination element
upon exposure of ARSOA aircraft to NBC agents.

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 Chapter 5

ARSOA Logistics Support

I don’t know what . . . this logistics is that Marshall is always talking
about, but I want some of it.
Fleet Admiral E.J. King, 1942

The U.S. Army strategy for conducting land warfare has changed from
AirLand Operations to force projection. Most ARSOF units are in the
continental United States (CONUS) and have always operated in a force-
projection mode. USASOC has aligned its ARSOF sustainment
organizations and activities with the U.S. Army’s concept of force
projection. This change allows ARSOF to integrate organic CS and CSS
elements within the theater Army support structure for continuous,
responsive sustainment to deployed ARSOF.

ARSOF LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT

5-1. The type of operation, deployment sequence, unit basing, and AOR
shape the logistics environment for ARSOF. A common problem throughout
the logistics environment is the integration and distribution of logistics to
committed ARSOF.
5-2. A robust sustainment system that builds up over time into a mature
logistics infrastructure characterizes a protracted MTW. When the theater
support system is in place, it can meet most ARSOA requirements, except
dedicated DS or GS that ARSOF CS or CSS elements must provide.
5-3. ARSOA logistics planners must concentrate on—
• Initial entry. They must determine the type of sustainment required,
the number of days of accompanying supplies based on the time-phased
force and deployment data (TPFDD), and the ARSOA basing needs.
• Buildup and integration. They must coordinate and integrate
ARSOA logistics with the theater support system before TPFDD
closure and as it continues to mature. In some cases, the theater
logistics infrastructure never achieves full maturity.
• Redeployment. As units start the redeployment phase, the Army
Service component command (ASCC) makes sure the remaining
support units (HN or contract) are able to meet stay-behind ARSOF
support requirements.
5-4. Each peacetime operation is unique and requires mission-specific
analysis that develops a tailored sustainment force. Joint, international, and
interagency activities add complexity to the sustainment system. ARSOF may
conduct peacetime operations outside a theater support system because of

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FM 3-05.60

geographic location. Preparation and submission of a statement of

requirements (SOR) during these types of operations not only enhance the
unit’s requirements determination process but also add a final review to the
theater operation plan (OPLAN).

PREPARATION MODES
5-5. Deliberate planning and crisis-action planning are the two methods of
planning for continued CS and CSS. In deliberate planning and preparation,
ARSOA can fully identify support requirements for OPLANs and concept
plans (CONPLANs) in a bare base SOR down to the user level. This way, the
ASCC coordinates in fulfilling requirements from the support structure in the
theater Army and prepares a support plan establishing and identifying
support relationships. In crisis-action planning and preparation, the
requirements the combatant commander anticipates dictate the amount of
responsiveness and improvisation for reactive, no-notice support and
sustainment. Upon notification of mission requirements, ARSOA units
submit another SOR, thus modifying logistics requirements that differ from
the bare base SOR and published theater support plan.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT COMMAND (SOSCOM)

5-6. The geographic combatant commander establishes the command
relationship involving ARSOF. Regardless of command relationships in
theater, the relationships do not affect support for ARSOA. The ASCC has
Title 10 U.S. Code responsibility to support and sustain all ARSOF unless the
commander designates otherwise. The theater combatant commander may
direct the ASCC or other Service component to support and sustain ARSOF
in common items and services. SOSCOM HQ provides C2 of its organic
elements and, when directed, deploys its CS and CSS battalions in DS of
deployed ARSOF. Figure 5-1, page 5-3, shows the organization of the
SOSCOM.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS THEATER SUPPORT ELEMENT (SOTSE)

5-7. The SOTSE is a staff planning, coordinating, and facilitating element. It
serves as the bridge between ARSOF and the operational and tactical
logistics levels to make sure the tactical commander has all the necessary
resources to accomplish the mission. Each ASCC commander has a SOTSE
embedded within the staff. As a part of the ASCC staff, the SOTSE plays a
key role in identifying support requirements.
5-8. A critical source of information the ASCC needs in its coordination and
facilitation functions is the SOR from the ARSOF units. The ARSOA,
regiment logistics (S4), and other logistics staffs must be proactive and be a
part of the mission-planning process. The logistics planners must anticipate
operational unit requirements at all stages of the mission. Ideally, the
regiment S4 uses the ASCC OPLAN in preparing his CONPLAN for inclusion
in the mission order. This approach allows theater support elements time to
review required support before the ARSOA mission unit submits its mission-
tailored SOR. This review is especially critical in crisis-action planning and
short-notice mission changes. Appendix D provides the format of an aviation-
specific SOR.

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 FM 3-05.60

Figure 5-1. Special Operations Support Command Organization

STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FLOW

5-9. The SOR is a living document that requires periodic reevaluation and
updating as requirements change. Determination of requirements begins
with the receipt of the mission. Figure 5-2, page 5-4, depicts the SOR flow.
Time and accuracy are critical factors. The intent of the SOR process is to
make sure each ARSOF unit or task force submits a comprehensive, valid
SOR early in the planning cycle. The unit or task force coordinates through
its higher HQ operations and logistics staff to provide the USASOC Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) an initial list of
requirements. The USASOC DCSOPS tasks the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics (DCSLOG) to source all requirements.

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FM 3-05.60

Figure 5-2. ARSOF Statement of Requirements Flow

5-10. When an ARSOA unit receives a mission, it updates the standing SOR
developed during the deliberate-planning process. The ARSOA commander
uses this SOR to cross-level supplies necessary at the assigned mission unit
level. The SOR identifies and consolidates in priority all unit requirements
that exceed organic capabilities. The mission unit forwards the SOR to the
next higher organization.
5-11. At the next higher level, the SOR begins the process into the
operational channels, through the S3 or operations staff officer (G3). The
operations and logistics sections review the SOR and direct or assist cross-
leveling and transfer of necessary items in the most expeditious way possible.
The staff level then forwards the SOR to the next higher level for any
supplies and services remaining on the SOR. This staff level forwards an SOR
through the process again, requesting only the supplies and services not
previously obtained. At the next level, USASOC coordinates with DA HQ,
Army Materiel Command (subordinate commands), other agencies, and major
commands to source all requirements.
5-12. To complete the SOR process, USASOC forwards unsatisfied support
requirements (two copies of the SOR—one to the SOC and the other to the

5-4
 FM 3-05.60

ASCC for information pending validation) to the SOC for validation. The SOC
coordinates with the ASCC for the necessary supplies and services.
5-13. The theater ASCC then tasks the assigned units the sustainment
mission. After all the units specify their efforts to satisfy all support
requirements identified in the SOR, the ASCC publishes a support plan
providing the details of the support. If the ASCC cannot sustain the ARSOA
mission or a sister Service can better sustain it, the theater ASCC forwards
the SOR to the theater CINC for assistance.
5-14. The SOR flow is not an exact procedure. More than one level may be
working the sustainment issues at the same time. ARSOA develops an SOR
for all theater contingency plans. The ASCC staff looks at the key issues and
coordinates them before submitting the revised SOR.

ARSOA LOGISTICS SUPPORT EXECUTION

5-15. Conventional CSS organizations and procedures are adequate for
ARSOA requirements. Standard procedures are in place to handle the few
ARSOA-peculiar requirements. The ASCC is responsible for reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and follow-on support
and sustainment of in-theater Army forces, including ARSOA. The ASCC is
responsible for intermediate staging bases. ARSOA have some key differences
that impact on the type of support required for RSOI and sustainment. The
following conditions occur often enough that they must receive special
consideration during logistics planning:
• Forward-deployed ARSOA units are usually in isolated and austere
locations. Distribution is the key consideration.
• Some special equipment exists; however, most equipment is Army
common, and organic ARSOA assets can maintain it.

RESPONSIBILITIES
5-16. Responsibilities for planning and executing theater support do not
align with the levels of war or with the HQ normally associated with them.
The ASCC provides the necessary capability for the Army forces assigned to a
unified command.
5-17. The theater SOC tasks missions to ARSOF. The theater SOC works
closely with the unified command staff and the theater ASCC to articulate
the ARSOF requirements. The theater CINC establishes priorities and
allocates the available resources to ARSOF to accomplish each mission. The
ASCC develops the theater support plan, which includes sustainment of
ARSOA by the theater logistics organizations. The theater SOC then
monitors in-theater ARSOA sustainment.
5-18. The SOC and ARSOA logisticians coordinate with the ASCC to develop
plans and subsequent orders or to implement directives the ASCC issues to
support the ARSOF assigned to the unified command. The SOC advises the
ASCC commander on the appropriate command and support relationships for
each ARSOF mission. The SOTSE keeps SOSCOM informed of the status of
ASCC supporting plans.

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FM 3-05.60

5-19. The geographic combatant commander supports ARSOF in his AOR.

The ARSOA logistics planners identify the support requirements in the
planning phase. The ASCC must also identify the logistics shortfalls for
inclusion in the CINC’s risk assessment in his AOR. If the ASCC cannot
support ARSOF, the ASCC must raise the shortfall to the supported CINC
for resolution.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-20. Planners must address the following considerations:
• Maximizing the use of existing facilities.
• Limiting CSS requirements to mission essentials.
• Concentrating maintenance on returning major end items to service.
• Relying on air lines of communications (ALOC) for rapid resupply.
• Anticipating high attrition during resupply missions into denied areas.
• Identifying to the ASCC as early as possible those items that require
operational floats or other special logistics arrangements.
• Making maximum use of HN support, including local and third country
resources.
• Coordinating basing requirements for surveillance and security force
support during combat operations.
5-21. The collocation of ARSOA assets with other SOF reduces distribution
problems and facilitates use of the airlift. ARSOA organic support capabilities
and limitations include—
• Class I. The ARSOA task force deploys with a basic load of meals,
ready to eat (MREs) for initial sustainment. They have no organic food
service or water storage capability.
• Class II. ARSOA deploys with a basic load of administrative supplies
for initial sustainment. It has limited document management
resources, such as computers, copiers, and shredders.
• Class III. ASCC pipeline support, joint assets, or in-country sources
provide bulk fuel to ARSOA in theater. During sustained operations,
heavy expanded mobile tactical truck (HEMTT) fuelers deploy if airlift
or sealift is available from the ASCC to provide fuel support at the
intermediate staging base (ISB) or forward staging base (FSB). They
can establish limited FARPs as well. ARSOA can deploy the equipment
by airborne or airland methods to establish 500-gallon blivet FARPs,
usually in support of a tactical operation. They do not have the
capability to conduct long-term sustainment operations without bulk
resupply from theater assets. Theater assets must deliver bulk
resupply, as ARSOA does not have the organic capability to transport
large quantities of fuel. Because of the high OPTEMPO of ARSOA, the
fuel requirement is higher than it is for a similarly sized conventional
force. Additionally, the fuel must be tested and certified for use with
aviation assets. ARSOA deploys with a basic load of Class III-packaged
petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) for initial sustainment. ARSOA

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 FM 3-05.60

requires aerial refueling support for missions when appropriate. The

SOR must identify the requirements.
• Class IV. Identification of barrier or construction materiel occurs,
based on mission requirements in the SOR. Because of the limited
space on United States Army Reserve (USAR) strategic airlift allocated
for deployment, coordination must occur for pre-positioning and HN
support.
• Class V. ARSOA deploys with a basic load of common and ARSOA-
specific ammunition. Planners schedule airlift and configure resupply
and follow-on ammunition packages for delivery based on the mission.
The ASCC or JTF coordinates ammunition resupply from available
sources in theater. ARSOA logistics planners identify common Class V
requirements using the SOR. ARSOA has a limited capability to
transport or store large quantities of Class V and relies on theater
transportation and storage.
• Class VI. Units deploy with personal demand items for initial sustainment
(usually 15- to 30-day supply), when available. Health comfort packets
arrive in theater upon establishment of the logistics system.
• Class VII. ARSOA controls weapon systems and replacement aircraft from
based stations using the ARSOA’s limited operational readiness floats. The
deployed ARSOA task force requests airframes, weapons systems, and
aviation parts through the logistics directorate (J4), to CONUS logistical
channels. ARSOA S4s coordinate with appropriate activities and item
managers for immediate release of replacement systems.
• Class VIII. ARSOA flight surgeons develop their deployment load of
Class VIII based on METT-TC for initial sustainment. The task force
then integrates into the joint or theater health service support (HSS)
system for resupply and sustainment.
• Class IX. The ARSOA task force deploys with forward support
packages (FSPs). These packages include Class IX air and armament
parts and contractor logistics items. The regiment S4 directs the
deployment of FSPs, based on METT-TC and availability of ALOC for
initial sustainment and follow-on resupply. If ALOC are unavailable
after deployment for a brief period of time, the forward support section
coordinates with the regiment aviation maintenance office and directs
additional items to accompany the standard FSP.
• Class X. The SOTSE coordinates—through major Army command
(MACOM)—Class X supplies for CMO, based on METT-TC and not
covered in the other classes of supply. Coordination occurs with the
JTF or JSOTF battle staff.

FIELD SERVICES SUPPORT

5-22. ARSOA requires the following services for which the regiment has no
organic capability:
• Food service. The regiment has no food service capability. Because of
mission duration and times, the ARSOA task force requires rations
during 24-hour operations. ARSOA units must rely on the supported

5-7
FM 3-05.60

unit to provide food service. The SOR must identify food service
requirements.
• Laundry and shower. Based on duration of the operation, the
ARSOA task force may require laundry and shower services. When
developing SOR, logistics planners must compute and include water
requirements for these services into the total water requirements.
• Aircraft water requirements. ARSOA has additional water
requirements to wash ARSOA aircraft and flush engines to prevent
corrosion during operations in austere environments, such as the
desert or the ocean. Logistics planners must compute these water
requirements as well. Figure 5-3 lists the minimum water planning
requirements for each type of organic aircraft in remote operations.
This minimum water requirement is for manual washing of aircraft
and engine flushing on a daily basis. The SOR must identify these
water requirements.

Figure 5-3. Water Requirements for Aircraft Washing and Engine Flushing

• Billeting. ARSOA has no organic tentage. Logistics planners must

identify and procure tentage for the ARSOA task force operating in an
austere environment. When available, fixed, climate-controlled
billeting is optimal for flight management. The SOR must identify
billeting requirements.
• Rigging and airdrop. ARSOA has limited airdrop resupply and
equipment maintenance capability. It can, however, provide airborne
insertion of a FARP and C2 elements. The SOR must identify follow-on
airborne requirements. Coordination is through the ASCC or JTF.
• Aviation life support equipment (ALSE). The regiment S4 is
responsible for deploying ALSE personnel and equipment based on
METT-TC, mission profile, and duration of the mission. The ALSE
officer in charge ensures preinspections of personal equipment,
protective armor, climate kits, and mission-specific equipment. ALSE
specialists deploy with limited backup equipment to support the
deploying task force. Additionally, the ALSE section provides SAR
swimmers for over-water operations.
• Mortuary affairs. The ARSOA task force requests mortuary services
as required and coordinates requests through the JSOTF and the
ASCC.

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 FM 3-05.60

• Funding and finance support. The finance battalion in the area of

operations provides support for funding and finance service, or the
finance battalion supporting the ARSOA in garrison, as determined by
the task force commander, may provide the service. Funding and
finance support includes—
ΠProviding funds to agents.
ΠCoordinating resupply of funds in theater.
ΠCoordinating currency exchange with the appropriate embassy or
agency.
ΠPaying local vendors and contracts.

FORWARD ARMING AND REFUELING POINT OPERATIONS

5-23. ARSOA has an organic airborne forward arming and refueling section
that provides Class III B and V support for operational units. The airborne
forward arming and refueling section is capable of rigging for airdrop and
operating 12-, 16-, or 32-foot Type V platforms with FARP equipment. FARP
personnel also have the capability to operate small FARP operations using
internal systems in the MH-47 and MH-60 aircraft. Additionally, they can
conduct refueling operations using wet-wing, Bladder Bird (aerial bulk fuel-
delivery system [ABFDS]), sling load, and Z-bags.
5-24. Some of the common configurations of the FARP platforms are as follows:
• A 12-foot FARP platform.
Π500-gallon fuel blivet, 2 each (each filled to 432 gallons), 864
gallons.
Π250-gallons-per-minute (GPM) pump with filter separator, 1 each,
and 100 GPM pump, 1 each.
• A 12-foot FARP platform (Little Willie).
Π500-gallon fuel blivet, 1 each (filled to 432 gallons).
Π250-GPM pump with equipment, 1 each.
Π2.75 rocket, 56 each.
Π7.62-millimeter (mm) minigun, 12,000 rounds.
• A 16-foot FARP platform (defensive armed penetrator [DAP]).
Π500-gallon fuel blivet, 2 each, 864 gallons.
Π250-GPM pump with equipment, 1 each.
Π2.75 rocket, 76 each.
Π7.62-mm minigun, 12,000 rounds.
Π30-mm, 4,400 rounds.
• A 32-foot FARP platform (Big Willie).
Π500-gallon fuel blivet, 6 each, 2,592 gallons.
Π250-GPM pumps with equipment, 2 each.
Π2.75 rockets, 224 each.
Π7.62-mm minigun, 48,000 rounds.

5-9
FM 3-05.60

• Combat offload.
Π463L pallet.
Π500-gallon fuel blivet, 1 each, 432 gallons.
Π250-GPM pump with equipment, 1 each.
Π2.75 rocket, 56 each.
Π7.62-mm minigun, 12,000 rounds.
5-25. The C-130, C-141, C-17, and C-5 can airdrop the 12- and 16-foot FARP
platforms and 18 FARP personnel parachutists. The following aircraft can
airdrop the 32-foot FARP platforms:
• C-130 and MC-130 with no jumpers.
• C-141 with one platform and 18 FARP personnel parachutists or two
platforms and no jumpers.
• C-17 with one platform and 18 FARP personnel parachutists.
• C-5 with one or two platforms and 18 FARP personnel parachutists.

RESUPPLY PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPED

AND UNDEVELOPED THEATERS
5-26. The supporting ARSOA task force must coordinate with the supported
theater for logistics resupply. The supported ASCC has a SOTSE mandated
to coordinate logistics for ARSOA operating in theater. The SOTSE is a key
element in setting the logistical conditions for successful ARSOA. The ASCC
receives the validated SOR and reviews the document (usually during initial
and in-progress planning conferences) with the ARSOA units to determine
availability of support and services. The SOTSE planners coordinate with the
other key elements in the theater logistics structure, particularly the theater
support command, to support ARSOF.
5-27. The essential element of support to ARSOA is the establishment of
scheduled intertheater and intratheater airlift. Coordination of movement
from the home station to the theater is through USASOC, DCSOPS.
Coordination of movement within the theater is through the SOC, JTF, corps
movement control center (MCC) headquarters, with approval for C-130 use
coming from the CINC. This transportation support is the hub of logistics
support since many SOF-peculiar repair parts, test sets, and associated tools
are unavailable in theater supply systems. This airlift transports SOF-
peculiar items from origin to the aerial port of debarkation (APOD). If the
APOD is the destination airfield in the supported theater, the ARSOA unit (if
within range) picks up the repair parts, or scheduled intratheater
transportation delivers the parts to the destination airfield.
ARSOA UNIT OR BATTALION
5-28. The deploying ARSOA unit must accomplish the following essential
logistical tasks:
• Develop the SOR based on OPLANs and mission plans. Submit the
SOR through operational channels for validation by the SOC as early
as possible but not later than the suspense date.

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 FM 3-05.60

• Deploy with sufficient required basic loads. Schedule additional

supplies on later flights as priorities allow.
• Resource key personnel in the following locations to facilitate parts and
equipment collection and transfer:
ΠBattalion S4 representative and production control forward
(deployed).
ΠBattalion S4 and production control rear at Fort Campbell,
Kentucky, with access to unit technical supply sections able to
conduct lateral searches for required items needed forward. These
key personnel coordinate with the FSP manager (deployed) and the
supply support activity (SSA) at Fort Campbell.
• Provide regiment S4 representative in the regiment emergency
operations center (EOC) an information copy of requests (message
traffic, facsimile transmissions) from deployed assets or units
upon receipt.

REGIMENT HEADQUARTERS
5-29. Upon receipt of a mission or the notification of an impending mission,
the regiment HQ begins planning the operation or contingency. Upon
notification of authorization to deploy forces, the regiment HQ—
• Implements a 24-hour EOC.
• Provides an FSP manager for the deploying task force.
• Reviews with the regiment S3 the SOR from the deploying ARSOA task
force and submits these requirements to USASOC DCSLOG, JSOTF
J4, and ASCC.
• Provides 24-hour oversight of activities of the SSA, ALSE, property
book officer (PBO), organization clothing and individual equipment
(OCIE), and regimental aviation maintenance officer (RAMO) for
aviation-intensive managed items (AIMI) release.
• Provides PBO or material management for deployed assets.
Coordinates directly with designated direct support unit (DSU), under
direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH).
• Provides a deployment Department of Defense Activity Address Code
(DODAAC) to the deploying task forces.
• Coordinates for all local purchases of items not readily available from
the Army supply system and SO sources of supply.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT COMMAND

5-30. The mission of the SOSCOM is to coordinate sustainment of ARSOF.
SOTSE assignment is to the SOSCOM, with duty at each theater Army,
either in the G3 or the logistics section (G4). The SOSCOM oversees the
preplanned support of SOF-peculiar items identified in unit SORs.
Additionally, the SOSCOM—
• Provides SOTSEs to theater Army HQ to coordinate logistics support
for ARSOA operating in theater.
• Provides SO support as required in the SOR.

5-11
FM 3-05.60

USASOC DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS

5-31. The USASOC DCSLOG coordinates for identified SOF-peculiar items.
DCSLOG arranges for a temporary loan, hand receipt, or purchase of these
items in support of the deploying task force. Additionally, USASOC
coordinates for intertheater airlift for the resupply of SOF-peculiar items,
including ARSOA Class IX air, associated tools, and test sets.

SOTSE
5-32. The SOTSE is responsible for coordinating and monitoring ASCC
logistics support for ARSOA deployed to that theater. The SOTSE—
• Reviews, coordinates, and monitors logistics support (intertheater and
intratheater transportation, supplies, and services) identified and
agreed upon in the validated SOR.
• Coordinates logistics to deployed ARSOA task force operating in or
from the theater.

ASCC
5-33. The ASCC provides CSS IAW Title 10 U.S. Code. SOTSE coordinates
logistics support between the supporting unit and the supported ARSOA task
force. Additionally, the SOC must coordinate for intratheater airlift of SOF-
peculiar repair parts, tools, and associated test equipment. The airlift must be
routine, scheduled support in order to forecast delivery of parts into the
theater AOR.

Theater SOC
5-34. When certain items are unavailable in the Army supply system but are
available in a sister Service, the SOC is the executive agent for coordinating
logistics support from another Service in support of the ARSOA task force.
DIRLAUTH between the SOC and the ASCC is essential to ensure
appropriate logistics support.

Supported Theater Command

5-35. The CINC’s staff coordinates CSS for the ARSOA task force that is
unavailable from ASCC, including common supplies and services available
from another Service or foreign nation, as identified by the ASCC.

Deployed JSOTF HQ
5-36. Once the JSOTF or ARSOTF officially initiates operations, the JSOTF
or ARSOTF J4 must validate logistics planning. The JSOTF HQ oversees and
validates required items and documents the need on the logistics situation
report (LOGSITREP).

Shipment of SOF-Peculiar Items from CONUS

5-37. The SOC, USSOCOM, and USASOC coordinate—on a case-by-case
basis—the procedures for shipping repair parts and other SOF-peculiar items
from CONUS to an overseas area.

5-12
 Appendix A

Intelligence
The effectiveness of SOA depends primarily upon the ability of the S2 to
gather and disseminate detailed operational intelligence quickly to
mission planners. The SOC J2, with theater intelligence assets, provides
near-real-time intelligence throughout mission planning and execution.

INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT TO SOA

A-1. The S2 staff is the only dedicated organic military intelligence (MI)
support in the ARSOA regiment and subordinate battalions. The regiment S2
section has three teams: order of battle (OB), imagery analysis, and
intelligence planning.
A-2. The S2 is the representative for intelligence and CI measures. The S2—
• Recommends priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to the
commander and establishes IRs.
• Provides accurate threat air defense and enemy OB information to
supported SOA units.
• Acquires necessary imagery for SOA operations.
• Validates geospatial information and services (GI&S) requirements.
• Assists the S3 in planning operations and participates in the MDMP.
A-3. The S2 and the S3 maintain the commanders’ threat information on
common situational overlays and automated data processing (ADP) systems
and coordinate weather information and analysis with the appropriate Air
Force weather element. The SOC J2 coordinates and provides in-theater
IEW support.

OB TEAM
A-4. The OB team is responsible for foreign OB files. It studies and processes
information on specific geographical target areas and assesses foreign
military capabilities. SOA OB intelligence goes beyond enemy air defense
threats. It includes foreign air support facilities and navigation aids that SOA
elements exploit or avoid while deep in hostile territory.

IMAGERY ANALYSIS TEAM

A-5. The imagery analysis team develops and maintains imagery data files
on specific geographical target areas.

A-1
FM 3-05.60

INTELLIGENCE PLANNING TEAM

A-6. The intelligence planning team coordinates with the theater CINCs to
make sure the regiment has each theater’s intelligence estimates and
OPLANs on hand.

NONORGANIC SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC

WARFARE
A-7. Nonorganic sources of intelligence include HUMINT, signals
intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT).
• HUMINT sources include enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), civilian
internees, detainees, and refugees. Other sources are U.S. personnel
who have returned from capture or who have escaped or evaded the
enemy. Elements that have conducted reconnaissance are sources of
HUMINT as well. ARSOA personnel—using aircraft forward-looking
infrared (FLIR) tapes and pilot debriefings following mission
completion—are also excellent intelligence collectors.
• SIGINT sources are the result of the collection, evaluation, analysis,
integration, and interpretation of information derived from intercepted
electromagnetic emissions.
• IMINT sources include radar and photographic, infrared, and electro-
optic imagery. SOA uses detailed imagery to develop sophisticated
target folders. Through IMINT, SOA can determine clearance distances
for landing areas and can locate hazards, such as wires or tall
obstacles.
A-8. EW is any military action that uses electromagnetic and directed energy
to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. EW has three
subdivisions: electronic protection (EP), electronic attack (EA), and electronic
warfare support (ES).
• EP constitutes protection of friendly combat capability against
undesirable effects of friendly or enemy employment of EW.
• EA supports SOA in disrupting, damaging, and killing enemy forces;
destroying enemy C2 and weapon systems; conducting deception
operations; and jamming enemy early warning radar and
communications.
• ES includes surveillance of the electromagnetic spectrum for
immediate threat recognition in support of EW operations and other
tactical actions, such as threat avoidance, homing, and targeting.
A-9. CI involves the detection, evaluation, counteraction, or prevention of
foreign intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism. CI
personnel are a critical force protection asset, both in CONUS and upon
receipt of a mission.
A-10. All aviation assets, including SOA, are susceptible to the effects of
weather. Detachments of the SOWT provide weather support to SOA. Direct
weather support includes—
• Forecasts of general weather conditions.

A-2
 FM 3-05.60

• Lunar illumination data.

• Solar geophysical information and climatic studies and analyses.
• Weather advisories and warnings, as well as specialized weather
briefings, including flight weather briefings.
• Electro-optical forecasts.

REQUESTS FOR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

A-11. Requests for intelligence information (RIIs) are a means of gathering
information for which a valid requirement exists to support assessments or
plans. Requesters should submit RIIs anytime the information is unavailable
on local databases or when requesters need an answer to a specific question
on published intelligence information.
A-12. Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers
(COLISEUM) is the preferred means of transmitting requirements. If E-mail
is the means of sending a requirement, an information copy must go to
USASOC and to USSOCOM. Different processes exist for requesting
information in CONUS (Figure A-1) and for requesting in theater (Figure
A-2, page A-4).

Figure A-1. CONUS-Related RII Process

A-3
FM 3-05.60

A-13. Requesters must forward RIIs in support of CONUS training exercises

through their appropriate validation chain of command. Regiment requesters
must send RIIs in support of theater OPLANs, contingency operations, or
theater exercises directly to the appropriate theater SOC and other
commands and agencies. This process ensures that the theater is aware of all
SOF requirements for its area of operations and responsibility. USASOC and
USSOCOM proactively monitor all requests and coordinate (as required) with
theaters to ensure the proper processing of the RIIs.

Figure A-2. Theater-Related RII Process

PRIORITIZATION
A-14. Major subordinate units (MSUs) and major subordinate commands
(MSCs) should use the following priority categories to validate their RIIs or
PIR for further submission:
• Expedite, to cover mission-essential RIIs that require an answer
during or before the deployment of a unit. Expedite RIIs warrant the
national intelligence community’s immediate attention and are vital to
the security and success of the mission. Expedite RIIs or PIR should
have a message precedence of immediate.
• Priority one, to cover mission-essential RIIs that support the
imminent deployment of a unit into a theater of operations for
contingency operations or foreign training missions, such as MTTs and

A-4
 FM 3-05.60

joint-combined exchange training. Priority one RIIs or PIR should have

a message precedence of immediate or priority.
• Priority two, to cover RIIs relevant to the operational decision-
making process of CONPLAN or OPLAN mission planning. Priority
two RIIs focus on intelligence gaps that require an answer in order to
support peacetime operations planning of OPLAN fulfillment. Priority
two RIIs should have a message precedence of priority.
• Priority three, to cover RIIs that build or enhance the general
database. Priority three RIIs are not immediately critical to mission
support of OPLAN decision-making. Priority three RIIs should have a
message precedence of routine.
• Priority four, to cover RIIs that support CONUS-based exercises
internally driven by the unit or that pertain to general background
queries for regional areas not specifically assigned to the unit by
mission statement. Priority four RIIs should have a message
precedence of routine.

PREPARATION AND METHOD OF SUBMISSION

A-15. Each paragraph or subparagraph must show its individual
classification, versus overall document classification. Theater-related RIIs
adhere to individual theater formats. As a minimum, all CONUS-based or
non-theater-related RIIs must contain the following information:
• A clear statement of the specific requirement.
• A justification of the need for the information, the intended use of the
information, and the applicable priority category.
• A suspense and a no-longer-valid date for the information.
• A listing of the resources already exploited for the information, so
analysts or agencies responding to the RIIs or PIR do not duplicate the
research effort.
• An internally generated number assigned to each RII. The number
includes the unit, calendar year of requirement, and sequence number
of the unit’s request. The number must appear in the subject line of the
RII for immediate reference and identification.

POTENTIAL CRISIS SITUATION REQUEST PROCEDURES

A-16. Upon receipt of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-directed alert, warning,
planning, or EXORD requiring increased intelligence support from national
agencies, the ARSOA regiment contacts USASOC Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT) via secure communications and provides
the following information:
• The country or region of the planned action.
• The estimated time frame for national agencies to provide intelligence
dissemination support.
• A short description of the current situation and planned action.

A-5
FM 3-05.60

• A brief statement of the types of information needed to support the

crisis-action planning—for example, background information on the
threat situation and the types of equipment in the threat inventory.
• A list of units needing current and recurring intelligence, including
their complete message addresses with office symbols and routing
indicators.
• A point of contact for the requested action, including name, office
symbol, and telephone numbers.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE FOR ARSOA

A-17. ARSOA uses the IPB process to support commanders and their staffs
in the MDMP. The commander directs the intelligence effort by selecting and
prioritizing intelligence requirements. These requirements support the
commander in conducting and planning operations. CCIR are the information
the commander needs to visualize the outcome of current operations. CCIR
become PIR. CCIR include information on both friendly and threat forces.
They help develop the IPB. The IPB results in a written, graphic intelligence
estimate that evaluates and portrays probable threat, friendly and
nonbelligerent third party capabilities, and their respective vulnerabilities
and probable COA.
A-18. IPB is a cyclic process of intelligence analysis and evaluation that
focuses on the assigned operational area and the forces expected to be
operating in the area. IPB is the systematic, continuous process of integrating
and analyzing data on the populace (threat, friendly, and nonbelligerent third
party), weather and climate, disease and environmental threat, and terrain
in a specific geographic area, and operational environment.
A-19. IPB is a graphic tool for presenting key characteristics of the
operational environment. The essential difference between IPB for
conventional forces and SOA is the detail required in each step of the IPB
process.

STEP 1 - EVALUATE THE BATTLESPACE AREA

A-20. The IPB begins with a battlespace area evaluation (BAE). The BAE is
an assessment of the battle area, including the overall nature of the friendly
and enemy forces and the operational environment. In this step, the S2
determines and answers requirements for weather, climate, and terrain.
A-21. The S2, working closely with the unit surgeon, develops detailed threat
intelligence on disease and the environment of the target area and
intermediate staging areas. The surgeon uses the intelligence to develop
appropriate countermeasures to the medical threat—for example, appropriate
immunizations, chemoprophylaxis regimes, and preventive medicine
countermeasures. These measures help decrease the loss of aircrew
availability due to disease or nonbattle injury.
A-22. During the BAE for SOA, the S2 evaluates threat ground, air, and naval
forces expected to operate within the battlespace area, including routes to and
from the target. The evaluations are useful in determining the capabilities of
the forces in relation to the weather, terrain, and friendly mission. Particular

A-6
 FM 3-05.60

attention is on air bases (including ships carrying aircraft), refueling points,

LZs, drop zones (DZs), minefields and air defense weapons, radar, and other
sensors operating within the battlespace area.

STEP 2 - ANALYZE THE TERRAIN

A-23. The purpose of terrain analysis is to reduce the uncertainties and
effects of natural and synthetic terrain and to assess the effects of the
population on military operations. SOA conducts in-depth studies of each
optional flight route during the terrain analysis step of IPB. This study is
imagery intensive because target areas are often inaccessible by ground or
are behind enemy lines. SOA operates primarily at night and under limited
visibility. Identifying and measuring terrain features are, therefore, often
critical to the success of the SOA mission.
A-24. Highly detailed imagery is necessary for precise preflight planning.
Because SOA flies long infiltration and exfiltration routes, critical terrain
consists of identifiable reference points that aid in navigation, as well as
terrain features that can mask friendly aircraft from detection.
A-25. SOA terrain overlays depict all the obstacles to flight, reference points,
checkpoints, masked areas, and danger zones. These factors are useful in
determining the best flight routes to the target. The S2 and engineers use the
modified combined obstacles overlay to determine flight routes for infiltration
and exfiltration. This overlay is the basis for input to the SOA requirements
section of the target intelligence package (TIP). When preparing to support
DA and SR ground missions, SOA terrain analysis must surpass the detail
developed by the ground force terrain analysis. Because of the low altitudes
SOA aircraft fly, features that are obstacles to ground forces may also be
obstacles to SOA. SOA terrain analysis, for example, requires the S2 and
engineers to provide heights of buildings, poles, trees, wires, streets, open
fields, and anything else that could be in an LZ, a PZ, or an obstacle to flight
during insertions and extractions. The theater terrain team may provide
terrain support if time permits.

STEP 3 - ANALYZE THE WEATHER

A-26. Detailed weather analysis is a necessity. Generic weather summaries
for a country are insufficient for SOA elements. Development of the best
flight routes requires weather patterns for each geographical region and a
comparison of the terrain data. Weather data that may have a negligible
impact on conventional Army aviation assets may be critical for night
infiltration operations in denied areas.
A-27. Within the target area, last-minute weather conditions may be critical
elements to the target analysis. The following weather aspects affect ARSOA:
• Moon illumination and angle are important for flight operations with
NVGs.
• Visibility, wind speed, and wind direction can significantly affect light
helicopter operations.

A-7
FM 3-05.60

• Conditions of sand or snow in a moderate wind; loose rock and gravel in

a high wind; and sudden brown-out or white-out can render SOA
operations ineffective.
• Sea and water conditions are also important to know for survivability
and for CSAR operations when SOA works over water.

STEP 4 - EVALUATE THE THREAT

A-28. Threat evaluation is a detailed study of threat forces and their
composition, organization, tactical doctrine, weapons, equipment, and
supporting systems. Threat evaluation determines threat capabilities and
limitations and the way the threat fights if unconstrained by weather and
terrain.
A-29. Threat evaluation for SOA is often difficult and complex because of the
environment in which SOA aircraft work. Many of the systems presenting a
threat to SOA do not affect conventional commanders. Because the mission
for SOA in DA and SR missions is to infiltrate and exfiltrate undetected, the
primary threat is anything that can detect and report aircraft movements.
A-30. During threat evaluation, the SOA S2 also examines communications
links. A threat that can detect the mission aircraft but cannot report its
presence in a timely manner is not a major concern to the SOA element. On
the other hand, a lone rifleman with a radio or a telephone can ruin an SOA
mission. Terrain masking is a critical factor in determining the threat’s
detection and reporting capabilities.
A-31. Threat evaluation of the SOA target site itself is also complex and goes
beyond the usual OB available or target area. SOA elements must know
almost as much as the ground element about security forces. They also need
information on aerial patrol reaction forces, lighting at the target, and so on.
When SOA and other ARSOF work together, close coordination—or even
consolidation of their threat evaluations—is necessary.

STEP 5 - INTEGRATE THE THREAT

A-32. The integration of all the factor analysis in the preceding steps occurs
during this final phase of the IPB process. It presents a total picture to the
S2, the commander, and the staff. Templates play a key role in presenting
this picture to the commander.
A-33. The S2 uses situation templates to show how threat, friendly, and
nonbelligerent third-party forces might operate and communicate within the
constraints of specific meteorological conditions and sociopolitical geography.
The situation template is basically a doctrinal template that takes into
account geographical and meteorological constraints. It identifies the critical
threat and friendly and nonbelligerent activities and locations. It also
provides a basis for situation and target development and high-value target
analysis.
A-34. Event templates show locations where critical events and activities are
to occur and where critical targets and opportunities are to appear. The S2
uses the event template to predict time-related events within critical areas. It
provides a basis for collection operations; predicting threat, friendly, and

A-8
 FM 3-05.60

nonbelligerent third-party intentions; and locating and tracking high-value

targets.
A-35. The S2 and the S3 use a decision support template to show decision
points keyed to significant events and activities. The template is the
intelligence estimate in graphic form. It identifies critical events and human
activities related to time and location that may require a tactical or
operational decision by the commander.
A-36. During this step, the S2 must also integrate pertinent threat data into
situational and event templates that affect the choice of flight routes and
modes of infiltration and exfiltration. This phase is the final step in the
development of the target folder. The threat as it relates to flight route
options is the final factor in deciding which operation provides the best route.
Threat integration helps determine the best approach and final assault paths
into the target area. It provides the necessary visual products for the
integration of coordinated assault fires if needed. Situation templates are
important for SOA only if the element must perform sustainment operations.
A-37. This step integrates threat data with the target terrain data, including
the location and dimension of every structure and obstacle. The final
product—
• Depicts the best insertion or extraction points.
• Identifies targets for destruction by support attack helicopter fire.
• Helps reconcile multiple flight routes in limited airspace.
A-38. Finally, threat integration results in the decision support template for
SOA, which depicts—
• Overlays of the air defense zone.
• Reaction times of threat aircraft.
• Combat radio overlays.
• Terrain-masking overlays.
• Other threat COAs.
A-39. The decision support template shows the best flight route and COA on
the target under varying conditions. It depicts terrain, obstacles to flight,
routes, LZs, PZs, alternate PZs, OBs, targets or target areas of interest
(TAIs), and operational time lines. In a sustained DA or SR mission,
personnel use named areas of interest (NAIs) along with TAIs when SOA
aircraft perform interdiction missions.

A-9
 Appendix B

Aircraft Capabilities
This appendix lists all aircraft in the ARSOA inventory. It defines the
most advanced technology in helicopters. Because of continuous
advancements in technology, the capabilities of all aircraft and systems
are dynamic in nature. This appendix also provides a capabilities matrix
that lists all ARSOA aircraft. The matrix serves as an easy, rapid
reference for mission planners.

MH-6J HELICOPTER

MISSION
B-1. The primary mission of the MH-6J helicopter is to conduct overt and
covert infiltration, exfiltration, and combat assaults over a wide variety of
terrain and environmental conditions. The MH-6J also performs C2 and
reconnaissance missions.

B-1
FM 3-05.60

DESCRIPTION
B-2. The MH-6J is a light assault helicopter. It is a single-engine, light
utility helicopter modified to transport up to six combat troops and their
equipment externally. Its small size allows for rapid deployability in C-130,
C-141, and C-5 transport aircraft. Aircraft modifications and aircrew training
allow for extremely rapid upload and download times.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
B-3. The ARC-186 (V) VHF provides AM and FM, air-to-air, and air-to-
ground communications. It has a band range from FM 30.000 to 87.975
megahertz (MHz) and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kilohertz (kHz)
increments.
B-4. The AN/ARC-210 provides the following band ranges:
• UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz.
• VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz.
• FM, 30.000 to 87.975 MHz.
B-5. The SATCOM provides ability for satellite air-to-air and air-to-ground
communications.
B-6. The SABRE is a ground radio with capabilities for air-to-air and air-to-
ground communications. Each aircraft has the system, although it is not
installed in all aircraft.
B-7. The AN/ARC-182 is a multichannel, multimode radio. It is SATCOM,
HaveQuick, and single-channel ground and airborne radio system
(SINCGARS) capable. The AN/ARC-182 can operate on the following
frequencies:
• UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz.
• VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz.
• VHF and FM, 155.975 to 173.975 MHz.
• FM, 30.0 to 87.975 MHz.
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
B-8. The Trimble 3100 Navigation System uses global positioning system
(GPS) and long-range navigation (LORAN).
B-9. The AN/APN-154 (V) has a very high frequency omnidirectional range
(VOR), distance-measuring equipment (DME), and tactical air navigation
(TACAN).
B-10. The ARGUS 7000 Display is a pictorial navigation instrument that
depicts aircraft position, orientation, and direction of flight in relation to
landing facilities, navigational aids, and special-use airspace. The unit provides
real-time situational awareness designed to reduce cockpit workload.
AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT
B-11. Each aircraft has the APR-39 Radar Warning Receiver System. This
passive omnidirectional warning set detects and identifies hostile search and

B-2
 FM 3-05.60

acquisition and fire control radar. It provides audio and visual alerts to the
flight crew.
STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT
B-12. Some aircraft have the FLIR, a passive radar system that provides an
infrared image of terrain features and ground or airborne objects of interest.
A standard videocassette recorder can play back recorded images.
B-13. The MH-6J can have two Goliath tanks installed as an internal
auxiliary fuel system (IAFS). The tanks provide 62 additional gallons of fuel
each. Each tank adds approximately 90 minutes of flight time.
Armament
B-14. The MH-6J has no standard armament.
SPECIAL MISSION EQUIPMENT
B-15. Personnel can rapidly configure the aircraft for fast-rope operations.
Motorcycle racks provide the capability to insert and extract up to two
motorcycles.
TRANSPORTABILITY OF MH-6J AIRCRAFT
B-16. A C-130 can carry 3 MH-6Js, a C-141 can carry 6, a C-17 can carry 9,
and a C-5 can carry 21. In each case, tactical uploading and downloading of
the aircraft can take place in an extremely short time.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Weather Minimums
B-17. A minimum 500-foot ceiling and a 2-mile visibility capability must
exist for day and night flying over all types of terrain. The unit commander
may reduce weather minimums on a case-by-case basis.
B-18. A visible horizon must exist in two of the four horizontal quadrants at
all times. All MH-6J missions must take place under visual meteorological
conditions (VMC). Instrument flight rule (IFR) flights are unauthorized.
Winds
B-19. The maximum wind allowed to start the aircraft is 40 knots, with a 20-
knot gust spread.
Flight Altitudes
B-20. For training missions, the minimum en route altitude for routes not
reconnoitered is 300 feet above ground level (AGL). The minimum overwater
altitude is 50 feet. For operational missions, the minimum en route altitude is
METT-TC dependent.
Landing Areas
B-21. The MH-6J is capable of landing on any structure that allows clearance for
the rotor systems (30 feet) and meets stress requirements. Single-aircraft
confined landing areas require a minimum size of 50 feet by 50 feet.

B-3
FM 3-05.60

Shipboard Operations
B-22. The MH-6J can operate day and night from any ship with at least a
one-spot helicopter-landing capability.
Aircrew Composition
B-23. The normal aircrew for most training exercises and operational or
contingency missions consists of a pilot and a copilot. All overwater flights
require a pilot and copilot current and qualified in overwater flight. All
aircrews can conduct NVG infiltration and exfiltration, stabilized body
operations (STABO), fast-rope insertion and extraction system (FRIES), and
aerial suppression operations to urban, mountainous, desert, and jungle
objectives, as well as to ships and offshore drilling platforms. Aircrews have
training in long-range precision navigation and formation flight over land
and water to arrive at objectives at a prearranged time (± 30 seconds).
Aircraft Capabilities
B-24. Table B-1 lists the capabilities of the MH-6J aircraft. Figures B-1 and
B-2, page B-5, illustrate specific dimensions of the aircraft.
Table B-1. MH-6J Aircraft Capabilities
Aircraft Weight

Basic weight 1,925 pounds

Mission weight 3,100 pounds
Maximum gross weight 3,750 pounds
Aircraft Dimensions

Length blades folded 22 feet 6 inches

Blades unfolded 32 feet 1 inch
Width blades folded 6 feet 5 inches
Blades unfolded 27 feet 4 inches
Height 8 feet 11 inches
Diameter of main rotor 27 feet 4 inches
Aircraft turning radius 36 feet 9 inches
Range and Endurance at 240 Pounds Per Hour

Fuel Tank Endurance Aircrew Passenger Fuel Range

(Hours + Minutes) (Nautical Miles)
Main 1+20 2 3 110
Main plus one auxiliary 3+00 2 2 240
Main plus two auxiliary 3+50 2 1 310
Airspeed. The cruise airspeed for the MH-6J helicopter is 80 knots.

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 FM 3-05.60

Figure B-1. MH-6J and AH-6J Aircraft Dimensions

Figure B-2. MH-6J and AH-6J Aircraft Dimensions and Turning Radius
SAFETY
B-25. The MH-6J has no seat belts installed for passengers. Each passenger
must provide his own means of securing himself. A short length of rope—
wrapped and knotted around the waist with a snap link attached to one
end—allows each passenger to secure himself to hard points on the aircraft.

B-5
FM 3-05.60

AH-6J HELICOPTER

MISSION
B-26. The mission of the AH-6J helicopter is to provide a rapidly deployable
light attack helicopter to meet the need for precise, small-area target
destruction or neutralization, with provisions for close air fire support for
ground assault operations.
DESCRIPTION
B-27. The AH-6J is a highly modified version of the McDonald Douglas 530-
series commercial helicopter. The aircraft is a single turbine engine, dual-
flight control, light attack helicopter. Its primary employment is close air
support of ground troops, target-destruction raids, and armed escort of other
aircraft.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
B-28. The ARC-186 (V) VHF provides AM and FM air-to-air and air-to-
ground communications. It has a band range from FM 30.000 to 87.975 MHz
and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments.
B-29. The AN/ARC-210 provides the following communications band ranges:
• UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz.

B-6
 FM 3-05.60

• VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz.

• FM, 30.000 to 87.975 MHz.
B-30. The SATCOM provides satellite air-to-air and air-to-ground
communications.
B-31. The SABRE is a ground radio with capabilities for air-to-air and air-
to-ground communications. Each aircraft has one, although it is not installed
in all aircraft.
B-32. The AN/ARC-182 is a multichannel, multimode radio. It is SATCOM,
HaveQuick, and SINCGARS capable. The AN/RC-182 can operate on the
following frequencies:
• UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz.
• VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz.
• VHF and FM, 155.975 to 173.975 MHz.
• FM, 30.0 to 87.975 MHz.
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
B-33. The Trimble 3100 Navigation System is installed in the MH/AH-6J
only. It uses GPS and LORAN.
B-34. The AN-APN-154 (V) uses VOR, DME, and TACAN.
B-35. The ARGUS 7000 Display is a pictorial navigation instrument that
depicts aircraft position, orientation, and direction of flight in relation to
landing facilities, navigational aids, special-use airspace. The unit provides
real-time situational awareness designed to reduce cockpit workload.
AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT
B-36. Each aircraft has the APR-39 Radar Warning Receiver System. This
passive omnidirectional warning set detects and identifies hostile search and
acquisition and fire control radar. It provides audio and visual alerts to the
flight crew. Additional survivability equipment includes fire extinguishers,
underwater beacons, first-aid kits, and survival kits.
STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT
B-37. Some aircraft have FLIR, a passive radar system that provides an
infrared image of terrain features and ground or airborne objects of interest.
A standard videocassette recorder can play back recorded images.
B-38. The AH-6J can have two Goliath tanks installed as an IAFS. The tanks
provide 62 additional gallons of fuel each. Each tank adds approximately 90
minutes of flight time.
SPECIAL MISSION EQUIPMENT
B-39. Personnel may configure the MH/AH-6J to employ the family of
loudspeakers - aircraft configuration (FOL-AC) for PSYOP missions.

B-7
FM 3-05.60

WEAPONS SYSTEMS
B-40. The AH-6J uses the plank system (Figure B-3), which features
detachable, foldable outboard store stations. The system permits simplified
aircraft transportability. Because of the flexibility of the plank system,
numerous configurations of weapons systems are possible. The M-27 system
is a single minigun mounted on the left side of the AH-6J. It has a maximum
of 1,500 rounds loaded in the ammunition can. The HGS-17 system is a single
rocket pod (7- or 19-shot) mounted on the right side. The standard plank
configuration for an AH-6J aircraft is two miniguns and two seven-shot
rocket pods.

Figure B-3. AH-6J Plank System for Aircraft Weapons Configurations

B-41. Provisions are available on the AH-6J plank system to mount and fire
the following systems:
• M134, 7.62-mm minigun, 2,000- or 4,000-round-per-minute rate of fire.
(See Figure B-4, page B-9.) The ammunition can holds a maximum of
2,625 rounds of ball, tracer, low-light tracer, or Sabot-launched armor-
piercing (SLAP) ammunition. Each aircraft uses two ammunition cans.
The normal load is 1,500 to 2,000 rounds per gun. The mounting site
for miniguns is normally on the inboard stores.
• M260 rocket launcher, seven-shot 2.75-inch folding-fin aerial rocket
(FFAR) pod. This system can fire both Mark 40 and Mark 66 rocket
motors and numerous warheads, including flare, infrared flare,
chlorobenzaimalononitrile, flechette, 17-pound high-explosive dual
purpose (HEDP), 17-pound HE-proximity, white phosphorus, 10-pound
HEDP, smoke, and inert. The mounting site for rocket pods is normally
on the outboard stores.
• M261 rocket launcher, 19-shot 2.75-inch FFAR rocket pod. All other
information on the M261 is the same as the data on the M260 rocket
launcher.
• Hellfire missile launchers attach to the plank system in pairs. The
mounting site is on the outboard stores. Each launcher can hold two
missiles, for a total of four missiles. The AH-6J has a Hellfire missile
laser designator mounted on the aircraft.

B-8
 FM 3-05.60

Figure B-4. AH-6J Weapons Variations

B-42. Some of the optional configurations are as follows:
• Two seven-shot rocket pods.
• One minigun, with two seven-shot rocket pods.
• Two 19-shot rocket pods.
• One minigun and two Hellfire missiles.
• Four Hellfire missiles.
• Four Hellfire missiles and one minigun.
• One minigun and one seven-shot rocket pod.
WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT
B-43. The pilot may fire weapons systems from either pilot station. He may fire
rockets in singles (one at a time), pairs (two rockets, one from each rocket pod),
or multiple rockets (depressing and holding down firing button). The pilot can
select, while in flight, the rocket he wishes to fire next on a 7-shot rocket pod or
on a 19-shot pod. The pilot can select a zone he wishes to fire next (two to three
rockets per zone, zones loaded with the same type of warhead). This
arrangement allows the pilot to select the type of warhead to use on the target.
B-44. During a call for fire, the radiotelephone operator can request a type of
round for firing (for example, a minigun only or flechettes), but normally the
pilot selects the type of rounds fired during an engagement. Normal
engagement ranges are as follows:
• Minigun, 10 meters to 750 meters.
• The 2.75-inch FFAR, 100 meters to 600 meters.
• Hellfire missiles, 800 meters to 8,000 meters.

B-9
FM 3-05.60

B-45. Minigun and 2.75-inch FFAR targets include ground troops, buildings,
small boats, aircraft, and thin-skinned vehicles (SLAP rounds can penetrate
3/4-inch homogeneous rolled steel). Hellfire missile targets include tanks and
other hard-skinned vehicles, bunkers to some degree, larger boats, and
buildings (shaped warhead causes very localized damage).
TRANSPORTABILITY OF AH-6J AIRCRAFT
B-46. The C-130 can carry 3 AH-6Js, a C-141 can carry 6, a C-17 can carry 9,
and a C-5 can carry 21. In each case, tactical uploading and downloading of
the aircraft can take place in an extremely short time. Off-load times vary,
based upon numerous factors, such as ramp space, ramp condition, ramp
type, off-load area, aircraft configuration, and mission configuration. General
planning times for off load from ramp down to takeoff (except C-5
deployment) are as follows:
• With the plank system, approximately 10 minutes.
• With the “T” tail removed, approximately 15 minutes.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Weather Minimums
B-47. A minimum 500-foot ceiling and 2-mile visibility capability must exist
for day and night flying over flat or mountainous terrain or over water. The
unit commander may reduce weather minimums on a mission-essential, case-
by-case basis.
B-48. A visible horizon must exist in two of the four horizontal quadrants at
all times. All AH-6J missions must take place under VMC rules.
Winds
B-49. The maximum wind allowed to start the aircraft is 40 knots, with a 20-
knot gust spread.
Flight Altitudes
B-50. For training missions, the minimum en route altitude for routes not
reconnoitered is 300 feet AGL. The minimum overwater altitude is 50 feet.
For operational missions, the minimum en route altitude is METT-TC
dependent.
Landing Areas
B-51. The AH-6J is capable of landing on any structure that allows clearance
for the rotor systems and meets stress requirements. Single-aircraft confined
landing areas require a minimum size of 50 feet by 50 feet.
Shipboard Operations
B-52. The AH-6J can operate day and night from any ship having at least a
one-spot helicopter-landing capability. Because of the high radio and radar
electromagnetic interface (EMI) signature onboard U.S. Navy vessels, only
Mark 66 MOD-3 rocket motors are compatible with shipboard operations
without waiver approval.

B-10
 FM 3-05.60

Aircrew Composition
B-53. The aircrew of an AH-6J consists of two pilots—a pilot in command
(PIC) and a copilot. The PIC is responsible for the employment and actions of
his aircraft. The copilot assists the PIC in accomplishing the mission. Both
aircrew members have extensive training in navigation, gunnery, shipboard
operation, overwater training, mountain flying, urban operations, and desert
flying. The lead aircraft has a flight-lead-qualified pilot during all operations.
The flight-lead pilot is responsible for mission accomplishment and is the
primary mission planner.
Aircraft Capabilities
B-54. Table B-2 lists the capabilities of the AH-6J. The aircraft dimensions
illustrated in Figures B-1 and B-2, page B-5, also pertain to the AH-6J.
Table B-2. AH-6J Aircraft Capabilities
Aircraft Weight

Basic weight 2,196 pounds

Mission weight 3,100 pounds (fully fueled, dual pilot)
Maximum gross weight 3,950 pounds
Aircraft Dimensions

Length blades folded 22 feet 6 inches

Blades unfolded 32 feet 1 inch
Width blades folded 6 feet 5 inches
Blades unfolded 27 feet 4 inches
Height 8 feet 11 inches
Diameter of main rotor 27 feet 4 inches
Aircraft turning radius 36 feet 9 inches
Range and Endurance at 240 Pounds Per Hour (With Optional Fuel Tank)

Fuel Tank Endurance Fuel Range

(Hours + Minutes) (Nautical Miles)
Main 1+17 116
Main plus one auxiliary 2+57 266
NOTE: Because of weight restrictions, the use of the optional fuel tank prevents the
installation of a minigun and ammunition cans and requires a reduced rocket load.

B-55. The cruise airspeed of the AH-6J is 90 knots indicated airspeed. The
maximum airspeed is 108 knots indicated airspeed. All speeds are
dependent on mission configuration and load.

B-11
FM 3-05.60

SAFETY
B-56. Personnel must observe the following safety precautions:
• Never walk in front of armed aircraft.
• Wear protective headgear at all times when working around the
turning rotor blades of the low rotor and tail rotor system of the AH-6J.
• Wear hearing and eye protection when working around operating
aircraft.
• Be aware that the aircraft exhaust can start ground fires in extremely
dry conditions with combustible material present (for example, dry
grass or straw).
• Approach operating AH-6J aircraft as depicted in Figure B-5.

Figure B-5. AH-6J Safety Approach Areas

B-12
 FM 3-05.60

MH-60L HELICOPTER

MISSION
B-57. The primary mission of the MH-60L is to conduct overt or covert
infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of SOF across a wide range of
environmental conditions. Additionally, the MH-60L/DAP has the primary
mission of armed escort and fire support. Secondary missions of the MH-60L
include C2, external load, CSAR, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)
operations. The MH-60L can operate from fixed-base facilities, remote sites,
or oceangoing vessels.
DESCRIPTION
B-58. The MH-60L (Blackhawk) is a highly modified twin-engine utility
helicopter. Its configuration may include a number of auxiliary fuel systems
to allow for operational times of as much as 5.5 hours with a range of 640
nautical miles. The MH-60L has secure Selective Adaptive Communications
Processor (SELSCAN) HF, FM, UHF, VHF, SATCOM, and SABRE
communications. The FRIES allows for rapid insertion and extraction of
personnel in areas blocked from air-land maneuvers. The aircraft has two
M134 7.62-mm Gatling guns (miniguns), a ballistic armor subsystem (BASS),
and ASE to increase aircrew survivability in all threat environments. Dual
GPSs, Omega, Doppler, and weather-detection systems allow pinpoint
navigational and weather-avoidance capability. Mission-selective systems
include a cargo hook for external load operations, a personnel locator system
(PLS) for CSAR, and a four-place C2 console for airborne C2 operations. An
armed version of the MH-60L, the DAP is capable of mounting two M134

B-13
FM 3-05.60

7.62-mm miniguns, two 30-mm chain guns, two 2.75 rocket pods, Hellfire
missiles, or combinations of the systems for armed escort and fire support
operations.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
B-59. The ARC-186 (V) VHF provides AM and FM air-to-air and air-to-
ground communications. It has a band range from FM 30.000 to 87.975 MHz
and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments.
B-60. The AN/ARC-220 HF Radio with SELSCAN provides long-range
air-to-air and air-to-ground communications.
B-61. The AN/ARC-210 provides the following communications band ranges:
• UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz.
• VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz.
• FM, 30.000 to 87.975 MHz.
B-62. The ARC-164 (V) UHF provides HaveQuick II and air-to-air and air-
to-ground communications. The band range is from 225.000 to 399.975 MHz
in 25-kHz increments.
B-63. The SATCOM is capable of satellite air-to-air and air-to-ground
communications.
B-64. The SABRE is a ground radio, capable of air-to-air and air-to-ground
communications.
B-65. The AN/ARC-182 is a multichannel, multimode radio capable of
SATCOM, HaveQuick, and SINCGARS. It can operate on—
• UHF, 225.0 to 399.975 MHz.
• VHF and AM, 108.0 to 155.975 MHz.
• VHF and FM, 155.975 to 173.975 MHz.
• FM, 30.0 to 87.975 MHz.
B-66. The AN/ARC-174 HF-AM, with SELSCAN, is capable of long-range
air-to-air and air-to-ground communications.
B-67. The airborne target handover system (ATHS) is capable of data
bursting preselected and formatted information to other equipped aircraft or
ground stations.
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
B-68. The AN/ARN-149A Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) is capable
of direction finding and homing.
B-69. The ARN-123 (V) (VOR/DME/Instrument Landing System [ILS])
is capable of heading guidance for instrument navigation and instrument
approaches.
B-70. The AN/ASN-137 Doppler Navigation System is capable of
continuous Doppler-derived measurements of the helicopter’s velocity and

B-14
 FM 3-05.60

continuous computations of the present position for worldwide navigation

guidance.
B-71. The AN/ASN-149 GPS is capable of continuous satellite-derived
measurements of the helicopter’s velocity and continuous computations of
present position to the MH-60L integrated avionics system. The GPS may act
as a stand-alone navigation system.
B-72. The AN/ARN-153 (V) TACAN Navigation Set is capable of slant-
range distance, relative bearing, course deviation, distance to and from the
station, and station audio identification.
B-73. The AN/ARS6B PLS can provide the relative position of downed
aviators equipped with the AN/PRC-112 transponder radio. It is capable of
homing to a continuous UHF radio signal.
AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT
B-74. The AN/APR-39A (V) 1 Radar Warning Receiver System identifies
threat pulse radar in the C/D and H through J bands. It provides audio and
visual alerts to the flight crew.
B-75. The AN/APR-44 (V) 3 Radar Warning Receiver System detects
continuous wave (CW) surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat radar emissions. It
provides audio and visual warnings to the flight crew.
B-76. The AN/ALQ-144 Infrared Countermeasures Set provides false
infrared signals to defeat the threat of infrared-sensing missiles.
B-77. The M-130 Chaff Dispenser dispenses decoy chaff as an effective
countermeasure against radar-guided missiles.
B-78. The AN/APX-100 (V) I Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF)
Transponder provides automatic identification of the helicopter to suitably
equipped ground and airborne interrogators.
B-79. The emergency locator transmitter transmits a distress signal on
UHF and VHF guard frequencies. It goes on the avionics rack on the left side
of the right pilot’s seat. Impact activates the transmitter, or personnel may
turn it on manually.
B-80. The underwater acoustic beacon radiates a pulsed acoustic signal
(37.5 kHz) detectable by hydrophone-equipped vessels. Water activates the
beacon.
B-81. Fire extinguishers are hand operated. One is mounted on the cabin
wall forward the right gunner’s window, and one is mounted on the right side
of the left pilot’s seat.
B-82. The first aid kits are located one each on the back of the left pilot’s seat
and one each mounted on the back of the right pilot’s seat.
B-83. Survival kits are one or two environment-specific kits attached to the
internal auxiliary fuel tanks.

B-15
FM 3-05.60

STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT

Armament
B-84. The standard armament is the M134 (7.62-mm minigun). The M134 is
a six-barrel, air-cooled, electrically operated Gatling gun, with maximum
effective fire of 1,000 meters. The gun fires A165 (7.62-mm balls), A257 (7.62-
mm low-light balls), and SL66 (armor-piercing sabots). One gun each is on
the outside of the left and the right gunners’ windows. The crew chiefs
normally operate the guns, using open-steel, aim point, or aim-1 sights.
Ballistic Armor Subsystem
B-85. This item is a fabric-covered steel plating that provides increased
ballistics protection in the cockpit and cabin.
Guardian Auxiliary Fuel Tanks
B-86. Two 172-gallon tanks, mounted in the cabin area at the aft bulkhead,
provide range extension of approximately 2 hours (mains plus two auxiliary
tanks, 4 hours total). Each tank occupies approximately 18 square feet of
usable cabin floor space. Normal operational time without the guardian tanks
is approximately 2 hours.
FRIES Bar
B-87. Each side of the FRIES bar (Figure B-6) can support a maximum
weight of 1,500 pounds.

Figure B-6. MH-60L/K Fast-Rope Infiltration-Exfiltration System Bar

B-16
 FM 3-05.60

MISSION-SELECTIVE SYSTEMS
B-88. The following items are mountable on the MH-60L to support a
primary mission or to enhance the capabilities of aircraft performing assault
or DAP missions:
• Cargo Hook. This item is mountable in the belly of the aircraft, below
the main rotor. The hook can support external loads up to 9,000
pounds.
• External Rescue Hoist System. This system is a hydraulic hoist
capable of lifting 600 pounds. It contains 200 feet of usable cable. The
crew chief or the hoist operator maneuvers the hoist using a handheld
pendant.
• Internal Auxiliary Fuel System. The MH-60L has wiring provisions
for four additional 150-gallon fuel cells, mountable in the cargo area.
Each fuel cell provides approximately 50 minutes flight endurance.
Ambient conditions and weight restrictions limit the maximum number
of additional fuel cells. The use of all four IAFS cells reduces usable
cargo area space to near zero.
• External Extended Range Fuel System (ERFS). This system
consists of two 230-gallon, or two 230- and two 450-gallon, or four 230-
gallon jettisonable fuel tanks mountable on the external stores support
system (ESSS) for long-range deployment of the aircraft. The use of the
ERFS restricts the employment of the M134 miniguns. Center-of-
gravity or maximum-gross-weight restrictions and ambient conditions
may limit the specific configuration of the ERFS.
• C2 Console. This system provides four operator positions with access
to the four AN/ARC-182 (V) multiband transceivers and FLIR display.
Personnel may configure the MH-60L with an ESSS to employ the
FOL-AC with the supporting amplifier array frame on the cabin floor
for PSYOP missions.
DAP SPECIAL CONFIGURATION
B-89. The mission of the armed MH-60L DAP (Figure B-7, page B-18) is to
conduct attack helicopter operations using area fire or precision-guided
munitions and armed infiltration or exfiltration of small units. The DAP is a
multimission aircraft capable of deploying on short notice and of conducting
direct action missions. It is also capable of reconfiguring for troop assault
operations. The DAP is capable of conducting all missions during day, night,
or adverse weather.

B-17
FM 3-05.60

Figure B-7. MH-60L Defensive Armed Penetrator

B-90. The DAP can provide armed escort for employment against threats to a
vertical-lift formation. Using team tactics, the DAP is capable of providing
suppression or CAS for formations and teams on the ground. In the defensive
armed role, the DAP is not a primary transport for troops or supplies because
of high gross weights. The DAP conducting deep attacks has a combat radius
of 225 nautical miles (takeoff, fly 225 nautical miles, no loiter, and return).
MH-60L DAP WEAPON SYSTEM AND EMPLOYMENT
B-91. The CMS-80 of the MH-60L DAP has integrated fire-control systems.
The integration gives the pilot a reduced cockpit workload and an increased
weapons-selection capability through cockpit control driver (CCD) and hands-
on collective and stick weapons selection.
B-92. The AN/AVQ-34 Monocular Head-Up Display Set (MONOHUD)
provides a lightweight, infinity focus, optical sight that allows the pilot to
deliver rockets and gun fire effectively at targets. It gives the pilot cues for
accurately launching missiles. It also provides aircraft flight symbology. The
symbology is concise and provides all pertinent information in a manner that
accommodates the pilot operating in daytime or with NVG.
B-93. The standard armament configuration of the DAP is one rocket pod,
one 30-mm cannon, and two miniguns. The configuration changes, based on
METT-TC. (See Figure B-8, page B-19.)
NOTE: To avoid exceeding maximum gross weight limitations, reconfiguration
of the ammunition or fuel mix may be necessary to achieve the desired
insertion ranges for personnel when the MH-60L is in the DAP configuration.

B-18
 FM 3-05.60

Figure B-8. Armament Options, MH-60L Defensive Armed Penetrator

B-94. The M134 7.62-mm Minigun is a six-barrel, air-cooled, link-fed,
electrically driven Gattling gun, with a 1,000-meter maximum effective range
and a tracer burnout at 900 meters. The weapon has a rate of fire of 2,000 or
4,000 rounds per minute. The weapon is mountable in the fixed position on
the left and right sides of the aircraft. The minigun fires a variety of 7.62-mm
rounds. Nighttime operations use a 7.62-mm ball with a special low-light
tracer, which prevents the shutting down of NVG. The weapon also fires 7.62
SLAP ammunition for light armor penetration. The DAP normally carries
3,000 rounds of 7.62-mm ammunition.
B-95. The M261 19-Shot Rocket Launcher fires a 2.75-inch FFAR with a
variety of special-purpose warheads. It has a 10-pound and a 17-pound high-
explosive warhead for light armor and bunker penetration. The bursting
radius for the 10-pound warhead is 8 to 10 meters and 12 to 15 meters for the
17-pound warhead. The antipersonnel flechette warhead contains 2,200
flechettes. Its minimum launch distance is 800 meters, and its optimum
range is 1,100 meters. Another warhead is white phosphorous used for
smoke. The illumination warheads come in two types. One provides a bright
light; the other, a bright infrared light. Firing of the warheads is within 3,000
meters of the target area. After deploying, the warheads provide 120 seconds
of overt light or 180 seconds of infrared light. The multipurpose submunition
(MPSM) warhead contains nine submunitions that are effective against light
armor and personnel. The MPSM round has a fuse that can be preset and
deploys the submunitions at the desired distance. The 2.75-inch FFAR is
useful as a point target weapon at ranges from 100 to 750 meters and an area
fire weapon at ranges up to 7,000 meters. The DAP can also fire
chlorobenzaimalononitrile, HE-proximity, and inert rockets. The aircraft can
carry an additional load of rockets internally, allowing the aircrew to reload
the rocket pod. The aircrew can accomplish the reload within 15 minutes.
B-96. The M230 30-mm Chain Gun has its own magazine capable of
carrying 1,100 rounds. The M230 has a cyclic rate of fire of 625 ± 25 rounds
per minute. The M230 is capable of firing the HEDP, target practice (TP), and

B-19
FM 3-05.60

target practice tracer (TPT). The HEDP is effective against light armor and
personnel at ranges of 4,000 meters. With the use of the MONOHUD as a
sighting system, the 30-mm cannon is a point-target weapon at a range of
1,500 meters and less. It is also an area fire weapon at ranges up to
4,000 meters.
B-97. The AGM-114 Hellfire is a 100-pound semiactive laser-guided missile,
capable of defeating any known armor. The M272 launchers are able to hold
four Hellfire missiles each. The minimum engagement range is .8 kilometer
to a maximum of 8 kilometers. Any ground or air North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) standard laser designator can designate the missile.
B-98. The AN/AAQ-16D Airborne Electronic Special Operations
Payload (AESOP) FLIR is a FLIR with a laser range finder or designator
(LRF/D). The Q-16D allows the DAP to detect, acquire, identify, and engage
targets at extended ranges with laser-guided munitions. The FLIR is a
controllable, infrared surveillance system that provides a television video-
type infrared image of terrain features and ground or airborne objects of
interest. The FLIR is a passive system and detects long wavelength radiant
infrared energy emitted, naturally or artificially, by any object in daylight
or darkness.
B-99. Air-to-Air Stinger (ATAS). The DAP can fire the infrared seeking,
fire-and-forget missile.
MH-60L DAP RECONFIGURATION
B-100. The MH-60L DAP has the capability to perform utility and armed
missions. The time to reconfigure the aircraft from either the armed to the
utility or vice versa is minimal. The 7.62 miniguns remain with the aircraft
regardless of the mission.
TRANSPORTABILITY
B-101. C-5A/B and C-141 aircraft can deploy the MH-60L, including the DAP
configuration. The C-5A/B can carry a maximum of six MH-60Ls. The
helicopters need a short time to prepare for on-load and again for rebuild
upon arrival at the destination. The C-17 can carry three MH-60Ls. The C-
141 can carry a maximum of two MH-60Ls; however, it requires considerable
time for preparation and rebuild. During disassembly, the ESSS wings are
removed and loaded onto the floor of the helicopter. The loaded helicopter
then goes onto the C-141 aircraft. The removed DAP equipment goes on a
separate trailer and accompanies the helicopter on the same C-141 aircraft.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
B-102. Successful mission accomplishment is largely a function of adequate
pre-mission planning time. Mission notification should occur in time to have
an adequate mission-planning session and briefing, followed by a period of
rest before mission execution.
Weather Minimums
B-103. For training missions, forecast and actual weather of 500-foot ceiling
and 2-mile visibility. For contingency missions, as directed by the
commander, a 500-foot ceiling and 2-mile visibility for planning purposes.

B-20
 FM 3-05.60

This type of forecast allows for en route cruise speed of the standard 120
knots and ample opportunity to adjust mission execution in the event of lower
weather.
Winds
B-104. The MH-60L rotor has the capability to start and stop in actual winds
no greater than 45 knots.
Flight Altitudes
B-105. For training missions, the minimum altitude for routes not
reconnoitered is 300 feet AGL and 150 feet AGL for reconnoitered routes. For
contingency missions, the minimum altitude is dependent upon METT-TC.
Landing Areas
B-106. The minimum landing area for the MH-60L is 100 feet by 100 feet.
Shipboard Operations
B-107. The MH-60L, including the DAP, can operate day and night from Navy
ships with Level II Class 2 helicopter-landing pads. For DAP, because of the
high radio or radar EMI signature onboard U.S. Navy vessels, only Mark 66
MOD-3 rocket motors are compatible with shipboard operations without
waiver approval.
Aircrew Composition
B-108. Most training flights and all NVG operations require four aircrew
members—a PIC, a pilot, and two aircrew chiefs or gunners. One aircrew
chief is at the right gunner’s position. He scans for hazards, operates the
hoist, conducts FRIES operations, operates the minigun, and conducts
external load operations. The other aircrew chief is at the left gunner’s
position and scans for hazards, conducts FRIES operations, operates the
minigun, and assists in external load operations.
Aircrew Qualifications
B-109. All aircrews are qualified to support flight operations for the missions
stated in JP 3-05. Aircrew qualifications include multiship NVG infiltration,
exfiltration, and live-fire operations in urban, overwater, mountain, desert,
jungle, and NBC environments to LZs, buildings, ships, and oil rigs. Aircrews
are trained in NVG long-range overland and overwater navigation, with an
arrival standard of ± 30 seconds.

B-21
FM 3-05.60

Aircraft Capabilities
B-110. Table B-3 lists the capabilities of the MH-60L.
Table B-3. MH-60L Aircraft Capabilities
Maximum Gross Weight (Ferry)

Ferry configuration 23,500 pounds

Assault configuration 22,000 pounds
Aircraft Dimensions

Length 64 feet 10 inches

Width 53 feet 8 inches
Height 16 feet 10 inches
Diameter of main rotor 53 feet 8 inches
Range and Endurance

Fuel Tank Endurance Fuel Range

(Hours + Minutes) (Nautical Miles)
Main 1+45 212
Main plus one auxiliary 3+02 364
Main plus two auxiliary 4+10 496
Main plus three auxiliary 5+00 600
Airspeed

Cruise 120 knots indicated airspeed

Maximum 165 knots indicated airspeed

B-22
 FM 3-05.60

MH-60K HELICOPTER

MISSION
B-111. The primary mission of the MH-60K (Blackhawk) is to conduct overt
or covert infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of SOF over a wide range of
environmental conditions. The MH-60K is capable of operating from fixed
base facilities, remote sites, or oceangoing vessels.
DESCRIPTION
B-112. The MH-60K is a highly modified twin-engine utility helicopter. The
aircraft can be configured with a number of auxiliary fuel systems to allow for
operational times of as much as 5.5 hours with a range of 634 nautical miles.
The MH-60K is equipped with secure HF, SINCGARS, FM, UHF, VHF,
SATCOM, and SABRE communications. The FRIES allows for rapid insertion
and extraction of personnel in areas occluded from AirLand maneuvers. The
aircraft has two M134 7.62-mm Gattling guns, a BASS, and ASE to increase
aircrew survivability in all threat environments. The GPS, area navigation
unit, inertial navigation unit (INU), attitude and heading reference system
(AHRS), and multimode radar systems allow pinpoint navigation. Mission-
selective systems include the cargo hook for external load operations and the
PLS for CSAR.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
B-113. The ARC-186 (V) VHF (AM/FM) System provides air-to-air and air-
to-ground communications, with a band range from FM 30.000 to 87.975 MHz
and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments.

B-23
FM 3-05.60

B-114. The ARC-164 (V) UHF with HaveQuick II Capability provides

air-to-air and air-to-ground communications, with a band range from 225.000
to 399.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments.
B-115. The AN/ARC-231 SKYFIRE SATCOM provides satellite two-way
communications, both line of sight or satellite with a band range from
255.000 to 399.995 MHz in either 25 or 5 kHz spacing.
B-116. The SABRE Ground Radio provides air-to-air and air-to-ground
communications.
B-117. The AN/ARC-201A (V) SINCGARS (VHF-FM) provides voice and
data communications, in single channel of frequency-hopping mode, with a
band range from 30.000 to 87.975 MHz.
B-118. The AN/ARC-220 HF Radio with SELSCAN provides long-range
air-to-air and air-to-ground communications.
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
B-119. The AN/ARN-206A ADF provides direction finding and homing.
B-120. The ARN-123 (V) (VOR/DME/ILS) provides heading guidance for
instrument navigation and instrument approaches.
B-121. The AN/ASN-137 Doppler Navigation System provides continuous
Doppler-derived measurements of the helicopter’s velocity and continuous
computations of the present position for worldwide navigation guidance.
B-122. The EGI H764G Navigation System is an embedded GPS inertial
(EGI) navigation system. It is a self-contained INU with an embedded GPS
card. The EGI system is fundamentally a dead-reckoning navigation system.
The advantage of a self-contained INU is its invulnerability to enemy
countermeasures. The disadvantage is its inaccuracy, which builds over time
unless the INU can be updated over known landmarks. Through
miniaturization, the GPS receiver has been reduced to the size of a computer
card. This miniature GPS receiver can now be installed (embedded) in the
INU. Using the closely coupled technique to apply the GPS signal to the INU
functions provides a means of accurately fixing position and measuring
velocity.
B-123. The AN/ASN 145 AHRS provides accurate outputs of pitch, roll,
heading, acceleration, velocity, and position to the integrated avionics system
or may act as a stand-alone system.
B-124. The AN/ARN-118 (V) TACAN Navigation Set provides slant range
distance, relative bearing, course deviation, distance to and from the station,
and station audio identification. Additionally, it is used during aerial
refueling for tanker-bearing information and during shipboard operations.
B-125. The AN/ARS6B PLS provides the relative position of downed
aviators equipped with the AN/PRC-112 transponder radio. It also homes to a
continuous UHF radio signal.

B-24
 FM 3-05.60

AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT

B-126. The AN/APR-39A (V) 1 Radar Warning Receiver identifies threat
pulse radar in the C or D and the H through J bands and provides audio and
video alerts to the flight crew.
B-127. The AN/APR-44 (V) 3 Radar Warning System detects CW SAM
threat radar emissions and provides audio and visual warnings to the flight
crew.
B-128. The AN/AVR-2 Laser Warning Receiver detects laser emissions
directed toward the helicopter.
B-129. The AN/AAR-47 Missile Warning Receiver detects plume
emissions from a missile’s exhaust.
B-130. The AN/ALQ-162 (V) 2 CW Radar Jammer detects and jams CW
radar emitters.
B-131. The AN/ALQ-136 (V) 2 Pulse Radar Jammer detects and jams
pulse radar emitters.
B-132. The AN/ALQ-144 Infrared Countermeasures Set provides false
infrared signals to defeat infrared-sensing missile threats.
B-133. The M-130 Chaff and Flare Dispenser dispenses decoy chaff and
flare as an effective countermeasure against radar-guided and infrared
missile threats.
B-134. The AN/APX-100 (V) 1 IFF Transponder provides automatic
identification of the helicopter to suitably equipped ground and airborne
interrogators.
B-135. The emergency locator transmitter is mounted on the left side of
the right pilot’s seat avionics rack. It transmits a distress signal on UHF and
VHF guard frequencies. The transmitter is impact activated or may be turned
to the ON state manually.
B-136. The underwater acoustic beacon is activated by contact with
water. It radiates a pulsed acoustic signal (37.5 kHz) detectable by
hydrophone-equipped vessels.
B-137. Fire extinguishers are hand operated—one mounted on the cabin
wall forward of the right gunner’s window and one mounted on the right side
of the left pilot’s seat.
B-138. First aid kits are located two each on the back of the left pilot’s seat
and one each mounted on the back of the right pilot’s seat.
B-139. Survival kits are environment-specific kits attached to the internal
auxiliary fuel tanks.
STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT
B-140. The following are systems and equipment always onboard the aircraft
during tactical missions. This list does not include avionics, ASE, and sensors,
as they are considered part of the basic aircraft.

B-25
FM 3-05.60

Armament
B-141. The standard armament is the M134 (7.62-mm minigun), 6-barrel,
air-cooled, electrically operated Gattling gun. (See Figure B-9.) The maximum
effective fire (MEF) is 1,000 meters. The M134 fires A165 (7.62 ball); A257
(7.62 low light ball); and SL66 (armor-piercing sabot) ammunition. One gun is
mounted outside both the left and right gunner’s windows. Aircrew chiefs
normally operate the weapon system. Weapon sighting is by open steel sights.

Figure B-9. MH-60K, M134 Minigun Window-Mounted Field of Fire

Ballistic Armor Subsystem
B-142. The system consists of fabric-covered steel plating, which provides
increased ballistic protection in the cockpit and cabin areas.
Guardian Auxiliary Fuel Tanks
B-143. Two 172-gallon fuel tanks provide a range extension of approximately
2 hours (4 hours total). The tanks are mounted in the cabin area at the aft
bulkhead. They occupy approximately 18 square feet of usable cabin floor
space. The normal operational time without the Guardian tanks is
approximately 2 hours and 10 minutes.
FRIES Bar
B-144. Each side of the FRIES bar can support a maximum weight of 1,500
pounds.
MISSION-SELECTIVE SYSTEMS
B-145. The following systems are mountable on the MH-60K to support a
primary mission or to enhance the capabilities of aircraft performing assault
missions:
• Cargo Hook. Is mountable in the belly of the aircraft below the main
rotor. It can support external loads up to 8,000 pounds.

B-26
 FM 3-05.60

• External Rescue Hoist. Is a hydraulic hoist capable of lifting 600

pounds with 200 feet of usable cable. The aircrew chief or hoist
operator uses a handheld pendant to control the system.
• External Tank System (ETS). Has two 230-gallon external fuel
tanks that may be jettisoned during emergencies. The fuel tanks are
mounted on the ETS for long-range deployment of the aircraft.
Installation of the ETS restricts the use of weapons systems. Aircraft
center of gravity, maximum gross weight limitations, or ambient
conditions may limit specific configuration.
• Aerial Refueling System. Is an aerial refueling probe that allows
extended range and endurance by refueling from HC/MC/KC-130
tanker aircraft.
• Aerial Loudspeaker System. The MH-60K with ESSS can be
configured to employ the 2,700-watt FOL-AC with the supporting
amplifier array frame on the cabin floor for PSYOP aerial loudspeaker
missions.
TRANSPORTABILITY
B-146. The MH-60K may be deployed by C-5A, C-5B, C-17, and C-141
aircraft. A maximum of six MH-60Ks can be loaded on a C-5A or a C-5B. (See
Figure B-10, page B-29, and Figure B-11, page B-30.) A short time is needed
to prepare the helicopters for on-load and again for rebuild on arrival at the
destination. Three MH-60Ks can be loaded onto a C-17. A maximum of two
MH-60Ks can be loaded on a C-141, requiring considerable time for
preparation and rebuild. ETS “wings” are removed during disassembly and
floor loaded on the StratAir aircraft. Ammunition for the weapon systems is
palletized and loaded on the same aircraft for distribution at the destination.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
B-147. Successful mission accomplishment is largely a function of adequate
pre-mission planning time. Mission notification should occur in time for an
adequate mission-planning session and briefing followed by a period of rest
before execution.
Weather Minimums
B-148. Training missions require forecast and actual weather of a 500-foot
ceiling and a 2-mile visibility. For contingency missions, as directed by the
commander, a 500-foot ceiling and a 2-mile visibility work well for planning
purposes. This type of forecast allows for en route cruise speed of the
standard 110 knots and ample opportunity to adjust mission execution
depending on the weather.
Flight Altitudes
B-149. For training missions, the minimum altitude for routes not
reconnoitered is 300 feet AGL and 150 feet AGL for reconnoitered routes.
Contingency missions are METT-TC dependent.

B-27
FM 3-05.60

Landing Areas
B-150. The minimum landing area for the MH-60K is 100 feet by 100 feet.
For shipboard operations, the MH-60K can operate day and night from Navy
ships that have Level II Class 2 helicopter-landing pads.
Aircrew Composition
B-151. Most training flights and all NVG operations require four aircrew
members. These members include a PIC, a pilot, and two aircrew chiefs or
gunners. One aircrew chief—stationed at the right gunner’s position—scans
for hazards, operates the hoist, conducts FRIES operations, operates the
minigun, and conducts external load operations. The other aircrew chief—
stationed at the left gunner’s position—conducts FRIES operations, operates
the minigun, and assists in external load operations.
Aircrew Qualifications
B-152. Aircrews can perform all mission tasks in all environments. They can
perform NVG long-range overland and overwater navigation, with an arrival
standard of ± 30 seconds.
Aircraft Capabilities
B-153. Table B-4 lists the capabilities of the MH-60K aircraft. Figures B-10
through B-12, pages B-29 through B-31, illustrate specific dimensions and
capabilities of the aircraft.

Table B-4. MH-60K Aircraft Capabilities

Aircraft Weight
Basic weight 15,600 pounds
Maximum gross weight 24,500 pounds
Aircraft Dimensions
Length 64 feet 10 inches (Folded, 60 feet 7 inches)
Width 53 feet 8 inches (Folded, 9 feet 9 inches)
Height 16 feet 10 inches
Diameter of main rotor 53 feet 8 inches
Aircraft turning radius 41 feet 8 inches
Range and Endurance
Fuel Tank Endurance (Hours + Minutes) Fuel Range (Nautical Miles)
Main 1+30 165
Main plus one auxiliary 2+30 275
Main plus two auxiliary 3+30 385
Airspeed
Cruise 115 knots indicated airspeed
Maximum 145 knots indicated airspeed

B-28
 FM 3-05.60

Figure B-10. MH-60K Dimensions and Turning Radius

B-29
FM 3-05.60

Figure B-11. MH-60K Dimensions for Strategic Airlift Preparation

B-30
 FM 3-05.60

Figure B-12. MH-60K Aircraft Capabilities

B-31
FM 3-05.60

MH-47D HELICOPTER

MISSION
B-154. The primary mission of the MH-47D is to conduct overt and covert
infiltration, exfiltration, air assault, resupply, and external-sling operations
under a wide range of environmental conditions. The aircraft can perform a
variety of other missions, including shipboard operations, platform
operations, urban operations, water operations, FARP operations, mass
casualty operations, and CSAR operations.
DESCRIPTION
B-155. The MH-47D (Chinook) is a twin-engine, tandem rotor, heavy assault
helicopter specifically modified for long-range SO flights. It has secure voice
communications on FM, UHF with HaveQuick II, VHF, HF and SELSCAN,
SABRE, and SATCOM radios. Other features include FRIES, limited aircraft
survivability equipment, a defensive armament system of two M134 machine
guns (one located in the left forward cabin window and one at the right cabin
door), one M-60D machine gun (located on the ramp), and an internal rescue
hoist with a 600-pound capacity.
B-156. The MH-47D adverse weather cockpit (AWC) is equipped with
weather avoidance and search radar, an aerial refueling probe for in-flight
refueling, a PLS used with the PRC 112 for finding downed aircrews, FLIR,

B-32
 FM 3-05.60

and a navigation system consisting of a mission computer using GPS, inertial

navigation system (INS), or Doppler navigation sources for increased
accuracy. It is instrument capable with ADF, VOR, DME, ILS, and TACAN
with the ability to do fully coupled approaches. Mission-computer-generated
approaches can be used when normal approaches are unavailable.
B-157. The MH-47D helicopter is capable of operating at night during
marginal weather conditions. With the use of special mission equipment and
night vision devices (NVDs), the aircrew can operate in hostile mission
environments over all types of terrain. The aircrew can operate at low
altitudes during periods of low visibility and low ambient lighting conditions
with pinpoint navigation accuracy ± 30 seconds on target.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
B-158. The ARC-186 (V) VHF (AM/FM) Systems (two) provide air-to-air
and air-to-ground communications, with a band range from FM 30.000 to
87.975 MHz and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments.
B-159. The ARC-164 (V) UHF with HaveQuick II capability provides
air-to-air and air-to-ground communications, with a band range from 225.000
to 399.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments.
B-160. The AN/ARC-174 HF with SELSCAN provides long-range air-to-air
and air-to-ground communications.
B-161. The SATCOM provides satellite air-to-air and air-to-ground
communications.
B-162. The SABRE Ground Radio provides air-to-air and air-to-ground
communications.
B-163. The ATHS provides data bursting preselected and formatted
information to other equipped aircraft or ground stations.
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
B-164. The AN/ARN-149 ADF provides low- and medium-frequency
direction finding.
B-165. The ARN-123 (V) (VOR/DME/ILS) provides heading guidance for
instrument navigation and instrument approaches.
B-166. The AN/ARN-153 (V) TACAN Navigation Set provides slant range
distance, relative bearing, course deviation, distance to and from the station,
and station audio identification. It is used during aerial refueling for tanker-
bearing information and during shipboard operations.
B-167. The AN/ASN-137 Doppler Navigation System provides continuous
Doppler-derived measurements of the velocity of the helicopter and
continuous computations of the present position for worldwide navigation
guidance. In the MH-47D, these displayed signals are sent to the Rockwell
Collins CMS 80 Mission Computer for sensor integration or may act as a
stand-alone navigation system.
B-168. The AN/ARN-148 GPS provides continuous satellite-derived
measurements of the velocity of the helicopter and continuous computations

B-33
FM 3-05.60

of the present position to the Rockwell Collins CMS 80 Mission Computer for
sensor integration.
B-169. The LTN 92 Ring Laser Gyro INS provides continuous derived
measurements for computations of the present position for worldwide
navigation guidance based on gyro precession. It sends these signals to the
Rockwell Collins CMS 80 Mission Computer for sensor integration or may act
as a stand-alone navigation system.
B-170. The mission computer unit provides mission navigation
management, including flight plan and automatic navigation. The aircraft
automatic flight control system (AFCS) can be coupled to the mission
computer for two-axis autopilot capabilities.
AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT
B-171. The AN/APR 39A Radar Warning Receiver identifies hostile pulse
fire control radar and provides audio and video alerts to the flight crew when
the system detects threat radar emissions.
B-172. The AN/ALQ 156 (V) 47 is an active airborne Doppler radar system
that detects the approach of antiaircraft missiles. When detecting a missile,
the system automatically triggers the M-130 flare system and ejects a decoy
flare.
B-173. The AN/ALE-47 (V) Countermeasures Dispensing System
consists of five components used to provide preemptive and terminal threat
protection. The pilots control the system by using the cockpit control unit
(CCU) mounted in the center console. The AN/ALE-47 replaces the M-130
system and enhances aircraft survivability by—
• Integrating with avionics and EW systems.
• Providing threat adaptive programmable dispensing routines.
• Providing data links for advanced expendables.
• Using available threat sensors.

B-174. The AN/AAR-47 (V) 3 Radar Warning System is a passive system

that provides visual and aural alert indications of CW radar signals from
SAM and airborne interceptor (AI) threats. The APR-44 interfaces with the
APR-39 to provide visual and aural indications. The system consists of two
SAM antennas, an AI receiver, a SAM receiver, and a low-pass filter.

B-175. The AN/ALQ 44 Radar Warning Receiver identifies hostile AI and

SAM CW fire control radar and provides audio and visual alerts to the flight
crew when the system detects threat radar emissions.
B-176. The M-130 Infrared Countermeasures Dispenser System is a
chaff and flare dispenser system designed to deceive radar guidance and
infrared missiles by using chaff or flares as required.

B-34
 FM 3-05.60

STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT

Armament
B-177. The MH-47D has three weapon stations—left forward window, right
cabin door, and at the ramp. The forward station mounts a 7.62-mm minigun,
and the ramp station mounts an M60D 7.62-mm machine gun. An aircrew
member at each station manually operates the weapon. The primary use of
the weapon is self-defense and enemy suppression. The minigun is normally
used for soft targets and troop suppression, which requires a high rate of fire.
The minigun is air cooled and link fed. It has a maximum effective range of
1,500 meters, with a tracer burnout at 900 meters. The weapon has an
adjustable rate of fire of 2,000 or 4,000 rounds per minute. The aircrew
members currently fire ball or SLAP ammunition with a mix of four ball
rounds to one tracer round (4:1) or a 9:1 mix to prevent NVD shutdown on
low-illumination nights. The ammunition complement without reloading is
8,000 rounds per weapon.
Ballistic Armor Subsystem
B-178. This subsystem is a fabric-covered steel plating that provides
increased ballistic protection in the cockpit and cabin.
FRIES
B-179. The FRIES is used for insertion and extraction of personnel. Applied
loads at the rear ramp for insertions will not exceed nine persons per rope at
the same time. Applied loads at the rear ramp for extractions will not exceed
six persons per rope at the same time.
MISSION-SELECTIVE SYSTEMS
B-180. The external cargo hook system facilitates greater load stability and
ensures faster airspeeds during flight. Each hook (Table B-5) may be used
separately or with each other. All loads should be planned as a tandem-rigged load.
Table B-5. External Cargo Hooks, MH-47D
Type Capacity

Forward hook 17,000 pounds

Center hook 26,000 pounds
Aft hook 17,000 pounds
Tandem hook 25,000 pounds

NOTE: These are maximum hook-rated loads and may not accurately reflect
the true capability of the aircraft because of external conditions, such as
pressure, altitude, and temperature.
B-181. The external rescue hoist system is configured for use at the
center cargo hook and rescue hatch. It has a 600-pound capacity and
approximately 150 feet of usable cable.
B-182. The AN/AAQ-16 FLIR is a controllable, infrared surveillance system
that provides a television video-type infrared image of terrain features and
ground or airborne objects of interest. The FLIR is a passive system and

B-35
FM 3-05.60

detects long wavelength radiant infrared energy emitted, naturally or

artificially, by any object in daylight or darkness.
B-183. The cargo compartment expanded range fuel system
(CCERFS) consists of one and up to three ballistic-tolerant, self-sealing
tanks. Each tank has the capacity of holding 800 gallons of fuel but normally
are filled to 780 gallons. They are refillable using aerial refueling operations.
B-184. The forward area refueling equipment (FARE) consists of fueling
pumps, hoses, nozzles, and additional refueling equipment to set up a two-
point refueling site. Gallons of fuel dispensed are dependent upon the range
of operation required of the tanker aircraft.
TRANSPORTABILITY
B-185. ARSOA has modified validated procedures to load two MH-47Ds on a
C-5 and one MH-47D on a C-17, with all support equipment. Compared to all
other SO helicopters, the MH-47D requires extensive time for aircraft
disassembly and assembly to become combat ready.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Weather Minimums
B-186. The weather minimum for the MH-47D is a 500-foot ceiling, with a
visibility of 2 miles.
Winds
B-187. The MH-47D has no specified minimum wind; however, the
maximum wind for starting and stopping the rotor system is 30 knots.
Flight Altitudes
B-188. For training missions, the minimum en route altitude for
reconnoitered routes is 150 feet AGL or above the highest obstruction (AHO).
For routes not reconnoitered, the minimum en route altitude is 300 feet AGL
or AHO. For operational missions, the minimum en route altitude is dictated
by threat systems.
Landing Areas
B-189. The minimum landing area for the MH-47D is 150 feet by 100 feet.
Shipboard Operations of the MH-47D
B-190. The MH-47D can operate day and night from Navy ships that have
Level II Class III helicopter-landing pads.
Aircrew Composition
B-191. Most training, exercises, and operational or contingency missions
require five aircrew members, including a pilot, a copilot, a flight engineer, and
two aircrew chiefs. The flight engineer, usually positioned at the ramp station,
scans for other aircraft, targets, and obstacles. He also operates the hoist (when
required), assists in FRIES operations, operates the machine gun, and conducts
sling load operations. The aircrew chiefs, positioned at the left and right
forward gunners’ stations, scan for other aircraft, targets, and obstacles. They
also operate the miniguns and assist in sling load and FRIES operations.

B-36
 FM 3-05.60

Aircrew Qualifications
B-192. MH-47D aircrews can perform all mission tasks in all environments.
They can perform NVG infiltration and exfiltration operations, arriving at
the target time of ± 30 seconds. MH-47D aircrews can also perform aerial
refueling operations.
Aircraft Capabilities
B-193. Table B-6 lists the capabilities of the MH-47D aircraft.
Table B-6. MH-47D Aircraft Capabilities
Aircraft Weight

Maximum gross weight 50,000 pounds

Empty gross weight 25,000 pounds
Maximum altitude 20,000 feet
Fuel Flow

Normal fuel consumption 2,750 pounds per hour

Maximum fuel consumption 3,300 pounds per hour
Range and Endurance

Fuel Tank Endurance (Hours + Minutes) Fuel Range (Nautical Miles)

Integral 2+08 256
NOTE: The range is limited only by aircrew and aerial refueling.
Cruise Speed

Normal Cruise 120 knots indicated airspeed

Maximum 170 knots indicated airspeed
NOTE: Actual figures are dependent upon temperature, aircraft gross weight, and density
altitude.
Aircraft Dimensions

Length of fuselage 50 feet 9 inches

Length of blades 98 feet 10 inches
Width of fuselage 11 feet 11 inches
Width of blades 52 feet
Height 18 feet 11 inches
Diameter of main rotor 60 feet
Aircraft turning radius 122 feet

B-37
FM 3-05.60

Table B-6. MH-47D Aircraft Capabilities (Continued)

Cargo Area (unobstructed)

Height 78 inches
Width 90 inches
Depth 366 inches
Troop Capacity

With seats 33 troops

Floor loading 65 troops
Litters 24 troops
NOTE: Actual amounts are dependent upon infiltration and exfiltration distances flown and
the number of internal auxiliary fuel tanks installed or the availability of aerial refueling.

TYPICAL MISSION COMPOSITION

B-194. A variety of mission scenarios may employ the MH-47D. A typical
mission profile for a low-to-medium threat infiltration and exfiltration sortie
could take the following form:
• Night, single-ship, VMC departure from a forward operating location to
a target 260 nautical miles (range dependent upon fuel configuration
and availability of prestaged FARP locations). MH-47D aircraft are
aerial refueling capable and are range limited by availability of MC-130
support.
• Navigate to an initial point using the best option of three navigational
modes available. GPS is the primary mode when the required number
of satellites is available.
• Using guidance cues, follow navigation steering to a landing site and
accomplish the approach to landing to a remote site of not less than 150
feet by 100 feet.
• On-load an exfiltration party of up to 65 passengers from conditions not
worse than 50°C (123ºF) at 500-foot pressure altitude.
• Reverse the route and return to a recovery base or location in friendly
territory.
• Low en route altitudes (down to 50 feet) are possible given favorable
conditions of ambient light and visibility and the use of infrared
searchlight with NVDs.

B-38
 FM 3-05.60

MH-47E HELICOPTER

MISSION
B-195. The primary mission of the MH-47E is to conduct overt and covert
infiltration, exfiltration, air assault, resupply, and sling operations over a
wide range of environmental conditions. The aircraft can perform a variety of
other missions, including shipboard operations, platform operations, urban
operations, water operations, FARP operations, mass casualty operations,
and CSAR operations.
DESCRIPTION
B-196. The MH-47E (Chinook) is a twin-engine, tandem rotor, heavy assault
helicopter specifically designed and built for the SOA mission. It has a totally
integrated avionics subsystem that combines the following:
• Redundant avionics architecture with dual mission processors.
• Remote terminal units.
• Multifunction displays and display generators to improve combat
survivability and mission reliability.
• Aerial refueling probe for in-flight refueling.
• External rescue hoist.

B-39
FM 3-05.60

• Two L714 turbine engines with full authority digital electronic control,
which provides more power during hot or high environmental
conditions.
• Two integral aircraft fuel tanks, providing 2,068 gallons of fuel.
• Stormscope for thunderstorm avoidance.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
B-197. The ARC-186 (V) VHF (AM/FM) provides air-to-air and air-to-
ground communications, with a band range from FM 30.000 to 87.975 MHz
and AM 116.000 to 151.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments.
B-198. The AN/ARC 201A (V) SINCGARS (VHF-FM) is a single-channel
ground and airborne radio system that provides voice and data
communications, in single channel of frequency hopping mode, with a band
range from 30.000 to 87.975 MHz.
B-199. The ARC-164 (V) UHF with HaveQuick II capability provides
air-to-air and air-to-ground communications with a band range from 225.000
to 399.975 MHz in 25-kHz increments.
B-200. The AN/ARC-200 HF Radio provides long-range two-way
communications in AM and single sideband (SSB), including the upper and
lower sidebands.
B-201. The AN/ARC-231 SKYFIRE SATCOM provides satellite two-way
communications, both line of sight or satellite, with a band range from
255.000 to 399.995 MHz in either 25- or 5-kHz spacing.
B-202. The SABRE is a ground communication radio that provides two-way
line-of-sight communication in the 136 MHz to 174 MHz range.
B-203. The CP-1516/ASQ ATHS provides the capability of data bursting
preselected and formatted information to other equipped aircraft or ground
stations.
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
B-204. The AN/ARN-149A ADF provides direction finding and homing.
B-205. The ARN-123 (V) (VOR/DME/ILS) provides heading guidance for
instrument navigation and instrument approaches.
B-206. The AN/ASN-137 Doppler Navigation System provides continuous
Doppler-derived measurements of the velocity of the helicopter and
continuous computations of the present position for worldwide navigation
guidance. In the MH-47E, these signals are sent to the mission processors
and are used as velocities only.
B-207. The EGI H764G Navigation System is a self-contained INU with
an embedded GPS card. The EGI system is fundamentally a dead-reckoning
navigation system. The advantage of a self-contained INU is its
invulnerability to enemy countermeasures. The disadvantage is its
inaccuracy, which builds over time unless the INU can be updated over
known landmarks. Through miniaturization, the GPS receiver has been
reduced to the size of a computer card. This miniature GPS receiver can now

B-40
 FM 3-05.60

be installed (embedded) in the INU. Using the closely coupled technique to

apply the GPS signal to the INU functions provides a means of accurately
fixing position and measuring velocity.
B-208. The AN/ASN 145 AHRS provides accurate outputs of pitch, roll,
heading, acceleration, velocity, and position to the integrated avionics system
or may act as a stand-alone system.
B-209. The AN/ARN-118 (V) TACAN Navigation Set provides slant range
distance, relative bearing, course deviation, distance to and from the station,
and station audio identification. It is additionally used during aerial refueling
for tanker-bearing information and during shipboard operations.
B-210. The AN/ASN-43 provides heading reference for system navigators.
B-211. The 2800A Air Data Computer (ADC) provides true airspeed,
pressure altitude, outside air temperature, and indicated airspeed to the
integrated avionics system or may act as a stand-alone system.
B-212. The AN/ARS6B PLS provides the relative position of downed
aviators equipped with the AN/PRC-112 transponder radio. It can also be
used to home to a continuous UHF radio signal.
B-213. The mission processor unit (2) provides mission management,
performance planning, and flight following. It provides the flight director’s
cues to the pilot, or it can be coupled through the AFCS as a two-axis
autopilot, allowing hands-off hovering, departures, cruise, and approaches.
(The pilot must still control the pitch axis.)
AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT
B-214. The AN/APR 39A (V) 1 Radar Warning Receiver identifies hostile
pulse fire control radar and provides audio and video alerts to the flight crew
when the system detects threat radar emissions.
B-215. The AN/APR 44 Radar Warning Receiver identifies hostile AI and
SAM CW fire control radar. It also provides audio and visual alerts to the
flight crew when the system detects threat radar emissions.
B-216. The M-130 Infrared Countermeasures Dispenser System
deceives radar guidance and infrared missiles by using chaff or flares as
required.
B-217. The AN/AAR-47 Missile Warning System is a passive electronic
warfare system that detects in-band infrared and ultraviolet radiation
emanating from a missile plume.
STANDARD MISSION EQUIPMENT
Armament
B-218. The MH-47E has three weapon stations: left forward window, right
cabin door, and the ramp. The forward stations mount a 7.62-mm minigun,
and the ramp station mounts an M60D 7.62-mm machine gun. An aircrew
member at each station manually operates the weapon. The weapons are
primarily for self-defense and enemy suppression.

B-41
FM 3-05.60

NOTE: When using the right cabin door weapon system, do not use the
forward fast-rope station.
B-219. The minigun is normally for soft targets and troop suppression, which
require a high rate of fire. The minigun is air cooled and link fed. It has a
maximum effective range of 1,500 meters with tracer burnout at 900 meters.
The weapon has an adjustable rate of fire of 2,000 or 4,000 rounds per
minute. The aircrew members currently fire ball or SLAP ammunition with a
mix of four balls to one tracer, 4:1, or a 9:1 mix to prevent NVD shutdown on
low-illumination nights. The ammunition complement without reloading is
8,000 rounds per weapon.
FRIES
B-220. The FRIES is a system for inserting and extracting personnel.
Applied loads for the FRIES are as follows:
• Applied loads at the rear ramp for insertions will not exceed nine
persons per rope at the same time.
• Applied loads at the rear ramp for extractions will not exceed six
persons per rope at the same time.
FLIR, AN/AAQ-16
B-221. The AN/AAQ-16 is a controllable, infrared surveillance system that
provides a television video-type infrared image of terrain features and ground
or airborne objects of interest. The FLIR is a passive system that detects long-
wavelength radiant infrared energy emitted, naturally or artificially, by any
object in daylight or darkness. In the MH-47E, the pilots or the onboard
computer may control the FLIR, and the infrared video may be saved on VHS
tape for later mission debriefings.
MAP DISPLAY GENERATOR
B-222. When used with the data transfer module (DTM), the map display
generator (MDG) displays aeronautical charts, photos, or digitized maps in
the mission planning and 3D modes of operation based on digital terrain
elevation data (DTED) and digital feature analysis data (DFAD).
MISSION-SELECTIVE SYSTEMS
External Cargo Hook System
B-223. Use each hook (Table B-7) separately or with others. Plan all loads as
a tandem-rigged load to facilitate greater load stability and to ensure faster
airspeeds during flight.
Table B-7. External Cargo Hooks, MH-47E
Type Capacity

Forward hook 17,000 pounds

Center hook 26,000 pounds

B-42
 FM 3-05.60

Table B-7. External Cargo Hooks, MH-47E (Continued)

Type Capacity

Aft hook 17,000 pounds

Tandem hook 25,000 pounds
NOTE: These are maximum hook-rated loads and may not accurately reflect the true
capability of the aircraft because of external conditions, such as pressure, altitude, and
temperature.
External Rescue Hoist
B-224. The external rescue hoist is for use at the right front cabin door. It
has a 600-pound capacity, with 200 feet of usable cable. Fast-rope operations
can still be conducted out the front cabin door with the hoist installed.
Internal Rescue Hoist
B-225. The internal rescue hoist is for use at the center cargo hook and
rescue hatch. It has a 600-pound capacity, with approximately 150 feet of
usable cable.
Cargo Compartment Expanded Range Fuel System
B-226. The CCERFS consists of one and up to three ballistic-tolerant, self-
sealing tanks. Each tank has the capacity of holding 800 gallons of fuel but
normally are filled to 780 gallons. Filling may occur during aerial refueling
operations or ground refueling operations.
Forward Area Refueling Equipment
B-227. The FARE consists of fueling pumps, hoses, nozzles, and additional
refueling equipment to set up a two-point refueling site. Gallons of fuel
dispensed are dependent upon the range of operation required of the tanker
aircraft.
TRANSPORTABILITY
B-228. SOA has modified validated procedures to load two MH-47Es on a C-5
and one MH-47E on a C-17, with all support equipment. The time required to
disassemble and assemble the MH-47E is greater than the time required of
other SO helicopters.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Planning Time
B-229. Execution of SOA missions usually follows a deliberate planning
sequence, time lined for maximum effectiveness. As planning time decreases,
a concurrent loss in planning detail occurs and risk increases.
Weather Minimums
B-230. The weather minimum for the MH-47E is a 500-foot ceiling, with a
visibility of 2 miles.

B-43
FM 3-05.60

Winds
B-231. No wind minimums are specified for training, operational, and
support missions; however, 45 knots is the maximum wind for starting and
stopping the rotor system in the MH-47E.
Flight Altitudes
B-232. For training missions, the minimum en route altitude is 150 feet AGL
or AHO for reconnoitered routes and 300 feet AGL or AHO for
unreconnoitered routes. For operational missions, the minimum en route
altitude is dictated by threat systems.
Landing Areas
B-233. The minimum landing area for the MH-47E is 150 feet by 100 feet.
Shipboard Operations
B-234. The MH-47E can operate day and night from Navy ships possessing
Level II Class III helicopter-landing pads.
Aircrew Composition
B-235. Most training, exercises, or operational or contingency missions
require five aircrew members. Aircrew members include a pilot, a copilot, a
flight engineer, and two aircrew chiefs. The flight engineer is usually at the
ramp station. He scans for other aircraft (targets or obstacles), operates the
hoist (when required), assists in FRIES operations, operates the machine
gun, and conducts sling-load operations. The aircrew chiefs are at the left and
right forward gunners’ stations. They scan for other aircraft (targets or
obstacles), operate the miniguns, and assist in sling-load and FRIES
operations.
Aircrew Qualifications
B-236. All aircrews can support flight operations for the missions stated in
JP 3-05. Aircrew qualifications include NVG infiltration and exfiltration
operations to urban, overwater (ship, oil rigs), mountainous, desert, and
jungle objectives arriving at the target at a prearranged time ± 30 seconds.
Aircrews are trained in formation live-fire, long-range NVD operations over
land and water. MH-47E aircrews can also perform aerial-refueling
operations.
Aircraft Capabilities
B-237. Table B-8 lists the capabilities of the MH-47E aircraft. Figures B-13
through B-20, pages B-46 through B-53, illustrate specific dimensions and
capabilities of the aircraft.
Table B-8. MH-47E Aircraft Capabilities
Aircraft Weight

Maximum gross weight 54,000 pounds

Empty gross weight 26,918 pounds

B-44
 FM 3-05.60

Table B-8. MH-47E Aircraft Capabilities (Continued)

Aircraft Dimensions

Length of fuselage 50 feet 9 inches

Length of probe 68 feet 7 inches
Length of blades 98 feet 10 inches
Width of fuselage 15 feet 8 inches
Width with blades 52 feet
Height 18 feet 7 inches
Diameter of main rotor 60 feet
Aircraft turning radius 122 feet
Cargo Area (unobstructed)

Height 78 inches
Width 90 inches
Depth 366 inches
Troop Capacity

With seats 44 troops

Floor loading 65 troops
Litters 24 troops
Airspeed

Normal cruise 120 knots indicated airspeed

Maximum dash 170 knots indicated airspeed
Maximum altitude 20,000 feet
Fuel Flow

Normal fuel consumption 2,750 pounds per hour

Maximum fuel consumption 3,300 pounds per hour
Range and Endurance

Fuel Tank Endurance (Hours + Minutes) Fuel Range (Nautical Miles)

Integral 4+30 540
Aircrew endurance and aerial refueling support may limit the range.
NOTE: Actual figures are dependent upon temperature, aircraft gross weight, and density
altitude.

B-45
FM 3-05.60

Figure B-13. MH-47E Aircraft Capabilities, Dimensions

B-46
 FM 3-05.60

Figure B-14. MH-47E Capabilities, Cargo Areas

B-47
FM 3-05.60

Figure B-15. MH-47E Capabilities, Turning Radius

B-48
 FM 3-05.60

Figure B-16. MH-47E Maximum Package Size

B-49
FM 3-05.60

Figure B-17. MH-47E Maximum Package Size, Ramp Door

B-50
 FM 3-05.60

Figure B-18. MH-47E Compartment Data

B-51
FM 3-05.60

Figure B-19. MH-47E Fitting Capabilities

B-52
 FM 3-05.60

Figure B-20. MH-47E Passenger Seating and Litter Placement

B-53
FM 3-05.60

TYPICAL MISSION COMPOSITION

B-238. A variety of mission scenarios may employ the MH-47E. A typical
mission profile for a low-to-medium threat infiltration or exfiltration sortie
could take the following form:
• Departing by night, single-ship, VMC from a forward operating location
to a target 520 nautical miles (range dependent upon fuel configuration
and availability of prestaged FARP locations). The MH-47E aircraft is
capable of aerial refueling. Availability of KC-, HC-, or MC-130 support
limits the range.
• Navigating to an initial point using the best option of eight
navigational modes available. GPS is the primary mode when the
required number of satellites is available.
• Using guidance cues, follow navigation steering to a landing site and
accomplish the approach to landing to a remote site of not less than 150
feet by 100 feet.
• On-loading an exfiltration party of up to 65 passengers from conditions
not worse than 50°C (123°F) at 500-foot pressure altitude.
• Reversing the route and returning to a recovery base or location in
friendly territory.
• Using low en route altitudes (down to 50 feet), given favorable
conditions of ambient light and visibility and use of infrared
searchlight with NVDs or during adverse weather conditions.

B-54
 FM 3-05.60

CAPABILITIES MATRIX
B-239. The ARSOA aircraft capabilities matrix (Figure B-21) is a ready
reference for mission planners. Its purpose is to reduce mission-planning
time. The matrix provides instant information, without time-consuming
research on the part of mission planners. The current aircraft capabilities
matrix encompasses all aircraft systems. ARSOA units must update the
matrix periodically as technology changes occur.

MH-6J AH-6J MH-60L MH-60L MH-60K MH-47D MH-47E

(DAP)

Aircraft Capabilities

Cruise Speed (Knots) 80 90 120 120 110 120 120

Flight Time (Standard Tanks) 1+20 1+17 1+45 1+40 1+30 2+08 4+30

Range (Nautical Miles) 110 116 212 200 165 256 540
(Standard Tanks)
Air Refuelable no no no yes yes yes yes
(FY 01)
Passengers 6 0 12 0 14 26 37

Maximum Passengers (No 6 0 17 0 23 60 65

Seats for Rucksacks)

Landing Area (Feet) 50x50 50x50 100x100 100x100 100x100 150x100 150x100

Communications

UHF yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

HF no no yes yes yes yes yes

VHF (FM/AM) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

SATCOM yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

SINCGARS yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

Sabre yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

ATHS no no yes yes no yes yes

Navigation

IMC Certified no no yes yes yes yes yes

GPS yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

ADF no no yes yes yes yes yes

VOR/DME yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

ILS no yes yes yes yes yes yes

Doppler no no yes yes yes yes yes

Figure B-21. ARSOA Aircraft Capabilities Matrix

B-55
FM 3-05.60

MH-6J AH-6J MH-60L MH-60L MH-60K MH-47D MH-47E

(DAP)

Navigation (Continued)

Inertial Navigation System no no no no yes yes yes

Attitude Heading Reference no no no no yes no yes

System

TACAN yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

Air Data Computer no no no no no yes yes

PLS no no yes yes yes yes yes

Mission Computer Unit no no no no yes yes yes

LORAN yes yes no no no no no

Armament

M134 7.62-mm Minigun no yes yes (2) yes (2) yes (2) yes (2) yes (2)
M230 30-mm Chain Gun no no no yes no no no
M260 7-Shot Rocket no yes no yes no no no
M261 19-Shot Rocket no yes no yes no no no
AGM-114 Hellfire (Maximum) no yes (4) no yes (8) no no no
M2 Caliber .50 Machine Gun no yes (2) no no no no no
ATA Stinger no yes no yes no no no

Standard or Special Equipment

Ballistic Armor yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Subsystem
Guardian Auxiliary Fuel Tank no no 2+00 2+00 2+00 no no
FRIES yes no yes yes yes yes yes
FLIR yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
External Cargo Hook no no 9,000 no 8,000 26,000 26,000
pounds pounds pounds pounds
Rescue Hoist no no 600 no 600 600 600
pounds pounds pounds pounds
Auxiliary Fuel System 3+50/ 2+57/ 5+00/ 4+45/ 3+30/ 7+53/ 8+20/
(Time/Nautical Miles) 310 266 600 570 385 945 1000
C2 Console no no yes no no no yes

Figure B-21. ARSOA Aircraft Capabilities Matrix (Continued)

B-56
 Appendix C

Operations
This appendix contains the formats of an OPORD and a mission-planning
folder specifically designed for ARSOA aircrews. Mission-planning
aircrews continually coordinate and update these documents throughout
the execution of the mission. This appendix also discusses airspace C2 for
ARSOA aircrew operations.

ARSOA OPERATIONS ORDER

C-1. The S3 of the ARSOA task force modifies the standard OPORD to
develop an aviation-specific OPORD (Figure C-1). A detailed ARSOA OPORD
is critical to mission success.

(Classification)
1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy forces.
(1) Weather (current and forecast).
(a) Area of operations or objective area.
(b) Forward staging base.
(c) En route (ingress and egress).
(2) Light data.
(a) Sources of light for night operations.
(b) Percent of moon illumination.
(c) Angle of moon during operation.
(3) Sea data.
(a) Sea state.
(b) Water temperature.
(4) Terrain (area of operations and objective area).
(a) Key terrain.
(b) Decisive terrain.
(c) Avenues of approach (air, land, and sea).

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format

C-1
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(d) Cover and concealment.
(e) Observation and fires.
(f) Hazards (existing obstacles and minefields).
(g) Effect on aviation.
(h) Effect on mission.
(i) Choke points on route.
(5) Enemy troops.
(a) Permissive, uncertain, and hostile environment.
(b) En route, LZ and objective area, FARP sites.
(c) Identification of forces.
(d) Locations.
(e) Strength.
(f) Morale.
(g) Capabilities.
(h) Vulnerabilities.
(i) Activities (current and future).
(j) C2.
(k) Service and support.
(l) Probable COAs following mission execution.
(m) Reaction time from known locations.
b. Friendly forces.
(1) Higher HQ.
(a) Command relationship (effective date-time group [DTG]).
(b) Mission.
(c) Intent.
(2) Ground and assault force.
(a) Command relationship (effective DTG).
(b) Mission.
(c) Intent.
(3) Adjacent units.
(a) Location.
(b) Mission.
(c) Airspace coordination.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-2
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
c. Attachments and detachments.
(1) Command relationship (effective DTG).
(2) Mission.
(3) Location.
d. Public affairs guidance.
e. Priority intelligence requirements and information requirements (PIR and IRs).
f. Essential elements of information and essential elements of friendly information (EEI
and EEFI).
2. MISSION. Who, what, when, where, and why.
3. EXECUTION.
Intent: State the commander’s intent.
a. Concept of the operation.
(1) Scheme of maneuver.
(a) General scheme, mission profile (diagram, chart), and H-hour (if applicable).
(b) Event- or time-driven.
(c) Phasing.
(d) Main effort.
(2) Plan of fire support.
(a) General scheme (air, ground, naval).
(b) Priority of fires.
(c) Target overlay.
(d) Types of fires.
(e) Preparatory or prehour fires.
(f) Fire support coordination measures.
(g) Illumination requirements.
(h) J-SEAD.
(i) Employment of nuclear or chemical fires.
(j) Test fire time and location.
(k) Actions to prevent fratricide.
(3) Counterair operations.
(a) Assets and plan.
(b) Use of ASE.
(c) Passive measures.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-3
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(4) EW.
(a) Collection and jamming.
(b) Types of targets.
(c) Priority of jamming.
(5) Deception.
(a) LZs, routes.
(b) Special movement and landing instructions.
(c) Deception target and intent.
b. Tasks to subordinate units.
(1) Companies, platoons, sections, or teams.
(2) AVUM.
(3) HQ.
c. Tasks to combat support units.
(1) Fire support.
(a) CAS.
(b) Chemical support.
(c) Field artillery support (including displacement).
(d) Naval gunfire support.
(e) Attack helicopters (AHs).
(f) Special instructions.
(g) Fire support overlay and target list.
(2) Air defense.
(a) Command relationship.
(b) Specified tasks.
(3) Chemical (including decontamination).
(4) EW.
(5) Engineering (battlespace preparation).
d. ISB.
(1) Marshalling area procedures and control.
(2) Time sequence.
(a) Show.
(b) Concept briefing.
(c) Weather decision.
(d) Preflight.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-4
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(e) Aircraft run-ups, equipment checks, communications checks, load time.
(3) Route to the area.
(4) Fuel requirements.
(5) Special equipment required.
(6) Contingencies.
(a) Minimum number of aircraft.
(b) Aircraft abort (cross-loading of personnel and equipment).
(c) Weather abort criteria.
(d) Ground force command and AMC bump plan.
(7) Aircraft parking plan.
(8) Aircraft load plan on C-5, C-17, C-130, C-141.
(9) Security plan.
e. FSB.
(1) Location.
(2) Landing.
(a) C-5, C-17, C-130, C-141.
1. Direction.
2. Time.
3. Offload sequence and position.
4. Aircraft parking and buildup area.
5. Fuel plan.
(b) Self-deployed.
(3) Aircraft combat load (ACL) plan.
(a) Seat configuration (if any) and number.
(b) Straps.
(c) Doors opened or closed.
(d) Miscellaneous equipment (stored, location).
(4) Security requirements.
(5) Repositioning for departure.
*(6) Hazards.
*(7) Weapons systems loading.
(a) Location.
(b) Orientation or heading.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-5
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(c) Safety measures.
*(8) Takeoff.
(a) Time.
(b) Heading.
(c) Formation.
(d) Airspeed.
(e) Altitude.
(f) Hazards.
(g) Aircraft lighting.
(h) ASE requirements.
(i) Fuel required.
(j) Weapons status.
(9) Combat control team (CCT) instructions.
(a) Communications.
(b) Signal.
*(10) Contingencies.
(a) Air Force air aborts.
(b) Air Force go-around.
(c) Aircrew injuries.
(d) Bump plan.
1. Change of lead aircraft due to maintenance.
2. Change of AMC aircraft due to maintenance.
3. Change of ground commander aircraft due to maintenance.
4. Change of other aircraft.
5. Spare (location, running, not running).
(11) Weather abort criteria.
(12) Aircraft abort criteria.
(a) Minimum number aircraft required to accomplish the mission.
(b) Aircraft systems failure criteria.
f. Flight route.
(1) Initial approach fix (IAF) air aborts.
(2) Formation.
(3) Airspeed and ground speed.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-6
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(4) Altitudes.
(5) Hazards to flight.
*(6) Turns in excess of 60Û
*(7) Communications signals unique to this portion.
*(8) Air traffic control (ATC) and CCT procedures.
*(9) Aircraft lighting.
*(10) Checkpoints.
*(11) Rally points (air and ground).
*(12) Point of no return.
*(13) Brief penetration control measures.
(a) IFF set for penetration.
(b) ASE and electronic countermeasures (ECM) (APR-39/44, flares, chaff, ALQ-144, radar,
TACAN).
(c) Armor panels and plates, forward.
(d) Armament systems.
(e) Review release point (RP), target, departure, and go-around procedures.
(f) Fast rope, extend bars.
(g) Fuel transfer off, prior to RP.
(h) Warning calls.
(i) Aircraft lights, interior and exterior.
(j) FLIR, lower brightness RP or short final.
(14) RP; time, distance, and heading (TDH) from RP to objective.
(15) Egress.
(a) Armament systems.
(b) Aircraft lights, adjust.
(c) IFF.
(16) Penetration control point (PCP) procedures.
(17) Aviation element link-up procedures.
(a) Location.
(b) Communications.
(c) Link-up procedure.
(18) ASE requirements (specify actions along route and especially when cross-FLOT).
*(19) Weapons status.
(a) Hold, fire only in self-defense.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-7
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(b) Tight, fire only if target identified as enemy.
(c) Free, fire at anything except if positively identified as friendly.
**(20) Contingencies.
(a) Downed aircraft.
(b) Actions on enemy contact.
(c) Communications failure.
(d) Lead disorientation.
(e) Weather abort.
(f) Adjustment to route procedures.
(g) Maintenance divert.
(h) Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) divert.
(i) Formation change.
(21) Mission abort criteria.
g. Landing area procedures (LZ, PZ).
(1) Location (primary and alternate).
(2) Description.
*(3) Hazards.
*(4) Arrival procedures.
(a) Time.
(b) Formation.
(c) Direction.
(d) Airspeed.
(e) ATC and CCT procedures.
(f) Aircraft lighting.
(g) Doors opened and closed.
(h) Door gunner instructions.
(i) Signal to execute alternate PZ and LZ.
(5) PZ and LZ marking and control.
(6) Aircraft positioning in PZ and LZ.
(a) Engines running.
(b) Auxiliary power unit (APU) only.
(c) Complete shutdown.
(d) Security in the PZ and LZ.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-8
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
*(7) Load plan (including troop safety considerations).
(a) Seat configuration (if any) and number.
(b) Strap configuration.
(c) Doors opened or closed.
*(8) Link-up procedures with supporting aviation elements.
*(9) Minimum fuel required to complete the mission from PZ and LZ.
(10) FARP operations (see coordinating instructions).
**(11) Contingencies.
(a) Lead aircraft change.
(b) AMC aircraft change.
(c) Task Force (TF) commander aircraft change.
(d) Tactical bump plan.
(e) Dispersal plan and rally point.
*(12) Time sequencing.
(a) Load.
(b) Reposition.
(c) Takeoff.
(d) Time on target (TOT) or H-hour.
*(13) Security requirements.
*(14) Weapons status.
(15) Departure procedures (same as FSB).
(16) En route procedures (same as flight route).
h. Assault (landing) plan and actions on the objective or target.
(1) LZ and objective location (primary and alternate).
(2) TOT and H-hour (rounds on target or wheels down) or critical
event that must occur before assault.
(3) Formation at RP (assault formation).
(4) Direction of flight.
*(5) Airspeed and ground speed.
*(6) Altitude.
*(7) Aircraft lighting.
(8) Hazards in the LZ or objective.
(9) LZ marking and control.
(10) ATC or CCT procedures.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-9
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(11) Aircraft touchdown points.
(12) Type of assault (fast rope, air, land).
(13) Location of friendly troops in LZ (reconnaissance and surveillance team, sniper).
*(14) ASE requirements in the LZ.
*(15) Air defense status and coordinating instructions.
*(16) Weapons status (hold, tight, free).
(17) Fires.
(a) Door gunner’s missions (be specific).
1. Priorities and sectors.
2. Shift-fire and hold-fire instructions.
3. Control measures and actions taken to prevent fratricide.
(b) Target overlay (artillery, AH control measures).
(c) Preplanned fires.
(d) ROE.
(e) Laser safety (troops on the ground).
(f) DAP, AH priorities, and type of ammunition.
**(18) Contingencies.
(a) Downed aircraft on insertion and departure.
(b) Go-around procedures (direction, signal, altitude, lighting, communication,
control measures, and intentions).
(c) Actions on enemy contact (flight and individual aircraft).
(d) Communications failure.
(e) Rally point.
(f) Friendly killed in action (KIA)/wounded in action (WIA) (troops and aircrew members).
(g) Signal to execute alternate LZ or objective.
(h) Aircraft delay and down on LZ.
(19) Departure instructions.
(a) Authorization to depart.
(b) Departure plan (when ready, in chalk order, or as a flight).
NOTE: If departing individually, identify departure sectors, control measures (“Eagle” call), rally
point, and safety measures.
(c) Heading.
(d) Formation.
(e) Airspeed and ground speed.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-10
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(f) Aircraft lighting.
(g) ATC and CCT procedures.
(h) Routes (primary and alternate).
(20) Follow-on instructions (laager, prepare for extraction, hold, return to FSB).
(21) Safety considerations during the assault and extraction.
i. Departure airfield procedures.
(1) Location.
(2) Arrival procedures.
(3) Parking and tear down.
(4) Repositioning.
(5) Marshalling.
(6) Critical times.
**(7) Contingencies.
(a) Friendly WIA and KIA.
(b) Aircraft abort or down.
(c) Weather abort.
(8) Security.
j. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Location and markings of friendly.
(2) Maps and charts.
(3) SAR plan.
(a) Brief CSAR zones for ingress, egress, safe area.
(b) Brief concept of operation, CSAR assets, C2, signal.
(c) Recovery hospital, secure LZ and FSB.
(d) Weather or divert plan (alternate recovery instructions).
(e) Effect on tactical operation.
(f) PLS coordination.
(g) Activation or implementation of SAR plan.
(4) EPA.
(a) Escape and evasion route, checkpoints, and procedures.
(b) Designated area for recovery (DAR).
(c) Recognition and recovery procedures.
(d) Notification procedures.
(e) PLS and ISOPREP coordination.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-11
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(f) Destruction of aircraft and sensitive items.
(5) Initial IMC procedures.
(a) Altitude to climb to, heading, airspeed, squawk.
(b) Recovery airfield and instrument capabilities.
(c) Minimum safe altitude.
(d) Communications procedures.
(e) Highest terrain, obstacles, and hazards.
(f) Effect on mission.
(g) Forecast weather and freezing level.
(h) Tactical procedures.
(i) Approval by higher headquarters of initial IMC recovery plan.
(6) FARP procedures.
(a) Location, marking, and marshalling control.
(b) Airspace management.
(c) Refueling points.
(d) Rearm points.
(e) Safety (weapons, ammunition, personnel).
(f) Security.
(g) Dispersal plan (including link-up procedures at rally point).
(h) Lighting.
(7) J-SEAD.
(8) Aircrew coordinating instructions with assault force in flight (time warnings and navigation).
(a) Fast-rope procedures, doors open and closed, removal of cargo strap, primary doors.
(b) Headset and communications coordination.
(c) Call-out of air control points (ACPs) or RP-TDH to objective or LZ.
(d) Time warnings.
(e) Confirm LZ.
(f) Door fires.
(g) Clamshell report (report given after all personnel and equipment are clear of the target
area).
(9) Mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level (include instructions on NBC defense and
decontamination procedures and operational exposure guide [OEG]).
(10) ROE.
(a) Combatants.
(b) Noncombatants.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-12
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(11) Precious-cargo-handling instructions (person or item that is the objective of the mission).
(a) Handling and control in and out of aircraft.
(b) Control in the aircraft.
(c) Doors closed.
(d) Reporting requirements (clamshell report).
(12) Preaccident plan.
(13) Inspections.
(a) Individual.
(b) Aircraft systems and communication.
(c) Weapons systems.
(14) Rehearsals and equipment checks.
(a) Loading and offloading procedures.
(b) Aerial link-ups.
(c) Assault procedures and actions on the objective.
(d) Door gunner fire procedures.
(e) Communications checks.
(f) ASE checks.
(g) Weapons checks, bore sighting, laser mount.
(h) Precious cargo handling.
(i) FARP operations.
(j) Actions on the objective.
(15) Air defense warning and air defense weapons control status.
(16) Individual responsibilities.
(a) Flight plan.
(b) Manifest.
(c) Weather.
(d) Sensitive item inventory.
(e) Weapons issue.
(f) ALSE issue.
(g) Mission brief sheet.
(h) Sterilization.
(i) Fuel identification plate (government credit card).
(j) NVG emergency locator transmitter (ELT) and radio aircraft key.
(17) Airspace deconfliction and coordination.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-13
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(18) Precision letdown procedures (GPS) at FSB, ISB, target.
(19) Antiterrorism measures.
(20) Backbrief time and location (platoon leader, AMC, flight lead, and key personnel
backbrief critical events or concept to commander).
(21) Debrief time and location.
(22) Weather decision time.
(23) Final mission update time and location.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. Supply.
(1) Class I (rations).
(2) Class III (fuel, POL).
(a) Location.
(b) Type.
(c) Amount.
(d) Compatibility of fuel and equipment.
(3) Class V (ammunition).
(a) Issue point and procedures.
(b) Individual authorizations by type.
(c) Crew-served authorizations by type.
(d) Aircraft systems authorizations by type.
(e) Turn-in procedures.
(4) Class VIII (medical supplies).
(5) Class IX (aircraft repair parts).
b. Water.
c. Maps.
d. Uniform.
e. ALSE.
f. Special equipment.
(1) ASE.
(2) PLS.
(3) Oxygen.
(4) FRIES.
(5) Cargo hook.
(6) Seats.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-14
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
g. Storage.
h. Weapons.
(1) Aircraft systems and aircrew-served weapons.
(2) Individual weapons.
(3) Issue instructions.
(4) Storage and security.
(5) Test firing and cleaning.
(6) Maintenance.
(7) Turn-in procedures.
i. Billeting.
j. Finance.
k. Transportation.
l. Maintenance.
(1) Location and composition of support.
(a) Pre-mission.
(b) Preflight.
(c) Crank.
(d) Mission.
(2) Location and composition of ground support equipment.
(a) Pre-mission.
(b) Preflight.
(c) Crank.
(d) Mission.
(3) Support facilities available.
(a) Hangar.
(b) Shop capabilities.
(4) Downed aircraft recovery.
(a) Recovery officer in charge and team location.
(b) Notification on command net frequency of the following information:
1. Type and serial number of downed aircraft.
2. Latitude and longitude of aircraft.
3. Description of recovery site.
4. Brief description of aircraft condition.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-15
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
5. Area security call sign and frequency.
6. Sensitive items and aircraft configuration.
7. Authority to destroy, if required.
(c) Method of recovery.
1. Method of recovery or disposition of aircraft made after consideration of
information received and tactical situation.
2. One of three methods of recovery.
m. MEDEVAC procedures.
(1) Responsibilities.
(2) Recovery hospital and location.
(3) Coordination procedures and communications.
(4) Alternate recovery procedure.
(5) Collection point at objective area.
(6) Launch authority.
n. Prisoner of war handling and collection point (including civilian detainees, if applicable).
o. NBC equipment and location of decontamination sites.
p. Services (hygiene, laundry, trash collection).
q. Discipline, law, and order.
r. Casualty reporting procedures.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command.
(1) Commander and location.
(2) AMC and location.
(3) Assault force commander (second in charge) and location.
(4) TF commander and location.
(5) Flight lead.
(6) Succession of command (air assault TF commander or ground commander,
air component commander, air mission commander, flight or serial commander).
(7) Rear detachment commander.
(8) Battalion or company command post location.
(9) TF command post location.
(10) Assault force command post location.
(11) Location of command sergeant major or first sergeant.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-16
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
b. Signal.
(1) Signal operating instructions (SOI) period (fill dates).
(2) Call signs.
(3) Frequencies or nets (primary and alternate, secure and nonsecure).
(a) Mission command.
(b) TF command.
(c) Helicopter communications.
(d) Company internal.
(e) Adjacent units.
(f) Fire control.
(g) SAR.
(h) SERE and PLS PRC 112-A-B.
(i) MEDEVAC.
(j) ATC and CCT.
(k) AWACS.
(l) Vectoring.
(m) Satellite and HF.
(4) Execution checklist and prowords.
(5) Signals.
(a) Lights.
(b) Visual markers.
(c) Recognition (day and night).
(d) Recognition (near and far).
(6) Challenge and password.
(7) Running password and number combination.
(8) Secure communications requirements. Identify element responsible for keying.
(9) Transponder.
(a) Mode requirements (include Transponder Kit lA/C) and codes.
(b) Antenna requirements.
(10) Aids to navigation.

* May be briefed under coordinating instructions.

** May be briefed under contingencies.

(Classification)

Figure C-1. ARSOA Operations Order Format (Continued)

C-17
FM 3-05.60

ARSOA MISSION PLANNING FOLDER

C-2. This portion of the appendix provides guidance on preparing the various
components of an ARSOA mission planning folder. Components of the
mission planning folder include the mission tasking letter, the feasibility
assessment, the initial assessment, the TIP for DA and SR missions, the TIP
for FID and UW missions, the mission tasking package, the SOF plan of
execution (POE), and the POEs for infiltrations and exfiltrations.

MISSION TASKING LETTER

C-3. The JFSOCC assigns missions to SOF commanders based on the joint
targeting process. Along with the commander who is responsible for
executing the mission, the JFSOCC selects a JSOA. Missions may range from
a specified task to a broad, continuing mission order. Figure C-2 shows a
sample format for a mission tasking letter.

(Classification)
Addressees:
I. REFERENCES.
II. GENERAL.
A. JFSOCC’s concept for employment of the Army special operations aviation task force
(ARSOATF) (deployment, employment, and sustainment).
B. JFSOCC’s contingency missions assigned the ARSOATF.
C. U.S. military strategic objectives.
D. Variables that complicate the attainment of strategic objectives.
E. JFC’s campaign plan points that accommodate the variables.
F. Preparation and priorities for unplanned contingencies.
III. JFSOCC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
A. Location and mission of the JFSOCC.
B. ARSOATF mission.
IV. SPECIFIC MISSION GUIDANCE.
A. Force operating locations.
B. Readiness standards (deployment time and time to commence operations expressed
in N+XX).
C. Specified operations tasks.
D. Specified planning and preparation tasks.
E. Specified area and mission orientation.
F. Actions to prevent fratricide.
V. SUSTAINMENT.
VI. COMMAND AND CONTROL.
VII. OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES.
(Classification)

Figure C-2. Mission Tasking Letter Format

C-18
 FM 3-05.60

FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT
C-4. The feasibility assessment (Figure C-3) is a basic target analysis that
provides an initial determination of the viability of a proposed target for SOF
employment. Normally, the feasibility assessment is associated with the SOF
ground element. When an ARSOATF is given a unilateral mission to conduct
a DA or an SR mission, the feasibility assessment should be used for target
analysis. It should include an initial assessment.

(Classification)
SECTION I - MISSION DESCRIPTION
A. Target Identification Data (Basic Encyclopedia [BE] Number, Category Code, Geographic
Coordinates, Universal Transverse Mercator [UTM] Coordinates, and Map Sheets).
B. Mission Statement and Commander’s Guidance.

SECTION II - COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT

A. Target Feasibility.
B. Probability of Mission Success.
C. Recommendation.
SECTION III - ASSUMPTIONS
SECTION IV - FACTORS AFFECTING COURSES OF ACTION
A. Characteristics of Joint Special Operations Area.
1. Weather.
2. Terrain.
3. Other factors.
B. Friendly Situation.
C. Enemy Situation.
1. Composition.
2. Disposition.
3. Strength.
a. Committed forces.
b. Location of reinforcements and estimated reaction times.
c. NBC capabilities.
4. Significant enemy activity, intelligence, and counterintelligence capabilities.
5. Peculiarities and weaknesses.
6. Vulnerability to deception.

(Classification)

Figure C-3. Feasibility Assessment Format

C-19
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
7. Enemy capabilities.
a. Defensive.
b. Offensive.
c. Intelligence and counterintelligence.
8. Reaction and reinforcement.
9. Security on target.
SECTION V - COURSES OF ACTION
A. Identification of COAs.
B. Analysis of COAs.
C. Comparison of COAs.
1. Advantages.
2. Disadvantages.
3. Risks.
D. Recommended COA.
SECTION VI - INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
SECTION VII - SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Personnel.
B. Logistics (Including CSS).
C. Other.
(Classification)

Figure C-3. Feasibility Assessment Format (Continued)

C-20
 FM 3-05.60

INITIAL ASSESSMENT
C-5. The initial assessment (Figure C-4) provides a basic determination of
the viability of the infiltration and exfiltration portions of a proposed SOF
mission. If the mission is to support another Army or Navy SOF mission, the
initial assessment becomes a part of the feasibility assessment as needed to
help establish the overall viability of the mission. The initial assessment goes
to the MPA for review and approval before it goes to the JFSOCC.

(Classification)
SECTION I - MISSION DESCRIPTION (BE Number, Category Code, Geographic Coordinates,
UTM Coordinates, Map Sheets)
SECTION II - ASSUMPTIONS
SECTION III - MISSION DATA
A. Launch Bases, ISBs, Recovery Bases.
B. LZs, DZs, Seaward Launch Points (SLPs), Beach Landing Sites (BLSs), Recovery Zones (RZs),
and Seaward Recovery Points (SRPs).
C. Abort and Emergency Divert Bases.
D. Air-Refueling Tracks and FARPs.
E. Flight and Seaward Approach Routes.
1. Ingress.
2. Egress.
3. Orbiting and holding.
F. Range Factors.
G. Time Factors.
H. Route Factors.
I. Refueling Factors.
J. Aircrew Factors.
K. Weather.
SECTION IV - MISSION ASSESSMENT
A. Threat.
1. Air defenses.
2. Deception of air defenses.
3. Surface and subsurface waters.
B. Probability of Team Infiltration.
C. Probability of Team Resupply.
D. Probability of Team Exfiltration.

(Classification)
Figure C-4. Initial Assessment Format

C-21
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
E. Overall Probability of Mission Success.
F. Other Factors.
SECTION V - LIMITING FACTORS
A. Intelligence.
B. Weather.
C. Terrain and Hydrography.
D. Equipment.
E. Monitors.
F. Tactics.
G. Logistics (Including CSS).
H. Personnel.
I. Training.
J. Supporting Forces.
K. ROE, Fratricide Prevention, and Legal Issues.
SECTION VI - SUPPORTING DATA
A. Photography and Imagery Requested.
B. Intelligence Information Requested.
SECTION VII - INITIAL ASSESSMENT BOARD
A. Composition.
B. Recommendation.
SECTION VIII - SOA, SURFACE SHIP, AND SUBMARINE REQUIREMENTS FROM
AFSOF, ARSOF, AND NAVSOF TO CONDUCT INITIAL ASSESSMENT
A. Target Coordinates.
B. Maximum and Minimum Distances of LZs, DZs, SLPs, BLSs, RZs, SRPs From Target.
C. Time Frame in OPLAN and CONPLAN Scenario (Pre-D-Day or D+XX).
D. Desired Launch and Recovery Bases.
E. Type of Delivery and Recovery Required (Airdrop, AirLand, Fast Rope, SEAL Delivery Vehicle,
or Combat Rubber Raiding Craft) and Preferred Platform.
F. Number of Personnel to be Transferred and Approximate Weight per Person.
G. Approximate Size and Weight of Additional Equipment.
H. Assumptions Made During Supported Commander’s Feasibility Assessment.
NOTE: Although not always readily available, information on hand is normally sufficient to
conduct the initial assessment. An effort should be made, however, to obtain and include in the
initial assessment all the information in the format sample.

(Classification)

Figure C-4. Initial Assessment Format (Continued)

C-22
 FM 3-05.60

TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE FOR DA AND SR MISSIONS

C-6. Figure C-5 provides a sample format of a SOF TIP for DA and SR
missions.

(Classification)
SECTION I - TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION
A. Target Identification Data.
B. Description and Significance.
C. Detailed Target Description.
D. Target Vulnerability Assessment.
SECTION II - NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
A. Geographic Data (Including Terrain and Hazards to Movement).
B. Meteorological Data (Climatological Overview and Tables and Illumination Data).
C. Hydrographic Data (Coasts, Waterways, Lakes, and Luminescence).
SECTION III - THREAT
A. Ground Forces (Including Border Guards).
B. Paramilitary and Indigenous Forces (Including Intelligence and Security and Police Services).
C. Naval Forces (Including Coast Guard and Maritime Border Guard).
D. Air Forces.
E. Air Defense Forces (Including Radars; Passive Detectors; and Command, Control, and
Communications [C3]).
F. Electronic OB.
G. Space-Based Assets.
H. Other.
SECTION IV - DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURAL FEATURES
A. Area Population Characteristics.
B. Languages, Dialects, and Ethnic Composition.
C. Social Conditions.
D. Religious Factors.
E. Political Characteristics.
F. Economic Conditions.
G. Miscellaneous (Currency, Holidays, Dress, and Customs).
SECTION V - LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
A. Airfields.

(Classification)

Figure C-5. Format of Target Intelligence Package for DA and SR Missions

C-23
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
B. Railways.
C. Roadways.
D. Waterways.
E. Ports.
F. POL.
G. Power Grid.
H. Telecommunications and Media (Print, Radio, and Television).

SECTION VI - INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION (Potential LZs, DZs, BLSs, and

helicopter landing zones [HLZs])
A. Potential Zones.
B. Choke Points Between Insertion Points and Objective.

SECTION VII - SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, ESCAPE, AND RECOVERY DATA

A. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape, and Recovery (SERER) and SAFE Areas.
B. Survival Data.

SECTION VIII - UNIQUE INTELLIGENCE (Mission-Specific Requirements Not Covered Above)

SECTION IX - INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS
Annex A. Bibliography.
Annex B. Glossary.
Annex C. Imagery.
Annex D. Maps and Charts.
Annex E. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) (If Applicable).

(Classification)

Figure C-5. Format of Target Intelligence Package for DA and SR Missions (Continued)

C-24
 FM 3-05.60

TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE FOR FID AND UW MISSIONS

C-7. Figure C-6 shows a sample format of a TIP for FID and UW missions.

(Classification)
SECTION I - OBJECTIVE AREA IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION
A. Objective Area Identification Data.
B. Description and Significance.

SECTION II - NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

A. Meteorological Data (Illumination Data and Climatological Overview and Tables).
B. Hydrographic Data (Coasts, Waterways, Lakes, and Luminescence).
C. Water Sources (Color-Coded Overlay).
D. Flora and Fauna (Plants and Animals of Tactical Importance).
SECTION III - THREAT
A. Objective Country (Enemy OB).
B. Opposition and Resistance Forces.
SECTION IV - DEMOGRAPHIC, CULTURAL, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL FEATURES (EEI
Must Be Answered for Objective Country and for Opposition and Resistance Forces)
A. Area Population Characteristics (Including Resistance Potential).
B. Languages, Dialects, and Ethnic Composition.
C. Social Conditions.
D. Religious Factors.
E. Political Characteristics.
F. Available Labor Force.
G. Customs (Society, Weapons, Religion, Culture, and Mores).
H. Medical Capabilities.
I. Health and Sanitation Conditions.
J. Economic Conditions.
K. Currency, Holidays, and So On.
SECTION V - LINES OF COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
AND LOGISTICS
A. Airfields.
B. Railways.
C. Roadways.
D. Waterways.
E. Ports.
(Classification)

Figure C-6. Format of Target Intelligence Package for FID and UW Missions

C-25
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
F. POL.
G. Power Grid.
H. Telecommunications and Media (Print, Radio, and Television).
I. Exploitable Civilian Transportation.
J. Primary Modes of Transportation.
K. U.S.-Provided Materials and Services.
L. Stockpiles.
M. War-Sustaining Industries.
N. War-Sustaining Resupply.
O. Movement Control Centers.
SECTION VI - INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION (Potential LZs, DZs, BLSs, and HLZs)
A. Potential Zones.
B. Choke Points Between Insertion Points and Objective Country (EEI Must Be Answered for the
Objective Country and for Opposition and Resistance Forces.)
SECTION VII - FID AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE (EEI Must Be Answered for the Objective
Country and for Opposition and Resistance Forces.)
A. Military Assistance Provided.
B. Foreign Personnel (Noncombatants).
C. Foreign Military Materiel.
D. Deployments of Foreign Personnel and Equipment.
E. Foreign Contractor Services and Construction.
F. U.S. Support.
SECTION VIII - SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, ESCAPE, AND RECOVERY DATA
A. SERER, SAFE Areas, and DAR Areas.
B. Survival Data.
SECTION IX - UNIQUE INTELLIGENCE (Mission-Specific Requirements Not Covered Above)
SECTION X - INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS
Annex A. Bibliography.
Annex B. Glossary.
Annex C. Imagery.
Annex D. Maps and Charts.
Annex E. SCI (If Applicable).

(Classification)

Figure C-6. Format of Target Intelligence Package for FID and UW Missions (Continued)

C-26
 FM 3-05.60

MISSION TASKING PACKAGE

C-8. Each mission tasking package consists of a mission tasking letter and
the transmittal documents. Figure C-7 shows the items included in the
mission tasking package.

(Classification)
SECTION I - MISSION TASKING LETTER AND TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENTS
A. Joint Force Special Operations Component (JFSOC) Tasking.
B. Subordinate Tasking From the JFSOCC.
C. Coordinating Instructions.
D. Direct Liaison Authorized (Yes or No).
SECTION II - TARGET IDENTIFICATION DATA
A. Name.
B. BE Number.
C. Mission Number (If Applicable).
D. Mission Tasks.
E. Functional Classification Code.
F. Country.
G. JSOA Coordinates (Geographic Reference [GEOREF] or UTM).
H. Geographic Coordinates (GEOREF or UTM).
I. General Description and Target Significance.
SECTION III - CINC MISSION GUIDANCE (Combatant Commander’s Mission Statement and
Objectives)
A. Mission Statement.
B. Specific Targeting Objective.
C. Commander’s Guidance.
D. C2.
SECTION IV - RECORD OF CHANGES
SECTION V - RECORD OF DISTRIBUTION

(Classification)

Figure C-7. Mission Tasking Package Format

C-27
FM 3-05.60

SOF PLAN OF EXECUTION

C-9. The POE is a detailed plan that shows how the SOF mission will be
carried out. This plan, along with the POE for infiltration and exfiltration
and mission rehearsals, is the result of the targeting and mission planning
process. It also describes the supporting infiltration and exfiltration plan
developed by the supporting organization. Figure C-8 shows a sample SOF
POE format.

(Classification)
Issuing HQ:
Place:
Day, Month, Year, Hour:
Commander’s or MPA’s Estimate of the Situation:
References (Maps, Charts, and Other Pertinent Documents):
SECTION I - MISSION DESCRIPTION (BE Number, Category Code, Geographic Coordinates,
UTM Coordinates, and Map Sheets)
SECTION II - THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
A. Considerations Affecting the COAs.
1. Characteristics of the JSOA.
a. Military geography.
(1) Topography.
(2) Hydrography and luminescence data.
(3) Climate, weather, and illumination data.
b. Transportation.
c. Telecommunications.
d. Politics.
e. Economics.
f. Sociology.
g. Science and technology.
2. Relative combat power.
a. Enemy.
(1) Strength.
(2) Composition.
(3) Location and disposition.
(4) Reinforcements.
(5) Logistics.

(Classification)

Figure C-8. SOF POE Format

C-28
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(6) Time and space factors.
(7) Combat efficiency.
b. Friendly forces.
(1) Strength.
(2) Composition.
(3) Location and disposition.
(4) Reinforcements.
(5) Friendly force assistance.
(6) Logistics (including CSS).
(7) Time and space factors.
(8) Combat efficiency.
3. Assumptions.
B. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.
C. Comparison of Friendly COAs.
1. Statement of COAs.
2. Assessment of the probability of success.
3. Comparison of COAs.
D. Decision (Recommended COA) and Mission Profile.
1. Method and location of infiltration.
2. Movement to target area.
3. Actions at the objective.
4. Movement to the objective and the method of exfiltration.
SECTION III - SUPPORTING PLANS
A. Overall Schedule.
1. Preparation.
2. Rehearsal.
3. Rendezvous.
4. Transit.
5. Execution.
6. Recovery.
B. Logistics (Including CSS).
C. Communications and Electronics Procedures and Equipment Operating Instructions.
D. Deception.
E. Indigenous Force Support.

(Classification)

Figure C-8. SOF POE Format (Continued)

C-29
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
F. Time and Distance Charts.
G. Deployment.
H. Weaponeering.
I. Target recuperability.
J. Resupply.
K. Exfiltration.
L. SERER.
M. Command Relationships.
N. PSYOP and CA.
SECTION IV - LIMITING FACTORS
A. Intelligence.
B. Weather.
C. Equipment.
D. Tactics.
E. Logistics (Including CSS).
F. Personnel.
G. Training.
H. Supporting Forces.
I. C3.
J. Law of War, ROE, and U.S. Law and Legal Issues.
K. Other Factors.

(Signed)
Commander

ANNEXES (As required. List letter and title.)

DISTRIBUTION (According to policies and procedures of the issuing HQ and at the direction of the
JFSOCC.)

(Classification)

Figure C-8. SOF POE Format (Continued)

C-30
 FM 3-05.60

POE FOR INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION

C-10. The POE for infiltration and exfiltration is a detailed plan that shows
exactly how the SOA will execute its assigned mission. This plan, along with
the supported element’s POE and mission rehearsals, is the result of the
targeting and mission planning process. It includes fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. Figure C-9 shows a sample format of
a POE for infiltration and exfiltration.

(Classification)
SECTION I - MISSION
A. Target Identification Data.
B. Mission Statement.
SECTION II - MISSION SUMMARY
A. Mission Tasking.
B. Objective Area.
C. General Concept.
D. Summary of Limiting Factors.
E. Probability of Mission Success.
SECTION III - ASSUMPTIONS
SECTION IV - THREAT ASSESSMENT
SECTION V - NAVIGATION AND OVERALL MISSION PORTRAYAL (This section
represents the entire infiltration and exfiltration route from launch to recovery on a suitable scale chart.
It shows information the planning cell deemed necessary to portray the mission. Items listed, however,
are not all-inclusive.)
A. Launch Bases.
B. Intermediate Staging Bases.
C. LZs, DZs, BLSs, RZs, SLPs, and SRPs.
D. Recovery Bases.
E. Abort and Emergency Diversion.
F. Air Refueling Tracks and FARPs.
G. Routes.
1. Ingress.
2. Egress.
3. Orbiting and holding.
4. Safe passage procedures.
5. Strip charts, navigation logs, GPS receivers, and other aids (as required).

(Classification)

Figure C-9. Format of Infiltration and Exfiltration POE

C-31
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
SECTION VI - SUPPORTING PLANS
A. Overall Schedule of Events.
B. Prelaunch Requirements.
1. Updates to OB.
2. EEIs.
3. Problem areas and key factors.
C. Infiltration and Exfiltration Platform Factors and Logistical Considerations.
D. C3.
1. Security Preparations.
2. Departure procedures (overt or deception procedures).
3. Communication equipment requirements.
a. Infiltration and exfiltration platforms.
b. SOC.
4. Specialized operational procedures and techniques.
5. Radio silence areas.
6. GO, NO-GO point.
7. Publication of joint SOI for air mission.
8. Deception.
E. Emergency.
1. Engine-out capabilities.
2. Weather.
3. Faulty intelligence.
4. Infiltration and exfiltration platform abort procedures.
a. Late departure procedures.
b. Maintenance problems.
c. Battle damage.
d. Aircraft destruction plan.
e. Bump plan.
5. Drop or other fuel-related malfunctions.
6. Lost communications procedures.
7. Mission abort procedures.
F. Evasion Plan of Action.
1. Aircrew responsibilities.
2. Immediate actions upon sinking, ditching, or bailing out.
3. Evasion movement.
4. Safe area intelligence descriptions.

(Classification)
Figure C-9. Format of Infiltration and Exfiltration POE (Continued)

C-32
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
5. SAFE.
6. Evasion team communications.
7. SAR contact procedures.
SECTION VII - LIMITING FACTORS
A. Intelligence.
B. Weather.
C. Equipment.
D. Munitions.
E. Tactics.
F. Logistics (Including CSS).
G. Personnel.
H. Training.
I. Supporting Forces.
J. ROE and Legal Issues.
SECTION VIII - SOA, SURFACE SHIP, AND SUBMARINE REQUIREMENTS FROM
AFSOC, ARSOF, AND NAVSOF TO CONDUCT INITIAL ASSESSMENTS
A. Target Coordinates.
B. Maximum and Minimum Distances of LZs, DZs, SLPs, BLSs, RZs, and SRPs From the Target.
C. Time Frame in OPLAN and CONPLAN Scenario (Pre-D-Day or D+XX).
D. Desired Launch and Recovery Bases.
E. Type of Delivery and Recovery Required (Airdrop, AirLand, Fast Rope, SEAL Delivery Vehicle,
Combat Rigid Rubber Raiding Craft, and Platform Preferred).
F. Number of Personnel to be Transferred and Approximate Weight per Person.
G. Approximate Size and Weight of Additional Equipment.
H. Assumptions Made During Supported Unit’s Feasibility Assessment or POE.
I. Desired Time Over Target.
J. Resupply and Exfiltration Requirements.

NOTE: Although not always readily available, information on hand is normally sufficient to
conduct the initial assessment. An effort should be made, however, to obtain and include in the POE
all the information in this sample format.

(Classification)

Figure C-9. Format of Infiltration and Exfiltration POE (Continued)

C-33
FM 3-05.60

AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL

C-11. The C2 of airspace in the combat zone enhances combat operations by
promoting safe, efficient, and flexible airspace use. ARSOA must be aware of
positive, procedural Army airspace command and control (A2C2) measures. In
addition, ARSOA must adhere to directed control procedures. To facilitate
rapid and accurate dissemination of information on the use of airspace, the
commander must make sure a strong, ongoing communications link exists
with A2C2 elements.

AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES (ACM)

C-12. The following measures provide procedural control:
• High-density airspace control zone. A high-density airspace control
zone is an area of concentrated employment of numerous and varied
weapons or airspace users. The zone has defined dimensions that
usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. The
appropriate commander normally approves access to a high-density
airspace control zone and air defense weapons status within the zone.
• Coordinating altitude. A coordinating altitude is a procedural
method to separate fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft by determining an
altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft normally will not fly and above
which rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly. It may include a buffer
zone for small altitude deviations and extend from the forward edge of
the communications zone to the FLOT. The coordinating altitude does
not restrict fixed- or rotary-winged aircraft when operating against or
in the immediate vicinity of enemy ground forces. Fixed- or rotary-
winged aircraft planning extended penetration of this altitude notifies
the appropriate airspace control facility. Approval acknowledgment is
not, however, required before fixed-wing aircraft operate below the
coordinating altitude or rotary-wing aircraft operate above the
coordinating altitude.
• Restricted operations zone. The terms airspace restricted area and
restricted operations zone refer to the same control measure. A
restricted operations zone is a volume of airspace of defined dimensions
developed for a specific mission. Some or all airspace users are
restricted from the area until the end of the mission. A restricted
operations zone may be established around a tactical airfield, DZ,
search and rescue operation, infiltration and exfiltration points, and
special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA) orbits, or it may be
established to facilitate fire support operations.
• Joint special operations area. The JSOA is a restricted area of land,
sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint SO
force to conduct SO activities. The commander of joint SO forces may
further assign a specific area or sector within the JSOA to a
subordinate commander for mission execution.
• Low-level transit route. A low-level transit route is a temporary
corridor of defined dimensions in the forward area. It minimizes the
risk to friendly aircraft from friendly air defenses or surface forces.

C-34
 FM 3-05.60

• Minimum-risk route. A minimum-risk route is a temporary corridor

of defined dimensions recommended for use by high-speed, fixed-wing
aircraft. It presents the minimum known hazards to low-flying aircraft
transiting the combat zone.
• Standard Army aircraft flight route. A standard Army aircraft
flight route (SAAFR) is a route below the coordinating altitude
established to facilitate the movement of Army aircraft during VMC.
Army aircraft movements in the rear operations area during IMC will
comply with established IFR. The SAAFR is normally in the corps and
the divisional rear areas. It is a recognized Army ACM that does not
require joint approval. The A2C2 element develops SAAFRs to route
Army aircraft safely when conducting CS and CSS missions at terrain
flight altitudes. SAAFRs are primarily for single aircraft or for small
flights of aircraft.
• Base defense zone. A base defense zone is an air defense zone
established around an air base. It is limited to the engagement
envelope of the short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems defending
the base. Base defense zones have specific entry, exit, and IFF
procedures aircrews must follow.
• Weapons-free zone. A weapons-free zone is an air defense zone
established for the protection of key assets or facilities of the joint force
other than air bases. ADA systems defending the weapons-free zone
may fire at any target not positively identified as friendly. Aircrews
must avoid active weapons-free zones or coordinate their use with the
designated control authority before entering or transiting the zone.
• Air corridor. An air corridor is a restricted air route of travel specified
for friendly aircraft use to prevent friendly fires against friendly
aircraft. Air corridors are temporary corridors for routing combat
elements of the division and corps aviation brigade between such areas
as assembly areas, battle positions, and FARPs. They are control
measures employed during air assault operations to designate routes
for air assault forces during the air movement phase.
C-13. Although ARSOA often operates in underdeveloped countries, ARSOA
personnel should review established ACMs. The control measures help
planners avoid suspected concentrations of aircraft. When the operations are
in developed countries, the ACMs show concentrations of aircraft as well as
other hazards to flight.

AIRSPACE DECONFLICTION
C-14. Route deconfliction is vital to ARSOA survival. Review of routes must,
therefore, occur at several levels. Planners should deconflict their routes by
plotting them on a map that is current with the latest ACM and enemy
locations. They should also send the route information through the chain of
command to the A2C2 cells for input into the airspace deconfliction software
(ADS).
C-15. When deconflicting the route of flight, planners should consider time
and space and plot all routes of flight on the map to make sure the routes do
not conflict with any ACM published in the ACO. They should then note all

C-35
FM 3-05.60

locations where routes cross and make sure aircraft will not cross within 10
minutes of each other. To allow for changes in mission times, all mission
aircrews should be notified of the aircraft crossing routes within 30 minutes
of each other.
C-16. Mission planners must send the route information up the chain of
command as soon as the information is available. The information for the
ATO must be submitted not later than (NLT) 24 hours before the ATO takes
effect. The lead time is necessary so that aerial refueling requests can be
submitted and put into the ATO.
C-17. In undeveloped AORs or during the initial stabilization of an AOR,
ACPs should be established throughout the AOR. These points expedite the
planning process and enable A2C2 personnel to plot and deconflict the routes
more quickly and accurately. Mission planners and the airspace control
authority should develop the list of ACPs. If an ACO has been published,
those ACPs should be used.

C-36
 Appendix D

Logistics
The SOR document (Figure D-1) is a key to SOF mission success. Theater
army closely reviews the SOR for detailed accuracy to support the unit’s
mission fully.

(Classification)
1. ( ) REFERENCES.
2. ( ) GENERAL.
a. ( ) Supported unit.
b. ( ) Time of support.
c. ( ) Location of supported unit at time of support.
d. ( ) Unit points of contact (POCs).
e. ( ) Database.
f. ( ) Number of supported personnel.
g. ( ) Force activity designator.
3. ( ) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
a. ( ) Mission. State the general mission of the unit, command, or operation.
b. ( ) Desired Results. Provide a concise statement of the desired results of the requested
support.
4. ( ) ASSUMPTIONS. Give the conditions that are likely to exist or that must exist for the support to
be required. Relate the assumptions to specific requirements, as appropriate.
5. ( ) CONSTRAINTS. Define the situation that, if experienced, will degrade operations.
Give conditions to specific requirements, as appropriate.
6. ( ) COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION. Describe functional C2 of the unit.
Attach organizational diagram, if necessary, and describe location of liaison with the HN.
7. ( ) SUPPLIES.
a. ( ) Class I.
(1) ( ) Requirements of Dining Facility. Identify personnel requirements.
(2) ( ) Type of Dining Facility. Determine if the dining facilities should be one of
the following:
(a) ( ) U.S. Government.

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format

D-1
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(b) ( ) U.S. civilian contracted.
(c) ( ) HN civilian contracted.
(d) ( ) HN military.
(3) ( ) Augmentation. If dining facilities are U.S. Government facilities, identify the
requirements for augmenting personnel.
(4) ( ) Food Storage Facilities. Determine which of the following food storage facilities
are required to contain a 30-day supply of rations.
(a) ( ) Dry space in cubic feet.
(b) ( ) Chill space in cubic feet.
(c) ( ) Freezer space in cubic feet.
(5) ( ) Insulated Food Containers. Determine the requirement for insulated food
containers. List the number of containers and required meals.
(6) ( ) Sack Lunches. Determine the requirements for sack lunches.
(7) ( ) Meal Payment. Determine how individuals will pay for their meals.
(a) ( ) Cash collection.
(b) ( ) Payroll deduction.
(c) ( ) Meal cards.
(8) ( ) Dining Facility Hours. Determine the requirement for a 24-hour facility.
(9) ( ) Equipment Augmentation. Determine the requirement for equipment
augmentation. List the equipment by nomenclature, national stock number (NSN),
and quantity.
(10) ( ) Combat Rations. Estimate the number of combat rations for 30-day sustainment
packages for aviation personnel.
(a) ( ) MRE.
(b) ( ) Long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) rations.
(c) ( ) Other (specify).
(11) ( ) Pre-positioned Rations. List the number of days required for pre-positioned
rations.
(12) ( ) Percentage of Pre-positioned Rations. Identify the required percentage of the
following pre-positioned rations:
(a) ( ) MRE.
(b) ( ) LRRP rations.
(c) ( ) Other (Specify).
(13) ( ) Local Purchase, Cash. Determine the need for small units to have cash to
purchase rations on the economy.

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-2
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
b. ( ) Class II.
(1) ( ) Self-Service. List the essential self-service supply center (SSSC) items required
for a 30-day sustainment.
(2) ( ) NBC Equipment. List the requirement for NBC consumables and nonconsumables
for two complete issues of NBC equipment following an NBC attack.
(3) ( ) Sustainment. List other Class II items required for sustainment, such as
common table of allowance (CTA) 50-900 items.
(4) ( ) Reproduction Equipment. Determine the required reproduction equipment.
List the equipment and the number of copies needed for 30-day sustainment.
(5) ( ) Special Equipment. List any special Class II equipment required beyond the
equipment already authorized and on hand. List the equipment by nomenclature, NSN,
and quantity.
(6) ( ) Clothing Sales. Determine the requirement for clothing sales facility.
c. ( ) Class III.
(1) ( ) POL. Determine POL, including base support functions, for a 30-day sustainment.
List item by type and quantity.
(a) ( ) Motor gasoline (regular or super).
(b) ( ) Diesel fuel (DF1 or DF2) or JP8.
(c) ( ) Aviation gasoline (JP4, JP5, JP8, or equivalent).
(d) ( ) Oil (bulk).
(e) ( ) Grease.
(f) ( ) Coolants.
(g) ( ) Packaged POL or other lubricants.
(h) ( ) Commercial grades of aviation fuel.
(i) ( ) Availability of POL laboratory for fuel testing.
(2) ( ) Tankers and Dispensers. Identify the requirement for tankers or dispensers in
addition to organic capabilities. List item by type, capacity, and quantity.
(3) ( ) Planning Factors. Determine if the planning factors used to identify POL
requirements were factors other than those in the Combined Arms Support Command
(CASCOM) database or operational log (OPLOG) planner. If so, specify.
d. ( ) Class IV. Determine the requirements for building or barrier materials for the following
items, listing them by type and quantity—for example, plywood, lumber, long and short pickets,
sandbags, and B-wire.
(1) ( ) Administrative and command post.
(2) ( ) Tactical and defensive use.
(3) ( ) Rigging and shoring.
(4) ( ) Concertina and barbed wire.

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-3
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(5) ( ) Stakes and pickets.
e. ( ) Class V.
(1) ( ) Additional Class V Requirements. Determine Class V requirements beyond those
in the unit basic load (UBL). List by Department of Defense identification code
(DODIC), nomenclature, and quantity. Identify nonstandard Class V requirements
separately.
(2) ( ) Planning Factors. Determine the planning factor used to forecast Class V
consumption rates.
f. ( ) Class VI. Determine the number of personal demand items based on the number of unit
personnel and the individual consumption rate. List items by type and quantity.
g. ( ) Class VII.
(1) ( ) Additional Equipment. Determine the requirement for additional items of
equipment, such as trucks and generators. List the items by nomenclature, NSN, and
quantity.
(2) ( ) Maintenance Augmentation. Determine the requirement for augmenting
maintenance personnel to support the equipment listed in paragraph 7g(1). List the
personnel by grade, MOS, and quantity.
h. ( ) Class VIII.
(1) ( ) Determine the requirement for Class VIII supplies by nomenclature, NSN,
quantities, and special requirements associated with a particular item, such as
refrigeration.
(2) ( ) Determine the schedule of resupplies required.
(3) ( ) Determine whether resupply will be prepackaged standard line items. Project
when line item ordering will be established and, if feasible, how often, how long, and
through what channels.
(4) ( ) Determine the need for Class VIII supplies peculiar to the area of operations and
whether the supplies are readily available or must be specifically acquired, such as
refrigeration, security, and shelf life—for example, antivenins.
(5) ( ) Determine the availability and reliability of HN Class VIII for emergency
purposes.
(6) ( ) Determine the need for blood and blood products and associated equipment.
(7) ( ) Determine coordinating agencies for chemical support.
i. ( ) Class IX.
(1) ( ) Mandatory Parts List. Determine if a mandatory parts list exists to support the
equipment.
(2) ( ) Prescribed Load List (PLL). Determine if PLL includes repair parts to support—
(a) ( ) Weapons.
(b) ( ) Communications equipment.

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-4
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(c) ( ) Vehicles.
(d) ( ) Support equipment, such as generators.
(e) ( ) NBC equipment.
(3) ( ) Other Equipment. Determine if the unit has nonstandard or commercial
equipment. List by type, model number, manufacturer, and density.
(4) ( ) Repair Parts Support. Identify how repair parts support is obtained for
commercial and nonstandard equipment.
(5) ( ) Maintenance Support. Determine maintenance support requirements.
j. ( ) Class X. Determine Class X Requirements. List by type and quantity.
k. ( ) Other.
(1) ( ) Emergency Resupply. Identify the requirement for emergency prepackaged
resupply. Specify by nomenclature, NSN, and quantity. Attach as separate enclosure for
each type of package.
(2) ( ) Maps and Photographs. Identify the requirement for maps and aerial photographs.
8. ( ) SERVICES.
a. ( ) Field Services. Determine field services support requirements, such as riggers and graves
registration (GRREG).
b. ( ) Engineering Services.
(1) ( ) Equipment Power Rating. Determine power rating needed for the equipment.
(2) ( ) Power Requirements. Determine power requirements beyond the organic
generating capability.
(3) ( ) Equipment Power Capability. Determine the following, if supplied with
commercial power at the wartime site:
(a) ( ) Equipment compatibility.
(b) ( ) Requirement for plug adapters, including voltage and the number of
adapters needed.
(c) ( ) Requirement for transformers, including voltage and the number of
transformers needed.
(4) ( ) Water Requirements. Identify daily requirements for potable water and for
washing engines and fuselages.
(5) ( ) Pest Control Requirements. Determine the requirement for rodent and insect
control assistance.
(6) ( ) Heavy Equipment Requirements. Identify requirements for heavy engineer
equipment, such as bulldozers. List the needed quantity.
c. ( ) Other Services.
(1) ( ) Linen Requirements. List by type and quantity.
(2) ( ) Linen Exchange. Determine the frequency of linen exchange.

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-5
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(3) ( ) Laundry Services Requirements. List by pounds per week. If none, so state.
(4) ( ) Commercial Cleaning Requirements. Determine the requirement for commercial
laundry and dry cleaning.
(5) ( ) Other Services Identification. Determine the need for other services.
9. ( ) MAINTENANCE.
a. ( ) Personnel Requirements. Determine if enough personnel exist to conduct the necessary
maintenance. If not, list the necessary augmentation by grade, MOS, and quantity.
(1) ( ) Vehicle.
(2) ( ) Support equipment.
(3) ( ) Communication.
(4) ( ) Weapons.
(5) ( ) Aviation.
b. ( ) DS and GS Maintenance. Identify requirements for DS and GS maintenance.
c. ( ) Other Maintenance Equipment. List commercial and nonstandard equipment requiring
maintenance.
10. ( ) TRANSPORTATION.
a. ( ) Air Transportation.
(1) ( ) Unit Load Plans. Enclose unit load plans.
(2) ( ) Administrative Aircraft. Determine the requirement for administrative aircraft.
Specify the type and number of hours per week.
(3) ( ) 463L Pallets. Determine the requirement for 463L pallets at the wartime location.
Specify the amount.
(4) ( ) Equipment and Personnel requirements. Determine the requirement for additional
materials handling equipment (MHE) and personnel at the SFOB and FOB airfield.
Specify requirement for crane or for rough terrain container handler (RTCH).
(5) ( ) Passenger Facilities. Determine the requirement for passenger facilities. Specify
the required type and size of the facilities, based on the duration of passenger use.
(6) ( ) Cargo Storage Facilities. Determine the requirement for cargo storage facilities.
Specify by the number of square feet required for the following:
(a) ( ) Covered secure storage.
(b) ( ) Outdoor secure storage.
(7) ( ) Airfield Requirements. Determine the requirement for an airfield to handle the
following:
(a) ( ) C-130s.
(b) ( ) C-141s.
(c) ( ) C-17s.

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-6
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(d) ( ) C-5As.
(e) ( ) Other (specify).
(8) ( ) All-Weather Surface Airfield. Determine the requirement for an all-weather
surface airfield.
(9) ( ) Airfield Services. Determine the requirement for airfield services, including MHE
support. List by type and quantity.
(10) ( ) Airfield Operations. Determine the requirement for airfield operations provided
by other sources.
(11) ( ) Flight Line Facilities. Determine the requirement for other aircraft flight line
facilities. Specify the types of aircraft.
b. ( ) Water Transportation. Determine the requirement for water transportation. Specify the
type and size of the maritime vehicle.
c. ( ) Ground Transportation. Determine the requirement for supplemental military vehicles.
Specify by type of vehicle and quantity.
(1) ( ) Commercial-Type Military Vehicles.
(a) ( ) Sedan.
(b) ( ) Carryall.
(c) ( ) Bus.
(d) ( ) Ambulance.
(e) ( ) Other (specify).
(2) ( ) Tactical Vehicles.
(a) ( ) Radio-equipped vehicles (state type of radio and quantity).
(b) ( ) Nonradio-equipped vehicles.
(c) ( ) Trucks and trailers.
(d) ( ) Wreckers and cranes.
(e) ( ) Aircraft-towing vehicles.
(f) ( ) Ambulances.
(g) ( ) Fire trucks.
(h) ( ) Other special purpose vehicles, such as warehouse trucks.
11. ( ) FACILITIES.
a. ( ) Maintenance Facilities (list in square feet).
(1) ( ) Maintenance Area Requirements. Identify vehicle maintenance area requirements.
(a) ( ) Number of bays.
(b) ( ) Number of pits.
(c) ( ) Aircraft parking (concrete or asphalt).

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-7
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(d) ( ) Wash racks.
(e) ( ) Secure storage (tools, test measurement and diagnostic equipment [TMDE]).
(f) ( ) Secure storage (repair parts).
(2) ( ) Signal Maintenance Area Requirements. Identify signal maintenance area
requirements.
(a) ( ) Power.
(b) ( ) Safety.
(c) ( ) Secure storage (repair parts).
(d) ( ) Secure storage (tools, TMDE).
(3) ( ) Weapons Maintenance Area Requirements. Identify weapons maintenance area
requirements.
(4) ( ) Aviation Maintenance Area Requirements. Identify aviation maintenance area
(covered) requirements.
(a) ( ) Aircraft parking (concrete or asphalt).
(b) ( ) Secure storage (repair parts).
(c) ( ) Secure storage (tools, TMDE).
b. ( ) Billeting Facilities.
(1) ( ) Billet number and size requirements. List the number of billets and required
square feet.
(a) ( ) Officers.
(b) ( ) Senior Enlisted.
(c) ( ) Enlisted.
(d) ( ) Females.
(2) ( ) Tentage. Determine if sufficient tentage is available within the unit to house
personnel. If not, specify number and types of tents required and when operationally
required, environmentally controlled tentage for an acceptable temperature range.
(3) ( ) Showers. Determine the required number of showers.
(4) ( ) Latrines. Determine the number and location of latrines.
c. ( ) Medical Facilities. Determine the requirement for physical facilities and optometry.
(1) ( ) Hospital beds.
(2) ( ) Treatment rooms.
(3) ( ) Dental treatment rooms.
(4) ( ) Laboratories.
(5) ( ) X-ray rooms.
(6) ( ) Pharmacies.
(7) ( ) Other (specify).
(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-8
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
d. ( ) Other Facilities (list by function and square feet).
(1) ( ) Operations center.
(2) ( ) Logistics center.
(3) ( ) Signal center.
(4) ( ) Reception and palletizing facilities.
(5) ( ) Dining facility.
(6) ( ) Dispensary.
(7) ( ) Isolation facility.
(8) ( ) Parachute rigging and drying facility.
(9) ( ) Ammunition storage.
(10) ( ) Clubs.
(11) ( ) Gym.
(12) ( ) Antenna fields.
(13) ( ) Ranges (list types of weapons requiring ranges).
(14) ( ) Drop zones.
(15) ( ) Secure facilities (for storing, receiving, and transmitting classified messages
and documents).
(16) ( ) Other (specify).
12. ( ) PERSONNEL SERVICES.
a. ( ) Personnel.
(1) ( ) Military Occupational Specialty. Identify critical MOSs (include additional skill
identifiers and special qualifications identifiers).
(2) ( ) Personnel Action Dissemination. Determine the routing of the following personnel
actions and the classification of those actions.
(a) ( ) Assignments.
(b) ( ) Reassignments.
(c) ( ) Efficiency reports.
(d) ( ) Awards.
(e) ( ) Promotions.
(f) ( ) Reclassifications.
(g) ( ) Other.
(3) ( ) Casualty Reporting. Determine the procedures for casualty reporting.
(4) ( ) Civilian Personnel Requirements. Identify civilian personnel requirements.

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-9
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
b. ( ) Administrative Services.
(1) ( ) Reproduction and Word Processing. Determine reproduction and word processing
requirements.
(2) ( ) Equipment Requirements. Determine the requirement for administrative
equipment beyond the present equipment. Specify the type and quantity of systems.
(3) ( ) Blank Forms and Publications. Determine the requirement for pre-positioning of
blank forms and publications.
(4) ( ) Accident Reporting Procedures. Determine the requirement for accident reporting
procedures (DA Form 265) and other related safety reports.
(5) ( ) Postal. Identify postal requirements.
c. ( ) Finance. Determine finance support requirements. Identify the type of requirement (pay
and allotments).
d. ( ) Religious Support.
(1) ( ) Religious Support Requirements. Determine the following religious support
requirements:
(a) ( ) Catholic.
(b) ( ) Protestant.
(c) ( ) Jewish.
(d) ( ) Orthodox.
(e) ( ) Muslim.
(f) ( ) Other.
(2) ( ) Vehicular Support. Determine additional equipment support, including
transportation and C4I to accomplish the religious support mission.
e. ( ) Legal. Determine the requirement for staff judge advocate (SJA) support in the
following areas:
(1) ( ) Administrative law.
(2) ( ) Claims.
(3) ( ) Defense.
(4) ( ) Prosecution.
(5) ( ) International law.
(6) ( ) Operational law, including ROE.
f. ( ) Public Affairs. Determine the requirement for PAO support.
13. ( ) COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT (CHS).
a. ( ) Hospitalization (Theater or ASCC).
(1) ( ) Determine the casualty estimate for the number of required hospital beds.
(a) ( ) Surgical.
(b) ( ) Medical.

(Classification)
Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-10
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(2) Determine the location and accessibility of supporting Echelons III or IV hospitals.
b. ( ) Medical Treatment and Patient Evacuation.
(1) ( ) Medical Treatment. Echelons III and IV hospitals provide medical treatment.
ARSOF must state their specific patient-tracking requirements.
(2) ( ) Organic Support.
(a) ( ) Availability of assets.
(b) ( ) Casualty evacuation. This requirement includes using conventional and
ARSOA evacuation assets to extract casualties from hostile and denied territory.
It should also include augmentation of ARSOA aircraft with medical personnel
(physicians, physician assistants, or ARSOF medics), as required.
(3) ( ) Theater or ASCC Support. Use traditional assets to support MEDEVAC only if
those assets do not compromise the security of the operation.
(a) ( ) Ground evacuation assets in a GS, a DS, or an area support role.
(b) ( ) Air evacuation assets in GS, DS, or area support roles.
(4) ( ) Theater Evacuation Policy. A requirement may exist that an exception to the
theater evacuation policy is necessary to retain qualified ARSOF personnel within the
theater.
c. ( ) Area Medical Support. The ARSOF must identify the location of the medical support
organizations and project medical treatment beyond organic capabilities.
d. ( ) Dental Services. Determine dental support requirements and location of support
organizations.
e. ( ) Preventive Medicine Services. Determine preventive medicine support requirements
beyond organic assets and the location of support organizations.
f. ( ) Veterinary Services. Requirements for veterinary support must be identified and
coordinated through the appropriate command and control element.
g. ( ) Combat Stress Control. Control of stress is a command’s responsibility. The ARSOF must
plan for combat stress control support and identify combat stress control organizations.
h. ( ) Combat Health Logistics.
(1) ( ) Determine requirements for Class VIII supplies by nomenclature, NSN, quantities,
and special requirements associated with a particular item such as refrigeration.
(2) ( ) Determine schedule of resupplies required.
(3) ( ) Determine whether resupply will be prepackaged standard line items. Project
when line-item ordering will be established and, if feasible, how often, how long, and
through what channels.
(4) ( ) Determine the need for Class VIII supplies peculiar to the area of operations;
whether they are readily available or must be specifically acquired, such as refrigeration,
security, and shelf life (for example, antivenins).
(5) ( ) Determine availability and reliability of HN Class VIII for emergency purposes.

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-11
FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(6) ( ) Determine need for blood and blood products and associated equipment, if
required.
(7) ( ) Determine coordinating agencies for chemical support.
i. ( ) Medical Laboratory Support. Determine medical laboratory support requirements and
support organizations.
14. ( ) SIGNAL.
a. ( ) Terminal Equipment and Access. Determine requirements for the following:
(1) ( ) Supplemental terminal equipment. Specify by type and quantity.
(2) ( ) Access to HN commercial telephone system. Specify need, such as number of
lines.
(3) ( ) Access to NATO telegraph network.
(4) ( ) Access to HN military teletype system.
(5) ( ) Access to automatic secure voice communications (AUTOSEVOCOM).
(6) ( ) Access to NATO secure voice network.
(7) ( ) Access to automatic digital network (AUTODIN).
(8) ( ) Identify Data Communications (DATACOM) requirements for Standard Army
Multi-Command Management Information System (STAMMIS) and other data systems.
Specify intertheater and intratheater requirements.
b. ( ) Transmit and Receive Sites. Determine the number of transmit and receive sites to be set
up and amount of area necessary.
(1) ( ) Access to NATO telegraph network.
(2) ( ) Access to HN military teletype system.
(3) ( ) Access to AUTOSEVOCOM.
(4) ( ) Access to NATO secure voice network.
(5) ( ) Access to AUTODIN.
(6) ( ) Identify DATACOM requirements for STAMMIS and other data systems. Specify
intertheater and intratheater requirements.
c. ( ) Transmit and Receive Sites. Determine the number of transmit and receive sites to be set
up and amount of area necessary.
d. ( ) Signal Maintenance Support. Determine the requirements for supplemental signal
maintenance support.
e. ( ) Frequency Requirements. Determine the number of separate frequencies needed on a daily
basis.
15. ( ) SECURITY.
a. ( ) MP Functions. Determine the requirement for the following MP functions:
(1) ( ) Access control.
(2) ( ) Detention (prisoner of war and friendly).

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-12
 FM 3-05.60

(Classification)
(3) ( ) Investigations.
(4) ( ) Traffic control.
(5) ( ) Physical security.
(6) ( ) General law enforcement.
(7) ( ) Convoy security.
(8) ( ) Special weapons.
(9) ( ) Other (specify).
b. ( ) Counterintelligence. Determine the requirement for CI.
c. ( ) Base Defense. Determine the requirement for base defense capabilities.
16. ( ) FUNDING AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT.
a. ( ) Type of required currency.
b. ( ) Source of resupply.
c. ( ) Means of contractual payment.
d. ( ) Means of local purchase payment.
e. ( ) Cost-capturing requirements.

(Classification)

Figure D-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

D-13
 Glossary
A2C2 Army airspace command and control
AADC area air defense commander
ABC3 airborne command, control, and communications
ABCCC airborne battlefield command and control center
ABFDS aerial bulk fuel-delivery system
A/C REH aircraft rehearsal
ACC air component commander
ACL aircraft combat load
ACM airspace control measures
ACO airspace control order
ACP air control point
ADA air defense artillery
adaptive targeting and Targeting and mission planning methods required when
mission planning circumstances prevent any command echelon from executing the
deliberate targeting and mission planning cycle.
ADC air data computer
ADCON administrative control − Direction or exercise of authority over
subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration
and support, including the organization of Service forces, control
of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit
logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization,
demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the
operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.
(JP 1-02)
ADF automatic direction finder
ADP automated data processing
ADS airspace deconfliction software
AESOP airborne electronic special operations payload
AFCS automatic flight control system
AFSOC Air Force special operations component − The Air Force
component of a joint force special operations component. (JP 1-02)
AFSOD Air Force special operations detachment
AFSOE Air Force special operations element

Glossary-1
FM 3-05.60

AFSOF Air Force special operations forces − Those active and

reserve component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of
Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to
conduct and support special operations. (JP 1-02)
AGL above ground level
AH attack helicopter
AHO above highest obstruction
AHRS attitude and heading reference system
AI airborne interceptor
AIMI aviation-intensive managed item
ALOC air lines of communications
ALSE aviation life support equipment
AM amplitude modulation
AMC air mission commander
AOC air operations center
AOR area of responsibility
APOD aerial port of debarkation
APU auxiliary power unit
Army special operations The Army component of a joint force special operations
component component. (JP 1-02)
ARSOA Army special operations aviation
ARSOATF Army special operations aviation task force
ARSOF Army special operations forces − Those active and reserve
component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense
that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct
and support special operations. (JP 1-02)
ARSOTF Army special operations task force
ASCC Army service component command
ASE aircraft survivability equipment
ASOC air support operations center
ATACMS Army tactical missile system
ATAS air-to-air Stinger
ATC air traffic control
ATHS Airborne Target Handover System
ATO air tasking order

Glossary-2
 FM 3-05.60

AUTL Army universal task list

AUTODIN automatic digital network
AUTOSEVOCOM automatic secure voice communications
AVIM aviation intermediate maintenance
AVUM aviation unit maintenance
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
AWC adverse weather cockpit
BAE battlespace area evaluation
BASS ballistic armor subsystem
BCD battlespace coordination detachment
BDA battle damage assessment
BE basic encyclopedia
BL butt line
BLS beach landing site
°C degree, Celsius
C2 command and control
C2-attack command and control-attack
C2-protect command and control-protect
C2W command and control warfare
C3 command, control, and communications
C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4 command, control, communications, and computers
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CA Civil Affairs − Designation of individuals trained to plan,
support, or conduct civil-military operations.
CAP combat air patrol
CAS close air support
CASCOM Combined Arms Support Command
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CBT combatting terrorism
CCD cockpit control driver
CCERFS cargo compartment expanded range fuel system
CCIR commander’s critical information requirements
CCT combat control team

Glossary-3
FM 3-05.60

CCU cockpit control unit

CD counterdrug
CHS combat health support
CI counterintelligence
CINC commander in chief
CINCSOC Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command
CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF commander, joint task force
clandestine operation An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental
departments and agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or
concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert
operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the
operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor. In
special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine
and may focus equally on operational considerations and
intelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02)
CM countermine
CMO civil-military operations
COA course of action
COLISEUM Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and
Managers
COMAFFOR Commander, Air Force Forces
COMARFOR Commander, Army Forces
combatant commander A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant
commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)
COMJSOTF commander, joint special operations task force
COMMARFOR Commander, Marine Forces
commo communications
COMNAVFOR Commander, Naval Forces
COMSOC Commander, Special Operations Command
CONOPS concept of operations
CONPLAN concept plan
CONUS continental United States
counterterrorism Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to
terrorism. (JP 1-02)
covert operation An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the
identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert
operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is

Glossary-4
 FM 3-05.60

placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on

concealment of the operation. (JP 1-02)
CP counterproliferation
CPWMD counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
CS combat support
CSAR combat search and rescue − A specific task performed by
rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during
war or military operations other than war. (JP 1-02)
CSS combat service support
CTA common table of allowance
CW continuous wave
DA direct action − Short-duration strikes and other small-scale
offensive actions by special operations forces or special operations
capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage
on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these
operations, special operations forces or special operations capable
units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace
mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from
air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for
precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and
conduct antiship operations. (JP 1-02)
DAP defensive armed penetrator
DAR designated area for recovery
DATACOM data communications
DCSLOG Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DD Department of Defense
deception Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation,
distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a
manner prejudicial to his interests. (JP 1-02)
deliberate targeting and Targeting and mission planning methods used when
mission planning circumstances permit execution of the deliberate targeting
and mission planning cycle (normal routine for targeting
and mission planning).
DFAD digital feature analysis data
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized
DME distance-measuring equipment
DOD Department of Defense
DODAAC Department of Defense Activity Address Code

Glossary-5
FM 3-05.60

DODIC Department of Defense identification code

Doppler A navigation system that works by sending four radar beams of
constant wave energy (8800 MHz) from the aircraft to the ground
and measuring the changes in the frequency of the energy
returned to the aircraft. The system is completely contained
within the aircraft and requires no external signal. It provides
aircraft position information with respect to a particular
reference point and the selected course.
DS direct support
DSU direct support unit
DTED digital terrain elevation data
DTG date-time group
DTM data transfer module
DZ drop zone − A specific area upon which airborne troops,
equipment, or supplies are airdropped. (JP 1-02)
E&R evasion and recovery − The full spectrum of coordinated
actions carried out by evaders, recovery forces, and operational
recovery planners to effect the successful return of personnel
isolated in hostile territory to friendly control. (JP 1-02)
EA electronic attack
EAC echelons above corps
EALT earliest anticipated launch time
ECM electronic countermeasures
EEFI essential elements of friendly information
EEI essential elements of information − The critical items of
information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by
the commander by a particular time to relate with other available
information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a
logical decision. (JP 1-02)
EGI embedded GPS inertial
ELT emergency locator transmitter
EMI electromagnetic interface
EOC emergency operations center
EP electronic protection
EPA evasion plan of action
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ERFS extended range fuel system
ES electronic warfare support
ESSS external stores support system

Glossary-6
 FM 3-05.60

ETS external tank system

EW electronic warfare
exfiltration The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy
control. (JP 1-02)
EXORD execute order
°F degree, Fahrenheit
FAAD forward area air defense
FARE forward area refueling equipment
FARP forward arming and refueling point − A temporary facility
organized, equipped, and deployed by an aviation commander,
and normally located in the main battle area closer to the area of
operation than the aviation unit’s combat service area, to provide
fuel and ammunition necessary for the employment of aviation
maneuver units in combat. The forward arming and refueling
point permits combat aircraft to rapidly refuel and rearm
simultaneously. (JP 1-02)
fast rope Commercially developed polyester rope (2.5 inches in diameter)
used with the FRIES.
fast-rope bar The stationary fixture in the FRIES to which the fast rope is
attached. When all personnel are safely on the ground, the fast
rope can be released from the fast-rope bar.
feasibility assessment A basic target analysis that provides an initial determination of
the viability of a proposed target for special operations forces
employment. (JP 1-02)
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FFAR folding fin aerial rocket
FID foreign internal defense − Participation by civilian and
military agencies of a government in any of the action programs
taken by another government to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02)
FLIR forward-looking infrared
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manual; frequency modulation
FOB forward operational base − In special operations, a base
usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is established to
extend command and control or communications or to provide
support for training and tactical operations. Facilities may be
established for temporary or longer duration operations and may
include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a
pier. A forward operational base may be the location of special
operations component headquarters or a smaller unit.
FOL-AC family of loudspeakers - aircraft configuration

Glossary-7
FM 3-05.60

FRIES fast-rope insertion and extraction system − An insertion and

extraction system suspended below helicopters for inserting and
extracting SO forces. The system consists of the fast rope and
fast-rope bar. Using the fast-rope technique, the individual slides
freely down the rope. During rappelling operations, the rate of
descent is controlled with a harness.
FSB forward staging base
FSE fire support element
FSP forward support package
functional component A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of
command two or more Military Departments that may be established across
the range of military operations to perform particular operational
missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a
period of time. (JP 1-02)
FY fiscal year
G3 operations staff officer; operations section
G4 logistics staff officer; logistics section
GEOREF geographic reference − A worldwide position reference system
that may be applied to any map or chart graduated in latitude
and longitude regardless of projection. It is a method of
expressing latitude and longitude in a form suitable for rapid
reporting and plotting. (JP 1-02)
GI&S geospatial information and services
GPM gallons per minute
GPS global positioning system
GRREG graves registration
GS general support
HA humanitarian assistance − Short-range programs aimed at
ending or alleviating present suffering. Usually conducted in
response to natural or man-made disasters, including combat.
HE high explosive
HEDP high-explosive dual purpose
HEMTT heavy expanded mobile tactical truck
HF high frequency
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
H-hour specific time an operation or exercise begins
HLZ helicopter landing zone
HN host nation
HQ headquarters

Glossary-8
 FM 3-05.60

HSS health service support

humanitarian and Defined by Title 10 U.S. Code, sections 401-405. Projects include
civic assistance medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural parts of a
country; well-drilling and construction of basic sanitation
facilities; and rudimentary repair of public facilities and transport
systems.
humanitarian Humanitarian assistance by the military.
civic action
HUMINT human intelligence
IAF initial-approach fix
IAFS internal auxiliary fuel system
IAW in accordance with
IDAD internal defense and development
IEW intelligence and electronic warfare
IFF identification, friend or foe
IFR instrument flight rules
ILS instrument landing system
IMC instrument meteorological conditions
IMINT imagery intelligence
immature theater A theater that cannot sustain the initial phase of anticipated
combat operations because of limited or no forward-deployed U.S.
forces, limited transportation infrastructure, and limited HN
support. It is further characterized by unsophisticated or poorly
integrated enemy ground, air, and air defense threats. Many
areas in Latin America and Africa are examples of immature
theaters. Southwest Asia and the NATO flanks have many of the
transportation characteristics of an immature theater yet have
sophisticated enemy defense characteristics.
infiltration 1. The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by
either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement
is made either by small groups or by individuals, at extended or
irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it
implies that contact is avoided. 2. In intelligence usage, placing
an agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory.
Usually involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line.
Methods of infiltration are black (clandestine); grey (through legal
crossing point but under false documentation); white (legal).
(JP 1-02)
initial assessment An assessment that provides a basic determination of the
viability of the infiltration and exfiltration portion of a proposed
SOF mission. (JP 1-02)
INS inertial navigation system

Glossary-9
FM 3-05.60

INU inertial navigation unit

IO information operations
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IR intelligence requirement
ISB intermediate staging base
ISOPREP isolated personnel report
J2 intelligence directorate
J3 operations directorate
J4 logistics directorate
JAOC joint air operations center
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE joint communications support element
JFACC joint force air component commander − The joint force air
component commander derives authority from the joint force
commander who has the authority to exercise operational control,
assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinate
commanders, and redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of
effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint
force commander will normally designate a joint force air
component commander. The joint force air component
commander’s responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force
commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to,
planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint
force commander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint force
commander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with
other Service component commanders and other assigned or
supporting commanders, the joint force air component
commander will recommend to the joint force commander
apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic
areas. (JP 1-02)
JFC joint force commander − A general term applied to a
combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force
commander authorized to exercise combatant command
(command authority) or operational control over a joint force.
(JP 1-02)
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFSOC joint force special operations component
JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander − The
commander within a unified command, subordinate unified
command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing
commander for making recommendations on the proper
employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and
coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such

Glossary-10
 FM 3-05.60

operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special

operations component commander is given the authority
necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the
establishing commander. The joint force special operations
component commander will normally be the commander with the
preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite
command and control capabilities. (JP 1-02)
JIC Joint Intelligence Center
JOC Joint Operations Center
JP joint publication
J-SEAD joint suppression of enemy air defenses
JSOA joint special operations area
JSOAC joint special operations air component
JSOACC joint special operations air component commander − The
commander within the joint force special operations command
responsible for planning and executing joint special air operations
and for coordinating and deconflicting such operations with
conventional nonspecial operations air activities. The joint special
operations air component commander normally will be the
commander with the preponderance of assets and/or greatest
ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the
assigned joint special operations aviation assets. The joint special
operations air component commander may be directly
subordinate to the joint force special operations component
commander or to any nonspecial operations component or joint
force commander as directed. (JP 1-02)
JSOTF joint special operations task force − A joint task force
composed of special operations units from more than one Service,
formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute
special operations in support of a theater campaign or other
operations. The joint special operations task force may have
conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to
support the conduct of specific missions. (JP 1-02)
JSRC joint search and rescue center
JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board − A group formed by the
joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight
functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating
targeting information, providing targeting guidance and
priorities, and preparing and/or refining joint target lists. The
board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint
force staff, all components, and if required, component
subordinate units. (JP 1-02)

JTF joint task force − A joint force that is constituted and so

designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander,

Glossary-11
FM 3-05.60

a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force

commander. (JP 1-02)
kHz kilohertz
KIA killed in action
LBL left butt line
LCC land component commander
LH left hand
LNO liaison officer
LOGSITREP logistics situation report
LORAN long-range navigation
low-visibility operations Sensitive operations wherein the political-military restrictions
inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not
necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit
exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of
these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the
action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible
denial by the initiating power. (JP 1-02)
LRF/D laser range finder or designator
LRRP long-range reconnaissance patrol
LZ landing zone − Any specified zone used for the landing of
aircraft. (JP 1-02)
MACOM major Army command
MCC movement control center
MDG map display generator
MDMP military decision-making process
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MEF maximum effective fire
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations
MHE materials handling equipment
MHz megahertz
MI military intelligence
mission tasking letter The means by which the joint force commander tasks the theater
special operations command to validate and mission-plan
assigned targets. (JP 3-05.5)
mission tasking package The documentation and guidance provided by the theater special
operations command to the mission planning agent to provide
basic guidance for target planning. It contains the tasking and

Glossary-12
 FM 3-05.60

administrative framework within which a given special

operations forces target is planned. (JP 3-05.5)
mm millimeter
MONOHUD monocular head-up display
MOPP mission-oriented protective posture
MOS military occupational specialty
MPA mission planning agent − The subordinate special operations
force commander designated by the joint force special operations
component commander to validate, plan, and execute a particular
special operations mission. (JP 3-05.5)
MPSM multipurpose submunition
MRE meal, ready to eat
MSC major subordinate command
MSU major subordinate unit
MTT mobile training team
MTW major theater war
NAI named area of interest
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSOF Navy special operations forces
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA National Command Authorities − The President and the
Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or
successors. (JP 1-02)
NGO nongovernmental organization
NLT not later than
NMJIC National Military Joint Intelligence Center
NSFS naval surface fire support
NSN national stock number
NSWTG naval special warfare task group
NVD night vision device
NVG night vision goggles
OB order of battle
OCIE organization clothing and individual equipment
ODCSINT Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
OEG operational exposure guide

Glossary-13
FM 3-05.60

Omega Navigation system that operates using a worldwide very low

frequency communication network consisting of eight ground
stations, two of which are located in CONUS. Each station
transmits continuously on an individually assigned frequency
between 14 and 24 kHz. The aircraft computer requires signals
from at least two stations to determine if an aircraft has changed
position during the flight.
OPCON operational control − Transferable command authority that
may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the
level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in
combatant command (command authority). Operational control
may be delegated and is the authority to perform functions of
command over subordinate forces involving organizing and
employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating
objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to
accomplish the mission. Operational control includes
authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and
joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the
command. Operational control should be exercised through the
commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this
authority is exercised through subordinate joint force
commanders and Service and/or functional component
commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority
to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as
the commander in operational control considers necessary to
accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in
and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or
matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or
unit training. (JP 1-02)
OPLAN operation plan
OPLOG operational log
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security − A process of identifying critical
information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions
attendant to military operations and other activities to: a.
Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary
intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence
systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together
to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c.
Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an
acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to
adversary exploitation. (JP 1-02)
OPTEMPO operating tempo
PA public affairs
packages (war) Part support packages designed to support ARSOA operations up
to 30 days. Consists of both standard and nonstandard

Glossary-14
 FM 3-05.60

components for repair of aircraft at AVUM, AVIM, and limited

depot.
PAO public affairs officer
PARIS planning and rehearsal information support
PBO property book officer
PCP penetration control point
PIC pilot in command
PIR priority intelligence requirements
PLL prescribed load list
PLS personnel locator system
POC point of contact
POE plan of execution − A detailed plan of precisely how the
assigned special operations forces will carry out the validated
mission assigned to them. This plan, in conjunction with mission
rehearsals, is the end result of the targeting and mission
planning process. The term also describes the supporting
infiltration and exfiltration plan developed by the supporting
organization. (JP 3-05.5)
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PR personnel recovery
PSYOP Psychological Operations − Planned operations to convey
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,
groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations
is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable
to the originator’s objectives. (JP 1-02)
PZ pickup zone
RAH reconnaissance attack helicopter
RAMO regimental aviation maintenance officer
RBL right butt line
RCC rescue coordination center
RH right hand
RII request for intelligence information
ROE rules of engagement
RP release point
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RTCH rough terrain container handler

Glossary-15
FM 3-05.60

RZ recovery zone
S2 intelligence and training officer (U.S. Army)
S3 operations and training officer (U.S. Army)
S4 logistics officer (U.S. Army)
SA security assistance
SAAFR standard use Army aircraft flight route
SAFE selected area for evasion
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR search and rescue
SATCOM satellite communications
SCI sensitive compartmented information
sea-air-land team A naval force specially organized, trained, and equipped to
conduct special operations in maritime, littoral, and riverine
environments. (JP 1-02)
SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses
SEAL sea-air-land
SELSCAN Selective Adaptive Communications Processor
SEMA special electronic mission aircraft
SERE survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
SERER survival, evasion, resistance, escape, and recovery
SF Special Forces − U.S. Army forces organized, trained, and
equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special Forces
have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign
internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and
counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for
specially organized, trained, and equipped Special Forces units
designated in theater contingency plans. (JP 1-02)
SFG Special Forces group − A combat arms organization capable of
planning, conducting, and supporting special operations activities in
all operational environments in peace, conflict, and war. It consists
of a group headquarters and headquarters company, a support
company, and Special Forces battalions. The group can operate as a
single unit, but normally the battalions plan and conduct operations
from widely separated locations. The group provides general
operational direction and synchronizes the activities of subordinate
battalions. Although principally structured for unconventional
warfare, Special Forces group units are capable of task-organizing to
meet specific requirements. (JP 1-02)
SFODA Special Forces operational detachment A
SFODB Special Forces operational detachment B

Glossary-16
 FM 3-05.60

SHORAD short-range air defense

SIGINT signals intelligence
SIMO systems integration and maintenance office
SINCGARS single-channel ground and airborne radio system
SJA staff judge advocate
SLAP Sabot-launched armor-piercing
SLP seaward launch point
SMB staff mission briefing
SME subject matter expert
SO special operations − Operations conducted by specially
organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces
to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives
by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically
sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full
range of military operations, independently or in coordination
with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces.
Political-military considerations frequently shape special
operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility
techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations
differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and
political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment,
independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed
operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (JP 1-02)
SOA special operations aviation
SOATC special operations aviation training company
SOC special operations command − A subordinate unified or other
joint command established by a joint force commander to plan,
coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within
the joint force commander’s assigned operational area. (JP 1-02)
SOCCE special operations command and control element
SOCJFCOM Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command
SOCJIC Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center
SOCRATES Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, and Threat
Evaluation System
SOF special operations forces − Those active and reserve
component forces of the military Services designated by the
Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and
equipped to conduct and support special operations. (JP 1-02)
SOFPARS special operations forces planning and rehearsal system
SOI signal operating instructions

Glossary-17
FM 3-05.60

SOLE special operations liaison element − A special operations

liaison team provided by the joint force special operations
component commander to the joint force air component
commander (if designated) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate
special operations air and surface operations with conventional
air operations. (JP 1-02)
SOR statement of requirements
SOSCOM special operations support command
SOTSE special operations theater support element
SOWT special operations weather team
SPTCONF support confirmation
SPTREQ support request
SR special reconnaissance − Reconnaissance and surveillance
actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify,
by visual observation or other collection methods, information
concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual
or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a
particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment,
and poststrike reconnaissance. (JP 1-02)
SRP seaward recovery point
SSA supply support activity
SSB single sideband
SSOPS sensitive special operations
SSSC self-service supply center
STA station
STABO stabilized body operations
STAMMIS Standard Army Multi-Command Management Information
System
sustained operations The capability to conduct effective and uninterrupted combat
operations when the necessary resources are provided.
TACAIR tactical air
TACAN tactical air navigation
TACS tactical air control system
TACSAT tactical satellite
TAI target area of interest
target list A listing of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior
echelon of command; it contains those targets that are to be
engaged by supporting arms, as distinguished from a “list of
targets” that may be maintained by any echelon as confirmed,

Glossary-18
 FM 3-05.60

suspected, or possible targets for informational and planning

purposes. (JP 1-02)
TASKORD tasking order
TDA table of distribution and allowances
TDH time, distance, and heading
TF task force
TGO terminal guidance operations
TIP target intelligence package − A product tasked and compiled
to provide the intelligence support to those personnel who will
plan and execute a given special operations forces mission.
(JP 3-05.5)
TMDE test measurement and diagnostic equipment
TOE table of organization and equipment
TOT time on target
TP target practice
TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data
TPT target practice tracer
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAR unconventional assisted recovery
UARM unconventional assisted recovery mechanism − That entity,
group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held or hostile
areas which operates to receive, support, move, and exfiltrate
military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control.
(JP 1-02)
UBL unit basic load
UHF ultrahigh frequency
UJTL universal joint task list
U.S. United States
USAF United States Air Force
USAJFKSWCS United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School
USAR United States Army Reserve
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
UTM universal transverse mercator
UW unconventional warfare − A broad spectrum of military and
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration,
predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who

Glossary-19
FM 3-05.60

are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in

varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla
warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or
clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of
subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and
escape. (JP 1-02)
VHF very high frequency
VMC visual meteorological conditions
VOR very high frequency omnidirectional range
WIA wounded in action
WL water line
WMD weapons of mass destruction

Glossary-20
 Bibliography
FM 1-100. Army Aviation Operations. 21 February 1997.

FM 1-111. Aviation Brigades. 27 October 1997.

FM 1-112. Attack Helicopter Operations. 2 April 1997.

FM 1-113. Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations. 12 September 1997.

FM 1-114. Air Cavalry Squadron and Troop Operations. 1 February 2000.

FM 1-564. Shipboard Operations. 29 June 1997.

FM 7-85. Ranger Unit Operations. 9 June 1987.

FM 31-20. Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. 20 April 1990.

FM 33-1-1. Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures. 5 May 1994.

FM 34-36. Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.

30 September 1991.

FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.

FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 14 February 2000.

FM 100-5. Operations. 14 June 1993.

FM 100-6. Information Operations. 27 August 1996.

FM 100-25. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 1 August 1999.

FM 101-5. Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.

JP 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). 24 February 1995.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. June 1999.

JP 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 April 1998.

JP 3-05.5. Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.

10 August 1993.

JP 3-09. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. 12 May 1998.

JP 3-13.1. Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W). 7 February 1996.

JP 3-50.2. Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue. 26 January 1996.

JP 3-50.3. Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery. 6 September 1996.

JP 3-53. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. 10 July 1996.

Bibliography-1
FM 3-05.60

JP 3-56. Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations.
1 April 1974. Change 1, 16 May 1979.

JP 3-57. Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. 21 June 1995.

JP 5-0. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. 13 April 1995.

USSOCOM Pub 1. Special Operations in Peace and War. 25 January 1996.

Bibliography-2

A combat, 4-1 − 4-3, 5-6, C-34,
aircraft capabilities, 2-16,
B-1 − B-56
AH-6J, B-6 − B-12
MH-6J, B-1 − B-5
MH-47D, B-32 − B-38
MH-47E, B-39 − B-54
MH-60K, B-23 − B-31
MH-60L, B-13 − B-22
aircraft capabilities matrix,
B-55, B-56
air defense, 4-4 – 4-5
airspace, C-1, C-34
command and control
(C2), C-34 – C-36
control authority, C-36
coordination, C-35
deconfliction, 3-3, C-35,
C-36
restricted, C-34
airspace control measures
(ACM), C-34, C-35
airspace control order (ACO),
3-3, C-35, C-36
Army tactical missile system
(ATACMS), 4-1, 4-2
ARSOA mission, 1-1
ARSOA principles, 2-6
attack helicopters, 1-1, 4-5,
B-6 − B-12, B-13,
B-17 − B-22, B-55, B-56
AH-6J, B-6 − B-12
MH-60L (DAP), B-13,
B-17 − B-22
C general engineering, 4-8
casualty evacuation
(CASEVAC), C-8
collateral activities, 2-1,
2-8 − 2-10, 2-16 – 2-19
Index
C-35
combat search and rescue
(CSAR), 1-2. 2-3, 2-16,
2-17, 2-20, 2-21, A-8, B-13,
B-23, B-32, B-39, C-11
combat service support (CSS),
Preface-1, 4-8, 5-1, 5-2, 5-5,
5-6, 5-12, C-22, C-29, C-30,
C-33, C-35
combat support (CS),
Preface-1, 2-16, 4-1,
4-6, 4-8, 5-1, 5-2, C-35
command and control (C2),
Preface-1, 1-2, 2-10, 2-13,
2-14, 2-16, 3-1 – 3-4, 3-10,
4-7, 5-8, B-13, B-17, C-1,
C-34
command, control,
communications, and
computers (C4), 3-11
command, control,
communications, computers,
and intelligence (C4I), 1-2
communications, 1-4, 2-10,
2-13, 2-16 – 2-20, 3-6, 3-10,
3-11, 4-7, 5-6, A-5, B-2, B-6,
B-7, B-13, B-14, B-23, B-24,
B-32, B-33, B-40, B-55,
C-5 – C-8, C-12, C-13, C-16,
C-17, C-32, C-34, D-4, D-6,
D-12
counterintelligence (CI), 4-7,
A-1, A-2
E
engineer support, 4-7, 4-8
countermobility, 4-7
mobility, 4-7
survivability, 4-7
topographic
engineering, 4-8
evasion and recovery (E&R),
1-2, 2-3, 2-17, 2-19, 3-6
external communications
support, 4-7
F
fire support, 2-1, 3-3, 3-6,
4-1 – 4-3, B-6, B-13, B-14,
C-3, C-4
air interdiction, 4-3
Army attack helicopters,
4-3, 4-5
Army tactical missile
system (ATACMS), 4-1,
4-2
close air support (CAS),
4-3
field artillery, 4-1, 4-2
fratricide control, 4-5,
C-3, C-10, C-18, C-22
naval surface fire
support, 4-1, 4-2
reconnaissance, 4-3
tactical air support,
4-1 – 4-3
forward arming and refueling
point (FARP), 3-6, 4-7, 4-8,
5-6, 5-8 – 5-10, B-32, B-38,
B-39, B-54
fratricide prevention, 4-5, C-3,
C-10, C-18, C-22
fuel, 5-6, 5-9, 5-10, B-3,
B-4, B-7, B-11, B-13,
B-16 – B-18, B-22 – B-24,
B-26 – B-28, B-32, B-33,
B-36 – B-41, B-43, B-45.
B-54 – B-56, C-5 – C-7, C-9,
C-14, D-3
Index-1
FM 3-05.60
H M
host nation (HN), 2-5, 2-10,
2-11, 2-15, 2-17, 2-18
I missions, 2-10 − 2-16
intelligence, 1-3, 1-4, 2-3, 2-5,
2-6, 2-10, 2-13, 2-15, 2-19,
3-2, 3-3, 4-5 – 4-7,
A-1 – A-9, C-3, C-20,
C-22 – C-26, C-30, C-32,
C-33
intelligence and electronic
warfare (IEW), 4-6, A-1
intelligence preparation of the
battlespace (IPB), 2-13,
A-6 – A-8
J Psychological
joint suppression of enemy air
defenses (J-SEAD), 4-4,
C-3, C-12
L information (RII), A-3 – A-6
landing zones, 2-8, 2-10, 4-5,
4-7, 4-8, A-7, A-9, B-55
liaison, 1-1, 1-2, 2-16, 3-3, 3-5,
3-6, 3-8, 3-9, 5-11
limitations, 5-6
logistics environment, 5-1
buildup and integration,
5-1
initial entry, 5-1
redeployment, 5-1
logistics planning, 5-2
aviation life support
equipment (ALSE), 5-8
classes of supply, 5-6,
5-7
considerations, 5-6
fuel, 5-6
Index-2
operations
maritime operations, 2-8, 2-21 airspace control
measures (ACM), C-34,
mission-essential and battle
C-35
tasks, 1-1, 1-2
airspace deconfliction,
mission planning, 3-4 – 3-9
C-35, C-36
Army airspace
Civil Affairs (CA), 2-12 command and control
combatting terrorism (A2C2), C-34 – C-36
(CBT), 2-15, 2-16 mission planning folder,
counterproliferation of C-18
weapons of mass operation order
destruction (CPWMD), (OPORD), C-1 − C-17
2-16
organization, 1-5, 1-6
direct action (DA), 2-14,
2-15
foreign internal defense
(FID), 2-11 P
information operations principles of war, 2-1 − 2-3
(IO), 2-10, 2-12 − 2-14 priority intelligence
requirements (PIR), A-1,
Operations (PSYOP), A-4 – A-6
2-11, 2-12
special reconnaissance
(SR), 2-15
R
unconventional warfare
(UW), 2-10, 2-11 request for intelligence
resupply procedures for
developed and undeveloped
N theaters, 5-10 – 5-12
night vision device (NVD), rules of engagement (ROE), 2-4
B-33, B-35, B-38, B-42,
B-44, B-54, B-56
forward-looking infrared
radar (FLIR), A-2, B-3, S
B-7, B-17, B-20, B-32, search and rescue (SAR), 2-9,
B-35, B-42, B-56 2-16, 2-21
night vision goggles, 2-8 special operations (SO)
nuclear, biological, and imperatives, 2-1, 2-3 − 2-6
chemical (NBC) special operations support
decontamination, 4-8 command (SOSCOM), 5-2,
5-3, 5-11
statement of requirements
(SOR), 5-2 − 5-5, 5-7, 5-8,
O D-1 − D-13
operational considerations, 2-1, supporting tasks, 1-2
2-7, 2-8
terrain, 2-7, 2-8
weather, 2-7
 FM 3-05.60

support services, 5-6 − 5-10

aircraft water
requirements, 5-8
airdrop, 5-8
aviation life support
equipment (ALSE), 5-8
base security, 5-6, D-13
billeting, 5-8
finance, 5-9
food service, 5-6 – 5-8
funding, 5-9
laundry and shower, 5-8
mortuary affairs, 5-8
rigging, 5-8, 5-9
suppression of enemy air
defenses (SEAD), 3-6, 4-2,
4-4, 4-6
assets and techniques,
4-4
coordination, 4-4
planning, 3-6, 4-4

T
tactical application, 2-19

W
weapons, B-56
weather support, 4-7
wind limitations, 2-7, B-3, B-10,
B-21, B-36, B-44

Index-3
PIN: 078613-000