J.

Padilla December 7, 1995

ACAP v. CA

Facts: Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental was evidenced by OCT No. R-12179. o title was issued and is registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. After both spouses died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. 1975 Felixberto executed a duly notarized document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of Cosme Pido since 1960, petitioner Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the said land, covering an area of 9,500 meters. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap continued to be the registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon Pido's death, to his widow Laurenciana The controversy began when Pido died intestate and on 27 November 1981, his surviving heirs executed a notarized document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre" o Now, therefore, We LAURENCIANA, ELY, ELMER, ERVIN and ELECHOR all surnamed PIDO, do hereby waive, quitclaim all our rights, interests and participation over the said parcel of land in favor of EDY DE LOS REYES, of legal age, (f)ilipino, married to VIRGINIA DE LOS REYES, and resident of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, Philippines. . . . The document was signed by all of Pido's heirs. Private respondent Edy de los Reyes did not sign said document It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pido's death, title to the property continued to be registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor, private respondent Edy de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claim against the original certificate of title After R informed P that he is the new owner of the land, R alleged that they entered into an oral lease agreement wherein petitioner agreed to pay ten (10) cavans of palay per annum as lease rental. In 1982, petitioner allegedly complied with said obligation. In 1983, however, petitioner refused to pay any further lease rentals on the land, prompting private respondent to seek the assistance of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The MAR invited petitioner to a conference scheduled on 13 October 1983. Petitioner did not attend the conference but sent his wife instead to the conference. During the meeting, an officer of the Ministry informed Acap's wife about private respondent's ownership of the said land but she stated that she and her husband (Teodoro) did not recognize private respondent's claim of ownership over the land.

28 April 1988 after the lapse of four (4) years, R filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against P, alleging in the main that as his leasehold tenant, P refused and failed to pay the agreed annual rental of ten (10) cavans of palay despite repeated demands P denied any knowledge of the transfer of ownership and claimed that he continuously plays his rental to Pidos widow, Laurenciana The RTC and CA decided in favor of R claiming that there was a contract of sale as evidenced by the "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights" Issue: W/N the subject Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership. Ratio: NO an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. o That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. o Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. o While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question

Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into two (2) classes o original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and the o derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum). In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. o The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. o The second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are coheirs in the succession Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent's name. Consequently, while the transaction between Pido's heirs and private respondent may be binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as a registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily forfeited on a mere allegation of private respondent's ownership without the corresponding proof thereof The reason is that private respondent never registered the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights with the Registry of Deeds or with the MAR. Instead, he (private respondent) sought to do indirectly what could not be done directly, i.e., file a notice of adverse claim on the said lot to establish ownership thereover SAN LORENZO v. CA (c/o Sales digest vee?) Facts:

B backed out of the sale. She returned the 50K to B through Oya. Thus this case filed by B for specific performance and damages Sps Lu contend that Pacita obtained loans from B, reaching 50K, so B without the knowledge of pacitas husband agreed to transform it into contract to sell of 2 lots, w/50K as downpayment. B backed out of the sale when Lu refused to reduce the price. Prop being conjugal, sale void. SLDC filed motion for intervention. SLDC contends that Sps. Lu executed on Feb 1989 an Option to Buy (option money = 316,160) out of 1.2M price. After Sps. received a total of 632,320, they executed on May 3, 1989 a Deed of Abs. Sale w/ Mortgage. Titles delivered were clean, so buyer in good faith. RTC: (in favor of SLDC) applying 1544, since both buyers didnt register sales, ownership should pertain to buyer who first acquired possession. DOAS in favor of SLDC sufficient delivery CA: (in favor of B) SLDC purchaser in bad faith SLDC contends that it bought prop w/o lien/encumbrance recorded in props titles. Also, B was not in possession. It had no prior notice of sale to B when it advanced 200K check in favor of B upon Pacitas representation that she needed money to pay B. After execution of sale, it took possession of the prop. Notice of lis pendens annotated June 2, 1989; sale to SLDC consummated May 3, 1989 B contends that SLDC in bad faith because at the time it registered the sale in its favor, theres already a notice of lis pendens ISSUE: Who bet B and SLDC has better right over the lots HELD: SLDC Agreement bet B and Sps. Lu contract to sell. Subsequent act of parties show that sps never intended to transfer ownership to B except upon full payment. In Bs letter to Pacita, B requested for the execution of DOS so he could pay balance, in effect recognizing that ownership of prop would not be transferred to him until payment. Also, if they intended to transfer title, they could have executed DOS. B should have consigned the balance. Letter + intention to pay = not valid tender of payment. Thus, Lus obligation to convey title never acquired obligatory force. Sale is not a mode of transferring ownership, but merely a title. Delivery may be actual or constructive (ex. Execution of public instrument, symbolical tradition ie. delivery of key where movable is kept, buyer already in possession prior to sell). B didnt acquire ownership by mere execution of receipt bcoz it was not embodied in public instrument EQUITORIAL REALTY v. MAYFAIR November 21, 2001 G.R. No. 133879 PANGANIBAN, J. Facts: Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. used to own a parcel of land, together with two 2storey buildings constructed thereon. 1967, Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. for a period of 20 years. Two years later, Mayfair entered into a second Contract of Lease with Carmelo for the lease of another portion of the latter's building. The Contract of Lease was likewise for a period of 20 years. Both leases contained a provision granting Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject properties. However, on July 30, 1978 within the 202

Sps. Lu owned 2 titled lots (3.6 hectares) and they sold it Aug 20, 1986 to Babasanta for 15/sqm. Babasanta made a downpayment of 50K, evidenced by memorandum receipt issued by Pacita Lu; his total payments reached 200K May 1989, Babasanta wrote a letter to Pacita demanding the execution of DOS in his favor, having received info that sps. sold the same to another person Pacita replied, acknowledged having agreed to sell the property but reminded B that when balance became due, B requested for reduction which she refused, so

year-lease term the subject properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development for the total sum of P11,300,000, without their first being offered to Mayfair. So, Mayfair filed a Complaint for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial. The Supreme Court ruled that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Equatorial and Carmelo is deemed rescinded. Carmelo is ordered to allow Mayfair to buy the aforesaid lots for P11,300,000.00. Now, Equatorial filed an action for the collection of a sum of money against Mayfair, claiming payment of rentals or reasonable compensation for Mayfair's use of the subject premises after its lease contracts had expired (as the owner of the subject premises by reason of the Contract of Sale).

avoid imminent eviction UNION MOTOR v. CA Date: July 20, 2001 Ponente: DE LEON, JR., J. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari Facts: On September 14, 1979, the respondent Bernal spouses purchased from petitioner Union Motor Corporation one Cimarron Jeepney P37,758.60 to be paid in installments. To secure payment, the spouses executed a promissory note and a deed of chattel mortgage in favor of the petitioner. Meanwhile, Union Motor applied for financing agreement and assigned the promissory note and chattel mortgage with Jardine-Manila Finance, Inc. The parties agreed that the spouses Bernal would pay the amount of the promissory note to Jardine-Manila.

Issue: WON there was delivery, hence, ownership passed to Equatorial, and so, it has a right to demand backrentals Held: NO Ownership of the thing sold is not acquired by mere agreement, but by tradition or delivery. The peculiar facts of the present controversy show that delivery was not actually effected; it was prevented by a legally effective impediment. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property during that period. Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him "in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee."This right is transferred, not merely by contract, but also by tradition or delivery. And there is said to be delivery if and when the thing sold "is placed in the control and possession of the vendee."Thus, it has been held that while the execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. Petitioner never took actual control and possession of the property sold, in view of respondent's timely objection to the sale and the continued actual possession of the property. The objection took the form of a court action impugning the sale which, was rescinded by an SC judgment. It has been held that the execution of a contract of sale as a form of constructive delivery is a legal fiction. It holds true only when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of the vendee. When there is such impediment, "fiction yields to reality the delivery has not been effected." The execution of a public instrument gives rise, therefore, only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the instrument itself expresses or implies that delivery was not intended; or when by other means it is shown that such delivery was not effected, because a third person was actually in possession of the thing. In the latter case, the sale cannot be considered consummated. The fact that Mayfair paid rentals to Equatorial during the litigation should not be interpreted to mean either actual delivery or ipso facto recognition of Equatorial's title. The rental payments made by Mayfair should not be construed as a recognition of Equatorial as the new owner. They were made merely to

The spouses signed a notice of assignment, a deed of assignment, a sales invoice, a registration certificate, an affidavit, and a disclosure statement. The agent of Union Motor told them that signing of the documents was so that the sale and the financing application would be approved. The Spouses paid P10K to Union Motor so the latter approved the sale. Although the spouses have not yet physically possessed the vehicle, agent Sosmea required them to sign the receipt as a condition for the delivery of the vehicle. After paying P7K to Jardine-Manila, the spouses stopped due to the non-delivery of the jeepney. They alleged that this was because the agent Sosmena already stole the jeepney. Thus on September 11, 1981, Jardine-Manila Finance, Inc., filed a complaint for a sum of money vs. Bernal spouses. The case later included Union Motor Corporation as defendant. PETITIONER: Union Motor Corporation maintains that the respondent spouses are not entitled to a return of the downpayment for the reason that there was a delivery of the jeepney as evidenced by the sales invoice and delivery receipt. o There was a constructive delivery of the vehicle when Albiato Bernal signed the registration certificate of the jeepney. Thus, ownership has been transferred to the respondent spouses. o The Chattel Mortgage Contract signed by the Bernal spouses proves that ownership has already been transferred to them. o As owners of the jeepney, the spouses should bear its loss under Article 1504 of the NCC which provides that when the ownership of goods is transferred to the buyer, the goods are at the buyers risk whether actual delivery has been made or not. RESPONDENT: In retaliation, the spouses filed their cross-claim against Union and counterclaim against Jardine-Manila. There they argued that: o They never possessed the jeepney thus, it is but appropriate that they be reimbursed of their initial payment RTC favored Bernal Spouses ordering Jardine to return the P7K installments and Union Motor to return the 10K paid by the respondent spouses. CA affirmed, denied Union Motors MR.

Issue: WON there has been a delivery, physical or constructive, of the subject motor vehicle. Held: NONE. Ratio: 1. Undisputed is the fact that the Bernal spouses did not come into possession of the Cimarron jeepney.
3

a.

The registration certificate, receipt and sales invoice that the respondent Bernal spouses signed were merely part of the processing and for the approval of their application to buy the jeepney. i. Issuance of a sales invoice does not prove transfer of ownership of the thing sold to the buyer; an invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity and cost of the thing sold, not a contract of sale ii. The fact that the registration certificate was still kept by JardineManila Finance, Inc. just goes to show that the spouses still had no complete control over the jeepney. The Chattel Mortgage Contract executed by the respondent spouses does not help its assertion that ownership has been transferred since there was neither delivery nor transfer of possession of the jeepney to the spouses. Hence the chattel mortgage has no legal effect, the Bernals not being the absolute owners thereof. Mortgagors must own what they chattel mortgage (Art 2085 NCC).

b.

2.

In all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act of delivery, whether constructive or actual, should be coupled with the intention of delivering the thing. The critical factor in giving legal effect to the act of delivery, is the actual intention of the vendor to deliver, and its acceptance by the vendee. Without that intention, there is no tradition.

Citing Addison v. Felix and Tioco Court ruled that in order that symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality-the delivery has not been effected. Disposition: Since there was neither physical nor constructive delivery of the jeepney, it remained at the sellers risk. Union Motor should therefore bear the loss after Sosmea allegedly stole the same. CA affirmed. CUTANDA v. CUTANDA Ponente: MENDOZA, J.: Nature: petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: Petitioners: DOMINICA, SEBASTIAN, JUANARIO, SOTERO, CRISPIN, FLORENCIO, TRINIDAD, NICANOR, GABINA, and CLAUDIO CUTANDA Private Respondents: HEIRS OF ROBERTO CUTANDA, namely, GERVACIO, SOPRONIO, JORGE CUTANDA, and CRISPIN G. AVENIDO August 4, 1988- private respondents brought an action for recovery of possession against petitioners in the RTC Tagbilaran City. They alleged that in the 1900s their grandfather, Roberto, owned two parcels of land in Bohol covered by two tax declarations in Robertos name. One is 31 ha and the other is 7ha. Upon Robertos death, the lands were inherited by his children, namely: Doque, Diego, Pedro, Andres, and Anastacia, all surnamed Cutanda. And except for Doque who stayed in Bohol and administered the lands, all other children established residence in Leyte. In 1987, they returned to Bohol to personally work the inherited lands. Petitioners were occupying the lands, refused to leave. Petitioners claimed that the owner was their uncle and predecessor-in-interest, Anastacio Cutanda who without children partitioned the property to his siblings.

3.

(FYI, according to Petitioners the original owner is Doque son of Rufina and Eustaquio. Doque had several children including Anastacio. Duque acquired land which was declared in a tax declaration in the name of Anastacio. Anastacio was in possession from 1933 to 1968 when he executed an extrajudicial partition in favor of his siblings because he has no children. After that the siblings worked on the land as shown by the tax declarations and their successors remained in actual and peaceful possession of said land till the filing of the case. ) Claiming a better right to possess the subject properties, petitioners alleged that while they occupied the shares which their parents inherited from Anastacio Cutanda, some of them also worked as tenants cultivating the lands of their copetitioners. TC- declared that petitioners have acquired the ownership of the subject properties through prescription Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA- affirmed dismissal of the case against petitioners, but declared that there was no sufficient evidence that petitioners were the owners of the properties. Both filed for motion for recon which was dismissed. Petitioners appeal to SC. Issue/s: Whether petitioners presented sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of the lands in question. YES Whether Anastacio acquired the land by prescription. YES Ratio: SC: The action is barred by prescription. TC and CA held that private respondents action for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) was already barred, it but they relied upon different grounds. TC- ground was extinctive prescription. Plaintiffs rights if any are lost by extinctive prescription and, therefore, defendants have acquired the rights over the parcels of land by acquisitive prescription. CA says the ground is laches.

The complaint put in issue the ownership of lands in dispute. It may thus be properly treated as accion reivindicatoria. It is settled that the remedies of accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria must be availed of within 10 years from dispossession. The evidence sufficiently establish that Anastacio Cutanda was in possession of the land which has an area of 31ha, from 1933 up to 1968, or a period of 35 years. Such possession appears to be adverse, continuous and in the concept of an owner because Anastacio Cutanda cultivated the land, thereby, performing an act of ownership over it. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, ten years of actual adverse possession was required, regardless of how such occupancy may have commenced or continued, before possession ripened into full and complete title over the land. Applying this to the present case, by 1943, ten years after his possession of the subject parcel of land had begun, Anastacio Cutanda became owner of the land in question through acquisitive prescription. As Anastacio Cutanda had acquired ownership of said parcel of land through the lapse of the period required by law, he could validly adjudicate and partition it among his brothers and sisters who were his only heirs. Petitioners, in turn, as children of Anastacios brothers and sisters, acquired ownership of the subject land not through prescription but through hereditary succession. There is no similar evidence to support the finding of the trial court that Anastacio Cutanda was also the owner of the other parcel of land consisting of seven hectares.

SERASPI v. CA Nature: Petition for review on certiorari in the opinion of the Court of Appeals Date: 28 April 2000
4

Ponente: Mendoza, J. Facts:

Marcelino Recasa is owner of two parcels of land, one in his name and another wherein the Taz Declaration No. is in the of Purificacion Seraspo. Marcelino died in 1943. By this time, he had 15 children from his 3 contracted marriages during his lifetime. In 1948, his intestate estate (2 parcels) of land was partitioned into 3 parts, each part corresponding to the share of the heirs in each marriage. 1948: Patronicio Recasa (1st marriage heirs) sold their share to Dominador Recasa (2nd marriage heirs). 1950: Dominador sold their share (including the one purchased from Patronicio) to spouses Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi (their heirs are the petitioners in this case). 1958: Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) o the security of the lands in question to finance improvements on the lands. Since they failed to pay their loan, the mortgage over the lands was foreclosed and they were sold to KRBI, who in turn sold the lands to a Manuel Rata. Coincidentally, Manuel Rata is a brother-in-law Quirico Seraspi. 1974, PR Simeon Recasa (3rd marriage heir) took advantage of Quirico Seraspos paralysis due to stroke, and forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession. 1983: Seraspis had purchased the lands from Rata and filed a complaint against Simeon for recovery of possession of the lands. Trial Court Seraspis get the land because they acquired the property through a sale and acquisitive prescription. CA NO. Seraspis action is barred by the statute of limitations! o 2 elements to prove ones claim for recovery is present: (NCC 434) identity of the property is established credibility of title of person claiming recovery

BUT did Simeon Recasa acquire the ownership of the lands by prescription? NO The Court turned to 3 provisions in the Civil Code: 1117, 1134 and 1137. These provisions, in a nutshell, basically tell us that if Simeon Recasa really did obtain the lands through ordinary acquisitive prescription, he must have done so (1) in good faith and (2) with just title for the time fixed by law. There are 2 ways to acquire ownership and other real rights through ordinary prescription: 1134 says through possession of 10 years OR if, in accordance with 1137, there was uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for 30 years, without need of title or good faith. PR says he acquired possession applying CC 1134. But the Court says this is WRONG.

He has no just title! For just title, he must have come into ownership of the property through any of the modes in CC 712 (O I L D S T P), which the SC pointed out that he didnt. The Court focused on how he couldnt have possibly acquired just title by occupation (because CC 714 says ownership over land cannot be acquired this way) nor by succession (because the properties of Marcelino were divided into 3 parts, each part for a group of heirs belonging to a marriage. The lands in question clearly belong to the heirs of the 1st and 2nd marriage. Simeon cannot be a co-owner because this was partitioned already and such action was agreed upon by all the heirs). There was no good faith! Its clear that he had forcibly entered into the lands when he did not have the consent of the previous owner. He is a MERE USURPER.

BUT does this mean that the petitioners truly own the property in question? NO Seraspis did not acquire the property through any of the modes under CC 712, either. And while they claim ownership due to the contract of sale between them and Rata, there was no actual nor constructive delivery by Rata to perfect the sale of the property. (NOTE: At the time of the sale, Simeon had already been in possession of the property.) In the end, the Court decided that Simeon Recasa had no right to remain in possession of the property. And that the title to the property of the Seraspi would still prevail over the possession of Simeon BUT without basis in law. UNITED STATES v. CERNA

o o

Even though both elements to prove ones claim for recovery was present, CA still ruled that the action was barred by prescription. Arradaza v. CA held that an action for recovery of title or possession of real property or an interest therein can only be brought within 10 yeas after the cause of action has accrued. Since in this case, the action was filed only 13 years after the petitioners predecessor-in-interest had been allegedly deprived of possession of property by the PR, the action had already prescribed.

MAIN Issue: Whether Simeon Recasa has acquired the ownership of the two lands by prescription. Held/Ratio: The Court made note to point out, first of all, that the application of the doctrine in Arradaza by the CA was incorrect because that case involved acquisitive, not extinctive prescription. Also, the facts arose prior to the Civil Code. That is not the case here.

In this present case, what is involved is an extinctive prescription, in which CC 1141 is applicable: Real actions over immovables prescribe in 30 years. This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
5

January 6, 1912 J. Arellano Facts: December 1902 Sabina Merenguel, or Maringol, lost a 3-year-old carabao which joined other carabaos belonging to Julian Nayre and afterwards strayed away and was not found by Sabina Merenguel until April, 1909. April, 1909 the lost carabao was found in the possession of R R, since finding the carabao, had not ceased to possess it and claimed ownership over it The CFI found Rs guilty of theft Issue: (1) W/N R is guilty of theft (2) W/N R acquired the carabao by prescription Ratio: (1) NO

when the defendants learned, in April, 1909, who claimed to be the owner of the carabao, they had already possessed the lost animal for an interrupted period of six years; and the ownership of the personal property prescribes by uninterrupted possession for six years, without the necessity of any other condition the owner of the thing found being unknown, its appropriate does not constitute theft, although the finding may or may not constitute of acquisition for the finder, and may or may not be a reason for the loss of the ownership by the original owner: all this is a matter for ventilation in a civil action o PAJUNAR v. CA

o o

the accused did not take, but found, the carabao in question

Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA. Ponente: J. Paras

It is an elementary principle that theft consists essentially in taking another's personal property from the place where it is held by it legitimate owner o To claim to be the owner does not make one the owner. For this reason, in the present status of the case, the courts must decide who is the owner. The defendant can not now, after the lapse of six years from the finding of the carabao, which was without owner and at large, be deemed guilty of the crime of theft. This is a new phase of the case at bar, which brings it within the prescriptions of the civil law and withdraws it from the sphere of action of the Penal Code (2) YES o The fourteenth provision of the Law of Bases provided that taking possession should be defined as one of the means of acquisition; that rights should be regulated over domestic animals, accidental finding of treasure and appropriation of abandoned personal property. o The Civil Code, in its articles 111, 112 and 113 [611-613], treats of the loss and acquisition of wild and tame animals. With respect to tame or domestic animals, as well as all other abandoned chattels, the only applicable is article 116 [615], which prescribes as follows: A person finding any personal property, which is not treasure, must return it to its former possessor. Should the latter be unknown, he must deliver it immediately to the mayor of the town where the find was made. o prescription is required to enable the finder or a third person to acquire title to the find; and the former, as a general rule, must have possessed it for the extraordinary term of six years, on account of the lack of good faith and because, for the same reason, his possession is not equivalent to a title, with the exception however of the provisions of article 1956 o The possession of personal property, acquired in good faith, is equivalent to a title thereto. (Civil Code, 464.) o The ownership of personal property prescribes by uninterrupted possession in good faith for a period of three years. (Civ. Code, art. 1955, par. 1.)

Facts: Initial case for recovery of personal property with writ of replevin filed by Arthur and Invencia Pajunat with the RTC. RTC dismissed and CA affirmed. 1969: Respondents Mauro and Teofila Eluna bartered a 3-year old male cow for a 1-year old female carabao in the possession of Enopia; carabao had the brand ART in front and hind legs. Mauro did not or could not register the transfer to him. March 1980: Arthur Pajunar learned that the carabao was in the possession of Mauro. He claims that he is the original owner of the carabao which got lost in 1974. Arthur demanded the return of the carabao and the delivery of its 2 offsprings. Mauro refused to do so despite repeated demands and filed the initial case. Petitioner contends: Mauro failed to establish his ownership over the mestisa carabao found in his possession. Failure of Mauro to register in his name said carabao, constitutes a flaw in his ownership as required by law. Respondent claims: he has been in possession of the carabao for more than 10 years, by wirtue of barter with Enopia in 1969. Hence, he acquired ownership by prescription under NCC 1132.

o
o

The ownership of personal property also prescribes by uninterrupted possession for six years, without the necessity of any other conditions. (Id., par. 2.) In this case, R had uninterrupted possession from January 1, 1903, to April, 1909

Issue: WON the transfer to Mauro of the carabao by barter was valid. Held/Ratio: No. Although the animal was branded ART at the time she was acquired by Mauro, said respondent did not or could not register the transfer to him in accordance with Sec. 529 of the Revised Administrative Code, which requires registration in order for a transfer to be valid. Mauro was not able to comply with this requirement. They are not possessors in good faith as a possessor in good faith is one not aware of that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw that invalidates it. The duty to make a close inquiry into the certificate of registration of the carabao should have been performed by Mauro but he failed to do so. Thus, proving, he was in bad faith when he acquired the said carabao from Enopia. The possession in good faith for 4 years is NOT applicable, neither can possession in bad faithof 8 years benefit respondent, for when the owner of a movable has lost or has been illegally deprived of his property, he can recover the same without need to reimburse the possessor (NCC 559). Art. 716 cannot apply since it evidently refers to a possessor in bad faith.

Dispositive: Decision reversed and set-aside.