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    Documents From the US Espionage Den' is a legendary series of Iranian books containing classified US documents that were found in the American Embassy in Tehran when it was taken over by revolutionaries. These books are very hard to come by, and until now there has been no concerted effort to post them. In 1977 Iranian students seized an entire archive of CIA and State Department documents, which represented one of the most extensive losses of secret data in the history of any modern intelligence service. Even though many of these documents were shredded into thin strips before the Embassy, and CIA base, was surrendered, the Iranians managed to piece them back together. They were then published in 1982 in 54 volumes under the title "Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den", and are sold in the United States for $246.50. As the Tehran Embassy evidently served as a regional base for the CIA, The scope of this captures intelligence goes well beyond intelligence reports on Iran alone. They cover the Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There are also secret analysis of arcane subjects ranging from the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence to Soviet oil production. Most of these documents are labelled "Confidential" or "Secret" and remain classified to this day.

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    Documents from the US Espionage Den Vol. 51

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    Documents From the US Espionage Den' is a legendary series of Iranian books containing classified US documents that were found in the American Embassy in Tehran when it was taken over by revolutionaries. These books are very hard to come by, and until now there has been no concerted effort to post them. In 1977 Iranian students seized an entire archive of CIA and State Department documents, which represented one of the most extensive losses of secret data in the history of any modern intelligence service. Even though many of these documents were shredded into thin strips before the Embassy, and CIA base, was surrendered, the Iranians managed to piece them back together. They were then published in 1982 in 54 volumes under the title "Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den", and are sold in the United States for $246.50. As the Tehran Embassy evidently served as a regional base for the CIA, The scope of this captures intelligence goes well beyond intelligence reports on Iran alone. They cover the Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There are also secret analysis of arcane subjects ranging from the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence to Soviet oil production. Most of these documents are labelled "Confidential" or "Secret" and remain classified to this day.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    276 views58 pages

    Documents From The US Espionage Den Vol. 51

    Uploaded by

    Irdial-Discs
    Documents From the US Espionage Den' is a legendary series of Iranian books containing classified US documents that were found in the American Embassy in Tehran when it was taken over by revolutionaries. These books are very hard to come by, and until now there has been no concerted effort to post them. In 1977 Iranian students seized an entire archive of CIA and State Department documents, which represented one of the most extensive losses of secret data in the history of any modern intelligence service. Even though many of these documents were shredded into thin strips before the Embassy, and CIA base, was surrendered, the Iranians managed to piece them back together. They were then published in 1982 in 54 volumes under the title "Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den", and are sold in the United States for $246.50. As the Tehran Embassy evidently served as a regional base for the CIA, The scope of this captures intelligence goes well beyond intelligence reports on Iran alone. They cover the Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There are also secret analysis of arcane subjects ranging from the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence to Soviet oil production. Most of these documents are labelled "Confidential" or "Secret" and remain classified to this day.

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    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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    of 58

    DEPART Off I c e

    IFFICE i ~ l ~ l a n D-64/36 nJ.

    Date:

    S e ~ t e m b e r3. 1964

    '0

    Lonal S e c u r i t y Superv:Lsors i o n a l S e c u r i t y Office1cs a - - - ~ r l t y O f f i c - -r m (Tsrhnl 1r.ll ----,

    : Depr~ t yA s s i s t a n t S e c r e t ;ary f o r Sec

    : a c t s w i t h S o v i e t and Cornrnunis t Bloc Nstiol

    CA-1471 o f August 6, 1964, e n t i t l e d k t S o v i e t end otimluniet Bloc N a t i o n a l s , s e t s f o r t h s p e c i f i c b r i e f i n g r e q u i r e c n t s f o r KSOs and PSOs c o n c e r n i n g c l e r l c a l p e r s o n n e l 1 RSOs s h o t11d i n s u r e t h a t PSOs fin t h e i r a re a s a r e awl 71 and a t.e complying wtch t h e b r i e f i n g r qquirementl F u t u r e S e c u r i t y S u rv e y s shoulcI i n c l u d e u n d e r S e c t i c>" A " ", D r t l n ~ f C o n t a c t s Po o e c t i c>n t a k e n by t h e p o s t Ito implement i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n t a i ne d i n CA-14 ~ 7 1 .

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    m,

    o automatic

    IMTED OFF1:CCAL USE

    l! !

    NEGW E OI I TU E C P I T U T N ABROIAD A AO S I

    This aucumor~t contams uuvrrnation afl r nationc e defense of the United States, within the meaning of Tit1 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amendec Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or n ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

    CONFIDENTIAL

    -A 1959 directit>e of the leadership of the: Committee :for StotG SeaWUy [KGB] entitled 'On Intc Against Amedcuna.W a s s t g .M important . J . n . , . , -____:a A-" . -A . . tasks to KGB residencies. It brects l w e a r e a enw rwmvawr-rw W--ing in a types o U.S. Government installations dwoad; Am& UIRI in emU f blocs. Also included in basks, in milituy units and on the stcrffs of mil* rganizllNDRI. the scope of the directive are AmeitcMc mgned to iflterncrtiOnol0 o v e r s e ~ rrepresentatives of scientific institutfm and bu(ineSJ firm8, news cor?el

    dents, etc:

    (Top . k m T h a Ro
    United !

    To the Soviet Government, and to the Soviet inlligence services in particular. the United States the -main enemy: a term appearing in numerous ~viet documents. Against this "main enemy," the 3viet intelligence services have developed over h years and are today conducting concerted, e ,odd-wide programs to probe, seek out and reuit Amexicans-official and private, civilian and lilitary-in order to penetrate our agenciles, acquire ur rr cryptographic systems, intercept 01 courier nnmunications, discover our military-Idated red and development, etc. In this dart, the -. .-soviets bring to bear the conviction that Nnencws are essentially materialistic, motivated principally by monetary need or greed, and can therefore be "bought" to serve Soviet interests.

    T i study describes and illustrates by examples hs an important threat to the security of the United States---the systematic and intensive program by the Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) and GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) to recruit ' d e a n s abroad and penetrate U.S. installations.
    It also pictures the average Am,.rican overseas as le is seen through the eyes of So. t InteUigen~rirnarily interested in money all.. making more of t, typically indifferent to the means and often to the r s s a person with his guard down, talkative by ik, nature, easier to approach abroad than he is at hs home:,, T i provocative portrait is not imaginary;

    it i p ~ l tof Soviet Intelligenca doctrine and will s emerge throughout this study in direct quotatiom from KGB documents. The actual case exampler cited, some in detail, will show the doctrine in practice. There will be particular emphasis on a parallel Soviet concept that certain categories of Americans, such as enlisted military personnel, juniqem. bassy employees, and students are, in effect, second class citizens" and thus particularly worthwhile targets for aggressive Soviet intelligena? &cers and their agents. The Soviet program, as it has been observed a world-wide basis, parallels and supplemenol viet espionage operations within the United Sta One of its principal aims is to acquire a b m American agents who have the potential an be directed to serve Soviet espionage in the United Stat- in various branches of

    sonnel outside the USSR to step up already ing operational activity against Americans. instructions were repeated in the spring of and again in December of the same year. The

    CONFIDENTIAL

    KGB leadership directive cited in me quotation at 111ehead of this study rdects a Soviet policy-level nlncision to further increase the scope of the operal111nal effort. ClassPed Soviet material of consid~rnbly more recent date is also available which d o e l~ments enlargement of the Soviet threat and tE the 111rreased operational sophistication which is toda lming brought to bear against Americans abroad. In recent years all KGB "trusted contacts" an agents, whatever their nationality or activity, SI -L~~uwn have been reappraised for possible directo Ii(~n against the American target. There is availsl~le much reliable information to con6rm that 1both 111rKGB and GRU are working with intense concntration against Americans and U.S. installa1 -1,road and that the:y have score
    8

    viet Serviar

    will tiom mpler pracaralmeriqem. secorth? &-

    ed ol ta bm

    to go into 1h e points 0 : orIt is 1 t . 3 . &.at ~.anlzahoniu ana recnxucal -man D e w e e n1 rna '.81vletintelligence SI:rvices .1 tlleu respectivle juI ~iclictional spheres, hot bri .oerltion of the nlajor m-l~nponentsmost a :tive ill the global opera1tions 1 . 1-11'gram against Amencans abroad is basic to Un~I~rstanding the program itselft. of a. First and foremost of thes e c o r n p e n the KGB's Foreign Diectoratt: (also know the First Chief Directorate) vvhich, outside lmrders of the USSR has ~rimarvreswnslt , lor clandestine pclsitive intelligFence collectii political, military, eCwOmic 6md sdenti6c wull as for highly specialized covert activitia

    ..

    iduence policies and actions of foreign governments. The Foreign Directorate also has the IS sponsibility for counterintelligence abroad, including penetration of all foreign security and intelligence services. KGB staff o5cers assigned .oad under diplomatic, hade and other fa ~fficial cover are under the immediate di n of appropriate gengraphic department! : Foreign Duectorate. It has been nota ent years that officers with American Der gent inaeasin lgiy to ment expexiena? are being : st$ PO1 remote from the United States on the tested y the ~ r (more aa this. later) that work 8%gainst h micans there3 is easier ar:id more .rewiuding. " .--. . . Msmy of the Kbn s merlcan speclallstr have i served tours in the United States, speak English fluently, are familiar with many aspects of official and private Amencan life, and concentrate their operational efforts on the American target wher.yer they are stationed. 1b. While the KGB as the larger and senior SO. senice, plays the major role in operations viet di, ,cussed in this paper, the CRU (actuaU the y Chuef Intelligence Directorate of the C:eneral I of the Minishy of Defense) works actively E d with equal professionalism to collect stra$c military intelligence abroad and is there,e I~rimarilypitted against American military rsorlnel and installations. It is also eneaeed operations ag, a' ainst American scientific an, ;&al personnel in the West,, particularly where ? field of s pdalization 11 a military applias

    ..

    -"

    ..... .

    FIGURE 1. KGB MOSCOW HEADQUARTERS KNOWN AS 'THE CENTEK i,

    CONFIDENTIAL
    U " . " "

    now bas w visible millby &hation. w a i c be may be a k t seaetmy of emb~ or, perb q, deputy c h i e f o f t h e :Soviet armme!mid represez tion. isamu Opeau.>,- uIwK-w UU d KGB and ( : Deploymaat d KGB and nsiderlc3 a b m d , Few Americam a b d in diplomatic, militnry out Mmponents a or other official and private capacities fully appredmiosion. They have, hction on .+ ate the overwhelming overseas deployment of S prut-timle basis-as 1 diplomatic seaeMes of viet Intelligence which can and is being brought mPh as Pollom and . C U ~and ScieaaC d to bem against them as well as a w t non-Ameri- Lches. as 61DSUIS. v8oecoDSUIS, presc and infon i can targ&. The fact is that agout BO% of the tion of8Ian, foreign eDde r e p mmtatives and, approrimately 7,000 Soviets abroad in ofacial inindicated, in almost every counbry they far C stallations are intelligence d o e r s of the two m- number the legithat e diplomats of the Minis&) .. . .. ices in n ratio of rouihlY two to one in favor of the Foreien NIPUS ana non-mreu~eenm revresenran KGB. Among Soviets with diplomatic rank the of &er Soviet mtnistries G a percentage of intelligence of8oers is even higher; 2 some ofsces, intellig;enm personr1 mnv haw the world-wide average is about 75% and in some wmplete monopoly. Certpin consulpr dffices, countn'es it tops 80%. These statistics are based example, have been wholly st&c d by the K( . . on identifiations mads by Soviet intelligence omAnd it is bv now a weu-vennea tact tner nu p s ~ cers who have defected to the West and are in a nel of S h milikrry attache (~ffices, includ o& position to point out their former colleagues and Iow-rmiking ortealsible civilian enlployees, are on analyses by Western security and counterintelli~ U ~ 'Puofesional miilitnry 05cers and mesr ml JY gence servim, including American, which have b m of the GRU. 'rhis .situation frequently gi I .. . been able to detect and observe the Soviets in nse to some curious evolumns m cover and re op~tional intelligence activity. To illusitrate, Pavel I[vanovich Lamakin, a dvi C chauffan of the military attache oface in R m e Intelligence units (known as legal d d e n d e :I ) r p from l! 4 t t m next a P Fd in C y in 5 o o . of both KGB and GRU exist independently of eacA 1 1 W a s a full-fledget Lt Colonel with the htlc3 o other in Soviet missions abroad, and stall pasonoel -. .. . f ... of hoth services are protected by diplomatic irD asistant military attacne. a m a r l y , noDerpler N. Filatov, a lowly civilian driver/interpreter for the munity or have other official status. The o p military attache in Ottawa from 1857 to. 1880, war tions c i f of each residency (ref& he to ss the posted to Rio de Janeiro in 1963 with diplomatic resident) normally has a senior cover position. In the case of the KGB, the resident may be coun- rank as seoond seaetary. Filatov, it is known, was Pctually n lieutenant senlor grade of the Soviet selor of embassy or at a minimum a k t smetary. nrmy wbile in Canada; Lomakin wm pmbnbly n Since 1961 the GRU resident has been d i d major while in Rome from the bxwbviou mle of military attache and main, e able m

    However, the GRU lacks exclusive & 7 intelligenceI, and mnsider1 even rivalry with the K B G

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    HGURE 2. G U OFFICERS L M KN (LEFO AND FllATOV R O AI CONFIDENTIAL

    ~*

    CONFIDENTIAL

    ot tas East European Camh o v m deployment of Soviet intelligesla, the intelligence rrrr, whether located within or outside offlcial mudst Bloc have given support in the W r to n at ~allations, comes reasonably close to saturating Soviet Intelligence operation against an American. This is an outgrowth of the close working relationavailable amedited cover positions. The maty of Soviet news media personnel abroad are ship which is known to exist between t h e - ~ G ~ and 1-lllgence officers. Overall, more than 60% have the dvilian East European Communist sesvicea . - ~ I I so identified nnd this is considered a minimal which share the Soviet concept of the United States 1 .91m. Included in this categoly are camspondas the main enemy.' (For purposes of this paper, '11 for the newspapen Rnvda and h e s t i a and these are the senices of East Germany,. Poland. limited degrea, eaaC,..~rrsentativesoof , the TASS and Novosti news Czechoslova!da, Hungary and to a intellieence offi.ncies. A d t the world-wide and still ex- Rumania.) Laszlo Sznbo, a senior )<ling Soviet civillan &line, provides both cover cer who defected from the Hungarian %H. r e I support to Soviet Intelligence, particularly the ferred to this collaboration in the following terms in (1, and surveys in recent years have established testimonv before a mmmittee of the House of Rep t 70% of itd oversea rep-tatives are st& resentatiks of the Eigbty-ninth Congress: , e of that service. .n "TdodhUy, tba Snvlt& all mnfsraoar wlth the Bloc s* o L the USSR fan a d of tnt.rngam .'ram numerous publicized eqionage cases in the 1 1 1 4 States, Americans have beoome generally Oblstlva pmblsmr. work bowam Swbt am that the United Nations in New York, in~ #lingthe internationally staffed Secretariat and , , i , pnd ths ~ u t y the sovfst of permanent Soviet U. N. Mission, is used W a Vnfon. . Each Bloc amvim bnr agreed 4 the t h r r base by the Soviet intelli~ence services. The S* o m l e o to &b*s b m d objstim i . Ib own inand tn the lntsrsl~ of 0th- ~ l o c q* is tru; of U. N. offices &d specialized sub,*ry organizations in ~ u r o p e . One example is ' Ir to bo mJn ensmy." I'nris headquarters of the U.N. Economic and The , 111~1ral OrE&tton (UNESCO) where over @ periodic conferences mentioned bv SzDbo I me teke pl&e annually and the inter-senice n~eementr ~~ctm ukployed i n the ~ ~ c r e t h iort attached are a in made are followed up with day-to-day coordination 111s Soviet UNESCO Mission. Approximately o f . "., are IdentiEd or suspect intelligence o 5 m and guidance by a small group of KGB officers asN. signed to the headquarters of each counterpart Bloc . , I the true percentage ir believed to be much he .Ivr. Another exampla is the International senice. ~lthdirghmuch of the emphasis is on war operations against American and other Western per' , tv~lc Energy Agency ( i,. 1 3 ) with headquarters tic sonnel and installations within the Bloc area ( a Vs~nna. Out of 55 Soviets working in the multiwas -@i,,11a1 IAEA Secretariat ss technical erperto, subject outside the scope of this paper), there is iet evidence that the Bloc services,where they are r e p .,,-lators, etc., or attached to the permanent Soy n IAEA Mission, nearly half an, identified or resented abroad in the West, cooperate closely with .81uJysuspect intelligence o f f i m with the marthe KGB, occasionally to the extent of making th* ,IWII personnel and local agents available to , # , I orror believed to be on the conservative side. the latter. picture is much the same in Geneva with a -1, foncenbation of KGB and GRU 0 5 in tbe In the of military apentlOIU, ' I European a c e (EOUN), the permanent Soparticularly those involving American military per* hflsslon to EOUN; the Economic Commission wnnected with NATO, =* and , I.'~~rope (ECE), the World Health Organiza,, ( WHO I , the world ~&eoroloeicalOrcaniza- lationships are b o close between the GRU and the .s WMOj: he~ ~ &Ation ~ military intelligence services. Inter-~ ~ East European ~ ~ ~ I c I), the ~ ~ t ~ Telerommounictionr ~ service agreements on intelligence requirements are ~ t i ~ l reached at annual meetings of the Wanaw Pact . (.ITV) and others. n powers. There is evidence that the GRU and the ud 'Ioc 'm d B, military Intelligence services regularly share I u 1 views, experiences, technial knowledge and opera\ I n v m l points there will bs n reference to tional t s not only at the headquprtm level within ak .q.twu In which agents or personnel of one of

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    CONFIDENTIAL

    ~*

    CONFIDENTIAL
    the Bloc area but also in the West through coUabomtive relationships between residencies through their respective military attaches. scale. The d o n s which follow win be prtnprl concened with the goals of Soviet Intelligenceopc ations against Americana a h 4 the target cat gories of highest priority (and th& vulnmbilitia the Sovi* approach to t h e targ- frontally a~ i n M y and, by illustratior~, Soviet techniqu both d e and subtle which, ns we will see, fi quently fail but too often hove succeeded wi serious security damage to tbs United States.

    In summe,

    this introduction bas sought to iden-

    tlfy the existence and steady intensification of the


    Soviet Intelligence threat to Americans and U.S. imtdhtions abroad and brirll! describe the Soviet components involved ar~tl. I O C variety of w e r wsitions from which t h y ooerate on a truly massive

    rl pc at a a~ qu

    rLS AND I

    ABROAD

    ENCE

    fi

    wi

    'The r KGB ~ m ] e mn 1m ~ a w wuh officialdooumentx from Anrcncrm irrna~urnmo. rru d other remet mexponden c i )UJI ml to agents 1witi acccsd to It J% c h k r and nmetmlu Mi6 clerk$, d pher machlne l n dsocloplng p e r d contact8 and rcts our @e TX to be morc broad who mn obtaln wawk &her denttar relathd i p s with . . m U . S . overmu tnstauat~11 wuh u . S . 5 . e n f and rcbnl$c orgmor trd zuflon, <n the United Statea. Similar mn$dmthl reloHonrhlp are a h & i e with Amerlmn, abroad who m k ln Amerlcun d l b h m e n t r ln any mpacity. auch a, tronrkltorr. d r i w x or cucn domattlcx m h agent wtumka rhmld be wed to obtain a complete plchrre of the atatfing and work s h e d d e r wUh9 A-rtfCM fdaUaHonr in order to obtain renet documents and to maplam a u d b

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    goals of Soviet Intelligenm opm.- -4 aplnst Americans a b m d are to obtain crypt* , mderiak so as to be able to mad mdpbered -. ,ss-anIcations.and to acquire, preferably in doc. -.~.ry fonn, o5cial secrets through recruitment tt-dcans--civilian and military and of d ..I -who themselves have access to the b. .t.18rrmntion. lvrn ue, of course, other objectives: to collect mation ,. an rcientisc and technological info1 .t.8allyevery field, industrinl as well as n"litpry. wrll ns clnsi8ed; to work t o w d u~ltimate .tlzrn nnd manipulation of American Fmlitical , 1 . 1 4 1 . life throu& identification nnd ass: %lent Ins with the potential tobe politico1action .lid, in acidition, to cuIdtivat' variwIS cateI . - 01 non-ofElcinl Am1 . ns :I abroad, such PI .*I,, whocan be b n ~ t under wnbrol and ...lql to seek pbs everrt;ralU with U.S. (h m y .. . 8 .~(rnclar, mcluctmg me mnlugenca and IIV trrvias. A l of these, however, are. l tltn basic goal of getting secret info1 Antrrlcnn overseas installations by eve erran:.
    'r primary

    ,.
    1

    ,. .

    .--.

    p Servlm oBcer, or any 0 t h sedor U.S. &dad - r m b i t is clew from Soviet InteUgenm docfrine and from scorns of reported and often observed KGB and GRU developmental opemtiom and recruitment approaches that the most aggressive Soviet operational activity is directed against junior employees of American diplomatic and other % -d 'i establisl~mentcand Isgainst enlisted overu peesonnel of the militwry servicer. It is thia bnoad categoy of code clerlcr, secretarleri, Bvlnrine ards, etc., wlhich the,.Sovietc regard asP srticu. .ly vulnerable since (in tne worm ot one! KGB &,d v e ) 'they do not bslong to the dvileged che s and are worse off Bnancidy.'

    . .

    Code and

    c nor

    Pnronnsl

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    ':

    "p

    (..leg& KGB would not I'y~loolrany :pmmis* . ~ r r l n ntarget--an ~ m b er Ford

    1. the 1

    1 In 1881, a g a d diredive sent to KGB 111cr abmd, signed by AldLIMdr Nikolnyevich Shelbin, then Chairman of tlm KGB, emphnsizad forcelly that the %st priority task of every residency es -to recruit cipher clerks.' It noted tersely at "the most fruitful rrpuld w m obtained in is manner. KGB residendes were instructed to ~ncentrateon 'the identification of American code ~b in p q ~ ~ ~ ~for i ao p m h t n g and recruitt pn ): th,.ln.- It is known that at least one KGB resiport bllow-up sup] from dc:ncy m the W 3 heels of the Sbelepin M oscow headq~ 'om of a prep d list directive. Tbi!

    CONFIDENTIAL of code clerks, cornpleto with namw and biographical data, who were at that time assigned to the Weturn country and aguimt whom residency efforts were to b concentrat~d. n o d than nlYmsd by PutyaWa pmhaw, t b Amerlcaar, even with polnted I ~ u wom not able , to m& the GHU oglcer leave them h They . were flnolly m d by m o t h Soviet ( a I c mm KCB 0 5 ~ who cpme ovor to the table m d ) hls staggering mllssgue away. Pulyatov, h ever, rbmnlned p l s t e n t evm when l b A o . weeh later he rhowed up uoindted at a dk puty given by an AID amploybe for aevsnl AmunCPN, including the urns oode clerk. ThL time, m d without drinking, Putptov again mncankated hlr nttentlon on tha code Jerk. The latter, bowever h11.1been keeping the smbpuy lscvrlty a c e informed of Putyatov'r aggrcsdve actionr and t h Soviet h n y abandoned bL efforts.

    The majorlty of cldo 1:k:l.l .md other Americm communicationr pirso~s~cl ,ad tend to fall in : the 'junior etnployrrr" cutrgtrly in terms of grade and salary. For the most part, they u s relatively young, often u~~nttached (both male and female), ~ often L s politically sophiiticatrd t h smior personnd, and tend to spend the& 05-duty social Ume in compmy with each othrr and with other junior employees. Unlika their Soviet m u n t e p u b abroad, who are reqitired to live within Soviet 05cis1 installations and are not allowed on the s h e a s without a prowtive escort, American smbDuy code Jerks live where they please and are free to circulate socially, to associate with l d citlzena and non-oEicial Americans at their foreign pasts. Under octhese conditions their specialized and ~ensltiw cupations tend to become widely known and, in fact, it is relativelv easy for an a g g r d v e and a: Soviet intelligenm residency, especially one pbk whiclh makes e5ective use of a local agent network, entify them and develop means of direct a to id, indinr t access for sLssessment purposes and, in some , ror r m l t m e n t attempts.

    The Soviet effort against oode <clerks takes ahm a t "Timaginable form, ranging; f m m t h e wildly

    crude! to subtle, well-planned ax~d highly corn~plex L--> : . . - . Itions in which the Soviet bmu rr -waled. the last moment and the Iintended victirn is ~t completely by surprise. example of Soviet d i t y in particularly - -. form din mPutyatov,,, blain - second Tanzania V l a d W T.
    1888
    n"0-1,

    Soviet

    secretary and CRU deer known to specialize in operations against communications pe~mnnel,a p proached an American Embasay cods clerk who wpr ententaining an em1b n s q secret9r at a beach nesort m t a l rant. An ass:iduous d t i v r tor of Amerkm . de h t y a~tovhad met the code .. rk sodally a few . w e e k betore and unquestionably was aware of h s i occupation The Soviet invited himself to dinner with the American couple, p d e d to get drunlc, them offered to make both of the Americana rich if they would give him embassy documents for which he would pay in Amuican dollan. He kept insisting the code clerk meet him privately. Mom an-

    Not infrequently, an indire method Involvbq use of local (non-Swlet) agents m d mmpromlm a the tnrget individual through m a l i n v o l m w * is a favorite Soviet Bnt step. A few para ago In I North Africnn country, a Soviet inteU1gcmca d8ca told one of his agents. a Eumburinarman an( h l mident, that bll prlnclpnl objective w u b penetrate the Arnsrlcan Embaaay c o m m u n l m h satlon. He p h e d to achleve thh by 4campromise of a female embassy cluk whom he i d s ~ fled to the agent. The latter, at that tlme only sllghtly acquainted Wth the American glrl, wu 08 dered to seduce her and waa pmrnlrad a l r b a n ap dal mward if s u d In thh CPU), he wu no1 Similnrly, in a Near Eastern county, a local goment o5dal who bad been recruited nr an agem by the Soviets, waa instructed to meat and cultivate two American @Is who were c l w frimdsone of them an embassy code clerk, the other. r CIA employee. The Soviet ofewr darcribed both g r s ns athactive, single. and Pecond class citlzemD il In telling the agent to bearme s a d l y involved ll. with either one of the g r s the Soviet ofecer dLplayed a diamond ring which be promised would be available for pmsentation as a (pH if t e agent h waa able to carry out hL assignment. Onca havtng a t its dgbb on a code or caamtre nications target believed even remotely awcaptibb on a long-range ba& to Soviet inducements OI threats, the KGB is both relentless m d p a t i a t One Department of State communications technidan who, althougb America0 by birth, bad m Eut European ethnic and educational background and once served in a very junior capadty in an Amsr' dipbmotic mirdon in the USSR durtrg World '

    CONFIDENTIAL

    14

    CONFIDENTIAL

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    mince been the object of two developmental . w h e in di5erent parts of the world, followed sllbsequent recruitment attempt at a third .-TI post. In this particular case,the KGB conm "accidental" encounter in the Far East Soviet citizen (coached by the KGB for the r if not a regular s M o5cer) whom the an had last h o w n and Last seen 16 years < us a young and friendly electricianhan~' the USSR. This time the Soviet posed I81mt civilian TV factory director from L I. temporarily in the Far East on burinc ,ally, travel remrds showed the Soviet v t in the area with a diplomatic passport on ( d r y duty from the Ministry of Foreign AfThe second Soviet approach, this time in P, came hvo years later and involved a KCB R operations specialist under diplomatic n xho presented himself to the American bearrtings and a letter from the original Soviet The new Soviet attempted to follow up approach with renewed efforts at cultiva. , M I rapport. A third-and crucial-approach ~,lrce three years later in a difterent Ws et . ,111 country. The American unsuspectiogly .,,4 made friends with a p e ~ who passed o ' 1 nff as a naturalized South American busi~ I Iof the samt? East Europ! n origin as the a an himself. The hvo we:re in occasional v mntact for alpproximately eight months be,"thing bapperled. When ttle completely un.I recruitment proposal wns made--and reit was ostensibly on behalf of the foreign C , I I C ~service of the East European country unted information on "all types of American .,.aphic equipment.' in return for which the 1 American was offered financial security for I 11f his life. The circumstances of the untu1 recruitment bid indicated strongly that ..ndble naturalized Soutlt merican was ac.I Soviet "Illegal," i.e., Soviet intellige llving and working in the Ws carnodal:ed et umented with a false, non-Soviet nationality.

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    -a .L ". -4don^.. 30, BmkIy~--- - ~ ~ , j e e of the American Embury in Vienna, graduate of the University of California, npplioant for career status in the Foreign S e h and accustomed to European life from previous residenm in Paris, was of soecial interest to Soviet Intelligence for a variety )ns. First ancI foremost, he was a mde clerk IS automatically in the top priority category for r aWtment. Se~ondly, his father was an from Czarist Russia to the United States, L ., anu arrnougn me son had been brought up to speak only English at home, from the somewhat myopic viewpoint of Soviet Intelligence there war a bars chance that he might harbor some'elements of sympathy for the homeland of his father. Thirdly, he was Jewish with apparently strong feelings about Nazi pmecutions and an interest in the Resistam movements of World War U. And, finally, he was fluent in French, liked to converse in it, and was interested in languages in general. All of t h m factors, plus undoubtedly others, had come to Soviet attenhon in Vienna through their excellent local capability to monitor closely the job status, pasonal characteristics and social pattern of the young A m group in Vienna, including embassy code clerk and secretaries, graduate students at the University ot Vienna and some expabiate types with vague means of support. Interwoven with this group were others of various nationalities, including Austrian employees of t e h American Embassy. Although this gmup was by no means a single, clubby unit in the relaxed charm of Vienna's coffee house, concert and cocktail party circuit, the Soviets had w t i it an agent, excihn sively directed against the Americans in the p r who had long since spotted Ultan, knew him a hk friends, shared some of their social life and w wiUine and able to assist the KGB in mountina hat bizarre op t the m i e cG

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    lollowing caw, although not new and giro. mvuntion in the press at the time, is m u n t e d .t l~rllw detail than befora Although there *M inexplicable aspects which are not likely In resolved the Soviet attempt to -recruit '-.k Donald Ultan is a clarslc example of a .t~tud,devious operation i which the Scn

    The sidewalk cafe of the old an1d famous Sac1 HoteL a pleasant spc* f m a n a p e r i itif in May 19 . was me openmg scene. ~ n agent ot me m t . e a natumlized citizen of a friendly W e t e m country and a trillimt mathematician, had invited an unemployad American teacher, a close friend of Ultan and, like him, a fluent French-apeaker, to join him for a drink. The plan was quite simple; merely to bring about a ' c h m d meeting betwan the

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    CONFIDENTIAL

    15

    CONFIDENTIAL Although foreign diplomatic personnel r d t e d in Moskow may have immediate value as sources of intelligence information, t111.i.~lsefulness the to KGB is often greater atter thr leave the USSR. Normally, control of them is p:~isedto the KGB's Foreign Directorate and their long-range exploitation continues as Soviet agents in subsequent assignments at home or elsewhere abroad. In addition to serving as Soviet Intelligence penetrations of t h e i ~ own governments, they frequently play a hard to detect role in Soviet operations against Americans in their own countries and in other counhies. As neutral or Western diplomats they are able to establish official and often close personal relationships with American counterparts m o p easily than Soviet representatives in the same area. Thus, their most important contribution to Soviet Intelligence operations against Americans is their capability, under normal-appearing circumstances, to cultivate and thoroughly assess American officials on Soviet behalf. They also serve as convenient channels for the introduction of Americans to Soviet Intelligence officers at times and places of Soviet choosing. Diplomatic "collaborators" fmm neutral countries, whether recruited in Moscow or brought under Soviet influence elsewhere, are favorite intermediaries for Soviet approaches to Americans, as the followhg quotation from a KGB document illuslrates: . - -. . .
    'No matter the I m t h , o m . . . effective way t o a h b l h b mntsd wlth Americans h indirectly vln mllabo n t o n from nsutrAl munkiw, perti&ly embassy pnonnel of nuutrnl muntries which nevertheless maintdll gmd l'Gltlri0~ with ~ ~ & ~ I I S . EXUnpleS of Such mbPuks would ba thow of India, Bwma, the Arab atntor md the Lstln American munhiw. In ordsr t o mme In mntact wlth Americans in thk way, our intslligsnos officers reek to establish cMpaativa rebd o d i p with mpresentntlves of such neutral munhh."

    known for having betrayed to the Soviets the entb Swedish air defense system, an incalculable l m i his country. Also well awered has been that pa of his career (195257) when he was Swedish A Attache in the United States and systematically d e c t e d or microfhed literally tens of thousands of American technical publications and military documents, many of them highly classi6ed, for his 1 Soviet masters, meanwhile cutting an elegant swath 1 in Washineon diplomatic and official societ Published \tudies have dwelt on the absorbu psychological makeup of the man himself, an ab and impeccable career officer of a Yrtendly" nel m l counhy with a calm facade behind which L a Walter Mitty world of fantasy, an unsatis6t ego of fantastic proportions, a hunger for person recognition and for involvement in worldhapir events. These were fatal personality wealmess, which the GRU m e c t l y analyzed in the late 1940 if not even earlier, and thereafter faultlessly e ploited and financially rewarded.

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    Most pa'hmt to the subject matter of d study, however, is the clear "Americans abroac aspect of the Wennerstmem case which n u thmugh it from beginning to end. At the time his formal recruitment in 1849 by the GRU in Mo cow, where he was serving as Swedish Air Attach Wennerstmem was told it was not Sweden tl Soviets were W e d about, but rather the United States, against which all possible resources had to be emplqyed. F m the &st day of his GRU career he vvas dhxted against Americans-first in Mormw then in Stockholm, Germany and Spain (and, of course, in the United States). Wennerstmem's 5& mission was to obtain, a h all, the closest possible contacts within the Amel can Embassy in Moscow which the Soviets in 1% regarded as the key ounpost of the I He wa!s asked to a names, positions, bi, graphic . Idetails and pemnal chrmcteristics t .~. . embassy personnel, an assignment he could full easily since he h d y knew many American dip18 mats and military officers, some of whom had pr viously served in Stoclcholm. As Wennmtroe himself said after his arrest: " very quickly g I in at the Ameriqn Embassy. This embassy had , distinctly dominating position among the diplomatic corps in Moscow, a d if one secured en& there, the rest (id-tion of interest to the

    The case summary which follows is a vivid example of Soviet Intelligence use against Americans of a high-level third-national agent who was recruited in Moscow-in this instance by the GRU since it had already handled the preparatory phase of the recruitment operation outside the USSR Many readen are probably familiar with the webpublicized highlights of the espionage career of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroern, secretly a highly s u d l agent of the GRU for nearly 15 years until his arrest in 1983 and subsequent sentence to life imprisonment. He is b s et

    CONFIDENTIAL

    38

    CONFIDENTIAL ~viets)came almost by itself.' It uppears to be anks chiefly to tlle "confid<:nccs' of Americun Ileagu~3, who accepted l1i111 witl~outyuestion for Ilut he uppeamd to I*, tllut Wennerstmcln colI0.1.tcdisfonnalion not only on prsonnel. but also slvms of infor~niilion the ltawly fornled Strategic on 41rCummaud (almut wllicll the Soviets deslwrntely wuntrd intelligc~~cc) incltltli~~g likely SAC t q e t 41cas within the USSR in the event of wu. I\rtunling ~ I U I I I o Stockllol~nn I857 II Ile U.S. assignal u noted, wus un 1111rcsceli bonus n Soviets were con, m ~ d )Wenncrs , ~stcd the S. to wedish ... o*lcn.scComn~slrl ullrll rnur~-n~cnt acti! from du rccluiremcnts continued to be important. On GHU i n s t ~ c l i o ~ uwus to muintuin inlimnto connections he with ~niliturypersonnel of tha Americun Embnssy. Onw uguin, he found this eusy since he was p p u Iar with Americum and regulurly invite r~nl;~ssy ?kiul ullnirs. In his Defense C office he wus ublc to obtain nnd microfilr Soviets voluminous publicatiow on Amcd tury uireruft and equipment In 1051) Wen1lerstrwm wa!I invited to a]p n d nwen1 duys in W.iesbudcn, Gelnnany, as h ouse gusst 1 ~ of u close friand, a promirlent general at headurtcrs of thca U.S. Air Forces, Eum~p. The . . viets insisted tnat ne accept MU even set tho act time for Ihis visit the month of ]

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    SURE 12. VITJ 4LIY D. BALA Belgion agent found him "rc

    Sovlets. She also lost interest in American employment and, in facf left her embassy job in August
    1864.

    Until January 1985 the KGB left her alone. In that month, Zelenin, the Soviet who had recruited her in Tunis and to whom she clearly felt a stronl, sense of personal attachment, huned up briefly h Brussels to bring her back under Soviet controlI. He came at the right time since her affair with thc lawyer was by then in a period of estrangemen, and she was ripe for renewed involvement Zelenin urged her strongly to re-apply for work at the American Embassy and introduced her to a new Soviet who would handle her, TASS correspondent Anatoliy Trifonovich Ogorodnikov. Perhaps to make the new Soviet more palatable to her than his predecessor had been, Zelenin played him up as a Ymyhood friend." Zelenin then returned to his post in Algiers, believing his mission accomplished. It did not quite turn .t that way-again due to her love affair. "Mau~meX" did, in facf reapply for American Embassy employment but was turned down on the basis of an undistinguished job performance record in the -past. Having patched up her on-again off-again romance with the lawyer, she failed to keep several appointments

    with Ogorodnikm, and one day in the late spring or early summer, when she happened to meet him on the street, she told the Soviet that she was pregnant ( h e ) , expected to be married soon, and IIIUIIC" no further contact She followed t i - h s UP by writim a letter to Zelenin, confinning what :she 1 g hail told his colleagut Ogorodnikov's reac!tion was 01 Ice. ) There w ere no threats. as tnere coula nave been. 1 n e mert:ly said he wrould-continu, established meeting place month should c:hange her mind Nearl)1 a year went by without :further inddt!nf ... ^ .. L . . . _ L . V. but the evcta- ...L:-L i'-11- ... .I wtuul ruuuwcu augxcsr.ular UIL. hCB kept a watchful eye: on '~ada; ne X." In 1 ate July 1% 3, the Belgian woman (whc) had meanwilile experiensced a misatrriage and had not bt:en married)I, had an un usually violent quarrel wpith . . . her lawyer-lover. When the latter actually attempted to strangle her, the romance broke up completely. It most likely was no coincidence that Ogomdnikov suddenly reappeared on the scene, handed her a gratuitous payment of several hundred dollars in Belgian francs and asked her to apply for a job at SHAPE Headquarters which \V B I scheduled to be moved from P r s to Casteau, ai south of Brussels, within less than a year and WOIuld be in need of many new employees with her qua! li6- . cations. New rehlrur meeting arrangements were made an~d at each of these she wias paid appn)i x. mately $ 120 in francs g the period .which followc:d, Ogorodnil(OV .. oegan ro . . .. remale agent m some or me m ualn NS r complicated techniques of espionage tradecraf obviously anticipating need for more professio agent management after she should obtain t ployment with SHAPE and again become opt tionally active for the KGB. She obtained a camera suitable for docum photography, was trained in its us, and submitted e test films to her Soviet handler. Vgorodnikov set up a complicated system of clandestine meeting 81. _ rangements which included the use of danger sig. nals and provision for. emergency contacts. Fi. nally, after personally reviewing her SHAPE a p plication forms, Ogorodnikov in December lW told her he would be going home in the suml-..v. of 1887 and introduced her to the Soviet who would handle her after he was g o n d)leg Aleksanclro. vich Semikov, a Soviet f i b &hi ution represe~ ItP.

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    CONFIDENTIAL tive in Belgium since 1864. Ogorodnikov told h a that for the sake of security she would not see him again and her next meeting with Semikov would not take place until July 1987. If, however, she was able to u into SHAF'E at Casteau before eet that time (it was to move there in March l W ) , she was instructed to give the appropriate signal for an imergency meeting to inform Semikov. To keep her content, Ogorodnikov then paid her a sum in advance equivalent to five months' salaxy. 'Madame X war 81~e.stedby Belgian security authorities in April 1967. She did not know it at the time, hut more than six months earlier her frustrated lover had betrayed her to several Belgian of ficials on the basis of diary notes he had seen re garding her contacts with Soviets, and the allegatic)n of her espionage work had been under investitio on by both American and Belgian authorities. gorodnikov's arrest and expulsion came shortly ter the confession of his agent, and, as previously )ted, Balashov and Semikov were quietly and Fectively discouraged f o remaining longer in rm dgium.

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    1

    (81

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    8

    CONFIDENTIAL
    "

    ..-

    I""'
    fl;~kl
    Wood block with cover removed. Note built-in tacks ot each end.
    I
    QUICK
    I ACK

    omponents as identified by X- ray photo

    Quickly trmplaced by pressing to underside of bookcoIse FIGURE 14,. SOVIET MI(:ROPHONE AND TRANSMITTER DEVICE FOUND I N AMERICAN EMBASSY. 1967

    CON FlDENTIAL

    48

    CONFIDENTIAL

    V. REVIEW OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL ,TECHNIQUES AND GAMBITS


    ll~e case examples cited so far to illustrate KGB
    d ike to remain PI broad for extenth perinds
    l various mate, e rial benefits such as higher . lower overwar ro save money aue ca , wanes, a living caots, certain tax exemptions, rent-free quarters, longer vacstionr, and the opportunity to engap in profiiabls foreign cumncy exchange."

    ...I GRU use of staff and agent personnel against

    ~trricans abroad have reflected various opera~ u techniques and gambits employed by the l 18-t intelligence officer to spot his targets, to ..,I direct or indirect access to them, and to assess ~ I I the unceasing search for vulnerability or in .svptibility. This section will review some of ,,. technique-and refer to others not yet menwrl-and seek to put them into focus on a rail-r basis without reference to individual types 1 .drjiets. +lthough various Soviet Intelligence doctrinal epts about Americans abroad have already be,,- clear (i.e., that junior employees are, in ef"tecond class citizens" and thus more vulnern~ldthat students are good targets because of 1 rrlative immaturity and lack of funds), there (81l1rr practical as well as doctrinal consideralhat have much to do with the inten:'.*---b Soviet effort against overseas Americ;ms and r twhniques employed.
    S..L..W.,

    Whatever the accuracy of the above observation, luept, urrit is a known and recognized Soviet cor---- - xperience, questionably drawn from oprational e. that Americans away from home tend tc) let t h e i ~ guard down, to talk more freely, and to enter more freely into contact with foreigners, inchuding So, . ., viets. There is recognition, of course, I:nar rnere are exceptions to the general rule, that itt some areas Americans refuse to have contact w,ith Soviet nationals and are increasingly prone to r ?port conc . . tacts when they do 'take place. However, in principle and practice, the KGB and GRU work on the theory that overseas Americans in general, by their open conduct, talkative nature, and freedom of movement and associations, are relatively approachable--directly and indirectly-and that the ertire operational process 1from spottint; through df?velopment t~ remitmenlt is less difficult than 3 the United Sitates.

    rc

    View of the American Abroad Tar1

    %tonthe Soviet viewpoint, operations against tt1.11ns overseas assignments outside the Bloc in arc, generally speaking, easier and more r e 1~11ji the same operations would be in the than , . I States. Obviously, one factor in this con..*lionis the severity of FBI counterintelligence va~n which inhibits, if it does not entirely prehCB and GRU efTorts to recruit Americans mnr.. But there are other mnsiderations as well 113~-e largely relate to the Soviet image, based .p-ricnce, of the indivi.' 1 American outside 1 , , ~ ~ nenyironment. sl

    '

    An additiona1 factor (mer " . rerent context) also anecrs the intensity or me aoviet program against Americans and permits the often free-wheeling, shotgun approach techniques frequently employed abroad. This is Soviet knowledge that in working aggressively against Americans outside the United States, including recruitment and use of local agents against them, they are violating, in most cases, no local laws since the activity is not directed against the host country. Thus the Soviets, as well as their local agents, are not normally punishable in the event an operation against Americans fails and is exposed.

    .-

    (n

    fiverage Arn&can, as the Soviets see bim, l o serve abroad for basically materialistic s--lflrh reasons. The KGB summarizes this .&111t the following words. in

    of

    Incentives

    Soviet Intelligence literally believes that Americans will do almost anything for money, and the factor of material incentive is somewhere present

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    CONFIDENTIAL American target's wile and c~ltildwn. The KCB covers this aspect in thc follou~iltgwords: "In urdcr lo nnli<lrfyca.crtly ;tcl~icvrdf r An~sricsnn,our olli~r.ra urider Sovwt LIIIVUJJ). wuully Ilrrsrrh gifts 01, New Yc.,rr' 1hy a ulllcr upx pro~lrl~il~ I)UC~S~OIIS. l.hU intclllgt:ncr: ol[iwr will de. liver Itis gtft ro parsml at the Alneric~n'sIIOIIIL. u at tlms wheu the Isttor is ~>r>n>,idly Thc purlwse tlrere. is to itqrct i w u~~ollic:iinl, frietally H;tvur illto tht relittia11r111p.111retun), thc An~cncilnUSUOIIY resl)otdsby visitillg the Soviel's ltozlle to prwmt u gift." As in the case of the American data processing technician in a Moslem country, language lessons are often 1)rought into the picture at about this point. And it is here that the wife of the Soviet intelligence officer has been seen on many occasions to play a supporting operational role. Without specific referencv to lanbwage lessons which am by now a standard develonmental gambit, the KGB outlines the role of thlo Soviet wife in these words: "It is often helpful if tl~,intelligcn~v Rimr takes his e o wife with him when vi siting the hutncr o a person f ,.h ..... .I... under drvclopmrot. Wi... hi. ir.... ....<... officer ciln clarify ~~:rtdin points o infurtniltlon or f arsesmunt wnct*mingtllc turgct individual and thereby dstmnine huw h i t to stmngthm h with him." In the early stages of direct culti venation is on harmless topics, sport, art, life in each other's country, etc. The Soviet may say he is bored with life in a foreign country, perhaps bored with his own countrymen, lonely for new and stimulating companionship. Controvisial subjects are avoided or glos.>,, over. This whole preparatory process 11.c~ a I .hose; assessment of the American's potential 11i c t~lnessfor espionage and assessment of him from the standpoint of the possibility of recruitment. This requires knowledge of the American's personal history, his family situation, his 6nancial standing (most important, as already indicated), his unfulfilled ambitions and possible weaknesses for women. During this assessment stage, the Soviet seeks to cement the friendship and at the same time--usually through giftscreate a sense of obligation for hospitality. Given the Soviet concept that money is the all-important American motivation, tactics may sometimes be ludicrously crude and include direct and very personal questioning about the American's income and debts, how much he pays for rent, the amount of his taxes, etc. Sooner or later in the developmental prowlis, assu~tling tll;~t the Soviets have concluded th at they have it11 intemsting prospect on the lir~e,smil11 1 . nspectsof clandcrtirrity will IJC gradu;llly insert<I into the relationship. Less p111,lic and more u! us~li~l;neetir~g places will be sl~ggated. Tho ta get will be rc~1uested not to call the Soviet at 11 oUicial number "to avoid e~nbarrassment Ior yo1 and meetings may bc suggest~xl at pre-arrangt limes ;~ndplaces. All unditioning f, what may follow.

    UYVV~

    .......,. ,, .., ". ..., ,. . .,


    .-..-.., --..

    '

    Eve-ntoally-pcrl~nps within week:s. perhaps nj .. .. -. , for months-tl~e Sovi-, l,ulr"3= will begin at emerge, it1itl~ough first it may not 1) recogai.zabl ,e as in the case of the Vienna studc nt already d scribed. The Soviet u(ill ask his American trier to help hi1n collect irtfo~ rmation of an overt nature. .*. , nerhens f~ a journa~~st or friend, poss~n~y a r tor scitrch paper or article which the Soviet himse claims he is writing, perhaps even for an inform public opinion poll. The Vienna student was askr for character assessments of his fellow Amcrical and saw nothing disturbing ahout the request. Eoropc:an national in the Middle East, under S m viet cultivation because of his access to American was dealt with somewhat more frankly by l k S s viet officer. The request went somt:thing like thi "You know many people here. They will tell yt what they won't tell me . . . they utill speak i o frankly to you than to Ime because I am a* diplom and represent a count ry that, unfortunately, d o not find much favor vvith them. 'rherefore, as .. I personal favor, will you ask MI. Blank. whom vt know, what. ."

    . - -.-

    . .

    3.

    -. . .

    ..

    Requests of this kind, even for I information, may be coupled with an ofier ot pa ment. If payment is accepted, a receipt will usally be requested under some plausible pretext. The process of gradual involvement is by this time well under way and elements of clandestinity and po:, lble potential compromise factors already pres :nt. Finally, one day, un an atmospthere of war friendshipI and mutual trust, the re< :mitment pm ess will ble brought to a head wit11 a request f . * . information or a servlce that is clearly ot an I telligence nature. Typically, generous financial rewards will be promised. If the American becomes frightened or refuses, he will be met at first with reasoned argument and renewed professions

    48

    CONFID

    s, at 11 1

    .I friendship. Depending on the course of the ~viet assessment and softening-up process, a ~rrlerLine may follow: threats and warning to if the American ,811kmatters over-particularly n already slipped over the line and exposed himr If to compromise. Whatevcr the American's ini.I reaction, the Soviet, as in the case of code clerk $n~ald Ultan, will press for one or more additional ,.stings.

    Ilsdaneous Dc r rhniques
    I vrtual cases, ca..
    !

    .....strate the tul.. -.--DSoviet operational practice employed tc) meet, Several , vr-lop and recruit Americans abroad. 1811.hhave not yet been mentioned or arcr worth Iblilional clarification and emphasis by way of w i n g are briefly discussed L-'---I :ompromise Although the E:GB, by its own doctrine, regards ra.~t~cial ioduccmcnt as normalIly the decisive factor . . .. \~~ccessfuI recruitment of Amerlcans aDr< lttcnt of contpromise is also an essential 11 such operation. It is brought into 8v.r which are often not fully appreciate

    No hypothetica

    ---.-.,

    .*

    Part of the COInpromise web. The effec:t of this ~m which Prmess over a I)eriod of time is to draw tlle America n into a "cor~fidential"relationship, frc thcL? American Iyadually c o m a to rea1i.n: that he -. - . cannot wltharaw excent at the cost of oLCULd dl',barrassrpent-a nd perhaps !severe persorla1 conse. qucncesLby clisclosing t h;~ compromise to his superiors. .. Actually, the build-up and use ot comp , )viet Intelligence is largely for psychological effect )th during the period of development and at the n e of recruitment is attempted. In operations in le West, the Soviets normally have no serious in-.--.. 1 ntion of using compromising informatior +" hl*-k8 . ail an American into doing their biddint ; Use of cc )ercive threats to destroy an American s career b:y exposure of compromising information is a rerd outside CIuitment technique only rarely employe the Sovit I Bloc area. This is because in wesreru countries the Soviets lack total conhol of the environment, such as they enjoy in the USSR, in their operations against Americam. It is thus difficult for them to acquire truly damaging evidence in a ' )nn which ca.n be effectively exploited for black. tail.

    .. .

    . .-

    ...

    . . L-

    '

    t. s y y

    ees h ns

    ., From the viewpoint of Soviet 1ntelliger.--, - . ~.nr.ricanwho agrees to an unofficial and personal I ttionship with a Soviet and conceals the 'fact t~nhis (or her) superiors has already taken a ..I compromising step. As the relationship d e e p ~lnd becomes more intimate along typical lines, It as described above, each Soviet move is inled to increase the degree of compromise. By ,.ping the small aspects of clandestinity which I:radually introduced, such as not calling the .vwt at his official number or agreeing to meetz4r nt unorthodox times and places, the American etpounds his original compromise. The initially tats.unt sm;tll "favors" which the Soviet asks on I,nsis of friendship are a calculated part of the ~npromiseprocess. So is the offer of payment I the seemingly plausible request for a signed vipt. Meanwhile, the Soviet through probing I other means uncovers indications of personal dkness and vulnerability (the presence of debt, -%rivedrinking, promiscuous sexual habits, etc.), ..WII are treated as "secrets" between the Ameri6 - t end his Soviet "friend and thus also become

    In Moscow and the East European c o d e s , owever, hlackmail is stanldard operatisonal prac. . n. . tlce agalnst wesrerners, ~ncludingAmen L-a"". v y erating on their own grounds, the KG1B and the cooperating Bloc services can work ulnder controlled conditions to secure disasterously compromising evidence (usually photographic and/or recorded on tape) which is then used as a means or recruitment. The well-publicized case of Irwin Scarbeck, the Foreign Service officer stationed in Warsaw who became involved with a female Polish agent and was blackmailed into accepting recruitrnenf is only one of nume] mus example? nf nnerat ions of this 1dnd.

    ...

    Sexuul and
    A number of actual ana lnclplenr sexual approaches overseas to Americans outside the Communist Bloc have been mentioned both in detail and in passing reference in this study. Although the KGB attempt to recruit Eleanor, the Bonn embassy file clerk, was based on shock tactics and threats against her own safety and the life of he1 supposed American fiance, the operation against her was, in its opening stages, a clear-cut case of seduo

    NTIAL

    ENTIAL

    tion which was accomplishrul In a matter of weeks. In the case of the c~nbu~sy src.rr.lltry in Africa whose local lover was in con1ut.l with u Soviet intelligence olcer, it seems likcly tllnt 11t.rsrxui~linvolvement wns to Iiave In?on io<lirvctly c-xploited on Soviet behalf. '1'11~AID Mirsir~n .icc.rctary in the Far E u t who scccptcd II lotlcr from a Soviet visitor gi~ve and appur~:~~lly in to his romuntic overtures prior to her Illrnovrr to :I I c r d KGB officer was almost c~.rt:tir~ly spotted in udvuncc as being susceptible to this type of ~~ppronch. In at lcast one n-ccnt instance outside the Communist Bloc, 1110 KCD is known to have recruited'hen clir~,ctrd agiiir~st Americans--a European l'hc: ~omoscxu~~l. recruitment itself was not on the ,asis of black mail (thc European made no secret ~fhis homosrxuulity and had no fear of exposure .. I this scorc), but onru: the agent had been ren cruited, thr: Soviets sought to exploit the homosexuul aspec't. l'11r:y financed the agent's move to an apnrimcnt sl~itablelor entertaining and asked him to report on oEcial Americans of his acquaintance who might be active or latent homosexuals. unsuccessful in this assignment, but The np?,ent W I I ~ if he hnd Ina~:n able to identify and establish a compron>ising rclntionship with such a person, it is likcly tl~ut the KCB would have considered blackmi~ilus a recruitment technique. The KGB ?xuality as is known to regnrd evidence of homos( particularly damaging information which is exploitable by blilckmail.

    tions are numerous and one will s d c e to illustrate how they usually come about. Several years ago, an AID o5cer in Pakistan was cultivated on a social relationship basis by Leonid Gavrilovich Kuimov, an intelligence officer under diplomatic cover as a first secretary. In the now familiar pattern, the Soviet drought small gifts to the American's family and the two men before long were in the habit of seeing each other several times a week, often dropping in on one another. The Soviet finally asked for an AID Mission pocket telephone directory and was given an outdated and generally available copy. He then probed several times to see if the American might be interested in a 'spe, cial deal" on a vacation tr,ip to Moscow. When itlis was refused, the Soviet I~fficerswitch1 to a ne'w ed tack; he urged the American to come to the USSiR 'It for a period and accept work as a teacher. - ' . would be a valuable experienm,' he said. -and you would be highly paid." The Soviets are also interested in attracting to the USSR as tourists persons whom they have spotted as potential recruitment targets. For example, in 1966 three female Peace Corps volunteers in Turkey visited the Ankara office of Intourist, the Soviet travel agency, to arrange a tourist trip to the USSR. While in the ofice, they met three Soviets (all of them intelligence officers) who were persistent irI attempts to cultivate them. A short time later, tlle local PeaceI Corps director persuaded the volunte~ to cancel their plans for the trip. :IS . . . When the local lntounst representative, a KGB agent, was told of the cancellation, he promptly lowered his previously set "minimum" price for the tour from $250 to $102. (The Peace Corps, of course, is an attractive target for Soviet Intelligence since many former volunteers have entered U.S. Government service and others can be expected to do so in future. Various types of Soviet efforts at cultivation of Peace Corps personnel have been reported from Africa, the Middle East and Asia.)

    .. l

    t .\ *I .g,:

    .*

    m
    .$

    -I
    *

    a .

    '

    Trips to the Communist Bloc

    1.

    :.

    d The KGB is known to have instruct its resi,dencies, as part of the operational progr;am against Americans abroad, to "find opportunities to organize trips to the USSR and ; :he Peoples' Demccracies for targets under dr\ ,,)merit." TI.- = .. son for this technique is ob\ i 0 . s . It gives the Scviets an opportunity, on their own gmunds and at leisure, to assess an agent prospect in greater depth than is often possible in the West and to carry through the operation to recruitment under circumstances overwhelmingly favorable to them. (In some cases where recruitments have been made in the West, the new agent is taken to the USSR or to one of the Bloc countries for intensive training in his agent assignment. The KGB and GRU can arrange this without a Soviet visa showing in the American's passport.) Examples of such invita-. e.

    False Flog

    The S~.\iet technique of 'false flap cultivation or attempted recruitment has been ill ustrated sc3vera1 times and is mentioned again ,for emphasis because it is extremely hard td recognize or detect until the Soviet hand comes out in the open (if it ever does). In its purest form the Soviet hand should not show at all since the essence of this

    CONFIDENTIAL

    54

    CONFIDENTIAL

    .. l~niqueinvolves the

    recruiter (Soviet national tii~t~-Soviet agent) pretending to represent a non.\lr.t intelligence service or commercial or indus*I organization, in cases where the American .g,:rt is considered unlikely to have any a5nity the Soviet cause. An American of German .*ractionmight be asked to covertly help his counof origin or an American of Jewish faith might wked to serve the Israeli intelligence service. Department of State communications techmn whose case has been described, was asked a, ollsborate with the intelligence service of his . $ I European country of ethnic origin-yet the rution was Soviet and involved a Soviet Illegal. Ultan case was a variation ol uic Ibnique.

    strike up an informal acquaintance. X few Years ago in Syria it was noted that Konstantin Ldoze], a Soviet intelligenoe 05a?r, was in the ha1bit of . spending the greater part of three days a weev at the diplomatic community swimming pool, engaging ,English-speaking wives in conversation while their h~~+~ands at work, were

    :ombits for Conta


    I he

    wnlcn lnrerugence contact with Americans atad and to ensure the prospect of follow-up ..clngs is impressive. In the case histories alwe have seen Soviet officers ap Iv trh Americans on the street, in bars. at private I W S and receptions, through the intermediary of , a dationals, e t c A KGB instructional docu41 makes further suggestions:
    variety '' to 'pen ofupways Anmwicnns . . . the intelligence officer may engage in ntnrtE, actively concern hir~urlfwith certain aspeits of trnce or art, or take up a hobby. Examples include I~*lming,.tennir, stamp collecting and coin collecting."
    '-In order- to widcn the m e of hir p
    mVFr

    In Tripoli the KGB instruction about stamp collecting was taken quite literally by Soviet intelligence personnel. Some of them were seen carrying folders of postage stamps about town and using them to strike up conversations in bars, cafes and other public places. If the person approached in this manner admitted an interest in stamps, the Soviet would hand over his packet, suggest that the potential target take it home to study and decide which exemplars he would like to have. This. of course, wouid open the door to another meeting at which stamps would indeed be &cussed, and possibly exchanged, but the bulk of the time would be spent by the Soviet officer in building rapport, ,ogaphic and employment information and la iing the groundwork for subsequent meetings.

    far meeting

    ..
    ilen

    above instructions have been faithfully fol-

    . . < I in every part of the world and actually


    ouved on. Soviets, as already shown, have or,,rd games such as the volley ball series played

    \'l~.nna, have sought out Americans to give uage lessons to themselves or their wives and taken to frequenting bowling alleys and even nrln guard quarters abroad. Grigoriy Iosifovich I~arov, GRU officer recently in Rabat, spent a a I part of his time on the beach looking for tlrnn military personnel with whom he could

    The GRU showed considerable ingenuity in staging an incident in Brussels in 1988 which was intended to bring one of their officers into contact with an American female employee of the M U G Mission. Returning home one day, the American woman found a Soviet female, apparently ill, leaning against the wall outside her door. Her agitated male companion, Vladimir I. Cheretun who posed as Aeroflot representative in Belgium, asked if he could bring his wife into the American home to rest. Once inside, the Soviet female (never identified) made a rapid recovery while Cheretun attempted to ingratiate himself with the American woman. He made a second-and unsuccessful-attempt at cultivation a few months later by approaching the American on the street. Cheretun was apprehended by Belgian authorities in 1967 and forced to leave the country because of his intelligence activities.

    CONFIDENTIAL

    55

    CONFIUCNI 1 . u

    VI. CO
    The efforts of Soviet Intelligence to obtain secret information through recruitment of Americans and abroad are, as this penetration 01 U.S. installatio~ls study has shown, world-wide in scope, massive in proportions, tenacious and persistent, and often highly imaginative. KGB and CRU targets are. varied and include privute as well as official Americans. But the most aggressive operational activity is directed against junior employees of diplomatic and other official establisllments and against enlisted personnel atf the military services. Priority is given nd to code a! cornmunil:ations personnel, Marine guards, file clerks and 1iecretaries, a broad grouping which 'the Soviet reg;ard as particularly vulner. . . able and relatively easy to approach The KCB doctrinal concept of the average Ameri can, his psychological makeup, matelialistic natun and primary interest in money and how to. makl .. more of it, which this study has documenteo, IS a challenging one and may seem grossly distorted to most readers. Nevertheless, it has obviously proven to be true in many individual cases in which the Soviets have made successful and highly rewarding recruitments. As a sweeping generalization, the: concept ha: i been proven in error by many Soviet recmitmerit failures, even after careful assessnlent and preparation. The record shows that Americans as a grc)up are loyal to their country and have proven harder for the Soviets to IC cruit than any other nationality. However, thiis advantage is partially offset by the fact that th United States is "the main enemy" and the KG and CRU devote more time and effort to recrul!ment ope1.ations against Americans than nationals of any otller co~~niTy. There i!9 no reason to doubt the validity of the that it is easier to recruit hmeriSoviet rxp~erienw cans abrcbad than in the United States, nor of ths Soviet mew that the American we~earten& to v i have his guard down, to talk freely about himself, e to associa~ t without suspicion +ith foreignm. The 1 - . soviets take fuU advantaee of the off-duty freedom , of movement and assoc:iarion which A m e r i w have r abroad. They find it relatively e asy to establish direct personal contac% for cultivaltion and assess. ment; they also manit)date a variety of local nonSoviet agents and willing coUaaoratOrJ.

    I :

    . . . .

    Examples of many Soviet operational t9 -1 have been shown in this study. Sometimes tl are apparent, even obvious. But they are of subtle and indirect. Soviet methods of spotti assessment, cultivation and recmihnent are e . / x tremely varied and limited only by local opem tional resources and by the imagination of thr Soviet intelligence officer. The effectiveness d these methods is conditioned by the degree d American appreciation of Soviet intentions, understanding of Soviet techniques and a const alertness to any possible manifestations of eitl It is most important to remember that SOV in the West, as a general rule, are not permittto make unofficial, social contacts with American unless there are intelligence reasons for doing an Casual, seemingly non-contrived contact with 8 Soviet should be reported in all cases to approprialc security authorities. Abnormally inquisitive no tions on the part of non-Soviets, especially regard I ing biog;raphic information, private and official .o tivities, and the personal financial status of Ameh :ials can 06% and employees abroad should be notd :s ;~ and rep~orted. ~ e c .ity authoritie will frecP e possess, or are in a ]position to ot,tain, informa identifying Soviet i!ntelligence officeI-9 andI t agents amd are able tc provide applmpriate guiida

    CONFIDENTIAL

    56

    CONFIDENTIAL

    INDEX OF NAMES

    Aodreyev, Andray N i l r o l a ~ c h Balashov, Vitaliy Dmitriyevich .........................

    .........................
    ............

    hs

    to

    elf, he 1 om ,

    ve sh ss. on-

    e. / x em

    thr d d

    V tcan an h 8 alc no ard I


    . o

    eh

    otd

    Cheretuq Vladirnir I. ............ Drummond, Nelson C. -Eleanor1 . . . . . . . . . . . ............ Fateyev, Albert Geoagl, ............ Filatov, Robespier N. ........... Goncharov, Grigoriy Iosifovich Ilyintsev, Valentin Ivanovich ..... Johnson, Robert L ............... . Korotkikb, Nikolay Ckqiyevich . ............. a Kuimov, Leonid Gavrilovich ............................... 50 Lomakiu, Pave1 Ivanovicb ................................ 3 Losev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich ........................... 17 'Madame X ........................................... 33.37, Matzdorff, Emst ..... Mintkenbaugh, James 1 MozeS Konstanti~~ . . Muratov, Yevgeni, :eo Ogorodnikov, Annroliy ..................... Prokhorov, Yevgeniy Mikhayhvich ........... Putyatov, Vladimir T . ........... Ranov, Nikolay Ivanov ........... Roganov, Aleksandr I. .................................. Runge, Yevgeniy Yevgenyevich . . . .......... Sakharovskiy, hleksahdr Mikhaylov Savelev, Mikhail Stepanovich ..... Scarbeck, Irwin .................. Semikov, .Oleg Aleksandrovich ............................. -* Shchukin, Mikhail. ............... 11 Shelepin, Aleksandr Nikohyevich . .. 7 Sorokin, Vadirn Vladimirovich . . . . 15 Stein, George ........................................ 18,19,2C szabo, Laszlo ................... ............. 4 IJltan, Donald ................... ............. 9,lo,11 Volotskov, Viktor I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 17 Vyrodov, Ivan Yakovlavlch ....... ............. 15 Wennerstroem, Stig .............. ............. 32.33.34 %ostrovtsev, Yevgeniy Aleltseyevicl Yrlenin, Andrey Nikohyevid .... yorln, Vderian Aleksandrovich . . .

    Beck, Jd . . . . . . . . ..

    ............

    ..

    .. ,

    ..

    ..

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