Doctrine: Effect of Non-Compliance with the rule Case: Samahang Magbubukid ng Kapdula Inc. vs.

CA
Macario is a former owner of 2 parcels of agricultural land with area of 168.7 hectares in brgy. Malinta, dasmarinas cavite. The members of petitioner of SMK Inc. were tenants on 2 parcels of land. In 1970, Mr. Aro sold the said parcel land to arrow head golf club inc. (Silverio) who planned to put up a car plant. Petitioners were evicted but it didnt exist. The parcels of land were leased to ruben Rodriguez and Gloria bugagao for 7 years and developed a sugar cane plantation which respondents are from workers. July 13,1984 the same property was acquired by PNB (Phil. National Bank) of sheriffs auction sale. 1986, members of petitioner seek help from DAR but nothing happened. March 26,1991 DAR issued (CLOA) Certificate of Land of ownership for the parcels of land favorable to petitioner. Sept. 27,1991 private respondents find a petition for certiorari with the court of appeals. January 30, Court of appeals granted the petition. Issue: whether Samahang Magbubukid ng Kapdula exhausted administrative remedies? Held: NO. Private respondents were deprived of an opportunity to be heard. 1. Letter of provincial agrarian reform Magpayo indicates no receipt of same by Rodriguez nor signed by magpayo. 2. It was never sent, it was sent too late. 3. Letter was addressed to Rodriguez, he does not possess the properties as his lease officer.

Doctrine: Effect of Non-Compliance with the rule Case: Republic vs Lacap

District engineer of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid. Respondent under the business name Carwin construction bid the lowest, and he was awarded for the contract for the concreting of sitio 5 bahay pare. On sept 25,1992 district engineer Rafael s ponio issued a notice to proceed with the concreting of sitio 5 bahay pare. Respondent took the works, made advances for the purchase of the materials and payment for labor costs. On oct.29,1992 district engineer of Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project and found it 100 percent complete with the approved plans and specs. When respondent tried to collect the payments, dpwh prepared disbursement voucher in favor of petitioner but the auditor (COA-comission on audit) disapproved the final release of funds on the ground of the contractors license of respondents license had expired at the time of execution of the contract. In a letter reply dated sept 1,1993 cesar mejia of dpwh legal dept. otherwise known as the contractors license law, does not proved that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void, the same is enforceable and payment should be paid.

In first endorsement of mejia, he recommended that payment should be made but no payment was made to carwin const. lacap filed a complaint for specific performance against petitioner on RTC. On sept. 14 petitioner through the office of OSG dismissed the complaint on grounds that RTC had no jurisdiction over the action since respondent did not appeal to CA. Issue: does the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply? Held: no. it does not apply, that by the actions of the govt is estopped from questioning the validity and binding effect of the contract agreement with the respondent that denial of payment to respondent on purely technical grounds after successful completion of the project is not countenanced by justice.

Exemptions from exhaustion of administrative remedies 1. Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine.

Doctrine: When due process is clearly violated

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Director Gozon issued an order dismissing the case filed by petitioners seeking to be the rightful locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Zambales. Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims and ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabilona (private respondents-appellees) were duly located and registered. The petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and during the pendency of the appeal, Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal upon exercising appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He ruled that the petitioners had abandoned the disputed mining claims, while, the Martinez and Pabilona groups had validly located the said claims. Hence, he dismissed the appeal from his own decision. The petitioners filed a complaint in CFI of Zambales, assailing Secretary Gozon's decision and praying that they be declared the prior locators and possessors of the 69 mineral claims. After hearing, the lower court sustained Secretary Gozon's decision and dismissed the case. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals where it reversed the judgment of the trial court and declared that the petitioners were the rightful locators and possessors of mining claims and that there was no sufficient basis for Secretary Gozon's finding that the mining claims of the Martinez and Pabilona groups were validly located. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Court of Appeals should have respected the factual findings of the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the theory that the facts found in administrative decisions cannot be disturbed on appeal to the courts. The petitioners opposed that motion for reconsideration that Secretary Gozon's decision was void and, therefore, the factual findings therein are not binding on the courts. In its second decision it set aside its first decision and granted the motion on the ground raised in petitioners opposition, that Secretary Gozon's decision was void because he was disqualified to review his own decision as Director of Mines. It remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources for another review of Director Gozon's decision. However, the second decision did not satisfy the parties so they filed motions for reconsideration. They abandoned their prayer that the case is returned to the Minister of Natural Resources. On the other hand, the private

respondents in their motion insisted that the trial court's decision be affirmed on the basis of the factual findings of the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Court of Appeals denied both motions. Only the petitioners appealed from the second decision of the Court of Appeals but they changed that relief and they now pray that the second decision of the Court of Appeals, referring this case to the Minister of Natural Resources for another review, be declared void and that its first decision be affirmed. The private respondents instead of defending the second decision pray for the affirmance of the trial courts judgment sustaining the decisions of Secretary Gozon. ISSUE: w/ n Secretary Gozon committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the case HELD: YES. Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice. The Mining Law, Commonwealth under section 61states that the decision of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates that the Secretary should be a person different from the Director of Mines. It must be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines. _____________________________________________________________________________________________

SOLANO LAGANAPAN vs. Mayor ELPIDIO ASEDILLO FACTS: The petitioner was appointed as chief of police of the municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna with a compensation of P660.00 per year by Mayor Asedillo. On July 1960, his salary was increased to P720.00 and was extended an appointment. On April 1962, the petitioner was given another increase in salary and a corresponding appointment was made which the Commissioner of Civil Service approved to continue until replaced by an eligible but not beyond 30 days from receipt of certification of eligibles by the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna. On July 1963, July 1964, and July 1965, he was again given salary increases and new appointments were extended to him, which appointments were also approved by the CSC. On February 1967, the petitioner was summarily dismissed from his position by Mayor Elpidio Asedillo on the ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has no civil service eligibility. The petitioner was told to surrender his firearm and other office equipment to the Municipal Treasurer of Kalayaan who was also informed of petitioner's dismissal. Private respondent Ragotero was appointed acting chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna on the same day, in place of the petitioner. Subsequently, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan abolished the appropriation for the salary of the chief of police of Kalayaan. The petitioner filed a petition for mandamus, quo warranto with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, the Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, and Epifanio Ragotero, in CFI of Laguna seeking his reinstatement to the position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries and damages. Respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero claimed that the appointment of the petitioner, being merely temporary in character, and the petitioner having no civil service eligibility, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure of the appoint power; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna also alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against it; and that, if the acts of the respondent mayor are patently irregular, the said mayor should be held solely liable. After due hearing, judgment was rendered (a) Declaring the summary dismissal of the petitioner illegal; (b) Ordering Mayor Elpidio Asedillo to recall his designation of respondent Epifanio Ragotero as Acting Chief of Police of Kalayaan; (c) Ordering Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and the respondent Municipality of Kalayaan to reinstate the petitioner to his former position of Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna, restore the appropriation for his salary and pay him his back salaries and (d) Ordering Mayor and respondent Municipality to give the petitioner a period of not less than thirty days from the date this decision becomes final within which to file his application for Civil Service eligibility. The respondents appealed to this Court, claiming that the lower court erred in its decision

ISSUE: W/ n this court committed an error in rendering its decision HELD: NO. In the instant case, there is no doubt that, in terminating the services of the petitioner, Mayor Elpidio Asedillo acted summarily without any semblance of compliance or even an attempt to comply with the elementary rules of due process. No charges were filed; nor was a hearing conducted in order to give the petitioner an opportunity to defend himself, despite the provision of RA No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966 which states that "Members of the local police agency shall not be suspended or removed except upon written complaint filed under oath with the Board of Investigators herein provided for misconduct or incompetence, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law." Following the rule, there was no need for exhaustion of administrative remedies before petitioner could come to court for the protection of his rights. Besides, it appears that the order was immediately executed and the petitioner was immediately removed from office and replaced by the appellant Epifanio Ragotero on the same day, so that appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service, even if available to the petitioner, was not an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While it may be true that the petitioner was holding a provisional appointment at the time of his dismissal, he was not a temporary official who could be dismissed at any time. His provisional appointment could only be terminated thirty (30) days after receipt by the appointing officer of a list of eligibles from the Civil Service Commission. Here, no such certification was received by Mayor Elpidio Asedillo thirty (30) days prior to his dismissal of the petitioner. The trial court, therefore, did not commit error in finding that the summary dismissal of the petitioner was illegal and in ordering the respondent Mayor and respondent Municipality to reinstate him with back salaries from the time of his dismissal. In addition, respondent Mayor Asedillo who was sued in his official capacity as municipal mayor, having passed away, the liability to pay petitioner his back salaries must now devolve upon the respondent municipality alone.

Soto v. Jareno

FACTS: 1939(filed an application): Sergio Serfino described himself as "married to Francisca Soto," 1953(original certificate was issued): in favor of "Sergio Serfino, widower" Serfino died in 1965, Petitioner/appellant Francisca Soto filed motion with the Court of First instance to change her description as a "widower" to "married to Francisca Soto." o Granted o Reconsideration- without jurisdiction to act on the matter since there was no observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Two daughters of the couple opposed the motion, pointing out that their mother had abandoned them in 1942 to live with another man. o According to these oppositors, it was their father himself who had described himself as a widower in 1953 because he had not heard from the petitioner since 1942. o Purpose:to prevent the land from being considered conjugal ISSUE: W/N the CFI has no jurisdiction due to the none observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. HELD: appeal is dismissed, with costs against the appellant NO. Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. o it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable to private lands

dismissed because the change sought is not authorized under Section 112 of Act 496: o it is not proper to cancel an original certificate of Torrens title issued exclusively in the name of a deceased person, and to issue a new certificate in the name of his heirs, when the surviving spouse claims right of ownership over the land covered by such certificate." in asking for the amendment of the certificate of title issued exclusively in the name of Sergio Serfino, the petitioner was seeking to reserve the title to one half of the subject land as her conjugal share. The proper procedure is to institute the intestate proceedings of the Sergio Serfino, where the appellant may file against its administrator the corresponding ordinary action to claim her alleged rights over the lot in question. CIR v. Lhuiller

FACTS: CIR Jose U. Ong issued Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 15-91 imposing a 5% lending investors tax on pawnshops o Since pawnshops are considered as lending investors, they also become subject to documentary stamp taxes prescribed in Title VII of the Tax Code. BIR issued Assessment Notice No. 81-PT-13-94-97-9-118 against Lhuillier demanding payment of deficiency percentage tax in the sum of P3,360,335.11 for 1994 inclusive of interest and surcharges. Lhuillier filed an administrative protest with the Office of the Revenue Regional DirectoR 1. neither the Tax Code nor the VAT Law expressly imposes 5% percentage tax on the gross income of pawnshops 2. pawnshops are different from lending investors, which are subject to the 5% percentage tax under the specific provision of the Tax Code 3. RMO No. 15-91 is not implementing any provision of the Internal Revenue laws but is a new and additional tax measure on pawnshops, which only Congress could enact 4. RMO No. 15-91 impliedly amends the Tax Code and is therefore taxation by implication, which is proscribed by law 5. RMO No. 15-91 isclass legislation" because it singles out pawnshops among other lending and financial operations. Deputy BIR Commissioner Romeo S. Panganiban issued Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy No. 81-043-98 against Lhuilliers property for the enforcement and payment of the assessed percentage tax. not acted upon by the CIR> filed a "Notice and Memorandum on Appeal" with the Court of Tax Appeals invoking Section 228 of Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the Tax Reform Act of 1997, which provides: Section 228. Protesting of Assessment. If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within one hundred eighty (180) days from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180)-day period; otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. CTA:

RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 null and void insofar as they classify pawnshops as lending investors o Assessment Notice No. 81-PT-13-94-97-9-118 as cancelled, withdrawn, and with no force and effect. o Affirmed by CA Petition for review on certiorari ISSUE: w/n RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 are valid? o HELD: petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. CA AFFIRMED. NO. Under Section 157(u) of the NIRC of 1986, as amended, the term lending investor includes "all persons who make a practice of lending money for themselves or others at interest." A pawnshop, on the other hand, is defined under Section 3 of P.D. No. 114 as "a person or entity engaged in the business of lending money on personal property delivered as security for loans and shall be synonymous, and may be used interchangeably, with pawnbroker or pawn brokerage." Adding to the invalidity of the RMC No. 43-91 and RMO No. 15-91 is the absence of publication. While the rule-making authority of the CIR is not doubted, like any other government agency, the CIR may not disregard legal requirements or applicable principles in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers. RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 cannot be viewed simply as implementing rules or corrective measures revoking in the process the previous rulings of past Commissioners. Specifically, they would have been amendatory provisions applicable to pawnshops. Without these disputed CIR issuances, pawnshops would not be liable to pay the 5% percentage tax, considering that they were not specifically included in Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended. In so doing, the CIR did not simply interpret the law. The due observance of the requirements of notice, hearing, and publication should not have been ignored.

Aurillo v. Rabi

FACTS: Noel Rabi was arrested without a warrant of arrest and charged in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Tacloban City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (possession of unlicensed firearm). o Public Prosecutor Zenaida Camonical Isidro conducted an inquest investigatio recommending that the case be dismissed for lack of probable cause on her findings material averments of the Joint Affidavit executed by the arresting police officers were hearsay due to the absence of any affidavit of the complainant the knife, gun and the live ammunitions referred to in said affidavit were not found under the chair occupied by Rabi Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Aurillo, Jr. assumed jurisdiction and ordered the conduct of a new preliminary investigation

Assistant Regional State Prosecutor issued a subpoena notifying Noel Rabi and Margot Villanueva of the preliminary investigation for violation of PD 1866 but also for the crimes of "Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2323 (gun banned) Batas Pambansa Bilang 9" (possession of deadly weapon) and "Malicious Mischief." Rabi filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City a petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction. o under the 1987 Revised Administrative Code and PD 1275 as implemented by Department Order No. 318 of the Department of Justice, a regional state prosecutor was vested only with administrative supervision over the city prosecutor and had no power to motu proprio review, revise, or modify the resolution of the city prosecutor on the latters conduct of a preliminary or inquest investigation of a criminal complaint filed directly therewith. o assistant regional state prosecutor continued with his preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043. o with Aurillos approval, he filed with the RTC o RTC rendered judgment in favor of Rabi. nullified the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 ordered Aurillo to pay the amounts of: P50,000.00 as moral damages P50,000.00 as exemplary damages P30,000.00 as attorneys fees Aurillo filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, on questions of law, against Rabi and the RTC ISSUE: 1. W/N Information filed by Aurillo against Rabi with the RTC for violation of PD 1866 may be nullified by RTC 2. W/N Aurillo is liable for damages and attorneys fees HELD: decision of the Regional Trial Court granting the petition for prohibition of Rabi is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The awards for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees are DELETED. RATIO: 1. YES. The RTC is possessed of residual power to restore the parties to their status before Aurillo proceeded with the preliminary investigation, and grant in favor of the aggrieved party such other relief as may be proper Generally, the relief granted in a prohibition proceeding is governed by: o the nature of the grievance proved o situation at the time of judgment. general rule: o writ of prohibition issues only to restrain the commission of a future act o where anything remains to be done by the court, prohibition will give complete relief, not only by preventing what remains to be done but by undoing what has been done. o court must grant the appropriate relief whatever the proceeding is called if facts stating ground for relief are pleaded. o court has authority to grant any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings. o If the application for prohibition is too broad, the court may mould the writ and limit it to as much as is proper to be granted. o The court may retain jurisdiction of the cause to enable it to make an appropriate order in the future, even though the petition for a writ of prohibition is dismissed. 2. NO. For Rabi to be entitled as a matter or law to moral damages(more so for exemplary damages), he must adduce evidence that he suffered injury and establish that such injury sprung from any of the instances listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code.

burdened to show proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury=failed to discharge his burden. In National Steel Corporation vs. RTC, et al., the Court held that: xxx o (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established (2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner

Finally, since Rabi is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, he is not entitled to attorneys fees Fernandez vs De la Paz FACTS: This is a petition for quo warranto filed by Fernandez claiming the position of Assistant Director for Professional Services at the East Avenue Medical Center alleged to be unlawfully held by Dr. Aguila. May 1 1985: petitioner was extended permanent appointment as Chief of Clinics at said hospital. Before that, petitioner was medical specialist and was already designated as Acting chief of clinics. As permanent chief of clinics she exercised control and supervision over all heads of depts. In the hospital. 1986: the new organizational structure of the hospital retitled chief of clinics to assistant director for professional services. De la Paz, as medical center chief, designated petitioner as assistnant director of professional services. 1987: EO 119 Reorganization Act of Ministry of Health was promulgated and Dela Paz designated Dr. Aguila as Assistant Director for Pro Services. Fernandez was transferred to Research Office. Petitioner was transferred from chief of clinics to research office. Petitioner protested to secretary of health, CSC and the chairman of the government reorganization commission. Because there was no action on her petition, she filed Petition for Quo Warranto with preliminary injunction against de la Paz, Aguila and DOH. ISSUE: W/N petitioner has valid cause of action HELD: YES. 1. Section 79 (D). of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 79 (D). Power to appoint and remove. The Department Head, upon the recommendation of the Chief of the bureau or office concerned, shall appoint all subordinate officers and employees whose appointment is not expressly vested by law in the President of the Philippines, and may remove or punish them, except as especially provided otherwise, in accordance with the Civil Service Law... The Department Head also may, from time to time, in the interest of the service, change the distribution among the several bureaus and offices of his Department of the employees or subordinates authorized by law. 2. It follows from the foregoing disquisition that petitioner has a valid cause of action. Where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper remedy. (Lota vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-14803, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 715). 3. The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude petitioner from seeking judicial relief This rule is not a hard and fast one but admits of exceptions among which are that (1) the question in dispute is

"purely a legal one" and (2) the controverted act is 'patently illegal" (Carino vs. ACCFA, No. L-19808, September 29,1966,18 SCRA 183). The questions involved here are purely legal. The subject Hospital Orders violated petitioner's constitutional right to security of in tenure and were, therefore, "patently illegal." Judicial intervention was called for to enjoin the implementation of the controverted acts. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong G.R. No. L-48848, 11 May 1988 Facts: Petitioner Federation of Free Workers is a labor organization registered with the DOLE. It is the certified collective bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of the herein private respondent, the Allied Sugar Centrals Company, a registered partnership. PD 1123 is promulgated requiring all employers in the private sector to pay their employees an across-the-board increase of P60.00 in their existing monthly emergency allowance. Allied Sugar applied for exemption from the said law due to financial losses. On recommendation of the Chairman of the Wage Commission, the Secretary of Labor approved the exemption for one year. Petitioner opposed it but to no avail. Allied Sugar applied for renewal of the exemption for another year. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC alleging that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in granting the applications for exemption of Allied Sugar. On the other hand, the respondents argue that the petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies available before it sought judicial review. They are of the view that the rulings of the respondent Acting Secretary of Labor can still be elevated to the President of the Philippines for review. Held: This view is traversed by the fact that, as stated by the respondent Acting Secretary in approving both applications, such approval is final and unappealable. Moreover, in the absence of a constitutional provision or a statute to the contrary, the official acts of a Department Secretary are deemed the acts of the President himself unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter. This is the doctrine of qualified political agency. Where the Administrative Remedy is Fruitless UP Board of Regents v. Rasul G.R. No. 91551, 16 August 1991 Facts: Private respondent Dr. Felipe Estrella, Jr., was appointed by the petitioner Board of Regents as Director of the Philippine General Hospital, to take effect 1 September 1986 until 30 April 1992. Barely 2 weeks after assuming the presidency of UP, petitioner Jose Abueva submitted a memorandum to the Board of Regents to reorganize the UP Manila including the Philippine General Hospital recommending that certain key positions of UP Manila including that of Dr. Felipe Estrella, Jr., be declared vacant. The Board of Regents approved the reorganization plan and a Nomination Committee was formed. Dr. Felipe Estrella, Jr., filed a petition for injunction with the RTC. The RTC granted the petition. Petitioners appealed to the SC arguing that public respondent Judge Rasul erred in not holding that Dr. Felipe Estrella, Jr., has to exhaust administrative remedies before he can bring suit against the UP Board of Regents, et. al. Held: Anent the issue regarding respondent Estrella's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies, this case has special circumstances that made it fall under the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions to the rule. As the facts show, respondent Dr. Estrella was about to be replaced by the Nomination Committee. He must have believed that airing his protest with the Board of Regents would only be fruitless and that unless he goes to the courts, irreparable damage or injury on his part will be caused by the implementation of the proposed reorganization. Celestial vs. Cachopero

FACTS: Cachopero filed a Miscellaneous Sales Agreement for a parcel of land which was formerly part of the Salunayan Creek. Cachopero alleged that he was in possession of the property since 1968 whereon he built a house and other improvements. Celestial filed a protest claiming preferential right over the land, being adjacent to her lot and is the only outlet from her house. The Bureau of Lands conducted an inspection and denied Cachoperos application for MSA on the ground that the land in question is outside the commerce of man. The Bureau however allowed Cachopero to temporary occupy the land subject to various conditions. Cachopero then filed another application for MSA over the same land. The DENR Regional Office issued an order that the subject land is suitable for residential purposes but in light of the conflicting interest of the parties it be sold at public auction. Cachopero filed a petition for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition with the RTC, and was denied. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Hence the this appeal by Celestial to the SC. ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was applicable to the case at bar. HELD: NO. The case filed before the RTC alleges that the DENR RED and OIC RED acted with grave abuse of discretion and without or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they issued the questioned Orders. The case at bar falls under the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies; when the final action of the administrative official concerned on the matter as a result of a patently illegal order. In resolving the issue the DENR RED, found it equitable to resolve the same by directing the sale of the subject land at PUBLIC AUCTION pursuant to Sec. 67, CA 141. However, RA 730 is applicable in the case at bar and should be applied to the MSA petition of respondent. But RED summarily applied Sec 67 CA 141. By abdicating his duty to process respondents MSA and summarily ordering the sale of the land thru oral bidding pursuant to Sec 67 the RED acted with patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the act complained of is patently illegal since the administrative body acted without or in excess of jurisdiction as to be tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required and resort to the courts through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is permitted.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan FACTS: PCGG issued separate orders against private respondent SIPALAY and ALLIED to effect heir sequestration. Concerning SIPALAY; it was the contention of PCGG that shares of stock in Maranaw Hotels and Resort were part of the ill-gotten wealth of Lucio Tan, thus sequestered these shares (July 24, 86). SIPALAY was forced to litigate after the sequestration and argued that the sequestration was w/o evidentiary substantiation, violative of due process, and deemed automatically lifted when no judicial proceeding was brought within the mandated period. In effect to the sequestration of the ALLIED shares, it was the contention of the petitioner that is was not an order for sequestration but rather a general warrant. The petitions were jointly heard by the Sandiganbayan and presentation of evidence ensued after. Seven years later PCGG manifested that it was no longer presenting any evidence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan gave both parties 20 days within which to submit its formal evidence in writing. 6 days after the PCGG instead of filling the written formal offer of its evidence, filed a Motion to Dismiss they alleged that Sipalay and Allied failed to exhaust administrative

remedies, PCGG contended that the two petitioners should have first appealed the sequestration orders to the OP before challenging them in Court. Sandiganbayan thereafter rendered its decision that the sequestration order and the subject search and seizure order is null and void. ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted beyond its jurisdiction when it dismissed the petition for Motion to Dismiss. HELD: NO. The Sipalay and Allied petitions were both filed on the third quarter of 1986 while the PCGG motion to dismiss was only in the middle of 1993. Nearly 7 years came to pass in between that so much has already transpired in the proceedings. Both petitioners had rested their cases and the PCGG had finished presenting all its witnesses, not to mention other various motions and incidents already disposed off by the Sandiganbayan, with special attention to the numerous postponements granted the PCGG for presentation of its evidence w/c prevented an earlier termination of the proceedings. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of evidence as required by the Sandiganbayan. The length of time the PCGG allowed to drift away and its decision to file its motion to dismiss only at the homestretch of the trial hardly qualify as proper time. The case at bar falls within the exception of exhaustion of administrative remedies; where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine. PCGG is guilty of estoppel by laches. There was no need of appealing the PCGG resolution to the OP as purportedly required by Sec 6 of PCGG Rules and Regulations.
Exhaust Admin Remedies: Patrocina Obanana & Emelio Obanana Petitioners vs. Hon. Alejandro R Boncaros, Dist Judge, CFI Br. V Negros Or. & Zoilo Lantao Facts: The case is about a parcel of unregistered land with a nipa swamp containing an area of approximately 2944 sq.ms., inherited by Patrocina Obanana and Emelio Obanana in the western part, paying teir taxes on said lot and enjoying fruits thereof, while on the other hand, their uncle Zoilo Boncaros, occupied the eastern part of said lot, that sometime in 1968, they and private respondent went to the Bureau of Lands to have their respective properties titled but they flabbergastedly discovered that the area possessed and cultivated by private respondent was inadvertently included in petitioners' tax declaration #4116. Upon discovery of said error, a PARTITION was made dividing the lot into two (2); that on December 24, 1968 petitioner executed a Deed of Quit claim, 1/2 of said parcel of land to Zoilo Lantao x x x Quit claim 1/4 to share in favor of his brother Emelio Obanana x x xt hat the agreement was graphically indicated in the sketch appearing in the document duly signed by Patrocinia and approved by private respondent Zoilo Lantao and by petitioner Emelio; when the petitioners were about to harvest nipa palms on the eastern portion they were surprised that Zoilo Lantao prevented them to do so and even threatened them with bodily harm and the filing of criminal cases. Petitioners finally discovered that private respondent without their knowledge and consent had secretly and fraudulently applied for a homestead patent over the whole lot in utter disregard of their rights and ultimately obtained Original Cert. of Title # FV9121 on July 18, 1969 also through fraud and misrepresentation, on June 25, 1970 the petitioners filed for a Complaint for reconveyance of the eastern portion premised on breach of constructive trust by private respondent. Private respondent also vehemently denies that he approved the Deed of Quitclaim.

The latter averred that the award of a patent by the Director of Lands is conclusive upon the rights of the parties and that it is said official, and not the Trial Court, who has jurisdiction over the controversy; and that there can be no collateral attack on private respondent's title, Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action due to petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies on July 13, 1979. He said " x x x The Director of Lands passes upon the qualification of an applicant for a Land grant. This authority is exclusive lodge with the said official. To order the reconveyance of a portion of parcel of land subject of this litigation would be tantamount to this court arrogating unto itself a power not granted to it. x x x The respondent court added "x x x the granting of the relief sought by the plaintiff in their complaint will result in setting aside a decision of an administrative official without giving an opportunity to correct whatever error (sic) he may have committed x x x". Was the Lower Court erred in dismissing the Petitioners' reconsideration? The Supreme Court said "YES".. The doctrine requiring prior exhaustion of adminstrative remedies before recourse to Courts may be had as confined to public lands. It is inapplicable to private lands. A free patent application having been granted in the case at bar and a corresponding certificate of title having been issued a subject property ceased to be part of the public domain and became private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. The petitioners who has been injured by FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION is an action for reconveyance. The relief that the latter seek is the enforcement of a constructive rust in order to obtain a judgment for reconveyance of the land. Judgment is rendered reversing and SETTING ASIDE respondent Judge Order of July 13, 1979. So ordered.

Vda. De Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, exceptions: Estoppel Facts: Tan is the widow of a war veteran who served in WW2. After the war, the United States Government agreed to compensate those who fought alongside them. Tan was part of a guerilla unit that was recognized by the United States Army. When Tan tried to collect, the commission told her that only Filipino citizens were entitled and that she may seek judicial intervention if she wished. Tan filed a case with the trial court. Now, the commission is questioning this move for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Issue: Does Tan have to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention? Held: No, she doesnt have to for the commission is in estoppel. The commission stated that if she wanted, she could seek judicial intervention. The commission is now in estoppel to question Tans move in filing a case in court. Doctrine: The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude petitioner from seeking judicial relief. This rule is not a hard and fast one but admits of exceptions among which is when the administrative body is in estoppel as to question petitioners recourse to the courts.

Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, exceptions: When there is a purely legal question or when the act complained of is patently illegal

Facts: On 1 May 1985, Petitioner Palma-Fernandez was extended a permanent appointment to the position of Chief of Clinics at the East Avenue Medical Center by then Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Center, Jesus C. Azurin. As Chief of Clinics, petitioner exercised direct control and supervision over all heads of departments in East Avenue Medical Center

On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 119 known as the was promulgated.

On 29 May 1987, pursuant to E.O. 119 known as the "Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health", Respondent De la Paz, as Medical Center Chief, designated Respondent Dr. Aguila, who was then Medical Specialist I, as Assistant Director for Professional Services "vice Dr. Nenita Palma-Fernandez, who will be transferred to the Research Office. Said order was purportedly issued "in the interest of the hospital service."

On the same date, Hospital Order No. 22, series of 1987, (Annex C, Petition), was issued by respondent De la Paz, whereby petitioner was relieved "of her present duties and responsibilities as Chief of Clinic and hereby transferred to the Research Office. This order being issued in the interest of the hospital service.

Upon receipt of Hospital Order No. 22, petitioner filed on 1 June 1987 a letter-protest with respondent Secretary of Health, furnishing copies to respondents De la Paz and Aguila, as well as to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission.

Failing to secure any action on her protest within a month's time, petitioner filed on 8 July 1987 the instant Petition for Quo Warranto with Preliminary Injunction against respondents Dr. de la Paz, Dr. Aguila, and the Secretary of Health.

Issues:

1. Who has the power to appoint and remove subordinate officials and employees?

2. Whether or not the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes the filing of the instant Petition.

Held:

1. Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the National Health Facilities attached to the Department of Health, the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and employees, like petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of Health, not the Medical Center Chief. Respondent Medical Center Chiefs argument that petitioner was not appointed but was merely transferred will not alter the situation. Even a transfer requires an appointment, which is beyond the authority of respondent Medical Center Chief to extend. Besides, the transfer was without petitioner's consent, was tantamount to removal without valid cause, and as such is invalid and without any legal effect (Garcia, et al. vs. Lejano, et al., 109 Phil. 116). A removal without cause is violative of the Constitutional guarantee that "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law" (Article IX, B, Section 2(3),1987 Constitution). 2. The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude petitioner from seeking judicial relief This rule is not a hard and fast one but admits of exceptions among which are that (1) the question in dispute is "purely a legal one" and (2) the controverted act is 'patently illegal" (Carino vs. ACCFA, No. L-19808, September 29,1966,18 SCRA 183). The questions involved here are purely legal. The subject Hospital Orders violated petitioner's constitutional right to security of in tenure and were, therefore, "patently illegal." Judicial intervention was called for to enjoin the implementation of the controverted acts.
There was substantial compliance by petitioner with the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies since she had filed a letter-protest with the respondent Secretary of Health that was not acted upon. Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez (Secretary of Agriculture) Doctrine: Qualified Political Agency FACTS: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru then Mayor Santiago Carlos, entered into a contact with the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda sa Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBPBPM) for the latters management and operation of the new muntinlupa market. The new mayor, Ignacio Bunye, claims to be scandalized with the virtual 50-year agreement and had the contract abrogated. Bunye went to the public market and announced to the general public that the Municipality is taking over the management and operation of the facility. Kilusang Bayan filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach of contract, specific performance and damages with a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers, premised on the alleged illegal take-over of the public market in excess of Bunyes authority. Writ applied for was denied.

The take over was by virtue of the Oct. 28, 1988 ORDER of respondent Secretary of Agriculture stating that there is urgent necessity that KBMBPM MUST BE PLACED UNDER MANAGEMENT TAKE-OVER of the Dept of Agriculture in order to preserve the financial interest of the members of the cooperative and to enhance the cooperative development program of the government. The Order appears to be based on an unverified petition. Respondent Bunye denies the factual allegations in the petition and claims that the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. HELD: Petitioners (ousted directors of KBMBPM) have the personality to file the instant petition and ask, in effect, for their reinstatement. As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-established that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a dept. Secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive.

Exceptions to the principle known as exhaustion of administrative remedies. 1. where the issue is purely a legal one 2. when the controverted act is patently illegal or was done without jurisdiction or in excess jurisdiction 3. where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the latters implied or assumed approval, unless actually disapproved 4. where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention Marquez-Azarcon vs Bunagan Issue is purely legal: the agreement between the two parties on the purchase price of the property became the law between them Azarcon was able to pay the initial amount of P49,740.00 but was not able to pay the remaining balance as the application for SSS housing loan wasa denied. The SSS housing loan was disapproved as SAGANA was unable to furnish the requirements needed such as the title. Azarcon was asked to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price, and the rental of P3000 (since he was already residing in the said lot) until the payment of the full purchase price. This implies having the rentals as over and above the purchase price Azarcon appealed and stressed that the delay in the payment was not due to her fault and should not be held liable for the non payment of the purchase price. The rentals should be viewed as only an interim scheme, until a substitute method of payment was agreed by the parties. Azarcon was able to pay fully the balance of the purchase price, less than 3 months before the Board decision was implemented of asking Azarcon to pay the additional rentals. Court of Appeals reversed in favor of Azarcon.

International Power Sales Inc vs Duma Sinusat Patently illegal or was done without or in excess of jurisdiction Invitation to Bid (1965) calls for 8 unit trucks,Line construction, left hand drive, complete and special factory buils, series of 1965, brand new for the used of the Bureau of Telecommunications Amended the guidelines and included not only foreign made products of CIF-Manila but also those local manufacture on an FOB-Manila Acting Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications made a 3rd Indorsement that locally manufactured utility truck would not be an objection so long as it conforms with the technical specifications Industrial Power Sales Inc. (IPSI) won the cotract Delta Motor protested on the following grounds: o IPSI were not factory built ( a stipulation on the Invitaiton to Bid) brought forth the complaint to the Office of the Secretary General Secretary Duma Sinsuat claimed that the The modification done by Acting Director Lachica has violated department rule that it should bear the approval of the Department Head. On this ground as well as the approval of the Department to Deltas price, the contract was given to Delta. IPSI filed an appeal on the following grounds: o Regardless of the validity of the modification done by Secretary Lachica, local manufacturers can not be lawfully excluded from the bidding o Secretary Sinsuat exceeded his jurisdiction in giving due course to Deltas appeal o Secretary Sinsuat had gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Secretay Sinsuat disregarded the following material facts: - invitation to bid was advertised - it was clear in the advertisements that offers not only foreign made or factory built trucks but also trucks with bodies of local manufacturers

Secretary Sinsuat also disregarded applicable provisions of the law conferring preferential status to local manufacturers. Republic Act No. 4164 and Flag Law

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 97903. August 24, 1998] ELMER F. ESPINA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, ROMMEL L. MANIKAN, LEYTE IV ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LEYTE IV ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., and MIGUEL COTIAMCO, respondents. This is a petition seeking review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 15, 1991, which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner and affirmed the order of the National Electrification Administration (NEA), dated October 1, 1990, declaring private respondent Miguel Cotiamco a bonafide member of the Leyte IV Electric Cooperative (LEYECO IV) and therefore qualified to be a director of said cooperative. FACTS: Petitioner Elmer Espina and private respondent Miguel Cotiamco were candidates for director of respondent Leyte IV Electric Cooperative (LEYECO IV), representing the Baybay South District. On May 23, 1990, petitioner Elmer Espina filed with the LEYECO IV District Election Committee (DECOM) a petition to

disqualify private respondent Miguel Cotiamco on the ground that respondent was not a bonafide member of the LEYECO IV.The DECOM endorsed the petition to the National Electrification Administration on May 26, 1990. On May 27, 1990, the election for the position of director of the LEYECO IV, Baybay South District was held where Contiamco was declared the winner. On June 27, 1990, the NEA remanded the petition for disqualification filed by petitioner Espina to the DECOM for proper disposition on the ground that the latter had original jurisdiction over the case. After hearing, the DECOM rendered a decision on July 28, 1990 disqualifying private respondent Cotiamco. Consequently, petitioner Espina took his oath and assumed office. However, private respondent Cotiamco appealed to the NEA which on October 1, 1990 reversed the DECOM and declared private respondent duly elected director of LEYECO IV, Baybay South District. The NEA found that, contrary to petitioners claim, private respondent Miguel Cotiamco was a bonafide member of the LEYECO IV. On October 23, 1990, petitioner Espina in turn filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction. Private respondent Cotiamco moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies, and lack of merit of the petition. CA decision: On March 15, 1991, the Court of Appeals upheld the order of the NEA. It held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was inapplicable to the case at bar; that the NEA did not commit grave abuse of discretion; that the order of the NEA dated October 1, 1990 was issued in the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives; and, that the findings of the NEA were supported by substantial. ISSUE: I. II. Is the doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies applicable? Is Miguel Cotiamco eligible to become the director on the ground that he is a bonafide member of LEYECO IV?

HELD: Private respondents contentions have no merit. When only a question of law is involved and nothing of an administrative nature is to be done or can be done, the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable. In this case, the issue whether private respondent Cotiamco is a member of the cooperative is one which calls for the interpretation and application of both the law creating the NEA and the by-laws of the LEYECO IV. Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case. However, appellate court erred in upholding the NEAs decision and ruling that Cotiamco is eligible because upon review of facts and evidence, Cotiamco is not considered a bonafide member of LEYECO IV therefore not qualified to be director of the said cooperative. DOCTRINE: Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a resort when the case is a question of law and nothing of an administrative nature is to be done or can be done.

China Banking Corp vs. Members of the Board of Trustees, Home Development Mutual Fund
FACTS: Briefly, petitioners China Banking Corporation (CBC) and CBC Properties and Computer Center Inc., (CBCPCCI) are both employers who were granted by the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) certificates of waiver for having a "Superior Retirement Plan" pursuant to Section 19 of P. D. 1752 known as the Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980 whereunder employers who have their own existing provident AND/OR employees-housing plans may register for annual certification for waver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Home Development Mutual Fund created under said law. On September 1, 1995, respondent HDMF Board issued an Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742. Under the Amendment and the Guidelines, a company must have a provident/retirement and housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund to be entitled to exemption/waiver from fund coverage. CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for renewal of waiver of coverage from the fund for the year 1996, but the application were disapproved for the identical reason that the company doesn't have BOTH retirement/provident and housing plan superior to PAG-IBIG. Petitioners thus a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Regional Trial Court of Makati seeking to annul and declare void the Amendment and the Guidelines for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction alleging that in requiring the employer to have both a retirement/provident plan and an employee housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage from the HDMF, the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-making power.

Respondent Board filed a Motion to Dismiss and the court a quo, in its first challenged order dated October 10, 1997 granted the same. The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari on the grounds (1) that the denial or grant of an application for waiver/coverage is within the power and authority of the HDMF Board, and the said Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the applications; and (2) the petitioners have lost their right to appeal by failure to appeal within the periods provided in the Rules for appealing from the order of denial to the HDMF Board of Trustees, and thereafter, to the Court of Appeals. The Court stated that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the above-Order having been denied in the October of December 19, 1997, this petition for review was filed under Rule 45 alleging that:

1. The court a quo erred in the appreciation of the issue, as it mistakenly noted that petitioner is contesting the authority of respondent to issue rules pursuant to its rulemaking power; 2. The court a quo erred in observing that the matter being assailed by the petitioners were the denial of their application for waiver (Annexes "H" and "I"), and therefore, appeal is the proper remedy. ISSUE: 1. Is the amendment inconsistent with the preconditions for exemption for coverage that is the existence of either a superior provident retirement plan or superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans? 2. Is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applicable if the subject of issue is the validity of the Amendments and Guidelines, which are patent nullity? Is it one of a question that is purely legal? HELD: 1. NO. The court held that Section 1, Rule VII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B and the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742, is null and void insofar as they require that an employer must have both a superior retirement/provident plan and a superior employees housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver and suspension of coverage from the HDMF. The basic law should prevail as the embodiment of the legislative purpose, and the rules and regulations issued to implement said law cannot go beyond its terms and provisions. 2. NO. The court held that the case at bar is exempted from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies therefore Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to question the validity of the challenged issuances of the HDMF which are alleged to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The case falls among the following accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, while certiorari as a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. It has been said that where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.

Espina vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Elmer Espina and private respondent Miguel Cotiamco were candidates for director of respondent Leyte IV Electric Cooperative (LEYECO IV), representing the Baybay South District. On May 23, 1990, petitioner Elmer Espina filed with the LEYECO IV District Election Committee (DECOM) a petition to disqualify private respondent Miguel Cotiamco on the ground that respondent was not a bonafide member of the LEYECO IV.The DECOM endorsed the petition to the National Electrification Administration on May 26, 1990. On May 27, 1990, the election for the position of director of the LEYECO IV, Baybay South District was held

where Contiamco was declared the winner. On June 27, 1990, the NEA remanded the petition for disqualification filed by petitioner Espina to the DECOM for proper disposition on the ground that the latter had original jurisdiction over the case. After hearing, the DECOM rendered a decision on July 28, 1990 disqualifying private respondent Cotiamco. Consequently, petitioner Espina took his oath and assumed office. However, private respondent Cotiamco appealed to the NEA which on October 1, 1990 reversed the DECOM and declared private respondent duly elected director of LEYECO IV, Baybay South District. The NEA found that, contrary to petitioners claim, private respondent Miguel Cotiamco was a bonafide member of the LEYECO IV. On October 23, 1990, petitioner Espina in turn filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction. Private respondent Cotiamco moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies, and lack of merit of the petition. CA decision: On March 15, 1991, the Court of Appeals upheld the order of the NEA. It held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was inapplicable to the case at bar; that the NEA did not commit grave abuse of discretion; that the order of the NEA dated October 1, 1990 was issued in the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives; and, that the findings of the NEA were supported by substantial. ISSUE: III. IV. Is the doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies applicable? Is Miguel Cotiamco eligible to become the director on the ground that he is a bonafide member of LEYECO IV?

HELD: Private respondents contentions have no merit. When only a question of law is involved and nothing of an administrative nature is to be done or can be done, the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable. In this case, the issue whether private respondent Cotiamco is a member of the cooperative is one which calls for the interpretation and application of both the law creating the NEA and the by-laws of the LEYECO IV. Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case. However, appellate court erred in upholding the NEAs decision and ruling that Cotiamco is eligible because upon review of facts and evidence, Cotiamco is not considered a bonafide member of LEYECO IV therefore not qualified to be director of the said cooperative. DOCTRINE: Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a resort when the case is a question of law and nothing of an administrative nature is to be done or can be done.

Case: Fernandez vs. De la paz Doctrine: Patent Illegality/ lack/ or Excess of Jurisdiction_________________________ Facts:

On May 1, 1985, Nenita Palma-Fernandez(petitioner) was extended a permanent appointment to the position of Chief of Clinics at the East Avenue Hospital by then Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Center, Jesus C. Azurin. Petitioner serving as Chief of Clinics, exercise direct control and supervision over all head of departments in the Medical Center. In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center retitled the position of Chief of Clinics to Assistant Director for Professional Services . In partial implementation of this new set-up, Dr. Adriano De la Paz, as Medical Center Chief, issued Hospital order No. 30, Series of 1986. As such, petitioner continued to exercise direct control and supervision over all of departments in the Medical Center. On January 30 1987, E.O. 119 known as the Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health was promulgated. On May 29 !987, respondent De La Paz, as Medical Chief , designated respondent Dr. Aguila, who was then Medical Specialist I, as Assistant Director for Professional Services. And transferred petitioner Vice Dr. Nenita Palma Fernandez to the research office. Said order was issued in the interest of the hospital service. Petitioner filed a letter protest with respondent Secretary of health, furnishing copies to the Commissioner of Civil Services and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission. The Secretary of Health failed to act on her protest, petitioner then filed an instant petition for Quo Warranto with Preliminary Injunction against respondent Dr.De Lapaz(Medical Chief), Dr Aguila, and the Secretary of Health. (Quo-Warranto- a common law writ designed to test whether a person exercising power is legally entitled to do so) Issue/s: 1. Whether respondent De la Paz has the power or authority to transfer Nanita Fernadez to another position? 2. Whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies bar the filing of an instant petition Held: 1. The court rules for the petitioner. Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the National Health Facilities attached to the Department of Health, the power to appoingt and remove subordinate offcers and employees, like petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of Health, not the Medical Center Chief. 2. The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not bar petitioner from seeking judicial relief. This rule is not a hard and fast one but admits of exceptions among which are that: 1. The question in dispute is purely a legal one 2. The controverted act is patently illegal The subject hospital orders violated petitioners constitutional right to security of tenure and were, therefor, patently illegal. Judicial Intervention was called for to enjoin the implementation of the controverted acts.

There was substantial compliance by petitioner with the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies since she had filed a letter protest with the respondet Secretary of health, with Copies furnished the Commissioner of Civil Service, and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission, but the same remained unacted upon an inadequate remedy. Besides an action for quo warranto must be filed within one year period. The writ of Quo Warranto is granted, and Dr Nenita Palma Fernandez, is hereby entitled to the position of Assistant Director of Professional Services of the East Avenue Hospital

Case: Cabada vs. Alunan III Doctrine: Patent Illegality/ lack/ or Excess of Jurisdiction Facts: (controverted decision of NAPOLCOM)( procedural po ito) Petitioners SPO3 Noel Cabada and SPO Rodolfo G. De Guzman seek to set aside the decision of public respondent NAPOLCOM which denied them due course for lack of jurisdiction. Philippine National Police Eighth Regional Command 8 (PNP RECOM8)filed an administrative charge of grave misconduct against the petitioners and instituted summary dismissal proceedings. Regional Director of PNP Recom 8- Affirmed the decision of PNP RECOM 8 Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman filed a motion for reconsideration with DILG for the decision of the Regional Director of PNP RECOM 8 who however failed or refuse to act on the said motion. Regional Appellate Boar 8-affirmed the decision of the Regional Director PNP-RECOM8 Petitioners then filed with Secretary of DILG and Chairman of NAPOLCOM their Appeal, respectively. NAPOLCOM-denied due course for lack of jurisdiction, because the resolution and decision of RAB has long become final and executory, had long become final and executor and there being no showing that the RAB failed to decide respondents appeal with the reglementary period of sixty days. Issue: Whether NAPOLCOM can exercised appellate jurisdiction over appeals from RAB? Held: Only the Secretary of the DILG can act on the appeal. The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition for review and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. Sec 14 Powers and function of the Commission xxx(k) of the DILG ACT of 1990: (k) Exercise Appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits.

In light of the foregoing, the petitioners could properly invoke the Courts original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the NAPOLCOMs decision of 24 March 1995. It being patent nullity, the filing of a motion for it reconsideration before the institution of this special civil action may be dispensed with.