MANINANG vs. CA GR No. L-57848; June 19, 1982 Melencio-Herrera, J.

DOCTRINE: In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue. FACTS: Clemencia Aseneta died and left a holographic will stating that all her real properties and personal properties shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang and family and that she does not consider Nonoy as her adopted son for he has made her do things against her will. Petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the (Testate Case) while respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings (Intestate Case). The cases were ordered consolidated. Respondent Bernardo filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. Petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent. The lower court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case and denied reconsideration for lack of merit and in the same Order appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased. Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court of Appeals and was also denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the Testate Case is proper. HELD: No. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The trial courts conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited. We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.

Wherefore, the Decision in question is set aside and the case is remanded to court of first instance for further proceedings.

ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ vs. CA GR No. 118671; January 29, 1996 Puno, J.

DOCTRINE: The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases. FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz died and left a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will. Four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Montes who filed a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence. Edmond then withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond. Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." The probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes's motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous motion for release of funds. ISSUE: Whether or not the intrinsic validity of the will may be passed upon by the probate court. HELD: The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his motion for reconsideration of the order of the said court. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.

IN RE KAW SINGCO. SY OA vs. CO HO GR No. L-48444; June 30, 1943 Moran, J.

DOCTRINE: The province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue," and it is not an element of jurisdiction. FACTS: A motion is filed seeking reconsideration on the certification of the case to the Court of Appeals since the question involved not being one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but rather of venue which in turn hinges on a question of fact, i.e., whether the deceased, at the time of his death, was residing in Camarines Sur on in the City of Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not venue is a component of jurisdiction in probate proceedings. HELD: In another jurisprudence we said that the term "jurisdiction" as used in the Constitution and in the statutes, means jurisdiction over the subject-matter only, unless an exception is clearly intended by reason of its employment in a broader sense. A perusal of all the laws of jurisdiction in the Philippines Act No. 136 and its amendments; Philippine Constitution, Article VIII, sections 2 and 3; and Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259 will readily show that the word "jurisdiction" as used in their different provisions is intended to have reference to the subject-matter only. It may fairly be assumed, therefore, that when particularly the same word is used in clause 3 of the section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution and in clause 3 of section 138 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, it is also intended to refer to the same kind of jurisdiction, since there is nothing therein to show that it is employed in a broader sense. We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province. Furthermore, Sec. 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province whether he had last resided could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject-matter is another. The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue." (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied.

REYES vs. DIAZ GR No. L-48754; November 26, 1941 Moran, J.

DOCTRINE: The question, therefore, of whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, calls for interpretation and application of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the different courts in the Philippines, and since the ruling on the matter is of farreaching consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial system, the law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court of the land. FACTS: This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the ground that the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue. The supposed questions of jurisdiction are, first, whether or not there is sufficient to show that the protestant has duly filed his certificate of candidacy, and second, whether the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant which have not been challenged by the protestee in his counter-protest. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has authority to pass upon question of jurisdiction. HELD: It has been held that the word "jurisdiction" as used in the constitutions and in the statutes "means jurisdiction as to the subject-matter only, unless an exception arises by reason of its employment in a broader sense." On the contrary, having due regard to the manifest purpose of the law, which is to confine the appellate jurisdiction of this court to cases of vital importance involving questions of fundamental character, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the issue of jurisdiction which confers appellate powers upon this Court in a given case is not such question as is dependent exclusively upon minor matters of fact or upon a mere construction of the pleadings, but that which has reference to the more important question of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter as determined by law. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers. The question, therefore, of whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, calls for interpretation and application of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the different courts in the Philippines, and since the ruling on the matter is of far-reaching consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial system, the law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court of the land. In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above described. Both parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case. The real question between them is one of fact whether or not the protestant's certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not the until this fact is proved can the question of jurisdiction be determined. Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal provisions above quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence. It may be true that the court by an erroneous ruling on such question my encroach upon issues completely foreign to those

defined in the pleadings, but in such case the question of jurisdiction that may arise would not be one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but of jurisdiction over the issue. In order that a court may validly try and decide a case, it must have jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. But in some instances it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue, meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter the latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court.

BERNABE vs. VERGARA GR No. L-48652; September 16, 1942 Moran, J.

FACTS: This is an action for partition of an inheritance left by the deceased Victoriano Zafra. He was survived by three children: Benito Apolonia and Dominga. Benito and Apolonia died, the first leaving a daughter named Irinea, and the second, three children named Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara. The plaintiff in the action for partition were the heirs of Benito and Apolonia Zafra and the defendants were Dominga Zafra and the persons to whom she sad sold her share in the common property; namely, Brigida Martinez, Amadeo Landicho and Marcelina Landicho. Dominga Zafra, in her answer, pleaded a counterclaim, alleging that she had paid certain debts contracted by Apolonia Zafra, the deceased mother of plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara. These debts constituted an equitable lien upon the property left by said deceased Apolonia Zafra. At the trial, evidence was presented as to such debts, and the trial court in its decision awarded the plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara one-third of the common property and, at the same time, ordered them to pay the debts of their deceased mother, Apolonia Zafra, in the amount of P350. Appeal was interposed by them from this judgment, and in this Court no question was raised as to the jurisdiction of the trial court to render a judgment in the said amount of P350. This Court accordingly assumed jurisdiction over the case and affirmed the judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to render its judgment for the sum of money above mentioned. HELD: There can be absolutely no doubt that the trial had such jurisdiction not only because there was a counterclaim wherein the amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded, but because the proceeding was in the nature of one for liquidation and partition of inheritance wherein debts left by the deceased ancestors may be determined and ordered paid if the creditors are parties, as was the case. Plaintiffs-appellees knew that the trial court had such jurisdiction as is shown by their omission to raise any question with respect thereto in their appeal to this Court. And such question may be deemed to have been passed upon impliedly by this Court when it acted on the case and decided the same on the merits. And, furthermore, the question of jurisdiction attempted to be raised in this case is not the kind of question that confers jurisdiction upon this Court. The jurisdiction involved is not one over the subject matter but at most over the issue or over the persons of the parties. A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the case involving P200 or more, and therefore the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had jurisdiction to render judgment in the amount of P350. The question of whether or not there was a proper issue raised in the pleading as to said amount, is not a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but jurisdiction over the issue. The question of jurisdiction raised in the instant case is not only unsubstantial but is also not the kind of question that may deprive the Court of Appeals of its appellate jurisdiction over the case. It is hereby ordered that this case be returned to the Court of Appeals for hearing and decision on the merits.

CASTRO vs. ANTONIO MARTINEZ GALLEGOS GR No. L-3880; March 9, 1908 Arellano, C.J.

DOCTRINE: It is a legal doctrine that "wills executed with the formalities of law are presumed valid"; that "the normal condition of the faculties of the testator is presumed under the law"; and "that is not proper to declare the nullity of a will if it be based on incapacity attributed to the testator when the notary who authorizes the instrument certifies that according to his judgment the testator, at the time of executing the will, was of sound mind." Nothing can be done upon the ground of nullity of an act without first obtaining, or at least petitioning at the same time for a declaration of nullity FACTS: Marcelina Cuico y Rodis was the owner of a house built of wood and nipa on Calle Cadiz, City of Cebu. On the 17th of October, 1896, before a notary and the proper number of witnesses she executed a nuncupative will under which she died and wherein she disposed of the house in which she lived and of some furniture and credits of small importance. By one of its clauses she bequeathed 10 pesos to each one of her nephews. Of these, Mateo, Quintin, and Constancia, and another of the name of Ignacio, together with Teopista Castro challenged the will. Under the will Antonio Martinez Gallegos and Evaristo Rodis were appointed executors, and in compliance with clause 4 of the same they sold the house and ground for the price of 500 pesos to Pedro Ferragut and was then sold to Tomas Osmea, who then sold it to Martinez Gallegos, and the latter finally sold it to Ramon Velez y Santos. With reference to the two questions submitted to the decision of the court, the same are decided in the following manner: "This court having considered as a matter of fact, that the will was not only null and illegal but also fraudulent, it naturally results that all the transfers made by Antonio Martinez Gallegos were and are null and illegal, and that the title to, and right of possession of No. 19 Calle Cadiz has always remained with the heirs of Marcelina Cuico y Rodis, and that they are entitled to the possession and to the proceeds of the sale of same, if there were any, now retained by the said defendants. The court orders and decrees that the alleged deeds of conveyance and each of them, executed by Antonio Martinez Gallegos as executor or personally as owner, that is the bill of purchase and sale of said Antonio Martinez Gallegos together with Evaristo Rodis, second executor, to Pedro Ferragut y Campos and the bill of purchase and sale of Antonio Martinez Gallegos to Ramon Velez, be, and are, hereby, declared to be canceled, null and without effect. That the said defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to the said plaintiffs the possession of the ground and property at No. 19 Calle Cadiz, by means of a sufficient instrument or instruments of a legal form and executed and delivered according to law, conveying to the said plaintiffs for their own use and benefit, and to all other heirs of Marcelina Cuico, deceased, all of the interest, right and title to said property. ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid. HELD: As the will in question was executed in 1896 under the laws then in force, the provisions of a law now in force but which did not exist can not be invoked. At that time the notary who authorized the will had to abide by the provisions of article 64 of the Notarial Law of the 11th of April, 1890: If the party, or parties executing a will are unable to sign the same, the notary shall so state, and a witness shall sign for him without the necessity of previously stating that he does so as a witness and on behalf of the testator, or testators, who are not able to do so, because it is

the duty of the notary to make such statement in the instrument itself" as was stated by the notary who authorized the will in question, saying that the testatrix ratified the contents of the will, and that she did not sign the same because she was prevented by her illness, "the witness Casals doing so at her reguest . . . ." Should the testator declare that he does not know how, or is not able to sign, one of the attesting witnesses or another person shall do so for him at his request, the notary certifying thereto. (Civil Code, art. 695.) It is a legal doctrine that "wills executed with the formalities of law are presumed valid"; that "the normal condition of the faculties of the testator is presumed under the law"; and "that is not proper to declare the nullity of a will if it be based on incapacity attributed to the testator when the notary who authorizes the instrument certifies that according to his judgment the testator, at the time of executing the will, was of sound mind." Consequently, neither directly nor indirectly, could the nullity of the will of Marcelina Cuico y Rodis have been declared either as a fact or as a conclusion of law. It is a legal doctrine that nothing can be done upon the ground of nullity of an act without first obtaining, or at least petitioning at the same time for a declaration of nullity; and the plaintiffs have limited themselves to asking that they be declared the owners of the property of the late Marcelina Cuico, without first obtaining, or petitioning at the same time for a declaration of nullity of the will whereby Marcelina transmitted said property to others. In the event that the will in question was really null, the proper thing to do would be open the intestate succession of Marcelina Cuico by means of the procedure established by law; in which action the declaration of heirs of Marcelina Cuico could be obtained with the right to demand the nullity of the acts or contracts by virtue of which the property of the intestate estate has been transferred to third persons. The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed.

ACAIN vs. IAC GR No. 72706; October 27, 1987 Paras, J.

DOCTRINE: Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. FACTS: Petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner. Respondents Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; he is merely a universal heir and the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied by the trial judge. After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of respondent Court's decision. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents have been pretirited. HELD: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.

Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved. The petition is hereby denied.