TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF BENIGNO DIAZ Y HEREDIA, DECEASED BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, TRUSTEE. SOLEDAD ROBLES, ET.

AL., PETITIONERS V. ISABEL MANAHAN DE SANTIAGO AND NESTOR M. SANTIAGO, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLANTS G.R. No. L-10111 31 August 1960 FACTS: Benigno Diaz Y Heredia, in his will, created a trust estate out of the properties not otherwise disposed of. After the death of his wife, Diaz caused the preparation of a codicil. The testator died and his will and codicil were accordingly probated. The Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed Trustee of the trust created by the testator in the will and the codicil, for the purpose of paying the monthly and yearly legacies of the legatees named therein. The trustee then petitioned the court, with the consent of all the legatees, for authority to sell all the properties and liquidate the estate. This petition was granted. The property located at Rosario, Binondo, Manila was sold to legatee Isabel Manahan de Santiago. Legatees Soledad Robles and her children filed a motion praying that the trustee be ordered to deliver to them, in accordance with the will, 90% of the rentals collected from the property in Rosario; which the trustee refused to deliver contending that upon authorization of the court of the sale of the properties, the trusteeship ceased already and the rentals collected thereafter not only from the Rosario property but also from all the other properties of the estate, constitute the mass of the residuary estate to be distributed among the legatees in accordance with the terms of the codicil, that is, only 30% and not 90% to the heirs of Domingo Legarda. The motion was granted by the court and directed the trustee to deliver to Soledad Robles and her children, their shares in rentals. ISSUE: Whether or not the said legatees-appellees may still demand their share of the rentals. RULING: Yes. From the testamentary provisions, it seems clear that the testator intended the enjoyment by the legatees, of their respective legacies for the entire duration of the trust estate, even when the specified properties are sold, the proceeds of which have been directed to be invested in mortgages with interest, or in the purchase of other rental-bearing properties. The legacies should therefore be viewed as one whole, continuing obligation based upon a judgment (the will becomes binding upon probate) and the prescription period is ten years. The fact that the rentals are to be delivered monthly, did not make each delivery a separate, distinct prestation. Considering that the obligation terminated upon the sale of the said property on March 18, 1955, the demand for complete delivery of the inheritance has not yet prescribed. It is evident therefrom that the testator intended the expenses incidental to the execution of his will to be defrayed and deductible from the residuary estate, excluding the rents from the Rosario property.

BRENDA J. DEBUQUE, ESTRELLA L. JAVELONA, ROSENDO L. JAVELONA, JR., ARTURO L. JAVELONA, YSMAEL L. JAVELONA, VIVIAN L. JAVELONA, ROBERTO L. JAVELONA AND EDUARDO L. JAVELONA, PETITIONERS, V. HONORABLE RAFAEL CLIMACO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SILAY CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, RENATO JAVELONA, EDNA JAVELONA, EDMUNDO JAVELONA, ERLINDA JAVELONA, AND LILIA LIBOON, JUDICIAL GUARD FOR THE MINORS, CAMILO JAVELONA, BONITO JAVELONA, BELENDA JAVELONA, ARMANDO JAVELONA AND EDWIN JAVELONA, RESPONDENTS. G. R. No. L-30634 27 August 1980 FACTS: On June 22, 1962, Rosendo Javelona, Sr. died intestate and left set of heirs. The first consisting of his widow and their seven legitimates children and the second set consisting of his illegitimate children. To avoid a protracted and expensive court litigation, the parties entered into an amicable settlement compromise agreement whereby they agreed that the first set of heirs will receive 71.66% of the decedents net estate which shall be equally divided among them, while the second set of heirs will receive 28.38% of the net estate, likewise to be equally divided among them. This was in accordance with the amended project of partition drawn by the judicial administrator and the second set of heirs and approved by respondent Judge. Brenda Javelona Debuque, the youngest legitimate heir, appealed the order after her emancipation by virtue of her marriage to lawyer Jorge Debuque; the former had acquired most of the interest of the other legitime. She prayed that the remaining balance belonging to the estate be proportionately divided between the first and second set of heirs, alleging that because the total balance exceeds the remaining cash deposit of the estate, payment to the two sets of heirs should be proportionately reduced. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge grossly erred in distributing the estate. RULING: We are satisfied that the lower court did not err in finding that the shares of the heirs in the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. When the parties entered into an amicable settlement-compromise agreement, they made the agreement as between the two sets. Upon approval and finality of said agreement, the two sets will again become co-owners of their respective shares as among themselves. Legitimate heirs will be co-owners in equal shares of the 7.66% portion of the estate, while the illegitimate heirs will be co-owners of their 28.38% portion until partition. Meanwhile, they are governed by the pertinent laws or co-ownership and succession. The members of the first set are solidarily liable for the estates losses due to the amounts they have taken and have not restored to the estate, pursuant to Article 927 of the New Civil Code. This solidary liability should be understood to cover not only negligence but also fraud and delay. This Article is for the protection of devisees and legatees; it may be applied in relation to Article 1087.

MISAEL P. VERA, AS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER V. HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO C. NAVARRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PASIG, RIZAL (BRANCH II); MAGDALENA ABANTO AND CAMILO ERIBAL, AS VOLUNTARY RESIDUAL HEIRS OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED ELSIEM. GACHES; DELIA P. MEDINA, AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF SAID HEIRS; BIENVENIDO A. TAN, SR., AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ELSIE M. GACHES; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK; PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION; THE OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA; AND BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, RESPONDENTS G.R. No. L-27745 18 October 1977 FACTS: This is a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Injunction filed by herein petitioner Michael Vera, in his capacity as commissioner of Internal Revenue, against Honorable Judge Pedro Navarro, in his capacity as Judge of CFI. It appears that Elsie Gaches died without a child. The deceased left a last will and testament. The herein respondent Judge Bienvenido Tan, Sr filed with the CFI a petition for the probate of the said will and he was appointed as executor. The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue filed with the probate court a claim of taxes particularly estate tax, inheritance tax, and income tax. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should be required to pay first the inheritance tax before the probate court may authorize the delivery of the hereditary share pertaining to each of them RULING: Under the provisions of Rule 90, Section 1, the distribution of the ascendants assets may only be ordered under the following three circumstances namely, (1) when the inheritance tax, among others, is paid, (2) when a sufficient bond is given to meet the payment of the inheritance tax and all the other obligation of the nature enumerated therein, or (3) when the payment of said tax and all the other obligations mentioned in the said rule has been provided for. None of these three cases insofar as the satisfaction of the inheritance due from the estate is concerned were present when the questioned orders were issued in the case at bar; likewise, the record is bereft of any evidence that sufficient bond has been filed to meet the outstanding obligation. The inheritance tax imposed by Section 86 shall, in the absence of contrary disposition by the predecessor, be charged to the account of each beneficiary, in proportion to the value of the benefit received, and in accordance with the scale fixed for the class or group to which is pertains: Provided, That in cases where the heirs divide extrajudicially the property left to them by their predecessor or otherwise convey, sell, transfer, mortgage, or encumber the same without being the estate or inheritance taxes within the period prescribed in the preceding subsections (a) and (b), they shall be solidarity liable for the payment of the said taxes to the extent of the estate they have received.

TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS ROSALINA SANTOS (EXECUTRIX), PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, V. FLORA BLAS BUENAVENTURA (LEGATEE), OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT G.R. No. L-22797 22 September 1966 FACTS: On October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos filed a petition for the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. Rosalina Santos, petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said nieces. Among the devisees mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the deceased. Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed on November 28, 1956 an opposition to the probate of said will on the grounds of undue and improper pressure and that Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will at the time of its execution. After the probate court had received the evidence for both the petitioner and oppositors, but before the latter could close their evidence, Flora Blas on November 6, 1957 filed a manifestation that she is withdrawing her opposition to the probate of the will. Later, she joined the proponent of the will for probate praying for the delivery of a specific fishpond as a specific devise. Rosalina filed an opposition citing that Flora had lost her right due to the contest and forfeiture clause found in the will whereby any one of the heirs who contests or opposes the probate of the will or the carrying out of its provisions shall lose any right to receive any inheritance or benefit, and their inheritance or share shall pertain to the other heirs who have not opposed. ISSUE: Did Floras actuation amounts to violation of the no contest-no forfeiture clause of the will? RULING: After realizing her mistake in contesting the will a mistake committed in god faith because grounded on strong belief she withdrew her opposition and joined the appellee in the latters petition for the probate of the will. She must not be penalized for rectifying her error. After all, the inheritance of the testatrix had been fulfilled, her will had been admitted and allowed within a reasonable short period, and the disposition of her property can now be effected. The testatrix was more concerned in insuring the carrying out of her testamentary provisions than in precluding any contest or opposition to it. It cannot be said that Floras actuations impaired the true intention of the testatrix in regard t the no contest-no forfeiture clause of the will. Floras act of withdrawing her opposition before she had rested her case contributed to the speedy probation of the will.

DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES, AND LUISA REYES, PETITIONERS, V. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, RESPONDENT G.R. No. L-23638 12 October 1967 MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES, AND PACIENCIA REYES, PETITIONERS, V. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, RESPONDENT G.R. No. L-23632 12 October 1967 FACTS: Ismaela Dimagiba submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of the purported will of late Benedicta de los Reyes. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. Dionisio Fernandez et al, claiming to be heirs of the estate of the descendant, filed oppositions to the probate. The CFI found that the will was genuine and properly executed. After receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of his estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 will, had revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code, the trial court resolved against the oppositors and held the will unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale. ISSUES: a. Are the issues of revocation necessary to be immediately resolved by the CFI? b. Had the 1930 will by Benedicta Reyes been impliedly revoked? RULING: a. The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.). b. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom. Revocation being an exception, in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.

ONESIMA D. BELEN, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, V. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES G.R. No. L-14474 31 October 1960 FACTS: When Benigno Diaz died, his will together with the codicil he executed, giving a legacy to Filomena Diaz, were admitted to probate. The proceedings were closed in 1950 and the estate was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee bank. Subsequently, Filomena Diaz died, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros , married with seven legitimate children and Onesima, single. The latter filed a petition contending that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil should now be divided equally only between herself and Milagros, to the exclusion of the seven legitimate children of the latter. The court denied the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the words sus descendientes legitimos refer conjointly to all living descendants of the legatee as a class or only to the descendants nearest in degree. RULING: By applying to the descendants of Filorema Diaz the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959, the inheritance would be limited to her children, or anyone of them, excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the intention of the testator who, in the selfsame clause 10 of his codicil, speaks of "cuatro hijos de mi difunto hermano Fabian" and of "los hijos de Domingo Legarda," as well as of "descendientes legitimos" of the other legates, to us indicating clearly that he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms. Observe that, in referring to the substitutes of Filomena Diaz, Nestor Santiago and Isabel M. de Santiago, the testator, does not even use the description "sus hijos o descendientes," but only "descendientes". There is no doubt that, the testator's intention being the cardinal rule of succession in the absence of compulsory (forced) heirs, he could have rendered inoperative all the articles mentioned, if he had so desired. But without any other supporting circumstances, we deem expression "o a sus desecendientes legitimos," the testator Benigno Diaz did intend to circumvent all the legal provisions (Articles 1016, 1019, 1022) quoted. It was incumbent upon appellant to prove such intention on the part of the testator; yet she has not done so. In the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with article 846. So, the original legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchildren.

OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, PETITIONER V. PASTORA PIEDAD, RESPONDENT G. R. No. 140975 08 December 2000 FACTS: From the resolution of the appellate court, intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto Piedad as she is the daughter of his first cousin. As such, she seeks to inherit from the estate of Piedad. In the intestate proceedings of the latters estate, notice of hearing therof was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. There was no order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court and that it has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto to petitioner-appellee. The appellate court rendered that intervenor-appellant, as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her intervention. Unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution in an instant petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? RULING: The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity is an absolute rule. An uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. Therefore petitioner is not so entitled.

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL AND HERMES S. PASCUAL, PETITIONERS V. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, AND THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA OF BR. 162, RTC, PASIG, METRO MANILA, RESPONDENTS G. R. No. 84240 25 March 1992 FACTS: Don Andres Pascual died intestate issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by his spouse, the children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., his full blood brother, the children of Pedro Pascual, his half-blood brother, the acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, his full blood brother and the intestate estate of Eleuterio Pascual, his half-blood brother. The surviving spouse filed for the administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. She filed later a Supplemental Petition where she expressly stated that petitioners are among the heirs of the deceased. Moreover, she executed an affidavit to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her deceased husband. The above-mentioned heirs executed a Compromise Agreement over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners. Thereafter, petitioners filed their motion to reiterate hereditary rights which was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Are petitioners allowed to inherit from their uncle? RULING: Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative. It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

CRESENCIO LEONARDO, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL AND RURAL BANK OF PARAAQUE, INC., RESPONDENTS G.R. No. L-51263 28 February 1983 FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by two daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter Pascuala who predeceased her. Sotero died in 1944 while Silvestra in 1949 without issue. Subsequently, petitioner, claiming to be the son of Sotero, filed a complaint to be declared as one of the lawful heirs of Francisca. Respondent, on the other hand, asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. James Bracewell claimed however that the subject properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal sale executed in his favour by Maria Cailles. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. The Court of Appeals however, reversed the same. ISSUE: May plaintiff inherit via the right of representation? RULING: NO. This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question. Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes.

MAURICO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES AND JUANA C. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, RESPONDENTS G. R. Nos. 89224-25 23 January 1992 FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants. On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted the defense that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents have the capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. RULING: It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executor. A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue. Therefore, Doribels legitimacy must be affirmed; she is the legitimate daughter of spouses Teodoro and Isabel. In consequence of the above, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceases Teodoro and Isabel. Furthermore, there is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has the right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents other children. However, while it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, V. ANA DEL VAL, ETC., OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT G.R. No. L-18753 26 March 1965 FACTS: Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will. Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will. ISSUES: Has the oppositor Ana Del Val Chan the right to intervene in the proceeding? Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate? Did the probate court err in passing on the intrinsic validity of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico? RULINGS: No, the testator has no right to intervene in the proceedings. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as claimant of the estate; an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. She does not have any interest in any of the provisions of the will; she has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir or executor or administrator because it nowhere appears in any of the provisions designating her as heir, legatee, or devisee of any portion of the estate. In the supposition that the will is denied probate, she still cannot acquire any interest of the estate because she was not the legal heir of the deceased. Art.992 CC prohibits natural children from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of the natural parent. Neither can she claim as the adopted child of the deceased sister of testator because under the law, the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted parents or of the adopted child; so the adopted child is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. Evidences show that the will was properly attested to. The witnesses Borja, Sanchez, and Formilleza all testified that it was properly attested; that the testator was in perfect state of health and mind, and that she was free of any pressure or force or deception when she executed the will. It was duly executed because it was signed by the testator, her instrumental witnesses, and the notary public in the manner provided by law. The pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. The purpose of a probate court is merely to determine if the will have been executed in accordance with the requirements of law.

MARIA LANDAYAN, ET AL, PETITIONERS, V. HON. ANGEL BACANI, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. L-30455 30 September 1982 FACTS: In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. The said properties were all covered by Torrens Titles in his name. He died intestate in Urdaneta, on March 20, 1948. On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse of Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document, entitled "Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated between themselves the properties left by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in said document as "the only forced heir and descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar. On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint seeking a judicial declaration that they are legal heirs of the deceased. In their complaint, petitioners Maria, Segundo, Marcial and Lucio, all surnamed LANDAYAN (the rest of the petitioners being their respective spouses), alleged that they are the legitimate children of Guillerma Abenojar, then already deceased, who was the only child of Teodoro Abenojar with his first wife named Florencia Bautista; and that while Teodoro Abenojar contracted a second marriage with Antera Mandap and a third with private respondent Maxima Andrada, he did not have any offspring in any of the said second and third marriages. They averred that private respondent Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar. They accordingly prayed that they be declared as among the legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar entitled to share in his estate. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the respondent Judge is correct when it held that the deed of extra-judicial partition is merely voidable and not a void one considering that private respondent Severino Abenojars legal status, (2) Whether he is a legal heir entitled to participate in the extra-judicial partition of the estate of said deceased, has not been passed upon. RULING: No. The dismissal of the action by the trial judge is erroneous. He is ordered to try the case on the merits and render the corresponding judgment thereon. The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on the truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar is recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code). He even claims that he is the sole legal heir of the decedent inasmuch as the petitioners, who are admittedly the children of the deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their mother being a spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar. Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. The right of representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. (Art. 992, Civil Code). On this supposition, the subject deed of extra-judicial partition is one that included a person who is not an heir of the descendant whose estate is being partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105 of the Civil Code, stating that, [a] partition

which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
It could be gathered from the pleadings filed by the petitioners that they do not seek the nullification of the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but only insofar as the same deprived them of their shares in the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro Abenojar. Should it be proved, therefore, that Severino Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, the portion of the deed of extra-judicial

partition adjudicating certain properties of Teodoro Abenojar in his favor shall be deemed inexistent and void from the beginning in accordance with Articles 1409, par. (7) and 1105 of the Civil Code. By the express provision of Article 1410 of the Civil Code, the action to seek a declaration of the nullity of the same does not prescribe.

EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, EUSTAQUIO, VICENTE, ESTELA, CAMILA, MAXIMO, LITO, FELIX, OMAN, CRISPINA AND REY, ALL SURNAMED RAMIREZ, TRIUNFO, RUPERTA AND CARMEN, ALL SURNAMED PASSILAN, AND DOMINGO ROQUE, QUIRINO, MANUELA AND ANITA, ALL SURNAMED LABOG, PETITIONERS, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANDRES PLAN AND BERNARDO MALLILLIN, RESPONDENTS G.R. No. L-44051 27 June 1985 FACTS: The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership, annulment of sale, and delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao in favor of respondent Mallillin. The original complaint and the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleges in quintessence or in substance the following: 'That Julia Capiao who maintained extra-marital relations with one Victoriano Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao who was married to Raymundo Zipagan both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970 and 1964, respectively, without any children and/or immediate forced heirs' (paragraph 5 of the amended complaint); That Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao having died on November 11, 1970 at Cauayan, Isabela, without any will inestate succession took place and the herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil degree to her (Lutgarda [Leogarda] Capiao were consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs and were legally entitled to inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue of the extra- judicial partition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners in this case can inherit from the decedent. RULING: No. It is clear from the records that the petitioners cannot inherit the properties in question because of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Being relatives on the legitimate line of Julia Capiao, they cannot inherit from her illegitimate daughter. Their relative Julia Capiao predeceased the daughter, Lutgarda Capiao. As explained by Manresa, whom the private respondents cited: Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. In this Article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumptive will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3rd ed., p. 110)."

GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. GERONIMO ALMANZA, ET AL., DEFENDANT. FLORENTINO CARTENA, DEFENDANTAPPELLANT. G.R. No. L-37365 29 November 1977 FACTS: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859. Of this marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic, and Ignacio Bagsic. Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic. On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died. Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945. Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong. Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese and her father Geronimo Almanza. The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic which she inherited from her mother. Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic. ISSUE: Whether or not Articles 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable in this case. RULING: Yes. The said provisions are applicable to the admitted facts of the case. In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood, in accordance with the provision of Article 975 of the same Code. By virtue of said decision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo v. Ferraris-Borromeo, the Supreme Court held that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. Under the same provision, Article 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half-blood, the sole niece of whole blood does not exclude the ten nephews and nieces of half-blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Article 1008 NCCP, in relation to Article 1006 of the same Code, which provisions in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half-blood.

BENITA SALAO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, GREGORIO MARCELO; ALMARIO ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA AND ANITA ALCURIZA, THE LATTER TWO BEING MINORS ARE REPRESENTED BY GUARDIAN AD LITEM, ARTURO ALCURIZA, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS v. JUAN S. SALAO, LATER SUBSTITUTED BY PABLO P. SALAO, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE OF JUAN S. SALAO; NOW MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P. SALAO, MARIA SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO DE SANTOS, AND PABLO P. SALAO, AS SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF THE LATE JUAN S. SALAO, TOGETHER WITH PABLO P. SALAO, ADMINISTRATOR, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. G.R. No. L-26699 16 March 1976 FACTS: The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao. Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary evidence to support that theory. On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908 as, shown in their Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by the plaintiffs. ISSUES: The 1st issue is whether or not the heirs of Valentin Salao are entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond. The 2nd issue is whether or not the heirs of Valentin Salao can validly pray for the annulment of the deed of donation executed in favor of Juan Jr. RULING: Regarding the first issue, No. The heirs are not entitled to reconveyance of the property since there was no community of property between Ambrosia, Juan Sr. and their father, Valentin. There was failure to prove by the plaintiffs of the existence of a trust of any kind between the parties which would give them any right to reconvey the said property. Furthermore, provided they have any right to the same, the action for reconveyance was barred by laches, for the same was only filed after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of the registration of the property. As to the second issue, again No. Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia to Juan Jr. of her share in the two fishponds. The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail the donation. Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to Ambrosias share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan Jr. Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-grandnephews, representing her grandniece Victorina.

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, PETITIONERS V. GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITO FERRARIS AND CONCHITA FERRARIS, RESPONDENTS G.R. No. L-19382 31 August 1965 FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs. She left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court. Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris. The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives? RULING: The Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. As an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975. Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujusexclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.

CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, PETITIONER V. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, RESPONDENTS G.R. No. 117740 30 October 1998 FACTS: Petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, claiming that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings, allegeding that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death and that during this period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence of said three children in other to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad. The lower court declared said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and Rosemarie S. Abad as the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased, subject to the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the property of said estate that may have been acquired thru her joint efforts with the deceased during the period they lived together as husband and wife. It further denied the petition of decedent's collateral relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M. Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and excluded them from participating in the administration and settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad. ISSUE: Who is entitled to inherit in the hereditary estate? RULING: Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abads filiation, submits the startling theory that the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were born in 1948 and 1954, respectively. It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971. The evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that ones parent is deceased is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished. More telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose BautistaLibunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynados first husband, the latters name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is different. Jose Bautista Libunaos wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria Empaynado. Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim by the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad: he stated in his individual income tax returns as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad. He insured his daughters on a 20 year endowment plan. He opened a trust fund account

for his daughters. With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother.

BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL AND NUMERIANA MANUEL, PETITIONERS V. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 37, LINGAYEN, PANGASINAN, MODESTA BALTAZAR AND ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, RESPONDENTS G.R. No. 117246 21 August 1995 FACTS: Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land was registered in his name. He would later buy two parcels and register the same under his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter". On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away. On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are intestate heirs of the decedent RULING: The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions. Under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. Where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato

from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. The order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014.

MAURICIO RAMIREZ, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF MOISES RAMIREZ, DECEASED, PETITIONER V. SIMEON BAUTISTA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS G.R. No. L-5075 1 December 1909 FACTS: Moises Ramirez, who died intestate in February, 1900, was married twice. By the first marriage he had five children, named Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia; by the second marriage three, to wit, Cirila, Isabel, and Serapio, of whom Isabel alone survives. At the time of his death he left two fish ponds. The two wives are also dead. The children of the first marriage, Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia, sold the two fish ponds on the 28th of November, 1901, to Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran for the sum of 1,100 pesos. The only surviving child of the second marriage, Isabel, was not a party to said sale, hence the suit now filed by the administrator of the intestate estate to have the sale declared null and void and the fish ponds restored to the intestate estate of Moises Ramirez. Owing to the fact that the fishponds were acquired during the first marriage, the conjugal gains on property applies. The death of the mother vested in the children of the first marriage their mothers half share. The death of Moises entitled his eight children to a share each in the fishponds. Thus Isabela, being the lone survivor of her siblings, was entitled to a 3/16 share of the total property. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale is voided by rights of intestate succession of the heirs of the decedent RULING: The Court ruled that the sale described in the public instrument of the of the thirteen-sixteenths which belonged to the vendors is valid, and that of the three-sixteenths which pertain to Isabel, who neither by herself nor by means of another took part in said sale is null. Thirteen-sixteenths should be apportioned among the children of the first marriage to wit, eight as their own, already inherited from their mother, Apolinaria Guillermo, and five subsequently inherited from their deceased father, Moises Ramirez and three-sixteenths should be the share of the three children of the second marriage, which accrued to Isabel Ramirez. Therefore, in the succession of Moises Ramirez that is now opened the whole of these fractional parts can not be included, but only the eight which actually constitute his share in the community of property maintained by him with his children of the first marriage since the death of his first wife. The above children of the first marriage, upon the death of Moises Ramirez, continued the aforesaid community of property with their three half sisters and brother, Cirila, Isabel, and Serapio; now with Isabel, their share being thirteen-sixteenths, and that of Isabel three sixteenths. The whole of the two fish ponds can not pertain to the intestate estate of Moises Ramirez, but merely the half that belonged to him and which at his death became a part of his intestate estate. Intestate succession can not disturb the lawful holder in his possession of property, which it is thought should constitute a part of the hereditary property. Only in the event of a division of the common property, or upon dissolution of the community of property now existing between the purchasers, Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran, on the one hand and Isabel Ramirez on the other, can the fruits, rents, or benefits received, and the part thereof, as well as of the expenses, corresponding to the coowner Isabel Ramirez in maintaining the community, be considered, as well as of the rights and actions that may pertain to the purchasers as against the vendors (who have taken no part in these proceedings), by reason of the total consideration paid for the two properties, and other obligations which may have arisen because of the sale.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON CLARO SANTILLON, PETITIONERS V. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA AND ROSARIO CORRALES, RESPONDENTS G.R. No. L-19281 30 June 1965 FACTS: Pedro Santillon died without testament, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; and (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario. Claro filed a motion to declare share of heirs to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2. The trial court held that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit 1/2 share and the remaining 1/2 share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. ISSUE: What provision of the Civil Code must properly apply? RULING: Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996. The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas intestate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate. It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous. Unfairness of Art. 996. Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.

On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets only onefourth." She or he may get one-half if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor).