Prof. V. A.

Avena
What Need Not Be Proved

Evidence-A2010
three times, was now happily married to an Englishman and residing in the United States. - Judge denied the motion and dismissed intervenors complaint, ruling that respondent was not able to prove her claim. The trial court pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim. Moreover, no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an original copy of the document or any public officer who had custody thereof. Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering that the latter referred to them as his children in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others. - Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had been married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the fact that Josefa was married to the decedent. ISSUE WON the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted by the other party who claims to be the second wife, should be allowed to intervene in an action for partition involving the share of the deceased husband in the estate of his parents. HELD YES. - The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC. Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late husband had been previously married to another. - This admission constitutes a deliberate, clear and unequivocal statement; made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. - A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. - The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A

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party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded. - Intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. - Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners mother, the Court rules that respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in the partition case. She has shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation. Dispositive The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit respondent Josefina Halasans Complaint-inIntervention and forthwith conduct the proper proceedings with dispatch.

ALFELOR v HALASAN G.R. No. 165987 CALLEJO; March 31, 2006 (glaisa)
NATURE This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari FACTS - The children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for Partition. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses. - Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the above-entitled case for partition between plaintiffs and defendants; that she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, one of the children and compulsory heirs of Telesforo I. Alfelor whose intestate estate is subject to herein special proceedings for partition; that herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo from the share of her late husband Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor. - Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention claiming that she was the surviving spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for having been contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that Joshua and Maria Katrina were not her husbands children. Josefina prayed, among others, for the appointment of a special administrator to take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of the marriage contract which indicated that she and Jose were married. - Judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina presented the marriage contract as well as the Reply-inIntervention filed by the heirs of the deceased, where Teresita declared that she knew of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with that of the herein intervenor. However, Josefina did not appear in court. - Teresita testified that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to Josefina annulled because he believed in good faith that he had the right to remarry, not having seen her for more than seven years. This opinion was shared by Joses sister who was a judge. Teresita also declared that she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she had been married

PSCFC FINANCIAL CORP v CA (QUIASON, BANCO FILIPINO) G.R. No. 106094 BELLOSILLO; Dec 28, 1992 (kooky)
NATURE Petition for annulment of foreclosure proceedings, and damages FACTS: - PSCFC as land developer availed of the Home Financing Plan of Banco Filipino and borrowed from the latter the amount of P6,630,690 as "developer loan." As security, petitioner constituted a mortgage over several lots in Pasay City which were not yet sold at that time to third parties. It was agreed that under the Home Financing Plan, the "developer loan" would mature only after the lots shall have been subdivided and improved and then sold to third persons who would then be substituted as mortgagors to the extent of the loan value of the lots and houses bought by them.

Prof. V. A. Avena
- Sept 25 1987, without the loan having matured as none of the lots have been conveyed to buyers, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and a certificate of sale was executed in favor of Banco Filipino. - Private respondents admitted the loan for which petitioner had executed a promissory note secured by a real estate mortgage on the properties. However, they denied that petitioner had availed itself of Banco Filipino's Home Financing Plan, averring instead that under the promissory note and the contract of mortgage, the subject loan would fall due "1 year from date" or on 5 January 1986 and that upon default of petitioner, Banco Filipino could immediately foreclose the mortgage under Act No. 3135. - PSCFC served upon Banco Filipino a written request for admission of the truth of certain matters set forth as follows: 1. The plaintiff (PSCFC) ... was ... granted by you under BF Home Financing Plan, on the security of mortgages constituted on the lands acquired, under the terms of which the developer loans, despite the contents of the covering promissory notes and security instruments, would mature only after the development of the acquired lands into residential subdivision and the resale of the ... lots ... to interested third parties who would then be substituted as mortgagors ... 2. ... in 1984, availing itself of your said Home Financing Plan, the plaintiff obtained from you a loan ... of P6,630,690.00 for which it signed in your favor a promissory note on the security of a mortgage constituted on ... lots, which were not then yet sold to any third person ... 3. ... on September 25, 1987, without the said loan having yet matured for the reason that none of the ... lots had yet been the subject of sale to third persons such that substitution of the latter as mortgagors in your favor could not yet be had, a certificate of sale was executed by the Notary Public over the ... lands in your favor. - PSCFC received Banco Filipino's answer to its request for admission signed by its counsel, Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun. Counsel admitted, inter alia, petitioner's mortgage loan as well as the fact that Banco Filipino was engaged in land development loans. However, respondent denied that petitioner availed itself of the Home Financing Plan, including the agreement that the maturity of the debt would depend on the resale of the mortgaged subdivision lots. - PSCFC made a second request for admission on respondent Banco Filipino impliedly objecting to the first reply having been made by its lawyer, Atty. Fortun, who was not even an attorney yet when Banco Filipino inaugurated its financing plan in February 1968 and therefore did not have personal knowledge of the

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financing scheme. The second request called on Banco Filipino to admit that it did not send a formal notice of its intention to foreclose the mortgage and that there was no publication of the notice of foreclosure in a newspaper of general circulation. - Banco Filipino objected on the ground of irrelevancy and denied all the rest. - PSCFC asked the trial court for a ruling that the matters sought to be admitted in its second bid for admission should be considered as impliedly admitted when the answer was made by a lawyer who was not qualified to do so as he had no direct and personal knowledge of the matters sought to be admitted. In insisting that only a client could make a binding admission in discovery proceedings, petitioner cites Koh v. IAC. (PSCFC counsel misquoted the decision; SC ordered counsel to show cause) - Trial court did not grant PSCFCs motion. CA sustained the trial court. - Petitioner submits that the answer to the request for admission under Rule 26 should be made by the party himself and nobody else, not even his lawyer. Consequently, failure of respondent Banco Filipino, upon whom the call for admission was served, to render the required sworn statement would constitute an implied admission of the facts sought to be admitted. Thus, it must be the party itself who must respond to the request for admission and that a mere reply made and verified by its counsel alone is insufficient and contrary to the Rules and the intent behind recourse to modes of discovery. ISSUE WON a request for admission directed to an adverse party under Sec. 1, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court may be answered by his counsel HELD YES - When Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf. - Section 21 of Rule 138 states Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. - An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client ... 3 - Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as found in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. - Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any

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agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure ..." Disposition Petition denied

PEOPLE v HERNANDEZ G.R. No. 108028 FRANCISCO; July 30, 1996 (eva)
FACTS - Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale in violating of Art. 38 (a) and (b) in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor Code.1 Between Dec.14-Dec.24, 1988, in Manila, she represented herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, and for a fee, recruited and promised employment/job placement abroad to: ROGELIO N. LEGASPI, ULDARICO P. LEGASPI, SONNY P. BERNABE, ARNEL B. MENDOZA, BENITO L. BERNABE, ARNOLD P. VALENZUELA, ARMANDO P. PAGULAYAN, GREGORIO P. MENDOZA, JR., RONALD T. CORREA, DANILO PALAD and ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ without first having secured the required license or authority from the POEA. - Upon arraignment, Hernandez pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. Of the 14 complainants, B.
1

Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officers may initiate complaints under this article. (b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme, defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group

Prof. V. A. Avena
Bernabe, Velasquez, G. Mendoza and A. Mendoza were presented as witnesses for the prosecution. - They testified to the following essential facts: Their first encounter with the Hernandez was on Dec.12, 1988 when one Josefa Cinco accompanied them to the office of the Philippine Thai Association, Inc. (Philippine-Thai) in Ermita, Manila to meet the appellant. Introducing herself as the general manager of Philippine-Thai, Hernandez asserted that her company recruited workers for placement abroad and asked private complainants if they wanted to work as factory workers in Taipei. Enticed by the assurance of immediate employment and an $800 per month salary, they applied. Hernandez required them to pay placement and passport fees in the total amount of P22,500.00 per applicant, to be paid in three installments. They were issued receipts by Liza Mendoza, the last one signed by Mendoza and Hernandez. Hernandez then assured them that they would be able to leave for Taipei sometime before the end of Dec.1988, but contrary to the promise, they were unable to leave for abroad. They demanded for the return of their money but to no avail. - DEFENSE presented as its lone witness, Hernandez, whose testimony consisted mainly in denying the charges against her. She claimed that she never met any of the complainants nor did she ever recruit any of them. She likewise denied having received money from anyone and asserted that she did not know any Liza Mendoza who is the alleged treasure of Phil-Thai. She maintained that although she had an office in Ermita Building, the said office belonged to B.C. Island Wood Products Corp. which was engaged in the logging business. However, when questioned further, appellant admitted being the president of Phil-Thai but only in a nominal capacity, and claimed that as nomineepresident, she did not participate in any of its transactions. Appellant likewise insisted that Phil-Thai was engaged solely in the barong tagalog business. - The court rendered a decision holding that the defense of "denial" interposed by the accused could not prevail over the positive and clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. - Appellant comes to this Court for the reversal of the judgment of conviction ISSUES 1. WON Hernandez is guilty of illegal recruitment committed in a large scale and by a syndicate. 2. WON the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the fact that Hernandez had been charged of illegal recruitment in another criminal case and in considering the pendency thereof as evidence of the scheme and strategy adopted by the accused.

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3. WON the trial court erred in not giving credence or weight to the defense of the accused. HELD 1. YES The prosecution had in fact presented evidence to prove the said element of the crime of illegal recruitment. "EXHIBIT I", a certification issued by the Chief Licensing Branch of the POEA, attesting to the fact that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai is licensed/authorized to recruit workers for employment abroad, was offered and admitted in evidence without the objection of the appellant. Reasoning - Defense contends that the prosecution failed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment- that the offender is a non-licensee or nonholder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. This element was the subject of a stipulation proposed by the prosecution and admitted by the defense during trial. Hernandez now assails as erroneous the reliance placed by the prosecution on the said stipulation of facts in dispensing with the presentation of evidence to prove the said element of the crime of illegal recruitment. Appellant argues that: (1) the stipulation of facts was not tantamount to an admission by the appellant of the fact of non-possession of the requisite authority or license from the POEA, but was merely an admission that the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA, if presented in court, would testify to this fact, and (2) the stipulation of facts is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. This being the case, it remained incumbent upon the prosecution to present evidence of such fact. ON WHAT WAS ADMITTED IN THE STIPULATION - Although appellant's arguments find no significant bearing in the face of the existence of "EXHIBIT I", they nonetheless require deeper scrutiny and a clear response for future application. - Appellant correctly distinguishes between an admission that a particular witness if presented in court would testify to certain facts, and an admission of the facts themselves. According to the appellant, what was stipulated on was "merely that the testimony of the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA would be to the effect that appellant is not licensed nor authorized to recruit workers." - The distinction, though cogent, is unfortunately inapplicable to the case at bar. Conveniently omitted from the appellant's reply chief is the ensuing statement made by the court after counsel for the accused, Atty. Ulep, agreed to the stipulation proposed by the prosecution: Atty. Ulep: Agreed, Your Honor.

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Court: The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate/admit that from the record of the POEA Licensing and Regulation Office, Dept. of Labor and Employment, accused Cristina Hernandez/Phil. etc., Ass. . . . is neither licensed nor authorized by the office to recruit workers overseas abroad and that if the duly authorized representative from the POEA Administration is to take the witness stand, he will confirm to this fact as borne by the records. - It is evident that the prosecution and the defense counsel stipulated on two things: that from the record of the POEA, Hernandez is neither licensed nor authorized by that office to recruit workers for overseas abroad and that if the duly authorized representative from the POEA is to take the witness stand, he will confirm to this fact. ON THE VALIDITY OF THE STIPULATION - Appellant further contends that granting that defense counsel had in fact agreed to the above stipulation of facts, the same is null and void for being contrary to the well-established rule that a stipulation of facts is not allowed in criminal cases. - The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded on the fundamental right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and corollary duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rationale behind the proscription against this class of agreements between prosecution and defense is that It is not supposed to be within the knowledge or competence of counsel to predict what a proposed witness shall say under the sanction of his oath and the test of cross-examination. A conviction for crime should not rest upon mere conjecture. Nor is it possible for a trial court to weigh with exact nicety the contradictory declaration of witnesses not produced so as to be subjected to its observation and its judgment as to their credibility. - However, in the light of recent changes in our rules, particularly the pre-trial provisions in Rule 118, the prohibition against a stipulation of facts in criminal cases no longer holds true. - Although not expressly sanctioned under the old rules of court, a stipulation of facts by the parties in criminal cases has long been allowed and recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties. In People vs. Bocar this Court stated that: There is nothing unlawful or irregular about the above procedure. The declarations constitute judicial admission, which are binding on the parties, by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence and the defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statements contained in the exhibits.

Prof. V. A. Avena
- American jurisprudence has established the acceptability of the practice of stipulating during the trial of criminal cases, and stated in People vs. Hare that: This court has held that an accused may by stipulation waive the necessity of a proof of all or any part of the case which the people have alleged against him and that having done so, he cannot complain in this Court of evidence which he has stipulated into the record. COROLLARY ISSUE: SHOULD STIPULATION BE IN WRITING AND SIGNED (Sec.4 R.118) - A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive." In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial." - Appellant was never prevented from presenting evidence contrary to the stipulation of facts. If appellant believed that the testimony of the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA would be beneficial to her case, then it is the defense who should have presented him. Her continuous failure to do so during trial was a waiver of her right to present the pertinent evidence to contradict the stipulation of facts and establish her defense. - The stipulation of facts proposed during trial by prosecution and admitted by defense counsel is tantamount to a judicial admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. 2. NO. Ratio It is true that as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. However, this rule is subject to the exception that in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or

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in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated. The judicial notice taken by the lower court of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case against the appellant falls squarely under the above exception in view of the fact that it was the appellant herself who introduced evidence on the matter when she testified in open court. Reasoning - Appellant cites a violation of Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that before the court may take judicial notice of any matter, the parties shall be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. It is claimed that the lower court never announced its intention to take judicial notice of the pendency of the other illegal recruitment case nor did it allow the accused to be heard thereon. - Even assuming, however, that the lower court improperly took judicial notice of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case against the appellant, the error would not be fatal to the prosecution's cause. The judgment of conviction was not based on the existence of another illegal recruitment case filed against appellant by a different group of complainants, but on the overwhelming evidence against her in the instant case. 3. NO. We do not find any compelling reason to reverse the findings of the lower court that appellant's bare denials cannot overthrow the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses against her. Well established is the rule that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. That she did not merely deny, but likewise raised as an affirmative defense her appointment as mere nominee-president of PhilippineThai is a futile attempt at exculpating herself and is of no consequence whatsoever when weighed against the positive declarations of witnesses that it was the appellant who executed the acts of illegal recruitment as complained of. Disposition Appellant's conviction of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is hereby AFFIRMED, and the penalty imposed MODIFIED. NATURE Petition for review on certiorari

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RAMOS v CA (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER) G.R. No. 124354 KAPUNAN (1999) (sj)

FACTS - Sometime in 1985, petitioner Erlinda Ramos, after seeking professional medical help, was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). She was referred to Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, who agreed to perform the operation on her. The operation was scheduled for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 in the morning at private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Since neither petitioner Erlinda nor her husband, petitioner Rogelio, knew of any anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez. - Petitioner Erlinda was admitted to the DLSMC the day before the scheduled operation. By 7:30 in the morning of the following day, petitioner Erlinda was already being prepared for operation. Upon the request of petitioner Erlinda, her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was then Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was allowed to accompany her inside the operating room. - At around 9:30 in the morning, Dr. Hosaka had not yet arrived so Dr. Gutierrez tried to get in touch with him by phone. Thereafter, Dr. Gutierrez informed Cruz that the operation might be delayed due to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka. In the meantime, the patient, petitioner Erlinda said to Cruz, "Mindy, inip na inip na ako, ikuha mo ako ng ibang Doctor." - By 10:00 in the morning, when Dr. Hosaka was still not around, petitioner Rogelio already wanted to pull out his wife from the operating room. He met Dr. Garcia, who remarked that he was also tired of waiting for Dr. Hosaka. Dr. Hosaka finally arrived at the hospital at around 12:10 in the afternoon, or more than three (3) hours after the scheduled operation. - Cruz, who was then still inside the operating room, heard about Dr. Hosakas arrival. While she held the hand of Erlinda, Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez trying to intubate the patient. Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez utter: "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan." Cruz noticed a bluish discoloration of Erlinda?s nailbeds on her left hand. She (Cruz) then heard Dr. Hosaka instruct someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. When he arrived, Dr. Calderon attempted to intubate the patient. The nailbeds of the patient remained bluish, thus, she was placed in a trendelenburg position a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet. At this point, Cruz went out of the operating room to express her concern to petitioner Rogelio that Erlindas operation was not going well.

Prof. V. A. Avena
- Cruz quickly rushed back to the operating room and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. At almost 3:00 in the afternoon, she saw Erlinda being wheeled to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The doctors explained to petitioner Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month. She was released from the hospital only four months later or on November 15, 1985. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died on August 3, 1999.1 - Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a civil case for damages against private respondents. After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Essentially, the trial court found that private respondents were negligent in the performance of their duties to Erlinda. On appeal by private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and directed petitioners to pay their "unpaid medical bills" to private respondents. - Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES 1. Whether or not private respondents were negligent in the performance of the operation on Mrs. Ramos. 2. Whether or not the CA erred in taking judicial notice that nurses do not have intubation in their curriculum as ground for excluding Dean Cruz (Mrs. Ramos sister in law, who was with her during the operation) testimony. HELD 1. YES Ratio Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. The phrase res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.

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- Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. INSTEAD, IT IS CONSIDERED AS MERELY EVIDENTIARY OR IN THE NATURE OF A PROCEDURAL RULE. It is regarded as a MODE OF PROOF, OR A MERE PROCEDURAL CONVENIENCE SINCE IT FURNISHES A SUBSTITUTE FOR, AND RELIEVES A PLAINTIFF OF, THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING SPECIFIC PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE. In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. Reasoning - In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the control of the instrumentality which caused the damage. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must show a situation where it is applicable, and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. ALTHOUGH GENERALLY, EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY IS RELIED UPON IN MALPRACTICE SUITS TO PROVE THAT A PHYSICIAN HAS DONE A NEGLIGENT ACT OR THAT HE HAS DEVIATED FROM THE STANDARD MEDICAL PROCEDURE, WHEN THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS AVAILED BY THE PLAINTIFF, THE NEED FOR EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY IS DISPENSED WITH BECAUSE THE INJURY ITSELF PROVIDES THE PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons,

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external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. WHERE COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE TEACH THAT A RESULTING INJURY WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED TO THE PATIENT IF DUE CARE HAD BEEN EXERCISED, AN INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE MAY BE DRAWN GIVING RISE TO AN APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR WITHOUT MEDICAL EVIDENCE, WHICH IS ORDINARILY REQUIRED TO SHOW NOT ONLY WHAT OCCURRED BUT HOW AND WHY IT OCCURRED. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. EXAMPLES FOR CLASS DISCUSSION Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of

Prof. V. A. Avena
those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could. FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE RATIO Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not happen in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia if the proper procedure was followed. Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-incharge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.

Evidence-A2010
Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, if negligence attended the management and care of the patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any and all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage. 2. YES Ratio Although witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well testify upon matters on which she is capable of observing such as, the statements and acts of the physician and surgeon, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one. This is precisely allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where the testimony of expert witnesses is not required. It is the accepted rule that expert testimony is not necessary for the proof of negligence in non-technical matters or those of which an ordinary person may be expected to have knowledge, or where the lack of skill or want of care is so obvious as to render expert testimony unnecessary. WE TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACT THAT ANESTHESIA PROCEDURES HAVE BECOME SO COMMON, THAT EVEN AN ORDINARY PERSON CAN TELL IF IT WAS ADMINISTERED PROPERLY. AS SUCH, IT WOULD NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT TO TELL IF THE TUBE WAS PROPERLY INSERTED. This kind of observation, we believe, does not require a medical degree to be acceptable. At any rate, without doubt, petitioner's witness, an experienced clinical nurse whose long experience and scholarship led to her appointment as Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing, was fully capable of determining whether or not the intubation was a success. She had extensive clinical experience starting as a staff nurse in Chicago, Illinois; staff nurse and clinical instructor in a teaching hospital, the FEU-

Page |6
NRMF; Dean of the Laguna College of Nursing in San Pablo City; and then Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing. eviewing witness Cruz' statements, we find that the same were delivered in a straightforward manner, with the kind of detail, clarity, consistency and spontaneity which would have been difficult to fabricate. With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied that she was able to demonstrate through her testimony what truly transpired on that fateful day.

PHILIPPINE HELATH-CARE PROVIDERS, INC. (MAXICARE) v CARMELA ESTRADA/CARAHEALTH SERVICES GR 171051 NACHURA; :Jan 28 2008 (da)
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari (original action was an action for breach of contract and damages filed by respondent Carmela Estrada, sole proprietor of Cara Health Services, against Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. (Maxicare)) FACTS - Maxicare is a corporation engaged in selling health insurance plans .On September 15, 1990, Maxicare engaged the services of Carmela Estrada who was doing business under the name of CARA HEALTH [SERVICES] to promote and sell the prepaid group practice health care delivery program called MAXICARE Plan with the position of Independent Account Executive. .The letter agreement provided for plaintiffappellees [Estradas] compensation in the form of commission. Estrada submitted proposals and made representations to the officers of MERALCO regarding the MAXICARE Plan but when MERALCO decided to subscribe to the MAXICARE Plan, Maxicare directly negotiated with MERALCO regarding the terms and conditions of the agreement and left plaintiff-appellee Estrada out of the discussions on the terms and conditions.On November 28, 1991, MERALCO eventually subscribed to the MAXICARE Plan and signed a Service Agreement directly with Maxicare for medical coverage of its qualified members.

Prof. V. A. Avena
- The total premium amounts paid by MERALCO to Maxicare was P20,169,335.00. - Estrada demanded from Maxicare that it be paid commissions for the MERALCO account and nine (9) other accounts. Maxicare denied this because Maxicare directly negotiated with MERALCO and the other accounts and that no agent was given the go signal to intervene in the negotiations for the terms and conditions and the signing of the service agreement with MERALCO and the other accounts so that if ever Maxicare was indebted to Estrada, it was only for P1,555.00 and P43.l2 as commissions on the accounts of Overseas Freighters Co. and Mr. Enrique Acosta, respectively. - Maxicare and its officers filed their Answer with Counterclaim alleging that Estrada did not intervene in the negotiations of the contract with MERALCO which was directly negotiated by MERALCO with Maxicare; and Estradas alleged other clients/accounts were not accredited with [Maxicare] as required, since the agency contract on the MAXICARE health plans were not renewed. - Both the trial and appellate courts held that Estrada was the efficient procuring cause in the execution of the service agreement between Meralco and Maxicare consistent with our ruling in Manotok Brothers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. - At the SC Maxicare urges the court that both the RTC and CA failed to take into account the stipulations contained in the February 19, 1991 letter agreement authorizing the payment of commissions only upon satisfaction of twin conditions, i.e., collection and contemporaneous remittance of premium dues by Estrada to Maxicare. Allegedly, the lower courts disregarded Estradas admission that the negotiations with Meralco failed. Thus, the flawed application of the efficient procuring cause doctrine enunciated in Manotok Brothers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] and the erroneous conclusion upholding Estradas entitlement to commissions on contracts completed without her participation. ISSUE WON Estrada is entitled to a commission for the execution of the service agreement between Meralco and Maxicare. HELD YES - Contrary to Maxicares assertion, the trial and the appellate courts carefully considered the factual backdrop of the case as borne out by the records. Both courts were one in the conclusion that Maxicare successfully landed the Meralco account for the sale of healthcare plans only by virtue of Estradas

Evidence-A2010
involvement and participation in the negotiations. The assailed Decision aptly states: There is no dispute as to the role that Estrada played in selling Maxicares health insurance plan to Meralco. Estradas efforts consisted in being the first to offer the Maxicare plan to Meralco, using her connections with some of Meralco Executives, inviting said executives to dinner meetings, making submissions and representations regarding the health plan, sending follow-up letters, etc. - These efforts were recognized by Meralco as shown by the certification issued by its Manpower Planning and Research Staff Head Ruben A. Sapitula . - this Court finds that Estradas efforts were instrumental in introducing the Meralco account to Maxicare in regard to the latters Maxicare health insurance plans. Estrada was the efficient intervening cause in bringing about the service agreement with Meralco. - The jettisoning of the petition is inevitable even upon a close perusal of the merits of the case. - Maxicares former Chairman Roberto K. Macasaet testified that Maxicare had been trying to land the Meralco account for two (2) years prior to Estradas entry in 1990. Even without that admission, we note that Meralcos Assistant Vice-President, Donatila San Juan, in a letter dated January 21, 1992 to then Maxicare President Pedro R. Sen, categorically acknowledged Estradas efforts relative to the sale of Maxicare health plans to Meralco, thus: - Sometime in 1989, Meralco received a proposal from Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. (Maxicare) through the initiative and efforts of Ms. Carmela Estrada, who introduced Maxicare to Meralco. Prior to this time, we did not know that Maxicare is a major health care provider in the country. We have since negotiated and signed up with Maxicare to provide a health maintenance plan for dependents of Meralco executives, effective December 1, 1991 to November 30, 1992. - At the very least, Estrada penetrated the Meralco market, initially closed to Maxicare, and laid the groundwork for a business relationship. The only reason Estrada was not able to participate in the collection and remittance of premium dues to Maxicare was because she was prevented from doing so by the acts of Maxicare, its officers, and employees. She was in fact the procuring cause.To be regarded as the procuring cause of a sale as to be entitled to a commission, a brokers efforts must have been the foundation on which the negotiations resulting in a sale began.[18] Verily, Estrada was instrumental in the sale of the Maxicare health plans to Meralco. Without her intervention, no sale could have been consummated. - On Judicial Admissions

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Maxicare contends that Estrada herself admitted that her negotiations with Meralco failed as shown in Annex F of the Complaint. - We observe that this Annex F is, in fact, Maxicares counsels letter dated April 10, 1992 addressed to Estrada. The letter contains a unilateral declaration by Maxicare that the efforts initiated and negotiations undertaken by Estrada failed, such that the service agreement with Meralco was supposedly directly negotiated by Maxicare. Thus, the latter effectively declares that Estrada is not the efficient procuring cause of the sale, and as such, is not entitled to commissions. - Our holding in Atillo III v. Court of Appeals,ironically the case cited by Maxicare to bolster its position that the statement in Annex F amounted to an admission, provides a contrary answer to Maxicares ridiculous contention. We intoned therein that in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a partys pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. We ruled, thus: - As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission. - For instance, if a party invokes an admission by an adverse party, but cites the admission out of context, then the one making the admission may show that he made no such admission, or that his admission was taken out of context. - This may be interpreted as to mean not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear. That is the reason for the modifier such. - In this case, the letter, although part of Estradas Complaint, is not, ipso facto, an admission of the statements contained therein, especially since the bone of contention relates to Estradas entitlement to commissions for the sale of health plans she claims to have brokered. It is more than obvious from the entirety of the records that Estrada has unequivocally and consistently declared that her involvement as broker is the proximate cause which consummated the sale between Meralco and Maxicare. - Moreover, Section 34,[22] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires the purpose for which the evidence is offered to be specified. Undeniably, the letter was attached to the Complaint, and offered in evidence, to demonstrate Maxicares bad faith and ill will towards Estrada.

Prof. V. A. Avena
- Even a cursory reading of the Complaint and all the pleadings filed thereafter before the RTC, CA, and this Court, readily show that Estrada does not concede, at any point, that her negotiations with Meralco failed. Clearly, Maxicares assertion that Estrada herself does not pretend to be the efficient procuring cause in the execution of the service agreement between Meralco and Maxicare is baseless and an outright falsehood.

Evidence-A2010
- Some press people were present in the mauling, and a lot of pictures were taken of the incident (which reached the front pages of newspapers) - The prosecution presented as evidence testimonies of 12 witnesses, including 2 eyewitnesses, newspaper accounts of the incident, and various photographs during the mauling. - RTC convicted the 5 attackers as principal, and an accomplice (a movie starlet Annie Ferrer whose participation in the crime was to shout gulpihn niyo ang mga cory hecklers! immediately before the incident). - CA confirmed and increased sentence to reclusion perpetua (and acquitted the starlet) - in relation to our topic (object evidence), the relevant part of the case is the error assigned to the lower court in admitting the photographs in evidence since they were not properly identified by the one who took them ISSUE WON the photographs of the incident should be admitted in evidence HELD YES Ratio We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged nonparticipation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. Reasoning - The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. - That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. - when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty.

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Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove (yessss, the name!) Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits V, V1-V48 to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective counsels. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the 3rd hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility. - An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only 3 of the appellants could be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. Appellant Sison appears only once and he, although (allegedly) afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the victim. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by the eyewitnesses. Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification. Disposition Petition is denied. Decision modified (increased award of moral damages and indemnity for death)

Object Evidence SISON V PEOPLE 250 SCRA 58 PUNO; November 16, 1995 (maia)
NATURE Consolidation of 2 cases: petition under rule 45 by accused, and automatic review of the murder case since penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua FACTS - After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a time when the Aquino administration was openly challenged by Marcos loyalists through rallies - In one particular rally (which was dispersed by the police for not having a permit to rally) on July 27, 1986 in Luneta, Stephen Salcedo was killed. Apparently, after the police dispersed the rallyists (using tear gas and truncheons), some Marcos loyalists chased people wearing yellow (Coryista) and mauled them - Thats how Salcedo died. He was mauled by some Marcos loyalists (8 were accused as principals, 5 were convicted), hitting and boxing and kicking him all over his body, even when he was down already. The attackers even punched him with stones in their hands and kicked him on the head. He lost consciousness and when the Lunetas electrician rushed him to PGH, he was already dead. The medical report showed that the cause of death was hemorrhage, intracranial trauma. (note: theres a graphic description of the mauling in the original case, and nakakawa siya, pinagtulungan talaga. Sabi pa, he even had a chance to sit on the pavement and wipe the blood from his face, but his attackers went after him again).

PEOPLE v ADOVISO G.R. No.116196-7 KAPUNAN; June 23, 1999 (owen)

NATURE Appeal from RTC Camarines Sur Joint Judgment FACTS - Pablo Adoviso, a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Murders of Rufino Agunos and Emeterio Vasquez. Four unidentified persons who have been originally charged with him, however, remained at large. The information states: That on or about the 18th day of February 1990 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening at Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Casugad, Municipality of Bula, Province of

Prof. V. A. Avena
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with assorted long firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Rufino Agunos several times with said firearms hitting the latter on the different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Rufino Agunos. That the crime complained of against the accused is not service connected. (information wrt the killing of Emeterio Vasquez, contains the same allegations) - PROSECUTION VERSION: The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had two adjacent houses in Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Casugad, Bula, Camarines Sur. One of the houses was actually a camalig where they stored harvested rice. The spouses preferred to live there because it was cooler. The living area of the camalig had walls of bamboo called salsag. This area was elevated from the ground. Three steps led down to an awning (suyab) walled with bamboo slats. These slats were placed horizontally approximately four to six inches apart. A portion of the awning was used as a kitchen but another portion had a papag where the Vasquez grandson, Rufino Agunos, son of their daughter Virginia, would sleep whenever he tended the irrigation pump. The spouses son Bonifacio occupied the other house eight (8) meters from the camalig with his own son Elmer. At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez was preparing coffee as his wife was about to retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep in the papag. Anastacia had just finished spreading the sleeping mat when she heard three or four gunshots. Emeterio then uttered that he had been shot. Seeing Emeterio, Anastacia exclaimed, Why should you not be hit when in fact there are guns in front of you. Anastacia saw the protruding edge of the gun on the wall near the stairs where Emeterio went down. A lamp near the stairs where Emeterio drank coffee illuminated the camalig but Anastacia failed to recognize the persons who fired their guns at her husband. The Vasquez son Bonifacio was in the bigger house when he heard the gunshots. Earlier that evening, Bonifacio was talking to Rufino regarding the engine of the irrigation pump. Bonifacio was still talking when he noticed that Rufino had fallen asleep, the latters back against the bamboo wall. Bonifacio left Rufino snoring in the papag and went to the other house. Only a minute had passed after he had gone

Evidence-A2010
up when Bonifacio heard the gunshots. He and his 16-year-old son Elmer immediately went down the front yard to investigate. Bonifacio hid himself in the dark portion of the yard, behind a coconut tree. From a distance of eight (8) meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was inside the camalig, being shot by several persons from the outside. Looking through the bamboo slats of the camalig wall, Bonifacio recognized one of the assailants, with a large built and long hair, as appellant Pablo Adoviso because of the gas lamp that was lighted inside the camalig. Of Rufinos assailants, only appellant was not wearing a mask. Appellant was holding a long firearm wrapped inside a sack with its muzzle protruding and directed where Rufino was sleeping. Appellant then fired hitting Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio heard his father Emeterio shout Pino, (referring to his grandson Rufino) and saw his father go down the stairs carrying a gas lamp. Appellant fired again, hitting Emeterio at the stomach. For his part, Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig with his father Bonifacio, saw five (5) persons aiming their firearms at the camalig. Except for appellant, each of these persons had a cover over their faces. Three (3) of them were positioned in a ditch near the camalig while two (2) others were near its door. Elmer saw these five (5) persons shoot his cousin Rufino who was lying down on the papag. Although his back was hit, Rufino was able to crawl under the papag. Elmers grandfather was also hit on the stomach but he managed to go up the camalig. When appellant and his companion by the camalig door saw Elmer, they fired at him then, with the three others at the ditch, escaped to the banana plantation. Elmer, on the other hand, fled towards the coconut plantation. Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer saw his father carrying his grandfather Emeterio. He also found Rufino at the foot of a coconut tree near the river, lying on his side with his body curled. Rufino told Elmer that he had been hit and, when Elmer failed to locate his wound, Rufino took Elmers hand and put it on his back. Elmer then moved Rufino sidewise. Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer carried his grandfather and bandaged his stomach with diapers. In the meantime, Bonifacio went to the municipal building of Bula to fetch the police. Inspector Antonio Lopez and Senior Police Officer 1 Claro Ballevar returned to the scene of the crime with him. The police brought Emeterio and Rufino to the municipal hall of Bula and then to the Bicol Regional Hospital. Both Emeterio and Rufino died early the next morning.

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- The certification dated March 7, 1990 and signed by Dr. Janice Nanette Estrada, resident physician of the Bicol Regional Hospital in Naga City, states that 35year-old Rufino Agunos died of four (4) gunshot wounds: at the inguinal area, the sacral area, the thigh and the abdomen. The wounds at the inguinal area and the thigh bore contusion collars. The same physician certified that Emeterio Vasquez, 88 years of age, sustained seven (7) gunshot wounds at the paraumbilical area, lumbar area, hypogastrium, anterior aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial aspect left arm and anterolateral aspect of the left arm. Four (4) of these gunshot wounds had contusion collars at the paraumbilical area, the hypogastrium, the right forearm and the left arm. - ACCUSEDS VERSION: Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense. He claimed that he was a member of the CAFGU whose headquarters was located in Barangay Palsong, Bula, Camarines Sur. At around 7:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, he was in Sitio Burabod, Palsong, about a kilometer away from the CAFGU headquarters. He, together with Francisco Bislombre, Benjamin Alina, Jr. and PFC Antero Esteron, had some drinks in the store of Honoria Tragante until around 11:00 p.m. Honoria Tragante and Francisco Bislombre corroborated his alibi. Antero Esteron likewise testified that from 7:00 until past 11:00 that night of February 18, 1990, he and Adoviso had a drinking spree at the Tragante store. He distinctly remembered that date because it was the fiesta of Balatan. To support his denial, he presented Lt. Antonio Lopez, the deputy chief of police and SPO2 Claro Ballebar of the PNP Bula Police Station. Lopez identified a police certification prepared by Pfc. Ramon N. Canabe to the effect that the shooting incident was perpetrated by unidentified armed men. Lopez said that he (Lopez) was one of those who brought the victims to the hospital who were then still conscious. The victims told him that they did not know who shot them or why they were shot. The defense also offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, who conducted a polygraph test on him. In Polygraph Report No. 900175, Lucena opined that appellants polygrams revealed that there were no specific reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant to the investigation of the crimes. - SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that in the follow-up investigation he conducted several days after the incident, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed to him

Prof. V. A. Avena
that he (Bonifacio) vividly saw the incident and recognized appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime and that the killings had some something to do with land dispute between Bonifacios parents and the Galicia family. - REBUTTAL: Bonifacio Vasquez revealed that when he reported the incident to the police, he did not identify appellant as one of the culprits because he was afraid of appellant who was a member of the CAFGU. Nevertheless, Bonifacio did mention to the police that he recognized appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime although he told them that he did not recognize appellants four (4) companions. He did not mention to Lopez and Canabe appellants identity because he was confused about what had happened in their house. - TRIAL COURT: Joint Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of murder - APPELLANT CLAIMS: His bid for exoneration on whether he was properly identified by the two (2) eyewitnesses as one of the killers of the victims. He contends that eyewitnesses Bonifacio and Elmer Vasquez presented an incredible story because it is highly improbable that they could have distinctly and positively recognized accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes." According to him, Bonifacio, who was in the dark portion of the yard hiding behind a coconut tree, could not have identified appellant by the light emanating from gas lamp inside the camalig where Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos were staying at the time of the incident. Neither could Elmer Vasquez, who declared that he saw his grandfather shot by him, could have identified him because of the poor lighting coming from the gas lamp being carried by his grandfather. He claims that the gas lamp carried by Elmer's grandfather was a small can about two (2) inches tall and the wick is smaller than a cigarette and the lamp inside the camalig was placed inside a bigger can so that the direction of the light emanating therefrom was upwards and not sidewise. ISSUES 1. WON visibility, through lamp, is factor in impeaching witness testimony 2. WON visibility, through bamboo slats, is factor in impeaching witness testimony 3. WON perpetration of a crime without a mask is improbable 4. WON failure to identify him as perpetrator immediately after the crime is a relevant

Evidence-A2010
5. WON motive is relevant in this case 6. WON alibi holds water 7. WON polygraph test is relevant HELD 1. NO Ratio Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious. Reasoning - In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps illuminated the place the one placed inside the camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire. Appellants contention therefore that one particular gas lamp could not have lighted the place because it was placed inside a can is puerile. Besides, Elmer was not describing either of the gas lamps during the incident. The defense counsel at the trial and appellants counsel misunderstood the testimonies of Elmer and his grandmother on that matter. - Through Anastacias testimony, it was shown that the lamp inside the camalig was placed on the floor and a can was placed over it only after the incident when Anastacia left with her son and the police to bring the victims to the hospital. 2. NO - The bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of Adoviso, considering that the slats were built four (4) meters apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of relatives of victims to strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities, and the manner in which the crime is committed. A relative will naturally be interested in identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction to obtain justice for the death of his relative(s). It must remembered that Adoviso was not a complete stranger to the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten (10) years while Elmer had been acquainted with him for four (4) years. Elmer recalled that Adoviso used to join the rabuz at the barracks. Familiarity with his face and appearance minimized if not erased the possibility that they could have been mistaken as to his identity. 3. NO

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- Adovisos allegation that it was improbable for him to have committed the crimes without a mask, unlike the other participants, deserves scant consideration. It is not contrary to human experience for a person to commit a crime before the very eyes of people who are familiar to them. Indeed, some may even take pride in their identification as the perpetrator of a criminal act. 4. NO Ratio The failure of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility as a witness. The general or common rule is that witnesses react to a crime in different ways. There is no standard form of human behavioral response to a strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime must react. Reasoning - The delay in reporting his participation to the police was however sufficiently explained by Bonifacio. Bonifacio was afraid of Adoviso since the latter was a member of the CAFGU and, as such, was provided with a gun. He was also hesitant in identifying him immediately lest he got wind of his impending arrest and posthaste escaped the clutches of the law. 5. NO - According to Adoviso, Bonifacio suspected that he was hired by the Galicia family to kill Bonifacio's father who had earlier won in a land dispute with the Galicias. It is irrelevant here to talk of motive on the part of Bonifacio inasmuch as to credible witnesses had positively identified appellant as one of the participants in the killing of Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos. 6. NO Ratio For an alibi to prosper, moreover, there must be proof that the defendant was not only somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he could not be physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Reasoning - Adovisos alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive identification as one of the perpetrators of the crimes. Appellant did not prove the physical impossibility of his being in Sitio Tan-agan which is not exactly remote from Sitio Palsong where he claimed to be when the incident happened. Both places are within the Municipality of Bula. Appellant admitted that the distance between the two sitios could be negotiated in three hours even without any means of transportation. On the other hand, his alleged companion in Sitio Palsong, Antero Esteron, testified that the distance could be traveled in thirty-five (35) minutes by trimobile or private vehicle. - Apart from the fact that appellant's alibi was inherently weak, he was not even sure where he was

Prof. V. A. Avena
and who were his companions at the time the crimes were committed. 7. NO Ratio A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinees conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person who lies deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on the graph. However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different in this jurisdiction. Disposition Joint Judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

Evidence-A2010
HELD 1. NO. Ratio When an appealed conviction hinges on the credibility of witnesses, the assessment of the trial court is accorded the highest degree of respect. Absent any proper reason to depart from this fundamental rule, factual conclusions reached by the lower court, which had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses while on the witness stand, should not be disturbed. Reasoning a. The contradiction between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness may be explained by the fact that an affidavit will not always disclose all the facts and will oftentimes and without design incorrectly describe, without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated. Being taken ex parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject. It has thus been held that affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former are often executed when an affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to him. The exception to the rule is where the omission in the affidavit refers to a very important detail such that the affiant would not have failed to mention it, and which omission could affect the affiant's credibility. Such exceptive circumstance does not obtain in the present case. The alleged omissions in the affidavit of complainant are not that vital and substantial as to affect her credibility. The more important detail which is really material to the case, and which is categorically declared and explained both in the affidavit and in complainant's testimony, is the fact that appellant had carnal knowledge of complainant without her consent. b. There is no discrepancy in the statements made by complainant in her affidavit, where she declared that she was stripped naked during the assault, and in her oral testimony, where she said that she was not naked when appellant did the sexual act. This seeming inconsistency was later clarified by complainant in her testimony where she explained that what she really

P a g e | 11
meant by the word "naked" is that she had no underwear but she had her uniform on. c. The bare fact alone that complainant did not know the name of herein appellant, we cannot safely conclude that the identity of the assailant was not sufficiently established. The fact that complainant testified that she was able to recognize appellant because at that time the moon was very bright, when in truth and in fact it was a first quarter moon, does not serve to discredit her entire testimony. It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. It is not inconceivable that complainant may have wrongly perceived the light coming from the lamp post as having come from the moon. d. Non-presentation of the torn dress and underwear of the complainant does not destroy the case for the prosecution, there being sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the rape charged beyond reasonable doubt. Those clothes are not essential, and need not be presented, as they are not indispensable evidence to prove rape. The absence thereof does not negate the truth of a rape complaint and the credibility of a victim's testimony. 2. NO. Reasoning a. An erroneous reckoning or mis-estimation of time is too trivial and immaterial to discredit the testimony of a complainant, especially in this case where time is not an essential element or has no substantial bearing on the fact of commission of the crime. (Note: med cert shows the information that she was raped at about 6pm while in her testimony she claimed that the incident happened at around 8:30pm)Minor inconsistencies are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on straightforward attestations. Far from being badges of fraud and fabrication, the inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses may on the contrary be justifiably considered as indicative of the truthfulness on material points of the facts testified to. These minor deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. b. The medical findings of the physician who examined complainant shows that she was positive for alcoholic breath, but this fact alone does not sufficiently establish that she was in such a state of intoxication as would completely deprive her of her sense of perception and which would pervert her otherwise coherent and credible testimony. Consequently, the rule is that the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the fact of rape (People vs Balane, People vs Selfaison, People vs Carandang). What is essential is that there was genital penetration, which was unequivocally testified to by complainant.

PEOPLE v EMPLEO 226 SCRA 457 REGALADO; Sep 15, 1993 (athe)
FACTS Elisa Cordova y Urdaneta filed a complaint against Edmund Empleo y Maquilan charging the latter with the crime of rape allegedly committed by grabbing her under a point of a gun, forced her to lie on the ground and forcibly tore her underwear, kissed and with the use of superior strength, had carnal knowledge with her. During the trial, Collen Parreno, corroborated the testimony of the victim, Elisa, being one of the latters companions on the date and time of the incident. The TC found Empleo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Thus, this appeal. ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on the basis of the testimonies of complainant Elisa Cordova and prosecution witness, Collen Parreo, which are allegedly replete with contradictions and inconsistencies on material point (in short, the issue devolves on the credibility of complainant and witness) 2. WON the trial court erred in not taking into consideration the results of the medical examination conducted on private complainant, the report on which was admitted as Exhibit B

Prof. V. A. Avena
Disposition The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.

Evidence-A2010
Croda and Charlito Gualderama, both residents of Payad, Pangantucan, Bukidnon, are his friends and could not think of any reason why they testified against him. - Lucresio testified in detail how the accusedappellants, taking advantage of their superior strength, hacked to death the victim. - The testimony of a witness, mentioning the minutiae of an incident that could not easily be concocted, such as the murder in the case at bar, deserves credence for it indicates sincerity and truthfulness in the narration of events. - The credible testimony of a lone witness can provide a rational basis for conviction. The fight for truth is not necessarily won by the party with more numerous witnesses. It is the quality and not the quantity of witnesses that counts in assessing their credence. - We take judicial notice of the fact that people usually shy away from any involvement in criminal cases due to its inconvenience, if not the danger it poses to their lives. The fact, therefore, that it takes them a long time to decide whether or not to testify should not necessarily erode their credibility. Inn this case, Lucresio had just witnessed a gruesome, hacking incident. There is no standard form of behavior when on is confronted with a shocking incident. Lucresio's initial hesitation to report the crime to the authorities due to the shocking experience should not be counted against his credibility. - It cannot also be doubted that the numerous wounds suffered by the victim were due to hacking by means of sharp bladed instruments. Appellant's participation in the merciless killing of Renato Salvar is further buttressed by the fact that before the victim died, he disclosed to witnesses CHARLITO GUALDERAMA AND SIMPLICIO SALVAR, JR. the name of his assailants. Utterances made immediately after a startling occurrence and before the declarant had an opportunity to fabricate a false statement can be considered as part of the res gestae. - As between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the appellants, the former deserve more credence and weight than the latter. In this case, we give full credit to the factual findings of the trial court considering that it is in the best position to weigh conflicting declarations of witnesses as it was able to observe their demeanor and conduct while giving their testimonies. Dispositive The decision of the appellate court finding accused-appellants ROGELIO ESPINOZA, VICTOR ESPINOZA and JULIAN MAGBARIL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Renato Salvar an indemnity (P50,000.00). of fifty

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thousand pesos

PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA G.R. No. 104596 PUNO; November 23, 1993 (glaisa)
FACTS - Prosecution witness Lucresio Croda was in the living room of his house when he heard cries for help. As he went down the stairs, he saw the appellants drag the victim away from the road towards his house. He positively recognized the victim. He also witnessed the accused-appellant Rogelio and Victor Espinoza hack the victim several times with their long bolos while appellant Magbarit held back the victim who was lying on his back. - Prosecution witness Charlito Guevarra testified that he was watching the coronation ceremonies of the fiesta queen at the barrio hall when he received information from his brother, Raul, about a hacking incident. He immediately went to the place and there saw Renato Salvar, seriously wounded and lying on his back. He asked Salvar who was responsible and Salvar answered: "I was betrayed by Rogelio Espinoza, Victor Espinoza and Julian Magbaril." - Simplicio Salvar, Jr. who also proceeded at the crossing of Anlawagan and Kisawi after being informed that his brother, Renato Salvar was the victim of an attack, was able to talk to the latter who was then still conscious and coherent in speech. The victim identified the three accused-appellants as his assailants. - Accused-appellants were charged with and convicted of Murder by the RTC for hacking to death a certain Renato Salvar. CA affirmed. ISSUE WON the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence to the testimony of the lone alleged eye-witness Lucresio Crudo. HELD 1. NO - Eyewitness Lucresio Croda, positively identified Rogelio Espinoza, Victor Espinoza and Julian Magbaril as the assailants of Renato Salvar. It is unrebutted that Lucresio's house is located at least three (3) fathoms away from the scene of the crime. Moreover, during the hacking incident, the place was illuminated by the moon. - The accused himself, Rogelio Espinoza, admitted on cross-examination that prosecution witness Lucresio

PEOPLE v AMESTUZO GR 104383 Jul 12, 2001; KAPUNAN (athe)

NATURE Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Kalookan City. FACTS At about nine-thirty in the evening of February 22, 1991, a group of eight armed men wearing masks entered the house of complainant Perlita delos Santos Lacsamana at Sacred Heart Village, Kalookan City and robbed the said premises of valuables in the total amount of P728,000.00. In the course of the robbery, two members of the gang raped Maria Fe Catanyag and Estrella Rolago, niece and employee, respectively of complainant Lacsamana. - On February 27, 1991, accused-appellant Albino Bagas, Valeriano Amestuzo, Federico Ampatin, Dioscoro Vias and four other accused, whose identities are unknown and who are still at large up to the present, were charged with the complex crime of robbery in band with double rape. - The trial court rendered judgment convicting all the accused. - From the judgment of conviction by the trial court, only herein accused-appellant Bagas appealed to this Court. His appeal is based mainly on (1) the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel during his identification, (2) the trial courts error in giving due weight to the open court identification of him which was based on a suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification, and (3) the trial courts improper rejection of his defense of alibi. ISSUES 1. WON his constitutional right to be represented by counsel was violated 2. WON the TC erred in giving due weight to the open court identification of him which was based on a suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification 3. WON the TC improperly rejected his defense of alibi HELD 1. NO. Ratio The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the

Prof. V. A. Avena
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. Reasoning: Bagas could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he was presented for identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that during his identification by the complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from accused-appellant. In fact, records show that the police did not at all talk to accusedappellant when he was presented before the complainants. The alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extra-judicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In the present case, there is no such confession or extra-judicial admission. 2. YES. Ratio There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. The fact that he was brought out of the detention cell alone and was made to stand before the accused by himself and unaccompanied by any other suspects or persons does not detract from the validity of the identification process. However, we agree that complainants out-ofcourt identification of accused-appellant was seriously flawed as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, we have applied the totality of circumstances test enunciated in the case of People vs. Teehankee which lists the following factors: xxx (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification process. Reasoning - The out-of-court identification of herein accusedappellant by complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly suggestive. Even before complainants had the opportunity to view accusedappellant face-to-face when he was brought our of the detention cell to be presented to them for identification, the police made an announcement that he was one of the suspects in the crime and that he

Evidence-A2010
was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culprits. The fact that this information came to the knowledge of the complainants prior to their identification based on their own recall of the incident detracts from the spontaneity of their subsequent identification and therefore, its objectivity. 3. YES Ratio The defense of alibi or denial assumes significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by a credible witness. And to be given weight, accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he was so far away that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Though inherently weak as a defense, alibi in the present case has been sufficiently established by corroborative testimonies of credible witnesses and by evidence of physical impossibility of accused-appellants presence at the scene of the crime. Alibi, therefore, should have been properly appreciated in accused-apellants favor. Reasoning - Accused-appellant vehemently argues that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. First, the crime was committed around 9:30 in the evening of February 22, 1991. Accused-appellant, as well as two other witnesses, testified that he worked in the factory until 10 p.m. that night and went to sleep after. Second, there was only one door in the factory which was the only means of entrance and exit and this door was kept locked by witness Ocasla after ten p.m. that night. Ocasla was the only person who had a key to this door. Third, the windows on the first floor of the building consisted of hollow blocks with small holes which do not allow passage. The second and third floor windows were 14 and 21 feet high, respectively. There was no possible means of exit through these windows without accusedappellant getting hurt or injured. Lastly, the crime took place in Kalookan City around 9:30 p.m. while accusedappellants place of work was in Pasay City. Assuming for the sake of argument that he was able to leave the premises after 10 p.m. that night, by the time he reaches Kalookan, the crime would have already been completed. - Another significant evidence which the trial court failed to consider is the voluntary confession of accused Federico Ampatin absolving accused-appellant Bagas of the crime. Ampatins testimony was clear and categorical that he pointed on Bagas because he was afraid to be hit again by the policeman if he would not do so. Ampatin did not know Bagas and he did not even saw his face before pointing on him. Ampatin and accused-appellant were charged as co-conspirators in

P a g e | 13
the crime of robbery with rape. As a co-accused, it would have been more consistent with human nature for Ampatin to implicate accused-appellant if indeed he was one of the gang. In fact, the Court has recognized that as is usual with human nature, a culprit, confessing a crime is likely to put the blame as far as possible on others rather than himself. The fact that he testified to the innocence of a co-accused, an act which resulted in no advantage or benefit to him and which might in fact implicate him more, should have been received by the trial court as an indicum of the truth of Ampatins testimony and the innocence of herein accused-appellant. Ampatins testimony, therefore, should have been given weight by the trial court. - More so, the same was substantially corroborated by another witness, Rodolfo Rosales, accused-appellants co-worker and who was present when accusedappellant was arrested. Rosales testified that he noticed that the reaction of Federico Ampatin was afraid, so, because of fear he was able to point on the person of Albino Bagas but when asked he does not know the name of Albino Bagas. Disposition The decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant Albino Bagas of the crime of robbery with multiple rape is REVERSED and he is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

PEOPLE v VALLEJO 382 SCRA 192 PER CURIAM; May 9, 2002 (guilia)
FACTS The accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo was convicted by the RTC of rape with homicide, which was affirmed by the CA. The accused was convicted through the ff circumstancial evidence: 1. The victim, Daisy, went to Aimee Vallejo's house for tutoring around 1pm 2. At around 2pm, the accused and Daisy went together to the latter's house to get a book from which the former could copy Daisy's school project. After getting the book, they proceeded to the accused's residence. 3. Daisy then went to her neighbor's house to watch TV. The accused thereafter arrived and whispered something to Daisy, and the latter went with him towards the 'compuerta'

4.

At about 4:30pm, Sps Yepes saw accused coming out of the 'compuerta' with his clothes wet, although his face and hair were not. According to witnesses, he looked pale,

Prof. V. A. Avena
uneasy, and balisa. He kept looking around and did not even greet them as was his custom to do so. 5. The fishing boat used by the accused as a bomber was docked by the seashore. 6. A little before 5pm another witness saw the accused buying cigarettes and noticed that his clothes were wet, but not her hair and face. 7. At around 5:30, Ma. Nida Diola, mother of the witness, looked for her daughter and the accused that Daisy had gone to her classmate's house. The information proved to be false. 8. Daisy's body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the river near the 'compuerta'. 9. During the initial investigation, the accused has scratches on his feet similar to those caused by the thorns of an aroma tree. 10. The clothes worn by the accused on that day were bloodstained. The bloodstains on the accused's clothes and those on Daisy's clothes were found positive of human blood type 'A'. 11. The accused's blood type is 'O'. 12. The vaginal swabs from Daisy's body contained her DNA profile as well as that of the accused. ISSUES 1. WON the bloodstains found on the accused's garments were not proven to have been that of the victim as the victim's blood was not determined and 2. WON the method by which his clothes were recovered was proper. 3. WON DNA analysis conducted by NBI was also questioned as the NBI failed to show that all the samples were not contaminated. 4. WON prosecution's oral and written confessions were admissible as evidence and WON the extrajudicial confessions by the accused were admissible HELD 1. On the bloodstained clothes and means of recovery Even if there was no direct determination as to what blood type the victim had, it can reasonably be inferred that the victim was a blood type 'A' since she sustained contused abrasions all over her body which would necessarily produce the bloodstains on her clothing. 2. As to the method by which the accused's clothes were recovered, there is no showing that accused was coerced or forced into producing the garments. 3. On the validity of DNA DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic code. When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of a crime or from the victim's body for the suspect's DNA.

Evidence-A2010
The purpose of DNA is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The test may yield three possible results: 1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion; 2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or 3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the Similarity. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. The bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human DNA. It is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused. 4. On the extra-judicial confessions There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in Art III of the Constitution: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which are dealt with in par 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of par 1 of the same section. Accused argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan of Rosario, Cavite and to NBI Forensic Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for being violative of his constitutional rights as these were made by one already under custodial investigation to persons

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in authority without the presence of counsel. The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by the testimony of Mayor Renato Abutan, it is also confirmed by accused where he was apprised of the consequences of the statements he made as well as the written confessions he was to execute. Neither can he question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed, counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Accused admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted the services of Atty. Leyva before the latter acted as his defense counsel. And counsel who is provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. Contrary to the assertions of accused, Atty. Leyva was not the municipal attorney of Rosario, Cavite but only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan. The mayor's questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature of an interrogation, but rather an act of benevolence by a leader seeking to help one of his constituents. For the same reason, the oral confession made by accused-appellant to NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant would have this Court exclude this confession on the ground that it was uncounselled and that Mr. Buan, who initiated the conversation with accused-appellant, was part of the NBI. The questions put by Mr. Buan to accusedappellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity and clearly not as part of his tasks. The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to an ordinary individual and is, therefore, admissible as evidence. The bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions from the accused are not sufficient. The standing rule is that "where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable

Prof. V. A. Avena
physician to buttress their claim," all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. Even if accused was truthful and his assailed confessions are inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution witnesses presented a mosaic of circumstances showing accused-appellant's guilt. Their testimonies rule out the possibility that the crime was the handiwork of some other evil mind. These witnesses have not been shown to have been motivated by ill will against accused. If the account of accused that he was beaten up is true, Dr. Antonio Vertido would have found more than mere abrasions and hematoma on his left finger. Dr. Vertido's findings are more consistent with the theory that accused-appellant sustained physical injuries as a result of the struggle made by the victim during the commission of the rape in the "compuerta." No other witness not related to accused-appellant was ever called to corroborate his claim. The defense presented only accused's sister, Aimee Vallejo, to corroborate his story. We have held time and again that alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons. It is well settled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. For this reason, this Court looks with caution upon the defense of alibi, especially when, as in this case, it is corroborated only by relatives or friends of the accused. Disposition decision of the RTC of Cavite City, finding accused Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.

Evidence-A2010

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