A CASE STUDY OF CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM PROBLEMS/FAILURES IN AN AMMONIA PLANT

The paper addresses the various problems/failures experienced in the CO2 removal system of an Ammonia Plant in a short span operation of less than one year. Probable causes of failures and the corrective steps taken to avoid such failures in future, have also been discussed. V.K. BALI and A.K. MAHESHWARI IFFCO Aonla Unit, Bareilly Uttar Pradesh, India

INTRODUCTION
Located at Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh in India, Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Ltd, operates two Ammonia plants, each with a name plate capacity of 1350 MTPD of ammonia. Both of these plants have been designed based on Haldor Topsoe technology with steam reforming of natural gas and/or naphtha. Ammonia-1 is designed for natural gas feed stock and was commissioned in 1988. Ammonia-2 was commissioned in December,1996 and is designed for both Natural Gas & Naphtha feed stocks. The Benfield process was selected for the CO2 removal system of Ammonia-1 which has been converted into Giammarco- Vetrocoke (GV) dual activator system in April,1997 for achieving lower CO2 slip and energy savings. For Ammonia-2 plant, the GV dual activator low energy process has been selected for CO2 removal system from the design stage. The paper describes the problems/failures experienced in the CO2 removal system of Ammonia-2 plant during very first year of its operation.

PROCESS TECHNOLOGY ADOPTED FOR CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM

CO2 removal system of Ammonia Plant has a conventional design based on the GV dual activator process. The process comprises of single stage absorption and two stage regeneration. Figure-1 shows the CO2 removal system flow sheet. Carbon dioxide is removed by absorption in hot aqueous potassium carbonate solution containing approximately 30 wt% potash (K2CO3) partly converted into bicarbonate (KHCO3). The solution further contains dual activators to effectively improve the overall performance of the system . Vanadium oxide is used as corrosion inhibitor. The process gas from the shift reactors is passed to the Vetrocoke Absorber which contains stainless steel packing material distributed in 5 beds. The absorption is carried out in one stage. The major part of the circulating solution is fed without cooling to the middle of absorber at about 241 F (116 C). The remaining solution is fed to the top of absorber after cooling to about 140 F ( 60 C). In the lower zone of absorber, the bulk of the CO2 is

absorbed. In the upper zone,the reduced stream of cold solution is used to get low CO2 slippages due to the low CO2 vapour pressure of the dual activated solution. The solution leaving the absorber bottom, loaded with CO2 is called the rich solution. The rich solution is transferred to a two stage regeneration system operating at low pressures. The rich solution is depressurised through the hydraulic turbine and is sent to the top of the 1st Regenerator operating at 14.2 psig (1.0 Kg/cm2g) pressure. A stream of rich solution extracted from the top of 1st Regenerator is depressurised through a control valve and enters the top of the 2nd Regenerator,working at low pressure of 1.42 psig (0.1 Kg/cm2g).

CORROSION CONTROL IN CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM

GV solution along with CO2 at boiling temperature is very corrosive and would normally require stainless steel equipment. However, carbon steel equipment with passivation layers (oxidation layers) are being used successfully. The desired passivation layer is formed by controlled passivation in two phases called static passivation & dynamic passivation. The layer formed is tight, magnetic & tenacious and protects the carbon steel surfaces from corrosion. However, rubbing with hard sharp edges can scratch the layer. The GV system uses vanadium as corrosion inhibitor. The recommended concentration of total vanadium is around 0.5% by weight as V2O5. The hot potassium carbonate inhibited with vanadium can be safely operated, but is very sensitive for corrosion. In order to maintain the electro-chemical potential required for protection of passivation layer of metallic surfaces, it is necessary to keep 30 to 40% of the total vanadium in the pentavalent form and never be allowed lower than 20% . This ratio is kept by means of the oxidation unit which treats a side stream solution with air. Hence, formation of proper passivation layer and its protection is very essential to avoid corrosion in the GV system equipment. Any damage to the passivation layer can cause very fast corrosion & subsequent leakages.

PROBLEMS/FAILURES EXPERIENCED
The various problems faced in the CO2 removal system of Ammonia Plant have been presented. Each problem/failure has been dealt with separately specifying the problem/failure faced, cause of the problem and various corrective steps undertaken to avoid such occurance in future.

2nd Regenerator
The 2nd Regenerator is a carbon steel tower provided with stainless steel internals and operating at a pressure of 1.42 psig (0.1 Kg/cm2g). It is a packed tower having 129 inches (3230 mm) diameter, 1643 inches (41075 mm) height and contains stainless steel packing material distributed in two beds. Broad specifications and the general arrangement drawing of 2nd regenerator are shown at figure-2.

Problem/failure description Based on the failure history of this equipment in other plants, it was decided to measure the thickness of 2nd Regenerator shell in the failure prone zones after about 9 months of operation. While the thickness measurement was in progress between A-2 and A-7 nozzles, a leak was observed on the other side of the shell on 11.9.97. This leak was located approximately 6 inches (150 mm) above the A-2 nozzle and 88 inches (2200 mm) circumferentially towards M3 manhole. Initially, a hole of approximately 0.8 inches (20 mm) diameter was observed which enlarged to a bigger size "Eye shaped" hole within 2 hrs of start of leakage as shown in figure-3. Thickness measurements were carried out around the leaking hole to ascertain the extent of thining in shell. No thinning was found even around the hole, leading to the conclusion that the failure was localized as shown in figure 4. The area of leakage was covered and welded with SS-304, 8" sch 10 pipe with blind and a vent to arrest the leakage. The whole exercise was carried out while the plant was in operation and the equipment was in line. As a preventive measure, it was decided to carry out thickness measurements around the effected area of the shell on a regular basis. It was observed that the thickness had been reduced to as little as 0.56 inches (14 mm) around the 8" stainless steel pipe, which had been welded to contain the leak. Stainless steel pads were welded around the 8" stainless steel pipe to strengthen the shell. The 2nd Regenerator was opened for inspection in October,1997. A hole of approximately 12 inches (300 mm) diameter was observed from inside. Welding of the cleat between SS 304 shroud and the vessel was also found broken.Photograph (PH-1) shows the damaged 2nd Regenerator shell. In addition to the leakage in the shell,the following upset conditions of a minor nature were also observed in the 2nd Regenerator. Three segments of the steam distributor above the chimney at elevation of 644 inches (16100 mm) were found lifted from their support beam by about 6 to 8 inches (150 to 200 mm ) as shown in Figure-5. Photograph (PH-2) shows the disturbed internals of the steam distributor. The bed no.1 liquid re-distributor (Norten type) at elevation of 26750 mm was found lifted from its support ring by about 50 mm on one side as shown in Figure-5.

Cause of the problem The mechanical design of the fluid entry zone of 2nd Regenerator was found to be inadequate. The support design of the stainless steel protective shroud was inadequate for the dynamic loads. This resulted in the shroud supports cracking and allowing the cleats of the shroud to hit the wall which broke the protective vanadium layer on the carbon steel shell. This allowed rapid corrosion of the shell and subsequent failure of pressure vessel (Figure 6).

Upon investigation, it was also discovered that the material of the cleats was carbon steel rather than the stainless steel material specified on the approved drawings. Also the number of cleats provided were at variance with the approved drawings. It was further concluded that an internal annular passage should be avoided if possible to safe guard the installation against even the slightest possibility of any means of damaging the passivation layer. The welding of cleats to the shell to support the annular passage which is likely to have some degree of vibration due to the process conditions, was identified to present such a possibility. Various design options Design problems in the fluid entry zone of 2nd Regenerator were reported in 1993 in a 900 MTPD ammonia plant operating in southern part of India. The flow was directly hitting the chimney which broke off and rubbed against the tower wall. This resulted in damage to the passivation layer and caused corrosion which, in a short period of time, resulted in equipment failure. Another operating problem experienced in this equipment, was the difficulty in maintaining the proper solution level. During the engineering and procurement phase of IFFCO-Aonla Unit,it was decided to reengineer the inlet arrangement using a Norton type inlet arrangement and providing an annular passage . The inlet arrangement was designed to divert the flow in two directions horizontally to avoid direct impingement on the chimney. A stainless steel annular passage was provided to prevent liquid impingement on the shell and possible disturbance of the passivation layer which could cause excessive corrosion . An annular passage was provided with an annular ring at the lower end to limit the disturbance of the surface i.e. to improve level measurement. The above arrangement is shown in Figure-7. Photograph (PH-3) shows the original inlet distribution arrangement. However, ammonia plant of Aonla Unit and other similar plants based on above design have reported failures in this equipment in the fluid entry zone. Yet another design option has been considered which has now been adopted and is described separately in the paper. Repairs/modifications The area of 24 inches x 24 inches (600 mm x 600 mm) which was patched up from outside to arrest leakage while the plant was in operation, was removed. A new matching plate of the same size was welded into the shell. The existing nozzle entry configuration and stainless steel shroud was dismantled and removed. A new arrangement of the distributor and supporting arrangement as shown in Figure-8 was provided. This arrangement removes the possibility of damaging the passivation layer. At the same time, it ensures that the GV solution is uniformly distributed throughout the circumference of 2nd Regenerator and does not hit the chimney and the surface of the tower.

Vetrocoke Absorber
The Vetrocoke Absorber is a carbon steel tower with stainless steel internals operating at 398 psig (28 Kg/cm2g) pressure. It contains stainless steel packing material distributed in five beds. Liquid distributors and redistributors (called LRD) of stainless steel material have also been provided. Broad specifications and the general arrangement drg.of Vetrocoke Absorber is presented as figure-9. The overall performance of Vetrocoke Absorber was satisfactory as the CO2 slip at the Absorber exit was less than the design figure of 300 ppm. However, a detailed analysis of the performance of each bed conducted in August,1997, indicated that the second bed was not performing satisfactorily. Maldistribution of GV solution at top of the 2nd bed was thought to be the probable cause and it was decided to open the Absorber at the earliest opportunity. Problem/failure description The Ammonia plant was shutdown in October,1997 and this opportunity was utilised to open the various manholes of Absorber for inspection. The following failures were found as observed from various manholes. Location : M3 manhole This manhole is located between bed No.2 (26400 mm). and bed No.3 at an elevation of 1056 inches

The Bed no.2 liquid redistributor (Norton type) called LRD located at elevation of 1030 inches (25750 mm ) was found buckled at the top and the J-bolts supporting the distributor had got sheared. The LRD was raised about 6 to 8 inches (150 to 200 mm) from its support ring. Further upward movement of the LRD was restricted by the semi-lean solution distribution parting boxes placed above it, and by the semi-lean solution distribution pipes of nozzles A2 and A3 located at elevation of 1066 inches (26640 mm). The distance between the LRD and the bed no.3 containing IMTP 40 stainless steel packing, had been reduced to around 24 inches (600 mm). A few loose rings were also found at the top of the LRD. The parting box was also found damaged and buckled at the ends. A few 8 inches NB nipples attached with the semilean solution distributor pipes of A2 & A3 nozzles were also found twisted. The details indicating the above failures are given in figure - 10. Location : M4 manhole This manhole is located between bed no.1 & 2 at an elevation of 631 inches (15780 mm). The Bed no.1 liquid redistributor (Norten type) called LRD located at elevation of 610 inches

(15250 mm) which should have been below the M4 manhole level, was found hanging at approximately 20 inches (500 mm) above the top of the manhole. The LRD was found in distorted condition and its middle portion had taken convex shape viewed from bottom. The whole bed no.1 had lifted up by approximately 64 inches (1600 mm) from its original position. Loose IMTP 50 packing of Bed No.1 were found all around the M4 manhole. Photograph (PH-4) & Photograph (PH-5) indicate the disturbed beds of Absorber. The support beam of bed no.1 LRD with its ends distorted was found loose above manhole M4 and being stuck up at ring support of Bed No.2. The multi-beam support plate of bed no.2 along with its supporting beam was not clearly visible. The beam had sheared from its support bracket and entered in the IMTP 40 packing of bed no.2 after leaving its original position. Probable causes The possibility of construction defects and weak structure of the tower internals were considered to be probable causes of the failure. The plate thickness used for bed supports and clamps was only 2 mm. The extent of damage, however suggested that forces of great magnitude acted in the upward direction in the Absorber. Hence the cause of the failure can not be attributed only to the weak design . Further, Absorbers of the same design have been reported operating satisfactorily in other plants without any problems. The other possibility could be some sudden upward gas surge through the 1st & 2nd bed of Absorber which caused the upheaval of these beds and buckling of LRDs. The process gas entering at the bottom of Absorber might have flowed backwards through the semi-lean inlet line via the ARC-NRV circulation line back to the solution draw -off tray in the 2nd Regenerator. The upward lifting of the steam distributor above the chimney in the semilean solution draw off tray and also the uplifting of the 1st bed LRD of the 2nd Regenerator seems to support this view. However, the above back flow could take place through this route only when both ARC/NRV valves & the solenoid operated valves are not holding. A study of the construction of the ARC/NRV valves indicated that a large quantity of gas passing backward through the NRV portion and then through the ARC portion could be possible only if the internals of the valve were severely damaged. These valves were opened to check their condition. The springs of these valves were found broken. The discs of these valves were also getting stuck up. The above conditions were creating possibilities of back flow. Each semi-lean pump had a solenoid valve at the discharge which closes when the pump trips via the interlock I-301 A/B/C. For back flow to take place, these discharge valves must be in open position . This can take place if the discharge valve does not close during the tripping of the pumps, due to failure of the interlock I-301. Mal-functioning of this interlock, however could not be confirmed.

Further, the back flow through the above route may result in reverse rotation of the semilean pumps. However, no damage to these pumps due to reverse rotation was observed. However, the absence of a reverse rotation of the semi-lean pump could be explained by the reasoning that the liquid passing in back flow through the valve was prevented by the motion of the decelerating machine. Another probable cause for the damage in the Absorber could be the fast depressurisation of the Absorber by sudden opening of vent valve (PV-60) located downstream of the Absorber. This could have occured during start up/shutdown of the plant. However, depressurisation through this route could have resulted in the failures of 3rd and 4th bed as well. No failure in these beds, however, were found. This could be explained because the 3rd and 4th beds are inherently stronger than the 1st & 2nd beds as the diameter there is 99 inches (2480 mm) compared to 150 inches (3750 mm) at the 1st & 2nd beds, even though the internals & fittings are of the same thickness.

Repairs/modifications The following corrective actions have been suggested based on all probable causes of failures as discussed above All damaged internals will be replaced with next higher thickness. In order to prevent back flow, the solenoid valves should be interlocked with low speed of turbines of the semilean solution pumps and lean solution pumps so that before all the liquid is drained off, the valve would have completely closed. The semi-lean flow control valve (FV-22) and the lean solution flow control valve (FV-23) should close shut on very low solution flow. Extreme care should be taken to ensure that the downstream vent valve (PV-60) is not opened suddenly under any circumstances. An additional NRV on each of the common headers of the semilean solution line and the lean solution line should be provided.

Hydraulic Turbines
The rich GV solution at high pressure coming from the bottom of the Absorber is let down and flashed in the upper portion of the Ist Regenerator operating at low pressure. This let down in pressure is carried out through hydraulic turbines to supply power to turbine driven GV solution pumps and thus reduce the steam consumption of turbines. Problem/failure description It was observed that the hydraulic turbine was not developing power as per design and thus the steam consumption of steam turbines was high. On inspection, the casing vanes of hydraulic turbines were found to be eroded. Probable causes

Butterfly control valves have been provided at the inlet nozzle of the hydraulic turbine. The shaft pins of these valves have also been found to be broken probably due to flashing. The sudden increase in volume and the two phase flow at the turbine inlet nozzle were the probable causes of the damage to the hydraulic casing vanes. Repairs/modification The butterfly control valves have now been shifted away from the inlet nozzle of hydraulic turbine to achieve laminar flow to the turbine inlet as shown in figure-11.

1st Regenerator
The 1st Regeneator is a carbon steel tower provided with stainles steel internals with operating pressure of 14.2 psig (1 kg/cm2g). It is a packed tower having 147 inches (3680 mm) diameter, 1855 inches (46375 mm) height and contains stainless steel packing material distributed in three beds. Problem/failure description The rich solution line (20") carrying rich solution from the bottom of the Absorber to the top of 1st Regenerator through two inlet nozzles, was vibrating heavily. Frequent leaks were observed at the welding joints at the upstream stub end of the butterfly valves provided in the inlet lines & these leakages were recurring frequently. Probable causes The rich solution line is divided with two branches near the 1st Regenerator and hence enters the vessel at two points. In both the branches, butterfly valves have been provided near the 1st Regenerator. These valves were causing restriction in the flow & hence the vibration in the lines. Vibration resulted in the increased load on the welding joints and the failure of the joints. Repairs/modifications Both the 20" butterfly valves and flanges were removed and the gaps were filled by providing 20" SS-304 spool pieces.

GV Regenerator
The GV Regenerator in CO2 removal system of Ammonia-1 has been in operation since 1988. The plant was originally built with the Benfield process and was converted to the GV dual activator process in 1997. The Regenerator is a carbon steel tower provided with stainless steel internals and operating at 14.2 psig (1.0 Kg/cm2g) pressure. It is a packed tower having 196 inches (4900 mm) diameter, 1796 inches (44900 mm) height and contains stainless steel packing material distributed in three beds. Rich solution to the regenerator is fed through two tangential enteries (called a necklace) as shown in figure-12. The above two inlet nozzles are welded to the 8 mm thick stainless steel liner provided to protect the carbon steel shell from severe inlet flow

conditions. Broad specifications and the general arrangements drawing of GV regenerator are presented in Figure-12. The CO2 removal system of Ammonia Plant has been operating normally except that the CO2 slip was high at around 1400-1600 ppm. A consultants' expert in these systems , was called in the last week of September,1997 to analzse the problem of high CO2 slip. Following the recommendations of this consultant , various chemicals were added to the system to increase the concentration of chemicals in the solution. Only marginal advantage in the reduction of CO2 slip was observed. However, it was observed that the iron content in the solution was increasing. The iron content in the solution had increased from 67 PPM on 30 September,1997 to 127 ppm on 15 October,1997 in a very short span of two weeks time and was a clear cut indication of heavy corrosion taking place in the system. V+5 to total V ratio was being maintained at the same level of around 15% as was maintained with Benfield system. KNO2 and V2O5 however, were added to increase the ratio of V+5/V to stop further corrosion. But iron level continued to increase in the solution. It was observed on 18 October,1997 that GV Regenerator had started leaking from the top, resulting in continuous GV solution droplets falling down. The leaking zone was thoroughly inspected and the leak was arrested by welding. On 21 October ,1997 another leak was observed about 180 Degree opposite the previous leak. An attempt was made to arrest the leakage by providing a box around it. This was not possible as the vessel thickness had been reduced by corrosion to the extent that welding was impossible. Thickness measurements showed patches of reduced thickness. It was decided to shutdown the plant and carryout a thorough inspection and repair. Problem/failure description The Ammonia Plant was shutdown in October ,1997 to carryout thorough inspection and repair of GV Regenerator. On opening the Regenerator, the following observations were made. Black colour deposition was found above the shroud. Both the necklace weld joints with liner were found cracked at two places in each joint. The length of crack was about 12 inches (300 mm). The liner plate had got deformed and was touching the Regenerator main shell at several places as shown in figure-13 . The gap between the liner and the shell should be 10 mm as per design ( figure-14). Heavy corrosion on the shell near and including the tray support ring was found at three places as shown in figure-15. Corrosion of the shell at several places just below the lower edge of SS liner were also found as shown in figure-15. Lower cleats welding with liner were found cracked.

Some of the weldings of end plates of Omega trays were found broken. At two places, end plates were missing. A broken piece of 690 mm x 280 mm was also found loose.

Probable causes The following reasons put together can be attributed to Regenerator and its subsequent leakage. the fast corrosion in the GV

The stainless steel liner plate became deformed and was touching the shell at various places. Cleats of the liner were also found cracked. Also there is two phase flow at the inlet. This must have resulted in vibrations in the liner and damaged the passivation layer. The places where there was no gap between shell & liner corrosion could be due to stagnated solution. V+5/V ratio was slightly on the lower side at around 15% in comparison to the consultants recommendations of minimum value of 20% and probably was not sufficient to give the desired protection to carbon steel shell. Increase in concentration of chemicals further aggravated the situation for corrosion.

Repairs/modifications It was decided to cut the liner by about 8 inches (200 mm) from the bottom at the places where there were no gaps between the liner and the shell to check for further damage to the shell. After cutting, it was discovered that some of the shell areas and the circumferential seal welds behind the liner were found badly corroded. Another 18 inches wide by 80 inches long (450 mm x 2000mm) section of liner was removed to inspect the condition of the shell. No further corrosion was observed on the shell behind the liner. A total of about 35 stainless steel cleats were welded behind liner to maintain a uniform gap between the liner and the shell throughout the periphery .This was done to ensure no further contact between the liner and shell in the future to avoid damage to the passivation layer and to avoid stagnation of the solution. Some of the welding of end plates of omega trays which was found to be broken, was rewelded. All the corroded areas of shell were repaired by filling material with welding. All the repair welds were ground finish and DP tested. The 18 inches (450 mm) width liner was rewelded in position. The cracks on both necklace to liner joints were also repaired & DP tested.

CONCLUSION

The failure presented in the paper were caused by a number of different factors including design deficiencies,defects introduced during manufacturing or fabrication, service related deterioration , and upsets during plant operation etc. The cases presented do not indicate that a particular system or design is more prone to failures than others. Instead,these examples must be carefully analysed to prevent their occurance in other plants. The awareness of the conditions which produce failures, helps the plant personnel to reduce the potential for failures. This also helps in purchasing the most suitable equipment for a given operation and ensuring proper design & fabrication of the equipment.

Figure-1
1ST REGENERATOR
CO2 GAS 1. 0 106
4 3

2ND REGENERATOR
CO2 GAS 0. 1

VETROCOKE ABSORBER
27.7 70

PROCESS GAS OUT

3 2

2 106 70 124 1 2 1

1 HYDRAULIC TURBINE 1. 2 127 0. 2 5

112

PROCESS GAS IN

28

101

LEGEND TEMPERATURE (DEG. C) PRESSURE (KG/CM2G)

CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM FLOW SHEET

Figure-2
GAS OUTLET B1

2nd REGENERATOR

RICH SOLUTION A1 INLET

PACKING DETAILS BED - 2 BED VOLUME (M 3) 1 2 BED - 1 81.9 81.9 TYPE IMTP 50 IMTP 50

LEAN SOLUTION INLET A3 SEMI- LEAN SOLUTION B2 OUTLET

A2

SEMI-LEAN SOLUTION INLET

B3

LEAN SOLUTION OUTLET

Figure-3

2nd REGENERATOR LEAKAGE IN SHELL DUE TO CORROSION

1800 15945 1300
CIRCUM WELD SEAM APPROX. 2200 M M
HOLE

1030

900

15100 14200

A-2

430 M M M-3

(Development Of Shell)

Figure-4

2ND REGENERATOR LEAKAGE IN SHELL DUE TO CORROSION

3000 15945 2850 1800
CIRCUM . WELD SEAM

1300

1030 900 15930 15530

15100 14850 14000

A-2 M-3 A-7

HOLE 14200

THICKNESS MEASUREMENT WAS CARRIED OUT IN THE HATCHED AREA NO REDUCTION, EXCEPT FAILURE, WAS OBSERVED

Figure-5

2ND REGENERATOR
FAILURE OF LIQUID REDISTRIBUTOR AND STEAM DISTRIBUTOR

BED NO. 2 M ULTI- BEAM SUPPORT PLATE 26750 LIQUI D REDISTRIBUTOR FOUND LIFTED BY 50 M M ON ONE SIDE BED NO. 1 IMTP 50 PACKING M ULTI-BEAM SUPPORT PLATE STEAM DISTRIBUTOR ( 3 SEGM ENTS FOUND LIFTED FROM ITS SUPPORT BEAM BY ABOUT 150 M M ) 15100 M M A2 BED LIM ITER

16100 MM CHIMNEY

2ND REGENERATOR
SOLUTION INLET NOZZLE CLEATS

Figure-6

SHELL SHROUD

IMPINGEMENT PLATE

CHIMNEY 10 MM GAP 48 NOS. 20 HOLES

2ND REGENERATOR
(Original Arrangement)
SHELL (25 M M THK ) LINER ( 8 M M THK ) IMPINGEMENT PLATE

Figure-7

10 M M GAP

SOLUTION INLET NOZZLE (A2)

900 CHIMNEY

48 NOS. 20 HOLES

2ND REGENERATOR
(Modified Arrangement)

Figure-8

SHELL (25 M M THK ) 496 X 10 THK

SOLUTION INLET NOZZLE (A2)

900 CHIMNEY

VETROCOKE ABSORBER
LEAN SOLUTION INLET (A1) MULTI-BEAM SUPPORT M2 SEMI -LEAN SOLUTION (A 2 & A 3) INLET BED NO. 3 M3 5 11. 0 2480 MM. BED NO. 4 M1 BED 1 2 3 4

Figure-9

PACKING DETAILS VOLUME (M3) 104. 9 104. 9 48. 3 48. 3 TYPE IMTP 50 IMTP 40 IMTP 40 MELLAPACK 250 Y IMTP 70

LIQUID REDISTRIBUTOR PLATES BENT UPWARDS BED NO. 2 3750 MM. BED NO. 1 PROCESS GAS (A 4) INLET M5 BED NO. 5 (B2) RICH SOLUTION OUTLET M4 MULTI BEAM SUPPORT GOT DISPLACED FROM T.S.R. L.R.D. WAS DAMAGED & LIFTED ABOVE M - 4

VETROCOKE

ABSORBER

Figure-10

PACKING BED NO. 2

MULTI-BEAM SUPPORT OF BED NO. 2 LYING LOOSE IN THE BED. DISTORTED / DISPLACED LRD OF BED NO. 1 DOUBLE C - BEAM LYING LOOSE

PACKING MATERIAL OF BED NO. 1

T.S.R. OF MULTI-BEAM SUPPORT MANHOLE ( M 4 )

T.S.R. OF LRD

PACKING BED NO. 1

HYDRAULIC TURBINE INLET PIPING

USV 126

ORIGINAL
2 76

MODIFIED
RICH GV SOLUTION

USV 126

2 76

RICH GV SOLUTION
18 26

18 26

00 11
ER 14 x 8

ER

14

8 x

HIC 18 HIC 18
107 0

1070

70
8 HYDRAULIC TURBINE INLET NOZZLE 8 HYDRAULIC TURBINE INLET NOZZLE

Figure-11

GAS OUTLET

B1

Figure-12

GV REGENERATOR
(Old Plant)
A1-2 4900 M M LEAKAGE FROM C - SEAM WELD JOINT BED - 3 44900 M M RICH SOLUTION INLET

PACKING DETAILS
BED - 2 BED VOLUME (M 3) 1 172.5 2 3 172.5 172.5 TYPE SLOTTED RINGS SLOTTED RINGS SLOTTED RINGS

BED - 1

B 2-3

SOLUTION OUTLET

B4

SOLUTION OUTLET

Figure-15

GV REGENERATOR
DEVELOPMENT OF SHELL AND SHROUD SHOWING AREAS OF CORROSION
0 DEG NECKLACE NOZZLE M2 NECKLACE NOZZLE SHROUD SOUTH SHELL

NORTH

180 DEG

CIR.SEAM WELD SHROUD LOWER EDGE AREAS OF CORROSION ON SHELL TRAY SUPPORT RING

GV REGENERATOR
SHROUD 2 NOS. INLET NOZZLES 180 DEG APART

SECTIONAL VIEW
10 NOS. SUPPORT CLEATS 10 MM GAP SHELL (16 MM THK) 8 MM. THICK SHROUD

SUPPORTING STRIPS

CIR. SEAM OF SHELL

8 NOS. SUPPORT CLEATS LIQUID DISTRIBUTOR TRAY SUPPORT RING

BED LIMITER GRID PACKING BED NO 3 BED SUPPORT

Figure-14

Figure-13

GV REGENERATOR
DEVELOPMENT OF LINER

0 DEG NORTH NECKLAC E NOZZLE

180 DEG M2 NECKLACE NOZZLE SOUTH

LINER GAP EXISTS

NO LINER GAP

LINER GAP EXISTS

NO LINER GAP

LINER GAP EXISTS

PH-1:2ND REGENERATOR Damaged Shell Near Solution Inlet

PH-2:2ND REGENERATOR Disturbed Steam Distributor

PH-3:2ND REGENERATOR SOLUTION INLET (Original Arrangement)

PH-4:VETROCOKE ABSORBER Disturbed Bed

PH-5:VETROCOKE ABSORBER Disturbed 1st Bed Liquid Redistributor